Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective
June 2011Sophia 50(2):253-263
DOI: 10.1007/s11841-011-0248-2
Authors:
Padmasiri de Silva
21.81Monash University (Australia)
Download full-text PDF
Read full-text
Citations (2)
References (19)
Abstract
The work ‘Thinking and Feeling’ edited by Robert C. Solomon may be considered as a landmark in the history of the philosophy of the emotions. The work also has assembled together some of the best minds in the Anglo American Traditions. The central focus in this work is to mediate between the physiological arousal theories of emotions and the cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. My article is an attempt to mediate from my Asian background and in specific terms using the Buddhist perspectives on emotion studies, to find answers, a subject on which I have worked over several decades. The Buddha has discouraged people in attempting to find ultimate answers to the body- mind relationships, but use pragmatic and practical perspectives for a two way interactionism. Thus, in the Buddhist analysis the mental and the cognitive, as well as bodily and the physiological are recognised, thus giving room for a holistic understanding of emotions concepts. In fact, Buddhism expects the body, feelings, perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations as facets of emotion concepts. The second point is the domination of the metaphor of reasons as the charioteer in managing unruly emotions in the West. But Buddhism introduces the factor of ‘mindfulness’ as an important ally in the management of emotions. My personal work in therapy and counselling has helped me to explore new dimensions for managing emotions through mindfulness practice. KeywordsEmotions–Body mind relationships–Phisiological arousal theories–Cognative appraisal theories–Mindfulness
----
THINKING AND FEELING: THE WISE MANAGEMENT
OF EMOTIONS IN EARLY BUDDHISM
Prelude
During the last two decades there has been a significant revival in emotion studies due to new developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology and medicine. As a result of these developments, an important thesis emerged in cognitive science that understanding emotions is central to understanding intelligent systems. Thus it became necessary to locate emotions within the interacting systems of cognition, motivation and emotion. In our normal access to the sensory world, we see things as red, round, tall, dense and so on. We identify sensory stimuli as apples, trees, and rivers. But if our sensory stimulus is an unexpected and disturbing one- that something we see is a snake, the meaning of the sensory stimulus is strongly affective- fear. The difference between seeing red and “seeing fear” is important. In fact though conscious thoughts and conscious feelings appear to be similar, they are produced by different subsystems, and emotional feelings involve more subsystems than thought. It was one of the discoveries of the neurologist Joseph Ledoux, that the emotional meaning of a stimulus may be appraised by the brain, before the perceptual systems have fully processed the stimulus. Our emotions like that of fear of the snake occurs with tremendous speed that the appraisal we make- the snake is poisonous and it is a danger- occurs in a quick and automatic manner. This gives us some insight in to emotions like anger and lust, which may invade our thoughts and why it is “difficult to control our emotions”.
Imagine walking in the woods. A crackling sound occurs. It goes straight to the amygdala through the thalamic pathways. The sound also goes from the thalamus to the cortex, which recognizes the sound to be a dry wig that snapped under the weight of your boot, or that of a rattlesnake shaking its tail. By the time the cortex has figured this out, the amygdala is already starting to defend against the snake (Ledoux, 1998, )
This paper is concerned with the question why passions invade our thoughts and bodies and exploring Buddhist perspectives and methods for developing conscious control of these emotions. In his work, The Emotional Brain, Ledoux makes the following observation:
…the struggle between thought and emotion may ultimately be resolved, not simply by the dominance of the neocortical cognitions over the emotional system, but by a more harmonious integration of reason and passion in the brain, a development that will allow future humans to better know their true feelings and to use them more effectively in daily life (Ledoux, 1998, 20).
Many philosophers down the ages have raised the same question but given different answers. Spinoza the Spanish philosopher who spent a complete life devoted to the study of emotions observes: “The impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions I call bondage, for a man who is under their control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, although he sees the better before him” (Spinoza, 1963, 187). Ledoux gives an additional reason for the difficulty in managing emotions, which is of great interest from a Buddhist perspective. He says that the real predicament is that both our cognitions and emotions seem to operate unconsciously (Ledoux, 1998, 21). We can make sense of this process by referring to the analysis of subliminal propensities (anusaya) as found in the Buddhist discourses. In the discussion on anger as recorded in the book Destructive Emotions, the Dalai Lama observes: “In Buddhist psychology, there is an understanding that many of the emotions need not necessarily be manifest. In fact, the emotions themselves may be felt or experienced, but they are also present in the form of habitual propensities that remain unconscious, or dormant, until they are catalyzed” (Goleman, 2003, 141). These tendencies lie dormant and may be excited by suitable stimuli (pariyutthana) and because of their strong tenacity they provide the base for the emergence of greed, anger and conceit.
The arousal of these tendencies is due to stimuli in the sensory field, thoughts or signals from the body. These stimuli generate pleasant, unpleasant feelings or neutral feelings. Pleasant feeling rouse subliminal tendency for lust and greed (raganusaya) and painful feelings rouse the subliminal tendencies for anger and hatred (patighanusaya). The arousal and persistence of this motivational cycle is also nourished by the roots of greed, hatred and delusion, which also make them unwholesome; morally wholesome states may have as their base generosity, compassion and wisdom. Feelings (vedana) also condition the emergence of three forms of craving: craving for sense gratification, craving for egoistic pursuits and the craving for self-annihilation (See, de Silva, 2000, 35-79). In Buddhist psychology, there is a close linkage of cognition, emotion and motivation.
“Yet, feeling by itself, in its primary state, is quite neutral when it registers the impact of an object as pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. Only when emotional or volitional additions are admitted, will there arise a desire and love, aversion and hate, anxiety, fear and distorting views. Be that need not be so. These admixtures are not inseparable parts of the respective feelings. In fact, many of the weaker impressions we receive during the day stop at the mere registering of a very faint and brief feeling, without any further emotional reaction”(Nyanaponika, 1983, 2). Nyanaponika Maha Thero concludes that this the reason why the contemplation on feelings is a key factor in the path to liberation. By directing bare attention on feelings, they will be divested of their emotional components and of their egocentric reference.
Body and Mind as Theatres of Emotion
Our feelings may often be observed in relation to the body. As both the body and mind may be considered as theatres of emotion. If we loose touch with the body, there may be blockages of communication between the psyche and soma and thus leaving the way for conditions like alexythymia. As Joyce McDougall says in her work, Theatres of the Mind (McDougal, 1986, 177), Affects are one of the most privileged links between psyche and soma. Alexythymia is a condition where people loose contact with their emotions and also the skill of discriminating between different emotions. Sensations occur in the body at all times. They may be cold and heat, heaviness and lightness, pressure and vibration. They may take place as localized
bodily sensations like a localized pain in the foot, a lump in the throat and a general bodily condition like feeling tired or refreshed. If we show preferences or negative reactions they emerge as hedonic tones which may be painful, pleasurable or neutral.
If a person feels sleepy, tired, feverish or refreshed that would be a general bodily condition, which again may be associated with any of the hedonic tones. We may compare these with attitudinal feeling which are emotional (related to the body) like feeling distressed, depressed .The following passage from the discourses of the Buddha describe very well the attitudes of a person to his body. This passage refers to those who are under the spell of the craving for self-annihilation:
“those worthy recluses and brahmanas who lay down the cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of the essential being, these, afraid of their own body, loathing their own body, simply keep running and circling round their own body” (MIII, 232-3). These attitudes towards the body are deeply emotional.
Once we make these finer distinctions in the way we speak about feelings, the next important point is that emotions have very significant physiological correlates in the body, and this is more true of emotions like anger, fear and sadness which are more closely linked to the physiology of the body and the neurology of the brain. Paul Griffiths who has written a well known work on the domination of the physiologically oriented emotions in humans or what he calls the “affect programme”, accepts that there are higher cognitive emotions like guilt, envy and jealousy which are not governed by affect programmes (Griffith,1997, 100). If we go to Buddhist texts it is quite clearly mentioned that “thoughts are translated in to sensations of the body” (sankappavitakka vedanasasamosaran, A IV 385).
What is important is to keep in mind that physiological arousal or bodily feeling is an important ingredient of emotions. In fact William James classic statement on the subject is worth quoting: “if we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind….and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains” (James, 1984, 131). But as Gerald Myers (1987, 240) and Robert M.Gordon (1987, 92) have pointed out James appear to have been careless in formulating his theory or he may have thought that the sound of paradox (we cry because we are sad) is more effective in communicating his ideas. There are good examples that fit in to what is implied by James’s theory: for example the scared to death feeling we have when we suddenly miss a step in a long winding staircase. But to move from the position that the emotional quality of consciousness is caused by bodily feelings, to- our emotions are cause by bodily symptoms- is a long road indeed.
Emotions have a cold aspect and a hot aspect. The cold aspect consists of cognitive appraisals, how we see the world, the hot aspect is the arousal aspect. Desires and craving may take a cold aspect of cool calculation or a hot impulsive form. As the etymology of the word “emotion” embodies the notion of momentum, hot desires play a crucial role in the building- up of emotions. In Pali, there are three important terms for the mind: mano representing rational thinking, vinnana, sensory perception and citta thought under the influence of affects (Karunaratne, 1995, 2). Mind as citta is said to be throbbing, trembling and wavering and is compared to a fish that is taken out of water and placed on a dry land (Dh.V33). The mind is also described as fickle, flighty and wavering. The Middle Length Sayings gives a long list of sixteen states which excite and defile the mind. The term defilement (kilesa) brings out the moral and spiritual features of Buddhist psychological concepts. Covetousness, ill will, anger, enmity, revenge, contempt, jealousy, envy-avarice, deception, fraud, obstinacy, presumption, conceit, arrogance, vanity and indolence (MI, sutta 7).
When the mind is developed through the practice of the path of morality, concentration and wisdom, it is supposed to radiate its natural luster, which has been submerged by defilements. The liberated one is completely fee of these defilements and one may say has undergone a change of body chemistry. “An arahant experiences both physical and mental bliss (so kayasdukham pi cetasukham pi patisamvedeti) as all tensions (daratha), torments (santapa), and fevers (parilaha) have been completely eliminated for good” (L.de Silva, 1996, 6). What is important in this context is that, in the way bodily states and emotional experience have a close link the emergence of negative emotions, in the positive emotions associated with a liberated monk, we see again the link of physiology and emotions. It is said that in the liberated monk, the whole body is permeated with joy and bliss (Tgh, 274).
In the final analysis, what Buddhism offers is a contemplative perspective on feeling, and the pleasurable, painful and neutral feelings are described as “impermanent, compounded, dependently arisen, liable to destruction, to evanescence, to fading away, to cessation”.
The Domination of a Metaphor
In the way that Ledoux calls for a harmonious relationship between reason and passion, western philosophy over the years saw the problem relating to the bondage of passions in terms one dominating metaphor first used by Plato: reason as the charioteer and passions as the unruly horses. Spinoza in fact develops a ratiocentric model where he attempts a geometry of passions, working out the thought components for each passion (Spinoza, 1963). David Hume turned the metaphor upside down saying that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. It is here that Buddhism replaces this dualism by replacing it with a three factor analysis: passions, reason and mindfulness. We often attempt to over-intellectualize our attempts to deal with the chaos of passions around our lives. It is our contention in this paper that the battle between our logical perceptions and emotions found in the western philosophical tradition might be taken to a more effective faculty- the practice of mindfulness. As Ajahn Sumedho says, “But the emotional nature is not rational. It’s a feeling nature, it is not going to go along with what is reasonable, logical, sensible” (Sumedho, 1998). He observes that if we have unkind feelings towards someone we develop metta towards the person, not being judgmental and having the patience to be with that feeling.
Paul Ekman in his recent book, Emotions Revealed (Ekman, 2003) presents a perspective that is very much open to the use of mindfulness practice during different stages of the emergence and expression of a negative emotion like anger. He says that if we develop the habit of being attentive or in Buddhist terminology develop mindfulness practice, we also develop the skill to observe ourselves during an emotional episode, ideally before more than a few seconds have passed. We can also recognize when we are emotional and consider whether our appraisal of the situation is justified and re-evaluate our appraisal. Most emotions involve judgments. In fact, the germinal state of what develops with great sped as an emotion is found in pleasurable, painful or neutral feelings (vedana). Then with the addition of thought, appraisals, desires and the excitement of our deeprooted tendencies towards attachment, aversion and conceit, including social and cultural filters, it would be clear that what appears as an emotion is a constructions. The important point is that we can “put our breaks” at any point on the development of this sequence from primary affect in to a full emotion. As we develop the skill of being attentive we are able to moderate our emotional behaviour, from facial expressions to speech and action. In fact one of the groundbreaking discoveries in brain science during recent times is the concept of the plasticity of the brain emerging out of the research of Richard Davidson. The pats of the brain like the frontal lobes, amygdale and the hypocampus are parts of the brain affected by emotional experiences but meditative experience is able to bring out positive changes in the brain (See, Goleman, 2002, 179-2004).
It is very encouraging to see that both in the area of scientific research and a number of therapeutic orientations in the west, there are clear indications of a journey beyond the Platonic metaphor of reason the charioteer and passions the unruly horses. These extensions to a therapy based on mindfulness practice may be seen in a number of apparently competing therapies. Jon Kabat-Zinn’s work on mindfulness meditation for pain control, both physical and emotional pain, has been a true breakthrough in the area of behavioural medicine: “Mindfulness allows us to see more clearly into the nature of our pain. Sometimes it helps us to cut through confusion, hurt feelings, and emotional turmoil caused perhaps by misperceptions or exaggerations and our desire that things be in a certain way” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 321). Also the focus on stimulus control, recognizing the “spark before the flame” before you attempt damage control, avoiding certain situations, de-conditioning, control of unwanted intrusive cognitions, modification of undesirable habits and such techniques of behaviour modification, using Buddhist resources have been tested over several years by Padmal de Silva (Padmal de Silva, 1996, 217-31). The recent work, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression by Segal, Williams and Teesdale is another landmark in the development of Buddhist resources for therapy (Segal, Williams and Teasdale, 2002). Eric From’s posthumous publication, The Art of Listening and Mark Epstein’s Thought Without a Thinker present the therapeutic value of mindfulness from yet another direction. It is for these reasons that we mentioned that the western therapeutic traditions have gone far beyond Plato’s dominating metaphor of reason as the charioteer and the unruly horses as the passions.
However, there have been a few cracks and dents in the philosopher’s epistemological disdain for using therapeutic models for understanding emotions. John Cottingham in a recent study of reason and passion in the western philosophical tradition makes this observation: “It is only by giving up, in the first instance, our pretensions to rational control that we open the way for deeper, transformed, self-understanding”. He also says, “The first stage of this process of transformation is thus one of listening, rather than declaring, of waiting rather than controlling, of attending rather than commanding” (Cottingham, 1998 ). In making this statement, Cottingham is following the footsteps of one of the most insightful philosophers of our times, Iris Murdoch, who said, “I regard the (daily, hourly, minutely) attempted purification of consciousness as the central and fundamental arena of morality” (Murdoch, 1970). These reflections of Cottingham and Murdoch are important for developing a viable philosophical perspective in the west regarding the management of emotions. In fact, during recent times E.M.Adams a philosopher was baffled by Goleman’s attempt to integrate the concept of mindfulness practice to the concept of emotional intelligence (see, de Silva, 2002, 188-93). In suspending the rational, analytic and dissecting mind for a while, we make room for listening with the right brain. In using the art of quiet listening to be aware of the emotional inroads of our own minds, we develop diminishing reactivity to raw sensory events, do not make automatic identifications with our reactions, develop openness, impartiality and flexibility (Epstein, 1995, 110-128). Lastly, the ground is prepared for “wise seeing”, a theme that we will pick up when we explore emotions in Buddhism, as a contemplative tradition.
It must be mentioned that the Buddha did use analytical, critical and even dialectical reasoning in his debates with philosophers. Also in the discourses to householders often he appealed to their reason but unless backed by a virtuous life and the practice of mindfulness, people will lack the stability, trust and confidence to deal with the chaos of their emotional lives. He also advocated the use of positive emotions as antidotes. In the Vitakkasanthana sutta (Discourse on the forms of thought, MI, Sutta 20), he mentions five methods for dealing with unwholesome thoughts which are best used by the method of mindfulness or to some extent through the use of rational discourse. Unwholesome thoughts may be eliminated by using antidotes, looking at the peril of unwholesome thoughts, by a process of let go (asati amanasikara), by looking at the consequences and lastly by will power. In talking to the householders about understanding the consequences of anger the Buddha makes the following points: When a person is overwhelmed by anger and wrath he earns a bad reputation, loses his friends and his relations will shun him; anger clouds the mind and an angry person looses the skill to look at a issue in an impartial manner; after venting his anger on some one he may be scared of revenge and even be struck by remorse; once anger is aroused one is able to commit the worst of crimes; anger affects a person’s health and breakdown of family and leads to failure in his profession; patience, forgiveness and understanding are positive virtues.
Healing the Chasm Between Cognitive Theories
and Arousal Theories of Emotion
Again if we make a glance through contemporary theories of emotion in philosophy and even psychology to some extent, they do not display the flexibility and the pragmatism found in the therapeutic traditions. The release of the recent book, Thinking and Feeling edited by Robert C.Solomon ( Solomon, 2004) brings the frontier lines of the above- mentioned debate up to date. John Deigh who has written the first chapter to this volume presents two conflicting programmes in psychology, one emerging from William James and the other from Sigmund Freud. He says, “Jame’s ideas are the sources of the view that one can fruitfully study emotions by studying the neurophysiological processes that occur with experience of them. He identified them with feelings.” (Deigh, 2004, 25). He also says, “Though Freud often described emotions as flows of nervous energy, his view of them as transmitters of meaning and purpose was nonetheless implicit in his notion of an unconscious mind and the way he used this notion to make sense of feelings, behaviour, and physiological maladies that seems otherwise inexplicable” ( Deigh, 2004, 25). He concludes his paper by saying that “The main problem for the study of emotions is how to develop a theory that reconciles these two facts”.
If we make a quick glance through the different therapeutic approaches in the west mentioned above, that have integrated Buddhist techniques of mindfulness practice to their routine agenda and their writings, it is to be seen that the impending chasm between the rival programmes have been, to some extent healed. In fact, in the discussion that follows, we bring number of points, which may help us to develop a more flexible and holistic approach to bring the rival programmes together. This is of course a Buddhist perspective that we are developing, using resources in the discourses of the Buddha and Buddhist practice.
( 1) In the context of Buddhist theory and practice, there is a close linkage between the two questions, “What is an Emotion? ” and “How do we manage emotions?” It appears to be a strange point that Buddhist text do not have a word for emotions. This puzzle receives the attention of the discussants in the dialogue on destructive emotions (Goleman, 2003, 158-159). It is mentioned in this discussion that it is difficult to find a Tibetan or Sanskrit word for “emotion”. Let us first look at the etymology of the term emotion. The term is derived from Latin, e+movere, which meant to move from place to place. It was also used for agitation, which meaning has been popularly associated with the word. As James Averill points out, the word passion was used for approximately two thousand years, and as the derivation from Greek pathos and Latin pati (to suffer) convey, emotions came to be associated with passivity (Averill, 1980, 380). In ordinary discourse we speak of being “gripped” and “torn” by emotion. Not only is this experience of passivity an illusion, as Averill points out, if you realize that this passivity is an illusion, this helps us to widen the area of self-awareness and not abjure responsibility for the consequences of emotions. As we have pointed out in an early study elsewhere, the notion of intention, intentionality (aboutness), responsibility and the possibility of moral criticism clearly indicate that emotions cannot be reduced to passive feelings (de Silva, 1995). They also contain a great deal of complexity. If we locate emotions like jealousy, grief, pride and guilt in the setting of a narrative (see, Goldie, 2000, Nussbaum, 2002) their rich complexity is evident. In Buddhism, a ‘significant action’ on which praise or blame can be bestowed is an action done with an intention (cetana). Even if an action is done automatically and impulsively or on the contrary as deliberate action, both these facets contain ‘intentions’ and are subject to moral criticism. There are other important features like the appropriateness, consequences, the manner in which it is done and the grades and types of consciousness that generate the action. When we look at the profile of an emotion in Buddhism the importance this analysis with a focus on intention may be evident. (Averill, 1980, 380).
An emotion in the context of Buddhism is a construction, an interactive complex or a construct emerging within a causal network. The best way to understand this complex is to first look at the five aggregates (khanda), which go to make up what we conventionally refer to as a person. Bhikkhu Bodhi says that as a meditator’s mindfulness becomes sharper and clearer, “the meditator learns to distinguish the five aggregates: matter or physical form (rupa); feeling (vedana) the affective tone of experience, either pleasant, painful or neutral; perception (sanna), the factor responsible for noting, distinguishing and recognition; volitional (sankhara), the intentional aspect of mental activity; and consciousness (vinnana), the basic awareness operating through the senses “ (Bodhi,1999, 27). The meditator discerns the marks of impermanence, suffering and non-self as characteristics of the aggregates. Thus within the five aggregates we discern the three dimensions of the cognitive, affective and conative or volitional facets of human consciousness. Now it is necessary to see the role of vedana in the construction of an emotion like anger or fear. Nyanaponika Thera clearly says in a comprehensive study of the contemplation of feeling as found in the vedana-samyutta, “It should be first made clear that, in Buddhist psychology, ‘feeling’ (Pali:vedana) is the bare sensation noted as pleasant, unpleasant (painful) and neutral (indifferent). Hence it should not be confused with emotion which, though arising from the basic feeling, adds to it likes or dislikes of varying intensity, as well as other thought processes” (Nyanaponika, 1983, 7). In more detail, it may be said that emotions emerge as a joint product of perceptions, feelings, desires, beliefs, appraisals and physiological arousal. Cultural and social filters have an impact on the experience of emotions and most of the emotions are related to interpersonal interaction. Out of the five factors cited above under the aggregates, the concept of sankhara provides a framework for placing the operative factors together.
This point is well confirmed by Nyanaponika who says “The specific factors operative in emotion belong to the aggregate of formations (sankhara-kkhanda). Feeling is one of the four mental aggregates which arise, inseparably, in all states of consciousness; the other three are perception, mental formations, and consciousness” (Nyanaponika, 1983, 7).
It must be mentioned that the term emotion covers a very broad range of emotions and they are not all alike. Some of the conflicting theories of emotions are often cast on certain selected emotions. In general, it is necessary to use a very holistic concept of emotions and contextualise discussions about emotions. In the Buddhist analysis of emotions weightage to both cognitive factors and physiological arousal is given.
(2) There is another reason why Buddhism facilitates the development of a holistic theory of emotions. This is the Buddhist perspective on the mind-body relationship. (i) The Buddha discourages people to push to the utter logical limits and engage in metaphysical wrangles about the relationship between the mind and the body, as in context of this sort, the Buddha has left it as an undetermined question. (ii) But he uses a contextual approach to refer to he mind body relationship. In accepting a reciprocal relationship between the mind and body, the Buddha did not accept any dualism or monism. There is also no place for reductive theories like epiphenomenalism. The body-mind relationship is compared to two bundles of reeds, one supporting the other (S II, 114). (iii). In the context of meditation, the Buddha adopts an anti-ontologising perspective, and considers the terms, ‘mind’ and ‘body’ as designations. And thus the phenomenal nature of experience is seen. This is the experiential context. (iv) In certain contexts the body is considered as a trap that obstructs liberation and mindfulness of the body helps us to nip passions at the bud. (v) When the Buddha discourages extreme asceticism and its mattered hair and starvation, he is advocating mind-body health, composure and sensibility of the body.
Thus in accepting that there can be feedback mechanisms by which the body can affect the mind and the mind can affect the body, Buddhism is able to bridge the chasm between cognitive theories of emotions and arousal theories of emotions.
We have already cited the convergence of different (or even competing) therapeutic approaches which use mindfulness practice; the textual basis for a holistic concept of an emotion and lastly the Buddhist contextual approach to the mind-body issue. The Buddha was also critical of strong attachment to fixed views and even compared the dhamma to a raft that is used for crossing a river. It is a perspective that helps practice. Lastly, the meditation practices as well as the practice of morality advocated by the Buddha helps the practitioner to deal with different components of negative emotions. The following passage describes the dynamic setting for the emergence of emotions:
Thus it is Ananda, craving comes into being because of feeling, pursuit because of craving, gain because of pursuit, decision because of gain, desire and passion (chandaraga) because of decision, tenacity because of desire and passion, possession because of tenacity, avarice because of possession, watch and ward because of avarice, and many a bad and wicked state of things arising from keeping watch and ward over possessions” (Gradual Sayings, II, 58).
(3) In the above section on “The domination of a Metaphor”, we have shown very clearly how at the level of the applications of therapy using mindfulness techniques, different therapeutic orientations have come together. They steer clear through the debate on cognitive and arousal theories of emotions. If we look at the structure of the Buddhist charter for meditation, the satipatthana, the four foundations for mindfulness practice cover different facets that go to make an emotion: the body (kaya), feelings (vedana), states of the mind (citta) and the psycho-physical complex (dharma). In fact states of mind are complex states emerging out of feeling like fear, doubt, restlessness and apathy. The fourth section has number of entries like the five hindrances and the seven factors of enlightenment. But the most central is the inclusion of the attachment to the psychophysical complex or the idea of the self. The idea of the self plays a central role in the inter-play of emotions (see, de Silva, 1994, 297-317).
We shall conclude this section with the Buddha’s advice to the monks not to debate about the efficacy of competing methods but practice what comes naturally to a person. On a certain day, when the Buddha was at the Jeta Grove, Venerable Sariputta asked a question about three types of practitioners seeking liberation from suffering:
(i) One whose faculty of faith (saddha) is developed ; (ii) one whose skill in the concentration on the body is developed; (iii) One whose faculty of insight was developed. Venerable Savittha tended to think that the first type of monk would reach the goal first, Venerable Kotthita backed the second type and Venerable Sariputta thought that the surest was the third. In my own attempt to make this issue intelligible, I thought it looked like some one asking me, who will get to the wining post first? The athlete who has lots of stamina, the one who has very good harmony of speed and movement and a third who has over the years collected the practical insights of doing the half mile. The following is the Buddha’s analysis:
i. It may be that the person who is released by faith is on the path to be an arahant, that the one who has testified to the truth with the body is a once-returner or a non-returner, and the one who has won view through insight is also a once returner or non-returner.
ii.It may be that the person who has testified to the truth with the body is on the path to be an arahant, that the other two are once-returners or non-returners.
iii. It may again be that the person who has gained a view through insight is on the path to be an arahant, and the other two are once-returners or non-returners.
(4) Lastly, the philosophy of William James has accepted the twin concepts of the importance of attention and will and this falls in line with the Buddha’s critique of theories of determinism and indeterminism. A recent reference to the importance of these concepts in James presents the point in a very effective manner: “Given James’s strong philosophical bent, it’s hardly surprising these twin concepts, attention and will, were of such tremendous importance to him. He was well aware, especially given his given his goal of placing psychology squarely within natural science, that thickets of controversy awaited any one willing to tackle the question of free will. But on the key point of the efficacy of attention, and its relation to will, James held fast to his belief- one he suspected could not be proved conclusively on scientific grounds, but to one which he clung tenaciously on ethical grounds—that the effort to focus attention is an active, primary causal force, and not solely the properties of a stimulus that acts on a passive brain (Schwartz and Begley, 2002, 326; Also see, James, 1992, 272, 278). In Psychology A Brief Course, James develops the point mentioned earlier, whole drama of voluntary life hinges on the amount of attention which rival motor ideas may receive (James, 1992).
In the light of all these points, Buddhism has resources to heal the chasm between cognitive theories and arousal theories of emotion.
PART II
Emotions in a Contemplative Tradition
In the first part of this paper, we have focused the attention of the readers on the claim that Buddhist meditation practice and theory have created a new perspective in looking at emotions and the wise management of emotions in the west. We have specially looked at the veritable revolution created in western therapeutic orientations by the integration of mindfulness practice and also directed attention on the interface between recent developments in cognitive science and neuroscience against the background of Buddhist philosophy of mind.
But there is an important issue that we need to raise regarding the difference between Buddhism as a contemplative tradition directed towards the liberation from suffering, and Buddhism as a form of therapy. In a sense, the Buddha was the physician par excellence and the fourfold noble truths offer analogies to the diagnosis and remedial action for a disease in medicine. But there have been words of caution, “we must be able to distinguish the two and know how and when to use each one” (Finister, 2004, 50). Coltart observes, “there are many more extensive and subtle ways in which they flow in and out of each other, and are mutually reinforcing and clarifying” (Coltart, 2004, 44). Mark Epstein’s piece of writing entitled, “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” is an excellent product of the interaction between Buddhism and therapy (Epstein, 1995, 159-222).
One way of developing a new dialogue between Buddhism as a philosophy of liberation and Buddhism as a therapy is to develop interest in the diaries and notes of contemplatives – personal narratives reminiscent of William James’s Variety of Religious Experience. Keith Oatley and Maja Djikic have presented us a fascinating account of this work with a focus on emotions and identity (Oatley and Djikic, 2002, 97-116. It is remarkable that during one lifetime, James was able to enter the world of emotions, first through the sensations of the body and then through the variety of religious experience. They conclude the article by saying that the main hypothesis of James in this work is that “Identity is inescapably emotional. Each of us has a center, perhaps of anxiety, perhaps of anger, perhaps (as in James’s example of saintliness) of love of God or human kind” (Oatley and Djikic, 2002,113). The reason why the center is emotional is that emotions are our principal motivators. Emotion can also succeed each other as the plot of a story. Oatley and Djikic observes in the concluding section that though the ideas of saintliness discussed by James may be somewhat anachronistic, the question how people born with a high proclivity towards self-interest might be touched by the fate of others is a theme for our times. Our study of grief and compassion that follows is a contribution in this direction on emotions and identity.
The claim that emotions have an epistemic, cognitive and hermeneutic role in directing us to the truths of the human condition, like impermanence, suffering and non-self is an important point for reflection. There has been a misunderstanding that
Buddhism advocates the “cutting off of the passions” and that there has been a detachment from the affective side of life. The need to open us to inner experience, our recurring thought patterns and our somatic expressions without denial, closure and repression takes a central place in Buddhism. In the first sermon, Setting the wheel in Motion, the Buddha is not asking us to get rid of suffering but to make it a subject for reflection and contemplation. It is an awakening to the truth and not a validation of the first noble truth that is necessary. By opening ourselves to our anger, fear and boredom, we transform them in to subjects for contemplation (dhammanupassana).
Emotions have important epistemic qualities in the Buddhist context. Emotions direct our attention to significant events in the outer world and it is possible to convert a challenging experience like loss of some one dear and near to us, into an experience of insight. Such insights help us to free from the entrapment of distorting cognitive structures (ditthi). Buddhist contemplative reflections help us to reduce the verbal –analytic activities of the left brain and develop the non-verbal, creative and holistic stances of the right brain.
We are in the process of narrating a story about grief with a Buddhist background. During recent times, the release of Martha Nussbaum’s work on emotions as “upheavals of thought” against the background of the immense grief triggered by her mother’s death, has brought the theme of grief to the center of philosophical reflections. She first directs our attention to the urgency and heat of emotions, their tendency to take over the personality, their connection with important attachments and the person’s sense of passivity before them and their adversarial reaction to rationality ( Nussbaum, 2001, 22). She also says that in spite of these features, emotions are suffused with intelligence and discernment, and emotions like grief can be a source of deep awareness and understanding. It is an excellent contribution to contemporary emotion studies. While we share these thoughts, we bring a new dimension for understanding the emotion of grief from the contemplative dimensions of Buddhism, the Buddhist meditative life and its social ethic. We also do not attempt to develop a theory of emotions as she does, in developing a theory of emotions as appraisals of value, as our perspective on a holistic conception of emotions has already been presented. We are also grateful to Robert C.Solomon for granting permission to refer to his recent paper on grief, to be released soon, by the Oxford University Press (Solomon, 2004). We have found his reference to the reflective quality of grief and its dedicatory quality, striking a kindred note with our own reflections on grief. But here again we follow our own intuitions. It is time that philosophers and psychologists looked more closely at emotion profiles, especially grief and sadness, covetousness and greed, boredom and slothfulness, restlessness and worry, jealousy and conceit. This is one way of diffusing the battle lines on theory.
