Showing posts with label Wakamatsu Eisuke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wakamatsu Eisuke. Show all posts

2022/05/05

Wakamatsu on Izutsu's "Consciousness" and "Essence" 와카마츠 에이스케

Wakamatsu Eisuke 와카마츠 에이스케

Toshihiko Izutsu and the Philosophy of Word: In Search of the Spiritual Orient  

【목차】 
머리말 
제1장 『신비 철학』――시인 철학자의 탄생 
제2장 이슬람과의 邂逅 
제3장 러시아, 밤의 영성 
제4장 한 동시대인과 선지자 전
제5장 카톨리시즘
제6장 말과 코토바 
제7장 천계의 번역자 
제8장 엘라노스—그분에서의 대화 
제9장 <의식과 본질>
제10징 예지의 철학


Ch 9

Wakamatsu on 

Izutsu's "Consciousness" and "Essence"


sense Izutsu's audacity in tracing back the unbroken history of Western
philosophy to its starting point and attempting to break through
"synchronically" to that point in time.

Insofar as it grapples with problems not just in the present but sub
specie deternitatis, synchronic activity is never complete. As Izutsu him-
self stated in the preface to Ishiki to honshitsu, what he had undertaken
was only a "prolegomenon"; he understood from the outset that it would
be impossible to bring it to a successful conclusion.* 

What Izutsu wrote
may only have been a prolegomenon, but, as we frequently discover in
this outstanding work, it clearly states the basic issues.

"Consciousness" and "Essence"

In "Ishiki to honshitsu," the properties of the words "consciousness"
and "essence" themselves are different from the way we normally use
them. 

According to Izutsu, "consciousness" is inherently "ecstatic," a
comment he made in reference to a statement by Sartre in "Une idée
fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: l'intentionnalite"
(1939; "A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Philosophy: Intentionality,'
2010). Izutsu never lost sight of the dictum that "consciousness is con-
sciousness of something.
* In the inseparability of ontology and theories of consciousness, Izutsu sees the contemporaneity and traditionalism of Sartre.

Datsuji (BA), a compound of characters that literally means "out
of oneself," is a key term for understanding "Ishiki to honshitsu." 
But if a reader were to keep on reading with only a superficial grasp of what
Izutsu means by "consciousness" and "essence," s/he will completely
lose the drift of Izutsu's argument when it begins to move dynamically.

"Consciousness," he writes, citing Sartre, is un glissement hors de soi,
"a sliding outside of itself."*? 
Awaiting "consciousness" on the outside is "essence": 
"consciousness" slides "outside of itself" toward "essence.

In this essay, neither "consciousness" nor "essence" is a static concept;
they both evolve "ecstatically."

Try looking up datsuji in a Japanese dictionary, and you won't find
it there. Although the first Japanese to use this word in a translation is
unknown, Shuzö Kuki used it at a very early date. 

We saw in Chapter Five that, inspired by Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927; Being and Time, 1962), he took note of ekstasis, the original meaning of datsuji, at quite an early date and developed it as part of his argument in his study of
time. After Propos sur le temps came out in France in 1928, he used
the espression datsuji in his essay "Keijijogakuteki jikan" (1931; Meta-
physical time), which was based on a lecture he gave on his return to
Japan.** Datsuji also appears in the first Japanese translation of Being
and Time, which was published in 1939.* and ever since then, it has
been accepted in Japanese philosophical circles as a technical term.
The role Kuki played in the development of Japanese philosophical
terminology and technical terms is worth noting. He was also the first
to use the expression jitsuzon (Jeff) for "existential."270

Izutsu began using the term datsuji regularly from the time of
Shimpi tetsugaku in 1949. It became a key word in that work along with
shinju (H *), which literally means "being filled with God," i.e. enthou-
siasmos. 
It is not certain, however, whether Izutsu used datsuji under
the influence of Heidegger. He was already reading Sartre by this time,
and his sense of datsuji seems nearer to Sartre's usage, i.e. as an expe-
rience in which language fails, which closely resembles the world of
Nausea. Sartre frequently deals with ek-stase in Being and Nothingness,
which Izutsu read after Naused. Being and Nothingness was written as
a response to Heidegger's Being and Time, and it was Kuki who made
Sartre aware of Heidegger's existence.

My aim in alluding to etymology here is not merely out of interest
in the associations connected with this word. The fact is that the philo-
sophical term datsuji term was born of, and fleshed out by, the "ecstatic
experiences of various thinkers and would become the impetus behind
the existential experiences of those who came after them. 

The words in the following sentences are Kuki's; they seem to describe what datsuji meant to him existentially.

 "Philosophy, I believe, is a primal understanding of existence in general." 
"We ought to feel surprise at the contingent fact itself that the real world exists. The abyss of some supersensible thing opens up there."* 

As we can see from these statements, the connection between Kuki and Izutsu goes beyond mere similarity.
In Shimpi tetsugaku, datsuji is acknowledged to be a translation of
the Greek word ekstasis. It signifies an existential experience in which
271

"the human self dies completely to its selfhood; the self is thoroughly
annihilated; the self is utterly destroyed until not even a single dust
mote of it remains."* If datsuji is "the annihilation of the relative self
as a sensible life principle." then shinja, which Izutsu annotates as
enthousiasmos, is "the occasion for a spiritual awakening of the abso-
lute self as a supersensible life principle" that accompanies eestasy
and occurs "immediately" with it.** Ekstasis is an instinctive breach-
ing of the restrictions of the phenomenal world such as self, time and
space, and an aspiration for the Other, eternity, a different dimension.
Enthousiasmos is the dispensation of Being, who reacts to it. There
is no interval between ekstasis and enthousiasmos. As Izutsu savs, the
experience of elstasis and enthousiasmos occurs on the same ontologi-
cal dimension as kensho (KLM), seeing one's true nature/self-awareness
in Buddhism, or to jan kuan l'ung (B*Fin), the enlightenment expe-
rience in Confucianism known as the "sudden breakthrough." Enthou-
siasmos, however, is not a special occurrence limited to mystics. Let
us, for convenience sake, call the one who does the filling up "God."
If enthousiasmos were an experience that occurs only under narrowly
prescribed conditions, it would fall under the vulgar definition of mys-
ticism, i.e. that the One who does the filling up only truly exists in a
chosen few. But "God" is omnipresent, or, rather, the Transcendent,
which is omnipresent, is "God." The way is open to all people.
If"consciousness" is "a sliding outside," "essence" is "a filling up.

The true nature of "essence" lies in giving fully and completely of
itself. It is the same as what the medieval Christian mustic Meister Eck-
hardt speaks of when he says that if one empties oneself and becomes
nothing, God will instantly fill that person up. If it were possible to
be truly "conscious" of "essence," it would be an experience of over-
flowing- even though we are profoundly incapable of recognizing this.
Likewise, "consciousness" always causes human beings to aspire to the
exact opposite of existential isolation.

What seems extremely important when reading "Ishiki to honshitsu'
is that Izutsu firmly roots, and develops the basis for, his speculations
in a sense of realism. He detested superficial views of mysticism. What
he asks of his readers is to observe in minute detail the commonsense
worldview that we experience every day and not to disavow it. 272 Rather, 
while leading his readers to the world's depths, he urges them to relurn
once again from this innermost region to the everyday world in which
we live. The following passage truly stales his intellectual attitude.
It is precisely in order to justify the coming into being of an
essence-free, articulated world that Buddhism sets forth the theory
of profitya-somutpada. But no matter how subtle this may be in
theor, in practice it is somehow not without its deficiencies. That is
because we have certain reactions to the things that we actually deal
with in the sensible world that cannot be explained br the theory of
pratitya-samutpada alone. 4

The meaning of the Buddhist theory of pratttva-samutpada (interdepen-
dent origination) is not the issue here. Where we ought to be looking
lies elsewhere. It is Izutsu's view that our starting point must never be
from theory; it is only through our "reactions" to the sensible world
that human beings can proceed to the depths of existence. He strongly
admonishes us against forgetting ordinary "emotional understandings
over specific ideologies or dogmas. Continning the previous sentence,
he writes, "Among the many schools of Mahayana Buddhism, it is
Zen, I believe, that in practice comes to grips with this issue head-on.
• Zen demands that each and every one of us confirms in practice
for ourselves that it is not an essence-initiated articulation of a solid
substance but an essence-free, Ruid, ontological articulation." Thie
point at which "each and every one of us confirms [this) in practice
for ourselves," Izutsu believes, is the starting point and also the goal of
ontological investigations.
All things are endowed with "essence" by "Being." the transcen-
dental Universal, and become "beings." What causes a cup to appear
before someone's eyes is the working of "Being," • but it is because that
person senses the "essence" of cup that s/he recognizes a "being" as a
cup. As we saw in the discussion of Nausea, "essence" is, as it were,
the covering that is indispensable for our understanding of "Being.
Rather than concealing something, it is the basic infrastructure that
makes human life what it is. Because "essences" exist. people are able
to recognize things, interact with other people and live their everyday
lives. "Essence" is the self-evident truth that "distinguishes a thing (a 
flower, for instance) from all other things and makes it what it indisput-
ably is."* Consequently, the same number of "essences" exist as there
are beings. Mountains, rivers, plants, flowers, valleys, lakes, oceans.
people-each has its own "essence." The world is partitioned off into
countless "essences." On the other hand. *essence" conforms to the
cultural framework within which it is generated; it is complexly inter-
twined with the multilayered consciousnesses of countless men and
women and precipitated out into history. A certain thing appears in
the sensible world as the result of the existential experience of a sage, a
mystic or a poet; it takes shape as art or philosophy or religion, etc., and
is passed on to other people.273

It is this unceasing activity of the human race that Toshihiko
Izutsu attempts to bring back to life in the present time through "syn-
chronic structuralization." This attempt is nothing less than laying the
groundwork for the self-manifestation of the Idea of Oriental spiritu-
ality, which has been dispersed among countless different cultures. It
resembles restoring a single book by bringing together scattered scraps
of paper. The "essence" that Izutsu is dealing with is not limited to
things; nor is it confined to visible, material existence. The principle
behind the generation of "essence" works the same way for invisible
concepts and spiritual realities. If it did not, "how could we explain
the overwhelming sense of reality in an esoteric Buddhist mandala,
which consists of images alone? Even the images that foat up in our
consciousness, Izutsu says, are "essences.

Although there have been many psychologists who have investi-
gated the reality of images, few have called them "essences" having
the same sense of reality as a single flower. If we regard the evil spirits
of mountains and rivers depicted in a mandala as nothing more than
symbols, Izutsu's study would probably make no sense. "It is, rather, the
things of what we call the real world that are merely shadow-like beings,
the shadows of shadows." he writes, referring to Suhrawardt's theory of
images. "The true weight of existence is in the 'metaphor.'* There
have been modern philosophers who treat images as real, but has there
ever been anyone like Izutsu who perceived them as "essences." the
ground of reality? In the view that the Tathagata and Bodhisattvas in
mandala are symbols and do not really exist, but are only "symbols."

CONSCIOUSNESS AND ESSENCE

Toshihiko Izutsu sees the embrittlement of the modern mind. A "sum-
bol., rather, is the passageway by which WORD manifests itself in the
phenomenal world. A "symbol" expressly indicates that behind it exists
an invisible something. It is the "metaphor" that is the reality, says
Izutsu. How is it possible to doubt the reality of Bodhisattvas? "They
materialize before our eyes and in the inner parts of ourselves. They
appear only to those who have eyes to see them."
After mandala, Izutsu deals with "archetypes. the world of images.
as part of his treatment of the reality of "essences."

" Though it is a study of archetypes, he does not discuss specific archetypes here such as what Jung calls anima, animus, the wise old man or the Great Mother.
Instead, the context in which Izutsu treats this technical term is the !
Ching. He sees that the process by which WORD expands itself and
gives birth to meaning is graphically found in the eight divination signs
of the I Ching, and notes that myths have been imprinted into each
of them. WORD is intrinsically latent in myth and poetry. Mythopoe-
sis, he argues, is not just a distinguishing feature of WORD, but rather
its fundamental characteristic and true nature. Myths are not merely
made-up stories. They are a form of self-manifestation by the Transcen.
dent. Human beings do not fabricate myths. Transcendental phenom-
ena choose the "archetypes" known as myths.

Archetypes are mental and spiritual patterns that, independently of
the individual unconscious, determine the ontological infrastructure of
a community or a culture. We can think of archetypes as analogous in
their function to what In 'Arab described as "permanent archetypes"
or "fixed entities" (a yan thabitah), which ontologically exist midway
between the Absolute and the world of sensible things." Izutsu counts
them as a kind of "essence" and recognizes their reality. Archetypes
are deeply connected to the "cultural framework" that fundamen-
tally ordains the depth structure of a person's consciousness, and they
achieve their unique development in a community. "In other words,
it is impossible for them [archetypes] to have universality in the sense
of surmounting regional and historical differences and being com-
mon to all ethnicities or to the human race as a whole."* "There is
no such thing as an "archetype endowed with a universality shared by
the entire human race. Both individual 'archetypes' and the systems in  
which they mutually materialize differ from culture to culture."* Ger-
shom Scholem once asked, "Why don't [Buddhists] see Christ or the
Madonna in their meditative visions?" Converscly, Izutsu asks, *
"Why don't images of Tathagata or Boddhisatvas or the various deities of the
Shingon mandala ever appear in the contemplative consciousness of
Christians?"* In contrast to the unity that, as we saw earlier, drew the
attention of the Traditionalist school, Izutsu tries to find meaning in
the differences among "essences.

In order to grasp the true nature of "consciousness," Izutsu believes,
"We must push on to the point at which consciousness goes beyond
the nature of consciousness, i.e. to the point at which consciousness
ceases to be consciousness."* The same logic is applied to the pursuit
of "essence."

* "Essence must be dealt with up to the point at which it separates from essentiality and ceases to be essence. At the instant that our "consciousness" perceives "essence,* * "Such and such a thing exists in it, a mountain or a river, for instance." Izutsu writes." If we accept this statement, then, if it were not for the fact that our depth consciousness grasps a thing, not only would we have no true sense of that thing's reality, the thing itself would not even exist. There are levels of consciousness. "Essence" changes shape depending on its position on the
ladder of consciousness. Or, it would be fair to say, Being appears in
response to consciousness.

The ultimate state of consciousness that Izutsu deals with here
is not the one that comprises the consciousness we personally expe-
rience, or the unconscious that psychoanalysis regards as a category.
Izutsu created the expression WORD (a * /S, kotoba) as a technical
term that transcends language and at times even signifies the Ultimate,
but, on one occasion only in "Ishiki to honshitsu." he wrote kokoro (a
a0, mind) as another name for it. "Used in this context, 'attachment'
(ushin, 18 0) and 'no-mind' (mushin, M0) are not synonyms. There is a
MIND in which 'attachment' and *no-mind each come into being on
different dimensions."* As this indicates, it is MIND that is the reality
in which "consciousness goes beyond the nature of consciousness," but
a full-scale treatment of this idea would have to await the discussion of
shin (C), the conscious Transcendent, in what would become his final 
book, Ishiki no keijijogaku: "Daijs kishinron" no tetsugaku (1903; Meta-
physics of consciousness: The philasophy of the Awakening of Faith in
the Mahayana)." "Being is WORD, Izutsu had said, summing up his
thought; he began to deal with the possibility that Being might also be
MIND.
276

In Oriental philesophy, cognition is a complex, multilayered inter-
weaving of consciousness and existence. Thus, in the process of pur-
suing the structure of this interweaving, human beings are inevitably
forced to confront the question of the reality of "essence."
This passage is found in what is virtually the last sentence of "Ishiki
to honshitsu." It is both a conclusion and a starting point. "Existence"
here is not "existents." It is another name for the absolutely Transcen-
dent, what In *Arabi calls "Being.

Izutsu was extremely cautious about using the technical term
"unconscious." which had rapidly become popular after the birth of
psychoanalysis. Or, rather, he seems to have regarded the careless use
of this word as almost taboo. It is not that he thought lightly of Freud
and Jung; indeed, he was someone who responded sensitively to the
contributions made by the founder of psychoanalysis and his heretical
successor and to the questions each had raised. But he had absolutely
no use for the false image of the "unconscious" that is prevalent today.
*Consciousness" is deep, broad and chaotic and defies theoretical con-
trol. All that human beings are permitted to do is to seriously observe
its dynamism and hypothesize about its structure; we experience only
a part of it. There should be no doubt about the reality of "conscious-
ness." but that does not mean there is a monster called the unconscious
lurking beneath it. The determinant "unconscious" is unnecessary:
"consciousness" is strange enough as it is.

Like a bottomless swamp, human consciousness is a weird thing, a
world where musterious matters dwell. No one really knows what lies
hidden in its depths. Nor can anvone predict what will suddenly rise
up from it 84

 
"Consciousness is assumed to have a two-layered structure, superficial
and deep." Izutsu writes.* but this distinction is merely for the sake of
convenience. It is not his intention to divide consciousness into two:
his aim is to endow the field that he calls the "middle space of con-
sciousness" - the "M-realm" or "M-region" - with structural reality.
Izutsu atterpts to lead the reader to this intermediary region that con
nects the surface-level of consciousness with its depths.

Diagram 1 is a structural model of consciousness in A
*Ishiki to honshitu.*** 


A is the surface consciousness; 
M, B and C indicate the realms of depth consciousness. 
The M of the M-realm is perhaps an abbreviation for "middle.'
or, considered as the field in which meaning is born,
it could conceivably stand for "meaning." This is also the location of the mundus
B imaginalis mentioned ear.

lier that Corbin described.
C
But, above all, we perhaps ought to detect the strong influence of Leo Weisger-
ber here. As we suw earlier, for Weisgerber, language
e
Diagrams: Structural model of consciousness
Source Ishiti to honshitu. IC6 1-4.

----

itself was nothing less than something situated "between" us and reality. Language determines the structure of culture. In other words, the sprachliche Zwischerwelt is also
a geistliche Zwischenwelt. Just as there are phenomena that exist only in
the mind, there are phenomena that exist only in particular languages,
as we saw in the case of the constellation Orion. For Japanese, a crow
is associated with ill-omened events, but, in the Old Testament, crows
are the companions of the prophet Elijah. Something similar probably
holds true for other symbols of good and bad fortune in everyday life.

But that does not mean that they ought to be regarded as nothing more
than symbolism. Conversely, since it is impossible for us to be free of
language and culture, we cannot readily escape from the world structure
they impose.278

Above and beyond being merely a theoretical hypothesis, the
M-realm was an existential region for Izutsu. "The theory of Ideas has
to be preceded by the experience of Ideas» -that statement in Shimpi
tetsugaku did not just apply to the true nature of Plato's Ideas alone:
it would be fair to think that this one sentence expressed Izutstt's own
article of faith: When dealing with basic issues, existential experience
always takes precedence. Indeed, it is a characteristic of Toshihiko
Izutsu that he would only delve deeply into what he had experienced
existentially.


The Mystic Philosophy of WORD

Even the word "meaning." when Toshihiko Izutsu uses it, becomes a
uniquely personal, technical term that is not limited to the denotative
content of a word, sentence or phenomena. "Meaning" is the appear-
ance of Being as it emerges from chaos; it is the "face" of beings. It is
individual entities, no two of which are alike.
Words are bodies of energy without any fixed form. It is not the case
that "meaning" is produced when a word comes into being; "mean-
ing" seeks words, Izutsu believes. In short, "meaning" is the matrix of
words, not the other way around. Izutsu perceives WORD as articu-
lating meaning. WORD is synonymous with "primal, absolute, unar-
ticulated reality,'
. the basis of all things.** In short, Izutsu believes that
WORD gives rise to all things. Our usual understanding is that a flower
exists, and so the word "Rower" is born. But Izutsu's statement con-
fronts us with a truth that is the exact opposite of this. If we take Izutsu
at his word, a flower is born after being formed in the "mold" of the
"meaning" of flower. In a world perceived by ordinary consciousness,
i.e. surface consciousness, things appear to be generated in the order
of phenomenon & word & meaning. A phenomenon comes first; words
and meaning follow. A word is a sign denoting a thing. Over time, the 
sign becomes endowed with meaning. If a phenomenon does not exist,
279