Neonationalism, Religion, and Patriotic Education in Post-disaster Japan | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
Neonationalism, Religion, and Patriotic Education in Post-disaster Japan
Mark R. Mullins 
October 15, 2016
Volume 14 | Issue 20 | Number 5
Article ID 4964
Source: Mie Network in Opposition to Forced Use of Flag and Anthem in Public Schools「日の丸・君が代」の強制を許さない三重ネットワーク
INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have seen a rise in religious nationalism around the world, and Japan is no exception. Over the past two decades there has been a significant rightward shift in Japanese politics and this trend is closely related to organized religion and its affiliated political efforts to “recover” or “restore” what had been destroyed during the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945-52). Our focus here is on the close connection between the Association of Shintō Shrines (Jinja Honchō) and many politicians belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This Association, which was organized in 1946, has some 80,000 affiliated shrines throughout the country and has been the base institution for Shintō nationalism throughout the postwar period.
According to Ueda Kenji, the beginnings of a “restoration movement” can be traced back to the early 1950s. The social status and “public character” of shrine Shinto had been undermined by the Shintō Directive issued by the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in late 1945, and the strict application of Articles 20 and 89 of the postwar Constitution from 1947, which defined a clear separation of religion and state. As soon as the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in 1952, Ueda points out, the Association of Shintō Shrines began to work actively on numerous fronts to “restore Shintō to its lost status and to revitalize the old tradition” (Ueda 1979, pp. 303-305).
In the following decades, the Association of Shintō Shrines nurtured the development of a number of affiliated groups to achieve its restoration goals. These groups, such as the Association for the Re-establishment of National Foundation Day (1957), the League Promoting Ties between Politics and Shintō (Shintō Seiji Renmei, 1969), which is known today as the “Shintō Association of Spiritual Leadership” (Shinseiren), the Association for Rectification of the Relationship between Religion and State (Seikyō Kankei o Tadasu Kai, 1971), and the Association to Preserve Japan (Nihon o Mamoru Kai, 1974), were all mobilized by Jinja Honchō in their efforts to reverse the various reforms that had been instituted by the government under the direction of the Occupation authorities.
These groups worked closely with the LDP to bring their political agenda and various initiatives to the Diet for action. One key concern was to renew support for the Emperor and the role of the Imperial Household in postwar public life. Two successful efforts related to this concern were the movements to restore National Foundation Day (Kenkoku kinen no hi; known as Kigensetsu in the prewar period), which was finally re-established in 1966, and the reign-name legalization movement, which was achieved with the passing of the Reign-Name Law (Gengōhō) in 1979.
In spite of these achievements, there were a number of equally important goals that were not reached during this same period. In addition to elevating the position of the Emperor and Imperial Household in national life, Shinseiren had clearly stated that its other high priorities were to revise the Constitution, to properly care for the enshrined Shōwa martyrs by renationalizing Yasukuni Shrine, and restore moral and patriotic education in the public schools.1 These were to become the focus of renewed attention after 1995.
NEONATIONALISM IN THE POST-DISASTER CONTEXT
As many observers have noted, the “double disaster” of 1995—the Awaji-Hanshin earthquake in January and the Aum Shinrikyō subway sarin gas attack in March—created a sense of social crisis and a situation that emboldened neonationalistic leaders (Mullins 2012; 2015). While traumatic at the time, the scale of this pales in comparison with the March 11/2011 “triple disaster”—earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant—which brought devastation to the Tōhoku region and overwhelmed the nation with a sense of loss. The religio-political right-wing has gained support for their restorationist vision and agenda in this seemingly precarious environment over the past two decades. During the administrations of eight Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments in the post-1995 context, one can document a renewed effort to pass legislation to restore and strengthen patriotic education in public schools, to promote “official” Yasukuni Shrine visits (kōshiki sanpai), and to revise the Constitution of Japan.
When considered in isolation, some of these developments may appear unrelated to religion—and they probably are without religious significance for many individuals whose lives are shaped by the new policies (in public schools, for example); however, when taken all together and seen in relation to the political agenda and goals of the Association of Shinto Shrines and its political arm, Shinseiren, they are clearly a part of a Shinto religious vision aimed at reshaping the whole of Japanese society and not just those individuals affiliated with Shinto institutions. Patriotic education, for example, may indeed be based on nonreligious foundations. In the case of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, however, an active member and chairperson of Shinseiren, who pushed through the revision of the Fundamental Education Law in 2006, it is clearly rooted in the religious beliefs and values promoted by the Association of Shinto Shrines.
One indicator of the neonationalistic resurgence in the post-disaster context may be seen in the revitalization of an older organization like Shinseiren and in the formation of new organizations. One of the newer groups that should be mentioned here is the Nippon Kaigi (“Japan Conference”), which was formed through a merger of Nippon o Mamoru Kai with another nationalistic group, Nippon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi, in 1997. According to the group’s publications and homepage, its mission is to rebuild a beautiful and independent Japan, which necessarily includes restoring proper respect for the Emperor and Japanese traditions, patriotic education, revision of the Constitution, and support for official visits (kōshiki sanpai) to Yasukuni Shrine. It claims a nationwide network of some 100,000 members, including some 100 Diet members who are associated with branches in local towns and communities from Hokkaidō to Okinawa.2 This organization has gained support from across the spectrum of Japanese society and includes prominent leaders from the business, legal, and academic worlds. While it is not a religious organization per se, some 20 out of 54 board members are religious leaders drawn from well-known Shintō institutions—Yasukuni Shrine, Meiji Shrine, and the Association of Shintō Shrines—as well as representatives from such new religions as Reiyūkai, Sūkyō Mahikari, Gedatsukai, and Kurozumikyō.
Here it must be recognized that this newer organization is essentially providing a broader base of support for the central concerns and agenda that have been pursued for decades by Shinseiren and its supporters in the LDP. The number of LDP politicians affiliated with this older Shintō political organization has increased significantly in post-disaster Japan. In 1984, there were only 44 Diet members claimed by this association, but this grew to 204 by late 2013, and to 268 in 2014, which represents 37 percent of the total Diet membership of 722. The percentage of Shinseiren members in the Abe Cabinet in 2012 had reached 14 (73.7%), and it has increased again to 16 out of 19 members (84.2%) in 2015.3
Over the past two decades, religious and political leaders have renewed their efforts to restore key elements of the social order that preceded the Occupation period. While promotion of Yasukuni Shrine has proved controversial—both domestically and internationally—and efforts to revise the Constitution have only been restarted since the return of the LDP and Prime Minister Abe came to power in late 2012, some restoration goals related to patriotic education have already been achieved through legislation passed by the Diet. Today there are new laws and regulations in place, which clearly reflect the agenda of the groups and political leaders mentioned above. Many critics claim that “coercion” has been brought back into public institutions as a result of these legislative victories. Given their significant social impact, they deserve more focused consideration here.
PATRIOTIC EDUCATION
The restoration of patriotic education in post-disaster Japan is closely related to the legislation passed by the Diet in 1999, which made the Kimigayo (national anthem) and Hinomaru (national flag) the “official” symbols of Japan, and the revision of the Fundamental Education Law (Kyōiku kihonhō) in 2006, which reinserted patriotic moral education into public schools. Although widely accepted as Japan’s national symbols from years of use, the Kimigayo and Hinomaru had never been officially approved as such by any government administration. It was in 1958 that the Ministry of Education first instructed (gakushū shidōyōryō) public schools that it was “desirable” for the Hinomaru to be raised and the Kimigayo sung at official school events (entrance and graduation ceremonies). Under these “soft” guidelines, however, compliance rates were not too impressive.
Some political leaders reasoned that the problems surrounding use of these symbols in public institutions could be resolved if they were “officially” recognized by passing legislation in the Diet. Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei expressed an interest in legislation to officially recognize these national symbols in 1974, but it would not be achieved for over two more decades. It was not until 1999, during the administration of Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, that the Diet would finally—after considerable debate—approve the flag and anthem as the official symbols of the nation. At the time this legislation was being debated in the Diet, Prime Minister Obuchi assured the public that no coercion would ever be involved in public institutions if the bill were approved.4 In spite of such assurances, public intellectuals and representatives of Christian churches, including various Protestant denominations and the Roman Catholic Church, raised serious concerns about this legislation. Just four days before the legislation was passed, the Japan Catholic Council on Justice and Peace and several Protestant bodies issued a joint declaration addressed to the Prime Minister and representatives of the LDP and Kōmeitō —its coalition partner—to express their strong opposition to the legalization initiative. The declaration stated that if the legislation was passed, it would undoubtedly lead to coercion and a violation of the individual rights and freedoms—thought, conscience, belief—that are protected by the Constitution. In particular, it expressed concern for public school teachers who might be forced to provide leadership in the ritual use of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo against their will.
It turns out that these religious minorities had legitimate concerns. The action of the Diet strengthened the position of politicians and educators who felt it was their duty to have all teachers and staff lead students by example in singing the national anthem before the flag for important school ceremonies. Instructions were soon issued by the Ministry of Education for how these symbols should be integrated into the calendar and curriculum of public schools, particularly for official entrance and graduation ceremonies. The strict enforcement of these new policies soon followed in two major metropolitan public school systems under the authoritarian leadership of Ishihara Shintarō, the former governor of Tokyo, and, more recently, Hashimoto Tōru, the Mayor of Ōsaka.
Initially, there were many protests against these new policies by both teachers and students in various schools across the nation. Some members of the leftist teachers’ union, Nikkyōso, argued that these symbols were unsuitable for use in the schools since they had been used for the mobilization of both teachers and students in wartime Japan. As Okada (2013, p. 11) observes, many union members actively resisted the efforts to reintroduce the flag and anthem back into the public schools and rallied under the catch-phase “we will not send our students to the battlefield.” Even before the intensification of “guidance” from the Ministry of Education, a number of teachers had already been disciplined for failing to comply with the 1989 guidelines. The pressure on teachers to fall in line was intensified in the Tokyo schools from October 23, 2003, when the Tokyo Education Committee issued an order for all teachers and staff to participate in leading students in singing the Kimigayo before the Hinomaru for entrance and graduation ceremonies or face disciplinary action (the committee, of course, was under the direction of the well-known nationalist and hardliner Governor Ishihara).
Anticipating a range of disciplinary action for non-compliance to this order, 228 teachers launched a pre-emptive lawsuit (yobō soshō) in January 2004 against the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education to protect themselves. In their view, this educational policy was a clear violation of Article 19 of the Constitution, which protects freedom of conscience.5 The lawsuit asked the court to (1) clearly state that teachers had no duty or obligation to sing the national anthem, (2) instruct the Board that they should not follow through with the disciplinary action threatened in the October 23 statement, and (3) confirm that music teachers could not be compelled to provide piano accompaniment for the anthem at school ceremonies (Okada 2007, p. 14). The number of plaintiffs quickly grew to 401 teachers, and their concerns were represented by a group of some 50 lawyers over the course of 14 court hearings. The teachers could clearly see what was coming under Ishihara’s Board of Education. In March 2004, some 180 teachers in the Tokyo Public School system were reprimanded for failing to comply and properly guide their students in these patriotic events.
In 2006, a decision of the Tokyo District Court gave these teachers some temporary reassurance that their rights would be protected by the Constitution. On September 21, presiding judge Namba Kōichi found that the Tokyo School Board’s directive was invalid. As Lawrence Repeta’s) helpful review of this case notes, Namba acknowledged that the flag and anthem had been used in the recent past as a “spiritual support” for Japanese imperialism and militarism, and these symbols have not yet “attained a status of political and religious neutrality among the people” (2007, p. 3). In this context, he concluded, it would be a violation of freedom of thought and conscience to force a teacher to sing or provide musical accompaniment for the anthem against their will.
“CIVIC DUTIES” VERSUS “RELIGIOUS RIGHTS”
At least two Christian teachers were involved in this initial legal action and one (Okada) was called to provide testimony as a person of faith for why he opposed and refused the order to lead students in the anthem. In addition to appealing to Article 10 of the Fundamental Education Law, which prohibits the political intervention into education, and Article 19 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought and conscience, Okada and other Christians regard forced participation as a violation of Article 20, which guarantees religious freedom: “No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite, or practice.” For them, singing the anthem constitutes a religious act—ritual praise of the Emperor and his reign—and to participate would violate their personal faith.
Given the history of Christian churches in wartime Japan, these teachers are concerned that they are again being forced to compromise their faith through participation in the civil religious rites at schools. Some teachers have reached back to the Tokugawa period in search of other parallels, and compared their experience of required participation in these patriotic rituals to what was expected of Kirishitan in the Tokugawa period: The followers of the “foreign” and evil religion (jakyō) were forced to step on a sacred object (fumie) to deny their Catholic faith in order to survive (Takahashi 1998, p. 177).6 For these religious minorities, the use of the flag and anthem in this way has become a humiliating public “test” of their identity and loyalty as Japanese.
Although various denominations and churches issued letters of concern to the Prime Minister and government officials over the legislation passed by the Diet and the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education, churches have been rather slow to become active supporters of individual Christians struggling with legal action in the Courts. A support group for Christian teachers—Hinomaru Kimigayo Kyōsei Mondai ni Torikumu Kai—was finally formed in July 2008 by the Human Rights Committee of the Tokyo Diocese of the Anglican Church. This was initially to encourage two church members and teachers employed by public schools in Tokyo: Kishida Shizue, an elementary school music teacher and pianist; and Iguro Yutaka, a teacher in a Tokyo Toritsu High School. In February 2010 this was expanded into an ecumenical trans-denominational support group, which included various Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church. These groups and other churches have been organizing special meetings in Tokyo and Ōsaka to raise the consciousness of Christians over the issues and to provide some moral support for teachers still involved in prolonged lawsuits and hearings over disciplinary action.
For the teachers on the frontlines, however, this is undoubtedly perceived as “too little and too late.” At one of the support group meetings organized by the Human Rights Committee of the Tokyo Diocese of the Anglican Church in 2011, I heard several teachers express exasperation at the lack of support from their own denomination or congregation. In spite of some official statements and letters of support from denominational officials, the vast majority of church members tend to embrace a more private and pietistic faith and avoid engaging social and political issues. They regularly admonish the “radical” teachers to be good citizens. Japanese Christians are divided over what constitutes legitimate grounds for resistance to government or public school directives. Some regard the civic rites simply as “religiously neutral” patriotic expressions and find no problem with going along; they have little sympathy for the Christian teachers stirring up trouble and siding with the radical elements of the Teachers’ Union. Most other religious bodies, including Buddhist institutions and New Religions, regard these patriotic rituals as religiously neutral and have largely remained silent on the issue.
REVISION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATION LAW
It is not surprising that Governor Ishihara and the Tokyo School Board appealed the 2006 Tokyo District Court decision that supported the teachers. To the dismay of the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court ruled on 30 May 2011 that it was not a violation of the Constitution for a principal to instruct and require teachers and staff to stand and sing the Kimigayo in front of the national flag at school ceremonies. This Supreme Court decision is undoubtedly related to the revision of the Fundamental Education Law (Kyōiku kihonhō) by the Diet in 2006, which “restored” patriotic moral education as a central component of public education and legitimized the use of the flag and anthem in public schools.
The movement to revise the education law can be traced back to discussions that began in the 1960s, but it was Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, a well-known nationalistic leader and member of both Shinseiren and Nippon Kaigi (at the time, 12 of the 18 members of Abe’s Cabinet were also members of the latter group), who finally pushed the legislation through the Diet. His tactics alienated many, however. In an effort to raise public support for revisions of the education law, for example, the government collected opinions and comments from both specialists and citizens at large, and even organized “Town Meetings” to discuss the proposed revision. It turns out that this was not really “democracy” in action. As Hardacre reports: “When it emerged in late 2006 that the government had paid agents to speak in support of the revision proposal at these Town Meetings, Prime Minister Abe and others in his cabinet apologized and returned their salaries to the public purse. The Prime Minister declared, however, that the revision itself was not the problem, and the government pressed on to promulgate it” (2011, pp. 207-208).
In spite of his downfall and resignation in September 2007 due to a series of scandals, corruption allegations, and ineffective cabinet reshuffles, Abe nevertheless achieved significant results during his term in office and left behind a more regulated school system with a particular type of moral and patriotic education in place. Of course, the revision of the Fundamental Education Law was only one part of his larger vision for Japan that he laid out in a book entitled Utsukushii kuni e [Toward a beautiful country] (2006), a popular volume published just three months after the revised law was passed by the Diet. While Abe and his supporters firmly believe that this has laid the foundation for a “beautiful Japan,” critics maintain that the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution have been undermined, and the revised law constitutes a radical shift in the educational system from one that seeks to nurture individual character to one aimed at cultivating individuals who will comply with the policies of the state.
While many may regard these patriotic rituals as religiously neutral, those promoting them are equally concerned to increase public support for Yasukuni Shrine, an institution registered as a religious corporation (shūkyō hōjin), by encouraging “official visits” (kōshiki sanpai) by government officials and through the development of educational materials for public schools. Shortly after the new Fundamental Education Law was passed by the Diet, an animated DVD entitled Hokori (“Pride”) was distributed to public schools under the auspices of the Ministry of Education in 2007. Produced by the Nihon Seinen Kaigisho as a part of the Ministry’s “Program for the Development of a New Educational System,” it was shown or scheduled for viewing in 93 different locations throughout Japan between February and June. This DVD contains a scene in which the spirit of a deceased soldier appears to a high school girl and invites her back to Yasukuni to remember those who died in defense of the homeland and for their love of country. The DVD as a whole essentially promotes the revisionist history as presented by Yūshūkan, the museum attached to Yasukuni Shrine. On May 17, 2007, Prime Minister Abe was questioned and criticized in the Diet by Ishii Ikuko, a member of the Communist Party, about this controversial DVD and his policies that allowed for it to be produced and distributed under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.7 This critical response appears to have been effective as public showings were apparently stopped and copies do not seem to be available.
It appears that disciplinary action against teachers in public schools is likely to continue and, perhaps, increase. On 5 June 2011—in an action resembling that of the Tokyo Education Committee in 2003—the Osaka Prefectural Assembly passed the Kimigayo jōrei, an ordinance that requires all teachers and staff employed by public schools in its jurisdiction to stand and sing the Kimigayo at all official school ceremonies. This ordinance, which was pushed through the Assembly by Governor Hashimoto Tōru, had the strong support of both the Osaka Ishin no Kai and Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) members. 8 Like Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo, Hashimoto is another authoritarian figure and “enforcer,” a person who has little patience for those who disagree with his position. He also uses social media effectively to promote his views and belittle his opponents. During the time the Kimigayo jōrei was being debated in Osaka, media savvy Hashimoto “tweeted” the following message to his 1.18 million followers on Twitter:
What is beneficial for the students is more important than freedom of conscience for the stupid teachers (baka kyōin). The teachers at public schools are public servants of Japan. They make their living off of our taxes. If they don’t like the national flag and anthem, they should resign from their position. There is freedom not to stand and refrain from singing the national anthem, but only for citizens who are not public servants (kōmuin).9
The local ordinance passed under Hashimoto’s leadership in Osaka, of course, simply reinforced the directives from the Ministry of Education, but it was soon followed with additional action that laid out more clearly the punishments for those who failed to comply. As a result of the hard line stance taken in Tokyo and Osaka, many teachers have since been disciplined, fined, suspended, or reassigned to schools that require a longer commute.
It is ironic that in pushing this agenda through the school system, the LDP politicians and their network of supporting groups are in fact going against the expressed will of the Emperor, the very person who constitutes the raison d’être of the entire “restoration” enterprise. In 2004, when questioned by a member of the Tokyo Education Committee about the use of the flag and anthem in the schools, Emperor Akihito responded that it was preferable for it not to be a forced activity.10 As we have seen, however, neonationalists have continued to pursue a policy of coercion in public schools in spite of their expressed devotion to the Emperor. It is not just the issue of patriotic education that reveals the growing gap between the far right of the LDP and the Imperial Household. Emperor Hirohito’s own actions—avoidance of Yasukuni Shrine visits since the enshrinement of class A war criminals in 1978—and recent public statements by both Emperor Akihito and Crown Prince Naruhito,11 indicate both are concerned to remember the wartime suffering of Japan’s neighbors and share and a deep appreciation for the “Peace Constitution,” which puts them at odds with the larger neonationalistic agenda of Prime Minister Abe and his revisionist supporters. Sooner or later, this divide will have to be addressed.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: POST-3.11 DEVELOPMENTS
The unprecedented triple disaster of 2011—earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident—shocked the nation and overwhelmed the leadership of the governing Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ was already in trouble, but the scale of this disaster and inadequate responses by the national government paved the way for the return of the LDP. After the three-year hiatus under the leadership of three successive DPJ Prime Ministers, the LDP made a comeback in December 2012, and Abe Shinzō began his second tenure as Prime Minister. Although his initial focus has been on revitalizing the Japanese economy, it was clear from the beginning that there was more to his agenda than “Abenomics.” Abe quickly renewed the call for revision of the Constitution. As noted in many speeches, his homepage, and in his popular Utsukushii kuni e, he believes that Japan’s true independence and escape from the postwar regime will only be achieved when the postwar Constitution is revised (2006, pp. 28-29).
While revision of Article 9—the central pillar of the “peace Constitution”—is one key goal of Abe and his supporters, there are a number of proposed revisions recommended by the Liberal Democratic Party, which are a cause of serious concern for the leaders of a wide-range of religious groups.12 As we have seen, protest against the government’s initiatives for patriotic education was largely limited to the shrinking secular left, members of the Teachers’ Union, and a few religious minorities; opposition to the proposed revisions to the Constitution, however, will undoubtedly face more serious resistance. Given the impact of legalization of the flag and anthem in 1999 and the revision of the Fundamental Education Law in 2006, many more religious groups are troubled by the LDP’s proposed revision of Articles 20 and 89, which in their current form clearly define the separation of religion and state and protect religious freedom. The proposed changes in the current articles would have serious implications for the status and treatment of the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.
In its current form, Article 20 of the Constitution of Japan (1947) prohibits any state support, promotion, or coercion with respect to religious education or activities:
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.
No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.
The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.
The draft proposal by the LDP suggests an additional phrase of qualification, that is, prohibiting any state support for religious activities that transcend “social ritual or custom” (shakaiteki girei mata wa shūzokuteki kōi no han’i o koeru). The language used here would clearly allow for some ritual activity in educational institutions redefined as a “social custom,” which approximates the strategy used by the government in relation to State Shintō until 1945. The same clause added to Article 89, which currently prohibits public funds being expended on or for religious institutions, would allow public money to be used in support of activities redefined as social ritual or customary practices.
Buddhist scholar and activist Hishiki Masaharu points out that the educational goal of nurturing “tolerance” in students will inevitably be subverted if things designated as “customs” are no longer subject to the constitutional principle of separation. It will create conditions that will allow “intolerance” to masquerade as “tolerance,” but coercion will become the new reality (2007, p. 62). If the revised law is ever approved, he explains, it will likely be used to identify such activities as jichinsai (land purification ceremony), as well as Yasukuni sanpai (official visits to the Shrine) as “customs” and outside of the application of the separation principle. Hishiki argues that if the ambiguous notion of religion embedded in this proposed revision is accepted, it will give the state the power to control the people, and the rights normally accorded to individuals—the right not to participate—will disappear (2007, pp. 64-65).
The Japanese Bishops in the Catholic Church are similarly concerned that this redefinition would provide a legal basis to again require children and teachers at schools, as well as employees at government institutions (kōmuin), to participate in jinja sanpai as a part of their official duties. Tani Daiji, the former Bishop of Saitama, argues that the LDP proposal is reintroducing the notion of “nonreligious Shintō,” which will lead to a situation in which coercion replaces freedom of conscience. He recalls that during the war shrine visits were redefined as a “nonreligious” civic duty, a duty required of Japanese as well as the colonized peoples in Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan. Tani fears that shrine visits (sanpai) could again be treated like other official ceremonies at school events, which require standing before the Hinomaru flag and singing the national anthem, but students could be forced to participate regardless of conscience or personal religious commitment. Tani maintains that by redefining something as a “social ritual” or “custom” will allow religious activity and education to go on in public institutions. He also suggests that this revised article would be used to legitimize and legalize official visits (kōshiki sanpai) to Yasukuni Shrine—recategorized as a “social ritual” (shakaiteki girei) or “national ritual” (kokuminteki girei)—which is a strategy designed to eliminate lawsuits and legal conflict over visits to the shrine by the prime minister and other government officials (2007, pp. 20-25).
CONCLUSION
Given the pluralistic nature of postwar Japanese society, it is not surprising the range of neonationalistic initiatives promoted by Shinseiren, Nippon Kaigi, and LDP leaders have been widely contested by many intellectuals, the teachers’ union, and a variety of religious leaders and groups. In the wake of the 1995 Aum incident, we observed a serious concern for protection from deviant new religions. Over the course of two decades, we have seen this evolve into a concern for protection from coercion in public institutions and forced participation in a revitalized civil religion. There is clearly a clash between those who recognize individual rights and freedoms as fundamental to civil society and those who regard the rights of the individual to be secondary and subservient to the needs of the nation or group. In light of the impact of post-disaster legislation on the school system nationwide, one can appreciate the concerns of religious minorities and others who fear an expansion of coercion as political leaders and groups—guided by their essentialist understanding of Shintō and Japanese identity—seek to reshape public institutions.
This essay is adapted from“Neonationalism, Politics, and Religion in Post-disaster Japan,” in Mark R. Mullins and Nakano Koichi, eds. Disasters and Social Crisis in Contemporary Japan: Political, Religious, and Sociocultural Responses, Basingstoke/NY: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2016, pp. 107-131.
REFERENCES
Abe Shinzō. 2006. Utsukushii kuni e. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.
Breen, John and Mark Teeuwen. 2010. A New History of Shinto Shintō. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hardacre, Helen. 2003. “RevisionofAdministrativeLawasShortcuttoConstitutionalRevision.” InJapanesePoliticsToday:FromKaraoketoKabukiDemocracy.Eds. Takashi InoguchiandPurnendraJain, 201-217. NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.
Hishiki Masaharu. 2007. Shiminteki jiyū no kiki to shūkyō—kenpō, Yasukuni Jinja, seikyō bunri. Tokyo: Hakutakusha.
Mullins, Mark R. 2012. “The Neo-nationalist Response to the Aum Crisis: A Return of Civil Religion and Coercion in the Public Sphere?” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 99-125.
_____. 2015. “Japanese Responses to ‘Imperialist Secularization’: The Postwar Movement to Restore Shintō in the ‘Public Sphere.’” In Multiple Secularities Beyond the West: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age. Eds. Marian Burchardt, et. al., pp. 141-167. DeGruyter.
Okada Akira. 2007. Shisō・Ryōshin・Shinkyō no jiyū ni tsuite kangaetekita koto—Toritsu Kōko ni okeru Kokki・Kokka kyōsei no naka de. Pamphlet No. 5, 2007.
_____. 2013. “Hinomaru・Kimigayo ‘kyōsei’ no mondai no kako・genzai・mirai.” In Kimigayo Kyōsei Hantai Kirisutosha no Tsudoi, ed. Shinkō no ryōshin no tame no tatakai. Tokyo: Inochi no Kotobasha, 2013, pp. 9-42.
Repeta, Lawrence. 2007. “Politicians, Teachers and the Japanese Constitution: Flag, Freedom and the State.” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 14 February, pp. 1-7. [http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/2355.
Shintō Seiji Renmei, ed. 1984. Shinseiren jūgonenshi. Tokyo: Shintō Seiji Renmei Chūō Honbu.
Takahashi Seiju. 1998. “Kyōsei no saki ni mieru mono.” In the Ryōshinteki ‘Hinomaru-Kimigayo’ Kyohi. Eds. ‘Hinomaru-Kimigayo’ Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, pp. 176-179. Tokyo: Akashi.
Tani Daiji 2007. “Jimintō shinkenpō sōan o kenshō suru.” In Shinkyō no jiyū to seikyō bunri, Eds. Katorikku Chūō Kyōgikai (Catholic Bishops Conference of Japan), pp. 17-44. Katorikku Chūō Kyōgikai.
Ueda Kenji. 1979. “Contemporary Social Change and Shintō Traditions.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 6/1-2: 303-327.
Notes
1
For the early history of this organization, see Shintō Seiji Renmei, ed. (1984). Information on current activities may be gleaned from its monthly magazine, Kokoro, and website. For more detailed analysis of its membership and political agenda, see John Breen and Mark Teeuwen (2010, especially chapter 6), and Mullins (2012; 2015).
2
Here I am paraphrasing the information widely available in Nippon Kaigi publications and on the official homepage. The membership figures are drawn from here.
Nationalism, Pacifism, and Reconciliation: Three Paths Forward for Japan's “History Problem” | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
Nationalism, Pacifism, and Reconciliation: Three Paths Forward for Japan's “History Problem”
Akiko Hashimoto
October 15, 2016
Volume 14 | Issue 20 | Number 4
Article ID 4963
Benedict Anderson reminds us that modernity has been characterized by the emergence of nation-states that can mobilize the passion of young men to “die for the country” on a mass scale.1 Once mobilized, nationalist passion allows a soldier to believe “he is dying for something greater than himself, for something that will outlast his individual, perishable life in place of a greater, eternal vitality.”2 But after demobilization, this patriotic fervor withers, no longer fed or needed for everyday combat. In peacetime, the fervor that enabled death and destruction for national purpose no longer even has any social or moral legitimacy.
After modern wars that called up millions of conscripts, the tension between repudiating or lamenting the violent destructions of war and seeking something meaningful in the same violent destructions has been unresolvable. This tension is especially acute in defeated nations where, as Wolfgang Schivelbusch asserts, the desire to search for positive meaning in the national failure is a common and powerful need.3 The impulse to generate positive meaning from defeat often gives over to narratives such as the myth of the Lost Cause among the American Confederacy after the Civil War, and the myth of the Fallen Soldier in Germany after World War I.
The difficulty of overcoming devastating defeat lies at the root of Japan's struggle to define its political culture and identity seven decades after the end of World War II. As I show in my book The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory and Identity in Japan (2015), how Japan reckons with this national trauma is crucial to understanding its contentious politics today. From disputes over revising the peace constitution to expanding military capabilities and increasing Japan’s global military role, different visions for Japan’s political future have clashed for many decades; they continue to clash in different arenas as we see today in the government’s swing to the right, and its declared intention to revise the peace constitution after dominating the 2016 upper house election. Characteristically, this contentious politics stirs up fierce passion on all sides precisely because “something much greater than ourselves” is at stake. In this context, Japan faces three broad choices for national policy and moral purpose in moving forward: nationalism, pacifism, and reconciliation.
Three Paths Forward beyond the Culture of Defeat
The three paths forward that I identify -- nationalism, pacifism, and reconciliation -- are preoccupied with different concerns and visions for Japan's future. They espouse different understandings of Japan's war, and propose different approaches for bringing closure to the long defeat. Similarly motivated by deeply engrained memories of humiliation, they nevertheless differ profoundly in their strategies to recover from them. These paths are embraced today to different degrees by different stakeholders, from state and business leaders to religious and civic groups, public intellectuals, political networks, social activists, and transnational movements. Ultimately they represent different approaches to repair the moral backbone of a society that has yet to effectively come to grips with the trauma of empire, war, and defeat.
In broad outline, the three paths can be described as follows. (1) The nationalist path is deeply concerned with erasing the stigma of defeat, and envisions a strong Japan to be reckoned with in the world. The proponents desire above all to enhance Japan’s power, wealth, prestige, and respectability, which align with Japan’s long-standing quest to stand shoulder to shoulder with world powers. (2) The pacifist path, on the other hand, is concerned with overcoming defeat by becoming a moral nation respected in the world for its principled commitment to non-violence. Its proponents seek to enhance Japan's moral standing against human suffering which aligns with a radical anti-military credo deeply ingrained in postwar popular sentiments. (3) Finally, the reconciliationist path differs from the first two in striving to inscribe Japan's dark past in national history, and build a contemporary identity based on regional reconciliation and integration. The proponents of reconciliation want Japan to earn the world’s respect by developing solidarity with former adversaries, based on goodwill and responsibility for past mistakes.
Clarifying and understanding these choices is more urgent today than ever. Japan is at a crossroads, embroiled in a politics of nationalism that will have wide ramifications throughout Japanese society. Internationally, the parallel horizons of the three paths were jolted into collision by the new realities of the new millennium when military threats and belligerence throughout the Western Pacific increased with a multitude of events: the missile launches from China and North Korea, the Gulf War followed by wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, 9/11 and the “war against terror,” and territorial disputes involving Japan with China, Korea, and Russia. Japan’s drive for peace and reconciliation suffered serious setbacks in the shifting geopolitics, as the nation’s tilt toward re-militarization began. At the same time, a new politics of nationalism emerged domestically, fueled by the economic downturn and anxieties of globalization, and contested by stakeholders in disputes such as the treatment of war guilt and war criminals at commemorations (“the Yasukuni problem”), the mandate to use patriotic symbols (the national flag and anthem),4 inculcating patriotism in schools, and the treatment of Japan’s atrocities (“Nanjing massacre”) in textbooks and popular culture.5 This escalation in the politics of nationalism is testing the core of Japan's postwar identity, and deepening the cleavage separating the nationalists, pacifists, and reconciliationists. In the following sections, I consider these three contending paths that are indelibly linked to the “history problem” in Japan’s political culture.
The Nationalist Path
The nationalist path subscribes to the notion that furthering the national interest is the best solution to overcoming the past. Thus the nationalist vision is to cultivate strong national belonging to move forward into the future. It emphasizes shared belonging and collective attachment to a historical community, and derives a social identity from that “traditional” heritage. People adopting this approach tend to use the language of national pride, and resent the loss of national prestige and international standing that came with defeat seven decades ago. They vary along a spectrum of intensity from aggressive hardliners to moderates in their search for respect, and vary from realist to idealist in seeking the competitive edge over other nations, like those in neighboring East Asia. Many proponents of this approach today are neonationalist public figures including politicians, intellectuals, and cultural critics.
From aggressive neo-nationalism to moderate civic and cultural nationalism, this approach partakes of a certain cultural resistance to cosmopolitanism.6 Recent Japanese prime ministers making official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine on commemoration day can be identified in this category, as well as those who passively condone traditional symbols of national honor like the national flag and the national anthem. Many of them favor revising the constitution, as Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō described in a new year’s interview with the Sankei newspaper in 2014. Asked about his vision for Japan in the year 2020, the year that Tokyo will again host the Summer Olympic Games, he responded:
“[I foresee that by 2020] the constitutional revision will be done.
At that stage, I want Japan to fully recover its prestige, and be recognized respectfully for its momentous contributions to world peace and stability in the region. Japan's higher prestige will restore the balance of power in the Asia region.”7
Emphasizing the recovery of prestige and respect, Abe makes clear that he wants to restore some fundamentals of nationhood that he believes were lost after defeat. His often-quoted ambition to “leave behind the postwar regime” (sengo rejiimu karano dakkyaku) is precisely about ending the long defeat, overcoming the cultural trauma of “a weaker Japan” that has been the subtext in postwar political culture, and gaining equal recognition in the world. In practical terms, this means strengthening Japan, and ending military disempowerment and Japan's one-sided dependence as a “client state” of the United States. This nationalist vision is encapsulated in the draft revised constitution (kenpō kaisei sōan) announced in April 2012 by Abe’s political party (LDP): It is a nativized, domesticated version of the constitution, emphasizing tradition, patriotism, and duties to the state; and significantly, it changes Article 9, replacing the renunciation of possessing a military force with the establishment of a National Defense Army (kokubōgun).8
The nationalists’ impetus to inculcate national pride and patriotism in the country is readily explicable when we consider the erosion of support for traditionalist sentiments over many decades. Surveys show that national pride has declined in recent decades from 57% in 1983 to 39% in 2008, and it is consistently lower for the younger generations.9 Japanese high school students, for example, have a lower sense of national pride compared to American and Chinese counterparts.10 Japan's younger generations born after the baby boom also report that they have no sense of attachment to the Emperor.11 The nationalists’ drive to cultivate patriotism in schools today actually emanates from a sense that their power base is eroding among the new generations who are disengaged and disinterested. In this sense, the mutual provocations that fan perceptions of threat in relations with China are effective tools to promote a stronger sense of national belonging and solidarity among these disengaged groups.
This approach to overcoming the past is also complicated. The accusation by the west that Japan is not doing enough to accept responsibility for World War II war crimes invites anger from nationalists who resent not being accepted as a member of the established western powers. Not being firmly established in the European order makes Japan’s path to shedding the stigma of defeat and asserting its established position more arduous than Germany’s. Taking account of this international stratification, the hurdle for recognition for non-western, non-white nations is doubly high and perpetually hard to clear.12 Nationalistic remembering is, then, not directed to reconciliation efforts but to gaining a position of moral and strategic superiority.13 In this sense, the attempt to achieve moral recovery from the long defeat takes the form of revising the script of defeat, questioning the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial, the devaluing of the Yasukuni Shrine, and China’s victory in the Asia-Pacific War. From this vantage point, China is a country that exploits historical grievances to promote political gain. Relations with South and North Korea should also be “normalized,” that is, uncompromised by assumptions of Japan’s colonial and war guilt and uninhibited by constitutional constraints.
The LDP proposal to revise the constitution emphasizes tradition, patriotism, and duties to the state (2012)
The pacifist creed has long been an important counterweight to nationalism in postwar Japan, and its proponents reaffirmed that mission in response to Japan’s dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to southern Iraq to take part in its first “humanitarian recovery mission” in support of the US. In June 2004, nine prominent Japanese public intellectuals gathered in Tokyo to announce the founding of the “Article 9 Association” (A9A, Kyūjō no kai) to protect the constitution from the state’s intensified efforts to revise it. The high profile cast ensured that the group would draw wide public attention. All of the founding members were of the wartime generation and had well-established credentials as postwar pacifists: Oda Makoto and Tsurumi Shunsuke had been leaders of the anti-Vietnam war movement; Ōe Kenzaburo, the Nobel laureate, is known for his pacifist conscience and outspoken public criticism of the state evoking comparisons with Germany’s Günter Grass; Miki Mutsuko had been active in the movement to attain redress for “comfort women” and joined the Asian Women’s Fund in 1995. Others included Katō Shūichi, a leading public intellectual and Okudaira Yasuhiro a prominent constitutional scholar. The Article 9 Association’s manifesto reads:The pacifist path subscribes to the notion that promoting healing and human security is the best solution to overcoming the past. Thus the pacifist vision emphasizes a radical anti-military ethos and anti-nuclear creed to make a fundamental break from Japan's war history. This moral vision is a source of humanist pride as well as a collective identity that allows Japan to recover its moral prestige from the deviant past. As a people-centered vision, it focuses on all victims of war violence and nuclear threats and uses the language of human suffering and human insecurity wrought by military action. People adopting this approach vary along a spectrum of intensity from aggressive to moderate in their protest of military violence, and from national to international in their images of victims, including the victims of the atomic bombs and firebombings of the Asia-Pacific War and victims of current international wars such as Syrian refugees These proponents tend to be public leaders, from politicians to intellectuals and cultural critics who deeply mistrust the state as an agent for peaceful conflict resolution.
The Pacifist Path
The pacifist path subscribes to the notion that promoting healing and human security is the best solution to overcoming the past. Thus the pacifist vision emphasizes a radical anti-military ethos and anti-nuclear creed to make a fundamental break from Japan's war history. This moral vision is a source of humanist pride as well as a collective identity that allows Japan to recover its moral prestige from the deviant past. As a people-centered vision, it focuses on all victims of war violence and nuclear threats, and uses the language of human suffering and human insecurity wrought by military action. People adopting this approach vary along a spectrum of intensity from aggressive to moderate in their protest of military violence, and from national to international in their images of victims, like those killed by atomic bombs and air raids and the refugees in Syria. These proponents tend to be public leaders, from politicians to intellectuals and cultural critics who deeply mistrust the state as an agent for peaceful conflict resolution.
The pacifist creed has long been an important counterweight to nationalism in postwar Japan, and its proponents delivered on that mission months after Japan dispatched the SDF to southern Iraq to take part in its first “humanitarian recovery mission.” In June 2004, a group of nine prominent Japanese public intellectuals gathered in Tokyo to announce the founding of the “Article 9 Association” (A9A, Kyūjō no kai) to protect the constitution from the state’s intensified efforts to revise it. The high profile cast ensured that the group would draw wide public attention. All of the founding members were of the wartime generation and had well-established credentials as postwar pacifists: Oda Makoto and Tsurumi Shunsuke had been leaders of the anti-Vietnam war movement; Ōe Kenzaburo, the Nobel laureate, is known for his pacifist conscience and outspoken public criticism of the state evoking comparisons with Germany’s Günter Grass. Miki Mutsuko had been active also in the movement to attain redress for “comfort women,” and joined the Asian Women’s Fund in 1995. Others included Kato Shūichi, a leading public intellectual and Okudaira Yasuhiro a prominent constitutional scholar. The Article 9 Association’s manifesto reads:
“Let our Constitution Article 9 shine upon this [changing] world, so we may hold hands with our fellow pacifist citizens around the world. For this purpose, we must re-select Japan's constitution and Article 9 as sovereigns of this nation …. as it is our responsibility to shape the future of this country.
We appeal to the world to do everything possible to prevent the revision of this Constitution, and to protect it for future peace in Japan and the world.14
The popular response to this appeal was resounding: within a year and a half, more than 4,000 local citizens’ groups of the Article 9 Association sprang into action. Ten years later, there were more than 7,500 A9A groups of all imaginable constituencies throughout the country: A9A for film makers, poets, women, children, the disabled, patients, doctors, musicians, scientists, the fisheries business, trading companies, the mass media, Buddhists, Greens, the Communist Party, and so on, and local community groups that have sprouted by the thousands across towns, cities, and prefectures.15 An international petition drive ensued, organized by the Global Article 9 Campaign to Abolish War established by the youth movement Peace Boat (2005).
The accusation by the West that Japan is suffering from collective self-pity in its vow never to allow another war that would create more Hiroshimas and Nagasakis, misses the significance of pledging disarmament for a country with seven hundred years of military tradition and three victories in international wars. The pride in this radical break with the past is such that a citizen’s group nominated Article 9 for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014.16
The popular appropriation of Article 9 as a form of civic identity was long in the making. Japan's postwar pacifism, historian Akazawa Shirō explains, was born out of a profound skepticism for the state-defined “justice” that wrought massive sacrifices and immoral acts of violence.17 As war memory fostered persistent antipathy for the military and mistrust of the government’s ability to control the military, Article 9 came to function as an important constraint on the government that allayed those fears. What emerged over time was an anti-war pacifism based on a desire for human security, regret for a violent past, and a pledge to be model global citizens in the future. Peace is therefore a civic identity and a strategy of moral recovery, expressing contrition as well as an aspiration for an elevated moral status in the eyes of the world. This multifaceted discursive practice of peace is therefore fundamentally different from an anti-war pacifism based on questions of war responsibility.
The A9A was a corrective to defy the resurgence of aggressive nationalism in the 2000s; it reasserted the pride in a pacifist identity that had become a standard moral framework learned in schools18 and historically found role models in both Christian pacifists – like Nitobe Inazo, Yanaihara Tadao, and Uchimura Kanzo – and atheist pacifists – like Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein who led the Pugwash movement dedicated to eliminating "all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and of war as a social institution to settle international disputes.”19 However, only six months after the A9A was launched, the Japanese government announced the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) that broadened and realigned the range of Self Defense Force activities to react rapidly and multi-functionally to domestic and international emergencies. In this policy, China and North Korea were identified as “potential threats.”20
More recently, high-profile civic organizations and networks have sprung into action to defend the integrity of Article 9 and the constitution in response to the cabinet’s decision to reinterpret Article 9 to permit SDF to participate in international collective defense (2014). Those civic groups, consisting of scholars, public intellectuals, students, activists, and other public figures who are mostly of the postwar generation, vow to safeguard constitutionalism and constitutional democracy, and hold the government accountable to them. Organizations such as “Save Constitutional Democracy” represent this updated brand of pacifism that seeks a broader constituency to hold off further challenges to Article 9 by the nationalists in government.21 In this perspective, constitutional pacifism embraced by popular, democratic choice constitutes the ultimate moral recovery from the long defeat.22
The Founding of Article 9 Association (2004)
The Reconciliationist Path
The reconciliationist path subscribes to the notion that enhancing transitional justice and moral responsibility in East Asia is the best solution to overcoming the past. This approach emphasizes rapprochement, an ethos of civil courage to face past wrongs, and prioritizes improved relations with Japan's regional neighbors. To different degrees, people in this category recognize that accepting responsibility for past wrongs is indispensable to moving forward, and the only viable way for Japan to build mutual trust in the global world in general, and among the victims of Japanese wars throughout the Asia-Pacific in particular. They use a range of language from human rights and redress to friendship and pluralism, and emphasize the requirements of good relations with regional neighbors. Embraced by an eclectic mix of internationally-minded leaders in politics, business, scholars, grassroots networks, and civic activists, people vary along a spectrum from aggressive to moderate in their quest for redress and justice, and from realist to idealist in pursuing rapprochement. This approach is cosmopolitan, presupposing justice as a universal value, whether it comes from religious belief, feminism, socialism, transnational intellectual sensibilities, or declarations of international agencies.
This reconciliationist approach to overcoming the past prioritizes international dialogue to build relations with regional neighbors with antagonistic histories, based on mutual respect and, ultimately, mutual trust. Japan's acknowledgement of its history of aggression is indispensable in this regard, together with an acceptance of responsibility and an effort to redress the wrongs. In the West German case, the effort to promote mutual understanding of the antagonistic histories with its neighbors started within years of the war’s end. Under UNESCO’s auspices, West Germany started an international dialogue first with France (1951), and then, with the advent of Ostpolitik, with Poland (1972). The joint textbook commissions carried out bilateral reconciliation work successfully by all accounts, and continue the efforts today with ongoing institutional support and state funding.23 By contrast, Japan's joint history research projects with South Korea and China started only in the 1990s and 2000s, and with limited institutional and supranational resources compared to the German case. During this period of joint research Japan carried out both state and civil projects with South Korea and China.24 One such effort was a tri-national joint history textbook called History That Opens the Future published in 2005 by a group of 54 scholars, teachers, and citizens from Japan, China, and South Korea; it was the first textbook of its kind in East Asia published in all three languages.25 The preface reads:
“[This textbook] is about the history of East Asia in Japan, China, and South Korea.
East Asia’s history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is scarred by the wounds of invasion, war, and human oppression that cannot be washed away.
But … East Asia also has a long tradition of cultural exchange and friendship as many people work across national boundaries, committed to building a bright future.
We can build a brighter, peaceful future on this beautiful earth by inheriting the positive assets of the past, while thoroughly reflecting (tetteitekini hansei) on the mistakes as well.
How can we learn from the lessons of history to build a future that guarantees peace, democracy, and human rights in East Asia? Let’s think about it together….26
A joint history textbook project presumes that a shared historical perspective is possible based on some shared universal values such as peace building, democracy and human rights, as this preface describes. The effort calls for a search for a common language, and as much as possible, also a shared framework of understanding and interpretation. The common language behind History That Opens the Future is Japan’s history of imperial aggression and its damage to modern East Asia. The language of perpetration ties the three national histories together in what might be considered a primer on the origins of Japan’s “history problem.” Here the perpetrators are delineated clearly (Japan), as are the heroes who resisted the incursions (China and Korea), and the victims who suffered (China, Korea, and Japan). It also provides a blueprint for a possible resolution, which is that Japan must offer a full “apology and restitution (shazai and hoshō)” for its imperialism, invasions, and exploitation if East Asia is to find true healing, justice, and long-term reconciliation.27
Finding this common language is central in reconciliation work, yet hard to attain.28 Sociologist Gi-Wook Shin points to four key areas of reconciliation in East Asia – apology politics, joint history research, litigation, and regional exchanges – where the search for common ground is necessary for progress to be made.29 At a pragmatic level, it means that former adversaries, former perpetrators and victims must set aside the hate and prejudice that have stewed for decades, and find a reservoir of patience and good will. This process is also complicated ideologically by the “universal” international norm that defines a common language of justice in the global arena: human rights, democracy, and international norms such as crimes against peace (wars of aggression) and crimes against humanity (genocide, torture, persecution etc.)30 It was precisely the failure to find common ground in the understanding of “justice” that eventually ended the government- sponsored bilateral history research committees of the 2000s.31
Recent polls show that only a small fraction of Chinese and South Korean people (less than 11%) actually believe that Japan embraces pacifism or is committed to reconciliation, while much larger proportions (one-third to half of respondents) believe that Japan upholds militarism. At the same time, many in China and South Korea point to Japan's “history problem” and the territorial disputes as obstacles that stand in the way of building better relationships.32
Indeed in the second phase of the trilateral scholars’ efforts to build international dialogue and mutual understanding in the 2010s, the political and social climate had grown considerably worse than in the 2000s. The follow up publication,33 which had set itself the ambitious task of providing an overarching regional history of East Asia, reflected this difficult climate. Finding common ground in the understanding of “justice” seemed strained, as evidenced by the failure to synthesize the section on collective memory that could have led to an understanding of the most pressing issue facing the three nations, the territorial disputes. Yet it is this type of painstaking and persistent work of cultivating civilian dialogue, however difficult it may be, that ultimately paves the way for future generations to pursue the task of East Asia’s reconciliation. These efforts join the assiduous work of many activist-scholars like Utsumi Aiko, Ōnuma Yasuaki, and others who have labored to achieve transitional justice and redress in Asia over the decades.34
History That Opens the Future (2005)
The Broader Picture
The nationalist, pacifist, and reconciliationist paths have been vying for dominance over the past decades. They do not coalesce into a unifying national strategy for overcoming the past, and imply different strategies for political legitimacy and politics of social integration. The pacifist approach has been particularly strong in the areas of family memory and schooling, as I show in The Long Defeat. Mending the broken fences and healing the deep scars of history, however, will take more than the advocacy and practice of pacifism, however well-intentioned and well-practiced. Moral recovery in the current geopolitics is achievable only when respect can be gained from past adversaries and victims. The new tensions between Japan, China, and the Koreas make this task even more difficult.
Moving beyond the 71st anniversary of the end of war, former adversaries of the Asia-Pacific War now face crucial choices for the future of the East Asia region. The mounting tension centered on war memory politics today among Japan, China, and the Koreas is not only about righting past wrongs, but also about jockeying for position in the shifting geopolitics owing largely to the rise of China, and the continuing belligerence of North Korea as well as Japan’s own foreign policy under the Abe administration. Japan's widely reported struggle today over remilitarization is fought precisely by these nationalists, pacifists and reconciliationists whose divergent understandings of Japan's war and defeat parallel different interpretive narratives of the war and different views on contemporary Japanese international policies.
The divergent paths of nationalism, pacifism, and reconciliationism outlined in this essay explain the current battles over the nationalist government’s brazen push to revise the role of the Japanese military – elevating the Self Defense Force to a full military. Many of Japan's current political problems – including its deteriorating geopolitical relations with China and the Koreas – continue to be fueled directly by the contentious meanings of defeat that remain unresolved.
This article is adapted from Chapter 5 of Akiko Hashimoto, The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2015).
Notes
1
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. and extended ed. London: Verso, 1991.
2
Rahimi, Babak. "Sacrifice, Transcendence and the Soldier." Peace Review 2005 no. 17 (1):1-8.
3
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery. Translated by Jefferson Chase. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003.
4
The Act on National Flag and Anthem 1999 (Kokki Oyobi Kokka ni Kansuru Hōritsu) mandated the use of the national anthem and flag in schools.
5
Fujioka, Nobukatsu, and Jiyūshugishikan Kenkyūkai. Kyōkashoga Oshienai Rekishi Tokyo: Fusōsha, 1996.
6
Smith, Anthony. D. National Identity. Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1991, 11-13, 66.
7
Sankei shinbun. “Gorin no toshi, nihon wa? Shushō: ‘Kaikenzumi desune’” 1.1.2014. Accessed 1/1/14.
8
Higuchi, Yōichi. Ima, ‘kenpō kaisei’ o dōkangaeruka: ‘Sengo nippon’ o ‘hoshu’ surukoto no imi. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2013.
9
Kōno, Kei. "Gendai Nihon No Sedai: Sono Sekishutsu to Tokushutsu." In Gendai Shakai to Media, Kazoku, Sedai, (ed) NHK Hōsō Bunka Kenkyujo, 14-38. Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2008; NHK Hōsō Bunka Kenkyūjo, Gendai nihonjin no ishikikōzō, 7th edition. Tokyo: NHK Books, 2010.
10
Japan had the highest proportion of people who are not proud of their country (48.3%) compared to USA (37.1%) and China (20.3%). See Nihon Seishōnen kenkyūjo, Kōkōsei no gakushū ishiki to nichijō seikatsu: Nihon, amerika, chūgoku no 3 kakoku hikaku. Tokyo: Nihon Seishōnen Kenkyūjo. 2004, 8.
11
Kōno, "Gendai Nihon No Sedai”; Kōno, Kei, and Takahashi Kōichi. "Nihonjin No Ishiki Henka No 35nen No Kiseki (1): Dai 8 Kai 'Nihonjin No Ishiki 2008' Chōsa Kara." Hōsō Kenkyū to Chōsa April (2009): 2-39. Kōno, Kei, Takahashi Kōichi, and Hara Miwako. "Nihonjin No Ishiki Henka No 35nen No Kiseki (2): Dai 8 Kai 'Nihonjin No Ishiki 2008' Chōsa Kara." Hōsō Kenkyū to Chōsa May (2009): 2-23.
12
Zarakol, Ayse. After defeat: How the East learned to live with the West, New York: Cambridge University Press 2011. 198, 243, 253.
13
Kosuge, Nobuko. Sengo wakai: Nihon wa kara tokihanatererunoka. Tokyo: Chuōkōronshinsha, 2005, 192.
14
Founding statement of the Article 9 Association, June 10, 2004.
15
Article 9 Association, accessed 4.22.2014. “Ōe Kenzaburōshi mo tōjō,” Sankei shinbun, 6.21.2014.
16
Alexis Dudden “The Nomination of Article 9 of Japan's Constitution for a Nobel Peace Prize” Japan Focus Apr. 20, 2014.
17
Akazawa, Shiro. Yasukuni jinja: Semegiau 'senbotsusa tsuitō' no yukue. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. 2005, 7, 257-60
18
For example, see the ethics textbook Daiichi Gakushūsha, Kōtogakko rinri kaiteiban, 2010,192.
19
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Principles, Structure and Activities of Pugwash For the Eleventh Quinquennium (2007-2012).
20
Fujiwara, Kiichi. Heiwa no riarizumu. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. revised ed. 2010.
21
“Scholars form ‘Save Constitutional Democracy’ to challenge Abe's 'omnipotence'” Asahi shinbun Asia & Japan Watch. April 18, 2014.
22
Okuhira, Yasuhiro, and Jiro Yamaguchi. eds. Shūdanteki jieiken no naniga mondaika: Kaishaku kaiken hihan. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014.
23
Alexandra Sakaki. Japan and Germany as Regional Actors: Evaluating Change and Continuity After the Cold War. Florence, KY: Routledge 2012; Kondo, Takahiro. Kokusai Rekishi kyōkasho taiwa: Yōroppa ni okeru "kako" no saihen. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1998; Schissler, Hanna, and Yasemin Soysal, eds. The Nation, Europe, and the World : Textbooks and Curricula in Transition. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005.
24
Yang, Daqing, and Ju-Back Sin. "Striving for Common History Textbooks in Northeast Asia (China, South Korea and Japan): Between Ideal and Reality." In History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation : Reconsidering Joint Textbook Projects, edited by K. V. Korostelina, Simone Lässig and Stefan Ihrig, 209- 30. New York: Routledge, 2013.
25
This text has been described variously as a textbook, supplementary guide, or a teachers’ guide.
26
Nitchū-Kan 3-goku Kyōtsū Rekishi Kyōzai Iinkai. Mirai o hiraku rekishi: Higashi ajia 3-goku no kingendaishi [History That Opens the Future] Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2005.
27
History That Opens the Future, 199, 217.
28
Kasahara Tokushi. “Shimin karano higashiajia rekishikyōkasho taiwa no jissen: Nit’chūkan sankoku ni okeru ‘Mirai o hiraku rekishi’ to ‘Atarashii higashiajia kingendaishi’ no hakkō,” Sekai 2013 March No. 840, 45-55; Kim, Seongbo. “Higashiajia no rekishi ninshiki kyōyū e no dai ippo.” Sekai 2006 October, 225-234.
29
Shin, Gi-Wook. "Historical Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: Past Efforts, Future Steps, and the U.S. Role." In Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, edited by Daniel Chirot, Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, 2014, 157-85.
30
Park, Soon-Won. "A History That Opens the Future: The First Common China-Japan-Korean History Teaching Guide." In History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, 230-45. New York: Routledge, 2011; Sneider, Daniel C. "The War over Words: History Textbooks and International Relations in Northeast Asia” in History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia, 246-68.
31
The reports of the official Japan-ROK South Korea Joint History Research Committee (2002-05 and 2007-10) are available here and here.
The reports of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee (2006-09) are available here.
For an assessment of how textbooks contents differ on controversial events, see Yoshida, Takashi. 2006. The making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press.
32
Genron NPO. “Dai 2 kai nikkan kyōdō yoron chōsa.” 2014; 2014. "Dai 10 kai nitchū kyōdō yoron chōsa kekka".
Those who thought of Japan as a pacifist society were 10.5% in China and 5.3% in South Korea; those who thought of Japan as a reconciliationist society were 6.7% in China and 3.9% in South Korea. Those who believed that Japan espoused militarism today were 36.5% in China and 53.1% in South Korea. In China, respondents believed that the “history problem” (31.9%) and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (64.8%) were major obstacles for developing a good relationship; in South Korea, the respondents ranked Takeshima/ Dokdo Island (92.2%) and the “history problem” (52.2%) highly as major obstacles for building friendships.
33
Nitchūkan 3-goku Kyōtsū Rekishi Hensan Iinkai. Atarashii higashiajia no kingendaishi (jō): Kokusaikankei no hendō de yomu: Mirai o hiraku rekishi Vol. 1. Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 2012. Atarashii higashiajia no kingendaishi (ge): Tēma de yomu hito to kōryū: Mirai o hiraku rekishi Vol. 2. Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 2012.
34
Utsumi, Aiko, Yasuaki Onuma, Hiroshi Tanaka, and Yoko Kato. Sengo sekinin: Ajia no manazashi ni kotaete. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014.
Dissecting the Wave of Books on Nippon Kaigi, the Rightwing Mass Movement that Threatens Japan’s Future | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
Dissecting the Wave of Books on Nippon Kaigi, the Rightwing Mass Movement that Threatens Japan’s Future
Saito Masami, Nogawa Motokazu and Hayakawa Tadanori (Translation by Miho Matsugu) with an Introduction by Sven Saaler
October 1, 2018
Volume 16 | Issue 19 | Number 1
Article ID 5201
Introduction by Sven Saaler
In 2018, a number of events in Japan and Europe have reassessed the legacy of the 1968 student movement and related phenomena. Generally speaking, “1968”—still considered a symbol of a critique of capitalism, imperialism, and the Cold War world order—is usually associated with left-wing forces. Only in recent years has attention been paid to student organizations opposed to the 1968 left-wing movement. This facet of “1968” is particularly important in Japan, where student groups that rejected the left-wing agenda of organizations such as Zengakuren (Zen Nihon gakusei jichikai sō rengō, All-Japan League of Student Governments) have made political inroads, while the representatives of the left-wing student movement eventually failed to do so.
The right-wing student groups formed in the late 1960s evolved into a political organization that has recently received a good deal of attention in Japanese journalism and academia: Nippon Kaigi (The Japan Conference, hereafter NK). While this association was founded in 1997, the controversy surrounding Japanese history textbooks unfolding around the same time preoccupied many researchers. NK received broad public attention only in 2012, when Abe Shinzo became prime minister for a second time and presented a platform strongly influenced by the demands of NK, to which he has close ties.
The official aims of NK as stated on its website sound like a rather non-partisan appeal to national unity and universal humanism.
We want to preserve traditional culture shaped by eternal (yūkyū) history and to stimulate a healthy national spirit.
We aim to preserve the glory and sovereignty of the state and the construction of a wealthy and disciplined society in which every national finds his/her place.
We aim at harmony between humankind and nature and the realization of a world characterized by mutual respect for culture. co-existence and prosperity.
However, in a society that still debates the historical legacy of ultra-nationalism and militarism, the advocacy of a “healthy national spirit” remains contentious. But beyond these broad goals, though closely linked to them, NK has been lobbying among lawmakers for controversial “reforms,” including a revamping of education as well as a “revision” of the 1947 Constitution. These NK proposals have stimulated scholarly interest, leading to a recent upsurge of studies on the organization. While the number of journal articles was already increasing, the years 2016 and 2017 saw the publication of more than a dozen books on the NK.
In this contribution, experts discuss these publications, summarizing the significance of NK influence on contemporary Japanese politics. A key issue is the far-reaching character of NK demands. Notwithstanding the organization’s innocuous-sounding objectives, the demands call for fundamental change in certain facets of Japanese society, including gender relations, the role of the family, and attitudes to war and peace, demographics, migration, even foreign relations.
While not all authors of this contribution agree on this point, many NK demands are deeply informed by 19th century or pre-war views. They directly challenge key reforms undertaken during the period of the Allied occupation of Japan (1945–52) and aim to “overcome” these reforms, as Prime Minister Abe puts it, and return to pre-war values. In terms of a revision of the Constitution, the most controversial among these topics, NK demands go far beyond an amendment of Article 9, the issue that has received the most media attention globally, to include a limitation on freedom of speech, and a constitutionally prescribed duty to value the “greater good” of society as well as a duty to care for one’s family. The latter has been widely seen as a step towards limiting the role of women and preventing women from succeeding in professional life. However, the authors of this contribution also point out the active participation of women in the NK, which even has a separate sub-organization and reduced membership rates to attract women to join. They also point out that apart from Yamaguchi Tomomi, none of the numerous books published in the last years really addresses the problem of NK’s views on women and gender issues.
Another important point raised in this piece is the strong influence of religious organizations on the NK. Religious organizations such as the followers of Taniguchi Masaharu, the founder of Seichō no ie, and others are closely related and to and strongly support NK. Politicians belonging to these religions have risen to powerful positions in the government, such as Inada Tomomi, a former Minister of Defense. However, notwithstanding these religious connections, the authors reject the characterization of NK as a cult.
Whether or not PM Abe will succeed with his pledge for constitutional revision in the next years, what is certain is that his agenda has been deeply shaped by the NK and the values and goals it promotes. (STS)
Dissecting the Spate of Books on Nippon Kaigi, the Rightwing Mass Movement that Threatens Japan’s Future: Nippon Kaigi is the Tip of the Iceberg
Discussion by Saito Masami, Nogawa Motokazu, and Hayakawa Tadanori
Translation by Miho Matsugu
The original Japanese version of the article is available in the Tosho Shinbun’s website.
Saito Masami, Nogawa Motokazu and Hayakawa Tadanori. “Nippon Kaigi-bon o Kiru!” [Dissecting the Spate of Books on Nippon Kaigi]. Tosho Shimbun, No. 2214, October 28, 2017.
Nippon Kaigi [The Japan Conference] is the embodiment of a conservative mass movement that has been heavily influencing Japan’s politics. Numerous books were published on Nippon Kaigi in 2016 and 2017, and it is safe to say that the public is now aware of the group’s existence. Now that all these books on Nippon Kaigi have been published and the boom has finished its initial stage, Saito Masami, Nogawa Motokazu and Hayakawa Tadanori, who have been critically monitoring the activities of conservative groups, evaluate each book. They clarify what has happened “until now,” and will happen “from now,” in the study of Nippon Kaigi.
Hayakawa Tadanori (top left), Saito Masami (bottom left) and Nogawa Motokazu (right) in Tosho Shimbun, No. 2214, October 28, 2017.
The Nippon Kaigi Book Boom, A Year On
Hayakawa Tadanori: In 2016 and 2017, about ten books and mooks (a publication that is a cross between a book and a magazine) were published on Nippon Kaigi. Nippon Kaigi is the embodiment of a conservative movementcreated in 1997 by the merger of “Nihon o Mamoru Kai” [Association to Protect Japan] which is made up of anti-communist rightwing religious groups including Jinja Honchō [the Associations of Shinto Shrines], and “Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi” [National Conference to Protect Japan]. The latter was an organization of rightwing intellectuals andlocal veterans’ groups(called kyōyūkai). Nippon Kaigi attracted national attention when it emerged that many ministers in the Second Abe administration were members of Nippon Kaigi Kokkai Giin Kondankai [Nippon Kaigi’s Diet Members’ League], and when the group spearheaded a mass movement for constitutional revision in part by establishing “Utukushii Nippon no Kenpō o Tsukuru Kokumin no Kai” [National Association to Create a Beautiful Constitution for Japan].
On September 5, 2016, Asahi Shimbun's evening edition carried a front-page story on the Nippon Kaigi boom in publishing, noting that Sugano Tamotsu’s Nippon Kaigi no Kenkyū [A Study of Nippon Kaigi] (Fusōsha 2016) had sold 150,000 copies, Uesugi Satoshi’s Nippon Kaigi towa Nanika: “Kenpō Kaisei” ni Tsukisusumu Karuto Shūdan [What is Nippon Kaigi? A Cult Group Rushing toward “Constitutional Revision”] (Gōdō shuppan 2016) sold 22,500 copies, and Nippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō [Nippon Kaigi and the Association of Shinto Shrines] (Kinyōbi, 2016) edited by Narusawa Muneo sold about 10,000 copies.
Sugano Tamotsu. Nippon Kaigi no Kenkyū [A Study of Nippon Kaigi] (Fusōsha 2016)
Uesugi Satoshi. Nippon Kaigi towa Nanika: “Kenpō Kaisei” ni Tsukisusumu Karuto Shūdan [What is Nippon Kaigi? A Cult Group Rushing toward “Constitutional Revision”] (Gōdō shuppan 2016)
Shūkan Kinyōbi, Narusawa Muneo (ed.). Nippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō [Nippon Kaigi and the Association of Shinto Shrines] (Kinyōbi, 2016)
Nogawa Motokazu: Including other books, there must have been more than 330,000 volumes sold.
Hayakawa: As someone who publishes books in the unpopular field of humanities, that is a tremendous number. The eerie organization seemingly behind the Abe administration clearly has become a subject of popular interest. While the Abe administration is losing popularity, the move toward constitutional revision for the worse is accelerating under Kibō no Tō [the Party of Hope], led by Koike Yuriko, the Governor of Tokyo and a former vice Secretary-General of Nippon Kaigi’s Diet Members’ League.1 I believe that now is the time to take stock of the books that have been part of the Nippon Kaigi book boom.
Back in the 1970s, there were numerous books published on rightwing organizations. Works by political critic Yamakawa Akio2 and journalist Chamoto Shigemasa among others,3 triggered by Japanese-South Korean collusion and the Lockheed bribery scandal,disclosed how right wingers and former military personnel infiltrated politics. In the 1980s, excellent documents like Hayashi Masayuki’s Tennō o Aisuru Kodomotachi [Children who Love the Emperor] (Aoki shoten 1987) and Kokumin Gakkō no Asa ga Kuru [The Morning of National People's School is Coming] (Tsuge shobō shinsha 1983) revealed how rightwing movements influenced highly controlled education.
From the 1990s, partly because of the prominence of the history textbook controversy, writers like Tawara Yoshifumi and Uesugi Satoshi published detailed reports on the rightwing network within “Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai” [The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform]. Unfortunately, however, readers might have viewed these writings as merely about the history textbook controversy. It seems to me that their works did not boost social awareness of the overall structure of the right wing movement.
The start of the 2000s saw a conservative backlash against “male-female co-participation in planning” (danjo kyōdō sankaku—the Japanese government's official English translation is “Gender Equality”),4 “gender free” (jendā furī),5 and “sex education” (sei kyōiku). Feminists fought against this backlash with a spate of books such as Jendā-Furī Seikyoiku Basshingu [Gender Free and Sex Education Bashing] (Otsuki shoten 2003), “Jendā” no Kiki o Koeru! [Overcome the Crisis of “Gender”!] (Seikyūsha 2006), and the most famous one, Bakkurasshu! [Backlash!] (Sōfūsha 2006).
In 2003, Iyashi no Nashonarizumu [Nationalism as Healing] by Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yoko (Keiō gijuku daigaku shuppankai), an account of people drawn to rightwing organizations like The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform appeared. And in 2012, Shakai Undō no Tomadoi: Feminizumu no “Ushinawareta Jidai” to Kusanone Undō [Social Movements at a Crossroads: Feminism's “Lost Years” vs. Grassroots Conservatism] (Keisō shobō 2012) by Yamaguchi Tomomi, Saito Masami, and Ogiue Chiki came out. Written from a feminist perspective, this book revealed how not only Nippon Kaigi but also the Unification Church of Japan (now the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification) have played a part in the grassroots conservative movement in Japan.
Saito Masami: Our book, Shakai Undō no Tomadoi, is an attempt to meet with and interview people who were on the conservative side during the 2000s when Nippon Kaigi and the Unification Church of Japan were leading thebashing of gender equality and sex education. We wanted to verify who they were, how they were organizing their networks, how they were acting individually, and what motivated their criticism. Although we were conducting research after the fact, we were able to trace the actions that conservatives were taking in their own fields. We pointed out that there was not only a “central control tower” giving orders, as has been understood, but that there were also various approaches to activism in each local area, using media, politicians and activists, and expanding their movement by cooperating with other regions. Still, our research was not able to reach Nippon Kaigi itself.
Nogawa: In 2008, Tawara Yoshifumi published a book titled “Tsukurukai” Bunretsu to Rekishi Gizō no Shinsō [The Split in “the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform” and the Depth of Historical Fabrication] (Kadensha) that detailed the split among proponents of textbook reform. But the book was not widely read. That’s why there are still many people who do not know that “the Society” broke up and that publishing companies such as Ikuhōsha and Jiyūsha are publishing right-leaning textbooks.
Hayakawa: Personally I think the Nippon Kaigi book boom was significant because it sparked broad interest in this rightwing group that was deeply embedded in the Abe administration’s efforts to revise the Constitution. There must be great numbers of people who have heard the name Nippon Kaigi, including those who may not have read books on the subject. That’s why many people were now able to look skeptically at the Moritomo Gakuen and Kake Educational Institution scandals, surfacing in February2010, and question their relationship to Nippon Kaigi.
Nogawa: It was especially clear when the Imperial Rescript on Education [Kyōiku Chokugo] problem occurred.6
Hayakawa: Most of the books on Nippon Kaigi point out that some of its core members were originally activists from Seichō-no-Ie [House of Growth]7 when it was run by the founder Taniguchi Masaharu. So the view that then Minister of Defense Inada Tomomi was “one of the Taniguchi Masaharu fundamentalists” made a splash when it came out that she had defended the private kindergarten Moritomo Gakuen’s use of the Imperial Script on Education in their curriculum. It was also interesting that Nippon Kaigi Osaka immediately announced that the chairman of the Moritomo school board, Kagoike Yasunori,8 was not one of their members.
Nogawa: Before the “Nippon Kaigi” book boom, there was some publicity around photos of politicians like prime minister Abe and Upper House member Yamatani Eriko9 with a former activist for Zaitokukai (or Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai [Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi Koreans])10, which has been distributing discriminatory propaganda. But the connections were not thoroughly investigated and seem to have been forgotten. It would have been different if the photos had come out after the boom.
Hayakawa: From 2014 to 2015, Zaitokukai was seen as the most troublesome group. But the Nippon Kaigi book boom made many people realize that there was a more established and larger movement behind the Abe administrations.
Saito: Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko’s exclusionist tendencies drew public attention when she included “opposition to the right to vote by foreigners in local elections11” as one plank in her Party of Hope’s political platform, and refused to send eulogies to an annual ceremony to commemorate Korean victims massacred at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 (doing so had been customary for Tokyo Governors). In his Nippon Kaigi no Zenbō: Shirarezaru Kyodai Soshiki no Jittai [The Complete Picture of Nippon Kaigi: The Unknown Reality of a Mammoth Organization] (Kadensha 2016), Mr. Tawara clearly explained Nippon Kaigi’s exclusionist stance, including its opposition to the proposal for the 2010 bill allowing non-Japanese residents to vote in local elections. His descriptions also anticipated the movement’s eventual political clout.
Tawara, Yoshifumi. Nippon Kaigi no Zenbō: Shirarezaru Kyodai Soshiki no Jittai [The Complete Picture of Nippon Kaigi: The Unknown Reality of a Mammoth Organization] (Kadensha 2016)
Nogawa: The most impressive part of Mr. Tawara’s book is that it includes many names that are not mentioned in other books such as the members of Nippon Josei no Kai [the Japan Women’s Association]. Conversely, for first-time readers on the subject, it may be hard to understand.
Is Nippon Kaigi a Cult?
Hayakawa: While the boom in its entirety was very significant, each author takes a distinct approach and has a particular emphasis. As much as they overlap, their opinions are diverse.
Nogawa: Most of the books provide a common understanding of Nippon Kaigi’s historical origins. It is symbolic that the title of the series written for Asahi shimbun, which became the basis for Fujiu Akira’s Dokyumento Nippon Kaigi [Document Nippon Kaigi] (Chikuma shobō 2017), the latest among all the books in the boom, was “Nippon Kaigi o Tadotte” [Tracing the Path of Nippon Kaigi] (November 6-21, 2016). Authors don’t generally disagree about Nippon Kaigi’s historical background; I think they share a common understanding. For instance, they all say that a major moment in the establishment of Nippon Kaigi was the reign-name legalization movement.13 Although, in Nippon Kaigi no Kenkyū [A Study of Nippon Kaigi] (Fusōsha 2016),Mr. Sugano says “the movement for legislating the reign-name system was the beginning of everything” (40), he also says “the origin of Nippon Kaigi lay in its failure to pass the ‘Bill for the establishment of state support of Yasukuni Shrine’ [Yasukuni Jinja Kokka Goji Hōan]”14 (74). This inconsistency may stem from merely putting these serial essays together in a book, which may have backfired since each issue tends to have a catchy topic (originally published in a web media, Harbor Business Online).
I think what divides authors are their views on the source and extent of Nippon Kaigi’s influence and its source of funding. The Sugano book says that the Association of Shinto Shrines,15 which is often seen as Nippon Kaigi’s funder, is not so important. In chapter 5, titled “A Crowd of People” (Ichigun no Hitobito), he emphasizes the administrative skills of Nihon Seinen Kyōgikai (Nisseikyō) [Japan Youth Council],16 a group organized by former members of the right wing student movements, many of whom are former members of Seichō-no-Ie.
On the other hand, Yamazaki Masahiro in his Nippon Kaigi: Senzen Kaiki eno Jōnen [Nippon Kaigi: Passions to Return to Prewar Japan] (Shūeisha 2016) regards the Association of Shinto Shrines as crucial. Aoki Osamu’s Nippon Kaigi no Shōtai [Nippon Kaigi’s True Colors] (Heibonsha 2016) appears to be somewhere in between. Although Nippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō [Nippon Kaigi and Association of Shinto Shrines] edited by Narusawa Muneo has “the Association of Shinto Shrines” in its title, Narusawa’s own chapter is titled “Nippon Kaigi to Shūkyō Uyoku” [Nippon Kaigi and the Religious Rightwing], which looks not only at the association but also at other conservative religious groups.
I think that we should neither overestimate nor underestimate the Association of Shinto Shrines. Certainly it sounds like a giant organization when we hear that there are 80,000 shrines in Japan. But in reality there are only about 20,000 so-called shinto priests. In other words, most of the shrines do not have full-time priests. Therefore, it clearly is an exaggeration to say that 80,000 shrines are mobilized in the movement. On the other hand, wealthy shrines hold significant power when we include their accumulated assets, despite their limited numbers. These issues need more research.
Fujiu, Akira. Dokyumento Nippon Kaigi [Document Nippon Kaigi] (Chikuma shobō 2017)
Yamazaki, Masahiro. Nippon Kaigi: Senzen Kaiki eno Jōnen [Nippon Kaigi: Passions to Return to Prewar Japan] (Shūeisha 2016)
Aoki, Osamu. Nippon Kaigi no Shōtai [Nippon Kaigi’s True Colors] (Heibonsha 2016)
Hayakawa: In terms of which is more influential, the former Seichō-no-Ie groups or the Association of Shinto Shrines, I would say both. But as someone who has seen a lot of their various activities, I think it is too simplistic to regard them exclusively as “right wing religious movements.” A certain number of ordinary people who have little to do with any religious group are also participating. And in some regions, local vocational schools or far-right conservative company presidents also take part.
Indeed, Nippon Kaigi is a conglomeration of a variety of new religious groups, some of whom are extremely reactionary. For example, OISCA International (The Organization for Industrial Spiritual and Cultural Advancement International), a non-profit foundation, originates in the former Ananai kyō. The school they ran was highly militaristic, emphasizing the principles of hakkō ichiu (The Eight Corners of the World under One Roof), a political slogan used to justify an international order for Asia with Imperial Japan at the top, and The Imperial Rescript on Education. Now OISCA is often portrayed as an international NGO working on developing farming villages and protecting the environment, but it used to be ardently anti-communist. As Tsukada Hotaka describes in his Shūkyō to Seiji no Tenketsuten [A Tipping point in Religion and Politics] (Kadensha 2015), each religious group has different characteristics and a different level of right wing politics, yet many of the books on “Nippon Kaigi” seem to focus only on the former Seichō-no-Ie members.
Saito: Some of their main targets are women and family. Abe Shinzo and Nippon Kaigi have taken various actions against women’s human rights including their opposition to allowing married couples to go by different surnames since the mid-1990s; their criticism of Gender Equality policy, sex education and the right of sexual self-determination since the early 2000s; and the promotion of family education under the 2006 “revision” of the Fundamental Law of Education.17 While the Abe administration currently has a policy called “Women’s Active Participation” (josei katsuyaku), Abe Shinzo, as the chairperson of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Project Team to Investigate Extreme Sex Education and Gender Free Education, has a history of running counter to the Gender Equality policy by spreading groundless rumors about co-ed cavalry battles and men and women changing clothes in the same room. However, these books do not mention issues of women and family other than their opposition to separate surnames for married couples. Mr. Tawara’s book is an exception, giving details about the move toward constitutional revision like “Joshi no Atsumaru Kenpō Oshaberi Kafe” [The Cafe where Girls Get Together to Chat About the Constitution18. On the contrary, although Mr. Sugano talks about the issues of gender, there are some problems in his approach.
Nogawa: I remember thinking that Mr. Sugano does not really understand gender issues, when I read what he wrote about the two Supreme Court rulings on allowing separate surnames for a married couple. One ruling, he said, found it “unconstitutional” to forbid remarriage for a certain period. The other said it was “constitutional" to require a single surname for a married couple. He writes that these rulings represent a “very clear contrast.” Actually the court only declared “unconstitutional” an extended remarriage ban of more than one hundred days, and did not rule against the idea as a whole. It was not a response to the fundamental question asked by the plaintiff, of whether it is against the principle of equality under law when only women are not allowed to remarry given the advances of reproductive technology. It was nothing like the “clear contrast” that he claims to find.
Saito: Yet Mr. Sugano is saying on twitter and other social media that Nippon Kaigi is a “shut-up-women-and-kids” movement.
Hayakawa: Does it really “shut up women and kids”?
Saito: Not at all. Nippon Kaigi is certainly a male-centered organization, but it created Nippon josei no kai [Japan Women’s Association] and it does place women in positions as needed, like making Sakurai Yoshiko19 a co-representative for their “Utsukushii Nippon no Kenpō o Tsukuru Kokumin no Kai” [National Citizens’ Association to Create a Beautiful Constitution for Japan]. They do not openly tell women to shut up or look down on them, although they do emphasize the division of labor by gender and the value of family. In fact, plenty of women actively participate in the movement.
Nogawa: And take Mr. Yamazaki’s idea that Nippon Kaigi is all about a “return to prewar Japan.” It is true that right wing movements tend to evoke the image of the return to prewar Japan, just as the Imperial Rescript on Education became the focus in the Moritomo Gakuen Incident. But if we frame everything in that lens, we end up overlooking many things. For instance, as only Mr. Tawara’s book points out, recent educational reforms in Japan are modeled on those by Margaret Thatcher’s administration. Kabashima Yuzo, the president of the Japan Youth Council and Executive Secretary of Nippon Kaigi, and Nakanishi Terumasa, Professor Emeritus of Kyoto University, made a study trip to England with politicians including Shimomura Hakubun and Eto Seiichi and published Sacchā Kaikaku ni Manabu Kyōiku Seijōka eno Michi [The Path to Normalization of Education Learned from Thatcher’s Educational Reforms] (PHP kenkyūsho 2005). In other words, while some of the family policies and historical view of Nippon Kaigi are specific to Japan, new-conservatism gives those policies more of a global stage. I think the generalization of Nippon Kaigi as a “return to prewar Japan” may lead us to miss that point.
Hayakawa: In the case of Mr. Yamazaki’s book, I notice the way he finds expressions in Kokutai no Hongi [The Essence of the National Polity] (ed. Ministry of Education, 1937) that are similar to Nippon Kaigi’s statements and insists they are identical. To be sure, there are commonalities between prewar nationalist fundamentalism and contemporary right wing movements. But Nippon Kaigi is not making “the return to prewar Japan” its goal. Finding simplistic analogies in prewar Japan is easy to do, and I am as guilty of it as the next man, but I am afraid that it gets in the way of understanding why, at this moment in history, they are embracing a movement based on the prewar view of the family state.
Saito: It is illogical to say that Nippon Kaigi’s ideology is a “return to prewar Japan” just because its arguments are similar to those of The Essence of the National Polity during the war, which has nothing to do with Nippon Kaigi’s activities.
Nogawa: A book published this past spring, Kore ga Warera no Kenpō Kaisei Teian da [This is Our Proposal for Constitutional Revision] by Ito Tetsuo, Okada Kunihiro and Kosaka Minoru20 (Nihon seisaku kenkyū sentā 2017), objects to the criticism that Nippon Kaigi wants “to revive the ie system,” thepatriarchal family legislative system of imperial Japan. Indeed, ideologues of Nippon Kaigi themselves argue that “postwar GHQ destroyed our ie system,” so in some sense they are bringing this criticism on themselves. They are not trying to revive the rights of the household head as they were before the end of the war, but rather aim at the “restoration of family” in a form that fits the present time.
Saito: To demonize them as a “cult,” “a crowd of people,” or an “inner circle” is problematic too. It’s a problem to try to consider Nippon Kaigi as heresy, claiming that they are a pack of evildoers.
Nogawa: The subtitle of Mr. Uesugi’s book refers to Nippon Kaigi as a “Cult Group.” The book defines “cult” as being “ignorant of the world, or not understanding the reality of society,” and to have a “tendency not to think independently.”
Saito: I think it’s very bad to use the word “cult,” especially in Japan, where the image of religion as scary or eerie tends to be strong. I feel that the book is trying to take advantage of this image.
Nogawa: The use of the word “cult” as I just mentioned may promote discrimination against religion, since, in Japan, it became known to the general public through the incidents caused by The Unification Church of Japan and Aum Shinrikyō. When I think about that kind of danger, Mr. Uesugi’s definition is excessively arbitrary. In the sociology of religion since the 1970s, the term “cult” usually refers to “a new religion that has a tense relationship with society (Shūkyōgaku Jiten [Religious Studies Encyclopedia] ed. Hoshino Hideki et. al, Maruzen shuppan, 2010). For example, with The Unification Church’s inspiration business fraud and Aum Shinrikyō’s terrorist sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, we can say, for the time being, that calling these institutions a cult follows this academic use of the word. I think, however, it is necessary to question whether the word is being used simply to designate a minority, as seen by the majority.
But to answer the question of whether we can call Nippon Kaigi or religious groups affiliated with Nippon Kaigi a cult, we have to look at the current state of Japanese society. For example, I am not sure if our society has such a tense relationship with the values of the Japan Youth Council that we would call them a cult.
Hayakawa: I see. It is not whether they are a cult or not, but whether we are able to separate ourselves from them as a cult.
Nogawa: In order to call them a cult, Japanese society must have had established values that are clearly disengaged from their values. But can we say that we have that kind of tense relationship with them? The issue of Moritomo Gakuen, for instance, had been well known among some people for a long time. The reason it became a topic for daytime tabloid TV shows, however, is because they were caught in a money scandal. Whatever we say, it was Japanese society who had neglected the kindergarten. That’s why I want to ask ourselves if we have the qualifications to call them a cult.
Nippon Kaigi, the History Wars, and Anti-Feminism
Hayakawa: You have both been looking at right wing conservative movements influenced by Nippon Kaigi. Is there anything that particularly concerns you?
Saito: For Nippon Kaigi, family education is very important, but these books say little about this. In his book, Mr. Tawara, who is knowledgeable about education, has the most detailed discussion of Nippon Kaigi’s emphasis on family. But school education was still his main focus. Oyagaku [Parental Education],21 advocated by Takahashi Shiro22 who has a very close relationship with Nippon Kaigi, regards the roots of various problems for children as “residing in problems at home,” and particularly those involving their parents’ “lack of effort to create affection.” Saying that “how parents engage is important,” oyagaku puts particular emphasis on family education (ed. Takahashi Shiro, Zoku Oyagaku no Susume [Encouragement of Parental Studies Part 2], Morarojī kenkyūsho, 2006).
Nogawa: Mr. Tawara, too, points out that the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education is modeled on the United Kingdom. But he cannot go further than that because, I think, he has not delved more deeply into the problem of family.
Hayakawa: Mr. Tawara and his group Kodomo to kyōkasho zenkoku netto 21 [Children and Textbooks Network Japan 21] focused on the changing view of family during the 1998-1999 revisions of home economics textbooks for elementary, middle and high schools (Tsuruta Atsuko, Kateika ga Nerawareteiru [Home Economics is Targeted] Asahi shimbunsha, 2004). That problem is resurfacing now.
Nogawa: In fact, right wing intellectuals who are very close to Nippon Kaigi, such as Yagi Hidetsugu 23and Takahashi Shiro, still now actively bring up home economics textbooks as their issue.
Saito: Takahashi Shiro has been reappointed twice as a member of the expert committee for the Conference for Gender Equality of the Cabinet Office under the Abe administration. He has also entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yagi Hidetsugu, too, is a member of the subcommittee of the Civil Code in Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice and of Kyōiku Saisei Jikkō Kaigi [Education Rebuilding Implementation Council] in the Cabinet Secretariat. Both Takahashi and Yagi are taking active roles in the center of the government.
Nogawa: You mean, methodologically speaking, their feminist point of view is very weak.
Saito: Yes. That home and family do not enter the minds of the authors of the “Nippon Kaigi” books means that they do not understand the true nature of Nippon Kaigi. My fear reaches that level.
Almost all the authors of the “Nippon Kaigi” books are men. Nippon Kaigi has been tackling gender, sexuality and family as issues that are important for their theory of the state. But almost none of these books address what Nippon Kaigi has done on these themes. Only Ms. Yamaguchi (Tomomi), in Nippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō, discusses gender and sexuality, arguing that Nippon Kaigi has deployed the movement against the separate surnames for married couples in order to stop what they see as the breakdown of the family. She clearly writes that one of Nippon Kaigi’s targets is to weaken Article 24 of the Constitution.
Nogawa: By the way, the Sugano book says that Nippon Kaigi’s most likely target for constitutional revision is not Article 9 but Article 24 and the Emergency Situation Article. Ms. Saito and I both support 24 jō Kaesasenai Campaign [The Campaign to Oppose LDP and Rightist Revision of Article 24] and yield to no one in drawing public attention to it. Still, Sugano is wrong. Nippon Kaigi’s true target remains Article 9. He uses this kind of contrarian claim in order to give his argument a semblance of originality. For example, he points out that Sakurai Yoshiko, one of the co-representatives of the National Citizens’ Association to Create a Beautiful Constitution for Japan, mentioned only two concrete issues at a conference hosted by the association on November 10, 2015: the “Emergency Situation Article” and “family.” Sugano writes that this shows “their posture is to prioritize these two over Article 9.” But if you listen to Ms. Sakurai’s speech, even though “Article 9” as a word does not appear, it is obvious that “Article 9 constitutional revision” (kyūjō kaiken) is uppermost in her mind. Also, other than those two issues, she concretely mentioned the preamble of the Constitution. I’d like to touch later on this kind of arbitrariness in interpreting materials and testimony.
Also, while they focus on Seichō-no-Ie, almost none of the authors look at Yūsei hogohō kaisei undō24 (the movement to revise the Eugenic Protection Law). Actually this is one of the themes that Seichō-no-Ie was obsessed with.
Saito: Recently there are signs of a dangerous turn of events. This July (2017), in Kaga City, Ishikawa Prefecture, the Mayor Miyamoto Riku, one of the founders of Nippon Kaigi Chihō Giin Renmei [the Nippon Kaigi Local Assembly Members’ League], succeeded in passing an ordinance called “Onaka no Akachan o Taisetsu ni suru Kagashi Seimei Sonchō no Hi Jōrei” [OrdinanceDesignating A Day for Caring for Babies in Their Mothers’ Tummies]. The move came in cooperation with the headquarters of “Seimei Sonchō Center” [Pro-Life Center] in Tokyo. The Pro-Life Center claims “human rights for the fetus” and hosts lectures to raise awareness by creating akachan posuto (side haven boxes for new mothers to relinquish their babies without penalty)25 criticizing the current Maternal Body Protection Law (Botai Hogo Hō) under which economic reasons can justify legal abortion.
Nogawa: Regardless of whether the ordinance is a result of Nippon Kaigi’s organizational activities, it is ideologically consistent with it.
Saito: Yes, it is. The word “pro-life” (seimei sonchō) is being used to deny the right to self-determination for women as part of women’s reproductive health and rights. We have to keep our eye on this.26
Hayakawa: “Pro-life for the fetus” was a key phrase that often appeared in efforts in the 1980s by Seichō-no-Ie to revise the Eugenic Protection Law.
Saito: Seichō-no-Ie had tried to revise the Eugenic Protection Law in the 1970s, but failed because of opposition from some members of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Japan Medical Association, and the women’s liberation movement.27 In 1982, Murakami Masakuni,28 a member of the Upper House and affiliated with Seichō-no-Ie, claimed that “fetuses are human” and used calls for “pro-life for the fetus” to try to revise the law. Again opposition from women’s groups short-circuited this attempt, but he was very active in doing things like using Mother Teresa’s words.
Nogawa: But many of the authors view Murakami in a favorable light because he is their source of information.
Saito: This is why I think we are at a crisis point.
Nogawa: Takahashi Shiro, a member of Nippon Kaigi, is still active in the anti-reproductive rights movement. He and some others have given talks in recent years at rallies held by an organization that advocates the “rights of the fetus.” Relating to the topic of the return to prewar Japan that we just discussed, the current push to regulate reproductive rights is not a simple repetition of efforts to debase the Eugenic Protection Law. We should look at it as a movement linked to social concern over the declining birth rate.
Saito: They are using it cleverly. By talking about the policy in terms of the declining birth rate and the crisis of a decreasing population, it makes us hard to see that their true goal is to deny a woman’s right to decide whether she will give birth or not.
Nogawa: The rhetoric of “a state of emergency” (kinkyū jitai) is also often used. This pulls people into a conservative backlash. If someone says “That’s dangerous!,” your response would more likely be “Oh my god!”
Hayakawa: You mean that these books on Nippon Kaigi rarely take up these right wing mass movements that have become enmeshed in our everyday lives.
Saito: I wonder if the authors of the books are not so interested in the problems of everyday life.
Nogawa: Exactly. Considering how much they emphasize the “grass roots” nature of the Nippon Kaigi’s movement, I feel that they ignore the activities of those living outside of Tokyo. This may be also related to the fact that most of the authors of the Nippon Kaigi books, including the media, live in Tokyo. In this sense, the greatest contribution of the Uesugi book is chapter five “Ikuhōsha wa Osaka de Donoyōnishite Tairyōsaitaku o Jitsugen Shitaka?” [How did Ikuhōsha Publishers. Make Possible the Massive Adoption of Their Textbooks in Osaka?], which describes the activities of Ikuhōsha29 in detail. This chapter is very worthwhile.
Saito: It gets into a structural analysis of the movement.
Nogawa: The fifth chapter is very useful for thinking about what exactly is happening in other regions. It mentions a company called Fuji Housing (Fuji Jūtaku).30 There are many CEOs and presidents who support this kind of movement all over Japan. In the context of Mr. Hayakawa’s question about whether to characterize Nippon Kaigi as a religious right wing movement, I think the presence of business people in local areas is often overlooked. At a rally by Nippon Kaigi Osaka on Constitution Memorial Day this year, a consulting company was involved in organizing the event and some of their employees were participants in the symposium.
I see only few books that talk about what Nippon Kaigi is really doing now. The Fujiu book, the most recently published, also focuses only on the historical origin.
Saito: I wonder why he does that when others have already done so.
Nogawa: Mr. Fujiu has been researching Nippon Kaigi for a long time, so I read his treatment of Nippon Kaigi’s historical origin as quite reliable. But what is happening now? Pardon me for my bias for wanting to talk about my own interests, but for example, we are at the height of the talk of “history wars” (rekishisen). Right wingers use the term “history wars” in reference to claims about “comfort women” and the “Nanjing Massacre” as false accusations in order to appeal to supporters both domestically and internationally.
Hayakawa: Speaking of the “history wars,” it was revealed in 2015 that LDP Upper House member Inoguchi Kuniko had sent out copies of the book History Wars: Japan-False Indictment of the Century, a shortened bilingual version of Rekishisen: Asahi Shimbun ga Sekai ni Maita ‘Ianfu’ no Uso o Utsu, published by Sankei shuppan, to numerous scholars of Japan in the United States.31
Nogawa: The Sugano book says that Takahashi Shiro wrote the letter opposing the inclusion of the Nanjing Massacre in the UNESCO Memory of the World Register sent by the Japanese government to UNESCO.32 The Yamazaki book also introduced Nippon Kaigi arguments denying both the Nanjing Massacre and the comfort women problem.
Hayakawa: I recently heard that a U.S.-based organization affiliated with the self-help group Rinri kenkyūsho [RINRI Institute of Ethics], which constitutes a part of Nippon Kaigi, is actively pressing a historical revisionist movement in New York and elsewhere. They are waging the “history wars,” including opposing the building of a “Statue of Peace” (statue commemorating military comfort women) and mobilizing people in the United States behind their movement. Nippon Kaigi is an umbrella organization for such movements. I believe this is the sketch that we have to have in mind when we talk about the “complete picture.”
Nogawa: If I may defend these authors a little, it might be hard for a single author to cover so much. The only authors who have been able to meet Nippon Kaigi members are Mr. Aoki and Mr. Fujiu. Mr. Sugano talked only to former members of Nippon Kaigi, who may have been able to talk candidly, but because they have left group their information might be wrong or be mixed with their personal antagonistic bias. We have to be careful about that.
Saito: Mr. Aoki and Mr. Fujiu both write about the difficulty of interviewing members, many of whom refused to talk with them. I admire and appreciate that these two journalists conducted interviews despite such difficulty. With increasing attention to Mr. Sugano’s articles on the Internet, I think that interviewing people in Nippon Kaigi has become harder. I myself was refused when I asked for the schedule of one of their constitutional revision campaign trucks. They said “we are only allowed to tell our board members.” I feel keenly the difficulty of research.
Further Critique of Ideological and Cultural Activism
Hayakawa: The concept of family, including the multigenerational family advocated by people like Momochi Akira33 (a member of Nippon Kaigi’s strategic committee), emphasizes “family bonding” as an ideal. They call for “caring for elders within the family.” Moreover, their Japanese family ideal provides justification to cut welfare. Takahashi Shiro and Yagi Hidetsugu, too, say, “This is an advantage of the Japanese welfare society.” The origin of this ideology is the Ohira Masayoshi administration’s “Policy for Perfecting Family Foundations,” which began in 1979. This is the forerunner of neoliberalism in Japan, much like Thatcherism or Reaganomics. It may appear as if Nippon Kaigi were praising the restoration of the prewar family. Yet what they propose as policies are in fact those of neoliberalism. If we frame everything as “misogyny” or “the return to prewar,” I think it makes it hard to see the discrepancy between the ideals they hold up and the reality of their actions, which will end up misleading readers.
Nogawa: The only book that mentions the name of Kato Akihiko, the professor at Meiji University who advocates multigenerational family residence, is Mr. Tawara’s. I give him credit for this.
Saito: We now have a pretty good sense of Nippon Kaigi’s background and the overall picture. Now we need micro-level fieldwork and investigative reporting on different themes and areas.
Hayakawa: I agree. For instance, the multi-generational household we discussed ended up being incorporated into government policy, through the tax incentive for multigenerational households (2015) passed during the second Abe administration. But if we conclude that there’s never anything wrong with a tax cut, we miss the family view that drives it.
Saito: The tax incentive applies even to those who are not living with their parents and grandparents. Still, they use the word “multi-generational household” that seems to favor a family of parents, their children and their grandchildren.
Hayakawa: After all, it became a system that gives you a tax advantage. Bottom line, as long as a construction project includes additions to accommodate another household, a second kitchen, bath tub, toilet, or entrance, you get favorable tax treatment. This is a prime example of the gap between their ideals and reality. Of course this is mainly a result of resistance on the part of the Ministry of Land, Information, Transport and Tourism and some members of the LDP to a taxation system that rewards certain life choices, but it would be interesting to follow the process at the micro level, starting from the proposal by Nippon Kaigi to when the policy was put into effect.
Nogawa: In any case, each book connects Nippon Kaigi with the Abe administration. Yet the problems each author finds in the Abe administration determine the problems that the author sees in Nippon Kaigi.
Hayakawa: Mr. Sugano writes, “Compared with any other prime ministers and LDP presidents, Abe is easily compromised and easily influenced by rightwing organizations’ old trick of ‘jōbu kōsaku’,” (sending members into positions in government or a political party thereby influencing their policy agenda and ideology) because the foundations of the administration are weak. This argument emphasizes the influence of what he calls “a crowd of people” within Nippon Kaigi, especially Ito Tetsuo, as “a promoter of Abe Shinzo.” The book reads as if Abe were manipulated by “a crowd of people.”
Nogawa: The Aoki book does that too. The Uesugi book says that Abe, influenced by his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke, had called for the revision of Article 9 since his college days. His diagnosis is that Abe was drawn to such ideology since his youth. Both Mr. Aoki and Mr. Sugano see Abe as an empty vessel. Their opinion is divided about what is all-important, however: that is, whether Abe Shinzo has an ideological affinity for Nippon Kaigi or not.
Hayakawa: On that, Nippon Kaigi no Jinmyaku [The Human Network of Nippon Kaigi] by Sansai bukkusu gives a detailed introduction into the brains behind both the administration and Nippon Kaigi’s think tank. It’s a good book, but unfortunately positive for the administration (laugh).
Focusing only on Nippon Kaigi could lead us to overlook other right wing movements that are gradually penetrating Japanese society, such as Nihon Seinen Kaigisho (Junior Chamber International Japan, or JC), Morarojī (The Institute of Moralogy), Rinri kenkyûsho (RINRI Institute of Ethics), the Clean-the-toilet-with-bare-hands-movement by Nihon o Utsukushikusuru Kai (the Council to Make Japan Beautiful) and other nationalistic business groups. Just this summer JC held its annual summer conference in Yokohama. I heard that there were many poster presentations on “the history wars.” JC’s organizational capacity and financial muscle should not be underestimated. It has already gotten deeply into education through programs like Ryōdo Ryōkai Ishiki Jōsei puroguramu [On and Offshore Territorial Consciousness-Raising Program], Tokuiku Zemināru [Moral Education Seminar], and Anzen Hoshō Kyōiku puroguramu [National Security Education Program].
Sansai bukkusu (ed.). 2016. Nippon Kaigi no Jinmyaku [The Human Network of Nippon Kaigi]. Sansai mook, vol. 899. Tokyo: Sansai bukkusu.
Nogawa: Many important members of Nippon Kaigi do not appear in these books.
Saito: For example, among the forgotten are Tashimo Masaaki, a pediatrician and executive secretary of the Hokkaido branch of Nippon Kaigi, and Okamoto Akiko, an activist journalist.34 Ms. Okamoto was long a very active member of Nippon Kaigi, writing for journals like Seiron and speaking as a housewife. She was deeply involved in Nippon Kaigi’s movement to prevent married couples from having separate surnames, and the backlash against the Gender Equality Policy. Ms. Okamoto accused the Japanese government of sending only leftists to the United Nations. In order to watch developments on women’s rights and family issues at the UN, she founded Kazoku no Kizuna o Mamoru kai or FAVS [Family Value Society] and sent people to the hearings by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Yamamoto Yumiko of Nadeshiko akushon (Nadeshiko Action, Japanese Women for Justice and Peace), an organization formed to deny the “comfort” women problem, and Ganaha Masako of Ryūkyū Shinpō Okinawa Taimusu o Tadasu Kenmin Kokumin no Kai [Association for the Inquiry of Ryūkyū Shimpō and Okinawa Times by the People of Okinawa and Japan], an anchor woman for the Okinawa branch of Channel Sakura, carry on Ms. Okamoto’s legacy.35
Nogawa: This is important. In addition, Ms. Okamoto wrote in the May 2012 issue of Seiron that Japanese children were bullied in the U.S. because of the “Comfort Woman Monument,” and pioneered criticism of “Comfort Woman Monuments” in the United States and other countries.
Saito: I met a member of Nippon Kaigi who said “Mr. Tashimo is important for me.” His house had many books written by Mr. Tashimo. Particularly important to him were a series of articles titled “Seminar to support raising kids who say I love Japan, Thank you mother” that Tashimo wrote in Nippon Kaigi’s official publication, Nippon no ibuki [Japan’s Breath of Energy]. “Mr. Tashimo’s articles are the most important,” he told me. “Everyone in our house is reading them.” The series was written for mothers to learn about raising children.
Nogawa: Mr. Tashimo’s main theme is a critique of the “critique of the myth of the first three years.” He says it is not a myth.
Hayakawa: If we only look at how Nippon Kaigi advocates “constitutional revision,” we will not pay attention to ideologues like Mr. Tashimo who focus on child rearing and family.
Nogawa: The only works of Ito Tetsuo that Mr. Aoki includes inches bibliography are Ito’s books on the constitution and the Imperial Rescript of Education. Based on this, we can see where Mr. Aoki puts his emphasis.
Saito: Nippon Kaigi considers important not only matters of state such as constitutional revision and national security but also culture. In terms of legislating the reign-name system, for instance, they know people are easily drawn in through everyday life, through events like “the Day of Meiji” and “the Day of Showa.”36 I also heard that some are questioning the way Motoya Toshio (CEO of APA group37) and his followers focus on hardcore politics and suggest, instead, a softer way through culture.
Nogawa: Looking only at hard-headed people keeps us from seeing how so-called ordinary people are participating in the movement.
Also in his book, Mr. Sugano interviewed an adjunct lecturer at Doshisha University who had been recruited by Japan Youth Council, but in this case the recruitment failed. While he writes that Nisseikyō skillfully persuade people to join the group, Mr. Sugano says young members are all the children and grandchildren of members. I see this kind of contradiction everywhere in his book. But scholars seem to often refer to this book since it was the first and it sold well.
Saito: Sugano writes that Nihon Seisaku Kenkyū Sentā or Japan Policy Institute focuses on four main issues: “historical recognition,” “opposition to separate surnames for married couples,” “military comfort women,” and anti-“gender free,” referring to the May 2004 issue of Asu eno sentaku [Choice for tomorrow], the institute’s journal. He writes that these are also the “main themes” for the Abe administration. A scholar referred to this part and wrote as if these four themes were still the Japan Policy Institute’s.38 The Sugano book is problematic because it introduces random documents convenient for his argument without considering the context.
Nogawa: Mr. Sugano also writes about Takahashi Shiro’s study abroad in the United States largely based on speculation. As supporting evidence, he says that Takahashi had written almost no “articles on education.” I wonder how he researched this claim. Until the mid-1980s, Takahashi Shiro wrote many articles on educational reform under the occupation. Sengo Kyōikushi Kenkyū Sentā (The Research Center for Postwar Educational History of Japan) at Meisei University was established using materials Takahashi collected in the United States. The author uses his unfair evaluation of Takahashi’s work to speculate about his motivation to study in the U.S. Because it is a best-selling book, I’d like to make this point clear.
Saito: I met someone, a right winger, who told me that he was angry because Mr. Sugano wrote about him as if Nippon Kaigi and Ito Tetsuo manipulated him, without even interviewing him. He said he complained to Fusōsha39, the publisher of the book.
Hayakawa: The book’s climax points to Ando Iwao40 as “a man who is standing at the origin of the swing to conservativism.” We can see that he wanted to identify the same kind of “final boss” character found in video games by digging up the human network of the former Seichō-no-Ie in Nippon Kaigi. But this is surprising when we look at the mainstream scholarship of the postwar right wing movements. Also, I thought the ending in which he says “We are still living in the extension of the violence in front of Nagasaki University’s main gate” is a quite stunning characterization.
Saito: It must be so upsetting if you were labeled that on the basis of simple speculation.
Hayakawa: Although the Sugano book was a best-seller, I have doubts about relying exclusively on this book, especially in the academic field. I hope scholars will look at not only the Nippon Kaigi books but also other books on right wing movements.
Nogawa: At least I want them to read more than two books so that they have a basis for comparison.
Saito: But in reality I bet most people only read the Sugano book.
Nogawa: Basically most of the authors are either scholars who are interested in the textbook problem or journalists. This topic may be too new and close to tackle, but in the future, political scientists will have to analyze the actual policy-making process and find out how Nippon Kaigi became involved. After all, it looks like we just took the first step in that vein with these smaller scale book forms such as shinsho, mook, and booklets. Scholars and journalists should build on these thin volumes and delve into the topic of Nippon Kaigi more deeply.
Hayakawa: I think many people have been able to grasp the contours of Nippon Kaigi for the time being. Now we need a critique of the ideology and thought that penetrates the Nippon Kaigi movement.
Saito: We have to include their cultural activities in addition to critiquing thought.
Nogawa: And it’s also important to know what kind of society they want to create. Aside from whether I agree with him, in this sense, I can understand the aim of Mr. Yamazaki’s “return to prewar” criticism.
Saito: We need to examine how conservative politicians, from the Abe administration’s cabinet down, turn the Nippon Kaigi ideology into policies and laws. At the same time, those who are engaged in religious groups’ activities that are tied to grassroots movements may not be aware that they are participating in the Nippon Kaigi movement. I think it’s important to look carefully at what Nippon Kaigi is doing every day.
Hayakawa: We’ve got enough books dissecting Nippon Kaigi as a cult. Nippon Kaigi is “the tip of the iceberg” and under the surface, it encompasses various movements, seminars, lectures, and patriotic businesses. I believe we are reaching a phase where we must turn our focus to concrete right wing movements that are connected with our daily life.
Saito Masami is a lecturer at University of Toyama. Her research is on feminist and other social movements. She is a co-author of Shakai Undō no Tomadoi: Feminizumu no ‘Ushinawareta Jidai’ to Kusanone Hoshu Undō [Social Movements at a Crossroads: Feminism's "lost years" vs. grassroots conservatism.] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2012) with Tomomi Yamaguchi and Ogiue Chiki. She has also contributed chapters for Kokka wa Naze Kazoku ni Kanshō suru noka: Hōan Seisaku no Haigo ni aru Mono [Why Does a State Intervene in Families? What is behind Bills and Policies] (edited by Honda Yuki and Ito Kimio, 2017, Seikyusha: Tokyo) and Tettei Kenshō Nihon no Ukeika [Thorough Inspection of Japan’s Leaning to Right] (Chikuma Shobô: Tokyo, 2017). She is a co-organizer of and contributor to the website Feminizumu no Rekishi to Riron History and Theory of Feminism].
Nogawa Motokazu is a lecturer in philosophy based at Kobe Gakuin University. His analyses of the history of Japanese war crimes and military sexual slavery have been published in the Japanese media and internationally.
Hayakawa Tadanori is the author of the following books: Life in the Incredible Final Battle of Japan, the Land of the Gods (Shinkoku Nihon no tondemo kessen seikatsu); Japan, the Nuclear Power Utopia (Genpatsu yūtopia Nihon); The Art of “Patriotism” (“Aikoku” no gihō); Advertisements of Hatred (Zō-o no kōkoku; The Dystopia of “Japan is Great”: the Genealogy of Singing One's Own Praises in Wartime (“Nihon sugoi” no disutopia: senjika jiga jisan no keifu).
Sven Saaler is Professor of Modern Japanese History at Sophia University in Tokyo. After earning a Ph.D. in Japanese Studies from Bonn University, he was Lecturer at Marburg University, Head of the Humanities Section of the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) and Associate Professor at The University of Tokyo. He is author of Politics, Memory and Public Opinion(2005), co-author/co-editor of Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History(2007), The Power of Memory in Modern Japan(2008), Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History(2011), Under Eagle Eyes: Lithographs, Drawings and Photographs from the Prussian Expedition to Japan, 1860-61(2011), Mutual Perceptions and Images in Japanese-German Relations, 1860-2010(2017), and the Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History(2018).
Miho Matsugu is a translator. For The Asia-Pacific Journal. She has translated Komori Yoichi’s essay--“Japan's Article 9 and Economic Justice: The Work of Shinagawa Masaji.” She is currently working on “Translation Practicum on Kawabata Yasunari’s The Izu Dancer” with Nobuko Chikamatsu, which incorporates a work of fiction into the Japanese language classroom.
Related articles
Hayakawa, Tadanori. Translation by Joseph Essertier. “The Story of the Nation: ‘Japan Is Great,’”
Jeff Kingston, “Nationalism in the Abe Era”
Adam Lebowitz and Tawara Yoshifumi. “The Hearts of Children: Morality, Patriotism, and the New Curricular Guidelines.”
David McNeill, "Nippon Kaigi and the Radical Conservative Project to Take Back Japan."
Sachie Mizohata, “Nippon Kaigi: Empire, Contradiction, and Japan’s Future.”
Mark R. Mullins, “Neonationalism, Religion, and Patriotic Education in Post-disaster Japan.”
Nakano Koichi, “Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism.”
Nogawa, Motokazu and Nishino, Yumiko. Translation by Rumi Sakamoto and Matthew Allen. “The Japanese State’s New Assault on the Victims of Wartime Sexual Slavery.”
Lawrence Repeta, "Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change"
Sven Saaler, “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan” https://apjjf.org/2016/20/Saaler.html
“Nationalism and History in Comporary Japan.”
Sasagase Yuji, Hayashi Keita and Sato Kei. “Japan’s Largest Rightwing Organization: An Introduction to Nippon Kaigi.”
Akiko Takenaka, "Japanese Memories of the Asia-Pacific War: Analyzing the Revisionist Turn Post-1995."
Tawara Yoshifumi. "The Abe Government and the Screening of Japanese Junior High School Textbooks 2014."
Tawara Yoshifumi and Tomomi Yamaguchi, "What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Suports Japan's Abe Administration?"
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Notes
1
This round-table took place in August before the Lower House election on October 22, 2017. In July, CNBC had reported on “the biggest collapse in the cabinet approval rating” for Abe since his reelection in 2012, to below 30 percent. The election produced a victory for the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito despite the low approval ratings for the Abe administration. The Party of Hope ended up losing seven seats and its leader Koike Yuriko stepped down to take responsibility for the defeat.
Nippon Kaigi has deeply influenced the Abe administration’s new approach to constitutional revision. Abe proposed adding a clause about the Self-Defense Forces to Article 9 on May 3, 2017. This proposal took place in a video message to a rally calling for constitutional revision organized by “Utsukushii Nippon no Kenpō o Tsukuru Kokumin no Kai” [Citizens’ Association to Create a Beautiful Constitution for Japan]. The timing coincided with the publication of Ito Tetsuo’s “Kenpō kaisei: ‘sanbun no ni’ kakutokugo no kaizen senryaku” [Constitutional Reform: Strategies for constitutional revision after gaining a two-thirds majority] in The Japan Policy Institute’s journal Asu eno sentaku (September 2016, 18-22). One of his proposals was to add a third paragraph about the Self-Defense Forces to Article 9. The Japan Policy Institute is a think tank group shaped by Nippon Kaigi members, which has been the brains behind Abe. Ito, the founder, is also a board member of Nippon Kaigi. It is clear that Abe's proposal was based on the Institute’s proposal.
Since Abe’s announcement in May 2017, the mass movement for constitutional revision led by Nippon Kaigi and the National Citizens’ Association to Create a Beautiful Constitution for Japan has narrowed their target. This followed the article’s suggestion to focus constitutional revision on “the emergency situation clause,”, and “the specification of the Self-Defense Forces.”
As of August 2018, the movement for constitutional revision continues, although there is a degree of internal resistance from some LDP members. Abe, who was shaken by the Moritomo and Kake scandals, is preparing to introduce a proposal for constitutional revision as part of his political agenda as he runs for a third term as LDP president in the fall of 2018. His opposing candidate Ishiba Shigeru seems to have different views about the speed and the way to proceed towards constitutional revision, yet is also a firm advocate of constitutional amendment and the removal of the second paragraph of Article 9.
Both the National Citizens’ Association to Create a Beautiful Constitution for Japan and the Japan Policy Institute have narrowed their objectives to the specific inclusion of the Self-Defense Forces in Article 9, and have downplayed the idea of adding a clause to cover emergency situations and revising Article 24.
2
Yamakawa Akio (1927-2000) was a critic, editor, and publisher. Active in the movement to democratize high schools in 1945, Yamakawa joined the Democratic Youth of Japan as a student at Naniwa High School in Osaka. Later, at the University of Tokyo, Yamakawa joined the Japanese Communist Party in 1948 and remained a member until 1972. In the context of this round-table, Hayakawa suggests two of Yamakawa’s works are particularly relevant. One is “Nihon-Chosen-Amerika: Nikkanbei no Taisei Yuchaku o Abaku” [Japan-Korea-United States: exposing the systematic collusion among the three countries] for the journal Gekkan jichiken, a 12-part series begun in May 1977. The second is Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson’s Inside the League: The Shocking Expose of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League (Dodd Mead, 1986) on which he worked as editor of the Japanese translation (Insaido za rīgu: sekai o oou tero netto wāku, translated by Kondo Kazuko, Shakai shisosha 1987).
3
Chamoto Shigemasa (1929-2006) was a freelance journalist known for his investigative reports on the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (now the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification). After fighting in the Asia-Pacific War as a child soldier and as part of a special attack unit (tokkōtai), Chamoto was a critic of militarization in postwar Japan and published numerous works including Documento Gunkaku Kaiken Chōryū [Documenting the Trend of Military Reform] (Satsukisha, 1983). He was one of the organizers of Kyūjō masukomi no kai (The Article 9 Association of People in Mass Media).
4
The term danjo kyōdō sankaku literally means “co-participation and co-planning by men and women.” On the decision to use the word sankaku, meaning “participation and planning,” committee member Osawa Mari writes that “since the word ‘sanka’ (participation) is used to mobilize the masses in Japan, ‘sankaku’ (participation and planning) was chosen in order to emphasize that people are participating in the decision-making process” (Osawa, Radikaru ni katareba: Ueno Chizuko taidanshū [Speaking radically: a collection of dialogues with Ueno Chizuko], edited by Ueno Chizuko, Heibonsha: Tokyo, 2001, p. 17). The committee chose danjo kyōdo (cooperation between men and women) despite its lack of clarity because many LDP politicians strongly disliked the word danjo byōdō (gender equality). Nevertheless the government had to use “gender equality” as the English translation of this phrase.
In 1996, the Council of Gender Equality appointed by the Cabinet Office published two reports titled Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Bijon or A Vision of Gender Equality and Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Shakai 2000-nen Puran (A National Plan for Gender Equality for the Year 2000). According to The 1999 Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society (Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Shakai Kihon-Hō), danjo kyōdō sankaku shakai is defined as “a society in which both men and women, as equal members of society, are given opportunities to freely participate in activities in any fields of society and thereby equally enjoy political, economic, social and cultural benefits as well as share responsibilities” (Basic Act for Gender Equal Society [Act No. 78 of 1999]). After Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Kihon Keikaku or Plan for Gender Equality 2000 was announced in 2000, many local governments began issuing ordinances that complied with the central government’s plan (See Yamaguchi, 2014, 545-546)
5
The term jendā furī or “gender free” became popular among policymakers, central and local administrators and educators after its introduction in 1995 in a handbook for school teachers and in a project report about gender equality in school education, both published by the Tokyo Women’s Foundation. The term “gender free” was meant to mean an attitude of being “free” from gender differences rather than aiming at achieving legal or institutional gender equality. Although no feminist scholars were part of the making of “gender free,” feminist scholars in women’s and gender studies later participated in various projects around the term, sponsored by local governments. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, conservative critics and media embarked on a backlash against feminists, criticizing “gender free” as a repudiation of sexual differences and an attack on traditional gender roles and values. (Yamaguchi, Saito, Ogiue 2012, pp. 2-47; See also Tomomi Yamaguchi, “‘Gender Free' Feminism in Japan: A Story of Mainstreaming and Backlash,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2014), pp. 541-572).
6
Amid the scandal resulting from state-owned land being sold to Moritomo Gakuen at an extremely low price in February 2017, Tsukamoto Kindergarten, which is operated by Moritomo, also drew public criticism of its curriculum under which students were instructed to recite the Imperial Rescript on Education every morning (Osaki 2017). Promulgated in 1890, the rescript was seen as encompassing “the highest moral norms for public education under the Meiji constitution” (Ienaga 45). The rescript or chokugo refers to the words uttered by the emperor to express his will and thoughts. It was regarded as sacred and absolute. The rescript on education, which was distributed to every school and read on important occasions with one’s head bowed before a set of portraits of the emperor and empress, emphasizes “loyalty” and “filial piety” from family members to the nation. Through this mental and physical practice, the rescript was used to have children and young people internalize a sense of awe and submission to the emperor and his state. Especially the passage—“should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state (giyū kō ni hōshi); and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth” (Rubinger, 109)—was a pillar of militarism inspiring people to die for the emperor and his empire (Ienaga 46; see also Dower 33-34). After Japan’s defeat, The Ministry of Education announced in October 1946 that students should no longer recite the rescript. Both Upper and Lower Houses in June 1948 passed a resolution confirming that the rescript was no longer in effect and would be excluded from public education.
7
Seichō-no-Ie was founded by Taniguchi Masaharu (1893-1985) in 1930. As of July 2018, it had over 1.5 million members, according to the group’s website (http://www.jp.seicho-no-ie.org/about/index.html). Seicho no Ie actively participated in postwar right wing religious movements to re-establish practices GHQ had abolished, such as commemorating Foundation Day (1951-1966) and using the reign-name system (Ruoff 162 and 194). In 1983, however, Seichō-no-Ie announced it would withdraw from all political activity. Under the current leader, Taniguchi Masanobu, some followers and related organizations left Seichō-no-Ie and founded a new movement based on founder Taniguchi Masaharu’s teachings; these followers who left the organization include movement leaders heavily involved in Nippon Kaigi. In the 2016 Upper House Election, Seichō-no-Ie issued a statement that its beliefs are at odds with the political attitude of the Abe administration and Nippon Kaigi. The current leaders are interested in environmental issues, which departs from the previous approach of Seichō-no-ie.
8
Kagoike Yasunori (b. 1953) is the former president of Moritomo Gakuen. In July 2017, Kagoike and his wife Junko were arrested for fraud in purchasing state-owned land in Osaka. Prime Minister Abe’s wife Akie was honorary principal of the elementary school that planned to use the land for its new building. Her involvement in this suspected fraudulent deal has been under public scrutiny (The Japan Times, “Kagoike arrest isn’t end of story.” August 2, 2017). Kagoike was summoned to testify under oath in March 2017. According to Nippon Kaigi’s website, Kagoike was a member until 2011.
9
Yamatani Eriko (b. 1950) has been an LDP member of the Upper House since 2004. Yamatani is a member of Nippon Kaigi’s Diet Members’ League. Under the Abe administration, she has held positions including Special Adviser to the Prime Minister for Educational Reform (2006-2007), Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission (2014-2015), Minister in charge of Ocean Policy and Territorial Issues (2014-2015), Minister in charge of the Abduction Issue as well as Minister in charge of Building National Resilience (2014-2015).
10
The ultra right wing group Zaitokukai was founded in 2006 by Sakurai Makoto (b. 1972). The group sees zainichi Koreans as recipients of social and economic “privileges” and campaigns using hate speech and demonstrations. See Ishibashi and Narusawa 2017.
11
“Koike’s opposition to foreign residents’ right to vote clashes with her call for diversity” October 4, 2017 The Mainichi
12
Ishibashi and Narusawa 2017; “Koike says no to eulogy for Koreans killed in 1923 quake” August 24, 2017, The Asahi Shimbun; “Koike's silence on Koreans slain after 1923 quake fuels criticism” September 2, 2017, The Asahi Shimbun; “Tokyo gov. skips eulogy to Koreans massacred after 1923 quake” August 25, 2017, The Mainichi Koike again did not attend the ceremony this year.
13
The reign-name legalization movement or Gengō hōseika undō (1968-1979) was a right wing grassroots movement to re-establish the reign-name system that had been abolished during the Occupation.
14
Yasukuni Shrine was cut off from state control and became a religious corporation after Japan’s defeat in World War II. The ‘Bill for the establishment of state support for Yasukuni Shrine’ [Yasukuni Jinja Kokka Goji Hōan] was designed to allow the shrine to officially host events such as memorials honoring the war dead. While it was submitted to the Diet every year from 1969 to 1974, the bill never passed.
15
Jinja honchō’s website.
16
Nihon Seinen Kyōgikai was founded in 1970 at Nagasaki University. Nippon Kyōgikai (Japan Council) was established in 2005 to appeal to a wider range of ages than just college students, but the two groups are substantially the same organization sharing the same office and official website. See also Keigo Kawasaki “As I See It: Nippon Kaigi and the Debate over Constitutional Division,” The Mainichi, December 17, 2016.
17
[1] Nippon Kaigi established Atarashī kyōiku kihon hō o motomeru kai [Association for a new Fundamental Law of Education] in September 2000 (led by Nishizawa Junichi, then the president of Iwate Prefectural University). Since then, the group has lobbied the government and the LDP for the reform of the Fundamental Law of Education. At the same time, Nippon Kaigi succeeded in helping pass a series of resolutions in local assemblies seeking such reforms and launched a massive national petition campaign in 2004. Prompted by this movement, the Koizumi Junichiro administration proposed a revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in 2006, put it to the Diet, and it passed. The reformed law (the official English translation is Basic Act on Education explicitly states that, following Nippon Kaigi’s demand, a goal of education is “cultivating” a “sense of morality” and “love of country,” and it includes an emphasis on “education in family.” Based on this new “basic act,” elementary and middle schools are required to teach “love of the country,” “National Flag and National Anthem,” “Japanese mythology,” and “significance of national defense and the role of Self-Defense Forces”.
The Fundamental Law of Education was established in 1947 in response to ultra-nationalist education before and during the wartime. The 2006 revision added new educational goals such as “the public sprit,” respect for “tradition,” and “love of the country.” It also made several changes, one of which is that guardians for children have the “primary responsibility” for their education. There is a criticism that it strengthens the state control over education. The “reform” of the law was one of the important goals for Nippon Kaigi.
18
Nippon Kaigi responded to concern that women are less supportive of the constitutional amendment than men by publishing Joshi no Atsumaru Kenpō Oshaberi Kafe [The Cafe where Girls Get Together to Chat About the Constitution] edited by Momochi Akira (Tokyo: Meiseisha, 2014) along with a manga and video. They also organized gatherings for women nationwide under the same title. The gatherings are reported on Nippon Kaigi’s website. On the gender gap around constitutional revision, see the poll conducted by NHK in 2017.
19
Sakurai Yoshiko (b. 1945) is one of the “females in the vanguard of the history wars” for the rightwing camp (Mark Ealey and Satoko Norimatsu, “Japan’s Far-right Politicians, Hate Speech and Historical Denial — Branding Okinawa as ‘Anti-Japan’,” and a leading advocate of constitutional revision who works closely with the Abe Administration (see Tawara Yoshifumi, “What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Supports Japan’s Abe Administration?” ). Sakurai founded Kokka kihon mondai kenkyūjo [Japan Institute for National Fundamentals] in 2007 and is its chairperson. Before becoming a prominent rightwing activist, Sakurai was a journalist, an anchorwoman for Nippon Television’s news show from 1980 to 1996, and an award-winning author of non-fiction books including Eizu hanzai: Ketsuyūbyō kanja no higeki [AIDS crime: a tragedy of hemophilia patients] (Chūō kōron: Tokyo, 1994).
20
Ito Tetsuo (b. 1947) founded Japan Policy Center in 1984 and is currently its representative. Okada Kunihiro (b. 1952) is the director of Japan Policy Center. Kosaka Minoru (b. 1958) is research director of the Center.
21
Oyagaku [Parental Education] refers to teaching parents and future parents “how to become a good parent” and is promoted by conservatives including prominent politicians and scholars. Education scholar Takahashi Shiro has been the leader of the movement, and he, along with organizations such as Oyagakkai [Oyagaku Conference] and PHP Oyagaku Kenkyūkai [PHP Oyagaku Study Group] published books on Oyagaku in the 2000s. The movement coincided with the national governmental committee’s repeated recommendation for “family education” since the late 1980s under Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Takahashi was amember of some of the committees. Currently the Oyagaku movement is promited by a general incorporated association, Oyagaku Suishin Kyōkai [The Association for Promoting Parental Education], established in 2006 in the same year that the Fundamental Law of Education was revised to include an article on “family education”. The association’s current president is Takahashi Shiro.
22
Takahashi Shiro (b. 1950) is an education scholar and specially-appointed professor of education at Reitaku University. He is the President of the Association for Promoting Parental Education. Takahashi also currently serves as Vice President of Rekishi ninshiki mondai kenkyūkai [Historical Awareness Research Committee], established in October 2016, of which he has also been the president. The committee asserts that “Anti-Japan views of history have damaged Japan’s diplomacy and damaged our country’s honor and national interests.” See Tawara Yoshifumi, “What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Supports Japan’s Abe Administration?”
23
Yagi Hidetsugu (b. 1962) is a legal scholar, professor at Reitaku University, and founder of Nihon Kyōiku Saisei Kikō [Japan Education Rebirth Institute], a conservative organization that promoted revisionist history and civil textbooks published by Ikuhōsha, worked to make moral education into an official subject taught in the school curriculum, and engaged in policy advocacy activities. Yagi was the third president of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, but he split from it and founded Japan Education Rebirth Institute. As of 2018, the Institute’s website disappeared, and it is unclear whether the Institute still remains active.
24
Yūseihogo hō (1948-1996) was renamed to Botai Hogo Hō [Maternal Protection Law] in 1996. In Japan, while abortion is prohibited under the Criminal Code, the former Eugenic Protection Law (in force until 1996) allowed it under certain situations. In the “reform” bill submitted to the Diet in 1972, the exceptions allowing abortion for eugenic reasons were expanded, but the provision allowing them for “economic reasons,” originally added in 1949 and used for most abortions, was removed. A protest against the eugenics provisions mainly organized by people with disabilities and women blocked this bill in 1974. About a decade later, conservatives again attempted to “reform” the Law, but their bill never made it to the Diet. Seichō-no-Ie was particularly obsessed with revising the Eugenic Protection Law to remove the provision for “economic reasons”. See SOSHIREN’s website, “72-nen no Yūseihogo hō Kaiakutowa.” [What is the revision for the worse of the Eugenic Protection Law in 1972?], and Tiana Norgren, Abortion Before Birth Control: The Politics of Reproduction in Postwar Japan, 2001, Princeton University Press.
25
According to their website, the Pro-Life Center has advocated establishing “baby hatches” to “protect the lives of fetuses” and created one at Kumamoto Jikei Hospital named Kōnotori no Yurikago or Stork’s Cradles. The Center is anti-abortion. It established a fund called the Embryo-kikin or Embryo Fund, borrowing the sound of the English “embryo” but replacing “em” with the Chinese character for “yen,” which is Japan’s currency. The fund’s goal is to “support the birth of new lives” and the center has also opened a telephone consultation service for pregnant women. In their justification, the center quotes the critical comment made by Mother Teresa on abortion in Japan when she visited in 1982: “Abortion is destroying the home, and destroying the home will destroy peace among nations”.
26
There is also concern that Takahashi, having made a name for himself by becoming a member of the Council of Gender Equality, uses its meetings to advocate for the rights of the fetus (See page 10 of the minutes from the council meeting held on May 25, 2017 at the official residence of the prime minister.
27
See Norgren, 63-64.
28
Murakami Masakuni (b. 1932) was elected to the Upper House with the backing of Seichō-no-Ie in 1980 and aggressively advocated Seichō-no-Ie’s pro-life agenda. In addition to opposing abortion as “murdering unborn children,” Murakami argued that the economic clauses of the Eugenic Protection Law were no longer meaningful in Japan after the postwar economic success. He also claimed that the revision of the law would “Save the Japanese Race from Extinction” (Norgren, 70-71). Before becoming a politician, Murakami had participated in the reign-name legalization movement (1968-1979) as National Affairs Measures Director of Nihon o Mamoru Kai [Association to Protect Japan], made up of Jinja Honchō, Seichō-no-Ie, and some other religious groups. In 2001, Murakami was arrested for accepting bribes from Small Business Owners Social Welfare Foundation and prisoned for a year and half.
29
Ikuhōsha Publishing was founded in 2007 as a subsidiary company of Fusōsha, the publisher of the nationalist history textbook for middle schools The New History Textbook (2001). Ikuhōsha is a publisher of a textbook edited by Committee to Improve Textbooks (Kyōkasho Kaizen no Kai), which is a group split from The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform in 2012 (Tawara 2015)
30
Fuji Corporation Limited (Osaka)
31
See David McNeill, “Nippon Kaigi and the Radical Conservative Project to Take Back Japan” .
32
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) accepted documents of Nanjing Massacre submitted by the Chinese government to include in the Memory of the World Register in 2015. Established in 1992, the Memory of the World Register envisions that “the world's documentary heritage belongs to all, should be fully preserved and protected for all and, with due recognition of cultural mores and practicalities, should be permanently accessible to all without hindrance”. In the meantime, the register has postponed a decision on accepting the documents of wartime “comfort women” submitted as “Voices of Comfort Women” by the International Solidarity Committee” made by civic groups from eight countries and the Imperial War Museum of the UK in 2016 (Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, “[Press Release] Statement concerning the AIC review for the UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register”).
33
Momochi Akira (b. 1946) is Professor Emeritus of Nihon University College of Law.
34
According to Japan-U.S. Feminist Network for Decolonization (FeND), Okamoto Akiko’s article published in the conservative opinion journal Seiron in May 2012, “Kankoku no ianfu han’nichi senden ga man’en suru kōzu: beikoku no hōjin shitei ga ijime higai” [How South Korea's “Comfort Woman” Anti-Japanese Advertising Spread Everywhere] (126-133) “served as a rallying cry for Japanese conservatives and comfort women deniers to begin propagating ‘Japan’s position’ regarding comfort women at the United Nations and in foreign media”. See also Emi Koyama, “The U.S. as “Major Battleground” for “Comfort Woman” Revisionism: The Screening of Scottsboro Girls at Central Washington University”.
35
Founded in 2004 by Mizushima Satoru, Takahashi Shiro and others, Channel Sakura or Nippon bunka channel sakura [Japanese culture channel sakura] is a right-wing television production company and internet TV network. In August 2013, the company established a branch in Okinawa focusing on politics in Okinawa as a way to glorify Japan’s role in World War II and support the presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa (See, Jon Mitchell, "U.S. Marines Raise Tensions on Okinawa,” Counterpunch). In March 2015, for instance, Channel Sakura showed leaked surveillance footage of the arrest of Yamashiro Hiroji, chairman of the Okinawa Peace Movement Center, for crossing into the marines’ Camp Schwab base in Nago City during a protest against a plan to build a new facility as part of the replacement of Futenma air base in Ginowan City. According to The Japan Times, the video was leaked to Channel Sakura by Robert Eldridge, a senior U.S. Marine Corps official, who was dismissed (Jon Mitchel, “U.S. Marines official dismissed over Okinawa protest video leak.” The Japan Times, March 23, 2015). It was “apparently leaked to justify the arrest,” the article says. Eldridge had appeared on the network the previous month when he called Okinawa anti-US base protests “hate speech.”
36
Some conservatives and rightwing groups are trying to pass legislation in 2018 to establish Meiji no Hi or the Day of Meiji as a national holiday on the occasion as the 150th anniversary of the beginning of Meiji era. They target November 3, currently Culture Day, which is the birthday of the Meiji Emperor. The Day of Showa is April 29, a national holiday, which was renamed from Green Day (Midori no Hi) in 2007. It was originally the birthday of the Showa Emperor until 1989 when he died.
37
Motoya Toshio (b. 1943) is CEO of APA Group, hotel and real estate developing company. Motoya has written several books under his pen name Fuji Seiji to argue that the Nanjing Massacre did not happen and put copies of the books in every room in his hotels (Elaine Lies and Kwiyeon Ha, “Japan hotel chain could remove books denying Nanjing Massacre from some hotels.” Reuters, January 25, 2017). Motoya is vice president of Anshin-kai, a support association for Abe Shinzo.
38
While these points might have been crucial themes for Nippon Kaigi in 2004, the Sugano book took them out of context. That may have contributed to the perception of this scholar that they are all still important points even though some have become less relevant, including “anti-gender free”.
39
Located in Tokyo, Fusōsha Publishing is part of Fujisankei Communications Group, a conservative media conglomerate. It published the controversial The New History Textbook edited by The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and got an approval as a textbook after Japanese government screening in 2001. Due to the internal conflict and division within the Society, some members organized a separate group Kyōkashokaizen no kai [The Society for Textbook Improvement], which has published their textbooks out of Fusōsha’s subsidiary company Ikuhōsha, established in 2007.
40
Ando Iwao (b. 1939) became a member of Seichō-no-Ie while he suffered from Pulmonary valve narrow empty disease. He recovered and entered Nagasaki University in 1966 where he was one of the leading members of the rightwing student movement.
