2024/01/11

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy Chatterjee, Satishchandra, Datta, Dhirendramohan, Datta, Dhirendramohan

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy 
Chatterjee, Satish chandra

Kindle  from $12.14
Hardcover  $54.03
Paperback  $27.07
===
https://archive.org/details/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy-1/page/n17/mode/2up

4.5 out of 5 stars 1,317 ratings

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, termed by Srila Prabhupada as 'very authoritative', while introducing the reader to the spirit, vast ocean of knowledge and outlook of Indian philosophy, also helps him to grasp thoroughly the central ideas. Philosophy, in its widest etymological sense, means 'love of knowledge'. It tries to search for knowledge of himself, the world and God, and describes the Indian way of life as we know it. Indian philosophy denotes the philosophical speculations of all Indian thinkers, ancient or modern, Hindus or non-Hindus, theists or atheists. Some believe 'Indian philosophy' to be synonymous with 'Hindu philosophy', however, this would be true only if the word 'Hindu' were taken in the geographical sense of 'Indian'. But if 'Hindu' means the followers of a particular religious faith known as Hinduism, the supposition would be wrong and misleading. The authors have, with considerable merit, highlighted the significance of Indian views in terms of modern Western thought. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy is a seminal work covering topics as varied as the Carvaka, Jain, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Buddha, Sankhya Systems, amongst others.

Print length  426 pages
=======



From other countries

Randall B Johnston
5.0 out of 5 stars You can't find a better compilation of Indian philosophy in one book than this ...Reviewed in the United States on 29 December 2014
Verified Purchase
I have the 1960 version in hardback and wanted an updated copy to keep and another to share with my step daughter who is finding her way forward. You can't find a better compilation of Indian philosophy in one book than this one. I have a degree in Philosophy from Berkeley in the 70's and am a graduate as a doctor of law. You can't go wrong with this balanced and profound dissection of Indian thought.

14 people found this helpfulReport

Rohit T.
5.0 out of 5 stars Great introduction to the different schools of Indian thoughtsReviewed in India on 25 December 2023
Verified Purchase
A great introduction for the lay person to the different schools of Indian Philosophy. It includes not only the astika (who accept the authority of Vedas) but also nastika (who don’t accept the authority of Vedas) schools.

It is written in an easy to understand language. Though the material presented is sometimes dense but it’s not the fault of the authors.



Rahul Batabyal
5.0 out of 5 stars GoodReviewed in the United States on 2 March 2020
Verified Purchase
Happy with this.
Report



Aedmaris Euphemius
5.0 out of 5 stars Philosophy is at its BestReviewed in India on 5 December 2023
Verified Purchase
This is the ABC of Indian Philosophy. One who wants to explore various angles of Indian Systems, Buddha Philosophy, Hanayana, Mahayana, Metaphysics, Ethics, Jaina Philosophy, Nyāya Philosophy, Vaiśesika Philosophy, Vedanta Philosophy and Many More. Then It is the Best Book For all Above Topics.


Report

Midhun Jose
4.0 out of 5 stars A good books for the students (lovers) of philosophy
Reviewed in India on 15 April 2017
Verified Purchase
This books give a clear bird's eye view of different philosophical schools and their main arguments in a brief, clear and to the point style. This a is perfect book for you if you are a beginner trying to understand the complicated indian philosophy and the complex relationships between different schools of thoughts within it. Also, this book can act as a quick guide of reference even if you already have a good grip in the subject.
The text book kind of style may not be a plus point for some readers. But in my opinion, a bit more over simplification would have failed the very essence of the content. Also, the very nature of the subject matter is that it confuses a bit to understand the web of interelated concepts and you need a bit of back references to previous pages.
Overall, the authors are very successful in handling such complex topics in one single book. You will enjoy reading this if you have passion for indian philosophy.

One person found this helpfulReport

RDS
5.0 out of 5 stars A must for people wanting to know about Indian philosophyReviewed in the United States on 20 October 2019
Verified Purchase
Nice summary of Indian Philosophy
Report

DEMOLITIONER
5.0 out of 5 stars Must book to understand Indian philosophy easilyReviewed in India on 5 November 2023
Verified Purchase


Play Video This book provides a comprehensive and accessible overview of a subject that can often be quite complex.

The author's writing is clear and engaging, making the concepts of Indian philosophy approachable for readers who may be new to the topic. What I particularly appreciated was the way the book seamlessly weaved together the historical and cultural context with the philosophical ideas, providing a well-rounded understanding of the subject.

The book's organization and structure were excellent, making it easy to follow the development of philosophical thought over time. It also included a helpful glossary and references for further exploration, which I found valuable.

Whether you're a student of philosophy or just curious about the rich philosophical traditions of India, this book is an excellent starting point. It's informative, well-written, and thought-provoking, and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in deepening their knowledge of this fascinating field.

Report

Displaying 1 - 10 of 29 reviews


Bernie Gourley
August 15, 2017
India has spawned a number of philosophical systems over the centuries. Chatterjee and Datta provide an overview of Indian philosophy by comparing and contrasting nine major schools of Indian philosophy—the six orthodox schools plus three well-known heterodox schools. The dividing line between orthodox and unorthodox hinges upon whether a philosophy accepts the Vedas as sources of authority.

After an introductory chapter that lays out the concepts that will be needed throughout the remainder of the book as well as providing brief sketches of nine philosophical schools, the remainder of the book is a one chapter per school examination of metaphysics, ethics, theology, epistemology, etc. The authors first consider the heterodox schools: i.e. Carvaka (a materialist /atheist approach), Jain (one of the major Indian religions), and Buddhist. After examining the heterodox approaches, Chatterjee and Datta take on the orthodox schools in the following order: Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga (which you may not have realized was a philosophical system), Mimamsa, and Vedanta.

There are a number of questions that recur as the authors compare these schools to each other. A major point of consideration is presence or absence of belief in a god, and—for those systems that believe in a God or gods—what is the role of said deity. It might seem that all the orthodox systems would be theistic, but this isn’t the case (e.g. Sankhya.) Another key question is how one can know something, i.e. what is acceptable authority—can one only trust one’s own senses or can one trust everything but one’s own senses? Then there is the matter of ethics and how each system regards ethical behavior. Of course, there are some elements that are unique to a given system, and so it’s not entirely a matter of comparison and contrast.

There are no graphics in the book and the ancillary material is limited to footnotes, a select bibliography, and prefaces to the various editions of the book. Note: I read the 2007 / 7th Edition of the book.

I won’t say this book isn’t dry. It’s a philosophy textbook, after all. However, it does provide a solid overview of the topic and seems to take great efforts to be unbiased (to the extent of sometimes not challenging philosophical ideas that are patently unsound in favor of reporting what advocates of the tradition propose.)

I’d recommend this book for anyone who’s looking for an overview of Indian philosophy.


19 likes


Kaamesh
9 reviews11 followers
May 25, 2020
Edit 1 (24.5.2020): I no longer subscribe to most of the views that I described here. I am now continuing my research in metaphysics and epistemology. There is no useful distinction between western philosophy and Indian philosophy anymore. It's just that various schools of thought (both within so-called Indian and western philosophies) offer various kinds of answers to the questions posed in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc. Nevertheless, I still believe that what common people (non-academicians) usually think of as Indian philosophy is total bogus.

All the schools of Indian philosophy (except Charvaka-materialists) believed in Karma, Bondage and Self-liberation. If one went on to find the reason behind this, one would find that the age-old Indian thinkers had to somehow explain the reality that they found themselves in without science and its tools. Fortunately for them, they found their recourse in Self-liberation.
By declaring that this world was not the primary one and that there was a form of 'higher existence' beyond this existence, they easily convinced the commoners that they needed to be 'good' in order to enter the portal to this higher existence. Thus the problem of morality was solved.
Their next problem was the unequal suffering and evil that was prevalent in their world. For that, they came up with a cunning concept called 'Karma'. They convinced the sufferers that they suffered because of the sins that they had committed in their past lives. And in order to escape from this bondage, they had to destroy their Karma. How could they do that? By renouncing all the desires and passions and becoming a monk. Yes, they had to continuously contemplate on the 'higher existence' or 'eternity' or 'God' or 'Supreme Reality' or 'thingamajig'. They had to accept that this life was vulgar and that unless they renounced their lives, they would be born again and again in this world of sorrow and suffering. Thus, the problem of suffering and evil was also solved.
All was going well. Suddenly, a commoner stood up and asked them how could one who was being brought into existence for the first time (first birth of a 'soul') have Karma? The thinkers replied again craftily that the universe was a 'BEGINNINGLESS SERIES OF ENDLESS CREATION AND ANNIHILATION'. So, one always HAD Karma. One had to contemplate in order to lose it. The commoner, who was not really intelligent enough to question the paradoxical quality of this assumption, accepted it without doubt and revered the thinkers for their intelligence.
Thus, everybody believed in Self-liberation and everybody renounced their lives. They began contemplating on this Self-liberation DISINTERESTEDLY and then became liberated. The liberated souls in turn helped their fellow humans to liberate themselves. Within a decade, all the humans in the planet became self-liberated. All their 'souls' were eternally 'blissful' or at least, devoid of misery and suffering. Now, since they were liberated, they did not indulge in 'worldly acts' and hence did not procreate.
Within a century, the human species became extinct.
End of story.


This was what would have happened if everybody had followed the concept of Self-liberation. Now, as an 'unliberated' human being, I cannot really comment on whether our extinction is good or bad for us since, according to the Indian philosophers, the liberated self is more important.
Also, I too find the 'beginningless series of endless creation and annihilation' concept of our universe paradoxical. So, I find the concept of Karma paradoxical too.
As to the metaphysical assumptions and arguments that pervade most of Indian philosophy, I can only say that it is full of mere sophistry. But who knows? Maybe they are right! But I like to follow Wittgenstein's advice here: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
I have one question here, though: What if the thinkers had deluded themselves into believing that Self-liberation was the ultimate goal and then in turn deluded themselves that they were really liberated and hence were blissful? After all, they were required to chant continuously, "I am not this self... I am God... I am Brahman..." A psychologist would not deny such a possibility.

By the way, the only thing that I liked in Indian philosophy is their contribution to Epistemology. The thinkers were very advanced in this field compared to the Western ones. But, unfortunately (or fortunately?), Western philosophy has now overcome Indian philosophy in Epistemology too, with the advent of Analytic philosophy.

Now that the existentialist, postmodern, post-postmodern philosophies are against metaphysical speculations (and they are right to do so!) and that this Meta-modern, scientific world is beyond the outdated and paradoxical concepts like Karma, Self-liberation, etc., I will be safe in assuming this:
Indian philosophy is practically dead. There's no use in resurrecting it.

8 likes

Like
Comment



Chetan
May 2, 2023
Getting into Indian Philosophy is a very complex task. A majority of the world’s population practices the three religions stemming from the Abrahamic “tree” of thought for better words. While Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are very different, they have many similarities. A few examples of these similarities would be that there is only one supreme, almighty powerful God. Or, that their religion is the absolute truth. Another would be, that there is evil in the world and that religion and God are purity and righteousness.

In some senses, a characteristic trait of the Abrahamic “tree” of thought is that it is very black and white. Indian philosophy is very much only shades of grey. India is a vast land, where many have searched for truth, liberation, and freedom across the past few millennia. Seeking the answers to what all ways of life do.

If we are to untangle Indian philosophy properly and not call everything Hinduism. We come out with 9 different schools of thought. They are Charvaka, Jainism, Buddhism, Nyaya, Vaisheshik, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa, and probably the most important Vedanta.

These schools do not encompass all of the beliefs and faiths practiced in India, but for the purposes of this book, giving the reader a theoretical overview and introduction to these systems. This is excellent. A little too dry for my taste but excellent neither less.
non-fiction
5 likes

Like
Comment



Pritam Chattopadhyay
1,929 reviews136 followers

Follow
May 22, 2022
Can much be said about this everlasting classic?

Philosophy in the Indian tradition was not merely an intellectual sumptuousness, a purely conceptual hair splitting, a mere attempt to win an argument, or defeating an adversary, although all these excesses characterized many works of Indian philosophy.

Underlying these excesses, there was an awareness of a thorough process of thinking towards a distant goal on the horizon for the individual person or for humankind as a whole.

These darśanas had a certain acceptance of the relations between the theoretical and the spiritual, and a certain conception of being from within the bounds of a tradition.

Indian philosophy denotes the philosophical conjectures of all Indian thinkers, ancient or modern, Hindus or non-Hindus, theists or atheists.

'Indian philosophy' is believed by some to be identical with 'Hindu philosophy'. This would be true only if the word 'Hindu' were taken in the geographical sense of 'Indian'. But if 'Hindu' means the followers of a particular religious faith known as Hinduism, the supposition would be wrong and misleading.

Even in the ancient writings of the orthodox Hindu philosophers, like the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha of Mādhavācārya which tries to present in one place the views of all (sarva) schools of philosophy, we find in the list of philosophies (darśanas) the views of atheists and materialists like the Cārvākas, and unorthodox thinkers like the Bauddhas and the Jainas, along with those of the orthodox Hindu thinkers.

Indian philosophy is marked, in this respect, by a striking breadth of outlook which only testifies to its unflinching devotion to the search for truth.

Indian philosophy is prosperous and multicoloured. It is a comprehensive embroidery and cannot be identified with one of its strands. Therefore, any simplification is an oversimplification. The problem is further compounded when we comprehend that in the Indian tradition there is no term in line with the Western term “philosophy.”

The term “darśana” used in the Indian tradition for “philosophy” is a rough approximation and lends itself to a variety of meanings not connoted by its Western counterpart. “Darśana,” derived from the Sanskrit root “dṛś,” means “to see” or a “way of seeing.” “Seeing” as the end result of darśana is “seeing within”—the Indian seer sees the truth and makes it a part of his understanding.

“Seeing within” should not, of course, be understood in a subjectivist sense; it signifies “seeing” or “insight” using the intellectual means with, the help of which insight is gained. Indian philosophy is not merely a search for knowledge of the definitive reality but also a critical analysis of the data provided by perception.

Leaving aside darśana, another term used to describe Indian philosophy is “ānvīkśikī,” which has been defined as “a critical examination of the data provided by perception and scripture.”

Inference is called nyāya because it consists in significantly analyzing the data formerly received by perception as well as by the authority derived from the foundational texts (Vedas).

In case of a conflict between two, the testimony of the foundational texts was probed into, analyzed, in order to determine how far it could be reconciled with the canons of logical reasoning.

Though there were many different schools and their views differed sometimes very widely, yet each school took care to learn the views of all the others and did not come to any conclusion before considering thoroughly what others had to say and how their points of view could be met.

This spirit led to the formation of a method of philosophical argument. A philosopher had first to state the views of his opponent's case which came to be known as the prior view (pūrvapakṣa).

Then followed the refutation (khaṇḍana) of this view…

Last of all came the statement and proof of the philosopher's own position, which, for that reason, was known as the resulting view (uttarapakṣa) or the conclusion (siddhānta)….

There are two basic points which are to be borne in mind –

a) Each darśana has a pramāṇa theory. The technical word “pramāṇa” has been variously translated as “proofs,” “means of acquiring knowledge,” “means of true or valid cognition,” or even “ways of knowing.” The Indian materialists admit perception to be the only means, the Buddhists accept perception and inference, the Nyāya admits four by adding upamāna (comparison) and śabda (verbal testimony) to the Buddhist two, and Advaita Vedānta accepts six and adds arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi to the Nyāya list.

b) In the Western epistemologies, e.g., in Kant, there is a continuing tension between the causal question of how cognition comes into being and the logical question of its validity, a tension not found in Indian epistemologies. The pramāṇas are both instruments by which cognitions arise, as well as the ways of mitigating a cognitive claim.

This discussion could go on and on and on ………….

Read this archetypal tome to know more.

Show more



Hemen Kalita
June 23, 2020
The book discusses all the Indian Schools of thoughts – Carvaka ,Jaina ,Budha ,Nyaya , Vaisesika ,Sankhya ,Yoga ,Mimamsa and Vedanta.

Sankhya School is considered the oldest (7-8 Century BC) whereas the Vedanta is considered the latest (10-15 Century AD) and the epitome of Indian philosophy. Carvaka is the only atheist and hedonistic sect, quite similar to the Greek Epicureanism.

Some common characteristics of these schools (except Carvaka)-

• Pessimistic in outlook. The authors, however, tried to make it look like an optimistic self help book. That’s really pity.

• Life is pain and knowledge is the only tool for liberation. Virtue comes from knowledge, and Morality and knowledge are inseparable. It mirrors Greek philosophy as Socrates also said, “Virtue is knowledge and Vice is ignorance”. It seems that Indian philosophy with their Greek contemporaries were on the right track prior to the arrival of the big states. Inception of big states with their organized religions changed things for the worse. Monotheism in west and ritual based Hinduism in India replaced curiosity with unquestionable faith and knowledge with God as the only source of morality.

• Where knowledge liberates, ignorance makes us miserable.
There are three kinds of pain / Dukha mentioned in Sankhya Philosophy–

1) Bhoutik Dukha– Pain caused by unfulfilled material needs.
2) Daivik Dukha – Pain caused by unforeseen events or accidents.
3) Adhyatmik Dukha – Life itself is pain.
Most people live through their entire life earnestly trying to avoid first two kinds of pains. Few people are able to realize that the actual source of pain is the life itself, ie, “Adhyatmik Dukha”. Realization of this eternal truth itself is liberating. So, awareness or knowledge of the reality is vital to alleviate suffering.

• The liberated soul will be freed from the embodied enslavement and from the endless cycles of life. No more afterlife, no more pain.

As far as the book is concerned, its not bad. Would have been much better if it were free from narrow religious outlook and some anti science views. The flaws can be ignored considering it was written a long time back, in the 60's i think.

3 likes



PRAJNA HEGDE
1 review

Follow
November 14, 2020
The book briefly introduces the general idea of Philosophy, its need and meaning in its broadest sense. It speaks about the origins and development of the schools of Indian philosophy and briefly compares them to Western philosophy. It touches upon 9 Indian schools of philosophy - providing information about the origin, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and views on religion and God for each of these schools. Certainly not an easy read for a novice but with some patience it will provide a good stepping stone in terms of vocabulary and frameworks to read and appreciate other works of philosophy.
Show more
2 likes

Like
Comment



Kruti Munot
November 21, 2017
This book is a rather comprehensive introduction to various schools of Indian philosophies - from sects of Hinduism, to Jainism, Buddhism, etc. I found the approach of introducing the schools of thought first before delving deeper into each one clear and easy to read. I only read the bits I was interested in, but the book overall provides a decent bird eye's view on Indian philosophy. I'll come back to this one for reference later.
2017 philosophy
2 likes


Bhavesh Mehta
January 17, 2019
A detailed account of all the major Indian school of thoughts. I enjoyed it.
indian-author philosophy religion
1 like

Like
Comment



Rick Sam
March 7, 2017
This book gives a general outline of Indian Philosophy. But, I think someone has to work on translating to English audience, technical terms. It seemed to me that, most of the Indian philosophical schools are writing about Karma, Liberation from it. They seem to have various schools writing in reaction to it. If you want to get a general outline, I would recommend this book.

philosophy

========
Full text of "An Introduction To Indian Philosophy"
See other formats
AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
SATISHCHANDRA CHATTERJEE, M.A., Px.D 
& 
DHEERENDRAMOHAN DATTA, M.A., Pu.D 


UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA 


First Eprtton-2.1939 
Szconp Epition—1944 
Tump Epition—1948 


(PRINTED IN INDIA) 


PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY NISHITCHANDRA SEN, 
SUPERINTENDENT (OFFG.) , CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 
48, HAZRA ROAD, BALLYGUNGR, CALCUTTA, 


1605B—Avg., 1948--C. 


4 


To - 
SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN 
AND 
PROFESSOR K. C. BHATTACHARYYA 
WHOSE TEACHINGS HAVE INSPIRED 
THE AUTHORS 

====
CONTENTS 

PREFACE.TO THE Finst Epition 
PREFACE TO THE SEconp ‘ Eeprrion 
PREFACE To THE THIRD EDITION 


CHAPTER 1  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

* The Schools cf Indian Philosophy 0 


THE Basic FEATURES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The Nature of Philosaphy. 
The Meaning and Scope of Indian Philo- 
sophy 
0 
The Places of Authority and Reasoning 
in Indian Philosophy 

How the Indian Systems Graduelly 
Developed 

The Common Characters of the Indian 
Systems 

The Space-Time Background 


A Brier SKETCH OF THE SysTEMs 


The Carvika System 
The Jaina System 
The Bauddha System , 
The Nyaya System _ 
The Vaisesika System 
The Sankhya Systein 
The Yoga System 
The Mémiarhsa System 
The Vedanta System 


CHAPTER II ‘ THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPAY 61-80 
I. Irs Opicin anp Scorz 63 
I], THE CARVAKA EPISTREOLOGY 64 
1. Inferetice is Not Certain 65 
"2, Testimony is Not a Safe Source of 
Knowledge 68 
“TH, METAPHYSICS 70 
1. The World is Made of Four Elements 70 
2, There is No Soul 71 
3. There is No God 72 
Iv." Eraics 73 
V. ConcLusion 77

 
CHAPTER III THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 81-127 
{. INTRODUCTION 83 
Il. Tur, Jaina THEORY oF KNOWLEDGE 85 
1. The Nature and Kinds of Knowledge 85 
2. The Carvaka View Criticized 89 
3. The Jaina Theory of Judgment 90 
(t) Syidvada or the Theory that Kvery 
Judgment is Relative ; 90 


(ii) Saptabhanginaya or the Seven Forms 
of Judgment 94 

ITI, THe Jaina MeraPHysics 99 
1. The Jaina Conseption of Substance 100 
2, Classificatim of Substances ~ 103 
3. Ibe Soul or Jiva 105 
4. The Inanimate Substances or Ajivas 109 
(i) Matter or Pudgala 110 
(ti) Space or Akaga 110 . 
(iit) Time or Kala 111 
(”) Dharma and Adharma 113, 
1V. Tae Jaina Ergics anD RELIGION 214 
A Bondage of the Soul 115 
2. Liberation Lif 
3. Jainism as a Religion Without God . 125, 


CHAPIER IV r'ntE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 129-183 
1. InrropucTion 131 
Ii. Tue Teachinas: or Buppua: Tue ,Four 
Nosie TROTHS 134 
1, The Anti-Metaphysical Attitude 134 


. ‘The First Noble Truth about Suffering _ 126 
3. The Second Noble Truth about the Cause 
of Suffering: the Chain of Twelve 





Links ‘437 
4. The Third Noble Truth about the Cessa- 
‘tion of Suffering » 141 


5. The Fourth Noble Truth about the Path’ 
to Liberation 149 


viii CONTENTS 


Page 

6. The Philosophical Implications of Buddha's 
Kithical Teachings o 15% 

(i) The Theory of Depenéent Origination 
or Conditional Existence of Things 152 


(ii) TKe Theory ofsKarma 154 
(iit) The Doctrine of Universal Change and 
Impermanence GD) 
(iv) The Theory of the Non-existence of 
the Scul 156 
(11. Tae Schoots oF BauppHa PHILOSOPHY 160 


1. The Madhyamika School of Sinya-vida 164 
2.°The Yogacéra School of Subjective 


Idealism 169 
. 3. he Sautrintika School of Representa- 
; tionism 173 
4» The Vaibhisika School 175 
IV. Tre Revicious ScHooLts or BuppHism: 
HINAYANA AND MAHAYANA 176 


CHAPTER V  THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 185-254 
I. InTRopvcTION 187 
II, Tue NyAya THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 195 
I. Definition and Classification of Knowledge 196 

2. Perception 199 

, (@) Definition of Perception 199 

‘ (ii) Classification of Perception 201 

(1) Extraordinary Perceptions 202 


(iv) Three Modes of Perception 204 


CONTENTS 


x *Paference 
(1) Denitior. of Inference 
(ii) The Constituents of Inference 
(iit) The Grounds of Inference 
(iv) The Classification of Inference 
(v) The Fallacies*of Inference 
4. U pamana or Comparison 
5. Sabda or Testimony 
(i) The Nature and Classification of 


Sabda 237 
(ii) The Logical Structure of a Sentence +229 

Ill. Tur NyAya Taeory’* or tHE Pwystoar. 
Worip ‘ 299 
IV. Tae INDIVIDUAL Seir aND 17s LIBERATION 233 
V. Tue Nyaya THrornocy 249 
1. The Idea of God 240 
2. Proofs for the Existence of God 242 
(i) The Causal Argument 242 
(ii) The Argument from Adrsta 244 

(itt) The Argument from the Authorija- > 
tiveness of the Scriptures 247 
(iv) The Testimony of Sruti 248 
3. Anti-tbeistic Arguments 251 
VI. CONCLUSION 252 
CHAPTER VI 

THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY "265-287 
J. Ixrropuctrion 257 
Tl. THe CaTEGORIES 259 
1. Substance or Dravya $59 


B—1605R 


x CONTENTS 


: Page 

2. Quality or Guna ‘265 

3. Action or Karma 969 

4. Generality or Siminya ° 271 

6. Particularity or Visesa 274 

6, Inherence or Samavaya 275 

7. Non-exidience or Ablava wi 

IJ]. THe CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE, 
vc Wortp 281 
TV. Conciusion 285 

: CHAPTER VII 

THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 289-352 
I. IntTropucrion 291 
TI, Tae SANkpya Merarnysics 293 
1. Theory of Causation 293 

2. Prakrti and the Gunas 296 

3. Puruga or the Self 808 

4. Evolution of the World 307 
AIM. ThE SiNkHya THEORY or “KNOWLEDGE 315 
IV. Tue Doctrine or TLineration 322 
V. Tar Prozizn or Gon 328 
VI. Concrision 330 

CHAPTER VII 

THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY’ 333-358 
1. Int RODOCTION 335 


T]. Yooa -PsycHorocy 338 


CONTENTS xi 
Page 
iil, Yoos Kryics 342 
1. The Nature afid Forms of Yoeu 342 
2. The Hightfold Means of Yoga 347 
IV. TH Prack or Gov in tHe Yous 353 
e ¢ 
V. CoNncausion 357 
CHAPTER IX 
THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 3399-392 
1. Iyrrovucrion 361 
JJ, Teas MimAgsé THeory or KNoWLEDUS 362, 
I? The Nature and Sources of Kuowledge3 68 
2, Non-perceptual Sources of Knowledge 365 
(i) Comparison (upamana) 363 
(it) Authority or Testimony (éabda) 363 
ww Postulation (arthapatti) 372 
(iv) Non-perception (anupalabdhi) 374 
3 The Validity of Knowledge 376 
x, £. What is Errot ? 378 
LIT. MinAasa Meraprysics 38i) 
1. General Outlook 380 
2, The Theory of Potential Energy (Sakti 
and apiirva) 382 
3. The Mimamisa Conception of Sou! 383 
IV. MimAmsA Reutcion AND Eraics 387 
1. The Place of the Vedas in Religion 387 
2. The Conception of Duty 387 
3. The Highest Good 389 
4, Is Mimamea Atheistic ? 390 



CHAPTER X THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 395-488 
1. INTRODUCTION "395 


1 Origin dnd Developfnent of the Vedinta 395 
2. How the Vedanta Developed through 


the Vedas and the Upanisads 399) 
4. The Unanimous Views of the inain schools 
of the Vedanta 412 
Il. Tau Monism or Sanxara (Apvatta) 420 
1. Sanhkara’s Conception of the World 4) 
(i) The Rational Foundation of Sankara’s 
: Theory of the World 427 
‘ (i) The Advaita Theory of Error 436 
(iti) Criticism of Sankara’s Philosophy of 
« , the World 439 
2. Sankara’s Conception of God 442 
(i) The Rational Basis of Sankara’s 
Theory of God 448 
~J 3.‘ Sankara’s Conception of-the Self, Bondage 
and Liberation 452 
Ill. Tue Qvuatirmp Monism or RAMANUWA 
(VisistADVAITA) 470 


1. Raméanuja’s Conception of the World 470 
(1) Raéménuja’s Criticism of the Advaita 


Theory of Illusion 173 

2 Réaménuja's Conception of God 476 
8. Ramanuja’s Conception of the Celf, 

Bondage and Liberation 479 


INDEX 489 


PREVACK TV THE FIRST EDITION 
; 5 


The object of this book is to provide a simple 
introduction to the Ingian systems of philosophy. 
Mach one ‘of these systems has had a vast and varied 
development and cannot be treated adequately in a brief 
work hke this. Attempt has been made to introduce 
the reader to the spirit and outiook of Indian Philosophy 
and help him to grasp thoroughly the centra) ideas 
rather than acquaint hin with minute details. Modern 
students of philosophy feel many difficultiés in under- 
standing the Indian problems and theories. “Their louy 
experience with university students hax helped the 
authors to realize these, aud they have tried to remove 
thei as far as possible. ‘his accounts for most of the 
critical discussions which could otherwise have been 
dispensed with. 


The book has been primarily written for beginners, 
The first chapter which contains the general principles 
and basic features of Indian philosophy, a» well as a 
brief sketch of cach system, gives the student a bird’:- 
eye view of the entire field and prepares him for a inore 
intensive study of the systems which are containcd in 
the following chapters. It is hoped, therefore, that the 
book will suit the needs of university students at ditfer- 
ent stages, as well as of general readers interested in 
Indian philosophy. [t will serve the needs of B.A. 
Pass students who may be required to Rave a brief 
general acqu&intance with Indian philosophy as a whole, 
as well as those of Honours students who may be 


Xiv PREFACE TO THE FIRST [EDITION 


expected to have a more detailed nowled goog @ng or 
inore systems. ° 

It is the firm gonviction of the writers that Reality 
is many‘sided and Truth is manifold ¢ that each system 
upproaches Reality from one point of view or'level of 
experience and embodies cne ,aspect of Truth. They 
have tried to approach each system with sytnpathy and 
justify it, rather than dismiss it with a customary 
criticism. They believe that a sympathetic insight into 
the zreat systems will enable the student to grasp 
their truths more easily and vive him a sound 
philosophical outlook. 

While an attempt has been made to bring out the 
stynificance of Indian views in terms of modern 
Western thought, care has always been exercised to 
‘preserve their distinctive marks, such us their spiritual 
and practical outlook, their recognition of the different 
levels of experience. ; 

The authors are grateful to Dr. Syamaprasad 
Mookerjee, M.A., D.Litt., B.L., M.L.A., Vidya- 
vacasptis Barrister-at- Law, ex- Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta 
University, at whose sug ggestion the work was uuder- 
taken, and to Sir S$. Radhakrishnan, Kt.,M.A., D.Litt., 
George V Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta University, 
Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, 
Oxford University, who has very kindly gone through 
the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. They 
are also indebted to Professor Krishnachandra Bhatta- 
charyya, M.A., with whom they discussed some of the 
problerns “Teasted here and received much light and 
guidance. They are grateful also io the authorities of 
the Calcutta University, and especially to the Registrar, 


PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION XV 


the gSupesintendent of the Press and his energetic 
colleagues, ‘for the publication of the work, 


sg 
Norm to Srupents 


The paragraphs which occur in tall type in this 
book are meant for more advanced students and may be 
omitted by beginners. The attention of students is, 
specially invited to the select bibliography given at the 
beginniog of each chapter. Reference to it will explain 
the abbreviations of the names of books found in the 
footnotes. 

For correct pronunciation “students should note that 
the fotiowing scheme has been adopted for representing 
Sanskait sound in Finglish: 


" >» 
a=F=a, M=AU=i, q-F=i, $=? -i, g=S8=n, 
* . . 
=6=-i, WSHad=r, T-|qg=e, = @=ni, wW=Ee=0, 


TA-p, HF ph, FI=—b, A-G=hh, R-J=m, 
Na ah I ak Gh Sal | — T=A-%, 
HrGns, FaAas, CHBHh. T-R-ks, RF = Hh 


e= w ne, 1 4 -B — ji, “==, spe 


PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 


The authors feel enconraged by the demand for a 
second edition of this hook within such a short time. 
They are grateful to the many universities, which have 

- adopted this compendium as a text-book, and to the 
many lay readers who have intimated their apprecia- 
tion of the book asa suitable introduction to Indian 
Philosophy. Bat at the same time the anthors realize 
once more the great difficnlty of compressing mio snch 
a volume iH! that is important in the arguments and 
theories 6f schools which have evolved through nearly 
two thoysand years, and developed intricacies which 

‘ defy easy exposition. They are, therefore, painfully 

aware of the many shortcomings of the book, and very 

eagerly avail themselves of this opportunity of a second 
edition 10 remove defects, as far as possibie, by addi- 
tion, alteration, omission and rearrangemen: of topics. 
Te this work of improvement they have received great 
help from ‘eachers and scholars who have favoured 
them with detailed opinions and suggestions. The 
authors are thankful to all of them; bnt they are 
especially indebted, in this respect, fo Professors 
Khagendranath Mitra, Haridas Bhattacharyya, Jadu- 
nath Sinha, Surendranath Goswami, Kalidas Bhatta- 
charyya'and Mr. Anilkumar Ray Chandhury. If some 
of the suggestions could not be carried ont, it was 
mainly ®ecause of the limitation of the orig‘nal scope 
of thé book, the necessity for economizipg paper, und 
the desire for avoiding difficulties that might embarrass 
the beginner. 


PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION Xvii 


The &fthors do not attempt to make the book 
y history of Indian Philosophy by adging a few more 
chapters on the Vedaz, the Upanigsats and the Gita, 
for which they refer the interested reader to the more 
comprehensive and competent treatises on the subject, 
like those of Sir 8. RadAakrishnan, * Professor 8. N. 
Dasgupta and Mr. M. Hiriyanna. They confine them- 
selves to the humbler task, and the original plan, of- 
writing a short account of only the schools, and for the 
beginner. The very short treatment of the philosophy. 
of the Vedas and the Upauisads that is given in the 
chapter on the Vedanta aims enly at showing how, out 
of these, the Vedanta of Sankara and Ramanyja deve- 
loped. » Tt should not be taken as a substantive account. 


The chapter on the Vedanta has beeh partly 
rewritten. Sankara and Ramanuja have been deait 
with successively (and not side by side, as,before). 
The rational or argumentative side of the Vedanta 
has been substantially reinforced by the addition of 
many new paragraphs in smail print. The authors 
hope that this will be useful to the advanced ‘reader, 
while the simplicity of the original treatinent, and the 
interest of the beginner, will remain unaffected. 

Tt is necessary to mention that instead of following 
the ordinary translation practice of rendering ‘Tévara’ 
into ‘God’ and ‘Braliman’ into ‘Absolute’, the authors 
have used the word ‘God’ also for ‘Brahman.’ Just 
as ‘Brahman’ (without adjectives) is used, even by 
the Upapisads and Sankara, for both the irpmanent, 
personal aspect, and also for the transtendent, im- 
persona] aspect, similarly ‘God’ also’ bas been ased*in 
English in this wide sense, and, therefore, sometimes 


C—1605B 


Vili PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 


for the Absolute (e.g. of Hegel), the Indeterminate 
Substance (e.g of Spinoza), the Prioordial Principle 
(e.g. of Whitehtad). The exact sepse in which ‘God’ 
has been used in this book will be clear from the 
context, Confinement of ‘God’ only to the Deity of 
Religion, and of ‘ Absolute’ to the ultimate philo- 
sophical principle, while convenient in one respect, 
‘suffers from the disadvantage of suggesting as though 
they stand for two distinct realities, and not for two 
‘aspects of the same reality, as is the case in the 
Vedanta. 


PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 


The second edition was exhausted much sooner 
than expected. The authors regret that tho third 
edition could not be brought out in time owing to 
labour unrest and other post-war difficulties in publiz 
cation, and, much to the inconvenience of students, 
the book was out of market for about two years’ 
Attempt has been made in this edition to improve the 
book by introducing minor clianges and making necess- 
ary corrections, 

The authors are grateful to those scholars who have 
appreciated the changes introduced in the ‘second 
édition, and to the authorities of many universities and 
institutions in India and abroad where the .book is’ 
recommended for use. 


CHAPTER I 


GENERAL? INTRODUCTION .« 


1. Tue Basic Features or INDIAN Pan.osoPpHy 


1. The Nature of Philosophy 


Like all other living beings man® strugales for 

. existence. But whith the lower 
as oe of beings struggle more oy less blindly 
without any conscious plan amd 

purpose, and work by instinct, man uses the supeyjor 
zift of his intellect to understand the confitions and 
meaning of the struggle and to devise plans and 
instruments to ensure success. He wishes to lead his 
life in the light of his knowledge of hungsglf and the 
world, taking into consideration not merely the imm3- 
diate results of hig actions, but even their far-reaching 
consequences. Desire for knowledge springs, therefore, 
from the rational nature of man. Philosophy is an 
attempt to satisfy this very reasonable dasire. It is 
not, therefore, a mere luxury, but a necessity. As an 
eminent English writer puts it: ‘* Man live in accord- 
ance with their philosophy of life, their conception of 
the world. This is true even of the mos#*thoughtless, 
It is impossible to live without,a metephytic.. The 
choice that is given us is not between “some kiad of 


2 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


metaphysic and no metaphysic ; it is always between 


ao1 


a good metaphysi« and a bad metaphysic. ga 


Philosophy in it's widest etymological sense means 
“love of knowledge.’ It tries to 
know things that immediately and 
remotely concern man. What is the real nature of 
man? What is the end of this life? What is the 
nature of this world in which he lives? Is there any 
creator of this world? How should man iive in the 
light of his knowledge of hiinself, the world and God ? 
These are some of the many problems, taken at 
random, which we find agitating the human mind in 
every Jand, from the very dawn of civilization. Philo- 
sophy deals with problems of this 
nature. As philosophy aims at 
, knowledge of truth, it is termed 
in Indian literature, ‘ihe vision of truth’ (daréana). 
Every Indian school bolds, in its own way, that there 
can be a direct realization of truth (tattva-dargana). 


In the history of European philosophy we find chat as 
human knowledge about each of the 

The ‘develoyment of different problems mentioned ubove 
‘Western philosophy. began to grow, it became impossible 
for the same man to study everything 

about every problem. Division of labour or specialization 
became necessary; and a group of men devoted them- 
selves io a particular problem or a few connected problems. 
There came into existence in this way the different special 
sciences. Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Astronomy, 
Geology and similar sciences took up each a part or aspect 
of the world of nature. Physiology, Anatomy and the 
other medica) sciences devoted themselves to the different 
problems of the human body. Psychology began to study 
the problems-af the human mind. The detailed study of 
many of the particular problems with which philosophical 


lta meaning aod scope. 


Daréana or vision of 
trutb. 


1 Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means, p. 262. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3 


theoulatipn originally started became thus the subject- 
matter ot the special sciences. Philosophy then began to 
depend on the’ reports of the investigation made by the 
different sciences, trie to understand ‘their meanings and 
implications critically, and utilized these Fesults for 
understanding the general nature of the universe—man, 
nature and God. The evolution of philosophical thought 
has been more or less thewsame in Europe and in India. 


European philosophy at the present day has for 
its main branches (a) Metaphysios, 
The branches of Which discusses the general problems 
Western philosophy regarding reality—man, nature und 
God, (b) Epistemology or theory, of 
knowledge, which enquirer into the nature of human 
knowledge, as to how it develops and how far it is Lble to 
grasp reality, (c) Logic, which discusses the laws of 
valid reasoning and other incidental problems, (d) Ethics, 
which investigates the problems of morality,/such as the 
stdndard of moral judgment, the highest goal of human 
Ife and other cognate problems, and (e) Aesthetics, which 
deals with the problems of beauty. Another recent 
development of philosophy, called Axiology, is devoted to 
the discussion of the problem of values. Sociology is kso 
sometimes regarded as o branch of philosophy and often 
discussed along with Ethics. Psychology has been so long 
a very.important branch of philosophy, but the tendency 
now is to treat it as one of the special sciences like Physics 
and Chemistry and give it a place independent of 
philosophy. . 


Though the basic problems of philosophy have been 
the same in the East as in the West 

The problems and and the chief solutions have striking 
methods of Indian sgjmilarities, yet the methods of 
philosophy. philosophical enquiry differ in certain 
respects and the processes of the 

development of philosophical thought also vary. Indian 
philosophy discusses the different problems of- Metaphysics, 
Ethics, Logic, Psychology and Epistemology, but generally 
it does not discuss them separately. Every problem is 
discussed by the Indian philosopher frong> all possible 
approaches, metaphysical, ethical, logical, pgychological 
and epistemological. This tenden has been cajled by 
some thinkers, like Sir B. N. Seal,(the synthetic outlook 
of Indian philosophy; ‘ 


4 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
a i 
2. The Meaning and Scope of Indjan Philosophy 


Indian philosop*y denotes the philgsophical specu 
lations of all Indian thinkers 
ost Hate rhnoahee ancient or modern, Hindus o 
i non-Hindus, theists or atbeiste 
‘ Indian philosophy ’ is supposed by some to be sync 
ny.ious with ‘ Hindu philosophy.’ This would be tru 
only if the word ‘ Hindu ’ were taken in the geographi 
ca!. sense of ‘ Indian.’ But if ‘Hindu’ means th 
foliowars of @ particular religious faith known a 
Hinduism, the suppositio. would be wrong an 
misleading... Even in the ancient writings of th 
orthodox Hindu philosophers, like the Sarva-daréaa 
sangraha of Madhavacarya which tries to presen 
in one place the views of all (sarva) schools of philo- 
sc-hy, we find in the list of philosophies (daréanas) 
the views of atheists and materialists ike the Carvakas, 
and unorthodox thinkers like the Bauddhas ané 
the Jainas, along with those of the orthodox Hindu 
thinkers. « 


Indian philosophy is marked, in this respect, by a 
striking breadth of outlook which 

toaige phliooetg: of only testifies to its unflinching 
devotion to the search for truth. 

Though there were many different schools and their 
views differed sometimes very widely, yet each school 
took care to learn the views of all the others and 
did not come to any conclusion before considering 
thoroughl; what others had to say and how their 
points could be‘met. ‘This spirit led to the formation 
of a method of philosophical discussion. A philosopher 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION ; 5 


had firtt tc,.state the views of his opponents before 
he formulated his own theory. This statement of 
the opponent's case cams to be know} as the prior 
view (pirvapakga). “Then followed the refut&tion 
(khandana) of this view. Last of all came the state- 
ment and proof of the philxsopher’s own position, 
which, therefore, was known as the subsequent view 
(uttarapakea) or the conclusion (siddhanta). ‘ 


This catholic spirit of treating rival positions with 
consideration was more than re- 
The consequent tho- warded by the thoroughness ang 
ey yeaa i perfection that each philosophical 
school attained. If we epen a 
comprehcnsive work on the Vedanta, we will find in it 
the statement of the views of all other schools, Cirvaka, 
Batddha, Jaina, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimainsa, Nyaya and 
Vaisesika, discussed and weighed with all care ; similarly 
any “good work on the Bauddha or Jaina philosophy 
discusses the other views. Hach system thus became 
encyclopsedic in its grasp of ideas. Naturally we find 
that many of the problems of contemporary W-vstern 
philosophy are discussed in Indian systems of philo- 
sophy. Besides, we find that indigenous scholars with 
a thorough training, exclusively in Indian philosophy, 
are able to deal even with abstruse problems of Western 
philosophy with surprising skill. 


If the openness of mind—the willingness to. listen 
to what others have to say—has 
Its moral dor the been one of the chief causes,of the 
sale: oe ied wealth and greatness of Indian 
philosophy in the past, it has 4, 
definite moral for the future. If Indian philozophy is | 


6 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOP iy 


once more to révive and continue its peat cfreer, it 
can do so ofily by taking into Saadention the new 
ideas of life aid reality which have been flowing into 
Indi» from the West and the East, from the Aryan, 
the Semitic and the Mongolian sources. 


G 


3. The Schools of Indian Philosophy | 

According to a traditional principle of classification, 
most likely adopted by orthodox 

cClessificstion of the Hindu thinkers, the schools or 
Perabo Saad systems of Indian philosophy are 
a divided into two broad classes, 
namely, orthodox (astika) and heterodox {nastika). 
To the first group belong the six chief philosophical 
systems (popularly known as sad-daréana), namely, 
Mimarhsi, Vedanta, Sanikhya, Yoga, Nyaya and 
Vaidesika. These are regarded as orthodox (astika), 
not because they believe in God, but because they 
accept the authority of the Vedas." The Mimarhea 
‘and ¢the Sanikhya do not . believe in God as the 
creator of the world, yet they are called orthodox 
(astika) because they believe in the authoritativeness of 
the Vedas. The six systems mentioned above are not 
the only orthodox systems ; they are the chief ones, and 


1 In modern Indien languages, ‘dstika’ and ‘nastika’ generally 
mean ‘theist’ and ‘atheist,’ respectively. But in Sanskrit philoso- 
phica!l literature, ‘astike’ means ‘one who believes in the authority of 
the Vedag’ or ‘one who believes in life after death.’ (‘Nastika’ means 
the opposite vf these.) The word is used here inthe first seuse. In 
the second sense, vaven the Jaina and Banddha kchools are ‘Satike,’ as 
they believe in life after death. The six orthodox schools are ‘dstike," 
and the Carvaka is ‘nastika' in both the senses. 


~? 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


there a.'e Ome other less important orthodox schools, 
such as the Grammarian school, the medécal school, 
etc., also noticed by Madhgvacarya. Und’ the other 
class of heterodox ‘systems, the chief three ‘are 
the schools of the Materialists like the Carvakas, the 
Bauddhas and the Jainas. hey are caljed heterodox 
(nistika) because they do not believe in the authority 
of the Vedas. 


To understand this more clearly, we should know 
something regarding the place of 
The place of the ar . 5 
Vedas in Indian ph. the Vedas in ‘he evolution of Indian, 
losaptiy. thought. The, Vedas are the earliest 
available records of Indian literature, and subsequent 
Indian thought, specially philosophical secs. is 
greatly influenced by the Vedas, either positivgly, or 
negatively. Some of the philosophical systems accept- 
ed Vedic authority, while others opposed ‘i The 
Mim4rea and the Vedanta may be regarded" as the 
direct continuation of the Vedic culture. The Vedic 
tradition had two sides, ritualistic and speculative 
(karma and jfana). The Mimarsi emphasised, the, 
ritualistic aspect and raised a philosophy to justify and 
help the continuation of the Vedic rites and rituals. 
The Vedanta emphasised the speculative aspect of the 
Vedas and developed an elaborate philosophy out of 
Vedic speculations. As both these schools were direct 
continuations of Vedic culture, both are sometimes 
called by the common name, Mimarhsa; and for the 
sake of distinction the first is called Pirva-Mimathsa 
(or Karma-Mimainsa) and the second Uttaras;Mnarbea 
(or Jiiana-Mimifihsa). But the more ysual -namés of, 
these two are Mimarhsa and Vedanta respectively, and * 


8 AN <NTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOS@PHY 


we shall follow this common usage here. Though 
the Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaidesikea based 
their theor2s on ordinary human experience and 
reasoning, they did not challeuge the authority of the 
’ Vedas, but tried to show that the testimony of the 
Vedas was quite in harmony with their rationally 
established theories. The Carvika, Bsuddha and Jaina 
schools arose mainly by opposition to the Vedic culture 
and, therefore, they rejected the authority of the Vedas. 
These facts may be summed up in a tabular form as 
follows : 


Indian schools of philosophy 














{ 
Schauls‘rejecting Vedic Schools not rejecting Vedic 
authority ‘Heterodox or authority (Orthodox or 
N&stika, eg. Caérvaka, Astika) 
Banddha, Jaina) fn tte Sohal es ; 

° | I ; 
Schools directly based Scho'ls based on inde- 
on Vedic texts pendent grounds (eg. 

Saikbye, Yoga, Nydya, 
| Vaidesika) 
| 
Schoo: emphasising School emphasising 
the ritualistic the speculative 
aspect of the aspect of the Vedaa 
Vedas (viz, Mi- - (viz. Vedaata) 


wamsa) 


4 The Places of Authority and Reasoning in 
Indian Philosophy 


The distinctions discussed above can be ultimate- 

ve ly traced to distinctions in the 

ac of Phi- methods of speculation, adopted by 
3 ; the different schools. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 9 


SolutiofA of philosophical problems, like ‘What is 
. ere ne ¢ tbe ultimate cause of the world?’, 
siways depend on ‘Doee God exist?’, What is the 
ordinary experience or ature of God?’, cannot be ob- 
depend on the ex- tained by observation. The philo- 


perience of the wise 
few? .  sopber thust emplof his imagina- 
tion and reasoning, and find out 
answers consistent with truths already established vy 
experience. Like most other branches of knowledge, 
philosophy proceeds, therefore, from the known to the 
unknown. The foundation of puilosophy is experience, 
and the chief tool used is reawon. But the question 
arises here: ‘‘What experience should form ths, -Dasis of 
philosophy ?’’ Indian thinkers are not imentinois on 
this point. Some hold that philosophy should beebased 
‘ on ordinary, normal experience, t.e. 
on truths discovered and accepted 
by‘ people in general or by scientists. This is the 
view of mest modern European thinkers. In India 
the Nyaya, the Vaisesika, the Sankhya and the Carvaka 
school accept this view fully ; the Bauddha ard the 
Jaina school also accept it mostly. On the other 
hand, there are thinkers who hold that refarding some 
matters, such as God, the state of liberation, etc., we 
cannot form any correct idea from ordinary experience ; 
philosophy must depend for these on the experience of 
those few saints, seers or prophets who have a direct 
realization (saksatkara or dargana) of such things. 
Authority, or the testimony of reliable persons and 
scriptures, thus forms the basis of philosophy. " The 
Mimiths’ and the Vedanta school foltow this method. 
They base many of their theories on the Vedas and the 


2—1605B 


The two views 


10 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPY Y 


Upanigads. Even the Banddba and the Jaina school 
depend someti-nes on the teachings of Buddha and 
Jinas who ar regarded as perfect and omniscient. 
In Europe the scholastic philosophy of the middle ages 
was based similarly on the authority of the Christian 
scriptures. 
Reasoning ie the chief instrument of speculation 

; for philosophers of both these 
skier woe 'in re classes. ‘The difference is that 
instrument of philoso. while by the former reasoning is 
phioal speculation. 

4 made always to follow the lead of 
ordinary 2xperience, by the latter reasoning is made to 
follow 1. some matters the lead of authgsity, as well. 


The charge is often heard against Indian philosophy 
that its theories are not based on independent reasoning 
but on authority and, therefore, they are dogmatic, 
rather‘than critical. This charge is clearly not true 
of the majority of Indian systems which are as much 
based on free thinking as any we can ‘find in the 
West even in this modern age of critical speculation. 
The criticism may be chiefly levelled against the two 
systems of the Mimirhsa and the Vedanta which, we 

-have found, give an important place to authority. 
Though these systems start from authority, the theories 
they develop are supported also by such strong indepen- 
dent arguments that even if we withdraw the support 
of authority, the theories can stand well and compare 
favourably with any theory established elsewhere on 
indepenJent reasoning alone. Man, as 4 rational 
creature, cannot of course be satisfied unless his reason 
is satisfied. But if arguments in favour of a philosophy 
are sufficient to satisfy his reason, the additional fact 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11 


of its’ bei , based on the experiences of persons of 


clearer minds and ,purer hearts will rathey add to its 
value. 


e 
5. How the Indian Systems Gradually Developed 


In the nistory of Europaan philosophy we usually 
find the different schools coming 
Pacts scale! growths into existence successively. Each 
ie ugh the les unl school predominates till another 
teschings of {active comes in and replaces it. In Thdia, 
on the otbar hand, we find that the 
different schools, though not originating simultaneousfy, 
flourish together during many centuries, @nd pursue 
parallel courséWef growth. The reason is to 4 sought 
perhaps in the fact that in India philosophy was @ part 
of life. As each system of thought came into existence 
it was adopted asa philosophy of life by a band of 
followers who formed a school of that philosophy. 
They lioed the philosophy and handed it down to 
succeeding generations of followers who were attracted 
to them through their lives and thoughts, The 
different systems of thought thus continued to exist 
through unbroken chains of successive adherents for 
centuries. Even to-day, we find the active followers 
of some of the chief philosophical schools in different 
parts of India, though development of indigenous 
philosophy has all but ceased now, owing to social and 
political vicissitudes. 

It should not be supposed, however, that the differ- 
Rach school criticizes 2" Systems developed , wighin their 
and influences*cvery respective circles of active followers, 
che eahenls without mutually influencing ‘gne 

c \ 


12 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


another. On the contrary, as we hav pointed out 
previously, erch philosophy regarded it as its duty to 
consider and ‘atisfy all possible objections that might 
be raised against its views. In fact it is by constant 
mutual criticism that the huge philosophical] literature 
has come intg existence, Owing to this again, 
there developed a passion for clear and precise enun- 

ciation of ideas and for guarding 
"Indian philosopby statements against objections. 


is its own best critic. 
Mutual criticism further makes 
‘ Indian philosophy its own best critic. 


Bearing this fact of mytual influence in mind we may 

aes to, try to understand the general proccss 

iow Heiescrhse by which the systems originated and 
Aieran ity tk renpes developed. The Vedas, we have said, 
are directly or indirectly responsible for most of the 
philosvphical speculation. ‘In the orthodox schools, next 
to the Vedas and the Upanisads, we find the siitra litera- 
ass ture marking the definite beginning 
icine hee of of systematic philosophical — think- 
“ing. ‘Siitra’ ctymologically means 
‘thread,’ and in this context it means a brigf mnemonic 
statement. As philosophical discussions took place 
mostly orally, and as they were passed down through 
oral trallitions handed down by tcachers to students, it was 
perhaps felt necessary to link up or thread together the 
main thoughts in the minds of students by brief statements 
of problems, answers, possible odjections and replies to 
them. A siitra-work consists of collection of many 
stitras or aphorisms of this kind, arranged into different 
chapters and sections according to different topics. The 
Brahma-sitra of Biadarayana, for example, contains the 
aphorisms that sum up and systematize the philosophical 
teachings of different Vedic works, chiefly the Upanisads, 
and also briefly mention and answer actual and possible 
objections to these views. This work is the first systematic 
treatise dp the Vedinta. Similarly, we havo" for the 
Mimargea, the sitras of Jaimini, for the: Meas the sutras of 
Gotama, forthe Vaisesika, the _siitras of Kanada, for jhe 


Yoga, the sittras ot Patanjali, According to tradition, for 


GENERAL INTROUUCTION 13 


the Shakhyetalso there were the siitras of Kapila, who is 
regarded as ‘the founder of the system. _ Put the sitras 
how available are ‘not recognized by all fas the original 
sitras. The earliest systematic work avaiable now is the 
’Sankhya-karikad of Tévara Krsna. : 
The siitras were brief and, therefore, their meanings 
; were not always clear, There arose 
Commentaries on tho thus the'necessity for elaborate expla- 
pine nation and interpretation through 
commentaries. These chief commentaries on the respec- 
tive sitras were called the Bhasyas, the names and further 
particulars about which will be found later in the chapters 
on the different schools. But it should be noted that, in 
some cases, on the same siitra-work different authors wrote ‘ 
difierent major commentaries (vbisyas) and interpreted 
the siitras to justify their respective standpoints. Thus 
came into existence, for example, the different Bhisyas on 
the Brahma-siitia by Sankara, Rimanuja, sMadbva, 
Vallabha, Nimbarka, Baladeva and others. The followers 
of each interpretation formed into a school of the, Vedanta 
and there arose the many schools of the Vedinta itself, 


As time went on, commentaries on commentaries arose 
and sometimes independent, works 
Pe ikea also were written to supply hand- 
aaa ’ books or to justify, elaborate or criti- 
cize existing doctrines. The philosophical literature of the 
orthodox schools developed in this way. Ths history of the 
development of the heterodox doctrines is also morgor less 
the same. They do not start, however, from any sitra- 
work of the above kind. ‘The accounts of these will be 

given in the chapters dealing with those schools. 
Though the different schools were opposed to one 
another in their teachings, a sort of 
in ecient orth. harmony among them was also con- 
gradttion of the schools ceived by the Indian thinkers. 

ccording to the fitn : 
iden They believed that all persons were 
not fit for all things and that in 
e 

religious, “philosophical and social matiere we should 
take into consideration these differences and recognize 


consequent distinctions of natural rights gdbikard- 


14 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPH* 
I 


bheda). The different philosophical dig:¥plines, as 
already point€d out, were taken in India as the differ- 
ent ways of shying practical lives. Consequently, it 
was afl the more necessary to discriminate the fitness 
of their followers. The many systems of philosoptry 
beginning from the materizlism of the Carvaka school 
and ending with the Vedanta of Sankara were thus 
conceived to offer different paths for philosophical 
thinking and living to persons of differing qualifications 
and temperaments. But even apart from this prag- 
matic explanation, we can discover in these schools, 
outwardly opposed, many, positive points of agreement, 
which may be regarded as the common marks of 
Indian culture. 


6. Che Common Characters of the Indian Systems 


The Br pbiloeebhy of a country is the cream of its 
culture and civilisation. It springs 
The unity of moral from ideas that prevail in its atmos- 
and spiritual outlook 
among the systems. phere and bears its unconscious 
stamp. Though the _ different 
schools of Indian philosophy present a diversity of 
views, we can discern even in them the common 
stamp of an Indian culture. We may briefly describe 
this unity as the unity of moral and spiritual outlook. 
To understand this, let us consider 
its main aspects and _ illustrate 
points of agreement among the different schools, 


Its chief factors, 


The most striking and fundamental point of agree- 
a nd practical ment, which bis have diready dis- 
motive” present in sll cussed partly, is that*all the systems 
ea regard philosophy asa _ practical 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 15 


necessity ‘atid cultivate it in order to ys abe how 
fife can be best Idd. The aim of philog/phical wisdom 
is not merely the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, 
byt mainly an enlightened life led with far-sight, 

foresight and insight. It became a custom, therefore, 
with an Indiaa writer to explain, at the beginning of 
his work, how it serves human ends (purusartha) 


But it should also be remembered that the presence 
Shee Aaa se ee ORG practical motive did not narrow 
their theoretical deve. the scope of Indian philosophy to’ 
jepaivee Ethics and Theology alone as some 
Western critics' imagine. Its scope is as wide as 
any philosophy springing only from theoretic/notives ; 
and even on theoretical grounds some branches of 
Indian philosophy, like Metaphysics, Epistemology and 
T.ogic can easily hold their own against any system of 

the West. - 


The reason why the practical motive prevails in 

Indian philosophy lies in the fact 

feat soto doguee that every system, pro-Vedic or 

cites Samelne orderof anti- Vedic, is moved to speculation 

by a spiritual disquiet at the sight 

of the evils that cast a gloom over life in this world and 

it wants to understand the source of these evils and 

incidentally the nature of the universe and the meaning 

of human life, in order to find out some means for 
completely overcoming life's miseries. 


E.g., Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 3;° 
Stace, A Critical Htstory of Greek Philosophy, p, 1¢. 


16 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPH? 


The attityde of mind which looks at the dark side 
Pessimism fn tndfin of things is knowa as pessimism. 
philosophy is initial, Indian philosophy has often been 
nen insl: criticized as pessimistic and, there- 
fore, pernicious in its influence on practical life. How 
far this criticism is justified will be seer in the course 
of this book, But one general point should be neted 
here, Indian philosophy is pessimistic in the sense 
that it works under a sense of discomfort and disquiet 
at the existing order of things. It discovers and 
strongly asserts that life, as it is being thoughtlessly 
led, is a mare sport of blind impulses and unquenchable 
desires; it inevitably ends in and prolongs misery. 
But no Indian system stops with this picture of life 
as a tragedy. It perhaps possesses more than a literary 
signiticance that even an ancient Indian drama rarely 
ends asa tragedy. If Indian philosophy points relent- 
lessly to the miseries that we suffer through short- 
sightedness, it also discovers a message of:hope. The 
essence of Buddha's enlightenment—the four noble 
truths—sums up and voices the real view of every 
Indian school in this respect; namely: There ts suffer- 
ing.—There is a cause of suffering.—There is cessation 
of suffering.—There is a way to attain it. Pessimism 
in the Indian systems is only initial and not final.’ 
The influence of such pessimism on life is more whole- 
some than that of uncritical optimism. An eminent 
American teacher rightly points out: “‘Optimism seems 
to be more immoral than Pessimism, for Pessimism 

‘ 6 


rv 
© For a full discussion of this point, see Introduction to Prof, Radha- 
krishnan’s Ind‘an Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 49-50. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 17 


warns us of danger, while Optimism luljs into false 
security.’”* . 
The outlook which prevents the Vndian mind 
(8) The beliet in an from ending in despair and guaran- 
‘eternal moral order’ tees its final optimism is what may 
in the universe. be o. , 
» be described as spiritualism after 
William James. ‘‘Spiritualism,’’ says James, 
‘‘means the affirmation of an eternal moral order aud 
letting loose of hope.’’ ‘‘This need of an eternal moral 
order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. And 
those poets, like Dante and Wordsworth, who live on 
the conviction of such an order,” owe to that efact the 
extraordinary tonic and consoling power of their 
verse.’’? ‘The faith in ‘‘an eternal moral order’’ 
dominates the entire history of Indian philosophy, 
barring the solitary exception of the Cirviaka material- 
ists. It is the common atmosphere of faith in ewhich 
all these systems, Vedicand non-Vedic, theistic aud 
atheistic, meve and breathe. The faith in an order—a 
law that makes for regularity and righteousness. and 
works in the gods, the heavenly bodies and all 
creatures—pervades the poetic 
of Fer a form’ imagination of the seers of the 
Rg-veda which calls this sinviolable 
moral order Rta.* This idea gradually shapes itself 
(a) into the Mimiirhsa conception of apiirva, the law 
that guarantees the future enjoyment of the fruits of 
rituals performed now, (l) into the Nyaya-Vaiéesika 


e 
1 George netbert Palmer, Contempurary Americdn Fhilgsophy, 
Vol. I, p. 51. . . . 
2 Pragmatism, pp. 106-107. 
3 Cf. Rg-veda, 1.1. 8, 1. 23, 5, 1, 24. 9, 1. 128. 13, passln. 


3~—~1605B 


18 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 


fe 
theory of adsta, the unseen principle which sways 


even over the \raterial atoms and brihgs about objects 
and events in accordance with méral principles, and 
(c) into the general conception of karma, which is 
accepted by all Indian systems. The law of karma 
in ifs different aspects may be regarded as the law 
of the conservation of moral values, merits and 
demerits of actions. ‘Chis Jaw of conservation means 
that there is no loss of the effect of work done (krta- 
prandga) and that there is no happening of events to 
a person except as the result of lus own work (akrta- 
bhyupagama). The law of karina is accepted by the 
six orth6dox schools, as well as the Jainas and the 
Bauddhas.' 

A” Gistinguished Danish philosopher, Harald Haff- 
ding, defines religion as ‘‘the belief in the conserva- 
tion of values," It is mainly such belief that raises 
Indian systems like Jainisin and Buddhism to the status 
of religion in spite of the absence of a belief in God. 

It is again this faith in ‘an eternal moral order,’ 
which inspires optimism: aud makes 
man the master of his own destiny. 
{t enables the Indian thinker to 


Optimism is generat- 
ed by this faith. 


' "Me word karma means both this law and also the fore generated 
by an action and having th? potency of bearing fruit. Karma jn the 
second sense is variously classified. According to one principle, karinas 
are bruadly divided toto (a) those which have not yet begun to bear fruils 
(anarabdha karma) and (b) those which have already begun to bear fruita 
like the present body and its accompaniments :drabdha or prarabdha 
kerma), /nerabdha karma again can be subdivided into two classes, ac- 
cording, as ‘it is accumulated from past lives (praktana or saficita karias) 
or is being gathered ia this life (kr.yamana or safciyamina karma), 

“ 2 Vide piereys Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 2U6 f.n. Cf. 
Hoffding, Tce Philosophy of Religion, pp. 1-15. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 19 


take ptesent evil as consequence of his own action, and 
hope for a better future by improving piiinsell now. 
There is room, th@refore, for free will ,and personal 
endeavour (purusaka™). Fatalism or determinism is, 
therefore, a misrepresentation of the theory of karma. 
Fate or destiny (duiva) is ngthing but the collective 
force of one’s own actions performed in past fives 
(piirva-janma-krtaih karma). It can be overcome hy 
efforts of this life, if they are sufficiently strong, jue! as 
the force of old habits of this life can be counteracted 
by the cultivation of new and opposite habits.’ 
Intimately connected with this outlook is tHe 
general tendency to regard the 
universe as the m.oral stag@, where 
all living beings get the dress and 
the part that befit them and are to act well to “deserve 
well in future. The body, the senses and the motor 
organs that an individual gets and the environment in 
which he finds himself ure the endowments of natwe 
or God in acvordaunce with the inviolabie law of karma. 
Another common view, held by all [ndian thinkers, 
is that ignorance of reality is the 
a panes fhe canse of our bondage aud sulferings, 


knowledge is neces- and liberation from these cannot be 
sary for liberation. 


(4) The universe us 
the moral stage. 


achieved without knowledge of 
reality, i.c. the real nature of the world. and the self, 
By ‘bondage’ is commonly meant the process of birth 
and rebirth and the consequent iniseries to which an 
individual is subject. ‘Wikeration’ fmukti or weksa) 
means, therefore, the stoppage of this process. eluibera- 


a 
1 Vide Yoga-rasistha-ramayana, Qnd Praksrana, 1h-9th sargas. 
‘ s 


for a full discussion. 


20. AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


tion is the state of perfection ; and according to some 
Indian thinkers, like the Jainas, the Bauddhas, the 
Sdakhyas ana. the Advaita-Vedinting, this state can 
be attained even in this life. Perfection and real 
happiness can, therefore, be realized even here, at least 
according to these chief Indian thinkers. The 
teachings of tlese masters need not moke us wholly 
unworldly and other-worldly. They are meant only to 
correct the one-sided emphasis on ‘the here’ and ‘the 
now’—the short-sightedness that worldliness involves, 


But while ignorance was regarded as the root 
cause of the individual’s trouble and knowledge, there- 
fore, as essential, the Indian thinkers never believed 

‘ that a mere acquaintance with 

But mere theoretical 5 

knowledge is not sufi- truth would at once remove imper- 
aes 3 fection. Two types of discipline 
were thought necessary for making such understanding 
permanent as well as effective in life, namely, 
continued meditation on the accepted truths and 
practical life of self-control. 


The necessity of concentration and meditation led 

to the development of an elaborate 

{6) Continued medi- technique, fully explained in the 
tation on trutbs learnt = ,, : 

is needed to remove Yoga system. But yoga, in the 

se false be sense of concentration through self- 

contro], is not confined to that 

system only. It is found in some form or other in 

Buddhism, Jainism, the Sinkhya, the Vedanta, and 

even in the Nyaya-Vaisesika systems. ‘The followers 

of these verious views believed, in common; that the 

philosophic truths momentarily established and under- 

stood threugh arguments were not enough to dispel the 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 21 


effects of opposite beliefs which have become a part of 
our being. Our ordinary wrong beliefsave become 
deeply rooted in Ay repeated use inthe different 
daily situations of life. Our habits of a apeech 
and action have been shaped and coloured by these 
beliefs which in turn have bgen mora and more strength- 
ened by those habits. ‘To replace these belief by 
correct ones, it is necessary to meditate on the latter 
constantly and think over their various implications for 
life. In short, to instil right beliefs into our minds, we 
have to go through the same long and tedious process, 
though of a reverse kind, by which wrong beliefs wefe 
established in us. ‘This requires a long ¢mtellectual 
concentration on the truths learned. Without *prolong- 
ed ineditation the opposite belicfs cannot be removed 
and the belief in these truths cannot be steadied and 
established in life. 


.Self-control (satiyama) also is neceesaty for con- 
centration of the mind on these 
ea Gites ae truths and for making them effec- 
sions that obstruct five in life. Socrates used ,to say 
conecotration and good Z . 
conduct, ‘virtue is knowledge.’ Flis followers 
pointed out that mere knowledge 
of what is right does not always Jead to right action<, 
becanse our actions are guided «8 much by reason as 
by blind animal impulses. Unless these impulses are 
controlled, action cannot fully follow the dictates of 
reason. This truth is recognized by all the Indian 
systems, except perhaps the Carvika. It is neatly ex- 
pressed My an oft-quoted Sanskrit saying which means: 
‘I know what*is right, but feel no inclination té follow 
it ; I know what is wrong but cannot desist from it.’ 


\ 


22 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN asad 


Our speech and action cannot always follow our 
intellectual qpnvictions because of the contrary impulses 
deeply rooted ip our character owing,Ao past misconcep- 
tions , about things and their valués. These inapulses 
are variously described by different Indian thinkers ; 
but there is a sort of unanjmity that the chief impulses 
are ‘likes and dislikes—love and hate (réga and dvesa). 
These are the automatic springs of action; we mdve 
under their influence when we act habitually without 
forethought. Our indriyas, i.c. the instruments of 
knowledge and action (namely, the mind, the senses of 
sight, touch, smell, taste, sound, and the motor organs 
for movement, holding things, speaking, excretion and 
reproduc:ion), have always been in the service of these 
blind impulses of love and hate and they have acquired 
some ‘nxed bad habits. When philosophic knowledge 
about the real nature of things makes us give up our 
previous wrong beliefs regarding objects, our previous 
likes and dislikes for those objects have also to be given 
up. Our indriyas have to be weaned fromm past habits 
and broken to thereign ofreason. ‘his task is as 
difficult as it is important. It can be performed only 
through Jong, sustained practice and formation of new 
good habits. All Indian thinkers lay much stress on 
such practice which chiefly consists of repeated efforts 
in the right direction (abhyasa). 





Self-control, then, means the control of the lower 

self, the blind, animal tendencies— 

ie een ue Jove and hate—-as well as the in- 

lower self ander the struments of knowledge aad action 
contrel of the higher. : 

’ (the indriyas}. From what has been 

said above jt will be clear that self-control was nota 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 98 


mere negative practice, it was not simply checking 
the indriyas, but c§ching their bad teldencies and 
habits in order toWmploy them for a better purpose, 
and make them obey the dictates of reason. 


It is a mistake, therefore, t@ think, as ,some do, that 
_« Indian ethics taught a rigorisnf or 
Tt docs not kill the agceticism which consists in killing 
natural impulses, but ‘i ‘ 
trains them te the ‘the natural impulses in man. As 
yoke of reason. early as the Upanigads, we find 
Indian thinkers recognizing that 
though the most valuable thing in man is his spirit 
(atman), his existence as 8 man depends on non-spiritual 
factors as well ; that even his thinking power depends dh 
the food he takes. ‘This convictien never left the Indian 
thinkers ; the lower clements, for them, were not for 
; destruction but fo reformdtion and 
jMorulity is not mere subjugation te the higher. Cessation 
Pe ecaltigation ct {orm bad activities was coupled, with 
positive virtues. performance of good ones. This we 
find even in the most rigoristic 
systems, like the Yoga, where, as aids to the attainment 
of perfect concentration (yoginga), we find meritioned not 
simply the negative practice oi the ‘don'ts’ (yamas), but 
ulso the positive cultivation of good habits (niyamus). 
‘The yamas consist of the five great efforts for abstinence 
from injury te life, falsehood, stealing, sensuous appetite 
und greed for wealth (ahizhsi, satya, asteya, bruhmacarya 
and aparigrahu). ‘These ure to be cultivated along with 
the niyamas, namely, purity of body and mind, content- 
ment, fortitude, study and resignation to God. Essentially 
similar teachings we find as much in the other orthodox 
schools as in Buddhism and Jainism which,|tike the Yoga, 
recommend, for example, the cultivation of love (maitri) 
and kindness (karuna) along with non-violence (ahimsi). 
That the action of the indriyas is not to be suppressed, 
but only to be turned to the service of the highcr self, is 
also the teaching of the Gita, as would appear from the 
following:, ‘‘One who has controlled himself, attains 
contentment by enjoying objects through sthe indriyas 
which have b&en freed from the influence of love and 
hate,’’? . 


1 Bhagavadgita, 2, 64. 


24 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Lastly, all Indian systems, except the Carvaka, 
(8) Belief in tbe pos accept the idea of, liberation as the 
elas Aereierrgiae sales highest end- oF life. The concep- 
nda ete ar a tion of liberation received, of course, 
slightly different meanings. All 
negatively agreed that the state of liberation is a total 
destruction of sufferings which life in this world brings 
about. A few wenta little beyond this to hold that 
liberation or the state of perfection is not simply nega- 
tion of pain, but is a state of positive bliss. The 
Mimaiinsa’, Vedinta and Jaina thinkers belong to this 
latter group, and ever the Bauddhas, according to 
some. 
7. The Space-Time Background 
2 
In addition to the unity of moral and _ spiritual 
sia siiewact ouilook described above, we may 
ness of the world of alsu note the prevailing sense of 
Space and ‘Pime for” the vastness of the space-time 
ed the common back- Pp 
nee of Indian” world, which formed the common 
background of Indian thought and 
influenced its moral and metaphysical outlook. 
The Western belief that the world was created  stx 
thousand and odd years ago and 
aatin brie aor all for the purpose of ‘man consti- 
and Space as incon- {yted a narrowness of outlook and 
ceivably vast entities. : 
exaggerated the importance of man. 
This belief has been shaken by the biological dis- 
coveries of Darwin and others who show that the 
evolution of‘living beings has to be conceived in terms 
of millions of years, not thousands. The science of 
astronomy, again, is gradually generating the belief 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION _ 25 


in the vastifets of the universe, the diameter of which 
ia “at least hungreds of millions of “tght-years.’” 
The sun in this Sai is a merd speck in the 
universe, and the earth is less than one-millionth part 
of this speck. And we are reminded that each faint 
speck of nebula observable iff the sky contains ‘‘matter 
enough for the creation of perhaps a thousand million 
suns like ours.’” 


Our imagination feels staggered in its attempt to 
grasp the vastness of the space- - 
Ind inate” ™ time universe revealed by scienc@* 
A similar feeling is caused by the 
accounts of creation given in some of the Rurdnas, 
which would, but for modern discoveries, be laughed at 
as pure fantasy. In the Vignu-Purana,’ for example, 
we come across the popular Indian conception of the 
world (brahmanda) which contains the fourteen regions 
(lokas) of which the earth (bhiitala) is only one, and 
which are separated from one another by tens of 
millions (kotis) of yojanas, and again the infinite uni- 
verse is conceived as containing thousands of nfillions 
of such worlds (brahmandas). 


As to the description of the vastness of time, we 
find that the Indian thinker, like the modern scientist, 
feela unable to describe it by common human units. 
The unit adopted for the measurement of cosmic time 
isa day of the creator Brahm&. Hach day of the 


1 Sir J.H. Jeans, in Nature, 262-27. A light-year=tbe distance 
travelled by” light in a year, at the rate of 186,825 miles per 
second = 60 X 60 X 2" 365 X 186,325 miles=5,875,945,200,000 miles. 

* Tbid. (quoted in Everyday Science, by L. M. Parsons\pp. 14-15).¢ 

3 Part 2, Chap. 7. 


4—-1605B 


26 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


creator is equal to 1,000 yugas or 432 million Nears 
ofinen. THR is the duration of she period of each 
creation of cosmos. The nightof the creator is 
cessation of creative activity and means destruction or 
chaos. Such alternating days and nights, creation and 
destruction (ststi and praiaya), form a_ beginningless 
series. 

It is not possible to ascertain the first beginning of 
creation. It would be arbitrary to think that creation 
bevan at first at some particular time and not earlier. 
A's there are no data for fixing the first beginning of the 
universe, .Indian thinkers, in general, look upon the 
universe as beginningless ‘anadi). They try to explain 
the beginning of the present creation by reference to 
previots states of dissolution and creation and think 
it idle and meaningless to enquire about the firs! 
creatiqn. Any term of a beginningless series can only 
be said to be carler or later in relation to others ; 
there ie nothing like an absolute first tern in such a 
series. 

With this overwhelming idea of the vast universe at 
ite background, Indian thought naturally harped on the 
extreme sinallness of the earth, the transitoriness 
of earthly existence and the insignificance of earthly 
possessions. If the earth wes a mere point in the vast 
space, life was a mere ripple in the ocean of tine. 
Myriads of them come and go, and matter very little to 
the universe as a whole, Even the best civilization 
evolved +hrough centuries is nothing very unijue ; there 
is notvone golden age only in the life of, the earth. In 
the beginningless cycles of creation and dissolution 
there haye been numberless golden ages as well as iron 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION - 27 


ones. Progperity and adversity, civilization and 
berbarity rise and fall, as the wheel of tinge turns and 
moves on. 

The general inftence of this outlook on meta- 
physics has been to regard the present world as the 
outcome of a past one and explain the foymer partly by 
referenve to tlte latter. Besides it set metaphysics on 
the search for the eternal. On the ethical and religious 
side, it helped the Indian tnind to take a wider and 
detached view of life, prevented it from the morbid 
desire to cling to the fleeting as the everlasting and 
persuaded it always to have an eve on what was of 
lasting, rather than of momentary, value. 


VI. A Brier Skrercu or THE Systems 
1. The Carodha System 


jn Indian philosophy the word ‘Carvaka’ moans 
a materialist. The Cirvikas hold that perception is 
the only valid source of knowledge. They point out 
that al] non-perceptual or indirect sources of kuowledge 
like inference, the testimony of other pergons, atc., are 
unreliable and often prove misleading. We should not, 
therefore, believe in anything exccpt what is imme- 
diately known through perception. 

Perception reveals to us only the material world, 
composed of the four bhitas or elements of matter, 
viz. air, fire, water and earth, the existence of which 
we cati directly know through the senses. All objects 
of this perceptible world are composed of thege ele- 
ments. There is no evidence that there is anything 
like an immaterial soul in man. Man tos is made 


28 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


wholly of matter. We say ‘I am stout,’ ‘I am lean,’ 
‘Tam lame.’ These judgments also tend to sho'y 
that the individual is identica/, with the body. 
There is of course consciousness in man, but con- 
sciousness is a quality of the living body. which 
is a product of matter. It should not be thought 
that because the elements of matter are unconscious, 
there can be no consciousness in objects madé of 
them. There are many examples in which qualities 
originally absent in the comp2nent parts are developed 
when the parts are combined together in a particular 
way. ‘There are examples even of the same substance 
acquiring’ new. qualities under different conditions. 
Bete] leaf, nut and lime chewed together acquire a red 
tinge originally absent in any of the constituents; 
molasses acquires by fermentation the power of intoxi- 
cation originally absent. Similarly, the elements of 
matter’ combined together in a particular way give rise 
to the living body having consciousness. Conscious- 
ness ceases apparently with the body. When man dies 
nothing is Jeft of him to enjoy or suffer the conse- 
quences of his actions hereafter. 


- The survival of man in any form after death is, 
therefore, unproved. The existence of God also is a 
myth. God cannot be perceived. The world is made 
by the automatic combination of the material elements 
and not by God. It is foolish, therefore, to perform 
any religious rite either for enjoying happiness after 
this life in heaven or for pleasing God. No faith 
should be put in the Vedas or in the cunning priests 
who earn their livelihood by exploiting the credulity 
of men. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 29 


The highgst end of life, for a rational man, should, 
therefore, be the oe of the greatest amount of 
pleasure here in th® life, of which alone we are sure, 
It is foolish to forge. ‘pleasures of life simply because 
they happen to be mixed with pain. It would be as 
though one were to reject the kernel because of its husk 
or cease sowing crops for fear of cattle. “We should *try 
to get the best out of this life by epjoing it as best as we 
can and avoiding as far as possible the chances of pain. 


2. The Jaina System 


The origin of the Jaina faith lies far back in the 
prehistoric times. The long line of teacher8 through 
whom the faith was handed down c nsists of *twenty- 
four Tirthankaras or liberated propagators of the faith, 
the last of whom was Vardhamina (also atyled Maha- 
vira), a contemporary of Gautama Buddha. 

The Jainas reject the Carvake view that perception, 
is the only v valid source of knowledge. They point out 
that if we “are to reject altogether the possibility of 
obtaining correct knowledge through inference aad the 
testimony of other persons because sometimes they 
prove misleading, we should doubt the validity of per 
ception also, beacause even perception sometimes proves 
illusory. In fact, the Cirvikas themselves take the 
help of inference when by observing some cases of 
inference to be misleading they come to hold that all 
inference is inyalid, and also when they deny the 
existence of objects because they are not perceived. ° 
“The Jainas admit, in addition to perception, fnference 
and jtestimony as sources of valid knowledge. "Infer- 
ence yields “valid knowledge when it obeys the logical 


80 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


rules of correctnese. Testimony is valid «yhen it is the 
report of a reliable authority, In fact, the Jainas hod 
that it is on the authority of Ph teachings of the 
omniscient liberated saints (Jifas or Tirthankaras) 
that we can have unerring knowledge about certain 
spiritual matters, which our limited sense-perception 
and reasoning cannot reveal to us. 


On the basis of these three kinds of knowledge, 
the Jainas form their view of the universe. Perception 
reveals the reality of material substances, composed of 
the four kinds of elements, as the Carvikas hold. By 
inference they come to believe in space (Akasa), because 
material‘ substances must exist somewhere, believe 
in time’ (kala), because changes or succession of the 
states of substances cannot be understood without it, 
and Believe also in the two causes of motion and rest 
respectively, for without them movement and cessation 
of movement in things cannot be explained. These 
last two are called respectively dharma and adharma 
which should not be taken here in their ordinary moral 
sense, but in the technical sense of the causes of 
motion and rest. But the physical world, consisting 
of the four elements of matter, space, time, dharma 
and adharma, is not all. Perception, as well as 
inference, proves the existence of souls in all living 
bodies. When we perceive the qualities of an orange 
such as its colour, shape, smell, we say we perceive 
the existence of the orange. On similar grounds, 
when we internally perceive pleasure, pain and other 
qualities of the soul, we should admit that tHe soul also 
is dirtctly known through perception. ‘ Consciousness 
vannot by said to be the product of matter; the 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 31 


Carvakas cdnnot point out any case where the combi- 
nation of material betances is perceivec*tc generate 
consciousness. The®sxistence of the soul can also be 
inferred on the ground that if there had been no 
conscious agent to guide them, materia] substances 
could not be formed into livihg bodies by themselvss. 
Without a conscious substance to regulate them the 
body and the senses could not do their work so sys- 
tematically. . 


There are, then, as many souls as there are living 
bodies. There are souls, the Juinas hold, not only iv 
animals, but also in plants and even in payticles of 
dust. The existence of very minute living. beings 
(such as germs) in dust and other apparently non- 
living materia] things is also admitted by idern 
science. All souls are not equally conscious. Sonie, 
like those in plants or dust-bodies, have only the sense 
of touch and have tactual consciousness alone. Some 
lower animals have two senses, others three, still others 
four, Man and some higher animals have five senses 
through all of which they know things. But, hoWever 
developed the senses may be, the soul living in the 
body is limited in knowledge; it is limited in power 
also and is subject to all kinds of miseries. 


But every soul is capable of attaining infinite can- 


sciousness, power and bappiness. These qualities are 
inherent in the very nature of the soul. They are 
ae Pra gre : 

obstructed by karmas, just as the natural light of the 
sun is ohstructed by clonds. The karinas,or the 
' forces of passiqns and desires in the soul attracd to it 
particles of matter which permeate the saul just a 
particles of dust permeate the light of any flame or the 


32 an INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


sun. In a word, the armas lead to thé bondage o 
the soul bysynatter. en removing peta ae 
remove bondage and regain its. ngjlral perfections. 

The teachings and lives of the liberated saints 
(Tirthankaras) prove the possibility of Jiberation and 
show also the path to bt followed for the | purpose. 
Three things are necessary for the removal of bon- 
dage, viz. perfect faith in the teachings of the Jaina 
teachers, correct knowledge of the teachings, and right 
conduct. Right conduct consists in the practice of 
abstinence from all injury to life, from falsehood, from 
stealing, from sensuality and from attachment to sense 
objects.’ By the joint culture of right faith, right 
knowledge and right conduct the passions are controlled 
and the karmas that fetter the soul to matter are 
removed. The obstacles being removed, the soul 
attains its naural  perfection—infinite faith, 
infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. 
This is the state of liberation. : 

The Jajnas do not believe in God. The Tirthan- 
karag, to whom alJl the godly powers like omniscience 
and omnipotence beiong, take the place of Gud. They 
are adored as ideals of life. 


Sympathy for all living beings is one of the chief 
features of the Jaina faith. Coupled with this there 
is, in Jaina philosophy, respect for all opinions. The 
Jaina philosophers point out that every object has infinite 
aspects, judged by what itis and what it is not from 
different points of view. Every judgment that we 
ordingrily ‘pass about @ thing is, therefore, true only in 
relation to @ particular aspect of the thing seen from a 
‘particular point of view. We should remember, there- 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 33 


fore, the eifmited nature of our knowledge and judg- 
ment, and ‘should refrain from thinking, that sny View 
is the whole troti,gbout any thing. We should guard 
and “qualify our own statements_and also Jearn to 
appreciate the possibility of the correctness of others’ 
views. 

The Jaina philosophy is a kind of realism, because 
it aeseris the reality of the external world, and it ia, 
pluralism, because it believes in many ultimate realities, ' 
Tt is atheism as it rejects the existence of God. _ 


3. The Bauddha System 


The Bauddha system of philosophy aroge out of 
the teachings of Gautama Buddha, the well-known 
founder of Buddhism. Gautama was awalsened to 
aconsciousness of sorrow by the sight of disease, 
old age, death and other miseries, to which man is 
subject. He spent years in study, penance and 
meditation to discover the origin of human sufferings 
and the means to overcome them. At last he received 
enlightenment, the result of which was set forth by 
him in the form of what bas come to be known as 
‘the four noble truths’ (catvari arya-satyani). Those 
are—the truth that there is misery, the truth that there 
isa cause of misery, the truth that there is cessation 
of misery and the truth that there is a path leading to 
the ceseation of misery. 

The first truth about the existence of misery is 
admitted by all in some form or other. But with his 
penetrating insight Buddha saw that misery is not 
simply casual ; it is universally present in all foums 
of existence and in all kinds of experiehce. Even 


6—16065B 


34 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN ‘PHILOSOPHY 


what appears as pleasant js really a sourca of pain 
at bottom... «+ 

Regarding the second truth, Bytadba’ 8 conclusion 
is deduced from his analysis of causation. He points 
out that the existence of everything in the world, 
mterjal and meatal, is caused by some other thing. 
There is nothing which is unconditional and self- 
existent. Nothing is, therefore, permanent in the 
world. All ‘things are subject to change. Our 
sufferings are similarly caused by some conditions. 
Sufferings depend on birth in thig world. Birth again 
is caused by our desire (tanh or trsna) for the worldly 
objects. ‘The force of desires drags us down to the 
world. But our desires can be traced ultimately to 
our ignerance. If we had a correct knowledge of 
the things of the world, understood their transitory 
and painful nature, there would be no-desire for them; 
birth would then cease and along with it also misery. 

.As suffering, like other things, depends on some 
conditions, it must cease when these “conditions 
are removed. This is the third truth about cessation 
of misery. 

’ The fourth truth about the rah that leads to the 
cessation of misery concerns the control of the condi- 
tions that cause misery. This path is known as the 
eight-fold noble path as it consists of eight steps, 
namely, right views, right determination, right speach, 
right conduct, right livelihood, right endeavour, right 
mindfulness and right concentration. These eight 
steps remove ignorance and desire, enlighten the mind 
and bring about perfect equanimity and tranquillity. 
Thus imisery ceases completely and the chance of 


GENERAL INTRODUOTION 95 


rebirth aleg i is stopped. The attainment of this atate of 
perfection is nirvana. - 

The teaching oi Buddha arg contuined i in the four 
noble truths destribed above. It will appear from 
this that, 1 Buddts ‘himself ‘was not concerned s0 much 
with ‘the problema of philosophy as with the practical 
problem: “how buman misery can _We removede He 
regarded it asa waste of time to discuss ‘metaphysi ical 
problems, while man is writhing in misery. But 
though a averse to theoretical speculation he could not 
avoid philosophical discussions altogether. Thus we 
find from early literature the following theories 
among bis teachings: (a) AM things ate ponditional ; 
there is nothing that exists by i itself. (b) All Jhings are, 
therefore, subject to . change, owing to the change of 
the conditions on which they depend ; wothing is 
permanent. (c) There is, therefore, neither any soul 
nor God nor any other permanent substance. (d) There 
is, however, continuity of the present life which 
generates another life, by the law of karma, just 
asa tree geverates another trée through its seed, and 
the second continues while the first Withers away. is 

The later followers of Buddha, in India and outside, 
developed the germs of philosophical theories contained 
in Buddha’s teachings, and imany schools thus came 
into existence. Of these the four that became mort 
well-known ‘in Indian philosophy may be mentioned 
here, 

The Médhyamika or Siinyavida School.—Accord- 
ing to this, the world is unreal (éiinya) ; mental aad 
noa-mental, phenomena are all illusory. ‘thie view. is 
known as nihilisin (Siinyavada). © e 


86 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The Yogdcara or Vijfanavada School—This holds 
that external objects are unreal. What appears’ as 
external is really an idea in the mind. But miad 
must be admitted to be real. It is self-contradictory 
to say that the mind is unreal; for, then, the very 


thought that_ . mind is unreal stands self-condemned, 
thougat being an activity of the mind. .This view is 


called subjective idealism (vijianavada). 

: The Sautrantika School.—This holds that both 
the mental and the non-mental are real. If every- 
thing ‘that we perceive as external were unreal, then 
our- perception of an object would not depend on any- 
thing outside the mind, but absolutely on the mind. 
But we fird that the mind cannot perceive any object, 
like a tiger, at any place it likes. This proves that ihe 
idea of +he tiger, when we perceive it, depends on 
hon-mental reality, the tiger. From the perceptual 
idea or representation of a tiger in the mind we can 
infer the existence of its cause, the tiger, outside 
the mind. Thus externa] objects van be inferred to 
exist outside the mind. This view may be called 
representationism, or theory of the inferability of 
external objects (bahyanumeya-vada). 

The Vaibhasika School.—This school agrees with 
the last on the point that both internal and external 
objects are real. But it differs from it regarding the 
‘way external objects are known. External objects, 
according to the Vaibhisikas, are directly perceived 
and not inferred from their ideas or representations in 
the mind. For, if no external object were ever 
perceived corresponding to any idea, it would not be 
possible to infer the existence of an external object 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 37 


from any idea, This view may be called direct 
realism, because it holds that external objects are 
perceived directly (babya-pratyaksa-vada). 

Buidhism is divided. on religious matters, into the 
two well-known schools, Hinayana, flourishing now in 
the south, in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, and Mahayana, 
found now in the worth, in Tibet, China and Japan? 
The first two of the four philosophical schvols 
mentioned above come under the Mahayana and the 
last two under the Hinayana. The most important 
religious question on which these two schools differ is: 
What is the object of nirvana ? The Hinayana holds 
that nirvana should be sought ‘in order that the 
individual may put an end to his own misery. « The 
Mahiyana thinks, on the other hand, that the object 
of nirvana is not to put an end to one’s °uwn 
misery, but to obtain perfect wisdom with which the 
liberated can try for the salvation of all beings. in 
uusery. 


4, The Nydya System 


The Nyaya system is the work of the great sage 
Gotama. It isa realistic philosophy based mainly on 
logical grounds. It admits four separate sources of 
true knowledge, viz. perception (pratyaksa), inference 
(anumana), comparison (upamana) and _ testimony 
(gabda}. Perception is the direct knowledge of objects 
produced by their relation to our senses. It may be 
external (bahya) or internal (@otara), according as the 
sense concerged is external, like the eye and the, ear, 
or internal, like the mind (manas), Inferenc’ is «the 
knowledge of objects, not through perception, but ' 


38 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


through the appreheneion of some mark (lifga) which 

is invariably related to the inferred objects (sddhya). 

The invatiable relation betwee: the two is called 

vyapti. In inference there are at least three proposi- 

tions and at most three terms, viz. the psksa or minor 

term about which we infer somethin:, the sidhya or 

inajor term ‘which is the inferred objegt, and the linga 

or sidhana or middle term which is invariably related 

to the major, and is present in the minor. To illus- 
trate: ‘‘ The hill is fiery, because it smokes ; and 

whatever smokes is fiery. Comparison is the know- 
ledge of the relation between a name and things so 
named,on the basis of a given description of their 

similarity to some familiar object. A man is told that 

8 gavaya is like acow. Then he finds an anima] in 

the forest, which strikingly resembles the cow, and 

concludes that this animal must bs a gavaya. Such 

knowledge is derived from upamana or comparison., 
Sabda or testimony is the knowledge about unperceived 
abjects derived from the statements of authoritative 
persons. A scientist tells us that water is a compound 
of °hydrogen and oxygen in o certain proportion. 

Although we have not ourselves demostrated the truth 

we know it on the authority of the scientist. Here 
our knowledge is derived from sabde or testimony. All 
other sources of knowledge have been reduced by the 
Naiyayskas to these four. 

The. objects of knowledge, according to the Nyaya, 
are the self, the body, the senses and their objects, 
cognition (buddbi), mind (manas,, activity (pravptti), 
mental defects (doga), rebirth (pretyabhaba!, the feel- 
ings of pleasure and pain (phala), suffering (dubkha), 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 39 


and freedom ffom suffering (upavarga). The Nyaya, 
like many other systems ef Indian philosophy, seeks 
to deliver the self from its bondage to the body, the 
senses and their objects. According to it, the self is 
distinct from the body and the mind. The body is 
only a composite substance mad® of matter.e The ming 
(manas) is a subtle, indivisible and eternal substance 
(anu). It serves the soul as an instrument for the 
perception of psy2hic qualities like pleasure, pain, etc. 
It is, therefore, called an internal sense. The self 
(Atman) is another substance whic. is quite distinct 
from the mind and the body. I¢ scquires the attribute 
of consciousness when it is related to any object 
through the sentes. But consciousness is not an 
essential quality of the self. It is an accidentgl or 
adventitious quality which ceases to qualify the self in 
the state of mukti or liberation. While the mind 
(manas) is infinitesimal like an atom, the self’ is” ail- 
pervading (bibhu), indestructible and eternal. It is an 
agent which likes and dislikes objects and tries to 
obtain or avoid them and enjoys or suffers the canse- 
quences of its actions. It is ignorance of the truth 
(mithya-jiaéna) and the consequent faults of desire, 
aversion and infatuation (raga, dvesa and moha) 
that impel the self to act for good and bad euds and 
plunge it into the world of sin and suffering, birth and 
death. Liberation. (apavarga) means the absolute 
Cessation of all pain and suffering owing to the right 
knowledge of reality (tattva-jfidna). Some people 
think that it is a state of happiness. Byt this is 
entirely wrong,’ for there is no pleasure without, 
pain, just se there is no light without shade. Bo‘ 


40 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


liberation is only release .from pain anu 30t pleasure or 
happiness. . ‘ 
The existence of God is proved by the Neaiyayikas 
by several arguments. God is the ulimate cause of 
the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. 
He did not,create the world out of nothing, but out of 
eternal atoms, space, time, ether, ‘minds and souls 
This world has been created in order that individual 
souls (jivas) might enjoy pleasure or suffer pain accord- 
ing to the merit or demerit of their actions in other 
lives and in other worlds. The most popular argument 
for God's existence js: ‘‘ All things of the world like 
mountains and seas, the sun and the moon, are effects, 
because they are made up of parts. Therefore, they 
must have a maker (karta).’’ The individual selves 
cannot be the maker or creator of the world, because 
they are limited in power and knowledge, and so can- 
not dea! with such subtle and imperceptible entities 
as atoms, of which aii physical things are composed. 
The creator of the world musi be an intelligent spirit 
with unlimited power and wisdom, and capable of 
maintaining the moral order of the univerre. God 
created the world not for any end of His own, but for 
the good of all living beings. This, however, does 
not mean that there must be only happiness and no 
misery in the world. If individual selves have any 
freedom of will in them, they would act for good or bad 
ends and thereby bring happiness or misery on them- 
selves. But under the loving care and wise guidance 
of tbe Divine Being, all individuals can sovner or later 
attafn right knowledge about themselves and the world, 
"and thereby final release from all suffering (mukti), 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 41 
05. The Vaisesika System 


The Vaisesika ° system was founded by the sage 
Kanada algo named d Uliika. It is allied to the Nydya 
syatern and has the same end in sa namely, the libera- 


ee See 


cuban: (dravya), quality” “(guna), action ae 
generality (samanya), particularity (viéesa), the relation 
of inherence ‘(camavaya), and non-existence _(abhaba), 


A substance is the_ substratrmn_ of qualities_and™ 
activities, but is different from, both. ” Thete ar are e nine 
kinds of substances, viz. iz. earth, water, fire, air, “ether 
(akaga), time, spa Space, soul and “mind (manss). Of 
these, the ‘first five are called the physical elements 
(bhites) and have respectively the specific qualities. of 
smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. The first four 
are re composed ofthe four kinds of atoms. (of 8arth, 
water, fire and air) “which ate invisible and inde- 
atructible Particles of matter, . “The atoms are uncreated 
and eternal entities which we get by resc resolving any 
material object into smaller and smaller parts till we 
come to such as cannot be further divided. ““Akada, 
space and time are imperceptible substances, each of 
which is one, eternal and all-pervading. The mind 
(manas) is an eternal substance which is not all- 
pervading, but infinitely smal] like an atom. It is the 
internal sense which is directly or indirectly concerned 
in all psychical functions like cognition, feeling and 
willing. ‘Fhe mind being atomic we cannot have more 
than one experience at one instant of time. The soul 
is an eternal and all-pervading substance whioh is ther 


6—1605B 


42 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


subsiratum of the phenomena of consciousness. The 
individual soul is perceived internally by the mind of 
the individual as when one says‘I am happy.’ The 
Supreme soul or God is inferred as the creator of the 
world of effects. God creates the world out of eternal 
atoms. The,compositionand decomposition of atoms 
explain the origin and destruction f the composite 
objects of the world. But the atoms cannot move 
and act by themselves. The ultimate source of their 
actions is to be found in the will of God, who directs 
their operations according to the law of karma. The 
‘atoms are made to compose a world that befits the 
unseen moral deserts (adrsta) of individual souls and 
serves the purpose of moral dispensation. This is the atomic 
theory of the Vaisesikas. It is rather teleological than 
mechanistic and materialistic like other atomic theories. 
A quality is that which exists in a substance and 
bas fiself no quality or activity. While a substance 
can exist by itself, a quality cannot exist unless it be 
in some substance. There is no activity or movement 
in the qualities of things. There are altogether twenty- 
four kinds of qualities, viz. colour, taste, smell, touch, 
sound, number, magnitude, distinctness (prthaktva), con- 
junction (sarhyoga), disjunction (vibhiga), remoteness 
(paratva), nearness (aparatva), fluidity (dravatva). viscid- 
ity (sneha), cognition (buddhi), pleasure, pain, desire, 
aversion, striving (prayatna) , heaviness (gurutva) , tenden- 
cy (sarhekira), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma).' 


i's Feentre stands for both remoteness in space and remotenesa iu 
time and’ Aperatva ’ for nearness both in space and time. ‘ Sathskirg * 
really stands for three qualities, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory- 
‘impression, ¢ 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 43 


An actich “is a movement. Like quality, it belongs 
only to substances.e There are fiv 8 of action, viz. 
throwing ig _ppward (utksepana), throwing downward 
(avakgepana) contraction (Gkuiicanay, expansion 
(prasirana), and going (gamana) 

All cows have in them a cértain commen nature _for 
which they~are grouped into one class and excluded. 
from other classes. This is called ‘ gotva’ or cowness 
and is thé Famanys or universal in them. Since cow- 
ness is not generated by the birth of any cow nor 
destroyed by the dcath of an;, it is eternal. A 
universal is thus the eternal essence common to all the 
individuals of a class. 7 

Particularity (visesa) is the ground of the ultimate 
differences of things. Ordinarily, we distinguigh one 
thing from another by the peculiarities of its parts and 
other qualities, But how are we to distinguish the 
ultimate simple and eternal substances of the world, 
like two atoms of earth? ‘There must be some ultimate 
difference or peculiarity in each.of them, otherwise they 
would not be different, both having all the qualitjes of 
earth, Particularity stands for the peculiarity or indivi- 
duality of the eternal entities of the world. It is the 
special treatment of this category of videsa that explains 
the name ‘ Vaiégesika ’’ given to this system of phi- 
losophy. 

Inherence (samavaya) is the permanent or eternal 
relation by which a whole is in its parts, a quality or 
an action is in a substance, the universal is in ihe 
particulars. The cloth as one whole always éxists in 
the threads, qualities like ‘green,’ ‘sweet’ and 
‘fragrant,’ and motions of different kinds*abide in 


44 an INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


some substances. Cowness as @ universal ig in all cows. 
This permanent relation between«the whole and its 
parts, between the universal and its individuals, and 
between qualities or actions and their substances, is 
known as samavaya or inherence, .-~ 

Non-existance (abhive) stands for all negative facts. 
‘There is no snake here,’ ‘that rose is ‘not red,’ ‘there 
is no smell in pure water’ are propositions which 
express respectively the non-existence of the snake, 
redness and swell in certain things. All such cases 
of non-existence are brought under the category of 
sbhava. It is of four kinds, namely, pragabbava, 
dhvarmeaibhava, atyantabhiva (these three being put 
together under sarhsargabhava or the absence of a 
relation between two entities), and anyonyabhava- 
The first means the non-existence of a thing before 
(prak) its production, ¢.g. the non-existence of a pot 
in clay before it is produced by the potter. The second 
is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction 
(dhvarmsa), ¢.g. the non-existence of the pot when it 
is breken up. ‘The third is the absence of a relation 
between two things for all time—past, present and 
future, e.g. the non-existence of colour in the air. 
The last kind represents the difference of one thing 
from another. When two things (say a jar and a cloth) 
differ fr.m each otber, there is the non-existence of 
either as the other. The jar is not the cloth, nor is 
the cloth the jar. This mutual non-existence of two 
different things is called anyonyabhava. 

Witi regard to God and the liberatitn of the 
individual eou! the Vaisesika theory is stibtantially the 
same as that of the Nyaya. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 45 
The Sénkhya System 


e 

The Saikhya is a philosophy of dualistic realism, 
attributed to the sage Kapila. It admits two ultimate 
realities, namely, purusa ind prakrti, ‘which’ are inde- 
pendent of each “plber. in respect of their existence, 
The purusa is a’p intelligent principle, of which con- 
sciousness (caitanya) is not an attribute, but the’ very 
essence. It is the self which is qu quite te distinct from the 
body, the senses and the mind (manas). It is beyond 
the whole world of objects, and is the eternal conscious. 
ness which witnesses the changes and activities going” 
on in the world, but does not itself act and change in 
any way. Physical things like chairs, i-eds, ett. exist 
for the enjoyment” rent of beings _ other than themselves. 
Therefore, there must be the puruga or the self which 
is distinct from prakrti or primary matter, but_is the 
enjoyer (bhokta) of the products of prakrti. ‘here are 
many different selves related to “different bodies, for 
when some men are ‘happy, ¢ others are re uuhap appy, some 
die but others liv live. ees : 


» 
“Prakrti is the ul ultimate cause of the world. Ati is 





changing and has no othe end than the satisfaction of 
the selves. Batt a, rajas and tamas are three consti- 
tuents of ‘prakrti ‘which holds them together in a state 
of rest or equilibrium (simyavaath’). The three are 
called gunas. But they are noi , qualities or attributes 
~~ 
in any sense. Rather, ‘they _ are. 2 three substantial 
elements ° which constitute prakrti i fike “three cords 


making up a°rope. The existance of the gunas is 


sling “up 9° rope. “the gp 
inferred from the qualities of pleasure, pain and 


46 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


indifference which we find in all things uf the world 

The same sweet is liked or disliked or treated with 
indifference by the same man in different conditions. 

The same salad is tasteful to some person, distasteful 
to another and iiisipid to a third. Now the cause and 
the effect are essentially identical, The effect is the 
manifested condition of the cause, ¢.g. oil as an effect 
manifests what is already contained in the seeds. “The 
things of the world are effects which have the qualities 


of pleasure, pain and_indifference. Therefore, prakiti 


<or pradhaina which is their ultimate cause must have 


“he three-tléments of sattva, rajas and temas which 


respectively Possess the he _naiures of pleasure, pain and 


indifference, and ¢ cause manifestation, activity _ and 
passivjty. oe 

The_ @ evolution of | the world has its starting point in 

16 World Nas 18 shart 

the associ sociation (sarh yoga) of the purusa with prakrti, 
which disturbs the original equilibrium of of the latter 
and moves it to action. The course of evolution i 18.88 
follows: “From o prakrti arises the great germ of this 
vast pniverse which is ‘which is mhich is called, therefore, the great _one 


Amahat)! The conscidtisnese of the self is reflected on 


TN ree, 


this and mak makes it appear as conscious. It r represents 
the awakening of g of nature from her cosmic sluiaber and 
the first ap appearance 0 of thought ; ary therefore, it is 
also_called the _ Intellect (buddhi)." It is the creative 
thought of the world to be evolved. Ahankara, the 
second product, arises by & s further “transformation - of 


en pepereay coer 


the Intellect.” The function of “ahankara i is the feeling 


en 


of ‘ I abd m mine ’ (abhimina), Owing to its "identifica- 


tion with this principle, the self considers itself to be 
un agent <karté) which it really is not. From ahadkara, 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION ~. AT 


with an exgens of the element of sattva, arise the five 
organs “of knowledge _ (jinendriya), the five five ) Organs | of 
action (karmendriya) and ihe mind (manas) which is at 
once an organ of knowledge and ac activity (ubhayendriya). 
With an increase of tamas, ahalikéra produces, on the 
other hand, the five subtle eleqnente (tanmitra) which 
are the potentidlities of gound, touch, colour, taste a1 and 
smell. From the five subtle elements come the five 
gross s elements of akaéa or ether, air, fire, water and 
earth in the same 0 ‘order. ‘Thus we have altogether 
twenty- -five principles | in the Sankhya. Of 1 these, all 
but the puruga is coniprised by prakrti w which is the® 
cause or the ultimate source of all other physical sical 11 objects 
including mind, matter and lifp. Prakrti is the urteaused 
cause of all objects. The seven principles of mahat, 
ahankara and the five tanmitras are causes of certain 
effects and themselves effects of certain causes. The 
eleven ‘senses and the five gt gross elements are-only the 
effect& of certain causes and not themselves the causes 

_ of anything Which is substantially different from them. 
‘The puruga_or the self is neither the cause (prakrti) 
nor the effect (vikrti) of anything. 

Although the self is in itself free and immortal, yet 
such is the influence of avidyaé or ignorance that it 
confuses itself with the body, the senses and the mind 
(manas). It is the want of discrimination (aviveka) 
between the self and the not-self that is responsible 
for all our sorrows and sufferings. We fcel injured 
and unhappy when our body is injured or indisposed, 
because we fail to realize the distinction between the 
self and the body. Similarly, pleasure and pain fn the 
mind seem to affect the self only because the self’ge 


48 AN INTRODUOTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY | 


distinction from the mind is not clearly . perceived by 
us. Once_we realize the distiaction between the self 


and the.not-self-including the body and the senseg, the 


mind, the intellect and the @go viveka-jiana), our self 
peases to be affected by the joys and sorrows, the ups 
ynd downs of life. It rests ‘in itself as the dispassionate 
observer_of ‘the show of events in ihe world without 


being implicated in them. Thig ig the state of libera- 
tion or freedom from suffering which has been variously 
deeNbsl as GATE apaverye, kaivalya, ete. It is 
possible for us to attain this state while alive in this 
world (jivanmukti) or after this life in the other world 
(videhamukti), But mere knowledge or intellectual 
understanding of the truth will not help one_to realize 
one’s self and thereby attain final release from sin and 
suffering. For this we require to go through a long 
course of spiritual training with deep devotion to, and 
constant meditation on, the trath that the self is the 
pure eternal consciousness which is beyond the mind- 
body complex and above the space-time and cause-effect 
order of « existence, It is “the unborn and undying 
spirit, of which the essence is freedom, immortality 
and life eternal. The nature and methods of the 
spiritual training necessary for self-realization have 
been elaborated in the Yoga philosophy. 

With regard to the problem of God, we find that 
the main tendency of the Saikhya is‘to do away with 
the theistic belief. According to it, the existence of 
God cannot be proved in any way. We need not 
admit’ God to explain the world ; for, prakrti is the 
adequefie cause of the world as a whole. God as eternal 
end unchgnging spirit cannot be the creator of the 





GENERAL INTRODUCTION 49 


world ; for to produce an effect the cause must change 
and transform itself into the effect. Some Sapkbya 
commentators and writers, however, try to show that 
the system admits the existence of God as the supreme 
person who is the witness but not the creator of the 
world. 


7. The Yoga System 


The sage Patafijali is the founder of the Yoga 
philosophy. The Yoga is closely allied to the Sankhya. 
It mostly accepts the epistemology ard the metaphy- 
sics of the Sinkhya with its twentf-five principles, but 
admits also the existence of God. The special interest 
of this system is in the practice of yoga as the means 
to the attainment of vivekajfidna or discrimirtative 
knowledge which is held in the Saénkhya to be the 
essential condition of liberation. According to jt, yoga 
consists in the cessation of all mental functions 
(cittavrttinirodha). There are five levels of mental 
functions (cittabhimi). The first is called ksipta or 
the dissipated condition in which the mind flirts am8ng 
objects. The second is midha or the stupefied condi- 
tion as in sleep. The third is called viksipta or the 
relatively pacified condition. Yoga is not possible in 
any of these conditions. The fourth and the fifth 
level are called ekiagra and niruddha. The one is a 
state of concentration of the mind on some object 
of contemplation. The other is the cessation of even 
the act or function of contemplation. The last two 
levels of the mind (cittabhimi) are conductive to yoga. 
There are two kinds of yoga or samadhi, viz.‘ 
samhprajiidta and asarmprajfidta. In the first we have 

7--1605B 


c 


50 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


yoga in the form of the mind’s perfect concen- 
tration on the object of contemplation, snd, therefore, 
involving a clear apprehension of that object. In the 
second, there is the complete cessation of all mental 
modifications and, consequently, the entire absence of 
ull knowledge including that of the contemplated 
object. 

There are eight steps in the practice of yoga. 
(yoganga), These are: yama or restraint, niyama or 
ethical culture, asana or posture, pranayama or breath- 
control, pratyahira or withdrawal of the senses, 
ahiarana or attention,-dhyana or meditation and samadhi 
or concentration. Yama or restraint consists in abstain- 
ing from injury to any life, from falsehood, theft, 
incontinence and avarice. Niyama or ethical culture 
is the cultivation of good habits like purification, 
panjentment, penance, study of the Vedas and contem- 
plation’ of God. Asana is the adoption of steady and 
pomfortable postures. Pr&énayéma or breath-control 
is regulated inhalation, exhalation and retention of 
brewth. Pratyaébira or sense-control consists in with- 
drawing the senses from their objects. Dharana or 


‘attention is fixing the mind on some intra-organic or 


extra-organic object like the nose-tip or the moon. 
Dbyina or meditation is the steady contemplation of 
the object without anv break. Samadhi or concentra- 
tion is that state in which the contempiative conscious- 
yess is lost in the contemplated object and has no 
awareness of itself. 

‘The Yoga system is called the theistic (segvara) 
, Satkhys. as distinguished from the ‘Kapila Sankhys 


s which is generally regarded as atheistic (niriévara), Jt 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 51 
holds that God is the highest object of contemplation 
for concentration and self-realization. He is the perfect 
Being who is eternal, all-pervading, omniscient and 
completely free from all defects. The Yoga argues’ for 
the existence of God on the following grounds : What- 
ever has degreesemust have a maximum. There are 
degrees of knowledge ; therefore, there must be such a 
thing a8 perfect knowledge or omniscience. He- who 
bas omniscience is God. The association of purusa 
with prakrti is what initiates the evolution of the world, 
and the cessation of this leads to dis.olution. Neither® 
the association nor the diseociation is natural to prakrti 
and purusa. Therefore, there must be a supreme being 
who is able to bring about these relations between 
prakrti and purosa sccording to the moral desefts of - 
individual souls. 


8. The Mimatisad System 


The Mitharhea (or Pirva-Miméathed) school was 
founded by Jaimini. Its primary primary y object _is to de is to defend_ 
and io vee ritualiem. fb course of this \atte this attempt_ 


Ena pacln 








are not ‘the works of any ae and are, “therefore, 
free from errors that human authors commit. The 





Vedas are eternal and self-existing 7 the written or 


pronounced “Vedas ar 8 ae only th their tex _temporsry 7_ manjfesta- 
tions through _Jarticular seers. For for establishing’ ¢ the 
validity of the Vedas, the ‘the Mimarhed discusses: very” ° 


elaborately the t theory of knowledge, the chief object 


52 aN inTRODUCTION ‘TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


of which is to show that the validity of every know- 
ledge is self-evident. When there are sufficient condi- 
tions, knowledge arises. When the senses ure sound, 
objects are present to then and other auxiliary condi- 
tions also prevail, there is perception. When there 
are sufficient data, there is inference. When we read 
a book on geography, we have knowledge of the lands 
described, through authority. In_each of these caser 


the knowledge that arises claims to. to be true a and _we 
accept spt it without further argument. If there is any 
cause for doubt, then knowledge docs not arise at all, 
because belief is absent. Similarly, by reading the 
Vedas we have at once knowledge and belief in what 
they say. The validity of Vedic knowledge is Sself- 
evident like that of every other knowledge. If any 
doubts arise, they are removed with the help of 
Mimiarhsé, argumenis ; and the obstacles being removed, 
the Vedas themselves reveal their contents to the 
reader. The authority of the Vedas thus becomes 
unquestionable. 

*What the Vedas command one to perform is right 
(dharma’. What they forbid is wrong. Duty consists 
in doing what is right _und desistng from forbidden 
acts, Duty must be done in the spirit of duty. The 
rituals enjoined by the Vedas should be performed not 
with the hope of any reward but just because they are 
so enjoined. The disinterested performance of the 
obligatory rites, which is possible only through know- 
ledge and self-control, gradually destroys the karmas 
and brings about liberation after death, The state of 
‘liberation is conceived in the early Miméarzusa as one of 
unalloyed bliss or heaven. But the later Mimarhsa 





GENERAL INTRODUCTION 53 


conceives libération only negatively as the cessation of 
birth and, thereforg, of al! pains. 

The soul must be admitted as an immortal eternal 
substance, for if the soul perished on death, the Vedic 
injunctions that certain rites should be performed for 
the attainment of heaven would be meayingless. The 
Miméined writers also adduce independent arguments, 
like the Jainas, to prove the existence of the immortal 
soul, and refute the materialistic view that it is nothing 
other than the body. But they do not admit conscious- 
ness as intrinsic to the soul. Consciousness arises in 
it only when it is associated with the body and then 
also only when an object is presented to the organs of 
knowledge (the five outer senses and the innér organ 
called mangs). The liberated soul, which is disem- 
bodied, has no actual consciousness, though it has the’ 
potentiality for it. 

The soul in the body has different kinds of know- 
ledge. "One school of the Mimfarnsa founded by “Pra 
bhakara ‘admits five different sources of knowledge 
(pramanas), namely, perception (pratyaksa), infer- 
ence (ahumana), comparison (upamana), testimony 
(fabdai and postulation (arthapatti). The first four 
ure admitted as in the Nyaéya system. There is, how- 
ever, one notable difference regarding comparison. 
According to the Mimiibsa knowledge by comparison 
arises in @ case like the following : A man who has 
seen @ monkey goes to a forest, sees an ape and judges, 
‘ this ape is like a monkey.’ From this judgment of 
perception he passes to the judgment ‘ the emonkey 
T saw before i like this ape.’ This last knowledge i ig 
obtained by comparison and not by perception, becausé 


54 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the monkey is not present then. Knowledge by postu- 
lation arises when we have to postulate something as 
the only explanation of an apparent conflict. When 
we find that a man doer not eat anything in the day, 
but increases in weight, we postulate that he must be 
eating at night. When # man is known to be alive 
and yet not found at home, it is known by postulation 
that he exists somewhere out. Another school of the 
Mimamsé founded by Kumirila Bhatia admits another 
soorce of valid cognition, in addition to the above five. 
«This sixth pramana is called non-cognition (anupa- 
Jabdhi). It is pointed out that when on entering a 
room and looking round one says, ‘ there is no cloth in 
this room,’ the non-existence of the cloth cannat be 
said tg be known by perception. Perception of an 
object arises when our sense is stimulated by that 
object, and non-existence, which is the object known 
here, canhot be admitted to stimulate sense. Such know- 
ledge of non-existence takes place by non-cognition. We 
judge the absence of the cloth not because other things 
are perceived but because the cloth is not perceived. 
The Mimarhsi believes in the reality of the physical 
world op the strength of perception. It is, therefore, 
realistic. It believes, as we have seen, in the reality 
of souls, a8 well. But it does not believe that there 
is @ supreme | soul or God who bas created the world. 
The world’s objects are formed out of matter in accord- 
ance with the karmas of the souls. The law of karma 
is @ spontaneous moral law that rules the world. The 
Mimirhe’ also admits that when any man performs 
any ritual, there arises in his sou) a potency (aparve) 
which produces in future the fruit of the action at an 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 55 


opportune *rhoment. On account of this potency 
generated in the sop! by rites performed here, one anc 
enjoy their fruits hereafter. 


9. The Vedanta System 


This aystem arises out ef the Upanisads which 
mark the culmination of the Vedic speculation and are 
fittingly called the Vedanta or the end of the Vedas. 
As we have seen previously, it develops through the 
Upanisads in which its basic truths are first grasped, 
the Brahma-sitra of Badarayana which systematizeg 


the Upanigadic teachings, and thp commentaries written 
on a Eiae cat Bee Writers: among. 
whom | Sankara anuja are well-known, ° Of _all 
the aye systems, » thé “Vedanta, specially as interpreted by. 
Sankara, . has exerted the ; the gréatest influence _on Indian’ 
life and it atill p persists in some form or ot other i ip 
different pa erent parts 0 rts of India. Lo = 
V The The idea” “of one Supreme Person (puruga), who 
pervades the whole universe gt ‘yet remains beyond it, 

is s found i ina y hymn o of the Rg-veda. ~All objects: gf of the 
universe, animate and inanimate, men and gods, are 
poetically conceived here as parts of that Person. In 
the Upanisads this unity of all existence is found deve- 
loped into the impersonal conception of One Reality 
(sat), or the conceptiorrof One Soul or One Brahman, 
all of which are used synonymously. The world is 
said to originate from this Reality, rest in it and 
return into it when dissolved. The reality of the 
many particular objects perceived in the universe is 
denied and théir unity in the One Reality is aeserted . 
ever and again; All is God (sarvath khalu ident 


56 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Brahma). The soul is God (ayam Atm&s Brahma). 
There is no multiplicity here (neha wand asti kificana). 
This Soul or God is the Reality (satya). It is Infinite 
coneciousness (jana) and Bliss (énanda). 

Sankara interprets the Upanisads and the Brahmua- 
sitra to show that purc and unqualified moniem is 
taught therein. God is the only Reality, not simply in 
the sense that there is nothing except God, but also in 
the sense that there is no multiplicity even within Ged. 
The denial of plurality, the unity of the soul and God, 

che assertion that when God is known, all is known, 

and similar views found in the Upanisads, in fact the 
general tone that pervades their teachings, cannot be 
explained consistently even if we believe in the exist- 
ence of many realities within God. Creation of the 
many things by God (Brahman) or the soul (Atman) ir, 
of course, related in some Upanisads. But in others, 
and even. in the Vedas, creation is compared to magic 
or jugglery ; God is spoken of as the Juggler who creates 
the world by the magical power called Maya. 

Sankara, therefore, holds that, in consistency with 
the emphatic teaching that there is only One Reality, 
we have to explain the world not ; as @ real creation, but 
da an appearance which God conjures up with his 


inscrutable power, Miyé. To make the conception of 


“Maya more intelligible to ordinary experience, he inter- 
prets it in the light of ordinary illusions that we have 
in daily life, when a rope appears, for example, as a 
shake or @ glittering shell appears 4s silver. In all 
such ca8es of illusion there is a substratum or a reality 
(e.g. rope, shell) on which something else (e.g. enske, 
silver) is imagined or superimposed due to the ignorance 


GENERAL INTRODUOTION 57 


of the substrdtum. This ignorance not only conceals 
the underlying reglity or substratum, but also makes 
it appear as something else. Our perception of the 
world’s objects can be similarly explained. We perceive 
the many objects in the One Brahman on account of 
SUF tpuormnce—tavidya OF ajuans) which econceals the 
real Brabinan from us and makes it 8 it appear as the many 
objects. When the juggler produces an illusory show, 
makes One coin appear aS Many, the cause of it from 
his point of view is his magical power; from our point 
of view the reason why we perceive the many coins,» 
is our ignorance of the one rea] coin. Applying this 
analogy to the world-appearance, we can say that this 
appearance is due to the magical power of Maya i in God 
and we can also say that it is due to our ignqrance. 
Maya and ignorance are then the two sides of the same 
fact looked at from two different points of view. 
Hence Maya is also said to be of the nature of Igno- 
rance (Avidy&é or Ajfiana). Lest one should think 
that Sankara’s position also fails to maintain pure 
monism, because two realities—God and Mayi-e-are 
admitted, Sankara points out that Mayé asa power of 
God is no more different from God tharthe power of 
burning i is from fire. There is then no dualism but 
“purée monism (advaita).— 

But is not even then God really possessed of creative 
power ? Sankara ? Sankara replies that 60 _long a8 On6 Believes 


in the world-appearance, he looks at God through the 
world, as the creator of it. But when he realizes that 


‘the world is apparent, that nothing is really drgated, 

icone ti AMR af Galt Ghesier, “Toa whe, 

is not deceived by the magician’s art and seed through 
8—1605B 


58 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


his trick, the magician fails to bea mibgician ; he is 
not credited with any magical power, Similarly, to the 
few who see nothing but God in the world, God ceases 
to have Maya or the power of creating appearances. 

In view of this Sankara finds it necessary to dis- 
tinguish two different points of view, the ordinary or 
empirical (vyavaharikaj and the transcendental or real _ 
(paramarthi e first is the standpoint of un- 
etifigntened persone who Fogard tho world as realy our 
life of practice depends _on this: it ia rightly called, _ 


therefore, the Bh Leela or practical point of Aad 


God thought to be ifs omnipotent and anactont 
preator, “gastainer and destroyer. Thus God appears 
as qualified (Gaguna) by many qualitiee. God in this 
aspect is called by Sankara Saguna Brahma or Tévara. 
From this point of view the self also appears as though 
limited by the body; it behaves like a finite ego (aham). 

Lhe second or the real (paramarthika) standpoint is 
that of 1at of the e enlightened who have realized that the world 
is an,appearance and that there is nothing but God: 
From this point of view, the world being thought un- 
real, God ceases {o-be-regarded as any real creator, or 
as possessed of any qualities like omniscience, e, omni- 
potence. God is realized as One without any internal 
distinction, without any quality. ~ God from this trans- 
cendental standpéint (paramarthikadrsti’ is indeter- 
minate, aid" charactérless; jé is Nirguna Brahman. 

The body also is kn ig known to be apparent and there i _there is 
nothing to n¢ to distinguish the soul from God, 


_ The attainment of this real standpoint is possible 
only by the removal of ignorance (avidya) to which the 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION 59 


cosmic illusitn is due. And this can be effected only 
y the knowledge that is imparted by the Vedante, 
One must control the senses and the mind, give up all 
attachment to objects, realizing their transitory nature, 
and have an earnest desire for liberation, He should 
then study the Vedanta under a an enlightened teacher 
and try 1a realize its truths by constant reasoning and ; 
meditation.) When ‘he is thus fit, the teacher would 
tell him at last: ‘Thou art Brahman.’”’ He would 
meditate on this till he has a direct and permanent 
realization of the truth ‘I am Brahman.’ This is 
perfect wisdom or liberation from bundage. Though’ 
such a liberated soul still persists in the body and in 
the world, these no longer fetter him as he does not 
regard them as real. He is im the world, but not of 
the world. No attachment, no illusion can_afféct_his 


eterna tre 


wisdom. ‘The soul then being free from the illusory 





idéas that divided it from. God, | is free from all miserye 
As God is Bliss, so 
The e teachings of the Vedanta are interpreted and ' 
developed by Ramanuja ina different way, as follows: | 
God is the only Reality. Within Him there exist as 
parts the different unconscious (acit) maferial objects 
as Wel WTES aaa conscious souls (ait). God is 
possessed of all supremely good qualities like omni- 
science, omnipotence. Just as a spider spins the cob- 
web out of his own body, so God creates the world of 
material objects out of matter (acit) which eternally 
exists in Him. ‘The souls are conceived as infinite] 
small (anu) substances which also exist eternally. They, 
“are by their very mature conscious and self-luntinous, 


“Every soul is endowed with a material body, jn accords 








60 AN iNTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


ance with its karma. Bondage of the soul means 1% its 
pontinement to this body. Liberation is the , complete 
Gissociation of the soul from the body. The cause of 
Bondage is kerma which springs from ignorance. ce. The 

soulidentifies itself with the body, through ignorance 
of its real nature and behaves as though it were the 
body. It hankers after sensuous pledsures. Thus it 
becomes attached to the world and the force of this 
attachment causes its repeated rebirth. Ignorance is 
removed by the study of the Vedanta. Man comes to 
know that bis soul is distinct trom the body, that it is 
“really a part of God or Brahman, on whom his existence 
depends. The disinterested rformance of the ob! obli- 
gatory duties enjoined by the Vedas destroys { the accu- 
nitisted forces ot attachment or Kariias aid helps the 
perfection of knowledge. God is known as the only 
object worthy of love and there is constant meditation 
on God and resignation to His will. __God is pleased 
by devotion and releases _the devotee from. _ bondage. 
He is never born again after death. The liberated 
foul becomes similar to God, because like God it has 
pure consciousness free from “imperfections, But it 
does not become identical with “God, _a8 the finite can 
never -become infinite. 

According to Ramanuja, though God is the only 
Reality and there is nothing outside God, yet within 
God there are many other realities. Creation of the 
world and the objects created are all as real as God. It 
is, therefore, not unqualified monism (advaita), but a 
monism.of the One qualified by the presence of many 
parts (Widistadvaita). God possessed of the conscious 
seule and unconscious matter is the only Reality. 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY, 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Dakshinaranjan Shastri ... 


e 


Madhavacarya nes 


Haribhadra 
Viatsyayana 
Redhakrishnan 


A Short History of Indian 


Materialism (Book 
Company, Calcutta). 

Charvéka-Shashti (Book 
Company). 


Sarva-Daréana-Sangraha 
(Eng. trans. by Cowell 
and Gough), Ch. on 
Carvaka, 


Sad-darSana-samuccaya. 
Kama-siitra, Chs. I-II. 


Indian Philosophy, Vo). 1, 
Ch. V. 


_ CHAPTER II 
THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 


I, Irs Oricin AnD ScoPE 


Materialism is the name given to the metaphysical 
doctrine which holds that matter is 
anbe iets of the only reality. This doctrine 
tries to explain mind and conscious- 
ness a8 the products of matter.’ In general outlook 
materialism represents the tendency that seeks to rgduce 
the higher to the lower or explain the higher phe ‘pheno- 
mena in the light of the-lower—ones. In this respect 
it is opposed to spiritual interpretations of the universe. 
Though materialism in some form or other has 
always been present in India, and 
aoe ee ee occasional references are found in 
is available. the Vedas, the Buddbhistic literature, 
the Epics, as well as in the luter 
philosophical works, we do not find any systematic 
work on materialism, ner any organised school of 
followers as the other philosophical schools possess. 
But almost every work of the other echools states, for 
refutation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of 
Indian materialism is chiefly based on these. 


‘ Carvike’ is the word that generally stands for ‘ mate- 
_tialist.’” But the original meaning of this word is shroude ad 
in mystery. According to one view, ‘Cirvaka’, was 
originally the name of a sage who propounded materialism. 
The common name ‘Carvak a’ is derived from this proper’ 


64 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


name and means the follower of that sage, i.¢., a mate- 
rialist. According to another view, ‘Carvaka’ was even 
originally a common descriptive namé given to a materialist, 
either because he preaches the doctrine of ‘eat, drink and 
cbe merry.’ } (carv—eat, chew), or because his words ar 
leasant. ice (ciru—nice, vik—word). “Some, writers’ 
again regard Brhaspati as the founder of materislism. 
This view is based on the facts (a) that some Vedic hymns 
‘ascribed by tradition to Brhaspati, son ofLoka, are marked 
by a spirit of revolt and free-thinking, (b) that in the Maha- 
bhirata and elsewhere materialistic views are put ip the 
mouth of Brhaspati and (c) that abouts dozen sitras and 
verses are found quoted or referred to by different authors 
as the materialistic teachings of Brhaspati, Some even 
go a little further and say that Brhaspati, the teacher of 
‘ the gods, propagated the materialistic views among the 
giants (the enemies ofthe gods) so that by following these 
attractive teachings they might come to ruin! 


But whoever be the founder of Indian materialism, 
‘ « Carvaka ’ has become synonymous 


A materialist is call cas 
Oarvibe of Lokkyeute. with ‘ materialist.’ The word used 


for materialism _is_also lokayata- 

mata, i.e., the view of common people, A materialist 
‘is accordingly called also lokayatika = 

Though the materialistic ideas are scattered here 

and there, they may be systematized and conveniently 

presented under three chief heads, namely, Epistemo- 


logy, Metaphysics and Ethics. 
Tl. THe Carvaka, EPISTEMOLOGY 


The entire philosophy of the Carvakas may be said 

to depend Jogically on their episte- 
Pieler greased mology or the theory of knowledge. 
The main problems of epistemo- 


4 
_ 1 Gf. * Piva, khéide cs veralocane,’ §c¢-daréana-samuocaya, Lokiya- 
\ tamatam, *, 
2 Ibid. and Sarpa-daréqna-sangraha, 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 65 


logy are: How’ far can we know reality? How does 
knowledge originate ahd develop? This last question 
involves the problem: What are the different sources 
of knowledge? This problem forms one of the chief 
topics of Indian epistemology. Knowledge of of reality 
or valid cognition is called prama na and th’ source of 
such ach knowledge i is called pramana, The Carvaka holds 
that _perception—is the only pramana_or de or_dependable 
source of knowledge. For establishing this position he 
criticizes the possibility of other sources of knowledge 
like inference and testimony which are regarded—as 
valid pramanas by many philosophers. 


1. Inference is Not Certain —- 


If inference is to be regarded as a pramana, it must - 
yield knowledge about which we can have no doubt and 
which must be true to reality. But inference cannot 
fulfil; these conditions, because when we infer, for 


* example, the existence of fire in 


Peerage hel the ® mountain from the perception of 
ee to the un- smoke in it, we take a 4 leap in the 
, dark, from.the perceived. amoke to... 
the unperceiyed fire..--A Jogician, like the Naiyayika. 
will perhaps point out that auch a 
Be sy pe re he. «(leap is justified by the previous 
tweea the middle and knowledge of the invariable con- 
the major term, and 
comitance between smoke and fire 
and that the inference stated more fully would be: 
All cases of smoke are cases. of fire, t this (mountain) is 
a case of smoke, therefore, this is a case of fire. ‘ 
The Carvaka ca points out that_thia contention ,would 
be acce ptable only if the major premise, stating the 


9—1605B 


66 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


invariable relation between the on the middle term (smoke) 
~omers——= "and the e majot (fire), were beyond 


no such aniversal doubt. But this invariable relation 
riation, con he Weer “ovapti) can be established only if 

we have a knowledge of all cases of 
smoke and ali. cases.of fire. This, however, is not pos- 
sible, a8 we cannot perceive even all the cases of smoke 
and fire existing now in different parts of the world, to 
speak nothing of those which existed in the past or 
will exist in the future. No invariable, universal rela- 
tion (vyapti) can, therefore, be established by percep- 
tion.” Neither can §t be said to be “bassi“on another 
inference, because it will involve a petitio principit, 
since the validity of that inference again has to be 
similarly proved. Nor can this vyapti be based on the 
testimony (subda) of reliable pereons (who state that 
all cases of smoke are cases of fire). For, the validity 
of testimony itself requires to be proved by inference. 
Besides, if inference always depended on testimony, no 
one could infer anything by himseif. 


¢ 





But it may be asked: Though it is not possible to per. 
ceive all individual cases of smoke and fire, is it not possible 
to perceive the constant class-characters (simapya) like 

‘smokeness ’ and ‘ fireness’ which must be invariably 
present in al] instances of smoke and fire respectively? If 
so, then van we not say that we at Jeast perceive a relation 
between smnokeness and fireness and with its help infer 
the presence of fire, wherever we perceive smoke? The 
Carvaka replies that even if we grant the perception of a 
relation Setween smokeness and firencss, we cannot know 
therefrom any invariable relation between all individual 
cases of amoke and fire. Tobe ab'e to infer a particular 
firs, we must know that it is inseparably related to the 
particular smoke perceived. In fact, it is not possible even 
to know by perception what ‘ smokeness’ or the class- 
character universally present in all particular instances of 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 67 


sinoke is, becauge we do not perceive all cases of smoke. 
What is found to e universally present in the perceived 
cases of smoke, may ,not be present in the unperceived 
ones. The difficulty of passing from particulars to the 
universal, therefore, remains nere as before, 


But it may be asked: If we do not believe in any 
fixed univerag] iaw underlying the 
Uniformities of ex. , 
perience are explain- phenomena of the world, how would 
ress " ereihies we explain the uniformities that 
ween slog change experienced objects possess? Why 
mn future, ° 
is fire always experienced to be hot 
and water to be cool? ~The Carvaka reply is that it is 
due to the inherent natures (svabhéva) of things that 
they possess particular characters. No supernatural 
principle need be supposed to account for the properties 
of experienced objects of nature. There is neither 
any guarantee that uniformity perceived in the past. 
would continue in future. 
A modern student of inductive logic would be 
tempted to ask the Carvika: ‘‘ But 
C 1 relation is not z 
ascevtaineble = C8 we not base our knowledge of 
the invariabie reiation between 
smoke and fire on a causal relation betweeu them?” 
The Carvaka reply would be that a causal relation, 
being only a kind of invariable relation, cannot be 
established by perception owing to the same difficulties. 
The Cirvika would further point out that a causal 
or any other invariable relation cannot be estavlished 
merely by repeated perception of two things occurring 
together. For one must be certain that there is no other 
unperceived condition (upidhi) on which tbis relation 
depends. For example, if a man perceives a number of 
times fire accompanied by smoke and on another occesion 


he infers the existence of smoke on the perception of fire, — 
he would be liable to error, because he failed tq notice 


68 AN‘INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


a condition ‘upaédhi), namely, wetness, of fuel, on the 
presence of which alone fire is attended with smoke. So 
long as the relation between two phenomena is not proved 
to be unconditional, it is an uncertain ground for inference. 
And unconditionality or absence of conditions connot be 
established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions 
may always remain hidden and escape notice. Inference 
or testimony cannot be used for proving this uncondition- 
ality without a petitio principii, Because its validity also 
is being questioned here. 


It is true that in life we very often act unsuspect- 
Be a Ne at! ingly on inference. But that only 
dentally turn out io shows that we act uncritically on 
ee: the wrong belief that our inference 
is true. It is a fact that sometimes @@# inference 
comes true and leads to successful results. But it is 
also a fact that sometimes inference leads to error as 
wel]: Truth is not then an unfailing character of all 
inferences; it is only an accident, and a separable 
one, that we find only in some inferences. 

Inference cannot be regarded, therefore, as a 
pramana—a sure source of valid cognitior.. 


2. Testimony is Nol a Safe Source of Knowledge 


But can we not regard the testimony of competent 

; : persons a8 a valid and safe source 
Testimony relating 

to unperceived objecta of knowledge? Do we not very 

ica often act on knowledge received 

from authority? The Carvaka replies that testimony 

consists of words (sabda). So far as words are heard 

throygh our ears, they are perceived. Knowledge of 

_words is, therefore, knowledge through perception 

and is* quite valid. But in so far as; these words 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 69 


suggest orntean things not within our perception, and 
aim at giving us knowledge of those unperceived objects, 
they are not free irom error and doubt. Very often 
we are misled by so-called authority. The authority 
of the Vedas, for example, is held in high esteem 

by many. But in, reality the 
mee atte. Vedas are the works of some cun- 

ning priests who earned their 
living by duping the ignorant and the credulous. 
With false hopes and promises the Vedas persuade 
men to perform Vedic rites, the only tangible benefit of , 
which goes to the priests who officiate and enjoy the 


emoluments. bar 


But will not our knowledge be extremely limited 

; and practical life sometimes im- 
Resse ad it lacs possible, if we do not accept ‘the 
certain ag inference. = Words of the experienced and do 
not depend on expert advice ? The Carvaka reply 
is that in so far as we depend on any authority, 
because we think it to be reliable, the knowledge 
obtained is really based on inference ; because our 
belief is generated by a mental process like this : 
This authority should be accepted because it is 
reliable, and all reliable authority should be accepted. 
Being based on inference, knowledge derived from verbal 
testimony or authority is as precarious as inference. 
And as in the case of inference, so here we often 
act on knowledge derived from authority on the wrong 
belief that it is reliable. Sometimes this belief acci- 
dentally leads to successful resulis, sometimes, it does 
not. Therefore, authority or testimony cannot _be 
regarded as safe and valid source of knowledge. 


70 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


As neither inference nor authority can‘ ke proved 
to be reliable, perception must be regarded | as the 
only valid source of knowledg3 (pramana). 


Til. Merrapuysics 


_ Motaphyalcs is the theory of reality. The Car- 
vaka theory of reality, follows from 
Matter is the only 
reality, because it the epistemological conclusion 
sloup as percntred just discussed. If perception ‘is 
the only reliable source of knowledge, we can 
rationally assert only the reality of perceptible objects. 
Ged, soul, heaven, life before birth or after death, 
and any vunaperceived ‘ law (like adrsta) cannot be 
believed in, because they are all beyond perception. 
Material objects are the only objects whose existence 
can be perceived and whose raality can be asserted. 
The Carvakas, thus, come t> establish materialism or 
the theory that matter is the only reality. 
1. The World is Made of Four Kiements 

Regarding the nature of the material world most 
other Indian thinkers hold that it is composed of 
five kinds of elements (pafica- 
bhiita), namely, ether (akida), air 
)vayu), fire (agni), water (ap) and 
earth (ksiti). But the Carvakas reject ether, because its 
existence cannot be perceived ; it has to be inferred. 
The material world is, therefore, held to be composed 
of the four perceptible elements. Not only non- 
living material objects but also living organisms, like 
plants and animal bodies, are composed of these four 
elements, by the combination of which they are pro- 
duced and to which they are reduced on death, 


" Matter is composed 
of four elements. 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 71 


2. There is No Soul 


But it may ‘be asked, even if perception is the 

; only source of knowledge, do we 

tae aie ving body, not have a kind of perception, 

Suk Se. dually of called internal, which gives an 

; immediate knowledge of our mert#t 

states ? And do we not perceive in these, conscious- 

ness which is nowhere to be perceived in the external 

materi] objects ? If so, does it not compel us to 

believe that there is in us some uon-material substance, 

whose quality is consciousness—the substance which 
is called soul or spirit (atma) ?° 

The Carvikas admit that the existence of con- 
sciousness is proved by perception. But they deny 
that consciousness is the quality of any unperceived 
non-material or spiritual entity. As consciousness is 
perceived to exist in the perceptible living body 
composed of the materia] elements, it must be a 
quality of this body itself. What people mean 
by a soul is nothing more than this conscious living 
body (caitanya-visista-deha eva atma). The. non- 
material soul is never perceived. On the contrary, 
we have direct evidence of the identity of the self with 
the body in our daily experiences and judgments like, 
‘Tam fat, ‘ Tam lame,’ ‘1 am blind.’ Tf the ‘ I,’ 
the self, were different from the body, these would be 
meaningless. 

But the objection may be raised: We do not per- 
ceive consciousness in any of the four material elements. 
How can it then come to qualify their prdQuct, the 
body ? In reply the Carvaka points out that qualitjes 
not resent originally in any of the component factors 


72 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


may emerge subsequently when the factors are combined 
together. Jor example, betel leaf, lime and nut, none 
of which is originally red, come to acquire a reddish 
tinge when chewed together. Or, even the same thing 
placed under a different condition may develop qualities 
originally absent. For example, molasses (guda), origi- 
nally non-jntoxicant, becomes intoxicant When allowed 
to ferment. In a sinilar way it is possible to think that 
the material elements combined in a particular way 
give rise to the conscious liviag body. Consciousness 
“is an epiphenomenon or bye-product of matter ; there 
is no evidence of its existence independent of the body. 
If the existence of a soul apart from the body is 
not proved, there is no possibility of proving its 
immortality. On the contrary, death of the body means 
the end‘of the individual. Al! questions about previous 
life, after-life, rebirth, enjoyment of the fruits of actions 
in heaven or hell, therefore, become meaningless. 


3. There is No God 


God, whose existence cannot be perceived, fares no 
better than the soul. The material elements produce 
the world, and tbe supposition of a creator is unneces- 
sary. The objection may be raised: Can the material 
elements by themselves give rise to this wonderful 
world ? We find that even the production of an object 
like an earthen jar requires, in addition to clay which is 
he: -anppouitton sat its material cause, a potter who is 
God as creator is un- the efficient cause that shapes the 
necessary. The world ‘ : : 
comes into existence material into the desired form. 
Dernline or este The four elements supply only the 
pat coment material caugegef the world. Do we 


not require’athefficient cause, life God. as the shaper 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY _ 173 


and designer who turns the material elements into this 

wonderful wotld ? In reply, the Carvaka states that 

the material elemerés themselves have got each its 

fixed nature (svabhiva). It is by the natures and laws 

inherent in them that they combine together to form 

this world. There is thus no necessity for God. 

There is no proof that the objects of the world are the~- 
products of any design. They can be explained more 

reasonably as the fortuitous products of the elements. 

The Carvakas, therefore, prefer atheism. 


In so far as this Carvaka theory tries to explain the 
world only by nature, it is sometim.s called naturalism 
(svabhaiva-vaida). Itis also called mechanism (yadrecha- 
vada), because it denies the existence of conscious pyrpose 
behind the world and explains it as a mere mechanical or 
fortuitous combination of elements. The Carvika theory 
on the whole may also be called positivism, because it 
believes only in positive facts or observable phenomena. 


IV. Eraics. 


Ethics ig the science of morality. It discusses 
problems like : What is the highest goal or Summum 
bonum man can achieve ? What should be the end of 
human conduct ? What is the standard of moral judg- 
meot ? The Carvakas discuss these ethical problems in 
conformity with their metaphysical theories, 

Some Indian philosophers like the Mimarhsakas 
believe that the highest goal of human life: is heaven 
(svarga) which is a state of unalloyed bliss that can be 
attained hereafter by performing here the Vedic ‘rites. 
The Carvaka rejects this view, because it is based on 

10—-1605B 


74 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the unproved existence of a life after death. ‘ Heaven’ 
; and ‘ bell ’ are the inventions of the 
ernie be methe priests whose’ professional interest 
Goal of life, lies in coaxing, threatening and 
making people perform the rituals. Enlightened men 
will always refuse to be duped by them. 


Many other philosophers regards liberation as the 
: highest goal of human life. Libera- 

_ Tuiberation, as free- 7 aos i ' 
dom from all pain, is tion, again, is conceived as the total 
sn impossible ideal. = destruction of all sufferings. Some 
think that it can be attained only after death, when the 
Soul is free from the body ; and others believe that it 
can be attained even in this life. But the Carvika 
holds that none of these views stands to reason. If 
liberation is freedom of the soul from its bondage to 
physical existence, it is absurd because there is no soul. 
But if liberation means the attainment of a state free 
from alj pain, in this very life, it is also an impossible 
idea]. Existence in this body is bound up with pleasure 
as well as pain. We can only try to minimise pain and 
enjoy 43 much pleasure as we can. Liberation in the 
setise of complete cessation of sufferings can only mean 
death." Those who try to attain in life a state free 
from pleasures and pains by rigorously suppressing the 
Pibater. aca natural appetites, thinking that all 
mixed with pain, is pleasures arising out of their grati- 
the only possible good- fication are mixed with pain, act 
like fools. For no wise man would ‘ reject the kernel 
because of its husk,’ nor ‘ give up eating Osh because 


there are bones,’ nor ‘ cease to grow crops because there 
é 


. 1 *Marenam eve apavergab,’ Brhaspati-siitra. 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY - 76 


2? 

are animals to destroy them,’ nor ‘ stop cooking his food 
because beggars might ask for a share.’ If we remem- 
ber that our existence is confined to the existence of, the. 
body and to this life, we must regard the pleasures 
arising in the body as the only good things we can 
obtain. We should not throw away the opportunities 
of enjoying this life, in the futile hope of enjoyment 
hereafter. ‘ Rather a pigeon today than a peacock 
toworrow.’ ‘ A sure shell (courie) is better than & 
doubtful golden coin.’ ‘Who is that fool who would 
entrust the money in hand to the custody of others ?’? 
The goal of buman life is, therefore, to attain the 
maximum amount of pleasure in this life, avoiding pain 

as far as possible. A good life is 
anni isthe deal dite of maximum enjoyment. A 

good action is one which leads 
to & balance of pleasure and a bad action is one 
which brings about more pain than pleasure. This 
Cirvika ethics may be called, therefore, hedonism or 
the theory tbat pleasure is the highest goal. 


Some Indian thinkers speak of the four ends of 
human activity (purusartha), name- 

tateoy ee Alera ly, wealth (artha), enjoyment 
tion (mokga). (kama), virtue (dharma) and_libera- 
tion (moksa). Of these four, the 

Carvika rejects the last two. Liberation in the sense 
of destruction of all sufferings can be obtained only 
by death and no wise man would willingly work for 
that end. Virtue and vice are distinctions myde by 


1 Kama-sitra, Chap. 2. 


76 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


eer 
the scriptures, whose authority cannot be rationally 
awresaiat accepted. Therefore neither libera- 
asa means to enjoy. tion nor virtue should be our end. 
hase Wealth and enjoyment are the only 
rational ends that a wise man can toil to achieve. 
But enjoyment is the ultimate end; wealth is not an end 


in itself, it is good only as a means to enjoyment. 


Having rejected the authority of the scriptures, the 
notions of virtue and vice and belief 
eves rites are all iy, life after death, the Carvakas are 
naturally opposed to the perform- 
ance of religious ceremonies with the object” of either 
attaining heaven or avoiding hell or propitiating 
departed souls. They raise cheap laughter at the 
customary rites. If the food offered during funeral 
ceremony iéraddha) for the departed sou! can appease 
his hunger, what is ibe use of s traveller’s taking food 
with him! Why should not his people make some 
offerings in his name at home to satisfy his hunger ? 
Similarly, food offered on the ground-floor should satisfy 
-@ person living upstairs. Ifthe priests really believe, 
as they say, that animals killed at a sacrifice (yajfia) 
are sure to reach heaven, why do they not rather 
sacrifice their old parents instead of animals and make 
heaven sure for them? 


Religion is thus reduced to morality and morality to 
“\the search of pleasure. The ethics of the Carvika 
‘is only the logical outcome of his materialistic meta- 

physics. 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 17 
VY. Conctiusion 


Like the Epicureans of Greece, the Carvaikas in 
— India have been more hated than. 
The contribution of 
the Carséka to Indian understood. ‘ Carvaka’ in the 
pean: mind of péople at largeis a term 
of reproach. But it is useful fora student of philo- 
sophy to remember as well what Indian philosophy 
owes to the Carvaka. Scepticism or agnosticism is 
only the expression of a free mind that refuses to 
accept traditional wisdom without a thorough criticism. 
Philosophy, as critical speculation, claims to live 
chiefly on free thought and the more it can satisfy the 
sceptic, the sounder it can hope tobe. By question- 
ing the soundness of popular notions, the sceptjc sets 
new problems, by the solution of which philosophy 
becomes richer. Kant, one of the greatest philosophers 
of the West, recognized his debt to scepticism when 
he declared : ‘ The scepticism of Hume roused me from 
my dogmatic slumber.’’ And we may say that the 
Carvika similarly saved Indian philosophy from dog- 
matism toa great extent. As noted already, every 
system of Indian thought tried to meet the Carvaka 
objections and made the Carvaka a touchstone of its 
theories. The value of the Ciarvika philosophy, 
therefore, lies directly in supplying fresh philosophical 
problems and indirectly in compelling other thinkers 
to give up dogmatism, and become critical and 
cautious in speculation as well as in statement of 
views, \ 


What bas made the Cirvaékas most disreputable to 
people is perhaps their ethics of pleasure. Pursuit of 


. 


78 AN INTRODUCTION TO JNDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


t 4 
pleasure is not by itself an odject of condemnation : 
pleasure in some form, is recognized «1s desirable by other 
philosophers as well. It is condemned only when the 
nature of pleasure is coarse and the ‘pleasure is wanted 
only for one’s own self. It is true that some Carvakas 
advocate a life of gross sensual pleasures. But a dis- 
tinction found sometimes, between the cunning (dhirta) 
and cultured ‘(suéiksita) Carvikas make jt likely that the 
‘irvakas were not all of the same gross, uncultured type. 
There is evidence that the maierialists devoted them- 
selves also to the pursuit of more refined pleasures by 
cultivating, for example, the fine arts, the number of which 
is as large as sixty-four (catuh-sesti-kalih), according to. 
Vitsyéyana, a recognized hedonist and author of the famous 


- Kdma-sitra. All materialists were not egoistic hedonists. 


f 


Egoistic hedonism in its gross form is not compatible 
with social discipline, Life in society is impossible if man 
does not sacrifice a part of his pleasures for others. Some 
Cirvakas, we are told, regard the king as God. This 
implies their great faith in the necessity of society and its 
head. "This view is further strengthened when we find 
that political philosophy and economy (dandaniti and 
viirtti) came to be incorporated at some stage in the 
philosophy of the Lokiyatikas. It would appear from 
these facts that there were among the materialists of 
ancient India as cultured thinkers as we find among the 
positivists of modern Europe or the followers of Democritus 
in ancient Greece. 

The best positive evidence of refined hedonism is found 
in the ethical philosophy propounded by Vatsyiyana in the 
second chapter of the Kadma-sitra. It is here that we 

‘find a great hedonist himself stating and defending his 
own views.!' Though Vatsydyana believes in God and in 
life after death and, therefore, is not a materialist in the 
ordinary sense, yet he may be regarded as one, according 
to a wider sense of the term, namely, one who tries to 
explain ‘higher phenomena by lower ones.’ Vatsyiyana 
admits three desirable ends of human life (purusirtha), 


1 The date of Vateyiyana, according to sume, is near about the 
beginning of the Christian era, and Vatsyéyana tells us that he is only 


» jummariving the views of a long line of previous writers, about a dozen 


(.m number, whose works are not available now. This shows the great 
antiquity of his line of thought, 
2 Vide James, Pragmatism, p. 93. 


THE CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY 79 


namely, dharmg, artha and kama (virtue, wealth and enjoy- 
ment), which should be cultivated harmoniously.! His 
materialist tendency , consists in holding that dharma and 
artha are to be treated only as means to enjoyment, which 
is, therefore, the supreme end, The element of refinement 
in his hedonism consists in his emphasis on self-control 
(brahmacarya) and spiritual discipline (dharma), as well as 
urbanity (nagarika-vriti), without which human enjoyment 
of pleasure is reduced to the I¢vel of beastiy enjoyment. - 
He shows that’all physical enjoyment (kama) is ulti- 
mately reducible to the gratification of the five senses. 
He further asserts that the satisfaction of the senses is 
necessary for the very existence of the body (Sarirasthiti), 
like the satisfaction of hunger.? But he also maintains 
that the senses must be educated, disciplined and cultured, 
through a training in the sixty-four fine arts. This train- » 
ing should be given only after a, person has devoted the 
earlier part of his life to absolute self-continence and 
study of the Vedas and the other subsidiary branches of 
learning. He points out that without culture human 
enjoyment would be indistinguishable from beastly 
pleasures. To the impatient hedonist who would not 
forego present comfort and would not undergo any toil for 
future enjoyment in this life, Vatsyiyana points out that 
such attitude would be suicidal. For, this would prevent 
& man even from the toil of cultivation and sowing seeds 
in the hope of the future enjoyment of a crop. In favour 
of regulation ‘of the desire for enjoyment, he points out, 
with historical examples, that inordinate desire, inconsis- 
tent with the principles oi dharma and wealth, leads to ruin 
and annibilates the chances o{ al! enjoyment. In support 
of scientific study of the conditions and means of enjoy- 
ment, he urges, like a modern scientific man, that some 
science is at the root of all successful practice; and that 
though all persons may not study science, they are bene- 
fited by the ideas which unconsciously and indirectly 
filter down to the masses, among which the few scientists 
live. We find, then, that Vatsyayana represents Indian 
hedonism at its best. It is perhaps to thinkers of this 


1 


1 * Parasparasya anupaghatakath trivargath seveta,’ Kama-sit., 
1.2.1. 

2 Yaéodhara, the commentator en Kéma-siit., explaining Yhis, men, 
tions that non-satisfaction of the senses might lead to diseases lik 
insanity (unmade). Vide commentary on 1, 2. 46. 


80 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


kind that the name ‘cultured hedonists’ (sysikgita-cirvaka) 


was applied. 
Finally, it may be noted that the contribution of 


Carvaka epistemology is not insignifiéant. The criticism of 
inference put in the mouth of the Carvaka by his opponents 
reminds us of similar criticism made in modern times 
against the soundness of deductive logic. The Carvaka view 
that no inference can yield certain knowledge is the view 
_of many Contemporary Western thinkers like the pragma- 


tists and logical positivists. 


me, 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 


A 8ELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Umasvami ee Tattivdrthidhigama-sitra 
(Eng. trans. by J. L. 
es Jaini. The Central 
Publisking House, 
Arrah, India). 


Siddhasena Divikara ... Nydydvatara (Eng. trans. 
and Introduction by 
8. C. Vidyibbisana. 
The Indian Research 
Society, Calcutta). 


Mallisena ... Syddvdda-manjari (Com- 
mentary by Hem- 
chandra, Chowkhamba 
Sanskrit serics, Bena- 
res, India). 


Haribhadra .. Sad-daréana-samuccaya, 
Com. by Gunaratna 
(Asiatic Society, Cal.), 
Com. of Manibhadra 
(Chowkhamba), Chap. 
on Jaina. 


Hermann Jacobi we The Jaina Sitras (Eng. 
trans. Sacred Books of 
the Hast series). 


« Dravya Sangraha (Kd. 
with Eng. trans. by 8. 
C. Ghoshal. Central 
Jaina Publishing 
House, Arrah). 


§. Stevenson we The Heart of Jainism 
M4 (Oxford University 
Press). 


Nemichandra 


CHAPTER IIl 
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 


I. InrroDucTion 


The Jainas recount the names of twenty-four teachers 
The founders of (tirthankaras) through whom their 
Jainism. faith is believed to have come down: 
from unknown antiquity. The fist of these teachers 
was Regabhadeva. The last was Vardhamana, also 
styled Mahavira (‘the great hero’). He is ‘said to 
have lived in the sixth century B.C. during the tine 
of Gotama Buddha. The teacher who immediately 
preceded Vardhamana was Parévanitha, who lived in 
the ninth century B.C. The other twenty-two teachers 
belong to pre-historic ages.’ The word ‘ Jina ’ ety- 
mologicaily “means a conqueror. It is the common 
name applied to the twenty-four teachers, because they 
have conquered ui] passions ‘raga and dvesa) and have 
attained liberation. 
The Jainas do not believe in God. They adore the 
Their place in Jaing ‘Lirthaikaras or the founders of the 
faith, faith, These are the liberated souls 
who were once in bondage, but became, through their 
own efforts, free, perfect, omniscient, omnipotent and 
all-blissful, The Jainas believe that every spirit (jiva), 
that is in bondage now, can follow the example set by 


1 For a complete account, cide The Kalpa-sittra of Bhadrabahu 
(Jacobi, Jaina Sitras, Part 1) and Mrs, Stevenson’s The Heart of 
Jainism, Chap IV. 


84 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the Jinas and attain, like them, perfect knowledge, 
power and joy. This is the great element of optimism 
that inspires every true Jaina with ubsoiute self-con- 
fidence. The possibility of the 1eaiization of absolute 
verfection, through persona! effort, is for him not a 
mere specuiation but @ promise repeated by the life 
of every liberated saint. ; 
In course of time the followers of Jainism were 
divided into two sects well-known 
The two sects of ; 
Jainisem—Svctimbara now as the Svetémbaras and the 
ang Digemem: Digambaras. The difference be- 
tween them lies, however, not so much in the basic 
philosophical doctrines as in some minor details of 
faith and practice. The teachings of the Jinas are 
accepled by both the sects. But the Digambaras are 
more rigorous and puritanic, while the Svetambaras are 
more accommodating to the common frailties of men. 
The Digambaras hold, for example, that ascetics should 
give up all possessions, even clothes, Whereas the 
Svetémbaras hold that they should put on white 
clothes.’ Again, according to the Digambaras, a rain! 
_ who has obtained perfect knowledge needs no food, 
women cannot obtain liberation (without being born 
once more as men). The Svetémbaras do not accept 
these views. 

Jainism possesses a vast literature, inostly in 
Prakrta. The canonical or authori- 
tative works accepted by all sects 
are said to contain the teachings of the last Tirthan- 
) kara, Mahavira, They are too many to be mentioned 


. 


Jaina Literature. 


1 * Digambara ’ literally means nude and ' Svetambara' white- 
tobed, 


{TH JAINA PHILOSOPHY 85 


a 
here. Much of the early literature has been lost. 
When Jainism had to defend itself against the criti- 
cism of other schools, it adopted, for this purpose, the 
technical philosophical terminoiogy of Sanskrit and 
thue developed its literature in Sanskrit as well. 

The philosophical outiook of Jainism is common- 
sense realism and pluralism. The objects perceived 
by us are real, and they are many. The world 
consists of two kinds of reality, living and non-living. 
Every living being has a spirit 
or a soul (jiva), tiowever imperfect 
its body may be. Avoidance of 
all injury to life (ehitnsi) plays, therefore, an impor- 
tant réle in Jaina ethics. Along with tnis respect for : 
life there is in Jainism another great element, namely, - 
respect for the opinion of others. This last attitude 
is justified by @ metaphysical theory of reality as many- 
faced (anekintavada) and a consequent logical doctrine 
(syadvada) that’ every judgment is subject to some 
condition and Hwitation, and various judginents about 


Tbe philosophical 
outlook of Jainism. 


the same reality may, therefore, be true, each in iis 
Own sense, subject to its own condition, 

The philosophy of the Jainas may be conveniently 
discussed under three topics, viz. Tpistemology (or 
theory of knowledge including Logic), Metaphysics, 
and Ethics aud Religion. 

Tl. Tue JainA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 

1. The Nature and Kinds of Knowledge 
Consciousness is the inseparable essence ofSevery 
xoul, according to the Jainas; it is 
not, as the Carvakas hold, a mere 
accidental property, arising only 


Y 


Consciousness is the 
essence of the soul. 


‘86 AN INTRODUCTION 10 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


under some conditions. Moreoyer, consciousness is 
conceived like the sun’s light, capable of manifesting 
itself and every thing else unless 
es iene some obstruction prevents it from 
P reashing its object.. Had there 
been no obstacles, the sou] would have been omniscient. 
Omniscience is a potentiality inherent in every soul. 
‘As it is, however, we find that ordinary souls are 
all more or less ignorant; their knowledge is limited. 
The Jainas hold that this limitation is due to the 
obstacles created by different karmas which obsiruct 
in different degrees the natural consciousness of the 
soul'and thus deprive it of its omniscience. The body, 
the senses and the mind (manas) are all constituted by 
karmas and the soul’s power is limited by them. 
Like other thinkers, the Jainas admit the twofold 
r ‘ classification of knowledge into 
Recon ina medi- immediate and mediate (aparokga 
and paroksa). But they point out 
that what is ordinarily regarded as immediate know- 
ledge is only relatively immediate. Perception of 
externa] or internal objects through the senses (indriya) 
or mind (manus) is immediate as compared with infer- 
ence. Still such knowledge cannot be said to be 
absolutely immediate, because even here the soul knows 
through the medium of something 
Two kindsofimme- else, namely, the senses or manas. 


diate knowledge, ordi- ae : 
nary immediste and In addition to such ordinary or 


ecules empirical (vyavahirika) immediate 
knowledge, there is also a really or 


absolutely (piramarthika) immediate knowledge, which “ 


1 * Jfanam sva-pare-bhasi.’ 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 87 


a soul attains, by removing its karma obstacles. ‘In 
such knowledge the soul’s consciousness becomes imme- 
diately related to objects, without the medium of senses, 
etc., simply by the removal of the karmas that pre- 
vented it from reaching those objects." Three different» 
kinds of such really immediate knowledge are distin- 
guished. When o person has ‘partially deStroyed and 

allayed the influences of karmas, he 
ge nea acquires the power of knowing 
~savedhi, menshper- objects which have forms, but are 
yaya and kevals. 

too distant or minute or obscure to 
be observed by the senses or manas. Such immediate 
knowledge by the unaided soul is? however, limited as 
its objects are limited and, therefore, il is called 
avadhijniana (limited knowledge). Again, when a person 
has overcome hatred, jealousy, etc. (which cyeate 
obstacles that stand in the way of knowing other 
minds), he can have direct access to the present and 
past thoughts of others. This knowledge is calied 
manah-paryéya (entering a mind). But when all 
karmas that obsiruct knowledge are completely remov- 
ed from the soul, there arises in it absoiute knowledge 
or omniscience. This is called kevala-jiaua. Only 
the liberated souls have such knowledge.” ‘ 


1 Barly Jaina writers like Umiasvimi confine ‘ aparokga ' only to 
the soul's immediate knowledge without any medium. Later writers 
like Hemacandra extend it to ordinary sense-perception as well, as most 
other Indian logicians do. To justify the narrower sense ‘akss' is 
interpreted as ‘jive’ and not ‘ indriya’ as ordinarily explained (vide 
Gunarains’s Com. on §ad-daréans, verse, 55), 

1 Vide Tattvdrthadhigama-sitra, Chap. I, siitras 9, 12, 21-29, 


88 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


These are, then, the three kinds ef extraordinary 
/ or extra-sensory perceptions which 
' Ordinary immediate are immediate par excellence. But 
ian. mediate know- in addition io these, there are the 
two kinds of ordinary knowledge 
possessed by an average person. Theseare called mati 
and éruta, ‘ There are ‘differences of opinion among 
Jaina writers regarding the exact meanings of these 
terms. But ordinarily, mati is taken to mean any 
kind of knowledge which we can obtain through the 
senses or through manas.' Thus understood, mati 
includes ordinary immediate knowledge (or internal and 
external perception)’memory, recognition and infer. 
ence.” Sruta is knowledge obtained from authority. 


The Jainas give an account of the process by which 
ordinary perception takes place and is retained,* At firat 
there is only a distinct sensation, say of 2 sound. It is not 
yet Imown what it means. This primary state of con- 
sciousness is called avagraha (i.¢., grasping the object), 
Then arises the query: ‘‘ What is this sound?’’ This 
questioning state of the mind is called thé (i.e., query). 
Then comes a definite judgment like ‘‘ This is the sound of 
acar.'’ This is called Gviya (removal of doubt). Then 
what is ascertained is retained in the mind. This retention 
is called dharana (t.e., holding in the mind), 

Sruta, the second kind of ordinary knowledge is mostly 
interpreted as knowledge obtained from what is heard from 
others.‘ This includes all kinds of knowledge derived 
from spoken or written suthority. As the understanding 
of any authority is dependent on the perception of sounds 
or written letters, sruta is said to be preceded by mati. 

It is pointed out, further, that these two kinds of ordi- 
nary knowledge (namely, mati and éruta), as well as the 
lowest kind of immediate extraordinary knowledge 
(namely, avadhi), are not absolutely free from chances of 


1 Jbid,,1.14, * Ibid,,1.18. 2 Ibid., 1,15, 4 Tbid., 1. 20, 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 89 


error. But the,tWo higher kinds of immediate extra-sen- 
sory knowledge (manahparyiya and kevala) are never liable 
to any error. . 

For ordinary purposes, the Jainas accept the general 
view that there are three pramanas, namely, perception, 
inference and testimony (i.e. authority). 


2. The Carvaka View Criticised 


In acvepting non-perceptual sources of knowledye 
like inference and testimony, the Jaina writers fee] it 
necessary to justify their view by refuting the Carvika 
theory that perception is the orsy source of valid 
knowledge.? They ask: If a Carvika were called 

upon to show why even per- 
Inference is not in- . . 
valid. Even the Gar- Ception should not be rejected, as 
Abe Fy sane Presup an invalid source of knowledge, 
what would he say ? He would 
either remain silent and thus confess that he has no 
reason to support his view, or hold that perception is 
valid because it is not misleading, If he adopts the 
first course, his view isa mere ipse dizit, an opinion 
unsupported by reason, and, therefore, not acceptable. 
If he adopts the second alternative, then he supports 
his view by a reason, and therefore, he is himself 
taking the help of inference. Besides, if the 
Carvaka admits that perception is valid because it is 
uncontradicted and not misleading, for similar reasons 
inference and testimony ‘also. abould be accepted. If the 
1 Vide Nyayavatara-virgtt (p. 4, 8, C. Vidyabbisane’s ed.): 
* pramanéni pratyakganomana-sabdazi.’ 


2 Prameya-kamala-martanda, Chap. 2 (Nirnaya-Sagara Press); 
SySdvdde-mafijari, verse 20, and Hemacandra's Com. thereon. 


12—~1605B 


€ 


90 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Carvaka says to this, that inference and ¢estimony. are 
sometimes misleading, then it is possible to point out 
that even perception is sometimes misleading. So the 
only reasonable conclusion is that any source of know- 
ledge, be it perception or inference or testimony, should 
be regarded as valid in,so far as it yields a knowledge 
that does” not prove misleading. ‘The criterion of 
validity should be the harmony (satmvada) of knowledge 
with the practical consequences to which it ieads. 

Moreover, when the Carvaka denies the existence 
of non-perceptible objects like life-after-death, he goes 
beyond perception and infers the non-existence of the 
objects from the fact of their non-perception. Even 
wher. the Carvika says about perception in general 
that it is valid, he goes beyond the perceived cases 
of perception found to be valid in the past and infers, 
from general similarity, something about the future 
unperceived cases of perception as well. Similarly, 
when Carvaéka argues with bis critics, he infers their 
thoughts from their expressions ; for otherwise the 
Carvika could not take part in any discussion. Hence 
the Carvika view that perception is the only valid 
source of knowledge, is not correct. 


3. The Jaina Theory of Judgment 


(i) Syadvada or the Theory that Every Judgment 
is Relative 


The Janas point out that the different kinds of 


Every jadgment ex- ; ; inate & 

presets one aspect af immediate and mediate knowledge 
‘ reality and is therefore that we possess aboul objects show 
.telative and subject to : : 

some condition, that every object has innumerable 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 91 


characters.’ An omniscieni being can obtain (through 
kevala-jfiina) an immediate knowledge of an object in 
al] its innumerable aspects. But imperfect beings look 
ai objects from one particular point of view at a time 
and have consequently the knowledge of only one 
aspect or character of the thing» Such partiai know- 
ledge about some ore of the‘innumerable aspects of an 
object is called byethe Jaina wniters ‘ naya.’? Judgment 
(paramaréa) based on such partial knowledge is aiso* 
called a ‘ naya.’° Every judgment that we pass in 
daily life about any object is, therefore, true only in 
reference to the standpomt occupied and the aspect 
of the object considered. It is because we forget 
this limitation and regard our judgments as uncondi- 
tionaliy true, that we come to quarrel and disagree 
very often in life. The story of the blind men who 
formed their ideas of an elephant by touching its legs, 
ears, tail and trunk respectively and thus came to 
quarrel about the real shape of the animal, illustrates 
this truth. They quarrelled because each thought 
that his knowledge was the only true and complete 
knowledge and should be accepted unconditionally. 
The quarrel was over as soon as each of them realized 
that his knowledge was only one of the many parts of 
the animal. 


1 Vide Sag-darsana-samuccaya, 58 : “anantadbartoakath vaata, ete.” 
and Guyaratna's Com. 

2 Vide Nydydvatara, verse 20 ; “* Ekadeéa-visigto'rtho nayasya vigeyo 
matah.” 

8 “ ueyaeti prapayuti eadivedanam drobayati, iti vaye) pramdga- 
pravptterultarakdlabbavi parimeréah,” Nyaydvatara-vir.. 20. 


s 
¥ 


92 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The various systems of jhibspny ‘which give 
different accounts of the universe 
aioe pcm similarly occupy different points 
pops aspects of view and discover the different 
aspecis of the many-sided universe. 
, They quarvel because fney do not bear in mind that 
each account is true only from its own standpoint, 
and is subject to certain conditions. They fail to 
realize, therefore, that the different views may be true 
like the different descriptions of the elephant. 
~ In view of these facts, the Jainas insist that every 
Belay fadanend acl ‘Judgment (naya) should be qualified 
be qualified by some by & some | word like ‘somehow’ (syat, 
word “ike ‘somehow’ + 
(ayat}, expreseing con- *,@. i) Bome respect), so that the 
wueaelhy: limitation of this judgment and 
the poasibility of other alternative judgments from 
other points of view may be always clearly borne 
in mind. For example, instead of a judgment 
like ‘‘ The elephant is like a pillar,’’ it should be 
said, to remove the chance of confusion, ‘‘Somehow 
(i.e. in respect of its legs), the elephant is Jike a 
pillar.’’ Similarly, on perceiving a black carthen 
jug existing in a room at a particular the, we should 
not assert unconditionally, ‘‘ The jug exists,’ but 
should rather say, ‘‘ somehow, the jug exists,’ which 
would remind us that the judgment is true only 
’ with regard to the many conditions of space, time 
quality, etc., under which the jug exists. The qualified 


| judgment “Somehow, the jug exists’’ (syad ghatah 


¢ 


| aBti) would prevent the possibility of the misapprehen- 
' sion that ihe pot exists a{ all times or in every place, or 
‘that a pot of any other colour, shape, etc., exists. The 


{HH JAINA PHILOSOPHY 93 


: unqualified "judgment, * The jug exists,’’ leaves the 
' possibility of such misapprehension. 

This theory of the Jainas has come to be known as 

7 syadvada, It is the view that 

sian . one every ordinary judgment (passed 

_ _ by imperfect minds hike ours) holds 

good only of the particular aspect of the object judged 

and of the point of view from which the judgment 

is passed. 


This Jaina view is quite in keeping with the view 
cad ohhh A: accepted by Western logicians gcner- 
Gee ae wee ally, namely, shat every judgment is 
view that every judg- Passed in a particular universe of 
ment relates to » discourse or context and myst be 
particular universe of undersiood only in reference thereto. 
ier anaibed i con- The universe of discourse is consti- 
to be mentioned.” _—sttuted by different factors Iske* space, 
time, degree, quality, etc., which wre 
Jeft unmentioned partly Decattse They are ubvious and 
partly because they are tvo many to be stated exhaus- 
tively, Now, if these conditions cannot be exhaustively 
enumerated, ,as some miodern logicians hike Schligr also 
admit, it is good for the sake of precision to qualify the 
judgment explicitly by a word like ‘ somehow ’ (syat), 
The principle underlying ‘syadvida’ makes Jaina 
ed ats thinkers catholic in their outlook. 
jee re icant They entertain and accept the views 
oatholic wha tolerant ‘of other philosophers as different 
possible versions of the universe from 
different points of view. The only thing thut the Juinas, 
dislike in other thinkers is the dogmatic claim of each 
that he alone is in the right, This claim amounts to the 
fallacy of exclusive predication (ekainta-vida), Against 
such a fallacy of philosophical speculation a protest has 
been raised recently in America by the Neo-realists who 
have called it the fallacy of exclusive particularity. But 
no Western or Eastern philosopher bas so earnestly tried 
to avoid thie error in practice as the Jainas have gone, | | 


x 


1 The New Realiem, pp. 14-18, 


94 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


€ 
(ii) Saptabhanginaya or the Seven Forms of 
Judgment 


I Ordinarily, logic distinguishes two kinds of judg- 
The seven formect weUt» affirmative and negative. 
conditional predica- The Jainas distinguish seven kinds 
oo : of Judgment including theee two. 
Any object may be described affirmatively by a judg- 
ment which predicates of it any of the characters it 
possesses, or it may be described negatively by a 
judgment which denies of it characters belonging to 
other objects but absent in this." These two are the 
affirmative and negative judgments ordinarily recog- 
nized + but the Jainas qualify each with ‘ somehow’ 
(syat) to emphasize its conditional or relative character. 
Affirmative judgments about a jug, for example, would 
be like ‘ somehow tle jug isin the room’ (i.e. in the 
room at ® particular place and at a particular time, and 
asa jug ofa particular description) ; ‘ somehow the 
jug is red’ (i.e. not always red but onfy during a 
particular time or under particular circumstances and 
the red is of a specific shade, eic.). The general form 
of all affirmative judgments can 

- OF radia then be symbolically represented 
as ‘somehow 8S is P’” (syat asti). 

Again, negative judgments ‘about an object would be 
like ‘ somehow the jar is not outside the room ’ (mean- 
ing that the jar of that particular kind, at that particu- 
lar time, etc., is not outside); ‘ somehow the jar is not 


© ,! Vide Goneralna’s Com, op. cit. pp. 219-26, Asiatic Soc. ed.) 
fha dvidhé earnbandho'stitvena néstitvens ca. Tatra svaparyéyairas- 
titvena sathbandhah,......paraparyayaiatu nastitvena.” 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 95 


black’ (i.¢.,iot black at that particular space and 
time and under these conditions, 
aoe : eae is etc.) We find then that the 
general form of all negative judg- 
ments is ‘ somehow 8 is not BP’ (syat nasti). 
When, "however, we have fp describe the complex 
(i * Somehow Bic fact that the j jar is sometimes red 
and also is not P’ and sometimes not, we must have 
Se ounealee s compound judgment like ‘ some- 
how the jar is and also is not red.’ The general form 
of this judgment would, iherefore, be ‘ somehow 8 is 
and qlso is not P* (syit astica naati ca). ‘Mis is the 
thivd“form of judgment recognized by Jaina logic. 
This form is obtained by combining successively the 
points of view of the first two judgments into one 
composite point of view. The necessity of such ’com- 
pound judgment lies in the need of a comprehensive 
' view of the positive and the negative character of an 
object. 
A jar is black when raw, and red when it is baked. 
: . Butif we are asked, what is the 
(4) " Somehow 8 is : 
indescribable’ (syat real colour of the jar always or 
eee under all conditions, the only 
honest reply would be that the jar cannot be described 
then, i.e. under the conditions of the question. Under 
such circumstances when we are forced to predicate 
simultaneously, of any object, characters which are 
incompatible, being contrary or contradictory, our judg-. 
ment, according to the Jainas, would be of the general 
form ‘ somehow 8 is indescribabie * (syit avaktavyam). 
This is the fourth kind of judgment recognized by- 
Jaina logic. 


96 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Recognition of this fourth form of jhdgment is of 
great philosophical value. It points out, first, that though 
an object can be described from different standpoints, .in 
different aspects separately or successively, it cannot be 
described at all, if no such distinction of standpoint and 
aspect is made. An object in general is an indescribable 
entity. Secondly, this also points out that philosophical 
wisdom does not always fonsist in the ability to answer a 
question by & straight affirmative or negative, but also in 

hsing that some questions, vy their very nature, are 
-~ answerable. Thirdly, the recognition of this foym of 
judgment shows that the Jaina logic does not violate the 
principle of contradiction, On the contrary, it shows that 
obedience to this law makes the Jaina confess that incom- 
patible characters cannot be simultaneously predicated 
of any subject in the same aspect. 


The other three; of the seven forms of judgment, 

} are obtained by combining suc- 

p ab) {Somehow 838 cessively each of the first three 
eae ¢® standpoints with the fourth. Thus 
by combining the first and the 

fourth successively, we get the fifth form of judgment, 
‘somehow § is P and is also indescribable’ (syad-asti 
ca, avaktavyarh ca). When we consider together, 
from a comprehensive point of view, the fact that a 
jug 1s sometimes red, but also that without reference 
to any particular time or state it cannot be described 
‘as having any predicable character, our judgment is 
of the form, ‘ The jug is somehow red but is also 
16) ‘Somehow 8 is Somehow indescribable,’ Similarly, 
pcr lan oi combining again the second__and 
ea, avaktavyath ca). the fourth standpoint successively 
we have the sixth judgment of the general form, * some-. 
how 8 is Ay P and is alsg_ins 


17) ‘ Somehow § is P, i ; ’ ‘ 

aleo a - P and ie = describable ’ (syat nasti ca, avak- 
i too’ (eyét .~ ae 

ee oka re tavyath \ ca). Lastly, combining 


svaktavyaii ca). successively the third with the 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY o7 


8 

fourth point of view, we get the seventh form of 
judgment, “ Somehow § is P, also is not P, and is in- 
describable too” (eyat asti ca, nasti ca; avaktavyam ca). 

If we combine simultaneously any of the first three 
points of view with the fourth, instead 
of doing sa successively, we shall 
have in each case the simultaneous 
predication of incompatible characters (like ‘is and is 
indescribable ’; or ‘is not and is indescribuble '; or ‘is, 
is not and is indescribable ’), Hence in each case the 
judgment would be the same in form as in the fourth case, 
namely, ‘Somehow 8 is indescribable’ (syat avaktavyam}. 
Therefore, though there are innumerable aspects of every 
thing, the forms of judgment would be only seven, neither 
more nor less. 


No other form is pos- 


sible. : 


To sum up, Jaina logic recognizes che following 
seven kinds of conditional judginent —(»aptabhangl- 
Naya): 

« (1) Somehow, 8 is P s(ya asti). 

(2) Somehow, § is not P (syat nasti). 
ec (8) Somehow. 8S is P, and is also not P (.yat asti ca 
Nibti ca). 

e (4) Somehow, 8 is indescribable (sy@t  avakta- 
yvyam). 


e ) Somehow. S is BP. and is also indescribable 
(syat asti ca avaktavyain ca). 

(6) Somehow, 8 is not P. and is atso indescribable 
(syat nGsti ca avakiavyam ca). 

(7) Somehow, S is P, and is also not P, and also 
indescribable (syit asti ca nasti ca avaktavyam ca). 


The Jaina doctrine of syidvada is sometimes compared 

. _ with the pragmatism of some Western 

¢ SyGdvada is realistic thinkers. It is true that 9 pragmatic’ 
cg not logician, hike Schiller, also recognizes 

, the truth that no judgment is true 


18—1605B 


98 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


or false without particular reference to’ ifs context and 
purpose. Even a so-called self-evident judgment, like 
‘A square is not acircle’ or ‘ Two and two are four, ’ is 
true only in a specific sense, according to Schiller. This 
is a striking poiné of resemblance. But there f¥ a very 
great difference also which should not be forgotten. The 
Jainas are realists, but the pragmatists have a distinct 
\idealistic bjas. Accordirg to the Jainas, the different 
judgments about an object are not simply different sub- 
jective ideas of the object, out they reveal the different real 
aspects of the object. The Jainas would accept, therefore, 
a realistic view of truth? which is rejected by all thorough- 
going pragmatists. 


The Jaina syidvada is sometimes compared with the 

as _ Western theory of relativity. There 
Pag daar asi ob = ro vane of ay, Sanaa 
vd not idealiati an of Protagoras, Berkeley, Schiller), 
aia peiacdita and fealiztis (as of Whitebead or 
Boodin). And if the Jaina is to be called a relativist, ho 
must be understood to be of the realistic type. Our 
judgments about things are relative—but relative to or 
dependent upon not simply the mood of the judging mind, 
but upon the relational characters of the many-sided 
reality itself. 


Another misunderstanding often found’ is the inter- 
Protation of the Jaina word ‘ syit’ 
as ‘may be.’ This would impart a 
sceptical or agnostic form to the Jaina theory, and make 
it look like the view of the pact Seaptie- Egua. who also 
recommended the qualification of every judgment with a 
phrase like ‘maybe.’ But it should be noted that the 
Jaina is not a sceptic. It js not the uncertainty of a 
judgment, but its conditional or relative character, that is 
pressed by the addition of ‘the paliying ‘pariels * pyat.’ 
Subject to the conditions or the tniversé of’ discourse 
under which any judgment is made, the judgment 1s valid 
beyond all doubt. There is, therefore, no room for 
scepticism, ee acs 


Tt is not scepticism. 


1‘ Yethévasthitérthavyavasdyardpath hi sarhvedanam pramadnam "= 
Prameyakamalamartanda, p, 41, 


THE JAINA PHITOSOPRY 99 
g 
IT. Tue Jaina Merapuysics 


The Jainas hold that every object known by us has 
a innumerable characters jananta- 

tet ia eat ib dharniakain vastu). Let us try to 
papa am Positive understand, a little more clearly 
* the implication of this view. 

Every object is what it is because of its positive and 
negative characters. The positive characters which 
determine, for example, an object like a man, iter his 
size, colour, shape, weight, constitution, heredity, 
family, race, nationality, educalioy, employment, place 
of birth, date of birth, habitation, age, etc., and the 
numberless relations he bears to the uncountable other 
objects of the world. The negative characters which 
determine the man consist of what he is sof. To 
know him fully, we should know how he is distinguish- 


lel ee ee 


ed_tre from everything else ; we should know,” for 
eximple. t that he is not a European nora Chinese, nor a 
Neero, etc., that he is not a Christian, nor a Molamine- 
dao nora Zoroastrian, ete., not dishonest. not foolish, 
not selfish, etc. As the negative characters of the 
man consist in his distunctions {rom all other objects in 
the universe, the number of these would, therefore, be 
far greater than that of the positive characters.’ 
If we consider, then, an object in the light of its: 
own positive characters and also in 
Moreover, it acquires the light of the characters of all 
new characters with ther objects which are absent in it, 


changes in time. ‘ 
the object would no longer appear to 


} “ gtokah svaparyéyéh parsparyéydstu vydvyttirdpa ananta, 
anantebhyo dravyebhyo vyavyttiival, '’ Gunaratna on Sad., verse 55. 


100 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


be a simple thing having. only a limita number of 
qualities, as we ordinarily take it to be. The object, on 
the contrary, turns out to be one possessed of unlimited 
characters. But when, moreover, the element of time 
is taken into consideration, and it 
Pe crroi eee has is remembered that the object takex 
on new characters‘with the chanye 
of time, the object is found really to possess infinite 
characters (anantadharma). 
Jaina writers, therefore, remark that ie whe knows 
one object fully, knows every thing. 
Only the omniscient Only an omuiscient person (kevali) 
“can, therefore, know 
an object fully can have such complete knowledge 
‘ of an object. For practical pur- 
poses(vyavahara) a partial knowledge of whal an object 
is or is not. is. of course. quite sufficient. But this 
should not make us think, as we do. that a finite object 
is really ‘possessed of limited characters. Nor should 
we think that our ordinary knowledge about it is com. 
plete and perfect. 


1. The Jainu Conception of Substance 


We have just seen that objects have many 
; characters. As in common con- 

A substance is possess- : ; ; 
ed of some unchang- versation so also in philosophy 
ing essential characters ee ea : ; : 
(qupes) end changing & distinction is made between 
modes (paryayas). the characters (dharma) and that. 
which possesses the characters (dharmi), The latter’ 
is generally called a substance (dravya). The Jainas 
accept this common philosophical view of substance. 
But they point out that there are two kinds of charac- 
ters found in every substance, essential and accidental. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 101 


The essential characters of a substance remain in the 
substance 28 long as the substance remains. Without | 
these the substance will cease to be what il is. Con-. 
sciousness, for exainple, 14 a1 essential character of the 
soul. Again, the acudentai characters of a substance, 
come and go ; they succeed ong another. Desires, vohi- 
tions, pleasure aitd pain are such accidental characters 
possessed by the soul-substance. It is (lrough such 
characters that a substance undergoes change 0! 
modification, They may also be called, therefore, 
modes, The Jainas call an essential unchanging charac. 
ier guna, and anaccidental. changiug character paryaya 
or paryaya. A substance is defined, therefore, as 
that which possesses qualities (sunas), as well as modes 
(parydyas).’ 
The wortd is composed of substances oi different 
kinds. In so far as the essential 
Cheng: aod perma- characters ol the ultimate sub- 
nence are, therefore : 
hoth real. stances are abiding. the world 1s 
permanent, aud in so far as the 
accidental characters undergo modification, the world 
also changes. The Jainas, therefore, hold that those 
philosophers like the Bauddhas, who say that there is 
nothing really permanent in the universe, and that 
everything changes from moment to moment (ksauika- 
vida), are one-sided and dogmatic. Equaliy mistaken 
also are philosophers like the monistic Vediantins, 
who declare that change is unreal and that Reality is 
absolutely unchanging (nityasvada).? Each of them 
looks at one side (ekinta) of reality only and thus 


1 Gupa-paryéyavad dre ryan, Tat. sit., 5.85 
2 Syadvadamenijari, verre 26 


102 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


commits the fatlacy of exclusive predication. Change 
wid permanence are both real. It should not be 
thought contradictory to say that a particular substance 
(or the universe as a whole) is both subject to change 
and free from it. Change is trne of the substance in 
one respect, (syait), whereas permanence is true in 
another respect (syét). The contradiction vanishes 
when we remember that caci predication is relative 
wnd not absolute, as taught by syadvada. 

A substance is real (sai). Reality consists of three 
aA an ae factors: permanence, origination 


factors preseat in anddecay. In substance there is 


reality, viz. perma- 


nence, origination and 118 unchanging essence and, there® 
decay. ; 
decay. , fore, it 18 perm: ; there are 


agam the onygin and decay of its changing modes 
(paryiya). Hence all the three clements that charae- 
terize realily are there in a substance. 
By accepting this criterion of reality the Jainax reject 
/ the Bauddha view that reality con- 
Causal efficiency can- _S!8t8 in Causal efficiency, i.c. that an 
not be a mark of real- object is real if it is capable of 
ity,as Bauddhes think. causing any effect. The Bauddha 
criterion is faulty, because according 
to it, even an illusory snake must be called real as it can 
cause effects like fear, flight, etc. 
, From this faulty criterion of reality 
The Bauddha th 
of Spomentaritets °%) «the Bauddhas deduce the theory of 
also untenable. the momentariness of things, which, 
therefore, turns out to be fallacious. 
Against the one-sided theory of momentariness the Jainas 
_ also adduce the following arguments :? 


\ (4) If every thing be momentary, the soul also would 
= be so, and then we could not explain 
fo ofmomen- memory, recognition, the immediate 
) feeling of personal identity, etc. (2) 


1 Sarva-dargane-sangraha, Ch. on Jaina, and Gunaratna’s Com. on 
Sad , 52. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 1¢8 


a) 

Liberation would then be meaningless, because there would 
be no permanent soul to be liberated. (8) No moral life 
would be possible then, because a momentary person could 
not attempt to attain any end. ‘The work of the person 
who would begin an effort would bring about a fruit that 
would be enjoyed by the person succeeding him, (4) Con- 
sequently there would be no moral law ; the consequences 
of one’s own action would be lést to him &rtapranaga) 
and the consequences of another man's action would be- 
fall him (akrtibhyupagama). (5) Mere momentary states 
would not even constitute any imdividual series, because 
without something permanent running through the chang- 
ing modes, the different changing states cannot be held 
together to form a continuous individual. (6) Neither 
perception nor inference reveals the existence of any thing 
in the world in which there is only change and no element 
of continuity. 


2, Classification of Substances ° 


The broadest classification of substances, according 
. . . < . e 
lo the Jaina, 1s into the.extended 


Substances extended ay the non-extended. There is 


and non-extendeu., 
ouly one substance, uamely, time 


(killa), which is devoid of extension, Ali other 
substances possess cxtension. They are called by the 
general name astikdya, because every substance of 
this kind exists (asti) like a body (kaya), possessing 
extension." 


Substances possessing exieusion (astikéyas) are 
The living and the subdivided into two kinds, namely, 
BENE the living (jiva) and the non-living 


1 Vide Dravya-sangraha, 24. According to Gunaratne, however, 
‘astikaya ' means a collection of indivisible parts of space. 


104 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


e 

(ajiva), Living substances (jivas) are identical with 
, souls or spirits. The souls again can 
be classified into those that are 
emaneipated or perfect (mukta) and 
those that are in bondage (baddha), The souls in 
. bondage are again of two kinds, 
au stay and the (hose that are capable of movement 
(wrasa) and thuse that are imimobile 
(sthavara). The immobile living substances have the 
most imperfect kinds of bodies. 
ie bie’ livine sub. ‘They live in the five kinds of bodies 
pisnecs Baring only lade of earth, water, fire, air or 
plants respectively.’ ‘hey have only 
the sense of touch ; they possess. therefore, tactual 
consoousness. The mobile living substances have 
ieee Gable Weng bodies of different degrees of perfec- 
substances having two «tion and variously possess two. 
Lortiee sents, three, four or five senses. Souls or 
living substances like worms have two senses, namely, 
those of touch and taste, those like ants have three 
senses, namely, those of touch, taste and smell; those 
like bees possess four senses, namely, those of touch, 
taste, smell and sight. Higher animals like beasts, 
birds and men have five senses. namely. those of 

touch. taste. smell, sight and hearing. 


Tha fettered nnd the 
liberated. 


Non-living subsiances possessing extension are 
dharma, adharma, akiéa and pndgala. 


Syadvada, 22, and alao Guysratna's Com. on §ad., 49. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 105 


The following table will clearly show the above 
scheme of classification : 


Substance (dravya) 


—— 


Extended (astikiya) Non-extsnded (anastikéya), 


e.g. time (kala) a 


Animate ijiva) Inanimate fajive) 


|| ~~ 
Emencipated Fettered Dharma Adharma Akisa Pudgala . 
(muktay (baddha) 


a 
ree | 


ee Ot | 


fe Tee i. 
Moving (trags) Non-moving (sthdvara) Atoms (anu) of Compounds 
w fe e.g. those living in earth, water, (saighita) 
bodies of earth, etc. , fire, air, 
* 
5-sensed, 4-sensed, 8-sensed, 9-sensed, 
eg. wen e.g. bees, e.g. ants e.g. worms 


Ne 


3. The Soul or Jiva 


A jiva or a soul is a conscious substance. Con. ° 
sciousness is the essence of the soul.’ It is always 
present in the soul, though its 
nature and degree may vary. 
Souls may be theoretically arranged in a continuous 


Jiva is a soul. 


1 Cetané-lakgano jivah, Gunaratna on G§ad., 47, 
laksanam.’ Tat. Sét., 2.8. 


14—1608B 


* Upayogo 


106 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
€ 


series according to the degrees of consciousness. 
At the highest end of the scale 
Souls have varying would be perfect souls that have 
reciept ig Kinds of overcome all karmas and attained 
omniscience. At the lowest end 
would stand the most imperfect souls which inhabit 
bodies of earth, water, fire, air or vegetable.’ In 
them life and consciousness appear to be absent. But 
really even here consciousness of a tactual kind is pre- 
. sent; only consciousness is in a dormant form awing to 
the overpowering influence of karma-obstacles.’ \ 
Midway between would lie souls having two to five | 
senses, Jike worms, ants, bees and men.” 


It ig the soul that knows things, performs activities, 
ee een enjoys pleasures, suifers pains, and 
itself and others. Itis illumines itself and other objects. 
i The soul is eternal, but it also 
undergoes change of states. It is different from 0 
body and its existence is directly proved’ by its con- 
sciousness of itself.“ 


Owing to the inclinations generated by its pas 

Tike © fight the eoul actions a }iva comes to inhabit diffe- 

pervades the entire rent bodies successively. Like a 
body in which it lives. : ae : 

light it iuminates or renders con- 

scious the entire body in which it lives. Though it has 


1 Vanaepatyantinam ekam, Tat. Sit., 2.22. 

2 Vide Gunaratoa (Sag., 49) for elaborate arguments eupporting the 
existence of life in plants and minerals. 

3 Krmi-pipihké-bh1amara-enusyAdiném ekaikavrddhani, Tat, Sat., 
2.28. 

4 Nydyavatdra, verse 81 and Dravya-sangraha, verse 2, 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 107 


no form (miyti), it acquires like a light the size and 
form of thé body wherein it lives. It isin this sense 
thai a jiva, though formless, is said to occu space-or 
possess extension. The jiva is not infinite but co- 
exténsive with the body, as it can immediately know 
objects only within the body. Consciosness 1s not 
present everywhere, but only in the bodys’ . 


Students of Western philosophy find it difficult to 
understand how 4 soul can possess 
Pptaoo as soul both consciousness and extension— 
qualities which are diametrically 

opposed, according to aescartes, Extension, Descartes - 
thioke, is the exclu-ive qua ity of material substances, and 
consciousness is the exclusive qu®lity of the soul. But 
the soul, as proved by Descartes, is essentially ‘a thinking 
being’; and ‘ thought’ seems to have no connection with 
space or matter. But the Jainas cunceive the soul 
primarily as a living being (jiva), Consciousness is found 
in every part of 8 living body, and if consciousness’ be the 
character of the soul, the soul should be admitted to be 
present in every part of the body and, therefore, to occupy 

space. The soul's ability to pervade space is admitted by . 

other Indian thinkers, as also by many Greek philosophers | 
like Plato, and even by some modern realistic philosophers 
Wes esa aaa “ak like Alexander. It should be borne 
F not in mind, however, that a soul’s occu- 
allavece like mitten: pying space simply means its presence 
in the different parts of space and not fillj ce 
like a materiel body. A material body fills a part of space 
in such a way that while it is there, no other matter can 
occupy it. But a soul’s presence in a particular space does 


. not prevent another soul’ esen, 
It is present in space there ; two_souls may. 2. 
like light. tha wameol the Fai nai ‘, 






just as two lights can illuimine the same area. 


“"The Jaina philosophers fee necessary to meet the 
Carvika views regarding the soul. Gunaratna, a great 


1 Vide Syad.. 8, and Tat. Sat., 5.16; ‘ Pradesa-satihara-visarpé- 
bhyam pradipavat.”’ 


108 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Jaina thinker, gives elaborate arguments to meet Carvaka 
scepticism and prove the existence of the: souf. We may 
state here the purport of his arguments. 


The existence of the soul is directly proved by such 
uncontradicted immediate experience 


Proofs for the exie- a8 ‘I feel pleasure.’ bile we per- 
terice of the soot. ceive the quality of a substance, we 
7 say, w6 perceite the substance. For 
example, on secing a rosy colour we hold that we perceive 
the substance rose, to which the 
The soul is imme- colour belongs. On similar grounds 
diately hehe io we can hold that the sou! is directly 
lcm. * perceived, because we immediately 
perceive such characters of the 
soul as pleasure, pain, remembrance, volition, doubts, 
knowledge, etc. The existence of the soul may also be 
indirectly proved by inferences like the following: ‘The 
body can be moved and controlled 
trig pari tein at will like a car, and, therefore, there 
many inferences. must be some one that moves and 
. controls it. The senses of sight, 
hearing, etc., are only instruments, and there must be, 
some agent who employs them. Again. there must be som. 
efficient cause or a of the body, because materi 
objects which have a beginning are found to require) 
some agent for shaping their material cause, Thus 
in different ways the existence of a substance like 
the sou] can also be inferred. The 
. The Carvaka view Carvika holds that consciousness is 
ay ene Go the product of the material elements. 
anes sicaeliances: js But we never perceive anywhere the 
not verified by percep-, generation of consciousness by the 
tion, unconscious material elements. The 
Caryaka believes that perception is 
the only valid source of knowledge. How can he then 
believe in what perception fails to show? Even if 
inference were accepted as valid by the Carvaka, it would 
not prove that consciousness is the 
nor by iaference. effect of matter or the material body, 
Because, if the body were the cause 
of consciousness, there would be no absence of conscious- 
ness 80 long as the body existed, and consequently, loss of 
consciousness in sleep, swoon, or in a dead body would be 
impossible. Besides, we find that there is no relation of 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY = 109 


concomitant variation between the body and consciousness, 
the development and decay of the body are not invariably 
followed by corresponding changes of consciousness. So 
no causal connection between matter and consciousness 
can be proved even by inference. The Carvika would 
perhaps say that, though every kind of matter does not 
produce consciousness, yet when matter is organized imto a 
living body, it produces consciousness. In reply to this 
it is pointed out that, but for spme organizer, matter 
would not be formed into a living body, and that this 
organizer is the soul itself. Judgments like ‘I am stout’ 
‘Tam thin,’ on which the Carvika tries to prove that 
the soul is identical with the body, must be understood 
figuratively and not literally, The soul sometimes treats 
the body as itself, because it is intimately interested in 
the body. Again, if the soul were absolutely unreal, the 
negative judgment ‘there is no soul in the body ’ would be 
unintelligible. Denial of somathing in "any place ‘iexplien/ 
the knowledge of its existence somewhere in some form 

Apart-from-eH other arguments, to say “that * my. sel: 

does not exist ’1s as absurd as to say ‘my mother i 

barren’ or ‘this sun, the giver of light, does ot 
exist.’ ; 


4. The Inanimate Substances or Ajivas 
ars a ae 
: es 


The physical world in which souls live is constituted 

by the material bodies that the 
1" « . ‘ : , 
cahatebeene apiatesny souls occupy and the other material 
time, space, dharma objects that form their environ- 
and adbarma. . “js 

ment. But in addition to these 
inaterial substances, there are space, time and the 
conditions of moiion and rest, without which the 
world and its events cannot be fully explained. Tet us 
consider these different substances one by one. 


‘ Yannisidhyate tat simanyena vidyate eva.’ Gunsratoa on 
8q., 48-49, 


e 
110 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
(i) Matter or Pudgala , 
e 


Matter in Jaina philosophy is called pudgala, 
which etymologically means ‘ that 
yea ee which is liable to integration 
bination end s:pare- and disintegration.’ * Material sub- 
signces can combine together to 
form large and jarger wholes, and dan also break up 
into smaller and smaller parts. The smallest parts of 
matter which cannot be further divided, being part- 
less, are called atoms (anu). Two or moré such atoms 
may combine together to form compounds (sanyghata 
or skandha)(\ Our, bodies and the objects of nature are 
such compounds of material atoms. Mind (manas), 
speech and breath are also the products of matter.” 

A material éubstance (pudgala) possesses the four 
as i te qualities of touch, taste, smell and 
lities of touch, taste, colour. These qualities are 
omelet possessed by atoms and also by 
their products, the compounds. Sound is not an 
original quality like these four, as most other Indian 
philosophers hold. The Jaina points out that sound 
along with light, heat, shadow, darkness, union, 
disunion, fineness, grossness, shape is produced later 
by the accidental modifications of matter.‘ 


(ii) Space or Akasa. 


The function of space is to afford room for the exis- } 
tence of all exteuded substances. 
Space gives room . 
PL seit Soul, matter, dharma and ee 
al] exist in space. Though spac 


1 ¢ Pitreyanti galanti ca,’ mareedarsane, lt. 
3 Tat, sut., 5.19, 3 [bid., 5.23, 4 Ibéd., 5.24. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 111 
4 


is imperceptible, its existence is known by an 
inference like the following: Substances which are 
extended can have extension only in some place, and 
that is called &kasa. Though to be extended is the 
very nature of some substances, and no substance 
which lacks that nature can bé made extended by 
space, yet it is also true that, io_be extended a sub- 
stance requires space, as a necessary condition. / 
"ft should not be thought that extension is explained 
fully by substances extended, with- 
Without space, sub- ; : 
stanees could not be Out the supposition of some other 
Suicnilen: condition like space. For, subs- 
tances are those that occupy or pervade, and space, is 
that which is occupied or pervaded.’ Space is not the 
same as extension, as Descartes thought, but it is she 
locus of extension, or of extended things, as Locke held. 
The Jaina distinguishes two kindsof space, the space 
Filled space and containing the world where souls 
empty space. , and the other substances live (loka- 
kasa), and empty space beyond such world (alokaékasa). 
(itt) Time or Kxala 
Time (kala), as Umasvami states, makes possible the 
continuity, modification, movement, 
Time is the necessary . 
condition of duration, newness and oldnessof substances.’ 
Se ee: new- Like space, time also is inferred, 
though not perceived. It is inferred 
as the condition without which substances could, 


not have the characters just mentioned, though 


it is true that time alone cannot cause a thing to 


1 Gunaraina on §ad., 49 
3 Tot sit.. 6.29 ; * vortand parindma-kriyah paratvdparatve ca 
kblaaya,’ 


112 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PIILOSOPHY 


6 

have the characters. Without time ‘a thing cannot 
endure or gontinue to exist"; duration implies 
moments of time in which existence is prolonged. 
Modification or change of states also cannot 
be conceived without time. A mango can be green 
and ripe‘ only successively, i.e., at different moments of 
time ; and without the supposition of time-distinctions 
we cannot understand how a thing can possess such 
incompatible characters. Similarly, movement which 
implies the assumption of successive states by an object 
can be conceived only with the supposition of time. 
Lastly, the distinction between the old and the-new, 
the earlier and the later cannot be explained without 
time. These are, therefore, the grounds on which the 
existence of time can be inferred. 


The reason why time is not regarded as an astikéya 

. is that time is one indivisible 

tie eet notextended substance. One and the same 

time is present everywhere in the 

world.’ Unlike all other substances called astikayas, 
time is devoid of extension in space. 


.Jaina writers sometimes distinguished between real 
time (paramarthika kala) and 

rion enntime snd empl: empirical or conventional time 
(vyavaharika kala, also called 

samaye). Continuity or duration (vartana) is the mark 
of real time, whereas Changes of ali kinds are the marks 
of empirical time. It is this latter (samaya) which is 
conventionally divided into moments, hours, etc., and 
is limited by a beginning and an end. But real time is 


1 Gonaratna on §aq., p. 168, 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 113 


/ 
formless andeeternal. By imposing conventional limita- 
tions and distinctions on rea) time, empirical time is 
produced." 


Some Jaina teachers, Gunaratna observes, do not 
admit time as a separate substance, but regard if as a 
mode (paryaya) of the other suistances.”—« 


(iv) Dharma and Adharma 


Like space and time, these two substances alxo are 
Dhaene ded cAliietc inferentially proved to exist. Mobi- 
are the conditions of lity and immobility—motion and 
Pena tones rest—are the grounds of such 
inference. The Jaina argues that just as the move-| 
ment of a fish in the river, though initiated by the fish 
itself, would not be possible without the medium 
of water, which is, therefore, a necessary condition / 
similarly ithe movement of a soul or a material 
thing requires some auxiliary condition, without which 
its motion would not be possible. Such a eondition 
is the substance called dharma. Dharma can only 
favour or help the motion of moving objects; it cand 
not make a non-moving object move, just as water 
cannot make a fish move. Adharma, on the con- 
trary, is the substance that helps the restful state 
or immobility of objects, Just as the shade of a 
tree helps a traveller to rest, or the earth supports 
things that rest on it. It cannot, however, arrest the 
movementof any moving object. Dharma and adharma, 


1 Dravya-sangraha, 21, 
2 §ad., p. 162. 


15—1605B 


114 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


though thus opposed, are also similar ne far as both 

are eternal, formless —manmoving. 
potiey are, mniem nd both pervade theentire_world- 

Space (lokakaga}. As conditions of 
motion and rest, both are passive,’ and not active. 
Dharma and adharma are used here in these technical 
senses, and not in their ordinary moral senses (i.e. 
merit and demerit.)? 


Regarding al} the four substances—space, time, dharma 
and adharma— it should be noted that 
Space, time, dharma 88 Causal conditions they all have a 
and adharma are re- peculiarstatus. The causal conditions 
mote aad passive in- (karenas) muy be distinguished into 
stramental conditions. three chief kinds, agent (as potter is 
of the pot) and instrument (as the 
potter’s wheel is of the pot) and material (as clay is of the 
pot)” Space, time, etc.,come under the category of instru- 
mental conditions, but they should be distinguished f-om 
ordinary conditions of that kind, being more indirect and 
passive than ordinary instrumental conditions. Gunaratna 
gives them, therefore, a special name, apeksakirana.® The 
stone on which the potier’s wheel rests may be cited asa 
condition of this kind in reiation to the pot. Space, time, 
etec., are similar conditions. 


IV. Tue Jaina Eruics anp RELIGION 


The most iniportant part of Jaina philosophy is its 
Ethies. Metapliysics or epistemology—in fact, know- 
ledge of any kind—is useful for the Jaina in so far as it 
helps him to right conduct. The goal of right conduct 

1 * Udasinakdrana ' (Gunaratna, Sad., p. 172). . 

3 Cf.‘ Dharmadoyah safijiih simayikah,” ete. (Tattodrthardja- 
varttika, 5. 1, 17-18). 

3 §ad:, p. 162, 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 115 


again is salvation (mokga), which means negatively 
removal ‘of all bondage of the soul and. positively the 


attainment of perfection. « 


1. Bondage of the Soul 


Bondage meang, in Indian phflosophy in general, the 
Bears liability of the individual to birth 
Possessed of infinite and all consequent sufferings. This 
pee: general conception of bondage is 
differently interpreted by the different systems in 
the light of their ideas of the individual and the 
world. The suffering individual,’ for the Jaina, is 
a jiva or a living, conscious substance called the soul, 
This soul is inherently perfect. It has infinite 
potentiality within. Infinite knowledge, infinite faa faith, 
infinite power and infinite bliss, can all be attained 
by the soul if it can only remove from within itself 
all obstacles that stand in the way. Just as the 
sun shines fgrth to illuminate the entire world as 
soon as the atmosphere is freed of cloud and fox, 
similarly the soul attains ommiscience and the other 
perfections inherent in it as soon as the obstacles are 
removed. But what then are these obstacles, and how 
_ do they come to rob the soul of its 

Pastels glean native perfections? The obstacles, 
and thus its limitation the Jaina asserts, are constituted 

or bondage occurs. . : : “so 

by matter-particles which infect | 

the soul and overpower its naturaj qualities. In 
other words, the limitations that we find in any | 
individual soul are due to the material body with/ 
which the soul has identified itself. The body! 
is made of particles of matter (pudgala), and for 


116 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the formation of a particular kind of body, particular 
kinds of matter-particles are to be arranged and 
organised in a particular way. In the formation of 
this body the guiding force is the soul’s.owa passions. 

Roughly ‘speaking, a soul acquires the body that it 
past life of a soul—its past thought, speech and 
activity—generales in it certain: 
blind cravings and passions that 

seek satisfaction. These cravings 
in a soul attract to it particuiar sorts of inatter-particles 

and organize them into the body unconsciously desired. 

The soul with its passions or karma-forces is, therefore, 
regaided by the Jaina as the organizer of the body, the 

efficient cause of it, whereas matter (pudgala) is said 

to be its material cause. The orgasm which the soul 

thus acquires, consists not suyply of the gross per- 

ceptible body, but also the senses, manas, the vital 

forces and all the other elements which curb and limit 

the soul’s potentialities. ° 


Passions atiract 
matter to the soul. 


The body that we have inherited from our parents 

is not a mere chance acquisition. 

contnidy and otter Our past karma determines the 
Co are all dueto family in which we are born as well 
as the nature of the body—its 

colour, stature, shape, longevity, the number and 
nature of sense organs and motor organs which it 
possesses. While all these, taken collectively, may 
be said to be due to karma, taken also in the collective 
sense (of the suni-total of all tendencies generated by 
past life;, each of these taken separately may be said to 
be due to a particular kind of karma. The Jaina, 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY Wi 


therefore, speuks of the many karmas, and names each 
after the effect it produces. For example, gotra-karma 
is the karma that determines the family into which one 
is born, ayu-karma is the karma determining the 
length of life, and so on. Similarly, we are told of the 
karma that clouds knowledge, (jianavaraniya), that 
which clouds faith (darganavaraniya’, that which 
produces delusion (mobaniya), (hat which produces 
emotions of pleasure and pain (vedaniya), and so on. 
The passions which cause bondage are anger, pride, 
infatuation and greed (krodha, 
The passions causing ee a eg oy ’ 
bondage are anger, ‘&na, miayd, *lobha).’ These are 
pairs infatuation and called kagayas (%.¢. sticky sub- 
stances), because the presence of 
these in the soul makes _matter-particles stick to it, 
As the nature and number of material particles 
attracted by the soul depend on its 
karma, these particies thémselves 
come to be cailed karmna-matter 
(karma-pudgaia) or even simply karma. The flow of 
such karma-matter into the soul is called, therefore, 
influx (asrava) of karma. 


The influx of karma- 
inutter into the soul. 


Bondage, in Jaina philosophy, comes, therefor®y 
to mean the fact that_jiva. infected 
Bondage of the soul : : arama? 
to matter is due toits With passions, takes up matter in 
bondage to bad dis. 7a eer «apna : 
pealiione of passions, avoordance with ay karma. As 

passion or bad disposition (bhava) 


of the soul is the internal and primary cause of 


1 Tat, sit., 8. 9. 
2 Tat. sul., 8.2: “‘sukasdyatvaj-jivah katmano yogyan pudvalan- 
adatte sa bandhah.”’ 


118 aN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


bondage, and the influx of matter (asravay*into the soul 
is only the effect of it, the Jaina writers point out 
that bondage or fall of the sou! begins in thought. 
They, therefore, speak sometimes of two kinds of 
bondage: (1) internal or idea! bondage, i.e. the 
soul’s bondage to bad disposition (bhava-bandha), and J 
(2) its effect, material bondage, i.e. the soul’s actual 
association with matter (dravya-bandha). 


The interpenetration of matter and soul (which, 
according to the Jaina, is the nature 
Interpeneiration of of bondage) would appear to be crude 
te va and matier ig to some. But we should bear in mind 
pov oneciouereae 1g, Hat the soul, for the Jaina, is not 
every part of the body. devoid of extension, but co-extensive 
: with the living body, The soulis the 
jiva, the living being ; and in every part of the living body 
we find matter as well as consciousness and, therefore, 
the “compresence or interpenetration of matter and the 
conscious living suvstance (i.e. the soul) is as good a tuct 
of experience as the interpenetration of milk und water 10 
a mixture of the two, or of fire and iron ia a red-hot iron 
ball. 


2. Liberation 


Tf bondage of the soul is its association with matter, 
liberation must mean the complete 
Liberation is the dissociation of the soul from matter. 
expulsion of matier a. ; 
from the soul. This can be attained by stopping 
the mflux of new matter into the 
soul as weil as by complete elimination of the sduitee| 
with which the soul lias become already mingled. The 
first. process is cailed sathvara (i.e. the stoppage of 
influx) and the second nirjaré {.e. exhaustion or wear- 
ing oul of karma in the soul). 


3 Gunoratna, Com. on §ad., p. 18h. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 119 


We have seen that the passions or cravings of the 
soul lead to the association of the soul with matter. 
Looking into the cause of the passions themselves, we 

find that they ultimately spring 
Seine ot onesies. the from our ignorance. Our ignorance 

about the reg] nature of our souls 
and other things leads to anger, vanity, infatuation 
and greed. Knowledge alune can 
remove ignorance. The Jainas, 
therefore, stress the necessity of 
right knowledge (samyag-jiana) or the knowledge of 
reality. Right knowledge can be obtained only by 

studying carefully the teachings of 
gerne Reomieias the omniscient — tirthankaras or 
teachings of the omoi- teachers who have already attained 


scient tirthankaras. 
libevabon-and are, therefore, fit to 


lead others out of bondage. But before we feel inclined 


Knowledge alone can 
remove ignorance. 


to study their teachings, we must have a- general 
acquaintance with the essen als of the teachings and 
consequent fdith in the competence of these teachers. 
This right sort of faith based on general preliminary 


acquaintance(called samyag-daréana) 
Therefore faith in 


thats ts neceuiary. paves the way for right knowledge 
(samyag-jfiana) and is, therefore, 
regarded as indispensable But mere_knowledge. is 


useless unless it is put to practice. Right conduct 
(samyak-caritra) is, therefore, regarded by the Jaina as 
the third indispensable condition of liberation. In right 

conduet, aman has to control his 
his thought, 

speech and action, in the light of 
right knowledge. This enables him to stop the influx 
of new karma and eradicate old karmas, securing. 


Knowledge is perfect- 
ed in right conduct. 





120 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


gradualiy thereby the elimination of matéer which ties 


the soul into bondage. 
Right faith, right knowledge, and nght conduct 
Henoe, right faith, have, therefore, come to be known 


right knowledge and jin Jaina ethics a ihe three gems 
right conduct con- : ; . . : 
stitute the three gems (trjratna) that shine in a good life. 


af « goot lite, In the very first stira of T'attodrtha- 


dhigama-siitra, Umasvami states this cardinai jeaciing 
of Jainism: The path to_liberati 


ie ey Produce ies throngh Tight faith, aici 
iberation. rns 
and conduct.’ Tiberation is “the 


joint effect of_these three. 


Right faith (samyag-dargana},—Umiisvami defines 
right faith as the attitude of respect (sraddha) towards 
truth. This faith may be inborn and 
a Mie isres- spontaneous in some; by others it 
pees may be acquired by learning or 
culture.” In any case faith can arise only when the karmas 
that stand in its way (i.e. the tendencies that cause 
disbelief) are allayed or worn out. 
Tt should not be thought that Jainism wants its 
followers to accept blindly what is 
Tt ie not blind faith. taught by the tirthankaras. As Mani- 
bhadra, a Jaina writer, states, the 
attitude of the Jaina is rationalistic, rather than dogmatic, 
and it is summed up in the following dictum: J have no 
bias for Mahavira, and none against Kapila and others. 
Reasonable words alone are acceptable to me, \ose-ever 
they might be:* ea 
The initial faith is a reasonable attitude, first, because 
it is based on some initial ac quaint- 
‘Tt is the minimum ance and is proporticnate to this, and 
will to believe, with secondly, because without such faith 
an ites 6 study there would be no incentive to further 
ly begin. : . 
study. Even a sceptical philosopher, 


1 ‘Samyag-darsana-jiéna-caritrini moksa-margah,* 
2 Tat, siit., 1. 2-8, 
3 Com, on Sad., 44 (Chowkbamba ed., p. 39,. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 121 


’ 
who begins t¢? study something rationally, must possess 
some faith in the utility of his method and the subject 
he studies. 


Starting with o partial faith and studying further, 
if the beginner finds that the Jaina 
teachings are reasonable, his faith 
increases. The Jaina claims that the 
_ more one sthdies these »views, the 
greater would faith’ grow. Perfect knowledge would cause, 
therefore, perfect faith (samyag-dargana). 
Right knowledge (samyag-jndna).—While faith is 
initially based on knowledge of only the essentials of the 
: Jaina teachings, right knowledge is, 
Hight knowledge con- ag Dravya-saigraha states, the ‘‘de- 
sists in the detailed : sys 
knowledge of ail ‘ailed cognition of the real nature of 
trutha, the ogo and non‘ego, and is free from 
doubt, error and uncertainty’’ (verse 
42). We have already seen in connection with Jaina 
epistemology the different ways in which correct cognition 
can be obtained. As in the case of faith, so in the 
case of knowledge, the existence of certain irfate- 
tendencies (karmas) stand in the way of correct 
knowledge. For the attainment of 
Removal of karma is perfect knowledge the rezuoval of 
necersary for this. these karmas should be attempted. 
Perfection of this process ends in the 
attainment of absolute omniscience (kevalajiana). ; 
Right conduct (samyak-cdritra).--Good conduct is 
: _ briefly described in Dravya-sangraha 
veiitiniig ten wise Metal 45) on relreiaiag fom mnee : 
: : harmful and doing what is beneficial. 
jomight. aire ati In a word, it is what helps the self to 
get rid of the karmas that load 
hin to bondage and suffering. For the stoppage of 
the influx of new karmas, and cradication of the old, 
one must (1) take the five greai vows (pafica-mahiivrata), 
(2) practise extreme carefulncss (samiti) in walking, 
spesking, receiving alms and other things, and answer- 
ing calls of nature, so as to avoid doing any harm to 
any life, (8) practise restraint (gupti) of thought, 
speech and bodily movements, (4) practise dharma of 
ten different kinds, namely, forgiveness, humility, straight- 
forwardness, truthfulness, cleanliness,  self-restraint, 
austerity (internal and external), sacrifice, non-attachment 


16—~1605B 


Perfect faith can re- 
sult only from perfect 
knowledge. 


122 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


€ 
and celibacy, (5) meditate on the cardinaf truths taught 
regarding the self and the world, (6) conquer, through 
fortitude, all pains and discomforts that ari-e from hunger, 
thirst, heat, cold, etc., and (7) attain equanimity, purity, 
absolute greediessness and pertect conduct.’ 


But Jaina writers are not unanimous regarding the 

necessity of ull the above steps Some 

Pita gp vove of tem select the first, namely, the 

ssiduck: Be five great vows as sufficient for 

perfection of conduct. Many of the 

other steps recommended are found to repeat in different 
ways the basic principles of these five. 

The value of the five great vows (pafica-mahi- 

. vrata) is recognized by the Upanisadic 

ying melee ueder, thinkers as well as the Bauddhus (who 

by many other faiths, 8ll them Pafica-sila). The principles 

of most of these are recognized also 

in the ten Christian commundinents. But the Jainas try 

to practise these with a rygour scarcely fouud elsewhere. 

There vows consist of the following: 


“Abirnsa: Abstinence from all injury to life.—Life, 
as we have seen, exists not simply in 
1) The vow of the moving beings (trasa), but alsv ia 
abiths® or non-injury = 
to lig some non-moving ones (sthavara) such 
as plants aud beiugs inhabiting bodies 
ofearth. The ideal of the Jama 1s, therefore, to avoid 
molesting life not only of the moving creatures but 
also of the non-moving ones. The Juina saints 
who try to follow this ideal are, th refore, found 
even to breathe through a piece of cloth tied over 
their voses lest they male and destroy the life of 
apy organism floating in the air. Ordinary Iuymen would 
fiud thi- ideal too high. They are advised, therefore, to 
begin with the partial observauce of ahithsa by abstaining 
from miury to moving beings which are endowed with at 
leust two senses. 
The Juina attitude of ahirh-i is the logical out- 
come of ther metaphy-~ical theory of the porential equa ity 
: vf all souls and recognition of the 
_1t is based on the principle of recipr city, i.e. we should 
idea cf ip tential 
equality of all suuls. o to others 18 we would be done by. 
It ‘s unfair to thnk that ahirhsa 
is the remnant of the suvage’s primitive awe for life, 


1 Drarya-sangraha, 86. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 123 


’ 
as some critics have thought.’ If every soul, however 
lowly uow, .can become us great as unv other soul, then 
one should recognize the value aud the claims of every life 
as his own, ‘ Resp-ct for life wherever found ’ becomes 
then un irresistibie duty, 
Tne Juina tries to perform this duty in every 
minute act in Jife, because he wants to be thoroughly 
“2, consi-tent with the basic principle he 
Ahitheé must be, has accepted, The Jaina also thinks, 
practised in thonght, th: ref gt Gee : 
speech and ection. hrefore, that it is not suffich nt 
simply not tu tuke life; «ne should 
not even think end speak ot tuking li‘e, nor even permit, 
nor encourage others to take life. Otherwise the vow of 
ahirhsé canpot be fully mamtained. 
Satyam: Abstinence frim fulsehord.—This vow also is 
(2) The vow of satya Irken very rigorously. Truthfuluess 
or truthfulness con. 38 not sprakng what is only true, 
sists in speaking what but tpexking what is true as well as 
ja toe, as vell as) god und pleasant. Without -the-e 
Pleasant an! gvod. Qualifications the practice of truthful- 
ness wuld be of littie use as an aid to moral propycss, 
Because, mere!y epraking what is true may sometimes 
descend into gurrulity, vulgarity, frivolity, vilification, ete. 
Truth set as the ideal of this vow is scmetimes ca!led, 
therefi re, sunrta, to suggest the fuller meaning of truth 
which is also wholesome and pleasant. It is also pointed 
out that for the perfect maintenance of this vow, one 
must conquer greed, fear ond anger and even restrain 
the habit of jesting. 
Asteyum: Abstinence from s!ealing.—This vow consists 
(3) The vow of in not taking what is out given. The 
astey or non-stealing S#DCtity of the property of others, like 
ia based on the idea thet of their lives is r cognized ty 
of the sanctity of the Jainax. A Jaina writer wittily 
property remarks that wealth is but the outer 
life of man and to rob wealth is to rublife. i human 


1 Vide Mackenzie, Hindu Ethics, p. 112: ‘* The root idea of the 
doctrine of abiths&.....ia the awe with which the savage re.ards life 
in all its forms.” But even the early Jaina teachers make it clear 
that it is the sense of fellow-feeling and equity on «hich abiths’ is 
based. Vide Acdranga-sitra, 1.42. (Jacobi, Jainasfitras, Prt I, pp. 
88-89), and Séira-krtanga, 1.1.4 (op cit. Part II, pp. 247-48), which 
speak of ahirhs’ as ‘ the legitimate conclusion from the principle of 
reciprocity.’ 


124 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
€ 

life is impossible without wealth in some form or other, 
there is no exaggerution in the Jaina thought that depriv- 
ing a manof his weelth is virtually to deprive him of an 
essential condition on which his life depends. This vow, 
therefore may be said to be logically inseparable from the 
vow of shirhsi, the sanctity of property being a logical 
sequence of the sanctity of life. 


Brahmécaryam: Abf&tinence from | self-indulgence.— 
(dk The owe <a This vow is generally interpreted ax 
brahmecarys consists that of celibacy. But the Jaina, 
in abstaining from all attaches to this also a deeper meaning 
forms of self-indul- that raises the standard of this vow 
Benne; far above mere sexual self-continence. 
It is interpreted as the vow to give up self-indulgence 
(kama) of every form. ‘The Jaina, bent on self-criticism, 
discerns that though outwardly indulgence may stop, it 
may continue stil! in subtle forms—in speech, in thought, 
in the hopes of enjoyment hereafter in heaven, even in 
asking or permitting others to indulge themselves. For 
the complete maintenance of this vow one must, therefore, 
des#i from all forms of  self-indulgence-—external and 
internal, subtle and yross, mundane and extra-nuadanc, 
direct and indirect. 
Aparigraba: Abstinence ve all attachment.—This is 
ea , explained as the vow to give up all 
See pict aie attachment for the objects of ihe five 
abstaining from all senses—pleasant sound, touch, colour, 
abtbacbinent to sense- taste and smell.’ As attachment to 
objects. the world’s objects means bondage to 
the world, and the force of this causes rebirth, liberation 
is impossible without the withdrawal of attachment. 


Knowledge. faith , and conduct are inseparably 
Right. “Knowledge. bound up 3 and the progress and 
faith and conduct degeneration of the one react on 
jointly bring about pete 
liberation consisting the other two. Perfection of con- 
in fourfold perfection. duet zoes hand in hand with the 
perfection of knowledge and faith. When a person, 


through the harmonious development of these three 


Acdranga sitira, Jacobi, B. T., p. 208. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY ; 125 
4 


succeeds 1) overcoming the forces of al] passions and 
karmas, old and new, the soul becomes free from its 
bondage to matter and attains liberation. Being free 
from the obstacles of matter, the soul realizes its 
inherent potentiality. It attains the fourfold perfec- 
lion (ananta-cainstaya), namely, infinite knowledge 
infinite faith, infinite power and infinite bliss. 


3. Jatnism as a Religion without God 


Jainisin presents, along with Buddhism, a religion 

The grounds of Jaina without belief in God : The 
atheism : atheism of the Jainas ix based 
on the following chief grounds ': 


fact 


(t) God is not perceived, but sought to he preved 
ANA ieceae: through inference. The Nyaya 
tion nor inference can holds, for example, that asx every 
prove Gods product. like a house, is the work 
of an agent (karté), the world, which is a product. 
must also have an agent or creator who is called God. 
But this inference is inconciusive, because one of the 
premises, ‘the world is a product,’ is doubtful. 
How is it proved that the world is a product ? Ii 
cannot be said that the world isa produci because 
it has parts. Though akaéa has parts, it is not 
admitied by the Nyaya to be a product ; it is said 
to be an eternal substance not produced by anything 
else. Ayain, wherever we perceive anything being 
produced, the producer or the agent is found to work 
on the material with his limbs. God is said to be 


1 Vide Prameya-kamala-martanda, Chap. I, and Syadeadamanjari, 
verse 6 and com. for elaborate argumenta in support of atheism. 


126 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
‘ 


bodiless. How can He, then, work on matter to 
produce the world ? 
(i) Like the existence of God, the qualities of 

omnipotence, unity, eternity and perfection, generally 

F ... attributed to Him, are also doubt- 

(2) The = qualities - P 
attributed to God sre ful. If God is gmnipotent, He 
nee ene: should be supposed to be the cause 
of all things. Butthis is not true, because we per- 
ceive daily that many objects like houses, pots, etc., 
are not produced by God. God is held to be one on 
the ground that, if there were many gods, they would 
act with different pléns and purposes, and consequently 
a harmonious world, as wa have, would not have been 
possible. But this argument is not sound, because we 
observe that many human beings like masons, and even 
lower animals like anis and bees, act tozether harmo- 
niously to build objects like palaces, ant-hil]s, and hives. 
God, again, is said to be eternally perfect. But eternal 
perfection is a maaningless epithet. Perfection is only 
a removal of imperfection, and it is meaningless to call 
a being perfect who was never imperfect. 

Though the Jainas thus come to reject God, as the 

The Jainos wor ship creator of the world , they think it 
the liberated souls necessary to meditate on and 
Fakes ‘island Ne worship the liberated, perfect souls 
sot (siddhas). The liberated souls 
possess.ng the God-like perfections mentioned already 
easily take the place of God. Prayers are offered to 
them for guidance and inspiration. The offering of 
prayers to five kinds of pure souls (pafica-paramesti)* 


1 These are the Arbsts, the Siddhas, the Acaryas, the Upadhyiyas, 
the Sadhus; vide Dravya-sangraha, 49. 


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 127 


also forms a, part of the daily routine of the devout 
Jainas. In spite of the absence of a creator-God, the 
sss vallsiues terse religious spirit of the Jaina backs 
of the Jainas does not, neitherin internal fervour nor in 
therefore, suffer. ; ‘ 
external ceremonial expressions. By 

meditating on the pure qualities of the liberated and 
those who are advanced on the path to liberation, the 
Jaina reminds himself daiiy of the possibility of 
attaining the high destiny. He purifies his mind by 
the contemplation of the pure and strengthens his heart 
for the uphill journey to beration. Worship, for the 
Jaina, is not secking for mercy, and pardon. The 
Jaina believes in the inexorable moral law of karma 
which no mercy can bend, The consequen es of past 
misdeeds can only be counteracted by generating 
within the soul strong opposite forces of good thoubht, 
good speech and good action, Every one must work 
out his own salvation. The liberated souis serve only 


as beacon lights. The religion: of 
Jainasin is a religion 


of self-help. the Jaina is, therefore, a religion. of 


the strong and the brave. It isa 
religion of self-help. This is why the libétated soul is 
called a victor (jina) and a hero (vira). In this respect 
it has some other parallels in India, in Buddhism, the 
Sankhya and the Advaita-Vedinta. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 


17—1605B 


CHAPTER IV 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Rhys Davids ...' Dialogues of the Buddha 


Mrs. Rhys Davids... 


H. C. Warren 


t 


Yamakami Sogen 


D. T. Suzuki 


B. M. Barua 


Stcherbatsky 


(Eng. trans. in 2 parts. 

Sacred Books of the 

Buddhists series). 
Buddhism (Home University 


Library), 

Buddhism in Translations 
(Harvard University 
Press). 

Systems of  Buddhisttc 
Thought’ ~ (Calcutta 
University). 


Outlmes of Mahdydna 
Buddhism (Luuzac & Co.). 

A History of Pre-Buddhis- 
tic Indian Philosophy 
(Calcutta University). 

The Central Conception of 
Buddhism (Royal Asiatic 
Society). 

The Dhammapada (Eng. 
trans. Sacred Books of 
the Hast series). 


CHAPTER IV 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 


. I. Inrrépuction 


The life of Siddhartha or Gautama Buddha, the 


Light of Asia and the founder of 
moe ofGeutems Buddhism, is fairly well-known : 

Born in a Royat family at Kapila- 
vastu (on the foot-hills of the Himilayas, north of 
Bihar) in the sixth century B.C., Siddhartha renounced 
the world early in life. The sights of disease, old age 
and death impressed the young prince with ¢he idea 
that the world was full of suffering, and the life of a 
care-free mendicant suggested to him a possible way of 
escape. As an ascetic, he was restless in search of the 
real source of all sufferings and of the means of com- 
plete deliverance., He sought light from many religious 
‘teachers and learned scholars of the day and practised 
great austerities ; but nothing satisfied him. This 
brew him back on his own resources. With an iron 
,will anda mind free from all disturbing thoughts and 
passions, he endeavoured to unravel, through continued 
intense meditation, the mystery of the world’s miseries, 
till at last his ambition was crowned with success. 
Siddhartha became Buddha or the Enlightened. The 
message of his enlightenment laid the foundation of 
both Buddhistic religion and philosophy which, in 
course of time, spread far and wide—to Ceylon, Burma 


132 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


and Siam in the south, and to Tibet, China, Japan 
and Korea in the north. 
Like al! great teachers of ancient times Buddha 
taught by conversation, and his 
Boden eachings of teachings were also handed down 
for @ long time through oral 
instruction imparted by his disciples ‘to successive 
generations. Our knowledge about Buddha’s teachings 
depends to-day chiefly on the 
a rere’? = Tripitakas or the three baskets of 
teachings which are claimed to 
contain his views as reported by his most intimate 
disciples. These three canonical works are named 
‘ Vinaya-piteka, Sutta-pitaka and 
Bide rg Her oy Abhidhamma-pitaka. Of these the 
sae first deals chiefly with rules of 
conduct, the second contains sermons with parables, 
and the third deals with problems of philosophical 
interest. All these three captain information regarding 
early Buddhist philosophy. These works are in the 
Pali dialect. 
In course of time, as his followers increased in 
Dem number, they were divided into 
iia Vahayees ence different schools. The most well- 
a eee known division of Buddhism on 
religious principles was into the Hinayana and the 
Mahayana. The first flourished in the south and its 
present stronghold is in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, 
Its literature is vast and is written in Pali. It isclaimed 
to be more orthodox and faithful to the teachings of 
‘Buddha. Hinayana is sometimes called also southern 
or Pali Buddhism. Mahayana flourished mostly in 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 1338 


the north and* its adherents are to be found in Tibet, 
China and Japan. It adopted Sanskrit for philosopiii- 
cal discussion and thus the enormous Buddhist literature 
in Sanskrit came io be developed. Most of this 
literature was translated into Tibetan and Chinese and 
thus became naturalized in fhe lands in which 
Buddhism flourished. Many such valuable Sanskrit 
works lost in India are now being recovered from those 
translations and restored to Sanskrit. Mahayana is 
also known as northern or Sanskrit Buddhism. 


As Buddhism flourished in different lands, it became 
coloured and changed by the original 
of td, eerste faiths and ideas of the converts. 
The different schools of Buddhism 
which thus arose are so numerous and the total output 
of philosophical works in the different languages is 50 
vast that a thorough acquaintance with Buddhist 
philosophy requires the talents of a versatile linguist, 
as well as the insight of a philosopher—and yet one 
life-time may be found all too short for the purpose. 
Our account of Bauddha philosopby wil] necessarily 
be very brief and so inadequate. We shall firet try 
to give the chief teachings of Buddha as found in the 
dialogues attributed 1o him, and next deal with some 
aspects of Bauddha philosophy as developed later by 
his followers in the different schools, and conclude 
with a short account of the main religious tendencies 
of the Hinayana and the Mahayana school. 


184 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
é 
II. Tse Teacnines or BUDDHA: 
Tue Four Nose Truras 


1. The Anti-Metaphysical Attitude 


Buddba was prjmarily an ethical teacher and 

; reformer, not # philosopher. The 
caanad disliked message of his enlightenment 
acyesitng of practic points to man the way of life 
that leads beyond suffering. When 

any one asked Buddha metaphysical questions as to 
whether the soul was different from the body, whether 
it survived death, whether the world was finite or 
infinite, eternal or non-eternal, etc., he avoided dis- 
cussing them. Discussion of problems for the solution 
of which there is not sufficient evidence leads only 
to different partial views like the conflicting one-sided 
accounts of an elephant given by different blind 
persons who touch its different parts.’ Buddha referred 
to scores of such metapbysical vieWs advanced by 
earlier thinkers and showed that all of them were 
inadequate, since they were based on uncertain sense- 
experiences, cravings, hopes and fears.” Such specu- 
lation should be avoided, Buddha repeatedly pointed 
ont, also because it does not take man nearer to his 
goal, viz. Arhatship or Vimutti, the state of freedom 
from all suffering. On the contrary, a man who 
indulges in such speculation remains all the more 
entangled in the net of theories he himself has 
1 For this parable ode Rhys Davide, Dialogues of Buddhe, I, op 


187-88, 
2° Brahma-jala-sutta, op.cit., pp. 52-5. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 135 
® 4 


woven.’ The faost urgent problem is to end misery. 
One who indulges in theoretical speculation on the 
soul and the world, while he is writhing in pain, 
behaves like the foolish man, with @ poisonous arrow 
plunged into his flank, whiling away time on idla 
speculation regarding the origin, the maker, and the 
thrower of the arrow, instead of trying to pull it out 
immediately.’ 

Ten questions are often mentioned by Buddha (vide 


Potthapdda Sutta, Dialogues, I. R. 
The ten unprofitable Davids, pp. 254-57) as uncertain and 
and unanswerable eae 
questions. ethicaliy unprofitable und therefore, 
not discussed byehim: (1) Is the 
world eternal? (2) Is it non-eternal ? (8) Is it finite ?. 
(4) Is it infinite ? (5) Is the soul the same as the body ? 
(6) Is it different from the body ? (7) Does one who “has 
known the truth live again after death ? (8) Does he 
not live again after death ? (9) Does he both live again 
and not live again after death? (10) Does he neither 
live nor not-live again after death? These have come 
to be known as the ten ‘ indeterminable questions’ {in Pali 
avydkaténi) in Buddhist literature and made the subject 
of a discourse in Sarhyutta Nikaya called Avyakata 
Sarhyutta.* 


Tnstead of discussing metaphysical questions, which 
are ethically useless and _ intel- 
lectually uncertain, Buddba always 
tried to enlighten persons on the 
most important questions of sorrow, its origin, its 
cessation apd the path leading to its cessation. 
Because, as he puts it: ‘‘ This does profit, has to do 
with fundamentals of religion, and tends to aversion, 
absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, 
supreme wisdom and nirvana.’’* 


The useful question 
about misery. 


1 Joid., p. 44. 2 Majjhima-nikéya-sutte, 68 (Warren, p. 120). 
3 Vide Dialogues I, p. 187. 4 Majjhima-nikaya-autta, 68 (Warren, p. 122). 


* 
186 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The answers to the four questions noted above 
constitute, as we know, the essence of Buddha’s en- 
lightenment which he is eager to share with all fellow- 
beings. These have come to be known as the four 
noble truths (catvari arya-satyani), They are: (1) 

: Life in the world is full of suffer- 

Peto erie ing. (@) There’ is a cause < of this 

suffering. (3) It is possible to stop 

suffering. (4) There is a path which leads to the 

cessation of suffering (duhkha, duhkha-samudiya, 

dubkha-nirodha, dubkha-nirodha-marga). All the teach- 
ings of Gautama centre round these four. 


/- HH. The First Noble Truth about Suffering 
T 


he sights_of suffering .. which upset the mind of 
young Siddhartha were of disease, 
ite isfull of auffer- oid age and death. But to the 
‘ enlightened mind of Buddha not 
simply these, but the very essential conditions of life, 
4 human and sub-human, appeared, 
ven apperent plea : ¥ 
sures are fraught with without exception, to be fraught 
pa. with misery. Birth, old age. disease, 
death, sorrow, grief, wish, despair, in short, all that is 
born of attachment, is misery." We have mentioned in 
the General Introduction that pessimism of this type is 
common to all the Indian schools ; and in emphasizing 
the first noble truth Buddha has the support of all 
important Indian thinkers. The Carvaka materialists 
would, of course, take exception to Buddha’s wholesale 
condemnation of life in the world, and point out 
the different sources of pleasure that exist in life! along 


1} Digha-nikdya-sutta, 22 (Warren, p. 868) , 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 137 


with those of, ain. But Buddha and many other 
Indian thinkers would reply that worldly pleasures 
appear as such only to short-sighted people. Their 
transitoriness, the pains felt on their Joss and the 
esting eagles fears felt lest they should be lost, 
worldly pleasures are and other evil consequences, make 
ponroen Of ene: > pleasures lose their charm ‘and turn 
them into positive sources of fear and anxiety. 


- 


3. The Second Noble Truth about the Cause of 
Suffering: the Chain of Twelve Links 
Though the fact of suffering is recognized 
Sufferlng, like every malady is not  always__unani-_ 
other thing, depends mous. The origin of life's evil ig 
cngremne eondilien: explained by Buddha in the light 
of his special conception of” natural , causation . (known 
as Pratityasamutpada). According to it, nothing _is_ 
unconditional ; the existence of ‘of everything” ‘depends on 
some conditions. _ As the existence of _every event 
depends on some conditions, there must be something 
The Ago causes hich being there our misery ¢ comes 
ete a teas into existence. Liie’s suffering (old 
world. age, death, despair, gtief and the 
like, briefly denoted by the phrase jaré-marana) is 
there, says Buddha, because there is birth (jati). If 
a man were not born, he would not have been 
subject to these miserable states. Birth again has its 
condition. It is the will to become (bhava),’ the force 
1 Mrs. Rhys Davids’ rendering of this word as ‘ the disposition for 
becoming’ (Buddhism, p. 91) is better than its ordinary rendering as ‘exis- 


tence,’ which is nearly meaningless in this context. ‘Bhiava' is used in 
the meaning of ‘ disposition,’ in the Sankbya and other Indian systema. 


18--1605B 


188 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


of the blind tendency or predisposition fo,be born, which 
causes our birth. But what is the cause of this ten- 
dency ? Our mental clinging to or grasping (upadana) 
the objects of the world is the condition responsible for 
our desire to be born. This clinging again is due to 
our thirst (trsna) or craving to enjoy objects—sights, 
sounds, éic. But wherefrom does this desire origi- 
nate ? We would not have any desire for objects, had 
we not tasted or experienced them before. Previous 
sense-experience, tinged with some pleasant feelings 
(vedana), is, therefore, the cause of our thirst or crav-_ 
ing. But sense-experience could not arise but for 
‘Contact (sparsa), te. contact of sensc-organs with 
objects. This contact again would not arise had there 
not been the siz organs of cognition, the five senses 
and manas (sadayatana). These six again depend 
for their existence on the body-mind organism (nama- 
rupa), which constitutes the perceptible being of man. 
But this organism could not develop in the mother’s 
womb and come into existence, if it. were dead or 
devoid of consciousness (vijfiana). But the conscious- 
ness that descends into the embryo in the mother's 
womb is only the effect of the impressions (saraskara) 
of our past existence. The last state of the past life, 
which initiates our present existence, contains in a 
concentrated manner the impressions or effects of all our 
past deeds. The impressions which make for rebirth 
are due to ignorance (avidyé) about truth. If the tran- 
sitory, painful nature of the worldly existence were 
perfectly realized, there would not arise in us any karma 
resulting in rebirth. Ignorance. therefore, is the root 
cause of impressions or tendencies that cause rebirth, 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 139 


Briefly speaking, then (1) suffering in life is due 
to Q) biggh, which is due to (3) 
the chai of caffering the will to be born, which is due to 
(4) our mental clinging to objects. 
Clinging again is due to (5) thirst or desire for objects. 
This again is due tp (6) sensc-cuperience whieb is is due 
to (7) sensc-object-contact, which again is due to (8) 
the six organs of cogaition; these organs are dependent 
on (9) the embryonic organism (composed of mind and 
body), which again could not develop without (10) some 
initial consciousness, which again hails from (11) the 
impressions of the experience of past’ life, which lastly 
are due to (12) ignorance of truth. 
Thus we have the twelve links in the chain of 
causation. The order and number 
‘hese constitute the of the links are not always the 
whec]l of existence : : 
birth end re-birth. same in al] the sermons ; but the 
above has come to be regarded as 
the full and standard account of the matter. It has 
been popularized among Buddhists by various epithets’ 
such as the twelve sources (dvadasa nidina), the wheel 
of existence ¢gbbiva-cakra). Some devout Buddhists 
remind thengselves, even to-day, of this teaching of 
Buddha by turfning wheels which are made to symbolize 
the wheel of causation. Like the telling of beads, this 
forms a part of their daily prayers. 





The twelve links are sometimes interpreted to cover 
the past. the present and the future 

The present life is life. which are causally connected, so 
eo — of oe re that present life can be conveni- 
future Ss ently explained with reference to its 
past condition and its future effect. 

The twelve links are, therefore, arranged with reference to 


140 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


‘the three periods in the following way proceeding from 
cause to effect : 


(1) Ignorance (avidyii) . 
(2) Impressions (aushekia) t Past Life. 
(8) The initial consciousness of the 

embryo (vijfidna) 
(4) «Body and mfad, the embryonic 
organism (nima-ripa)) 
(5) Six organs of knowledge (sad-: 
dyatana) Present Life. 
(6) Sense-contact (sparéa) 
(7) Sense-experience (vedani) 
(8) Thirst (treni) 
(9) Clinging (upidana) 

10) peneeney te be born (bhava) 

11) Rebirth (jiti) \ er 

(12) Old age, death, etc. (jari- marane) Future Lite, 


Before we close this topic, we may note one very impor- 
e.. _ tant contribution made by Indian 
eee carta thinkers in general and Buddha in 
‘ particular; namely, the conception 
that the external phenomenon of life or the living organisin 
is due to an internal impetuscf desire, conscious or uncon 
scious. The evolution of life is sought 
Life isnot the prow 40 be explained méchanically by 
duct of @ mechanical modern biologists—both Darwinians 
combination of mate- and anti-Darwinians—with the help of 
rial conditions. material conditions, inherited and 
environmental. The first appearance 
of a horn on the cow’s head, or the formation of an eye, 
is to them nothing more than an accidentel variation, 
slow or sudden. The famous contemporary French 
. : philosopher, Bergson, shows that 
It ie the expression of the development of life cannot be 
inner forces as Berg- . ° : 
son now holds. satisfactorily explained as merely . 
accidenlal, but that it must be 
thought 1o de the outward expression of an internal! urge or 
life-impetus (élan vital), Buddha’s basic principle of the - 
explanation of life, namely that bhava (internal predisposi- 
tion, the tendency to be) leads to birth (existence of the 
body). or that consciousness is the condition of the develop- 
ment of the embryo, anticipates the Bergsonian contention 
that the living body is not caused simply by collection of 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 141 


pieces of matter, but is the outward manifestation or 
explosion of an internal urge. Incidentally we may note 
also that Bergson’s philosophy of reality as change resembles 
the Buddhistic doctrine of universal impermanence. 


4. The Third Nobie Truth about the Cessation 
of Sufferjng 


The third noble truth that there is cessation of 
suffering, follows from the second 
truth that misery depends on some 
conditions. If these conditions are 
removed, misery would cease. But we should try to 
understand clearly the exact nature of the state called 


Suffering must ccase 
if its canse is stopped. 


cessation of misery » 

First of all it should be noted that ibe ion from 
; misery is a state attainable héte in 
eae tee this very life, if certain conditions 
ecg ae in this are fulfilled. When the perfect 
control of passions and constant 
contemplation of truth jead a person through the four 
Stages “of concentration to perfect wisdom (as will be 
described hereafter), he is no longer under the sway 
of worldly attachment. He has broken the [etters 
that bound him to the world. He is, therefore, free, 
liberated. He is said then to have become an Arhat— 
a venerable persou. The state is more popularly known 
now as nirvina—the extinction of passions and, there- 

fore, also of mirery. 
We should remember. next that the attainment of 
this state is not necessarily a state 
ene is Dot in- of inactivity, as it is ordinarily 
misunderstood to be. It is true 
that for the attainment of perfect, clear and steady 


142 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


knowledge of the fourfold trath one bas to withdraw all 
his attention from outside and even from other ideas 
within, and concentrate it wholly on repeated reasoning 
and contemplation of ithe truths in all their aspects. 
But once wisdom bas been permanently obtained, 
through concentrated tlfoucht, the liberated person 
should neither always remain rapt in meditation nor 
wholly withdraw from active life. We kaow what an 


active life of travelling, preaching, 


Buddha's life . : ; : 
full of activity, even {0UNding brotherhood, Buddha him- 


after his enlighten- self Jed during the long forty-five 

years that he lived after enlighten- 
ment, and even to the last days of his eightieth year 
when he passed away! Liberation then was not 
incompatible with activity in the life of the founder 
himself. 


As he clearly Pointed out once, there are two kinds 

of action, onc that is done under the 

Work without attach- influence of  attachmvnt, hatred, 

| fey Rag i” infatuation (riya, dvega, moha), 
canse bondage. another that is done without these. 
It is only the first that strengthens 

our desire to cling lo the world and generates the seeds of 
karma causing rebirth. The second kind of action, done 
with perfect insight into the real nature of the universe and 
without attachment, does not create a karma producing 
rebirth. The difference between the two kinds of karma, 
Buddha points out, is like that between the sewing of 
ordinary productive seeds and the sowing of seeds which 
have been fried and made barren.’ This Jesson he teaches 
also in the story of his enlightenment.’ After he had 
attained nirvina, he was at first reluctant to work. 
But soon his enlightened heart began to beat with 


} Anaqutiara-nikdya (Warren, pp. 216 f.). 
2 Mojjhima-nikaya, 26 (ibid., pp. $89 f.). 


THE RAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 1438 


sympathy for the countless beings who were still writhing 
in pain. He thought it proper, there- 
Buddha set the ex- forc, that the raft which he construct- 
apie eck Pics ed with toil and with which he got 
fig across the flood of musery, should be 
lefé for othere and not allowed to 
perish.’ Nirvana, he thus shows by his own example end 
precept, does not require the Arhat to shun activity; on the 
contrary, love and sympathy fot all beings ivcrease with 
enlightenment atid persuade the perfect man to share his 
wisdom with them and work for their moral we 


2 ate it is wrong to thiol, as it is 
ea ert tacan nor very often done, that nirvina means 
cxitence, total extinction of existence. The 

etymological meaning of ‘nirvina’ is 

blown out.’ ‘The metaphor of a ‘ blown cut light ’ is there > 
aad the liberated onc is sometimes compared to it. Depend- 
ing on such etymological meaning and the negative descrip - 
tion of nirvana as the absence of all physical and mental 
states known 4o us, some interpreters of Buddhism—. 
Huddhists and non-Buddhists—have explained nirvina as 
complete cessation of existence. But agninst this view 
we have to remember, first, that if nirvina or liberation be 
extinction of all existence, then Buddha cannot be said 
to have heen liberated till he died; his attainment of 
eee perfect wisdom and freedom, for 

aes ier alee Po avingh we have his orn words, turns 
m1 : then into a myth. It is difficult 
eee to hold, therefore, that nirvana as 
taught by Buddha means cessation of all existence.” 
Secondly, we are to remember that, though nirvine, 
according to Buddha, siops rebirth and, therefore, means 
the extinction of all misery and of the conditions that cause 
future existence in this world after death, it does not 
mean necessarily that after death the liberated saint 


1 Majjhima-nikéya (vide Silécara's trans., p. 170, German Pali 
Society). 

2 Rhys Davids shows that the Pali word for ‘ liberated,” ‘ Parinib- 
huto’ is used of living persons and scarcely of dead Arhants. (Vide 
Dialogues, IT, p. 182, f.n.). 


144 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


does not continue 


Buddha's __ silence 
about the condition of 
the liberated after 
death does not mean 
his denial of the ex- 
istence of such a 
person after death. 


in any form. This last point, as we 
mentioned previously, is one of the 
ten points on which Buddha repeated- 
ly refuses to express any opinion. 
So that even the view that, after 
déath, the person who attains nirvina 
ceases to exist altogether is one 
which Buddha cannot be said to have 


held. Budéha's silence ‘might just mean that the state 
of liberation cannot be described in terms of ordinary 


experience.’ 
The important 
If Buddha is not 


person after death, 


The double gain of 
nirvana: stopping of 
rebirth and future 
misery, and  attain- 
inent of perfect peace 
in this life. 


lives after enlighten 


question that arises here then is: 
explicit about the fate of a liberated 
what according to him 1s gained by 
nirvina? ‘The gain is double, negative 
and positive. Nirvina is e guarantee 
that rebirth, whose conditions have 
been destroyed, will not occur. 
Nirviina also positively means that 
one who has attained it enjoys perfect 
peace even in this life so long as he 
ment. This peace is not, of course, like 


any of the pleasures born of the fulfilment of desires. Jt is, 
therefore, said to be beyond worldly pleasures and pains. 
But itis 4 state of serenity, equanimity and passionless 
self-possession. It cannot be described in terms of ordinary 
experiences; the best way of understanding, it in the light 
of our imperfect experience is to think of if as a relief 
from all painful experience from which we suffer, We 
can understand this because all of us have cxperience at 
least of temporary feelings of relief from some pain or 
other, such as freedom from disease, 
debt, slavery, imprisonment.” Be- 
sides, the advantages of nirvina can 
be enjoyed in part, even before it has 
been obtained, by the partial fulfil- 

ment of its conditions. As Buddha 
explains to King Ajatagatru in a discourse on the advan- 
tages of the life of a recluse, every bit of ignorance removed, 
and passion conquered, brings about palpable benefit, such 


Even the partiai fal- 
filment of the condi- 
tions of nirvana 
causes palpable bene. 
fits. 


1 Vide Prof. Radhakrishnan's article,‘ The teaching of Buddha by 
speech and silence,’ Hibbert Journal, April, 1934. 
1 Vide Sémafitta-phala-suita (Dialogues, I, p. 84). 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 145 


> 
as purity, good-will, self-possession, courage, unperplexed 
mind, unruffled temper.’ This heartens him and gives him 
the strength to pursue the difficult goal of nirvana till it is 
fully obtained. 


We know that a later Buddhist teacher of great 
eminence, Nigasena, while instructing the Greek King 
Menander (Milinda) who aecepted his discipleship, tried to 

convey to him the idea of the blissful 
The real natore of + character of nirviine with a series of 


nies a culy Pr metaphors; Nirvana is profound like 
cribed in terms of 280 Ocean, lofty like a mountain peak, 


ordinary experience. swect like honey ; etc.” But all these, 

as Nigasena points out, can scarcely 
convey to the imperfect man the idea of what that thing 
is. Reasoning and metaphor are of little avail for convine- 
ing a blind man what colour is like. 


ef 


5. The Fourth Noble Truth about the Path to 
Liberation . 


The fourth noble truth, as seen already, lays dogvn 
that there is a path (marga)—which 
Buddha followed and others can 
similarly follow—to reach a state 
free from misery. Clues regarding this path are 
derived from the knowledge of the chief conditions that 
cause misery. The path recommended by Buddha 
consists of eight steps or rules and is, therefore, called 
the eightfold noble path.” This gives ina nutshell 
the essentials of Bauddha Ethics. This path is open to 
all, monks as well as laymen.‘ The noble path consists 
in the acquisition of the following eight good things: 
Right views (sammiaditthi or samyagdrsti)—As 
ignorance, with its consequences, namely, wrong 


The path consists of 
cight steps : 


1 Ibid. 2 Vide Milinda-patha. 

3 Fall discussion occurs in Digha-nikdya-sutta, 22 (Warren, pp. 
372.74), Majjhima-nikaya (quoted by Sogen, Systems, pp. 169-71). 

4 Vide Rhys Davids, Dialogues, I, pp, 62-68. 


19—1605B 


116 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


views (mithyidrsti) about the self and the world, 
: ; is the root cause of our sufferings, 
(1) Right views, ot 
knowledge of the four it is natural that the first step 
pevincmnes: to moral reformation should be the 
acquisition of right views or the knowledge of truth. 
Right view is defined as the correct knowledge about the 
four nobfe truths. [t'is the knowletlge of these truths 
alone, and not any theoretical speculation regarding 
nature and self, which, according to Buddha, helps moral 
reformation, and leads us towards the goal—nirvana. 


Right resolve (sammisahkappa or samyakeankalpa). 

—A mere knowledge of the truths would be useless 

unless one resolves to reform life in 

aun) Right restive. of their light. The moral aspirant is 

aaah inthe light asked, therefore, to renounce worldli- 

rr ce ness (all attachment to the world), 

to give up ill-feeling towards others and desist from 

doing any harm to them. ‘These three constitute the 
contents of right determination. 

Right speech (summiavici or ‘Samyagvak).— 
Right determination should not remain a mere 
‘ pious wish ’ but must issue forth 
into action. Right determination 
should be able to guide and control 

our speech, to begin with. The result would be right 
. speech consisting in abstention from lying, slander, 
unkind words and frivolous talk. 


(3) Right speech, or 
control of speech. 


Right conduct (sammakammanta or samyak- 

(4) Right conduct karmanta).—Right determinstion 
or abstention from should end in right action or good 
vi Sail conduct and not stop merely with 
good speech. Right conduct consists, therefore, in 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 147 


desisting from destroying life, from stealing and from 
improper gratification of the senses. 
Right livelihood (sammia-ajiva or samyagajiva).— 
(8) fght. Hivetibooa Renouncing bad speech and bad 
or maintaining life by actions, one should earn his livelihood 
Hane: HEAD, ,by honest mtans. The ssecessity 
of this rule lies in showing that even for the sake of 
maintaining one’s life, one should not take to forbidden 
means but work in consistency with good determination. 
Right effort (sammavayima or samyagvyaéyama).— 
he While a person trios to live a re- 
ae nae to formed life, through right views, 
oe ey aaa : pre resolution, speech, action and 
thoughts and enter- Jivelihood, he is constantly knocked 
taining good ones. ; ‘ a 
off the right path by old evil idegs 
which were deep-rooted in the mind as also fresh ones 
which constantly arise. One cannot progress steadily 
unless he maintains a constant effort to root out old evil 
thoughts, and prevent evil thoughts from arising anew. 
Moreover, as the mind cannot be kept empty, he should 
constantly endeavour also to fill the mind with good 
ideas, and retain such ideas in the mind. This fourfold 
constant endeavour, negative and positive, is called 
right effort. This rule points out that even one high 
up on the path cannot afford to take a moral holiday 
without running the risk of slipping down. 
Right mindfulness (sammasati or samyakemrti).— 
(7 Right minatul- The necessity of constant vigilance 
bess or constant is further stressed in this rule, which 
ciabatta ee lays down that the aspirant should 
sbisae- constantly bear in mind the things 


he has already learnt. He should constantly remember 


148 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


and contemplate the body as body, © sensations as 
sensations, mind as mind, mental states as mental 
states. About any of these he should not think, ‘‘This 
am I,” or ‘‘ This is mine.’’* This advice sounds no 
better than asking one to think of a spade as a spade. 
Rpiee Bu‘ ludicrously superfluous as it 
esoraies at might appear to be, it ix not easy to 
to things; end grief remember always what things really 
are, It is all the more difficult to 
practise it when false ideas about the boby, etc., have 
become so deep-rooted in us and our behaviours based 
on these false notions have become instinctive. If we 
are not mindful, we behave as though the body, the 
mind, sensations and menta] states are permanent and 
valuable. Hence there arise attachment to such things 
and grief over their loss, and we become subject to 
bondage and misery. ut contemplation on the frail, 
perishable, loathsome nature of these, helps us to 
remain free from atiachment and grief. This is the 
necessity of constant mindfulness about truth. 


In Digha-nika@yu, sutta 22, Buddhu gives very detailed 

: instructions as to how such contempla- 

The practice of such tion is to be practised. For example, 
ae baltic ee regarding the body, one should remem- 
pute details in Digha- ber and contemplate that the body 
nikaya. is only a combination of the four 
elements fearth, water, fire, air), that 

it is filled with all sorts of loathsome matter, flesh, bonc, 
skin, entrails, dirt, bile, phlegm, blood, pus, ete Going to 
a cemetery one should observe further how the dead body 
rots, decays, is eaten by dogs and vultures and afterwards 
gradually becomes reduced to and mixed up with the 


Vide Majjhima-nikaya, 1, p. 171 (EB. T. by Silaécéra). 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY ~ 149 


elements. Bf such intense contemplation he is able to 
remember what the body really is: how loathsome, how 
perishable, bow transitory! ‘Fe gives up all false emotions 
and affection for the body, his own and others,’ By 
similar intense contemplation about sensation, mind 
and harmful mental states he becomes free from attach- 
ment and grief regarding all these. The net result of this 
fourfold intense contemplation.,is detachinent from all 
objects that bind man to the world.’ 


Right concentration (sammisamadhi or samyak- 
<i) Rigi enn sumidhi).—One who has success 
tio, through four fully guided his life in the light 
stages, is the last step 
in the path that leads Of the last seven rules and thereby 
tothe goal—nirvéns. freed himself’ from all passions 
and evil thought, ix fit to enter step by step into 
the four deeper and deeper stages of concentration 
that gradually take him to the goal of his jong 
and arduous journey—cessation of suffering. He 
concentrates his pure and unruffled mind on reasoning 
(vilarka) and investigation (viciira) regarding the 
truths, and enjoys in this state, joy 
(a) The first atage of 
concentration isonrea- and ease born of detachment and 
soning and investiga- "his ore 
tion regarding the UTE thought. This is the first 
truths. There is then stuge of intent meditation (dhyina 
a joy of pure thinking. ee 
or jhana). 
When this concentration is successful, belief in the 
fourfold truth arises dispelling all 
b) TL d st . 
ements is wy doubts and, therefore, making 
ruffled meditation, free : i igati 2 
fron: reasoning,” cte. reasoning abd invessigaion un 
There is then a joyof necessary. rom this results the 
franquillity. : . ‘ 
second stage of concentration, in 


which there are joy, peace and internal tranquillity 


1 Vide Warren, Buddhism in Trans., p, 354. 


150 


born of intense, unruffled contemplation. 


AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


There is in 


this stage a consciousness of this joy aud peace too. 
In the next stage attempt is inade by him to initiate 


{c)} The third stage 
of concentration is de- 
tachment from even 
the joy of trabquillity. 
There is then indiffer- 
ence even to such iov. 
but e feeling of bodily 
ease still persiats. 


with an experience of bodily ease. 


an attitude of indifference, to be 
able to detach himeelf even from 
the foy of concentration. From this 
results the third deeper kind of 
concentration, in which one experi- 
ences perfect equanimity, coupled 
He is yet cons- 


cious of this ease and equanimity, though indifferent 
to the joy of concentfation. 
Lastly, he tries {o put away even this consciousness 


(d) The fourth stage 
of conevntration is de- 
tachment from _ this 
mtg case too. There 
are then perfect cqua- 
nimity ande indiffer- 
ence. This ia the state 
of uirviéne or perfect 
wisdom. 


of ease and equanimity and all the 
sense of joy and elation he previous- 
ly bad. He attains thereby the 
fourth state of cencentration, a 
state of perfect equanimity, in- 
difference and __ self;possessiun— 
without pain, without ease. Thus 


he attains the desired goal of ceseation of all suffering, 


he attains to arbaiship or nirvana.’ 
(prajfia) and perfect 


perfect wisdom 
(éila). 


There are then 
righteousness 


To sum up the essential points of the eightfold 


Kvowledge, conduct 
and concentration 
fortn the essentials of 
the path. 


path (or, what is the same, Buddha's 
ethical teachings}, it may be noted 
first that the path consists of 
three main things—knowledge, con- 


duct und concentration, harmoniously cultivated. In 


1 Vide Potthepada-sutta, for the detailed treatment of the Jhanae 


(Dialogues, 1, pp. 248 f.). 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 151 


e 

Indian philosephy knowledge and morality are thought 
inseparable—not simply because morality, or doing of 
good, depends on the knowledge of what is good, about 
Perfect knowledge is which all philosophers would agree, 
impossible without but also hecause perfection of 
ne knowledge ig regarded as impossible 
without morality, the voluntary control of passions 
and prejudices. Buddha explicitly states in one of his 
Tee ese tee discourses tbat virtue and wisdom 
purify each other,” purify each other and the two 
eee: are inseparable.’ In the eightfold 
path one starts with ‘ right views a mere intellectual 
apprehension of the fourfold truth. The mind is not 
yet purged of the previous wrong 

Se aaa: pos ideas and the passions or wrong 
feng neee aaa emotions arising therefrom: more- 
part of the eightfold over,old babits of thinking, speaking 
oe and acting also continue still. In 
a word, conflicting forces—the new good ones and the 
old bad ones—create. in terms of modern psychology, 
a divided personality. The seven steps beginning 
with right resolve furnish a continuous discipline for 
resolving this conflict by reform of the old personality. 
_ Repeated contemplation of what is true and good, 
training of the will aud emotion accordingly, through 
steadfast determination and puassionless behavionr, 
sradually achieve the harmonious personality in which 
thought and will and emotion are all thoroughly 
cultured and purified in the light of truth. The last 
step of perfect concentration is thus made possible by 


Sonadanda-sutta \ibid., p. 166). 


152 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


€ 

the removal of all obstacles. The result of this 

: unbampered concentration on truth 
Concentration. ae ha < 
ia possible only after is perfect insight or wisdom, to 
men rele: which the riddle of existence stands 
clearly revealed once for al]. Ignorance and desire 
are cut at their roots and the source of misery vanishes. 
Perfect wisdom, perfect goodness and perfect equani- 
mity—complete relief from suffering—are simultaneous~ 
ly attained, therefore, in nirvana. ‘“‘ Goodness is a 
function of intelligence,’’ said Matthew Bassendine,’ 
‘* as beauty is of health.’’ In Buddha’s view, good- 
ness, wisdom and. tranquillity are the joint and 
inseparable functions of the complex fact of nirvana. 


6. The Philosophical Implications of Buddha’s 
« : Ethical Teachings 


We may discuss here briefly some of the more 
important ideas about man and the world underlying 
Buddha’s ethical teachings. Some of these are 
explicitly stated by Buddba himself. We’ shall mention 
four of these views, on which his ethics mainly depends, 
namely, (1) the theory of dependent origination, (2) 
the theory of karma, (3) the theory of change, and (4) 
the theory of the non-existence of the soui. 


(i) The Theory of Dependent Origination o. or 
~ Conditional 3 Existence of ‘Things ~ aes 


There is a spomtaneous and universal law of causa- 
tion which conditions th r- 

Everything de- : e eEPee 
pends cp some condi ancé of all events, mental and 
Ta physical. This law (dharma or 


1 Vide Rhys Davids, Dialogues. T, p. 187. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 158 


dhamma) woftks automatically without the help of any 
conscious guide. In accordance with it, whenever a 
particular event (the cause) appears, it is followed by 
another particular event (the effect). ‘‘On getting the 
cause, the effect arises.’ Theexistence of everything is 
conditional, dependent on a cause. Nothing happens 
fortuitously or * ‘by ‘chance. This ie’ called the 
theory of dependent origination (Pratityasarnutpida in 
Sanskrit and Paticcasamuppada in Pali).'| This view, 
as Buddha himself makes clear, avoids two extreme 
views: on the one hand, eternalism or the theory that 
some reality evrnally exists inde- 
ome bing exists with’ pendently of any condition and, on 
perish without leaving the other hand, nihilism of the 
some effect. 
theory that something existing fan 
be annihilated or can cease to be. Buddha claims, 
therefore, tc hold the middle view,’ 
doe Cecldine ymiddle namely, that. everything that we 
extremes of eternalism perceive possesses an existence but 
and nihilism. 

: is dependent on something else, 
and that thing in turn does not perish without leaving 
some effect. 

Buddha attaches so much importance to the 

understanding of this theory that he 

tes ta indeeoeanie calls this the Dhamma. ‘‘Let us 

for understanding his put aside questions of the Beginning 
gr. 

and the Eind,’’ he says, “T will 

teach you the Dhamma: That being.thus, this comes to 


1! Visuddhimagga, Chep. xvii (Warren, pp. 168 f.). Etymclogi- 
caliy, pratitya=getting (something), samutpdda=origination {of sone- 
thing else). 

2 Sathyutta-nikdya, xxii (ibid., p. 165), 


20—1605B 


‘154 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
° t 


be. From the coming to be of that, this ‘arises. That 
being absent, this does not happen. From the cessa- 
tion of that, this ceases.”” ‘‘He who sees the paticca- 
samuppada sees the Dhamma, and he who sees the 
Dhamma, sees the paticcasamuppada.’’ It is again 
compared, to a staircasa, by mounting which one can 
look round on the world and see it with the eye of & 

Buddha.’ It is the failure to grasp 
thinrinipicct dus, this standpoint which, Buddha 
fone of all agseris, is the cause of all our 

trouble.? Later Buddhism, as Rhys 
Davids notes, does fot pay much heed to this theory. 
But Buddha himself says that this theory is very 
profound.” We have seen already liow this theory 
is applied to the solution of the question regarding the 
origin of misery, as well as to that regarding the 
removal of misery. We shall see just now how 
profound in its many-sided implications this theory-is 
in some other respects as well. 


(i) The Theory of Karma 


*The belief in the theory of karma, it will be seen, 
riseu anne is only an aspect at this doctrine. 
an aspect of this The present existence of an 
Principle of cansaticn. individual is, according to - this 
doctrine, as according to that of karma, the effect of its 
past ; and its future would be the effect of its present 


1 Dialogues, II, p. 44, 
3 Mahdanidana-sutta (Warren, p. 208), 
3 Ibid. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 165 


existence. This has been seen very clearly already in 
connection with the explanation of the origin of suffer- 
ing in the light of the theory of dependent origination. 
The law of karma ie only a special form of the more 
general law of causation as conceived by Buddha. 


(#1) The I)octrine of Universal Change’and 
Impermanence 


The doctrine of dependent origination also yields 
the Buddhist theory of the transi- 
arineaterere xi8t® tory nature of things. All things, 
dition and is.thereforey Buddha repeatedly teaches, are 
impermenent. ie, . 
subject to change and decay. As 
everything originates from some condition, it disappears 
when the condition ceases to be. Whatever bas a 
beginning has also an end. Buddha, therefore, says, 
‘¢ Know that whatever exists arises from causes and 
conditions and is in every rerpect impermanent.’’* 
‘That which seems everlasting will perish, that 
which is high will be laid low ; where meeting is, 
parting will be ; where birth is, death will come.’”” 


Transitoriness of life and worldly things is sfoken of by 
many other poets and philosophers, 

Subsequent Bauddho §=uddba logically perfects this view 
ia useing tefl into ihe doctrine of impermanence, 
perinmpities uke thet His later followers develop this further 
of momentariness. into a theory of momentariness, which 
“means notonly that cverything has 

conditional and, therefore, non-permanent existence, but 
also that things last not even for short periods of time, 
but exist for one pariless moment only. This doctrine 


1 Mahapariniroaya-sitra (quoted in Sogen'’s Systems, p 9). 
3 Dkammapeda (ibid.), 


166 An inTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


4 

of- momentariness of sll things is supponted by later 
writers with elaborate arguments, one of which may 
be briefly noticed here: The criterion of the existenee 
(satté) of a thing is its capacity to 
The view is deducea Produce some effect (artha-kriyé- 
from the criterion of karitva-laksanamsat), A non-existent 
existence as cauéel thing, like o hare’s born, cannot, 
efficiency. produce any effect. Now, from this 
‘ critefion of existence, it may be 
deduced that a thing having existence must be momen- 
tary. If, for example, a thing like a seed be not accepted 
to be momentary, but thought to be lasting for more 
than one moment, then we have to show that it is 
capable of producing an effect during each moment it 
exists. Again, if it really remains thc same unchanging 
thing during these moments, then it should be able to 
produce the same effect at every one of those moments. 
But we find that this is not the case, The seed mn the 
house does not produce the seedling which is generated 
by a seed sown in the field. ‘I'he seed in the house cannot 
then be the same as thal in the field. Lut it may be 
suid that though the seed does not actually produce the 
same effect always, it always has the potentiality to 
produce it, and this potentiality becomes kinetic in the 
presence of suitable auxiliary conditions like earth, water, 
ete. Therefore, the seed is always the same. But this 
defence is weak; because then it is virtually confessed 
that the seed of the first moment is not the cause of the 
scedling, but that the seed modified by the other conditions 
really causes the effect. Hence the 
Nothing exists for seed must be admitted to have 
more than gre mo- changed. In this way it may be shown 
ments regarding everything that it does not 
stay unchanged during any two 
moments, because it does not produce the identical effect 
during both moments. Hence everything Jasts only for 5 

moment, ) 


iv) The Theory of the Non-existence of the Soul 


rs 


The Jaw of change is universal; neither man, nor 
apy other being, animate or inanimate, is exempt from 


{HE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 187 


it. It is commonly believed that in man, there is an 
_., abiding substance called the soul 

Thecommon beliefis .. _ ; ‘ 

that there is a per- (Atma), which persists through 

manent substance in changes that overcome the body; 


nan, namely, the soul. 
But this belief is un- exists before birth and after death, 


tenable, because of the . 
law of universalchange and migrates from one body to 
ad aaa ‘another. Consistently with his 
theories of conditional existence and universal change, 
Buddha denies the existence of such sov!. But how, it 
may he asked, does he then explain the continuity of a 
pereon through different births, or even through the 
different states of childhood, youth and old age? Though 
denying the continuity of an identical substance in man, 
Buddha doés not deny the continuity of the stream 
of successive states that compose his life. Life is an 
unbroken series of states ; each of these states depends 
on the condition just “preceding a: and d_gives rise to the 
Life is an unbroken one just succeeding it. (the. conti- 
ee h bp caeids nuity of the life-serjes is, therefore, 
sally connected. +  hased ona causal connection run- 
ning through the different states. This continuity is 
often explained with the example of a Jamp burning 
throughout the night. The flame of each moment is 
depeudent on its own conditions and different from 
that of another moment which is dependent on other 
conditions. Yet there is an unbroken succession of 
the different flames. Again, as from one flame 
ile digeaunacteade another may be lighted, and though 
backward and forward the two are different, they are 
and makes the past, nen 
present and future Connected causally, similarly, the 
pres eon tone: end-state of this life may cause the 
beginning of the next. Rebirth is, therefore, not 


15S AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


transmigration, i.e. the migration of «the same soul 
into another body ; it is the causation of the next life 
by the present.’ The conception of a soul is thus 
a de, replaced here by that of an un- 
placed by 2 continu- broken stream of consciousness a8 
ons stream of states. = i) the philosophy of William 
James. As the present state of comsciousness inherits 
its characters from the previous one, the paat ina 
way continues in the present, through its effect. 
Memory thus becomes explicable even without a 
soul. This theory of the non-existence of soul (Anatid- 
vdda) plays a very important part in understand. 
ing the teachings of Buddha. He, therefore, 
repeatedly exhorts his disciples to give up the false 
view about the seif. Buddha points out that people 
-“——-—__—— who suffer from the illusion of 
mebe illusion of 8 Per- the self, do not know its nature 
oo and mi- clearly; still they strongly protest 
that they love the soul ; they want 
to make the soul happy by obtaining salvation. This, 
he wittily remarks, is like falllng in Jove with the most 
beautiful maiden in the land though she has never been 
seen nor known.’ Or, itis like building a stair-case 
for Mounting a palace which has never been seen.” 
Man is only a conventional name for a collection 
Man js‘an unstable 0! ‘iflerent constituents,‘ the mate- 
collectifn of body, rial body (kaya), the immaterial 


id ious- e . 
naa ene console mind (moanas.or citta), the formless 


1 Vide Warren, pp. 234 f. 

2 Potthapdda-sutta (Dialogues, 1, p. 258). 
3 Idid., p. 261. 

4 Ibid., pp. 269.61. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 159 


consciousness ‘vijfiana), just as a chariot is a collec- 
tion of wheels, axles, shafts, etc.’ The existence 
of man depends on this collection and it dissolves 
when the collection breaks up. The soul or the 
ego denotes nothing more than this collection. From 
fuss cacy hie bate @ psychological point of view, man, 
garded us 8 combina- aS perceived from without and 
tion of five kinds of ee : ; 
cbanging states—pat- Within, is analysable also into a 
cuciarehee: collection of five groups (paiica- 
skandhas) of changing elements, namely, (1) form (ripa) 
consisting of the different factors which we perceive in 
this body having form, (2) feelings (vedan4) of pleasure, 
pain and indifference, (3) perception including under- 
standing and naming (saiijiia), (4) predispositions 
or tendencies generated by the impressions of pest 
experience (sataskiras), and (5) consciousness itself 
(vijfiana).? 
In summing up his teachings, Buddha himself once 
said: ‘‘ Both in the past and even 
Py feoliney Bis now do I set forth just this: suffer- 
fering and ceasation of ing (duhkha) and cessation of 
suffering. < ; : 
suffering.’’ Rhys Davids, quoting 
this authority, observes that the theory of dependent 
origination (in its double aspect of explaining the worid 
and explaining the origin of suffering), together with the 
formula of the eightfold path, gives us ‘‘ not ‘only the 
whole of early Buddhism ina nutshell, but also just 
those points concerning which we find the most empha- 
tic affimations of Dhamma as Dhamma ascribed to 


1 Milinda-paftha, Warren, pp. 129-83. 
3 Satnyutta-nikdya, ibid , pp. 188-45. Vide siso Mra. Rhys Davids. 
Buddhist Psychology, Chap. ITI : Suzuki : Outimes, pp. 160-63. 


160 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHII OSOPHY 


Gautama.’’’ And this is the substahce of what we 
have learnt in the above account of Buddha’s teachings. 


Ill. THE ScHooLs or BauppHA PHILOSOPHY 
‘ 4 

It has been found again and again in the history of 
-human thought that every reasoned 
sr cle headed toce attempt to avoid philosophy lands 
rise toa new kind of 4 thinker into a new kind of philo- 

metaphysics. 
sopby. Inspite of Buddha's aver- 
sion to theoretichl speculation, he never wanted to 
accept, nor did he encourage his followers to accept, 
any course of action without reasoning and criticism. 
He was extremely rational and contemplative, and 
wanted to penetrate into the very roots of human exist- 
ence, and tried to supply the full justification of the 
ethical principles he followed and taught. [1 was no 
wonder, therefore, that he himself 
tind the mens or incidentally Jaid down the founds- 
apne Pe antapig tion of a philosophical system. His 
philosophy, partly expressed and 
partly implicit, may be called positivism ia so far as he 
iaught that our thoughts should be confined to this 
world and to the improvement of our existence here. 
Tt may be called phenomenalisn: in so far as he vaught 
that we were sure only of the phenomena we experi- 
enced. It is, therefore, a kind of empiricistn in method 
because experience, according to him, was the source 


of knowledge. 


Dielogues, II, p. 44. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY ~ 161 


These different aspects of his philosophy came to be 
developed by his followers along 
These are developed diffcrent lines as they were requir- 
by bis diverse [followers enh Z 
siong different lines. ed to justify Buddba’s teuchiog, 
to defend it {rom the severe criticism 
it bad to face in India and outside, and to convert 
other thinkers to’ their faith. Buddha’s reluctance 
to discuss the ten metaphysical questions concerning 
things beyond our experience and his siience about 
them came to ke interpreted by his followers in differ- 
ent lights. Some took this attitude as only the sign of 
a thoroughgoing empiricism which wust frankly admit 
the inability of the mind to decide non-empirical ques- 
tions. According to thir explana- 
jRmpiriciemand seep” tion, Buddha's attitude would be 
regarded as scepticism. Some 
other followers, mostly the Mahdyanists, interpreted 
Buddha’s view neither as a denial of reality -beyond 
objects of ordinary experience, nor as a denial of any 
means of knowfng the non-empiricical reality, but only 
ae signifying the indescribability of that transcendental 
experience and reality. The justification of tbis last 
interpretation can be obtained from some facts of 
Buddba’s life and teachings. Ordinary empiricists 
believe that our sense-experience is the only basis of all 
our knowledge ; they do dot admit the possibility of 
any non-sensuous experience. Buddha, however, taught 
the possibility of man’s attaining in nirvana an experi- 
ence or consciousness Which was 
Pcl (esr tran- not generated by the activity of 
the senses. The supreme value 
and importance that he attached to this non-empirical 
M1—1605B 


162 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


consciousness, justify his followers in supposing that he 
regarded this as the supreme reality, as well. The 
fact that very often Buddha used to say ' that he had 
a profound experience of things ‘ far beyond,’ which 
_ 48 ‘ comprehended only by the wise ’ and ‘ not grasped 
e by mere logic,’ may be taken to mean that his non- 
empirical experience ‘can neither he logically proved 
with arguments nor be expressed in empirical ideas and 
language. These grounds lead some followers, as we 
shal] see, to raise a philosophy of mysticism and tran- 
scendentalism out of the very silence of Buddha. The 
nemesis of neglected metaphysics thus overtakes 
Buddhism soon after the founder’s passing away. 
Buddhism, though primarily an ethical-religious 
movement, thus came to give 
There sreabout thirty birth to about thirty schools, not 
chief schools of later , : 
Buddhiem. counting the minor ones.” And 
. some of these vet into the deep 
waters of metaphysical speculation, heedless of the 
founder’s warning. Ofthese many schogls of Buddhis- 
tic thought we shall first notice the four well-known 
systems as discussed generally by Indian writers. Ac- 
cording to this account, (1) some Bauddha philosophers 
are nihilists (Stinya-vidi or Madhyamika), (2) others 
are subjective idealists (Vijfidna- 
aoe pare vadi or Yogiicira), (3) others again 
cule AA ane are representationists or critical 
realists (Bahyanumeya-vadi or 
Sautrantika), and (4) the rest are direct realists (Bahya- 
pratyakea-vadi or Vaibhasika). The first two of the 
above four schools come under Mahayana and the 


1 Vide Brahmaja'a-sutta. 1 Vide Sogen, Systems, p. 3. 


-THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY... 168 


last two under Hinayana. {t should be noted,: hog 
ever, that under both Mahiayina and Hipayiss wf 
are many other schools.’ A 
.The fourfold classification of Bauddha hiloeoehy 
; is based upon two chief questions, 

This fourfold division 


> . . 
is based on two prob. 'OD€ metaphysical or coficerning 


lems: (1) Je there 
any reality? Three : ; 
replies ‘to this ques- Jogical or concerning the knowing 


tion. i 

of reality. To the metaphysical 
question ‘‘Is {here at all any reality, mental or non- 
mental?’’ three different replies are given: /(a) The 
Madhyamikas hold’ that there is no reality, mental 
or non-nicntal; tbat all is void (ginya). Therefore, 
they have been known as the nihbilists (sinya-vadins). 
(b) The Yogicaras hold that only the mental is real, 
the non-mental or the material world is all void of 
reality. They are, therefore, called subjective idealists 
(vijfiana-vidins). (c) Still another class of Bauddhas 
hold that botk the menta] and the non-menta] are 
real. They may, therefore, be called realists. Some- 
times they ere styled Sarvastividins (i.e. those 
who hold the reality of all things), though this term 
is used ina little different sense by some Buddhist 

writers." But when the further 
reality’ known? Two epistemological question ig asked : 
pee to this ques- ‘How is external reality known 

to exist?’ this third group of 


reality aud the other cpistemo- 


1 Jbid., Sogen mentions 21 schools of Hinayéna and eight’ of 
Mahayana, which aie said to have many other less. known schools. ' 

2 According to non-Buddhist Indian critics. This interpretation ‘is 
not supported by the Mabayanist writers as will be shown later. 

3 Vede, for example, Stcherbateky, The Central Conception of 
Buddhism, pp. 63-76 (where Sarvastivadin = Vaibhasika). 


164 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


thinkers, who believe in external reality, give two 
different answers. Some of them, called Sautrantikas, 
hold tbat externa] objects are not perceived but known 
by inference. Others, known as Vaibhasikas, hold that 
the external world is directly perceived. Thus we 
have the four schools, representing-the four important 
standpoints. This classification has much philosophical 
importance, even in the light of contemporary Western 
thought, where we find some of these different views 
advocated with great force. Let us consider these 
four schools. ; 
1. The Madhyamika School of Stinya-vdéda 


‘The founder of this school is eid to be Nagarjuna, 
pias isto: who was a Brahmin bern in South 
er of this school of India about the second century 
Stage wee: A.D. Aévaghosa, the author of 
Buddhacarita, is also regarded as a pioneer. In his 
famous work, Mddhyamikasdsira, Nagarjuna states, 
with great dialectical skill and scholdrehip, the phi- 
losophy of the Madhyamika school. 
The doctrine of Sinya-vada has been understood in 
Sinyo-vk eh cans India, by non-Buddhist philosophers 
stood as nihiliam by in general, to mean that the uni- 
aoe ee verse is totally devoid of reality, 


that everything is éimya or void. In setting forth 
thie doctrine in his Sarvadaréana-sangraha, Madhava- 


carya has mentioned the following 
A proof of nibili ; oa 
or the unteality of ell as an argument in its support. 
things : obects, know- The self (or the knower), the 
ledge and knuwer. ; eae a 
object (or_the known) and know- 
ledge are mutually interdependent, The reality of 
1 Vide Sogen, Systems, Chap. V, p. 187. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY: 165 


one depends on each of the other two, and if one be 
false, the others also must. be so (just as the father- 
hood of any person will be proved false if the existence 
of his children be proved to be false). But it must be 
admitted by all that when we perceive a snake, in 
@ rope, the object perceived? namely, the snake is 
absoiutely false. Hence the mind or the subject which 
knows such an object turns out to be false and 
all knowledge also becomes false. Thus it may be_ 
concluded that all that we perceive within or without, 
along with their perception and the percipient mind, 
are illusory like dream-objects. "There is, therefore, 
nothing, mental or non-mental, which is real. The 
universe is anya or void of reality. " 


From such arguments it would appear that, aceord-’ 

ing to the Madhyamika view, every- 

Pitibater ene thing is unreal. Hence, it is that 

menal world, and not such a view came to be known 
all realty. 

: as nihilism in Europe as well as 
in India (where it has also been termed ‘Sarva- 
vainagika-vada by some writers). The word éinya, 
used by the Madhyamikas themselves, is chiefly 
respcnsible for this notion—because sinya means 
ordinatjly void or empty. But when we study this 
philosophy more closely, we come to realize that the 
Madhyawika view is not really nihilism, as ordinarily 
supposed, and that it does not deny all reality, but 
-only the apparent phenomenal world erceived by us. 
Behind this phenomenal world there is a reality which 
is not describable by any character, mental or non- 
mental, that we perceive. Being devoid of phenomenal 
. characters, itis calied éanya. But this is only the 


166 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


negative aspect of the ultimate reality; it is only-a 
P description of what it is not. In 
jinya means the 
indescribable netureof the Larkavatdra-siitra (quoted by 
puenemnne: Madhavacdrya himself) it is stated 
that the real nature of objects cannot be ascertained 
by the intellect “and catinot, therefore, be described. 
That which is real must be independent and should not 
Wai anata “be depend on anything else for its exis- 
eaid to becitherrealor tence and origination. But every- 
unreal, or both real . f 
and unresl, or neither thing we know of is dependent on 
peal nor onreal, some condition. Hence it cannot 
be real. Again, it’ cannot be said to be unreal. 
Because an unrea! thing, tike a castle in the air, can 
‘never come into existence. To say ibat it is both real 
and ynreai or that it is neither rea} nor unreal, would 
be unintelligible jargon."! Siinyat& or voidness is the 
name for tlus  indeterminable, 
indescribable real nature of things. 
Things appear to exjst, but when 
we try to understand the real nature of their existence 
our intellect is baffled. Tt cannot be called either real 
ov unreal, or both real and unreal, or neither real nor 


Sinyata if this in- 
determinable nature. 


unreal, 


It. will be seen that in the ubove argument, the inde- 
scribable nature of things is’ deduced 

Sanyaté is only an {rom the fact of their being dependent 
aspect of the dependent on other thingsor conditions. Niagar- 
netare of things. juna suys, therefore, ‘‘The fact of 
dependent origination jis called by us 

éinyata.’’’ ‘‘ There is no dharma (character) of things 
which is not dependent on some other condition regarding 


1 Sarvadargana-sangraha, Chap. TI. 
3 Madhyem-ka-éastra. Chap. 21, Karika, 18, 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY] 


iis_ origin. 
siinya. 


167 


Therefore, there is no dharma which js not 
It would appear, therefore, that siinya only 


means the conditional character of things, and their conse- 
quent constant changeability and indeterminability or 


indescribability.? 


This view is called the middie 


This view avoids the 
two extreme views of, 
the absolute reality 
and the absolute un- 
reality of things. 
Hence it is known as 
themiddle(madhysama) 
view. 


(madhyama) path, 
because it avoids extreme views by 
denying, for,example, botl» absolute 
reality and absolute unreality of things 
and asserting their conditional exis- 
tence. This was the reason why 


Buddha, as we saw, culled the theory 


of dependent origination—the middle 
path.* And so Nagirjuna says‘ that 


ginya-vida is called the middle path Lecause it implies 
the theory of dependent origination. » 


The conditionality of things which makes their own 


Sapya-vada is a kind 
of relativity. 


nature (svabhava) una-certainable, 
either as real or unreal. etc., may be 
ulso regarded as a kind of relativity. 
Fivery character of a thing is condi- 


tioned by sometbing else and, therefore, its existence is 


relative to that, condition. 


Sinya-vads can, therefore, also 


be interpreted as a theory of relativity which declares that 
no, thing, no phenomenon experienced has ua fixed, 
absolute, independent character of its own (svabbiiva) and. 
Baer bh 


therefore, no ription of any phenomenon can be ssid fo 
Ped bean ea 


be unconditionally true. 
To this philosophy of phenomena (or things as they 


v The positive side of 
the Madhyamika dov- 
tune : there is a reality 
behind phenomenu ; it 
is unconditional and 
free from change. 


appear to us), the Madhyamikas add a 
philosophy of noumenon (or reality in 
itself). Buddha’s teachings regarding 
dependent oviginaiion, impermanence, 
etc., apply, they hold, oniy to the 
phenomen2! world, to things commoniy 
observed by us in ordinary experience. 


But when nirviina is attained and the conditions of sense- ; 
experience and the appearance of phenomena are controlled, 


what would be the nature of (he resultant experience ? 


1 [bid., Karika 19. 


To 


2 Sogen, Systems, p. 14 and pp. 194-98 ; Suzuki, Outlines. 


5 Vide ante. 


4 Kartka 18 quoted above. 


168 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


this we cannot apply the conditional characters true of 
phenomens. The Midhyamikus, therefore, ho!d that there 
is a transcendental rc al.ty (noumenon) behind the pheno- 
mena} one and it is free {rom chunge, conditionuity Ame all 


other phenomenal characters. 


Nag&rjuna speaks, 
thereture, of two 
truths, empirical or 
phennenal and tran- 
avendental or xDou- 
menal. 


As Nagarjina says: “There 
truths, on whicn Buddha's 
teaching of Dharma depends, one is 
empirical (surhvrti-sutya) and m+ ant 
for the ordicary people, another is the 
transcendental or the absoiutely true 
one (paramartha-satsa). Those who 
do not know the distinction between 


these two kinds of truth, cunnot understand the profound 
mystery of Buddha’s teachings.’’* 


The truth of the lower order is only a stepping-stone to 


The higher truth 
realzed in nirvana, 
can be, deser.bed only 
as negation of what 1s 
known in ordinary 
expenience.. 


cribes nirvina with a seres of negatives, thus: 


the attainment of the higher. The 
naturé Of birvana-expeérience which 
takes one beyond ordinary experince 
cannot be described, it can only be 
suggested negatively with the help of 
words which describe our common 
experience, Nagariuna, therefore, des- 
“That 


which is not known (ordinarily), nol acqu.red «new, not 


ing No poritive descrip- 
‘Won of it ia posmble. 
ts 


nirvana. 


destroyed, not eternal, not suppressed, 
not generated is called nirvina.’” 
As with oirvéna so ‘also with the 
Tathagata or one who has renlized 


His nature al-o cannot be described. That is 


why, when Buddha was asked what becomes of the Tatha- 
gata alter nirvana is attained, he declined to discuss the 


question. 


In the same light the silence of Buddha regarding all 


This accounts for 
Buddha's eilence on 
matters beyond Ordi- 
nary experience. 


metaphysicai questions about wnon- 
empirica: thinys can be interpr-ted 
to mean that he believed im x tran- 
scendental experience and reality, the 
truths about which cannot be deseriv-* 
ed in terms of commin experience. 


Buddha's frequent statements that he had realized some 


1 Madhyamtka-ééstra, Chap. 24, Kadrikds 8-9. 
9 Ibid., Chap. 26, Katka 8. 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 169 


profound truth which reasoning cannot grasp, can be cited 
also to support this Midhyamika contention about the 
transcendental.' 


It may be noted here that in its conception of twofold 
truth, its denial of the phenomenal 

The points of agree- world, its negative description of the 
ment between Bud- transcendental, and its conception of 


aaa be ic nirvana as the attainment’ of unity 


Madhyamikes) and With the transcendental self, the 
that of the Upanigads. Midhyamika approaches very close to 

Advaita Vedinta as taught in some 
Upaniyads and elaborated later by Gaudapida and 
Satkariicirya. 


2. The Yogdcdra School of Subjective Idealism 


While agreeing with the Madhyamikas, as to the 
pecifel the: Pecniy unreality of external objects, the 
ofthe mental is selfs Yogacara schoo] differs from them 
Cnteed ee: in holding that the mind (citta) 
cannot be regarded as unreal. For then all reasoning 
and thinking would be false and the Madhyamikas could 
not even establish that their own arguments were 
correct. To say that everything mental or non-mental 
Mind must, therefore, 18 Unreal is suicidal. The reality of 
he admitted. the mind should at least be admitted 
in order to make correct thinking possible. 


The mind, consisting of a stream of different kinds 
‘he objaela postal vel of ideas, is the only reality. Things 
are all ideas in the that appear to be outside the mind, 
alts our body as well as other objects, 
are merely ideas of the mind. Just asin cases of 
dreams and hallucinations a man fancies to perceive “ 


1 Vide Prof. Radbukriebnap’s article, ‘‘ The teaching of Buddhs by 
speech and silence,” Hibbert Journal, April, 1984, for 6 fuller discussion. 


22—1605B 


170 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 


things outside, though they do not really exist there, 
similarly the objects which appear 
ae mind slone is to be out there, are really ideas 
in the mind. The existence of 
any external object cannot be proved, becayse it can- 
not_be shown that the object is 
aie into external different from the consciousness of 
the object. As Dharmakirti states, 
the blue colour and the consciousness of the blue 
colour are identical, because they are never perceived 
to exist separately. Though really one, they appear 
as two owing to illusion, just as the moon appears as 
two to some owing to defective vision. As an object is 
never known without the consciousness of it, the 
object cannot be proved to have an existence indepen- 
deni of consciousness. 


The Yogacdras also point out the following absurdities 

k which arise from the admission of an 

ny externe) real. Odjec’ external to the mind. An 

ity ig fren alae external object, if admitted, must be 
difficulties at ise. either partless (i.6., atomic) or com- 
posite (i.c., composed of many parts). 

But atoms are too small to be perceived. A composite 
thing (like a pot) also cannot be per- 

(1). An external object ceived, because it is not possible to 
cannot bo perceived. perceive simultaneously all the sides 
and parts of the object. Nor can it 

be said to be perceived part by part, because, if those 
parts are atomic, they are too small to be perceived, 
and if they are composite, the original objection again 
arises. So if one admits extra-mental objects, the 
perception of thase objects cannot be explained. These 
objections do not arise if the object be nothing other 
(i Hea woiiales than consciousness, because the ques- 
Sh iesk: Gales poe tion of parts and whole does not 
tion is unexplained. arise with regard to. consciousness. 
Another difficulty is that the 

consciousness of the object cannot arise before 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY. 171 


the object ha&’ come into existence, Neither can if 
arise afterwards, because the object, being momentary,| 
vanishes as soon as it arses. The external object, accord- 
ing to those who admit it, being the cause of consciousness 
cannot be simultaneous with consciousness. Nor can it 
be said that the object may be known by consciousness 
after it has ceased to exist. For in that case the object 
being in the past there cannot be gny immediate knowledge 
or perception of it. Perception of present objects, as we 
must admit always to have, remains, therefore, un- 
explained if objects are supposed to be external to the 
mind. This difficulty does not arise, if the object be 


supposed to be nothing other than consciousness. 
The Yogicara view is called Vijiina-vida or idealism 


The Yogécira view 
is called Vijidnu-vade 
becauss it admits 
vijdane or conscious- 
pess re the only resl- 
ity. It is subjective 
iSealians. 


because it admits tnat there is only 
one kind of redglity which is of the 
nature of consciousness (vijfiana) and 
objects which appear to be material 
or external to consciousness are feally 
ideas or states of conscivusness. This 
theory may be described further as 
subjective idealism, because according 


to it the existence of an object perceived is nut different 
from the subject or the perceiving mind. . 


One of the chief difficulties of subjective idealism is: 


The ideas of obiects 
ate all Istent in the 
mind. The conditions 
of a partioular noment 
make a particular ides 
mature or become 
conacious and vivid. 


If an object depends for its existence 
solely on the subject, then, how is it 
that the mind cannot create at will 
any object at any time? How is it 
explained that objects do not change, 
appear or disappear at the will of the 
perceiver ?/ To expiain this difficulty, 
the Vijhina-vadin says that the mind 


is a stream of momentary conscious states and within the 
stream there lie buried the impressions (sarhskara) of all 


past experience. 


At a particular moment that latent 


impression comes to the surface of consciousness for which 
the circumstances of the moment are the most favourable. 
At that moment that impression attains maturity (pari- 


Honce a pertiouler 
object is perocived at 
® particular time. 


paka), so to say, and develops into 
immediate consciousness or percep- 
tion. It is thus that at that particular 
moment only that object, whose 


latent impression can, under the circumstances, reveal 


172 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


itself, becomes percoived; just as in the case of the 
revival of past impressions in memory, though all the 
impressions are in the mind, only some are remembered 
at a particuiar time. This is why only some object can 
be perceived at a time and not: any at will. 
The mind considered in its aspect of being a store- 
house or home of all impressions is 
The mipd, as the called by the Vijfiinevidins Aleye- 
home of ai jyent vijfiane.” It may be regarded ax the 
vijaace, SS «éOtential. mind and answers to the 
soul or atman of other systems, with 
the difference that it is not one unchanging substance like 
the soul, but is a stream of continuously changing states. 
Through culture and self-control this 
Colture end control Alayavijitiina or the potential mind 
eee ban rig Wad .can gradually stop the arising of 
nal objects apa attach. undesirable mental states and develop 
ment to them. into the ideal state of nirvinn. Other- 
‘ wise, it only gives rise to thoughts, 
desires, attachment which bind one more and more to the 
fictitious external world. The mind, the only reality 
according to this school, is truly its own piace, it can make 
heaven of hell and hell of heaven.? 
The Yogicaras are so called either because they used 
; to practise yoza * by which they came 
ious of to realize the sole reality of mind (as 
— Alayavijfiana) dispellmg all belief in 
the external world, or because they combined in them both 
critical inquisiliveness (yoga) and good conduct (acaraj.* 
Asanga, Vasubandhu, Digniga are the famous leaders of 
the Yogicara school. Lankdvatdra.sitra is one of its most 
important works. Tattvasafgraha of Santeraksita, with a 
commentary of Kamaluadila,’ is another very scholarly 
work of the school. 


Vide Bogen, Systems, p. 256, 
Ibid , p. 259. 
Vide Bogen, Systems, p, 213. 
Sarvadaréana-sangraha, Ch. I. 

& This wo.khas been published reccntly in ' Gackwad's Oriental 
Series.' Vide p. 14 of the Sanskrit Introduction for the view that this 
work belongs to the Yogécéra school. 


~ op wm 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 173 


3. The Sautrantika School of Representationism 


The Sautrintikas believe in the reality not only of 
The mentaland the the mind, but aleo of external 
external ere both real. objects. They point out that 
without the supposition of some external objects, 
_ itis not posnible to explain even 
Proofs for the reality . 
of external objects : the illusory appearance of oex- 
(1) Ifthere were no ternal objects. If one never per- 
external cbject, it ; 
would be mesningless ceived anywhere any external 
at the exter, object, he could not say, as a 
nal object.” Vijfianavadin does, that, through 
illusion, consciousness appears like*an externa) object 
The phrase ‘ like an external object’ is as meaningless 
id Gomasvew ax. 2° ‘like the son of a batren 
directly as being out. mother,’ because an _ external 
oe eae object is said by the Vijianavadin 
to be wholly unreal and never perceived. Again, the 
argument from the simuilaneity of conecioustiess and 
object to their identity is also defective. Whenever 
we have the perception of an object like a pot, the pot 
is felt as externa] and consciousness of it as internal 
(i.e., to be in the mind). So the object from the very 
Aiea eee beginuing is known to be different 
perceived as identicel from and not identical with con- 
Sead ay“ oy ‘he Sciousness. If the pot perceived 
pot’ and not, ‘There were identical with the subject, the 
1s the pot. . , 
perceiver would have said, ‘‘f am the 
pot.’’ Besides, if there were po externai objects, the 
distinction between the ‘consciousness of a pot’ 
and ‘the consciousness of a cloth’ could not be 
explained, because as consciousness both are identical; 
it is only regarding the objects that they differ. — 


174. aN INTRODUCTION To INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Hence we must admit the existence of different 
external objects outside conscious- 


Payer td pong ness These objects give particular 
them. Hencr objects forms to the different states of con. 
oateide can be inferred i 

from their mental gciousness. From these forms or 


i ideas. ; 
Petre representations of the objects in the 


mind we can infer the existence of their causes, f.c. 
the objects outside the mind. 


The reason why we cannot perceive at will any object 

at any time and place, lies in the fact 

‘ that a perception depends on four 
chet depends onfoar differnt conditions! and not simply on 
seuse and auxiliary « the mind. There must be the object 
conditions. to impart its form to consciousness, 
there must be the conscious mind (or 

the state of the mind at the just previous moment) to cause 
the consciousness of the form, there must be the sense to 
determine the kind of the consciousness, that is, whether 
the consciousness of that object would be visual, tactual or 
of any other kind. Lastly, there must be some favourable 
auzilicry condition, such as light, convenient position, 
perceptivle magnitude, etc. All these combined together 
bring about the perception of the object. The form of the 
object thus generated in the mind, is the effect of the 
The effect of these object, among other things. The 


Perception of external 


conditions is the copy 
or idea of the object 
produced in the mind. 
We infer the object 
from this ides. 


existence of the object is not of 
course perceived, because what mind 
immediately knows is the copy or 
representation of the object in its own 
consciousness. But from thie it can 


infer the object without which the ccpy would not arise, 
The Sautrantika theory is, therefore, called also the 


The meaning of 
‘Santrantike.” 


theory of the inferability of external 
objects (Bahyanumeya-vide). The 
neme ‘ Sautrintika’ is given to this 


school because it attaches exclusive importance to the 
authority of the Sdtra-pifaka.* ‘The arguments used by 
1 These are called respectively, the dlambana, the samanantara, the 
adbipsti and the sabakir: pratyayas (conditions). 
3 Many works of this class are named ‘ suttdota.’ 
Systems, p. 6, for this interpretetion of ‘ssutrantika.’ 


Vide Sogen, 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 175 


this school fos the refutation of subjective idealism 
anticipated long ago some of the moat important argumenta 
which modern Western reslisty like Moore use lo refute 
the subjective idealism of Berkeley. Tho Sautrintika 
position, in epistemology. resembles ‘ representationism ’ 
or the ‘copy theory of ideas ’ which was common smong 
Western philosophers like Locke. This exists even now in 
a modified form among some critical realists. 


4. The Vaibhdsika School 


While agreeing with Sautrintikas regarding the 
reality of both the mentsl and the 

beg veneer e4 non-mental, Vaibbisikas, like many 
eigenen modern neo-realists, point out 
that unless we admit that external 

objects are perceived by us, their existence cannot 
be known in_a#y—Other way. Inference of fire 
from the perception of smoke is 

ne paren peta possible because in the past we 
directly Pha a Pay have perceived both smoke and 
place and not in- fire together. One who has never 
y perceived fire previously cannot 

infer its existence from the perception of smoke. 
If external objects were never perceived, as Sautranti- 
kas hoid, then they could not even be inferred, simply 
from their mental forms. TQ one unacquainted with 
an external object, the mental form would not appear 
to be the copy or the sign of the existence of an extra- 
mental object, but an original thing which does not 
owe its existence to avything outside the mind. 
Rither, therefore, we have to accept subjective idealism 
(vijfiine-vada) or, if that has been found unsatisfactory, 
we must admit that the external object is directly 





176 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


known. The Vaibhasikas thus come to hold a theory of 
direct realism ’ (bihya-pratyakea-vada). 
The Abhidhamma treatises formed the general founda- 
tion of the philosophy of the realists. 
eaping of ‘ Vaibha- The Vaibhagikas followed exclusively 
nike.’ @ particular commentary, Vibhded (or 
. Abhidhamma-mahdvibhdgd) on an 
Abhidhamma treatise (Abhidharma-jnana-prasthdna,*) 
Hence their name. 


IV. Tue Reuiaious ScHoots or BUDDHISM : 
HInAYANA AND MAHAYANA 


In respect of: religion Buddhism is divided, as 
we know, into the two great schools, the Hinayaina 
and the Mahayana. 

Representing faithfully the earlier form of Buddhism 

the Hinayaua, like Jainism, stands 
The Hinayéns school as the example of a religion without 
eo Ran cn. (God. The place of God is taken 
par bopelecger aad in 1t by the univergal moral law 

of karma or dharma which governs 
the universe in such a way that no fruit of action is 
lost and every individual gets the mind, the body 
and the place in life that he deserves by bis past deeds. 
The life and teachings of Buddha furnish the ideal 
as well as the promiee or the possibility of every 
fettered individual’s attaining liberation. With an 
unshaken confidence in his own power of achievement 
and a faith in the moral law that guarantees the 
preservation of every bit of progress made, the 
Hinayanist hopes to obtain liberation in this or any 


1} VideJ. E. Turner, A Theory of Direct Reaham, p. 8, 
3 Vide Sogen, Systeme, pp. 102 and 106, 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 177 


other future life by following Buddha’s noble path. 
His goal is Arhatship or Nibbana, the state that 
extinguishes all his misery. Hinayana is, therefore, 
a religion of self-help. It sticks fast to Buddha’s 
saying: ‘ Be a light unto thyself.’’ Everyone can 
and should achieve the highest gqal for and by ,himself. 
It is inspired by the last words that Buddha said before 
he passed away: ‘* Decay is inherent in all things 
composed of parts. Work out your salvation with 
diligence,”’ 
This path which depends neither on divine mercy 
nor op any other foreien help, 
Reiner hesikg except the ideal set by Buddha 
and the moral jaw of the oniverse, 
is meant only for the strong, who are all too few in 
this world. 
As the fold of Buddhism widened in course of 
time, it came to include not only the few select 
Ttdid not snit, there. PeTPOUS fit to follow this difficult 
fore, the multitudes of ideal, but also multitudes of 
en comers halt convinced nomins! converts 
who neither understood the Path nor had the 
necessary moral strength to follow it. With the 
support of royal patrons like Asoka, Buddhiem gained 
in number but lost its original quality. ‘The bulk 
of people who accepted Buddhism, on grounds other 
than moral, brought it down to their own level. They 
came with their own habits, beliefs and traditions which 
soon became a part of the new faith they accepted. 
The teacher. had to choose between upholding 
the ideal at the cost of number and upholding the 


1 * Atmadipo bhava,’ 
38—1605B 


178 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


number at the cost of the ideal. A few sturdy ones 
preferred the first. But the majority could not resist 
the temptation of the second. They came thus to 
build what they were pleased to 
deities chick tas call the Great Vehicle, Mahayana, 
adheres tastes and = contrasting it with the orthodox 
faith of the former, which they 
nicknamed the Lesser Vehicle, Hinayina. By the 
criterion of number Mahayana surely deserved the 
name, for it was designed to be « religious ommibus, 
with room enough to hold and suit persons of all tastes 
and cultures. ‘ 


Tis accommod:ting spirit and missionary cal made it 

. possible for Mabiyiana to penetrate 

The accommodating into the Himalayas and move across 
spicit and the mission- fo China Jari . ; 

ary zeal of Mebéyana. ‘0 China, Japan and Korea and aosorb 

peoples of diverse cultures. As it 

progressed, it assumed newer and newer forms, assimilating 

the beliefs of the people it admitted. Modern Mahayanist 

writers are reasonably proud of their faith and Jove to call 

it a living, progressive religion whose adaptability is the 

sign of its vitality. 


The accommodating spirit of Mabayénism can be 

<a traced back to the catholic concern 

onaharane Bye gree’ which Buddha himself had for 

nxiety for the salva- sal vati ings. Muabi 

Seren icllee hana che eal vation of all beings. Mabi- 

yanisni emphasizes this aspect 

of the founder’s life and teachings. Mahayanists 

ds Spee oe ea: point out that the long life of 

lightenment is oot Buddha, after enlightenment, dedi- 
one’s own salvation. . 

cated to the service of the 

suffering beings, sets an example and an ideal, 

namely, that enlightenment should be sought 


TH BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 179 


not for one’s own salvation, but for being able to 
minister to the morai needs of others. In fact, in 
It in the ability to CUPS of time, Mah6ySnism came 
liberate ail suffering to look upon the Hinayanist caint’s | 
beings. E aa . 
anxiety to tiberate himself, as a 
lower ideal which had yet an clement of selfishness in 
it, however subtle or sublime this 
The greatness of selfishness might be. The ideal of 
Mahiyana lies in this : \ A : 
spirit, and the inferior- the salvation of al! sentient beings 
ity of Hineyéesisdue thus came to be regarded as the 
higher aspect of Buddha’s teachings. 
The greatness of their faith, Mahayanists contend, 
consists in this ideal and the inferiority of the Hina- 
yanists in the lack of it.” 


The new elements which Mahayinism came to 
acquire or develop in its different branches were many 
and sometimes conflicting. We shall mention here 
only a few of the more important ones. 


(a) The Ideal of Bodhisattca: As noted previously 
Mahayana regirds even the desire for one’s own salva- 
tion as selfish at bottom. Tn the place of persona! 
liberation, it establishes the * liberation of all sentient 


1 All these aspects of Mahayanism are summed up by the eminent 
Japanese writer, D. T. Suzuki. in his Outlines of Mahayana Buddhiem, 
thus: “It (Mabay&nisin) is the Buddhism which, inspired by s pro- 
gressive epirit, broadened its original scope, so far as it did not contradict 
the ioner significance of the teachings of the Buddha, and which assimi- 
tated other religio-pbilosophical beliefs within itself, whenever it felt 
tbat, by eo dcing, people of morc widely different characters and intellect. 
ual endowments could be saved "’ (p. 10). 


180 aN INTRODUCTION To INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


beings’ as the ultimate goal of every Mahiyanist's 

; _ spiritual aspirations. The vow 
ware Peproeoet ye that a devout Mahaydnist is ex. 
Perfect wisdom with ® pected to take is that he would 


view to being sbla to 
bark = beings out of try to achieve the State of En- 
lightenment. Bodhisativa (the 
Wisdoni-State-of-Existence), now to live aloof from the 
world but to work with perfect wisdoin and love among 
the multitudes of suffering beings for removing their 
misery and achieving their salvation. The spiritual 
ideal of Mahayana has, therefore, come to be called 
Bodhisattva. 
One who has attained this ideal of Enlightenment 
5 ; and works for the salvation of other 
aa o. Be beings is also called a Bodhisattva. 
ce orbodknanree Love and wisdom (karuni and 
" prajiti) constitute the essence of his 
existence.’ Speaking about such perfect persons 
Nagarjuna says in the Bodhicitta: ‘* Thus the essen- 
tial nature of all Bodhisativas is a great loving heart 
(mahakarund-citta) and all sentient beings constitute 
the object of its love.’’? ‘‘ ‘Therefore, all Kodhisattvas, 
in order to emancipate sentient beings from misery. 
are inspired with great spiritual emergy and mingle 
themselves in the filth of birth and death. Though 
thus they make themselves subject to the laws of birth ° 
and death, their hearts are free from sins and attach- 
A Bodhisattva ex. mente. They are like unto those 
changes his deserts immaculate, undefiled lotus-flowers 
with those of the fellow. ‘ 2 
beings and suffer to Which grow out of mire, yet are 
relieve their misery. not contaminated by it.""* By an 
exchange (parivarta) of the fruits of action, a Bodhi- 


1 Vide guepki, Outlines,p. 206. 7 ibsd., p.292. Jbid., pp. 208-04- 


tHE BAUDDBHA PHILOSOPHY isi 


sattva relieves the miseries due to others with his own 
good deeds and suffers the consequences of their actions 
bimeelf, 


This ideal of Bodhisattva is nurtured by the Mahayana 
philosophy, which comes to think that all individuals ure 
unreal as separate particular phenomena, and that they are 
all really grounded in one transcerdental Reuiity» (Aiaya- 

vijiiina, according to some Yogiciras- 
The ideal of Bodbi- or Sinya or Tathita, according to 
sattve is based on the some M@dhyamikas), of which they 
philosophy of the unity : ae Pigs 
of all be ings. are the partial or illusory manifesta- 
tions. This philosophy favoured the. 
rejection of the idea of the individuai ego and seceptance of 
un universal absolute serif (Mahitmun or Paramitman)! es 
the real self of man. Striving for the Aberntién of ail and 
not simply for the little self (hinadtmun) was, therefore, the 
iogival outcome of this philosophy of the unity of all beings. 
~Morcover, the idea that the transcendental Reality isnot 
away from but within the phenomena paved the way for 
aoe i the belicf that perfection or mrvina 
Poveda Prorga is not to be sought away from the 
away from it. werld but within it. Nirvana, says 
Nagarjuna, is tobe found within the 
world by those who can see what the world reaily is at 
vottom.” <Asceticism of the Hinayina is, therefore, re- 
placed by a loving, enlightened interest in the world’s 
affuirs. 


(b) Buddha as God : The philosophy which gives 
the udvanced followers of Maha- 
yava, on the one hand, the ideai of 
Bodhisattva, supplies the backward 
ones, on the other hand, with a rehgion of promise and 
hope. When un ordinary man finds himself crushed 
in life’s struggle and fails, in spite of all bis natural 
egoism, to avert nusery, his weary spirit craves for 


Buddha comes to be 
conceived as God. 


1 Vide Sogen, System», pp. 28-44, 
2 Vide Nagaejune’s saying “oa saredrasya nirvagat kificilasti 
yideganam,'etc., Madhyumike-déstra, Chap. 35, Karika 19. 


182 AN inTRODUCTION To INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


some unfailing source of mercy and help. He turns to 
God. A religion of self-help, such as we bave in early 
Buddhism, is a cold comfort to him. To such forlorn 
multitudes Mahayana holds out the hope that Buddha's 
watchful eyes ure on all miserable beinys. 

Buddha is identified with the transcendental 
Buddha is identifed °blity that Mabayana philosophy 
with transcendentsl accepted. The historical Buddha 
Reality and is attri- ; . . 
buted the power of or Guutuina is believed, in the 
Peer cominon Indian way, to be the 
incarnation of that ultimate Reality or Buddha. Many 
other previous incarnations of Buddha are also 
believed in and described in the famons Jatakas ‘or 
stories of the different births of Buddha). As in 
Advaita Vedanta, so also here, the ultimate Reality in 
itself is conceived as beyond all description (like the 
Nirguna Brahma). But this reality is also thought of 
as manifesting itself in this world, as the Dbharmakiya 
or the regulator of the universe. In this aspect of 
Dharmakaya the ultimate Reality or Buddha is anxious 
for the salvation of al: beings, lends himself to 
incarnation in the different spiritual teachers and 
idan Macatacked helps all beings out of inisery. So, 
as teachersand helpers Buddha as the Dharmakaya, for all 
of beings. : ‘ 

practical purposes, takes the place 
of God to whom the weary heart can pray for help, 
love and mercy. In this aspect Buddha is also called 
Amitébba Buddha. Thus the religious hankerings of 
those who accepted Buddhism are also satisfied by the 
Mahayana by identifying Buddha with God. 

(c) The Restoration of the Self: One of the sources 
of the ordinary man’s dread of eurlier Buddhism must 


THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY 183 


have been the negation of self. If there is no self, for 

Though individual whom is one to work ? Mahayana 
wolves. a _< Naresls philosophy pointa out that it is the 
seff, i.e. the Reality little individual ego which is false. 
bebiod all phupomens; But this apparent self bas behind 
Belf of ali beings. it the reality'of one transcéndental 
self (Mahatman), which is the Self of all beings The 
devout Mahayinist thus finds his self restored in a 
more elevating and magnified form. 

At the present day the foliowers of Hinayina and 
Mahayana often try to belittle one another. But to 
the discerning outsider they stand as the living 
exainples of a fight between two equally noble motives. 
namely, greater purity and greater utility. To impartial 
The Hinsyfpa and observers the mighty current of 
the Mahéyépa sre Buddhism, like every current, 
inspired by two differ- mat , 
ent, but equally noble, aturally divides itself into two 
er eee! parts—the narrow but pure and im- 
petuous stream,that runs through the solitary uplands 
near the source, and the eradualiv widening river that 
floods and fertilises the vast plains below, though not 
uomingled with the indifferent streams that increase 
its volume on the way and not unsoiled with the vast 
amount of dirt that it carries down. The first without 
the second would remain sublime but relatively usgiéss; 
the second without the first would cease to be. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 


24—1606B 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Jivananda Vidyasagara 


Keéavamisra 


A.N. Jere 


Madhavacarya 


Udayana 


Dbarmarajédh varindra 


Brajendranath Seal 


Gangainath Jha 


§, Radhakrishnan 


Nydya-daréana with Vat- 
syayana’s Bhasya and 
Viévanatha’s Vrtti 
(Calcutta). 

Tarkasangraha with 
Tattoadipika and Viorts 
(Calcutta). 

Tarkabhasa (Original 
text. Eng. trans., Ori- 
ental Book Supplying 
Agency, Poona). 

Karikdvali (or Bhasdparic- 
cheda) with Siddhdnta- 
muktavali, Dinakari 
and Radmarudri 
(Nirnaya Sagar Prese. 
Bombay). 

Sarva-dar§ana-sargraha 
(Original text. Eng. 
trans. by Cowell and 
Gough), Ch. XI. 

we Nydya-kusumadnjali (Oni- 
ginal text, Chowkham- 
ba. Eng. trans. by 
Cowell). 

ee = Veddnta-paribhdasd, Chaps. 
I-Tll, 

. The Positive Sciences of 
the Ancient Hindus 
(Longmans), Ch. VII. 

Nydya-sitras with Bhdsya 
and = Varttika (Eng. 
trans., Indian Thought, 
Allahabad). 

Indian Philosophy, Vol, 
I, Ch, IT, 


187. 


CHAPTER V 
THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 


1. IntrropuctTion ' 


The Nydya philosophy was founded by the great 
sage Gotama who was aleo known 
Gotama was the 
founder of the Nyays us Gautama and Aksapada. Accord- 
re ingly, the Nyaya is also known as 
the Aksapada system. This philosdphy is primarily 
concerned with the conditions of correct thinking and 
the means of acquiring a true knowledge of reality. 
It is very useful in developing the powers of logical 
thinking aod rigorous criticism im its students. So 
we have such other names for the Nyaya philosophy 
as Nyayavidyi, Tarkasdstra (i.e. the science of teason- 
ing), and Anvikeiki (i.e. the science of critical study). 
But the logical problem as to the methods and con- 
ditiona of true knowledge or the canons of logical 
criticism is not the sole or the 
iecaten ane ultimate end of the Nydya philo- 
abo interest’ is sophy. Its ultimate end, like 
that of the other systems of Indian 
philosophy, 18 hberation, which means the absolute 
cessation of all pain and suffering. It is only in order 
to attain this ultimate end of life that we require a 
philosophy for the knowledge of reality, and a logic 
for determining the conditions and methods of true 
knowledge. So we may say that the Nyfya. like 
other Indian systems, i> « philosophy of hfe, although 


188 AN INTRODUCTION To INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


it is mainiy interested in the problems of logic and 
epistemology. 
The first work of the Nyaya philosophy is the 
Nydya-sitra of Gotama. It is 
eocen. sketch of divided into five adbyayaa or books, 
‘ each containing two abnikas or 
sections. The subsequent works of the Nyifiysu system, 
such as Vatsayana’s Nydya-bhdsya, Uddyotakara's 
Nydya-varttika, Vacaspati’s Nydya-vdrttika-tatparya- 
tikd, Udayana’s Nydya-vdritika-tatparya-parifuddhi 
and Kusumdijali, Jayanta’s Nydyamanjari, etc., 
explain and develép the ideas contained in the Nydya- 
sutra, und also defend them against the attacks of 
hostile critics. The ancient school of the Nyaya 
(pracina-nyéya) is thus a development of the siitra- 
philosophy of Gotama through a process of attack, 
counter-attack and defence umong the Naiyayikas and 
their hurd critics. The modern school of the Nyaya 
(navya-nyaya) begins with the epoch-making work of 
Gatigeéa, viz. the Tattvacintamani. This school 
flourished ut first in Mithila, but subsequently became 
the glory of Bengal with Navadvipa as the inain centre 
of its learning and teaching. The modern schoo! 
lays almost exclusive emphasis on the logical aspects 
of the Nyaya, and develops its theory of knowledge 
into a formal logic of relations between concepts, 
terms und propositions. With the advent of the 
modern Nyaya, the ancient school lost some of its 
popularity. The syncretist school of the Nyiyu is a 
later development of the Nyaya philosophy into the 
form of a synthesis or an amalgamation between the 
Nyaya and the Vaigesika system. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 189 


The whold of the Nyaya philosophy may be con- 
: : veniently divided into four parts, 
The sixteen philoso- c 
phicsl topics of the namely, the theory of knowledge, 
Me: the theory of the physical world, 
the theory of the individual self and its liberation, and 
the theory of God. It should, however, be observed 
here that the Nyadya system is in itself an elaboration 
of sixteen philosophical topics (padartha).’ These are: 
pramana, prameya, sathéaya, prayojana, drstanta, 
siddhanta, avayava, tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, 
vitandé, hetvabhisa, chala, jati and nigrahasthaina. 
These may be briefly explained here. 

Pramana is the way of knowing anything truly. It 
gives us true knowledge and nothing but true 
knowledge. It thus includes all the sources or methods 
of knowledge. Of the philosophical topics, pramana is 
the most important and so it wiil be treated more fully 
in the next section. . 

Prameya literally ineans a knowable or an object of 
true knowledge, i.c. reality. The objects of such 
knowledge, according iv the Nyiya, are (1) the self 
(atma); (2) the body (sarira) which is the seat of organic 
activities, the senses and the feelings of pleasure and 
pain; (3) the senses (indriya) of smell, taste, sight, 
touch and hearing; (4) their objects (artha), i.c. tbe 
sensible qualities oi sinell, taste, colour, touch and 
sound; (5) cognition (buddbi) which is the same thing 
as knowledge (jiina) and apprehension (upalabdhi); (6) 
inind (manas) which is the interna! sense concerned in 
the internal perceptions of pleasure, pain, etc., and 


1 Nydya-sdtra and Bhdgya, 1.1.1-1.4.20. 


190 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


limits our cognition to one at a time, the mind being 
like an atom and one in each body; (7) activity 
(pravrtti) which may be good or bad, and is of three 
kinds, namely, vocal, mental and bodily; (8) mental 
defects (dosa) such as attachment (raga), hatred 
(dvesa) and infatuation (moba) which are at the root 
of our activities, good or bad; (9) rebirth after death 
(pretyabhiva) which is brought about by our good or 
bad actions; (10) the experiences of pleasure and pain 
(phala) which result from the activities due to mental 
(defects); (11) suffering (duhkha) which as a bitter and 
painful experience 3 known to everybody; (12) libera- 
tion or freedom from suffering (apavarga) which means 
the absolute cessation of all suffering without any 
possibility of its recurrence.’ This list of twelve is not 
an exhaustive list of all realities. This mentions, as 
Vatsyiyana points out,’ only those the knowledge of 
which is ‘important for hberation. 

Satnsaya or doubt is a state of uncertainty. It 
represents the mind's wavering between ‘different con- 
flicting views with regard to the same object. Doubt 
arises when with regard to the same thing there is the 
suggestion of different alternative views but no definite 
cognition of any differentia to decide between them. 
One is said to be in doubt when, looking at a distant 
figure, one is Jed to ask; ‘ Is it a statue or a pillar’? but 
fails to discern any specific mark that would definitely 
decide which of them it really is. Doubt is not certain 
knowledge, nor is it the mere absence of know- 
ledge, nor is it an error. It is a positive state of 


1 Nydya-sitra and Bhagya, 1.1. 9-22, 
3 Jbid.,1. 1.9, 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 191 


cognition of mutually exclusive characters in the same 
thing at the same time.’ 

Prayojana or an end-in-view is the object for which 
or to avoid which one acts. We act cither to obtain 
desirable objects or to get rid of undesirable ones. Both 
these kinds of objects constitute the end of ouc,activi- 
ties and are, therefore, included within prayojana. 

Dregtanta or an example is an undisputed fact which 
illustrates a general rule. It is a very useful and 
necessary part of any discussion or reasoning, and it 
should be such that both the parties in the discussion 
may accept it without dispute or différence of opinion. 
Thus when any one argues that there must be fire in a 
certain place because there is smoke in it, the kitchen 
may be cited ss an instance (drsténta), for in the 
case of a kitchen we are all agreed that some smoke 
is related to some fire. 

Siddhinta or a doctrine is what is taught and 
accepted as true in a system or school. A view that 
a certain thing is or is such-and-such, if accepted as 
true in a system, will be a doctrins of that system, 
e.g. the Nydya doctrine that the soui is a substance of 
which consciousness is a separable attribute. 

Avayava or u member of the syllogism is any of the 
five propositions in which syllogistic inference requires 
to be stated if it is to prove or demonstrate a doctrine. 
It may be one of the premises or the conclusion of the 
syllogism, but never any proposition that is not a part 
of any syllogism. The avayavas or constituent propo- 
sitions of the syllogism will be more fully explained 
under Inference. 


1 Loe. ett., 1.1. 98. 


192 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Tarka or a hypothetical argument ‘is an indirect 
way of justifying a certain conclusion by exposing the 
absurdity of its contradictory. It is a form of supposi- 
tion (Gha), but is an aid to the attamment of valid 
knowledge. It will be explained more fully Jater on. 

Nirnaya ‘is certain knowledge about anything, 
attained by means of any of the legitimate methods of 
knowledge. It is usually preceded by doubt and 
requires a consideration of all the arguments for and 
against a certain view or doctrine. But it is not 
always conditioned by doubt in the mind of the 
inquirer who ascertains the truth about something. So 
we may say that nirnaya is just the asceriainment of 
truth about something hy means of any of the recog- 
nized methods or sources of knowledge. 

Vada is a discussion which is conducted according 
to logical rules and aims only at finding out the truth 
of the matter discussed. In it each of the parties, the 
exponent (vidi) and the opponent (pratividi), tries to 
establish his own position and refute that of the other, 
but both try to arrive at truth. This is very well 
illustrated by a philosophical discussion between the 
teacher and his student provided boih of them are 
honest seekers after truth. 

Jalpa is mere wrangling in which the parties aim 
only at victory over each other, but do not make an 
honest attempt to come to truth. It has all other 
characteristics of a discussion than that of siming at 
truth. Here the parties aim at victory only and, there- 
fore, make use of invalid reasons and arguments with 
the full consciousness that they are such. Tawyers 
sometimes indulge in this kind of wrangling. 


THE NYKYA PHILOSOPHY 198 


Vitanda is a kind of debate in which the opponent 
does not establish his own position but only tries to 
refute that of the exponent. While in jaipa each of the 
parties somehow establishes his own position and tries 
to gain victory over the other by refuting the other 
position, in vitanda one of the parties triesto win 
simply by refuting the other’s position. Otherwise, the 
two are the same. So vitandai may be said to boa 
sort of cavil in which the opponent indulges in a merely 
destructive criticism of the opponent's views. It is 
sometbing like abusing the plaintiff’s pleader when one 
has no case. , 


Hetvabhasa literally means a hetu or reason which 
appears as, but really is not,a valid reason. It is 


generally taken to mean the fallacies of inference. We 
shall consider them separately in connection with the 
theory of inference. 

Chala is a kind of quibble in which ao attempt is 
mude to contradict a statement by taking it in a sense 
otber than the intended one. I[t is a questionable 
device for getting out of a difficulty in an argument. 
Thus when an opponent cannot meet the exponent’s 
argument fairly and squarely be may take it ina 
sense not incended by the latter and point out that it is 
fallacious. One man says ‘the boy 1s naoa-kambala ° 
(possessed of a new blanket), and another unfairly 
objects * he is not nava-kambala’ (possessed of nine 
biankets); here the latter is using ‘chala.”* 

The word jati is here used in a technical sense to 
mean an evasive and shifty answer to an argument. It 


! ‘Tbe Sanskris word, usva. means ‘new,’ and also ‘ nine '; and 


‘kembala* means ‘ blanket" 
25—-1605B 


{194 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


consists in basing a futile argument on any kind of 
similarity or dissimilarity between two things to 
controvert another sound argument. Thus if one 
argues ‘sound is non-eternal, because it is an effeot like 
the pot,’ and another objects that ‘sound must be 
eternal, because it is incorporeal like the sky’, then the 
objection is @ kind of jati or fulile argument, for there 
is no necessary or universal relation between the incor- 
poreal and the eternal. as we find in the case of many 
objects like pleasure and pain. 

Nigrahasthina literally means a ground of defeat in 
debate. There are two primary grounds of such 
defeat, namely, misunderstanding or wrong understand- 
ing and want of understanding. If any party in a 
debate misunderstands or fails to understand his own 
or the other party’s statement and its implication, he 
is brought to the point at which he has to admit 
defeat. Thus one is defeated in a debate when one 
shifts the original proposition or one’s ground in the 
argument, or uses fallacious arguments and the like. 

The Nyaya philosophy is a syste: of logical realism. 

: 7 In philosophy realism means the 

The Nydya is a ; A 

system of logical rea- theory or doctrine that the existence 
nen of things or objects of the world is 
independent of all knowledge or relation to mind. The 
existence of ideas and images, feelings of pleasure and 
pain, is dependent on some mind. These cannot exist 
unless they are experienced by some mind. But the 
existence of tables and chairs, plants and animals, 
does not depend on our minds. These exist and will 
continue to exist, whether we know them or not. 
Realism is a philosophical theory which holds that the 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 195 


existence of all things or objects of the world is quite 

independent of ai} minds, finite or 
Rrcryrr real- infinite, human or divine. Idealism, 

on the other hand, holds that 
things or objects can exist only as they are related to 
some mind. Just as feelings and cognitions exist only. 
an they are in some mind, so the objects of the ' world 
exist only as they are actually experienced or at least 
thought of by us or by God. Now the Ny’ya is a 
realistic philosophy in so far as it holds that the objects 
of the world have an independent exir‘ence of iheir 
own apart from all knowledge or experience. In the 
Nyaya this realistic view of the world is based, not on 
mere faith or feeling, intuition or scriptural testimony, 
but on logical grounds and critical reflections. 
According to it, the highest end of life, i.e. liberation, 
can be attained only through a right knowledge of 
reality, Buta true knowledge of reality presupposes 
an understanding of what koowledge is, what the 
sources of knowledge are, how true knowledge is dis- 
tinguishgd from wrong knowledge and so forth. In 
other words, a theory of reality or metaphysics pre- 
supposes & theory of knowledge or epistemology. 
Hence the realism of the Nyaya is based on the theory 
of knowledge which is the logical fouadation of all 
philosophy. Thus we see that the Nydya is a system 
of philosophy which may be justly characterized as 
logical realism. 


II. Tag Nyzya THEeory oF KNOWLEDGE 


The Nyaya theory of reality is based on the Nyaya 
theory of knowledge. According to this, there are four 


196 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


distinct and separate sources of true knowledge. ‘These 
are (i) pratyaksa, perception ; (ii) anumana, inference ; 
(iii) upamana, comparison ; and (iv) éabda, testimony. 
We shall explain them separately. But before we 
come to these pramanas or sources of valid 
knowledge, let us understand what knowledge is, 
what the different kinds of knowledge are, und 
how true knowledge is distinguished from false know- 
Jedge. 


1. Definition and Classification of Knowledge’ 


Knowledge or cognition (jfiina or buddhi) is the 
asa als manifestation of objects. Just as 
manifestation of cb- the light of a lamp reveals or 
jects, shows pbysical things, so knowledge 
manifests all objects that come before it. Knowledge is 
of different kinds. First we have valid knowledge 
There are two (rama or pramiti), which has been 
main kinds of know. subdivided into perception, inference, 
ledge, valid and pon- : : 
valid. each of which comparison and testimony. Then 
aw-of four Kinds: we have non-valid knowledge 
(aprama), which includes memory (smrti), doubt 
(sarngaya), error (bliraima or viparyyaya) and hypotheti- 
cal argument (tarka). True or valid knowledge ie a 
Definition of valig eSnite or certain (asandigdha), and 
knowledge. a faithful or unerring (yathartha) 
presentation (anubhava) of the object. My visual 
perception of the table before me is a true cognition, 


“1 Vide Ta rkasangraha, pp. 82-85, 82; Tarkabhaga, q. 28; Talparya- 
tikd, 1.1.1f, 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 197 


because in it the table is presented to me directly jast 
iti ei ust ae it really is, and I am certain 
non-valid knowledge:, about the truth of my cognition. 
wil id acer peed “Memory is uot valid knowledge, 
appt because in it the remembered 
object is not directly presented, since it is past, 
but only represented or recalled by th mind.’ 
Doubtful cognition cannot be called prama, because it 
is not certain knowledge. Error is undoubted know- 
ledge indeed, and may algo be presentative, but it is 
not true to the nature of its object Sometimes we 
perceive a stake in a rope in the twilight and have 
then no doubt abont the reality of what we see. Still 
this perception is erroneous, because it is not a (rue 
cognition of the object (yatharthanubhava). Tarka 
is not pram. since it does not give us any knowledge 
of objects. A tarka is like this: Iuooking out of the 
window of vour class-room you see a mass of smoke 
rising from a distant house and say that the house has 
caught fire. A friend contradicts you and asserts that 
there is no fire. Now you argue: if there is no fire, 
there cannot be smoke. This argument, starting with 
an ‘if’. and exposing the absurdity of your friend's 
position, and thereby indirectly proving your own, is 
larka. It is not prama or valid knowledge, because to 
argue like this is not to know the fire. but to confirm 
your previous inference of fire from smoke. That 
there is fire, you know by inference. To argue that 


1 Some Mim&thaakas exclude memory from valid knowledge, on the 
Around that it does not give ua any uew knowledge. It is only s 
reproduction of some past experience and not a cognition of anything not 
known before ‘anadhigata). 


198 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHII OSOPHY 


if there is no fire there cannot be smoke, is 
not to know the fire as areal fact either by way of 
perception or by that of inference. 
The next question is: How is true | 
distinguished from false knowledge? 
ia distinguied feos Knowledge is true when it sere 
fale knowledge. with or corresponds to the nature of! — 
its object, otherwise it becomes false. Your know- 
ledge of the rose as red is true if the rose has 
really a red colour as you judge it to bave (tadvati 
tatprakiraka). On the contrary, your perception’, of 
the syn as moving is wrong, since the motion belongs 
really to the earth and is wrongly transferred to the 
sun which remains relatively motionless or stationary 
(tadabhavavati tatprakaraka). But then it may be 
asked: How do we know that the first knowledge 
is true and the second false? In 
ee of ‘rath other words: How do we test the 
truth or falsity of knowledge? The 
Nanyayikas (also thé Vaisesikas, Jainas and Bauddhas) 
explain it in the following manner: Suppose you want 
alittle more sugar for your morning tea and take a 
spoonful of it from the cup before you and put it into 
your tea. Now the tea tastes sweeter than before and 
you know that your previous perception of sugar was 
true. Sometimes, however, it happens that while look- 
ing for sugar, you find some white powdered substance 
and put a pinch of it into your mouth under the im- 
pression that it is sugar. But to your utter surprise and 
disappointment, you find that it is salt and not sugar. 
Here then we see that the truth and falsity of know- 
ledge consist respectively in its correspondence and 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 199 


/fon-correspondence to facts. On the other hand, the 

test of the truth or falsity of knowledge is the success 
or failure of our practical activities in relation to 
its object (pravritisimarthya or pravrtlivisathvada).: 
True knowledge leads to successful practical acti- 
vity, While faise knowledge ends in failyre and 
disappointment.’ 


2. Perception 


In Western logic the problem of perception as a 
source of knowledge has not been properly discussed. 
The reason probably is this. We generaily believe that 
what is given in perception must be true. Ordinarily, 
no man questions the truth of what he perceives by his 
senses, So it is thought that it is unnecessary, if 
not ridiculous, to examine the validity of perception, or 
to determine the conditions of perception as a source of 
valid knowledge. Indian thinkers are more critical 
than dogmatic in this respect, and make a thorough 
examination of percepiion in almost the same way as 
Western fovicians discusss the problem of inference. 


(3) Definition of Perception 


In logic perception is to be regarded as form of 
true cognition. ‘Taking it in this 
Perception is s defi- ie natae 
r pee ene edie sense, some Naiyayikas define per-_ 
of objects produced by ceptionas a definite cognition which 
sense-object contact. A ° 
is produced by sense-object contact 


and is true or unerring.” The perception of the table 


1 For s detailed account of the nature and forme of knowledge, and 
the tests of truth and error, vide 8.C. Chatterjee, The Nydya Theory 
of Knowledge, Chaps, IT, V. 

2 Nydyo-e@tre, 1.1.4. ° 


200 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


before me is due tothe contact of my eyes with the 
table, and I am definite that the object is a table. The 
perception of a distant figure as either a man or a post 
is a doubtful and indefinite cognition, and, therefore, 
not a true perception. The perception of a snake in a 
piece of rope is definite but false; and so it is different 
from valid perception. 


The definition of perception as a cognition due to the 
su stimulation of our sense organs by the 
Another definition of pergeived object is generally accepted 
perception is that it is i Te i d b 
immediate cognition. «YY US- is accepted also by many 
systems of philosophy, Indian and 
Western. Some Naiyayikas, the Vedintins and others) 
however, reject it on the ground that there may be percep 
tion without sense-object contact. God, we are told, 
perceives all things, but has no senses. When I see a 
snake in a rop2, there is really no snake to come in contact 
with my eyes. Mental states like the feelings of pleasure 
and pain are directly cognised or perceived by us without 
the help of any sense organ. All this shows that sense- 
object contact is not common to, and cannot, therefore, be 
a defining character of, perceptions. What, however, is| 
really common to, and distinctive of, all perceptions is a 
feeling of directness or immediacy of the knowledge given 
by them, We are said to perceive an object, if and when 
we know it direct'y, i.e. without taking the help of previous 
experiences or any reasoning process (jfanakaranaka). If 
at midday you turn your eyes overhead, you see the sun 
directly, and not by means of any process of inference 
orreasoning. There is neither any necessity nor any time 
for you to think and reason before the perception of the 
sun arises in your mind. So some Indian logicians propose 
to define perception as immediate cognition /sikeit pratiti), 
although they admit that perception is in almost all cases 
conditioned by sense-object contact. 


1! Vide Tarkabhasa, p. 5; Siddhantamuktavali, pp. 335-88; Toattea 
cintdmani, i, pp. 539-48, 552. we 


THE NYKYA PHILOSOPHY 201 


(#) Classification of Perception! 


There are different ways of classifying perception. 
First, we have the distinction be- 
tween laukika or ordinary and 
alaukika or extraordinary percep- 
tions. This distinction depends on the way in which 
the senses come in contact with their objects. We 
have laukika perception when there is the usual sense- 
contact with objects present to sense. In alaukika 
perception, however, the object is such as is not ordi- 


narily present to sense, but is comveyed tu sense 
through an unusual medium. Ordinary perception, 


again. is of two kinds, namely, 
external (bahya) and_ internal 
Qnmanasa). The former is due to 
the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and 
swell. The tatter is brought about by the ,mind’s 
contact with psychical states and processes. Thus we 
have six kinds of lauktka or ordinary perceptions, viz. 
the visual (ciksusa). auditory (Srautra), tactual (spar- 
Sana), 2uetatory (risana), olfactory (ghrinaja), and the 
internal or mental (ménasa) perception. Alauktka or 
extraordinary perception is of three kinds, viz. sinjinya- 
laksana, jiana-lakeana and yogaja. 
According 1o the Nydya (also the Vaisesika, 
. Mimarmsé, and Jaina), thereare six 
The six organs of 
knowledge, ois. the organs of knowledge. Of these five 
AS the attenal cones, are external and one is internal. 
ee The five externai senses are the 
organs of smell (ghrana), taste (rasana), sight (cakguh), 


Ordinary and extra- 
ordinary perceptions. 


Exterpal and internal 
perceptions. 


1 Vide Bhagdpariccheda and Muktdvali, 62. 
25 — 16065 


202 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


touch (tvaky, and hearing (érotra). These perceive 
respectively the physical qualities of smell, taste, 
colour, touch and sound. They are physical in nature 
and each of them is constituted by that very same 
physical element whose qualities are sensed by it. 
This seems to be suggested by the fact that in many 
cases we use the same name for both the sense organ 
and the physical quality sensed by it. It is probably 
based on the principle that only like can perceive like. 
Mind (manas) is the internal orgau which perceives 
such qualities of the soul as desire (iccha), aversion 
(dvega), striving or willing (prayatua), pleasure 
(sukhe), pain (duhkha) and cognition. It is not made 
of the material clements (bhutas) like the external 
senses. It is not limited to the knowledge of any 
particular class of things or qualities but functions aa 
a central co-ordinating organ in all kinds of knowledve. 
The Nyaéya view of mind as an ‘internal sense’ 
(antarindriya) is accepted by the Vaiéesikas, the 
Sankhyas, the Mimamsakas and others. But some 
Vedintins criticise and reject the Nyaya view of mind 
as an ‘inner sense.’ 


(wii) Extraordinary Peerception’* 


Alaukika or extraordinary perception is of three kinds. 
The first is calied samanyalakeana. 
There are three kinds When we say, ‘‘All men are mortal,’ 
ef extraordinary per- we know that mortality is truc of all 
ceptions. The first is Thi that ‘ali ‘ 
samanyelakeana or the +=™en. is means that mortality is 
perception of classes. true, not of this or that man only, nor 
of all men who are dead and gone, but 
of all men in the past, present and future. In other words, 


Op. cit., 63-65. For a fuller account, vide 8. C. Chatterjee. 
The Nyéya Theory of Knowledge, Ch. X. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 203 


1t means that mortality is true of the class of men. But 
the question is: How do we knew the whole class of men? 
We cannot know it by ordinary perception, since all men 
cannot be physically present to our senses. Yet we must 
somehow know all men. The Naiyaéyika explains this 
knowledge of the class by extraordinary perception, in 
which the class men is presented through the class-essence 
or the universal ‘‘manhood.’” When I perceive 4 man 
as man, 1 do perceive the manhood in him; otherwise I 
cannot directly recognize him as man. Now this direct 
knowledge or perception of the universal manhood is the 
medium through which 1] perceive ail men or the cluss of 
men. To perecive manhood is to perceive all men so far 
as they are possessed of the universal ‘‘“nanhood.’’ In 
short, to perceive manhood is to perceive all men as the 
individuals in which the universal ‘‘manhood’’ inheres. 
/Yhis perception of the class of mien, being due to thé 
perception of the universal (samanya), is called simanya- 
:lakgana perception and is marked off as salar uednaedd 
(alaukika) on account of its obvious difference from our 
ordinary percepticns. 


The second kind of extraordinary perception is called 

: a jiinalaksana. We often use such ex- 
iene ae ger ir pressions as “‘ice looks could,’ ‘‘the 
ention, stonc looks hard,’ ‘‘the grass looks 
soft,’’ and so forth.” This means that 

the coldness of ice, the hardneas of a stone, the softness 
of luxuriant grass are perceived by us with our eyes. Bui 
the question is: How ean the eyes perceive touch 
qualities, bke hardness and softness, which can ordinarily 
be sensed only by the sense of touch? Among Western 
psychologists, Wundt, Ward and Stout explain such per- 
ceptions by ‘complication,’ a process by which sensa- 
tions or perceptions of different senses become so closely 
associated as to become integral parts of a single percep- 
tion. Similarly, when on seeing something one says, 
“T see a piece of iragrant sandalwood,"’ one has a preception 
of its fragrance by means of one’s eyes, How can we 


1 Vide Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 102; Wundt, Human and 
Animal Psychology, pp. 285-86; Ward, Article ‘‘Paychology,"’ Encyelo- 
paedia Britannica. Mth ed., Vol XX, p. 57. Cf. Woodworth, Psychology 
(9th ed.}, p. 115, where the perception of the smell of roses shat in a gless- 
case and seen through the glass ie cited a8 an exampie of hallucination. 


204 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


explain this visual perception of fragrance whigh can be 
ordinarily eensed only by the sense of sméll ? The 
Naiyayika says that here our past olfactory experience of 
fragrance as closely associated with the visual appearance 
of sandalwood (since every time we smelt it we saw ita 
colour, unless that was in a dark room) brings about the 
present visual perception of fragrance simultaneously with 
that qf its colour. This present perception of frayrance,: 
being due to the past knowledge of fragrance (saurabha-| 
jflana), hus been called jfianalakeana perception, which is 
aleo extraordinary in the sense that it is brought about b 
@ sense organ which is not ordinarily capable oi perceiving 
fragrance. The Naiyayikas also explain Illusion, e.g. uf a 
snake in a rope, as a case of jianalaksana perception. 
The third kind of extraordinary perception is cul.ed 
og _« yogaja. Itis the intuitive perception 
abe shied 18 Xoesl® of all objects—past and future, hidden 
iim and infinitesimal—by one who possess- 
es some supernatural power gene-, 
rated in the mind by devout meditation (yogibhyasa). In 
the case of those who have attuined spiritual perfection 
(yukta), such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant 
and spontaneous. In the case of others who are on the 
way tq perfection (yufijana), it requires the help of concen- 
tration as an auXiliary condition, The reality of yogaja 
perception is generally accepted in Indian philosophy on 
the authority of the scriptures (gruti and the I.ke). It ir 
to be observed also that the Vedintins' severely criticize 
and reject the Nyéya theory of siimanyalukgana and 
jftanalakeana perception, although they do not repudiats 
the idea of yogipratyaksa out of respect for the scriptural 
texts in its favour. 


(it) Three Modes of Perception? 


According to another classification, ordinary perception 
aiiicss.. tars he is of two kinds, namely, nirvikalpaka 
andes diedinate pers, Of the indeterminate and savikalpaka 
¢ eption. or the determinate. Here the princi- 
ple of classification is the more or Jess 

developed character of perceptua] knowledge. To thesr 


1 Vide Advaitasiddhi, pp. 387-48; Vedantaparibhagd. Ch. 1. 

3 Vide Nydya-bhégya and Tatparyalikd, 1.1.4; Tarkabhaga, p. 5 : 
Nyayalildvati, p. 58. For a detailed account, vide 5. C, Chatterjee, 
The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, Ch. 1X. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 205 


two we may add pratybhijié or recognition. Keeping in 
view the nature of perception, the Naiyayikus distinguish 
between three modes of ordinary perception. Extraordinary 
perception is always determinate, since it is definite and 
explicit knowledge. 
Nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception is the cogni- 
tion of an object as just an existent 
The first is mrvi- thing without an explcit recognition 
kalpske, which is cog- and cbaracterization of it us this or 
sms a hi a that kind of thing. Suppose you Jook 
without any explicit 4 an orange placed on the otber side 
recognition and cha- of your tuble, Immediately after the 
racterization of it. first glance, or after the first moment 
of contact betwecn your eyes and the 
ubject, you apprehend something, its colour, shape. etc., 
along with « gencral ebaracter calle@ orapgeness. But at 
first sight, you do not think of it as yellow or sound, or a8 
un orange. There may be u simple perception of an 
object and its specific and generic quulities, without any 
judgement of it as thie or thut kind of thing. Suppose on” 
the first day of your examination you enter the bath room 
engrossed in thinking about the possible questions and 
their answers. It is not wolikely that you may finish your 
bath without thinking of the water used by you. as water. 
Yct it cannot be said that you do not perceive the water: 
but for a very reul perception of ut, your act of bathing 
cannot be explained, This perception of water and its 
characters, without any thcught or judgment of it as 
water, as liguid, as cold, cte., if the nirvikeipuka or 
indeterminate perevption of it. 
Savikaipaka perception ts tbe cognition of wo object 
us possessed of some character. 
The evcund ia sasi- White nirvikalpaka 1s the cognition of 
ae renes ts Plsgohed the existence of a thing as such, savi- 
partiealsrkiod of thing. kalpaku may be said to be the recogni- 
tion of its nature. Thus when, !ook- 
ing ut the orange, I judge within myself ‘‘ this is an 
orange,’ I do not only cognise the existence of the 
orange us such, but also explicitly recognize or mentally 
assert what existence it is. Here the existent fact, this, 
becomes the subject of a proposition and orangeness is 
related to it as a predicate. Thus we may say that nirvi- 
kulpaka is a simple apprehension ; and savikalpukna a predi- 
cative judgment, of the same object. There cannot be any 
savikalpaka perception of an object without a previous 


206 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


nirvikalpaka perception of it. Unless we first know the 
existence of an ovject we cannot possibly kaow it ag this 
or that kind of object. Unless I first perceive water as 
something there in a pool, I cannot know it ae water or 4s 
a substance which is qualified by certain attributes. 
Pratyabhijfié is recognition in its literal meaning. It is 
a 1€-cognition of some object, i.e. a 
The ad pratya- cognition of it as that which was 
bbijié, which is the  Gognised before. In it we know that 
cognition of an object : : ae 
av what was cognised the thing which we now cognise is 
before. the same as that which was cognised 
before, as when one says: ‘‘This must 
be the same man who pushed me down the tra'n-eur yester- 
day.”’ It should be remarked here that the distinctions 
of uirvikalpaka perception, savikalpaka perception, and 
pratyabhijiii have note been recognized, or recognized in 
the same way, inall the systems of Indian philosophy, 
While the Vaisegika, the Saakhya and the Mimirhsi 
system accept, on the whole, the Nyaya view as explained 
here, the Bauddha and the Advaita Vedanta system reject 
it and hold very different views. 


3. Inference 


(1) Definition of Tnference 


After perception comes unumaéna or unfepence. 
Anumana (anu—after, mana—knowledge) | literally 
means a cognition or _knowi follows some 






Toference is the pro- 
cess of knowing some- 
thing, not by observa- 
tion, but through the 
medium of a mark 
that is invariably re-  . Ae eae e — 
lated to it. is_mortal, becapse he is .a_man, 


and all men. are mortal.’ In_ 
the first example, we “pass from the perception of . 
smoke in the hillto the knowledge of the_exietence of | 
fire in it, on the ground of our previous knowledge of 
the universal relation—hetween smoke and fire. In 











HE NYKYA PHILOSOPHY 207 


the second example, we know the mortality of Deva- 
bene meee 
datta, which is not now perceived, from the presence 
of manhood in him, Thus we see that inference is a 
process of reasoning in which we pass ‘Trom the appre- 
hension of sone mark (linga) to that of something 
else, by virtue ofa relation Lof invariable concpmitance 
(vyapti) between the two. As Dr.B. N. Seal puts i It: 


“ Anumdna (inference) i ix the process of _ascerlaining, 
not by pel perception or directo “observation, but through 
the instrumentality or incdium of a mark, that a thing 


possesses a certain character,”” * 


@)y The Constituents of Inference ? 


From the detinition of inference it will appear 
that an inference must have as its 
Tnoference has three ee es 
terms and at least constituents three terms and ay 
three propositions. ne ee a 
Ba aa least three _proposiuuns, In_in- 
ference we arrive at the knowledge of some character 
ofa thing through the knowledge of some mark and 
gen ona er: pry 
that of its universal relation to the inferred character. 
Thus i int the above inferenc ‘v_ of fire we know the un- 
perceived ‘fire in the hill through the perception _ “of 
nr 
smoke in it and the k knowlede of anu invariable relatic n 
site fan invariable rel 
between smoke and fire. Thereis, first, the knowledge 
pom Seas a 
or apprehension” o! of smoke as & mark in the hill. 
Secondly; There is is a recollection of the relation of 
invariable Concomitance between smoke and fire, as 
we have observed it in the past. Thirdly, we have 


the resulting krowledge of the existence of the 





1 The Positive Sciences of the Anctent Hindus, p. 260. 
2 Vide Muktdeali, 66 67. 


208 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


unperceived fire in the hill. Now in this inference the 
Pakga is the minor hill is the paksa (minor term), 


foros, oSitiys toe tee ee since it is the subject under con- 
sniddla’ tara. of ante sideration ih the & “course of the 
mag ce Anleronce. inferential reaso _Teasoning.. Fire is the 
sadhya (major term), as that is rgomatbiig which we 
want to prove or es‘ablish in relation to the hill by 
means of this inference. Smoke is ihe litga (middle 
term), as it is the mark or sign which indicates’ the 
presence of fire. It is also called the hetu or or “sadhana. 
i.e. the reason or ground-of inférence. ’ Thus corre- 
sponding to the minor, major and “middle terms of the 
syllogism, inference, ‘i Indien logic, contains three 
terms, namely, pales, sidhya ‘and heta. “The paksa 
is the subject with which we are concerned in any 
inference. The sadhya is the object which we want 
to know in relation to the paksa, or the inferable 
character of the paksa. The hetu is the reason for our 
relating the sidhya to the pakga. It is the ground of 
our knowledge of the sidhya as related to the pakga. 





In order of the events which take place when a 
musts cena ual certain thinker is inferring, the 
propositions inso in- first step in inference is the ap- 
erence, prehension of the hetu (smoke) in 
the peksa (hill), the second a recollection of the uni- 
versal relation between hetu and sidhya (smoke and 
fire), and the last is the cognition of the sadhya (fire) 
as related to the paksa (hill). But as a matter of 
formal statement or verbal expression, the first step in 
inference is the predication of the sadhya with regard 
to the paksa, e.g. ‘‘ The hill is fery."’ The second is 
the affirmation of the hetu as related to the pakga, 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 209 


e.g. ‘‘Because the hill is smoky.’’ The third is the 
affirmation of the betu as invariably related to the 
sadhya, e.g. ‘‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, 
as in the kitchen.” “Thus in inference we must have 
at least three propositions, ‘all of which are categorical 
affirmative or negative” The first proposition corres- 
ponds to the conclusion of the syllogism, ibe second to 
the minor premise, and the third to the major premise. 
Thus inference, in Indian Jogic, may be said to be a 
syllogism consisting of three categorical propositions. 
But the order of the propositions is reversed in Indian 
logic, in so far us it puts the conclusion of the syllogism 


first, and its usual major premise last, in the formal 
statement of an inference. 


Indian logicians are agreed that-so far as inference 
is svartha or for oneself, it requires 
forme of the ssllogim, DO formal statement by way of a 
number of propositions. Itis only 
in the case of “inference which is pardrtha, t.e. meant 
to prove or demonstrate some truth, that we_require 
to state an inference in the form of a rigorous chain 
of argument without any gap. This is the logical 
form of an inference. We may say that in Indian 
logic inference corresponds roughly, in respect of its 
form, td _the categorical ayllogism of Western logic. 
But there are certain important differencés between 
the Indian and Western forms of the syllogism. In 
Western logic, the syllogism is generally stated in the 
form of three propositions, of which the Grst is the 
major premise, the second is the minor premise, and 
the last is ihe conclusion. According to the Naiyayikas, 
27—1605B 


910 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


however, inference, as a conclusive proof, must 
be stated in the form of five propositions, called its 
avayavas or members. These are pratijfid, hetu, 
udaharana, upanaya, and nigamana.* The five- 
membered syllogism may be thus illustrated : 

(1) Ram is mortal (pratijia) ; 

(2) Because he is a man (hetu) ; 

(3) All men are mortal, e.g. Socrates, Kant, Hegel 
(udabarana) ; 

(4) Ram also is a man (upanaya) ; 

(5) Therefore he is mortal (nigamana). 

The pratijia isthe first proposition, which asserts 
something. The hetu is the second proposition, which 
states the reason for this assertion. The uda&barana 
is the universal proposition, showing the connection 
between the reason and the asserted fact, as supported 
by known instances. Upanaya is the application of 
the universal proposition to the present case. Niga- 
mana is the conclusion which follows from the prece- 
ding propositions.” 

(iit) The Grounds of Inference’ 


Now we come to the consideration of vyaipti or invari- 
able concomitance between the middle 

There are two condi- term and the major term;-whioh is the 
tions of an inference. logical ground of inference. In infer- 
ence our knowledge of the sadhya 


1 Vide Tarkabhéga, pp. 48-49. For a critical discussion of the logical 
form of inference, cide 8. C. Chatterjee, The Nyaya Theory of Know- 
ledge, pp. 897-405. 

q The Miméhsakas and the Vedantins bold thet the first three or 
the last three propositions suffice for inference. 

3 Vide Tarakabhagd, pp. 7. ; Tarkasahgraha. pp. 48 f. ; Bhaga- 
periccheda and Muktavali, pp. 187-88; Sarvadarsan, Ch. ui; Paribhasd, 
ch. Th, 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 211 


(fire) as related to the pakga (hill) depends on the previous 
knowledge of the hetu (emoke) as related to the paksa on 
the one hand, and universally connected with the sadbya, 
{on the other, We infer that there is fire in the hill, - 
because we see that there is smoke in the bill and know 
that smoke is always accompanied by firs: It appears, 
_therefore, that an inference has two conditions. The first 
is a cognition of the hetu or middle ierm (smoke) in the 
pakga or minor term (the hill). The second is the relation of 
invariable concomitance between the middle and the major 
term. That there is fire in the hill is a conclusion which 
we can justify only if we know that there is an invariable 
concomitance between the hill-smoke end fire. This 
relation of invariable coneomitance be. ween the hetu. 

, the sidbya, or the middle term and the 
VySpti is the Jogical major term of inference is technically 
conditon of inference. called vyapti, and is regarded as the 

logical “gSund of inference, since it 
guarantees the truth of the conclusion. So the questions 
we ere to consider now, are: What is vyapti ? How is‘ 
vyapti known by us? 
With regard to the first question, we have to say that 
vyapti literally means the state of 
There” are two kinds pervasion. It implies a torrelation 
of vy&pti. etweentt two facts, of which one is 
pervaded (vyapya), and the other 
pervades (vyapaks). A fact is said to pervade onother 
when it always accompanies the other. A fact js seid tobe 
Mee te ie oo is aineye aay nae the 
other. this. _smoke is pervaded by fire, since it is 
always sccompanied by racer a eck stocks ee fieky, 
But While al siticky objects are‘flery, all fiery objects are 
~ not emoky, ¢.g. the red-hot-iron ball. A vyapti between 
terms of unequal exttiision, such ae smoke and fire, is 
called asamavyapti or vigamavyapti. It ie a relation of 
non-equipollent concomitance between two terms, from 
one of| which “wé “may infer the other, but not vice versa. 
‘We may" $¥6from smoke, but not eee 
‘As distinguished for this, 8 yyapth det arms of 
equel extension id ‘called samavyapti or equipclient con- 
‘comitance. Here the vyapti holds betweeh two terms” 
which “Gre co-extensive, so that we may infer either 
‘of them trom the other, e.g. _(pameable’ snd 
hha Whatever is nameable is knowable, and vice 
verhas ~*~ 


212 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPBY 


. For any inference the minimum condition is some kind 
Yof vpapti between the middie and the major term. This 
satisfies the fundamental Jaw of sylingistic inference that 
one of the premiser must be .unjversal. Now the vyapti 
between the iniddle end the major term means generally 
a relation of co-existence (sahacarya) between the two, 6.9. 
‘wherever there. is smoke, there is fire.” _ avery case of 
co-existence, however, 1g nota case of vyapti. Inm many 
instaneés"fYé May “Go-SxTst with smoke, Sul there is no 


ee here cag be fre ene tion between fire and smoke,~ 
since There neay by te without stole. Tis reseon is is that 
in su 6 relation of co-existence is depen pendent on 
, certain conditions (upgdhi) other than the terms related. 
Thus the présence of smoke in fire is conditione by wet 


fuel (ardrendhans). So we are to. § vyapti is that 
Vyepti (s aa invati lation of co-existence between the 
able and unconditional =! @ major term which 


relation of concomt- i8 “tidependent of ll conditions. 
ance between the It is an invariablé and unconditional 
pe and msjor relation of  coiicomitance ~(niyata 
snaupadhika | sarhbandba)- between 
the middle and the major term. 

The second ¢ question is : ; Howie vyapti_Imawn? How 
do we get a universalproposition ‘like 

Different methods of ‘‘all smoky objects are fiery,”’ or ‘‘all 
ascertaining vyapti. men are mortal’’? This-is the problem 
of induction. "For the Carvakas, who 

are radical empiricists, there is no roblem, because there 
is ledge. All the 
i h ich admit the validity 

igs problem in some way or other. 
e B the knowledge 


The Buddhat metbed. of universal —propasitions on the 
principles of causality and essential 


identity, which they regard as a priori and necessary 
principles of human thought and action. If two things 
are related as cause and effect, wa know that they are 
universally related, for there cannot be any effeet without 
its cause. To determine the causal relation between 
them, the Buddhists adopt the method of paficakirani 
which is as follows: (a) neither the cause nor the effect 
is perceived, (b) the cause is perceived, (c) immediately, the 
effect is perceived, (2) the cause disappears, (¢) imme- 
diately, the effect disappears. Similarly, if two things are 
essentially identical (i.e. possess # Common essence), they 







of inference try lo slove 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 213 


must be universally related. Ali men are animals, because 
animality belongs to the essence of both, and men without 
animality will ‘et be men. LT 
e Vedantins bold that vyapti or the universal pro- 
—————————position is the n induction 
The  Vedantin’s by simple enumeration. erived 
method. from” The Uncdttradicted experience of 
agreement in presence between two 
things. When we find’ that two things go together or 
co-exist, and-that there is no exception to their relation 
(vyabhiciradaréane ati sahaciradaréanam), we may take 
them as universally related. — ae 
Thé Naiydyikas agree with the Vedinting in holding that 
vyapti is established by the uncontradicved experience 6 


the relation between two things, and not on any @ priori 
principle like~causality or — essential identity. They, 
however, go furtber than the Vedantins and supplement 
uncontradicted’ experience of the relation between two 
facts by tarka or indirect proof and by simanyalakgana 
: ’ perception. The Nyaya method of © 

rhe Nyfys method induction or generalisation may be 

which ireludes— Bue ation _Mgy 

analysed “into the _ following steps. 

First we observe that there is a relation of . agreement 
in presence (anvaya) between two 

(a) anvaya things. or that in all cages in which 
one is present, the otheralso is present, 

c.g, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, Secondly, we 
see that there is uniform a i (vyatireka) 
bétweeit “them, ¢.g. wherever there 
is no fire, there is no_ smoke. 
These two steps taken together correspond very. well to 
Mill’s Joint Method of Agreemént in presence and inv 
absence. Thirdly, we do not observe any contrary instance 
in which one of them is present 
without the other (vyabhicaragraha). 
From this we may conclude that there must be a natural 
relation of invariable concomitance between the two things. 
Still we cannot be sure if the relation in question is 
unconditional or free froma upadhis, which a real vyipti 
must be. Hence the fourth step of the inductive method is 
elimination of upadhis or conditions on 

(@) upidhinirdss, which the relation may be possibly 
dependent (upadhinirisa). I put on 

the switch and there is light ; if I do not, there is no light. 
From this if anybody concludes that there is a vyépti or 






(by vyatireka, 


(c) vyabbicdrigraba. 


214 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


invariable relation between switching on and lightiag the 
room, then he would commit the mistake of ignoring the 
upadchi or condition, viz. the electric current, in the presence 
of which alone there can be light. This upadhi, viz. electric 
current, must be present when there is light, but it may not 
be present wherever there is switching on. So an upadbi is‘ 
defined as aterm which is co-extensive with the major . 
(sidhyasamavyapta) but not with the middle term of an ' 
inference (avyaéptasidhana). Taking the stock example, 
when one infers the existence of smoke from fire, one relies 
onthe conditional relation of fire to smoke, since fire is 
attended with smoke on the condition of its being fire from 
‘* wet fuel,”’? It will be seen bere tbhit the condition 
“wet fuel ”’ is always related to the major term “ smoky,” 
but not so related to the middle term “‘fire,’’ as there are 
cases of fire without’ wet fuel.” Hence to eliminate the 
suspected conditions of an invariable relation between two 
things we inust make repeated observation (bhiyodargana) 
of their agreement in presence and in absence under 
varying circumstances. If in the course of this process 
we see that there is no material circumstance which is 
present or absent just when the major term is present or 
absent, we are to understand that its concomitance with 
the middle term is unconditional. In this way we can 
exclude all the suspected conditions of a relation of invari- 
able concomitance between the middle and the major 
term and say that it is a relution of vyapti or invariable 
and unconditional concomitance. 

But there is still room for a sceptical doubt about 
the ha or universal proposition thus arrived at. It 
may be urged by 2 sceptic like Hume or the Carvika 
that so far as our past and present experience is concerned, 
there is no exception to the uniform relation of concomi- 
tence between smoke and fire. But there is no knowing 
whether this relation holds good in distant regions, like the 
planets, or will hold good in the remote future. To end 
this sceptical doubt, the Naiyayikas try next to fortify 
the induction by tarka, The proposi- 
tion ‘all smoky objects are fiery ’’ 





(e) tarka, 


1 The inference is like this : ‘Whatever is fiery is smoky, X is fiery, 
therefore X is smeky.’' Here the conclusion is cantradicted by the red- 
hot iron ball, lightning, ete. The reason is that the relation of the 
middle “' fiery ** to the major ‘‘ smoky "’ is conditional! on ite being fiery 
* yom “* wet fuel.” 7 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY . 215 


may be indirectly proved by o tarka like this: If this 
proposition is not true, then its contradictory, ‘‘ some 
smoky objects are not fiery,’’ must be true. This means 
that there may be smoke without fire. But this supposi- 
tion is contradicted by the law of universal causation, for 
to say that there may be smoke without fire is just to say 
that there may be an effect without a cause (since fire is 
the only known cause of smoke). If any one has the 
obstinacy to say that sometimes there may be effects 
without causes, he must be silenced by reference to thea 
practical contradictions (vyighita) involved in his position. 
If there can be an effect without a cause, why seek for fire 
to smoke your cigar or to cook your food? This process of 
indirect proof in the Nydya may be said to correspond 
roughly to the method of reductio ad absurdum in Western 
logic. 
: Although the Naiyayikas take great pains to establish 
: vyapti or a universal proposition on 
(f) simanyeleksens =the ground of the observation of parti- 
Peroeption: cular facts, still they feel that a 
generalisation from particulars as mere particulars cannot 
give us that certainty which we claim when we lay down 
a general proposition like ‘‘ all men are mortal.’’ The 
proposition ‘‘ aj] crows are black ’’ is not so certain as the 
proposition ‘‘ all men are mortal.’’ We find it less difficult 
to think of a crow which is not black, than to think of a 
man who is not mortal. Just as a cuckoo may be black or 
rey and spotted, so crows may be black or dark, grey or 
bean: We cannot, however, seriously and honestly think 
of ourselves as immortal, and regulate our practical acti- 
vities accordingly. Why this difference :n the sense of 
security or certa‘nty? The answer that naturally suggests 
itself, and that not unreasonably, is that while there is 
nothing in the nature of a crow to prevent it from being 
grey or brown, there seems to be something in the nature 
of man that makes him mortal. We say that all crows 
are black, not because they cannot be otherwise, but 
because they happen to be so, as far as we have seen. 
On the other hand, we say that all men are mortal because 
they are men, i.e. because they possess some essential 
nature, manhood, which is related to mortality. This 
becomes clear when we say that ‘' A, B, C are mortal, 
not because they are A, B, C but because they are men.” 
It follows from this that an inductive generalisation muat 
be ultimately based on the knowledge of the essential 


216 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


nature of things, i.e. the class-essence or the universal in 
them. Hence it is that the Naiyayikas finally establish 
an induction by simanyalaksana perception.’ They hold 
that a universal proposition like ‘‘ all men are mortul,’’ or 
‘‘ all smoky objects are fiery,’’ must be due to the percep- 
tion of the universal ‘‘manhood”’ as related to ‘‘mortality,’’ 
or that of ‘‘smokeness”’ as related to “ fireness.’’ It is 
only when we perceive ‘‘ manhood ’”’ as related to mortality 
that we can say that all men are mortal, for to perceive 
‘‘manhood”’ is to perceive all men so far as they are 
man-as-such, and not this or that man. “So we may say 
that the essence of induction is not an inference of the, 
form ‘‘some men are mortal, therefore all men are 
mortal.’’ This is not a logically valid inference, because 
there is,an obvious illicit distribution of the subject term 
men./ On the other hand, induction is a process of general- 
isation from the particulars of experience through the 
knowledge of the class-esseuces or universals underlying . 
such particulars.* \ 


iiv) The Classification of Inference 


As we have seen before, inference is, in Indian 
logic, a combined deductive-inductive reasoning con- 
sisting of at least three categorical propositions. All 
inferences are thus pure syllogisms of the categorical | 
type which are at once formally valid and materially 
true. Hence we have not here a classification of 
inferences into deductive and inductive, immediate and 
mediate, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed 
types. ‘The Naiydyikas give us tbree different classi- 
fications of inferences which we shall now consider. 


1 Vide Muktévali p. 280; Tattoacinlamant, ii, pp, 158-64. 

3 For a somewhat similar theory of induction the reader may be 
referred to R. M. Eaton, General Logic, Part IV. Vide The Nydya 
Theory of Knowledge, Chaps. X, XII, for a fuller account. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 217 


According to the first classification, inference is of 


two kinds, namely, svartha and 
Toference 1s svaitha 


por parartha, according parartha. This is a psychological 
as it is mesntforone- classification which has in view the 


self or for others. 
use or purpose which an inference 
serves. An inference may be intended either for the 
acquisition of some knowledge on our part or for the 
demonstration of a known truth toother persons. In 
the first case we have svarthinumana or inference for 
gueself. In the second, we have pararihanuumiana or 
inference meant for others. The first is illustrated by 
a man who first perceives a inass of gmoke in the hill, 
then remembers that there is a universal relation 
between smoke and fire, and finally infers that there 
is fire in the hill. On the other hand, an inference is 
porirtha when in making it a man aims at proving or 
demonstrating the truth of the conclusion to other 
mey. This is illustrated when a man, having , inferred 
or known the existence of firein a bill, tries to convince 
another man who doubts or questions the truth of his 
knowledge, and argues like this: ‘‘The hill must be 
fiery ; because it smokes ; and whatever is smoky is 
fiery, e.g. the kitchen: so also the hill is smoky ; 
therefore it is fiery.’’ * 


According to another classification, we have three 
' kinds of inferences, namely, piirva- 
‘It is pdrvavat or nes riser 
fepavat, according as Vat, Segavat and sémanyatodrsta, 
Mice k fron Gflestio ‘This classification has reference to 
le the nature of the vyapti or universal, 
relation between the middle and major terms. While 
1 Vide Tarkasakgraha, pp. 46-49. 
2 Vide Nydya-eat. and Bhagya, 1.1.6. 


28-—-1605B 


218 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


piurvavat and éesavat inferences are based on_ causal 
uniformity, the last is based on non-causal uniformity. 
A cause is defined as the invariable and unconditional 
antecedent of an effect. Conversely, an effeet is, the 
invariable end unconditional consequent of a cause.’ 
Accordingly, a purvavat inference is that in which we 
infer the unperceived effect from a percely BUSG, 
e.g. the inference of future rain from the appearance of 
dark heayy clouds in the sky. A éegavat Inferemee is 
' that in which we mleF-We unperceived cause from 8, 
Perceived effect, e.g. the inference SP -PAsT TaN Tom 
the swif muddy current of the-viver. In these two 
kinds of inference, the vyapli or universal relation | 
between the middie and the major term is @~Whiform - 
relation of causality between them. They are thus 
dependent on what is known as “‘scientific induction."’ 
In simanyatodrsta inference, however, the vyapti_or 
universal relation between the middle and the major 


a ete term does not depend on a causal 
It is simanyatodrste 


when based on ‘cettsin uniformity. The middle term is 
observed pointe of — rere ranean 
major neither 


general similarity be- related to the } age 


eke qiblects of ex: cause nor as an effect. We infer 

the one from the other, not because 
we know them to be causally connected, but because 
they are uniformly related in our experience. This 
is illustrated when, on seeing the different positions 
of the moon at long intervals, we infer that it moves, 
although the motion might not have been perceived 
by us. In the case of other things whenever we per- 
ceive change of position, we perceive motion also. 


1 Vide Tarkabhdgé p.2; Tarkesatgraha and Tattra-dipska, 
pp. 36-86. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 919 


From this we infer motion in the moon, although the 
movement of the planet is not perceived. Similarly, 
we may infer the cloven hoof of an unknown animal 
simply by seeing its horns. These inferences depend 
not on a causal connection, but on certain observed 
points of general similarity between different objects of 
experience. Saméanyatodrsta inference is thus similar 
to analogical argument.’ 


A third classification gives us the three kinds of 
kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and 
Inference is called anvayavyatireki inferences.* This 
et rin classification is more logical, inasmuch 
term which is always 8° it is based on the nature of the 
positively related to induction by which we get the know- 
the major term. ledge of vyipti, on which inferences 
depend. An inference is called 
kevalanvayi when it is based on “A™wHddle term which is 
always positively related to : 
knowledge of vyapti between the middle and the major 
v term is arrived at only through the method of agreement 
in presence (anvaya), since there is no negative’ instance 
of their agreement in absence. This is illustrated by the 
following inference : 


All knowable objects are nameable ; 
The pot is a knowable object 5 
Therefore the pot is nameable. 


In thie inference the major premise is a universal 
affirmative proposition in which the predicate ‘‘nameable’’ 
is affirmed of all knowsble objects. It is not really possible 
for us to deny the predicate with regard to the subject 
and say that here is a knowable object which is nob name- 
able, because we have at least to speak of it as ‘‘unname- 
able,’’ The minor premise and the conclusion of this 


1 According to another interpretation, pdrvavat inference is that 
which is based on previous experience of the ooncomitance between two 
things and éegavat is pariéega or inference by elimination, ¢.g. sound ia 
a quality, beesuse it cannot be a substance or sn activity or anything else. 

3 Vide Tarkasakgraha, pp. 61-52, Bhdsdpariccheda and Muktévali, 
pp. 149-48, 


2290 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


inference are also universal affirmative propositions and 
cannot be otherwise. Hence, in its logical form, this 
inference is a syllogism of the first mood of the first figure, 
technically called Barbara. 
A kevalavyatireki inference is that in which the middle 
term is only sr esc related to the 
; .,. majorterm, It depends on 4 vyapti 
st act et bai between the absence of the major 
isoply negatively re- term and that of the middie term. 
lated to the major. Accordingly, the knowledge of vyapti 
is here arrived at only through the 
method of agreement in absence (vyatireka), since there is 
no positive instance of agreement in presence between the 
middle and the major term excepting the minor term. 
This is illustrated thus by the Naivayikas : 


What is not different-from-other-elements has no 
smell ; 

The earth has smell; 

Therefore the earth is different-from-other-elements,’ 


In this inference the major premise is a_universa) 
negative proposition in which the predicate or the middle 
term ‘‘smell’’ is denied of the subject or the negative of 
the major term ‘‘what is not different-from-other-elements.”" 
It is not possible for us to affirm the predicate ‘'smell’’ 
of any other subject excepting the earth which is the minor 
term of the inference. Hence the only way in which we 
can relate the middle to the major is the negative way of 
saying that ‘‘what is not different from the other elements 
hae no smell.”’ Hence the major premise is a universal 
negative proposition arrived at only through the method 
of agreement in absence between the major and the middle 
term. ‘The minor premise isan affirmative proposition. But 
although one of the premises is negative, the conclusion is 
affirmative, which is against the general canons of the 
syllogism in Formal I ogic. Hence we are to say that this 
inference is not any of the valid moods of sy!logism recog- 
nized by Formal Logic, nor should we forcibly convert the 
conclusion into a negative proposition. But the validity 


? Another example of such inference would be: The sun is different 
from other planets, since it is stationary, and what ie pot different from 
the other planets is pot stationary, 


THE NYZSYA PHILOSOPHY 921 


of such an inference has been admitted by Bradley as a 
special case of negative reasoring. * 

An inference is called anvayavyatireki when its middie 
term is both positively and negatively 
Re ied Guvaye aioe! related to themajor term. In it there 
bed era is a vyapti or universal relation 
ie aie nd between the middle and the major 
ths major term. term in respect of both their presence 
and ubsence. So the knowledge of 
the vyapti or the universal proposition is based on the Joint 
Method of agreement is presence (anvaya) and in absence 
(vyatireka). The universa) proposition is affirmative when 
it is the result of the observation of positive instances of 
agreement in presence, and negative when based on the 
observation of negative instonces of agreement in absence, 
between the middle and the major:term. The differece 
between the universal affirmative and negative propositions 
(anveya and vyatircka vyapti) is that the s 1dject of the 
affirmative proposition becomes predicate and the ccntradi- 
tory of the predicate becomes subject in the corresponding 
negative proposition. Hence anvayavratireki inference 
may be based on both universa! affirmative and universal 
negative propositions. It is illustrated in the following pair 

of inferences : : 

(1) All smoky objects are fiery ; 
The hill is smoky ; 
Therefore the hil] is fiery. 


(2) No non-fiery object is smoky ; 
The hill is amoky; 
Therefore the hill is fiery. 


(o) The Fallacies of Inference ” 


The fallacies of inference (hetvabhasa) in Indian 
Bt ._ logic are a]l material fallacies. So 
Fallacies in Indian : . 
logic are all material far as the logical form of inference 
ee is concerned, it is the same for all 
inferences. There is, strictly speaking, no fallacious 


1 Cf. Bradley, Principles of Logio, Vol. I, pp. 974-88. 
3 Vide Tarkesahgraha, pp. 64-60. 


222 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


form of inference in logic, since all inferences must be 
put in one or other of the valid forms. Hence if there 
is any fallacy of inference, that must be due to the 
materia] conditions on which the truth of the constituent 
premisesdepends. It may be observed here that in the 
Aristotelian classification of fallacies into those 
dictione and those extra dictionem there is no mention 
of the formal fallacies of inference like the undistributed 
middle, the illicit’ process of the major or minor term, 
and so forth. The reason for this, as Katon ' rightly 
points out, is that ‘' to one trained in the arts of 
syllogistic reasoning, they are uot sufficiently persuasive 
to find a place even ainong sham arguments.’’ As for 
Arislotle’s fallacies in dictione, i.e. those that occur 
through the ambiguous use of words, they ate all 
included by the Naiyayika among the fallacies of chala 
jati and nigrahasthdna with their numerous subdivisions. 


In Indian logic, a fallacy is technically called hetva- 
bhdsa, a word which literally means a hetu or reason 
which appears as, but really is not, a valid reason. 
The fallacies of iaference being ultimately due to snch 
fallacious reasons, the Naiyayikas consider these only, 
and not such other fallacies as may infect the consti- 
tnent propositions of the syllogism. According to 

the Naiyiyikas, there are five kinds 
a pening five kinds of fallacies. ‘These are (1; Savya- 
bhicdra, (2) Viruddha. (3) Satprati- 


pakea, (4) Asiddha, (5) Badhita.* 


1 General Logic, p, 384. 
3 Vide The Nyéya Theory of Knowledge, Ch, XIV, for a detailed 
account of the fallacies. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 993 


The first kind of fallacy is called savyabhicara or the 
irregular middle. To illustrate: 


The first is called All bipeds are rational; 
savyebhicira or the Swans are bipeds; 
irregular middle. Therefore swans aro rational. 


The conclusion of this inference is false. But why? 
Because the middle term ‘biped’ is not uniformly related 
to the major ‘rational.’ It is related to both rational and 
non-rational creatures. Such a middle term is called 
savyabhicira or the irregular middle. 

The savyabhicira hetu or the irregular middle is found 
to lead to no one single conclusion, but to different opposite 
conclusions. This fallacy occurs when the ostensible middle 
term violates the general rule of inference, namely, that it 
must be universally related to the major term, or that the 
major term must be present in all cases in which the 
middle is present. The savyabhicara middle, however, isnot 
uniformly concomitant with the major term. It 18 relat- 
ed to both the existence and the non-existence of the major 
term, and is. therefore, also called ana:kantika or an incon- 
stant concomitant of the major term. Hence from such 
a middle term we can infer both the existence and the non- 
existence of the major term, To take another illustration : 


All knowable objects are fiery ; 
The hill is knowable ; 
Therefore the hill is fiery. 


Here the middle ‘ knowable’ is indifferently related 
to both fiery objects like the kitchen, and fireless objects 
like the lake. All knowables being thus not fiery, we 
cannot argue that a hill is fiery because it is knowable. 
Rather, it is as much true to say that, for the same reason, 
the hill is fireless. : 

The second kind of fallacy is called viruddha or the 
contradictory middle. Take this in- 

: ving ference: ‘‘Airis heavy, because it is 

ac ee ee: empty.’’ In this inference the middle 
tory middle, term ‘empty ’ is contradictory because 
it disproves the heeviness of sir. Thus 

the viruddha or the contradictory middle is one which dis- 
proves the very proposition which it is meant to prove. 
This happens when the ostensivle middle term, instead of 


224 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


proving the existence of the major, in the minor, which is 
intended by it, proves its non-existence therein. Thus to 
take the Naiydyikas’ illustration, if one argues, ‘‘ Sound is 
eternal, because it ts caused,’’-we have a fallacy of the 
viruddha or contradictory. middie. The middle tearm, 
‘caused ’ does not prove the eternality of sound, but its 
\ non-oternality, because whatever is caused is non-eternal. 
The distiaction between the savyabhicara and tha viruddha 
is that while the former only fails to prove the conclusion, 
the Jatter disproves it or proves the contradictory proposi- 
tion. 
The third kind of fallacy is called satpratipakes or the 
inferentially contradicted middle. 
The third is sat This fallacy arises when the ostensib!e 
patiekte or rat middle term) of an inference is validly 
rid cuntracic'e’ contradicted by some other middle 
‘term which proves the non-existence 
of the major term of the firstinference, Thus the inference 
‘‘gound is eternal, because it is audible” is validly contra- 
dicted by another inference like this: ‘* sound js non-eternal, 
because it is produced like a pot.” Here the non-existence 
of eternality (which is the major term of the first inference) 
is proved by the second inference with its middle term 
‘ produced,’ as against the first inference with its middle 
‘audible.’ The distinction betwen the viruddha and the 
satpratipakga is that, while inthe former the middle itself 
proves the contradictory of its conclusion, in the latter the 
contradictory of the conclusion of one middle term is 
proved by another middle term. 


The fourth kind of fallacy is called asiddba or sadhya- 

: sama, i.e, the unproved middle. The 
The fourth is asiddha ®@dhyasamea middle is one which is not 
or the unproved mid- yet proved, but requires to be proved, 
dle. like the sidhya or the major term. 
This means that the sidhyasama mid- 


dle is not a proved or an established fact, but an asiddha or 
unproved assumption. The fallacy of the asiddba occurs 
when the middle term is wrongly assumed in any of the 
premises, and so cannot be taken to prove the truth of the 
conclusion. Thus when one argues, ‘‘the sky-lotus is. 
fragrant because it has lotusness in it like a natural lotus,” 
the middle has no locus standi, since the sky-lotus is non- 
éxistent, and is, therefore, asiddha or a merely assumed but 
not proved fact. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 225 


The last kind of fallacy is called baidhita or the pon- 
inferentially contradicted middle, It is 
Tho Stth is called the ostensible middie term of an in- 
badbits or the noo- ference, the non-existence of whose 
inferentially contra- 
dicted middie. major is ascertuined by means of some 
other pramana or source of knowledge. 
This j is illustrated by the argument: ‘'Fire is cold, because 
itis @ substance.’’ Here ‘coldness’ is the sidbya or 
major term, and ‘substance’ is the middle term, Now 
the non-existence of coldness, nay more, the existence 
of hotness ia perceived in fire by our sense of touch. S80 
we are to reject the middie ‘substance’ as a contradicted 
middie. The fallacy of satpratipaksa, as explained before, 
is different from this fallacy of badhita, because in the 
tormer one inference is contradicted by enother inference, 
while in the latter an inference is contradicted by 
perception or some other non-infercntial source of 
knowiedge. Another example cf badhita would be: Buger 
is sour, because it produces acidity: - ; 


4. Upamdna or Comparison 


Upamina is the third source of valid knowledge 
eeu accepted by the Nyadya. -It is the 
Belt Retine cheats source of our knowledge of the 
through @ given des- relation bet weeu a name and things 
eription . 
so named or between a word and its 
denotat:on (saijfidsaijiiisambandha). We have such 
knowledge when we are told by some authoritative 
person that a word denotes a class of objects of a 
certain description and then, on the basis ofthe given 
description, apply the word to some object or objects 
which fit in with that description, although we might 
not have seen them before. For example, a man, who: 
does not know what a gavaya’ or wild cow is, may be 
told by a forester that it 1s an animal like the cow. If 


1 In sowe parte of India, the ‘ gavays ‘is more commonly known a8 
* nilgai.® 
99-—-1605B 


996 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


subsequently he happens to meet with such an animal 
in the forest and knows or recognizes it as a gavaya, 

; then bis knowledge will be due to upamina or compari-- 
son.' A boy, who does not know what as jackdaw is, 
‘may be told by you that it is like a crow, but of bigger 
size and glazy black colour. When next he sees a 
jackdaw and says, ‘this must bea jackdaw,’ we know 
that he has learnt the denotation of the word. To 
take another example trom Dr. L.S. Stebbing,* 
suppose you do not know what ‘‘saxophone’’ means. 
You may be told by a musician: ‘“‘A saxophone ie a 
musical instrument something like a U-shaped trum- 
pet.’’ If, on subsequently seeing a saxophone, you are 
able to give its name, it will be clear that you under- 
stand what “‘saxophone’’ means. Now, upamana is 
just this way of knowing the denotation of words, or 
the relation between names and the objects denoted 
by them. The grounds of our knowledge in upamana 
are a given description of the objects to be known and 
a perception of their similarity, etc. to the familiar 
objects mentioned in the description. A man recog- 

_‘Dizes @ gavaya as such just when he perceives its simi- 

' larity to the cow and remembers the description, the 
gavaya is an animal resembling the cow.’”* 


That upamine or comparison, as explained by the 
Naiyiyikas, is a distinct source of 

Other systems onthe valid knowledge, has not been recog- 
nature of upamBna. nized in the other systems of Indian 
philosophy. The Carvakas* contend 


1 Vide Tarkasangraha, pp. 62-68, 

2 Modern Introduction to Logte, p. 19. 

8 Vide Nydya-bhagya, 1.1.6 ; Nydyamanjart, pp. 141-42. 
4 Vide Nydya sit. and Bhagyc, 2.1.42. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY _ 227 


that upamina is not a pramina at all, since it cannot give 
us any true knowledge about the denotation of words as 
maintained by the Naiyayikas. The Buddhist logicians 
recognize upaména as a form of valid knowledge, but they 
reduce it to perception and testimony, so that we do not 
require @ separate source of knowledge like upamina.’ 
So also, the Vaigesika* and the Sankhya® system explain 
upamiina as a form of inference, and therefore, neither a 
distinct type of knowledge nor an independent way of 
knowing. The Jainas‘ reduce upamana to pratyabhijfii or 
recognition. While recognizing upamana as a separate 
source of knowledge, the Mimamsakas® and the Vedantins* 
explain it in a different way which will be considered under 
the Mimarhsi,’ 


5. Sabda or Testimony 
(i) The Nature and Classification of Sabda 


Subda is the last pramana accepted by the Nydya. 
Literally abda means verba! know- 

Sabds consists, in Jedye. It is the knowledge of 
plseelbdad al aoe objecis derived from words or sen- 
Blew a trustworthy tences, All verbal knowledge, 
however. is not valid. Hence 

gabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyfya as valid 
verbal testimony. Ii consists in the assertion of a 
trustworthy person.” A verbal statement is valid when 
it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks 
the truth about anything for the guidance of other 


Vide Nytyavdritika, 1.1.6. 
Vide Tarkasahgroha and Dipikd, p. 63. 
Tattoakaumudi, 8. 
Prameyskamalamartanda, Ch, YI. 
Sastradipika, pp. 74-76. 
Vedanta-Paribhasa, Ch. ITI. 
Vide The Nydya Theory of Knowledge, Ch, XVI, for a critica: 
discussion of ppam&na ss a distinct source of knowledge. 
8 Nydye-stt, 1.1.7. 


@=—en* «= ww 


998 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


pereons.' But itiaa matter of common obrervation 
that a sentence or statement is not by itself sufficient 
‘ fo give us any knowledge of things. Nor again does 
the mere perception of the words of a sentence lead ta 
any knowledge about objects. It is only when one 
perceives the words and understands their meanings 
that be acquires any knowledge from a verbal state- 
ment. Hence while the validity of verbal knowledge 
depends on its being based on the statement of  trust- 
worthy person, its possibility depends on the under- 
istanding of the meaning of that statement. Hence 
“éabda or testimony, +as a source of valid knowledge, 
consists in understanding the meaning of the statement 
of a trustworthy person.? 


There are two ways of claesifying fabda or verbal 
There are two ways KNOwledge. According to the one, 
of classifying Sebda, there are two kinds of éabda, 
which give us (a? : ; 
drstérths and adyst- namely, that relating to perceptible 
es objects (drstartha), and that relating 
ta imperceptible objects (adrstirtha).* Under the first 
beac we are to include the trustworthy assertions of 
ordinary persone, the eaints and the scriptures in so far 
as they bear on the perceptible objects of the world, c.g. 
the evidence given by witnerres in Jaw courts, the state- 
ments of a reliable farmer about plants, the scriptural 
injunctions to perform certain rites to bring about rain- 
fall, etc. The second will include all the trnstworlby 
assertions of ordinary pereons, saints,.prophets and the 
scriptures in so far as they bear on superseneible reali- 


1 Tarkikaraked, pp. 94-08, 
3 Tarkasangraha, p. 73: Bhagdpariecheda and Muktdvali, §1. 
3 Nydya-sht., and Bhasgys, 1.1.8. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 229 


ties, e.g. the scientists’ assertions about atoms, ether,, 
electrons, vitamins, etc. the prophets’ instructions 
about virtue and vice, the scriptural texts on God, 
freedom and immortality. 
According to another classification, there are two 
kinds of testimony, the scriptural] 
ane pote end vsi-  (vaidika) and the secular (laukika).? 
In vaidika testimony we have the 
words of God, Vaidika or scriptural testimony is thus 
perfect and infallible by its very nature. But laukika 
or secular testimony is not a!l valid. It is the testi- 
mony of human beings and may, therefore, be true or 
false. Of laukika testimony, only that whic proceeds 
from trnstwortby persons is valid, but not the rest. It 
willbe observed here that the first classification of 
testimony (gabda) has reference to -the nature of the 
objects of knowledge, the second to the nature of the 
source of knowledge. But the two classifications, given 
by different Naiyayikas, agree in impiying that testi- 
mony must always be personal, i.e. based on the words 
of some trustworthy person, human or divine. Ii 
respect of their truth, however, there is no difference 
among the trustworthy statements of an ordinary 
person, u saint, a prophet, and the scriptures as 
revealed by God.’ 


(if) The Logical Structure of a Sentence 


Sabda or testimony, we have seen, gives us knowledge 
about certain things through the understanding of the 


1 Tarkasatgraha, p. 73; Tarkabhasé, p. 14. 
For a critical discussion of éabda ae an independent ecurce of 
knowledge, vide Tha Ngdyo Theory of Knowledge, pp, 881-89. 


230 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


meaning of sentences, either spoken or written by some 
authoritative person. Hence the question is: What is 
. a sentence and how does it become 
Page tend ® group intelligible ? A sentence, we are 
palate way. ged ® told, is a group of words (pada) 
arranged in a certain way. A word, 
again, is a group of letters arrauged in a fixed order.. The 
essential nature of a word Jies in its meaning. A. word is 
that which has a fixed relation to some object. so as to 
recall] it whenever it is heard or read, i.¢. it means on 
object. So we may say that words ure significant symbols. 
This capacity of words to mean their respective objects is 
called their éakti or potency, and it is said to be due to 
the will of God.? That a word has a fixed and an unulter- 
able relation to certain things only, or that this word 
always means this object and not others, is ultimately due 
to the Supreme Being who is the ground and reason of all 
the order and uniformity that we find in the world. 


A sentence (vakya) is a combination of words having a 

Pa certain meaning. Any combination 

The four conditions _ of words, however, does not make a 
of an intelligible sen- wacee 

tenes < significant sentence. The construction 

. of an intelligible sentence must con- 

form to four conditions. These are akanksi, yogyata, 

sannidhi and tatparya.° 


By akantiked or expectancy is meant that quality of the 
words of a sentence by which they 
‘a) Akétkga or the expect or imply one another. Gene- 
ert ard Sed rally speaking, a word cannot by itself 
for expressing 8 com. COnVey a complete meaning. It must 
plete sense. be brought into relation with other 
words in order to express a ful] judg- 
ment. When one bears the word ‘bring,’ he at once asks: 
‘what?’ The verb ‘bring’ has a need for some other words 
denoting some object or objects, e.g. ‘the jar.’ Akanksa is 
this mutual need that the words of a sentence have for 
one another in order to express a complete sense. 


1 Tarkasahgraha, pp. 68-64. 
3 Ibid., p. 64. 
3 Ibid.,p. 72; Bhagdpariccheda, p. 62. 


THE NYALYA PHILOSOPHY 231 


The second condition of the combination of words in a 

sentence ie their yogyaté or mutual 

o Yoayats br a fitness. 1t consists in the absence of 

woade: cass © contradiction in the relation of objects 

denoted by a sentence. When the 

meaning of a sentence is not contradicted, there is yogyaté 

or fitness between its constituent words. The sentence 

‘moisten with fire’ is faulty of unfitness, because there is 
a contradiction between ‘fire’ and ‘moistening.' 


Sannidbi or asatti is the third condition of verbal 
oe knowledge. It consists in the juxta- 
(c) Sannidhior the position or prozimity between the 
proximity between the diff favondecct t If th 
words of @ sentence. ifferent words of a sentence. If there 
is to be an intelligible sentence, then 
its constituent words must be continuous with one another 
in time or space. Spoken words cannct make a sentence 
when separated by !ong intervals of time. Similarly, 
written words cannot construct a sentence whe. they are 
separated by long intervals of space. Thus the words 
‘bring—a—cow’ will not make a sentence when uttered on 
three days or written on three pages, even though they 
possess the first two marks of ikinks&’ gr expectancy and 
yogyata or fitness. 
Tiitparya as a condition of verbal knowledge stands for 
the meaning intended to be conveyed 
(d) Tétparya or the ny g sentence. A word may mean 
meuning intended to : . , . 
be conveyed by a different things in different cuses. 
sentence. Whether it means this or that thing 
in a particular case depends on the 
intention of the person who uses the word. To understand 
the mcuning of a sentence, therefore, we must consider the 
intention of the writer or the speaker who uses it. Thus 
when a man is asked to bring a ‘bat,’ he is at a loss to 
understand whether he is told to bring a particular kind of 
animal or a wooden implement, for the word means both, 
This can be ascertained only if we know the intention of 
the sperker. Hence the understanding of a sentence 
depends on the understanding of its tatparya or intended 
meaning. In the case of ordinary sentenses—used by 
human beings, we can ascertain their tatparya from the 
context (prakarana) in which they are used. For the 
understanding of the Vedic texts we are to take the help 
of the logical rules of interpretation systematized by the 
Mimarsa, 


2382 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


III. Taz Nyasya Turory or THe PuysicaLWor.tp' 


So far we have considered the Nyaya doctrine of 
Baineye iv a word pramana or the methods of know- 
of objects of know- ledge. Now we come to the second 
ledge. > F 

topic of prameya or the objects of 
knowledge. According to the Naiyayikas, the objects 
_ of knowledge are the self, the body, the senses and 
their objects. knowledge, mind (manas), pravrtti or 
activity, dosa or the mental imperfections, pretyabbava 
or rebirth, phala or the feelings of pleasure and pain, 
duhkha or suffering, apavarga or absolute freedom from 
all suffering. There are also such objects as dravya or 
substance, guna or quality, karma or motion, samanya 
or the univereal, videsa or particularity, samavaya or 
the relation of inherence, and abbava or non-existence. 

All of these prameyas or knowables are not to be 

; found in the physical world, be- 

Bll dei etl ga cause it includes only those objects 
aod &k@és constitute that are either physical (bhita) or 
the physical world. : 
somehow belong to the world of 

physical nature. Thus the eelf, its attribute of know- 
ledge.and manas are not at all physical. Time and 
space are two substances which although different from 
the physical substances, yet somehow belong to the 
physical world. Akaéa isa physical substance which 
is not a productive cause of anything. The physical 
world is constituted by the four physical substances of 
earth, water, fire and air. The ultimate constituents 
of these four substances are the eternal and unchanging 


1 Vide Nydya-sGt. and Bhagya 1. 1. 9-22. 


THE NYLYA PHILOSOPHY 233 


atoms of earth, water, fire and air. Akiéa or ether, 
kala or time, and dik or space are eternal and infinite 
substances, each being one single whole. Thus the - 
physical world is the product of the four kinds of atoms 
of earth, water, fire and air. It contains all the 
composite products of these atoms, and their qualities 
and relations, including organic bodies, the senses, and 
the sensible qualities of things. To it belong slso the 
physical substance of 4kaéa or ether, and the non- 
physical substances of kala or time and dik or space “ 
with all their various relations and appe~ent modifica- 
tions. The Nyaya theory of the physical world, in 
respect of these and other connected subjects, is the , 
sume as that of the Vaisesika. The Vaisesika theory, a 
which isa more detailed account of the subject, is 
accepted by the Nydya as samdnatantra or an allied 
theory common to the Nyaya and the Vaigegika 
System. So we propose to take up this eubject when 
we come to the Vaisesika pmiosophy. 


IV, Tue Ixpivipua S&LF AND ITs LIBERATION 


The Nyiaya is a philosophy of life and seeks to guide 

; individual selves in their search for 

of crepes men seg trath and freedom. With regard to 

ede and the individual self § jivatma) we 

s have to consider first its nature and 

attributes, There are four inain views of the self in 

Indian philosophy. According to the Carvakas, the self 

is the living body with the attribute of consciousness. 

This is the materialistic conception of the self. The 
30—1605B 


234 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Bauddhas reduce the self toa stream of thoughtor a 
series of cognitions. Like some empiricists and sensa- 
tionists, they admit only the empirical self. The 
Advaita Vedanta takes the self as one, unchanging and 
self-shining intelligence (svaprakass caitanya) which 
is neither 6 subject nor an object, neither the ‘I’ nor 
the ‘me.’ The Viéistadvaita, Vedinta, however, holds 
that the self 1s not pure intelligence as such but an 
intelligent subject called the ego or the ‘I’ (jiata 
ahamartha evatmi). Both these views of the self may 
be called idealistic in a broad sense. 


The Nyiva-Veigesikas adopt the realistic view of 
vie the self. According to them, the 
The reslistic view of . ; : 
the self inthe Nyaya- self is a unique substance, to which 
Nategike s7stel- all cognitions, feelings and cona- 
tions belong as its attributes. Desire, aversion and 
volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are all qualities 
of the eoul. These cannot belong to the physical subs- 
tances, since they are not physical quulities perceived 
by the external senses. Hence we must admit that 
they are the peculiar properties of some substance other 
than and different from all physical substances. There 
are different selves in different bodies, because their 
experiences do not overlap but are kept distinct. The 
self is indestructible and eternal. It is infinite or 
ubiquitous (vibhu), since it is not limited by time and 
space" 


1 NyAya-bhagya, 1. 1. 10; Padarthadharmasangraha, pp. 90. {: 
Tarkabhagé, pp. 1819. 


THE NYXYA PHILOSOPHY 235 


The body or the senses cannot be the self because 
: consciousness cannot be the attri- 
fica ia bol cee: bute of the material body or the 
manus and the stream senses, The body is, by itself, un- 
of consciousness. ; > 
' conscious and unintelligent. The 
senses cannot explain functions like imagination, 
memory, ideation, e'c., which are independent of the 
external senses. ‘he manas too cannot take the place 
of the self. Ifthe manas be, as the Nyaya-Vaisegikas 
hold, an atomic and, therefore, imperceptible substance, 
the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., which should 
belong tothe manas, must be equafly imperceptible. 
But pleasure and pain are experienced or perceived 
by us. Nor can the self be identified with the sermes 
of cogoitionsas in Bauddha philosophy, for then 
memory becomes inexplicable. No member of a mere 
series of cognitions can, like a bead of the rosary, 
know what has preceded it or what will succeed it. 
The Advaita Vedintin’s idea of tha self as eternal self- 
shining intelligence is no more acceptable to the Naiya- 
yika than that of the Buddhists. There is no such 
thing as pure intelligence unrelated to some subject 
and object. Intelligence cannot subsist without a 
certain locus. Hence the self is not intelligence as 
such, but a substance having inteiligence as ita attri- 
bute. The self is not mere consciousness or knowledge, 
but @ knower, an ego or the ‘]' (abankdragraya), and 
also an enjoyer (bhokta)’. 


' Bhasapanccheda and Mukldcais, 46-50, Nyaya-siit. and Bhagya, 
3.1.4. 


286 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Although knowledge or consciousness belongs to the 
Consciousness 18 not self as an attribute, yet it ie not an 
an essential atiribute essential and inseparable attribute 
of the sou] substance. i ee . 
of it. All cognitions or conscious 
states arise in the self when it is related to the manas, 
and the manas is related to the senses, and senses 
come in contact with the external objects. Otherwise, 
there will be no consciousness in the self. In its dis- 
embodied condition, therefore, the self will have no 
knowledge or consciousness, Thus the attributes of 
cognition, feeling and conation—in a word, conscious- 
ness—is an accidental attribute of the self, the accident 
being its relation to the body." 


How do we know that there is any self of the indivi- 
Proofs for the exis  2U8!, which is distinct from his body, 
tence of the self. |‘ bis senses and mind? Some old 
Naiyayikas? seem to think that there 

cannot he a perception or direct cognition of the self. 
According to them, the self is known either from the 
testimony of spiritual authorities or by inference from the 
functions of desire, aversion and volition, the feclings of 
pleasure and pain, and the phenomenon of knowledge in 
us. That we have desire, aversion, etc., no body can 
doubt. But these cannot be explained unless we admit 
a permanent self. To desire an object is to strive to 
obtain it as something pleasurable. But before we obtain 
it, we cannot get any pleasure out of it. So in desiring 
the object we only judge it to be similar to such objects 
as were found to be pleasurable in the past. This means 
that desire supposes some permanent self which had ex- 
perienced pleasure in relation to certain objects in the 
past and which considers a present object to be similar to 
any of those past objects, and so strives to get possession 
of it. Similarly, aversion and volition cannot be explained 


1 Varitika, 2,1, 22; Nyayamanijari, p. 432, 
2 Vide Nydya-bhagya, 1. 1, 9-10 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 237 


without a permanent sel{, The feelings of pleasure or 
pain also arise in an individual when he gets something 
considered to be the means of attaining a remembered 
pleasure, or gets into something which had previously led 
to a painful experience. So too kmowledge as a process 
of reflective thinking requires a permanent self which first 
desires t¢ know something, then reflects on it und finally 
attains certain knowledge about it. All these phenomena 
of desire, etc., cannot be explained either by the body or 
the senses or the mind as a series of cognitions or a stream 
of consciousness, Just as the experience of one man can- 
not be remembered by another man, so the body or the 
senses which are really series of different physiological 
states and stages, and the mind or the empirical self, 
which is admittedly an aggregate of different momentary 
psychical states and processes, cannot explain the pheno- 
mena of desire, aversion and volition, pleasure, pain and 
cognition.' 
The later Naiyiyikas go a step further and maintain 
| ‘ that the self is directly known through 
ae ri gar ale internal or mental perception (ma- 
perception. nasapratyaksa). Of course, when 
its existence is denied or doubted by 
anyone, the self must be inferred and proved in the way 
explained above. The mental perception of the self may 
take either of two forms. It may be a perception in the 
form of pure self-consciousness, which is due to a contuct 
between the mind and the pure self, and is expressed in 
the judgment ‘Iam.’ According to some Naiyayikas, 
however, the pure self cannot be an object of perception. 
The self is perceived only through some such quality of it as 
cognition, feeling or willing, and so the perceptual judgment, 
is in the form, ‘I um knowing,’ ‘I am happy’, and so forth. 
We do not perceive the self as such, but as knowing or feel- 
ing or domg something. Hence  self-consciousness is a 
menial perception of the self as present in some mode of 
consciousness. While one’s own self can be percvived, 
other selves in other hodies can only be inferred from their 
intelligent bodily actions, since these ’cannot be explained 
by the unintelligent body and require a conscious self for 
their performance.* 


} Vide Rhagya, 1. 1. 10. 
7 Vide Torkabhagd, p.G: Tarkakaumudi, p. 8; Bhasdpariccheda 
aud Muklavali, 49-50. 


238 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The end cf almost all the systems of Indian 
oo philosophy is the attainment of 
aliberation 1s free: rpukti or liberation for the indivi- 
woftering. dual self. This is eepecially true 
of the Nyéya system which proposes, at the very out- 
set, to give us a knowledge of reality or realities for 
the realization of the bighest good or the summum 
bonum of our life. The different systems, however, 
give us d:fferent descriptions of this consummate state 
of the coul’s existence. For the Naiyiyikas it isa 
state of negation, complete and absolute, of all pain 
and suffermg. Apavarga or Jiberation is absolute 
freedom from pain. This implies that it 1s a state in 
which the soul is released from all the bonds of its 
connection with the body and the senses. So long as 
the soul is conjoined with a body, it is impossible for 
it to attain the state of uiter freedom from pain. The 
body with the sense organs being there, we cannot 
possibly prevent their contact with undesirable and 
unpleasant objects, and so must submit to the inevi- 
table experience of painful feelings. Hence in 
liberation, the soul must be free from the shackles of 
the body and the senses. But when thus severed from 
the body, the soul ceases to have 

In it the self ceases not only painful but also pleasur- 


to have any experi- 
ence, painfulor plea able experiences, nay more, it 


sulable, and exists a8 

& pure substance de- ceases to have any experience or 
void of consciouaness. -oneciousness. So in liberation the 
self exists as a pure substance free from al} connection 
with the body, neither suffering pain, nor enjoying 
pleasure, nor having consciousness even. Liberation 
is the negation of pain, not in the sense of a suspen- 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 239 


sion of it for a longer or shorter period of time, as in 
a good sleep or a state of recovery from some disease 
or that of relief from some bodily or mental affliction. 
It is absolute freedom from pain for all time to come. 
It is just that supreme condition of the soul which has 
been variously described in the scriptures as ‘freedom from 
fear’ (abbayam), ‘freedom from decay and change’ (aja- 
ram), ‘freedom from death’ (amrtyupadam), and so forth.” 
To attain liberation one must acquire a true know- 
ledge_of the self and all other objects of experience. 
(tattva-jfidna). He must know the self as distinct from 
the body, the mind, the senses, etc. For this he should 
first listen to the scriptural instruc- 

The way to attain- tions about the self (éravana). Then, 


ment o! liberation. : 
he should firmly establish the know- 
ledge of the self by means of reasoning (manana). 


Finally, be must meditate on the self in conformity 
with the principles of yoga (nididhyadsana). These help 
him to realize the true nature of the self as distinct 
from the body and all other objects. With this reali- 
zaticn, the wrong knowledge (mithya-jidna) that ‘I am 
the body and the mind’ is destroyed, and one ceases to 
be moved to action (pravrtti) by passions and impulses 
(doga). When aman becomes thus free from desires 
and impulses, be ceases to be affected by the effects of 
his present acticns, done with no desire for fruits. 
His past karmas or deeds being exhausted by producing 
their effects, the individual has to undergo no more birth 
in this world (janma). The cessation of birth means the 
end of his connecticn with the body and, consequently, 
of al) pain and suffering (dubkba); and thatis liberation.’ 


1 Vide Bhdgya,1, 1. 23. cf. Praina Upinigad, 5. 7. 
2 Cf. Bhagya,1. 1.2; Tarkasatgraha and Drpika, pp. 106-107. 


940 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


V. Tae Nysya THEOLOGY 


It isby no means true to say that the Nydya and 
the Vaisesitka Sitra make no men- 
‘coe. fe, Godin tion of God.’ We do find short 
gika siitras. references to the Divine Being in 
both the sitras.* The later Naiyayikas give us an, 
elaborate theory of God and connect it with the 
doctrine of liberation. According to these Naiyayikas, 
the individual self can attain true knowledge of realities 
and, through it, the state of liberation only by the 
prace of God. Without God’s grace neither the true 
knowledge of the categories of philosophy aor the 
highest end of liberation is attainable by any individual 
being of the world. So the questions that arise are: 
What is God? How do we know that God exists? 


1. The Idea of God 


God is the ultimate cause of the creation, main- 
tenance and destruction of the 
indie : ‘eit segs world. He does not create the 
creates, maintains aud =world out of nothing. but out of 
destroys the world. 5 
eternal atoms, space, tine, ether, 
minds (manas) and souls. The creation of the world 
means the ordering of the eternal entities, which are 
coexistent with God, into # moral world, in which in- 
dividual selves enjoy and suffer according to the merit 
and demerit of their actions, and all physical objects 
serve a8 means to the moral and spiritual ends of our 


1 Vide Hiriyanoa, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 242. 
3 Vide Nyaya-sat., 4.1, 19.21; VatSesika-sitt., 2. 1, 17-19, 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 941 


life. God is thus the creator of the world in the sense 
of being the first efficient cause of the world and not 
its material cause, i.e. a sort of demiurgus or a 
builder of the ordered universe. He is also the pre- 
server of the world in so far as the world is kept in 
existence by the willof God. So also He is the des- 
troyer who lets loose the forces of destruction when the 
exigencies of the moral world require it. ‘Then, God is 
one, infinite and eternal, since the world of space and 
time, minds and souls does not Jimit Him, but is 
related to Him as a body to the self which resides in 
it. He is omnipotent, although He :s guided in His 
activities by moral considerations of the merit and de- 
merit of human actions. He is omniscient in so far as 
He possesses right knowledge of all things and events. 
He has eternal intelligence as a power of direct and 
steadfast cognition of all objects. Etérnal intelligence 
is only an inseparable attribute of God, not His very 
essence as maintained in the Advaita Vedinta. He 
possesses to the fullall the six perfections (sadaisvaryya) 
and is majestic, almighty, all-glorious, infinitely beauti- 
ful, und possessed of infinite knowledge and perfect 
freedum from attachment. * 
Just as God is the efficient cause of the world, so 
He is the directive cause of the 
eer a Hees actions of all living beings. No 
pain includiug our- creature, not even man, is abso- 
lutely free in his actions. He is 
relatively free, t.e. his actions are done by him 
under the direction und guidance of the Divine 
Being. Just as a wise and benevolent father 


1 Vide Saddarsana, Ch. 1, Kusumanjali, 5. 
3i-- 16068 


942 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


directs his son to do certain things, according to his 
gifts, capacities and previous attainments, so God 
directs all living beings to do such actions and feel such 
natura] consequences thereof as are consistent with their 
past conduct and character. While man is the efficient 
instrumental cause of his actions, God is their efficient 
directive cause (prayojoka karté). Thus God is the 
moral governor of the world of living beings including 
ourselves, the impartial dispenser of the fruits of our 
actions (karmaphaladala), and the supreme arbiter of 
our joys and sorrows. * 


2. Proufs for the Existence of God 


Now the more important question which naturally 
arises here is this: What are the proofs for the exist- 
ence of God? The Nyilya -Vaisesikas have to their 
credit an array of proofs which include almost all tbe 
arguments given in Western philosophy for God's 
existence. ‘There are «xs many as ten proofs, of 
which the more important may be considered here. 


(1)- The Causal Argument 


‘All composite objects of the world, formed by the 
combination of atoms (e.g. moun- 
All composite and ; 5 
chad coneirat tte tains, seas, etc.), must have a cause 
world must have an because they are of the nature of 
intelligent maker who i ; 
is omnipotent and effects, like a pot. ‘That all such 
omniscient, and thet objects of the world are effects 
follows first from their being made 
up of parts (savayava) and secondly, from their possess- 


ing an iniermediate magnitude (avantaramahattva). 


1 Vide Nydya-bhagya, 4.1 21. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 243 


Space, time, ether and self are not effects, because thesé 
are infinite substances, not made up of parts. Atoms 
of earth, water, light and air, and ihe mind are not the 
effects of any cause, because they are simple, indivisible 
and infinitesimal substances. All other composite 
objects of the world, like mountains and seas, the 
sun and the moon, the stars and the planets must 
be the effects of.some cause, since they are both made 
up of parts and possess Jimifed dimensions. These 
objects are what they are because of the concurrence 
of a number of material causes. Therefore, there must 
be an intelligent cause (karta), for all these effects. 
Without the guidance of an intelligent cause the 
material causes of these things cannot attain just that 
order, direction and co-ordination which enable them 
to produce thesé“definite effects. This intelligent cause 
must have a direct knowledge of the material causes 
(the atoms) as means, a desire to attain some end, and 
the power of will to accomplish or realize the end 
(jfiana-cikirsé-krti). He must also be omniscient 
(sarvajiia), since only an omniscient being can have 
direct knowledge of such absolutely simple and 
infinitely smal] entities as atoms and the Jike. That 
is, He must be God and none but God.' 


al 


The first argument of the Naiydyikus, 16 will be 

A comparison of the Observed, resembles the causal argu- 
Naiyéyike's causal “ment for God’s existence «as explained 
argument with that of by some Western thinkers like Paul 
Weatern theologians. = Janet,” Hermann lotze’ and James 


1 Vide Kusuménjali, 5: Sarraduréana, Ch Xt: Tarkusongraha 
aud Dipikd, pp. 21-22. 

2 Vide Final Causes, Bk. 1, Ch. I. 

3 Vide Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, Chu. I and IT. 


244 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Martineau.’ According to them, the world oi finite 
objects requires an intelligent cause which gives order 
and co-ordination to their concurrent physical causes. Thus 
Janet lays it down as a principle that al] co-ordination 
between divergent phenomena implies a final cause or 
an intelligent agent who effects the complex combi- 
nation of such separate phenomena. So also, both Lotze 
and Martineau start from the fact of physical causation 
in the world and rise up to the conception of an intelligent 
principle as its ultimate ground and reason. Indeed, the 
Naiyayika view of an efficient cause as an intelligent agent 
strikingly anticipates Martineau’s idea of cause as will direc- 
ted to the realization of ends. There is, howcver, some 
differ: nec between these theists and the Naiyiyikas. Western 


theists generally believe that God is not only the cause 
of the order and Ynity of things in “The world, bub-alsa the- 


creative energy that gives existence 1o the things of Nature. 
For the Naiyayikas, however, God is only the cause of the _ 
order of Nature, and not ofthe éxistence of the ultimate 

constituents of it. Still the Nyiya conception of God 

‘cannot be called deistic. According to deism, God creates 
the Worldat'a vértaiii point of time aff then leaves it_ 
to itself, He has usually a0 concern with the affairs 

of the world, although He may occasionally interfere 

with them in case of grave emergency asa clock-maker . 
does when his manufactured clock gets oué of order, On 

the Nyiya theory, however, God maintains a continuous 

relation with the world (being conceived as not only the 

creator, but ulsu as its maintainer and destroyer). This 

is the essence of theism as distinguished from dvisin and, 

as .such, the Nyjiva conception of God is rather theistic 

than deistic. 


(11) The Argument from Adrsta 


The second argument of the Naiydyikas is this: The 
The differences in our question here is: How are we to 
lot require an explana- account for the differences in our lot 
tion which must be here on earth? Some people are 
giveninterms of cur happy and some miserable, some 
good or bad deeds. wise and some ignorant. What may 


be the cause of all these variations in our worldly life ° 


Vide A Study of Religion, BK, IT, Ch. 1. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 245 


We cannot say that they have no causes, because these 

are 60 many events in our life, and every event must have 

its cause. Now the causes which produce our joys and 

sorrows in this tife ureour own actions in this or some 
previous iife. We enjoy or suffer in this jife because of 
our good or bad actions. The law that governs the lives of 

individuft! eouls is the morai Jaw of karma which requires 

that every individual being must reap the fruits of its 

own actions, good or bad, right or wrong. There is 

nothing strange or improbable in this. It follows logically 

irom the Jaw of universal causation, which means that 
every cause must produce its effect and every effect 
must be produced by its cause. That our moral 

actions are as good causes as our physic~i actions must be 

admitted by every one who believes in the law of causation 

and extends it to the mora) world. * Just as bodily acts 

produce bodily changes, and mental functions produce 
mental changes and dispositions, so morally good or bad 

actions lead to good or bad moral consequences, such as 

reward or punishment, happiness or misery. Hencc it 1s ° 
established that our joys and sorrows are due to our own 

actions.” > 


But the next question is: How do our mora! actions 
Kivetxcle (he sateck peeiue their conmedienses which 
of merit snd demeri, ™ay be separated from them by long 
accruing from our good intervals of time ? Many of our 
and, bad aioe = joys and sorrows cannot be traced 
our fot 18 determine’ to any work done by us in this life 
h 7n actions. y 
aN aaa as Fven those that are due to acts 
done in this life, do not arise out of them immediately, 


1 If the world be created by God, who is not only omnipotent but 
also moral'y perfect, it is not unreasonable to think tbat good actions 
must produce good effects and bad actions must produce bad effects in 
our lives. If God is both the creator and moral governor of the world, 
it logically follows that human beings are responsible to God for their 
actions. It follows also that our actions are judged by God as gord or 
had, right or wrong, according as they do or do not help us to realize the 
end of our life, or to perform ont own duties to God and man. And 
from this it is but natural snd rational to conclude that God rewards us 
for our good acts and punishes ue for bedones. In other words, ip 
# world created by God, good actjona must lead to good results and evil 
actions must not {sil to lead to evil consequences. 


946 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


but after some time. A sinner m thé heyday of youth 
may bea sufferer in the infirmity of old age. So it is 
maintained that our good actions produce a certain effi- 
ciency called merit (punya), and bad actions produce some 
deficiency called demerit (piipa) in our souls and these 
persist long after our actions have ceased and disappeared. 
This stock of merit and demerit accruing from ‘good and 
bad actions 1s called adrsta. There is nothing more 
mysterious in the concept of adrsta than in those of virtue 
and vice. Just as good actions have a purifying, so bad 
actions have a corrupting effect on our nffnd. And just 
as virtue conduces to a sense of security, serenity and 
peace (in a word, happiness), so vice plunges the mind 
into the ruffled waters of suspicion, distraction and 
unessiness (in a word, unhappiness). In the same way, 
adrsta, as the surn-total of merit and demerit accruing 
from our past actions, produces our present joys and 
SOITOWS. 


But how is it that adrsta manages to produce the proper 
consequences ? It is an unintelligent 
But sdysta being an principle which cannot by itself 
unintelligent principle * Jond to just that kind and degrce of 
reguires to be guided . wean 3 
by a supremely wise Joy and sorrow which are due to 
peraop, namély,God. our past actions. So it is argued 
that adrsia must bt guided by some 
intelligent agent to produce its proper consequences. 
Individual selves cannot be sail to direct or control adfsta, 
for they do not know anything about their adreta, and 
further, it is not inircquently thatadrsta defies the control 
of their wili. So the intelligent agent, who guides adrsta 
through the proper channels to produce the proper effects, 
is the eternal, omnipotent and omniscient Divine Being. 
It is God who controls our adysta, and dispenses 
all the joys and sorrows of our life, in strict accordance 
with it. Or, as Kant would say, itis God who combines 
happiness with virtue and misery with vice. God gives us 
the fruits of our actions in the shape of enjoyments or 
afflictions in a way similar to that in which a wise and 
potent monarch rewards or punishes his subjects according 
to the merit or guilt attaching to their good or bad actions.* 


Vide Kusumanjali, 1. 


THE WHAYA PHILOSOPHY 947 


(it) The Argument from the Authoritativeness 
of the Scriptures 


Another argument for God's existence is based on the 
; authoritative character of the Vedas. 
an ee il ae The authority of the scriptures is 
authoritative texts. accepted as unquestionable and 
This is due to the infallibie in all religions. Now the 
supreme suthority of question, we are to conrider here, is 
their author who must ¢thic:; What is the source of the 
be omniscient, and se. ke 
nonie other then Goa. authority of the Vedas? According 
to the Naiyiyikas, the authority 
(primanya) of the Vedas has its source in the supreme 
authority of their author ‘aiptaprimanya). Just as the 
authoritativeness of the medical science, or for the matter oi 
that, of ali sciences, is derived from the scientists who 
founded them, so the authoritativeness of the Vedas is 
derived from some person who imparted that character to 
them. The validity of the Vedas may d¢ tested Lke that of 
any science, by jollowing their injunetions about worldly 
objects and seeing how they produce the desired results. Of 
course, the truth of other Vedic texts bearing on supersen- 
sible objects cannoi, like some scientific truths, be tested in 
this way. Still, we may accept the whuie ot the Vedas as 
valid and authoritative, in the sume way in which we 
accept the whole of a science as true when, asa matte: of 
fact, we can verify only some paris of it. So we must ez- 
plain the authority of the Vedas by referring them to some 
authoritative person. Now the mdividual self (jiva) cannot. 
be the author of the Vedas, since the supramundane reali- 
ties and the transcendent principles related in the Vedas 
cannot be objects of the knowledge of any ordinary indi- 
vidual. Hence the author of the Vedas must be the 
supreme person who has a direct knowledge of all objects, 
past, present and future, finite, infinite and infinitesimal, 
sensible and supersensible, That is, the Vedas. hke other 
scriptures, are revealed by God.’ 


§ Npaya-bhasya, 2. 1, 68, Kusumafjaii, b, p. 62. 


248 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
(io) The Testimony of Sruti 


Another proof of God’s existence is this ; God exists, 
because the Vedic scripture (Sruti) 
Tue Sruti bears Dears testimony to His existence. 
tertimony to the exis Here are some of the scriptural texts: 
tence of God. ‘The highest eternal self is the Lord of 
all, the ruler of all, the protector of 
all...’’ ‘‘The great unborn spirit is the receiver of al}: 
offerings and the giver of all gifts.’* ‘‘The one God lies 
hidden in all, is all-prevading, is the inmost self of all and 
the controller and sustainer of all.’'? ‘‘He is the ruler 
ofall selves and the creator of the world.’’* In the 
Bhagavadgitd also, the Lord says: ‘‘l am the Father and 
the Mother of this world, its Foster-parent, and its eternal 
and immutable God,”” ‘I am the highest end of all, the 
maintainer of all, the controller of all, the witness of all, 
the abode of all, the shelter of all, the friend of all, the 
creator of all, the destroyer of all, the substratum of all, 
and the unchanging ground of the origin and destruction 
of all.’’* : 
It will appear from the above that the érutior the 
scripture bears unmistakable testimony to the existence 
oi God. But the question that may 
tells fees agitate the mind of the reader is: 
of the seriptureon this Why should one believe in God simply 
point ? on the authority of the scriptures ? 
An ordinary man may be inclined to do 
so, if he has not the spirit of erilical enquiry in him. 
But’a critical philosopher may say that scriptural testi- 
mony has no importance for philosophy, which is satisfied 
with nothing short of logically vaiid arguments in the 
attainment of true knowledge about anything, huinan or 
divine. So long as these are not forthcoming, the appeal 
to authority is of no avail. It may also be thought that 
such logical support {for the belief in God is afforded by the 


1 Brhadéranyaku Upanigad, 4. 4. 22, 4, 1. 24. 
9 Svetasoatara Upanigad, 6, 11. 

4 Kausitaki Upanigad, 4. 18. 

1 Bhagavadyita, 9, 17-18, 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 249 


traditional proofs of God’s existence. But as Immanuel 
etic acest as pail and, after him, poser: 
n exemiration o §Lotze* huve clearly shown, none o 
Pad Re eens the so-called proofs can really prove 
shows that God can- the existence of God, To prove any- 
not be proved in any thing is to deduce it as a necessary 
heel Prva pre conclusion irom certain given pre- 
Gal esspat. - ° ~=«smises, But God being the highest of 
all premises, i.e, the uitimate reality, 
there cannot be any anterior premise or premises from 
which we can deduce God as a conclusion. The onto- 
logical proof starts from the idea ol the most perfect being 
and infers its existence on the ground that without exis- 
tence it would not be most perfect. So, the cosmological 
argument starts from the sensible wor'd asa finite and 
conditioned reality, and argues to tbe existence of an 
infinite, unconditioned and supersensible reality as the 
gruund thereof. Similarly, the teleological proof lays stress 
on the udaptation of means to ends which we find every- 
where in nature and infers the existence of an infinitely 
intelligent creator of the world. But a!l these proofs are 
vitiated by the fallacy of deducing the existence of God 
from the mere idea of Him, The idea of the most perfect 
being may involve the idea of existence, but not actual 
existence, just as the thought of one hundred rupees in my 
pocket involves the imuge or the idea of their existence, 
but not their real physical existence. So, to think of the 
conditioned world we have to think of the uncondilioned, 
or to explain the adaptation of things we lave to think of 
an intelligent cause. But to think of the existence of 
something is not to prove its existence, since the thought 
of existence is not actuul existence, 
The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the 
existence of God canvot ve proved by any argument. In 
truth, mere reasoning or logical argu- 
Experience is the ment cannot prove the existence of 
only a ee fact «<S0ything. The existence of o thing 
ae ene. om ie’ is to be known, if at all, through 
expericnce, direct or indirect. A man 
of normal vision may indirectly know what orange colour 
is, if he has seen red and yellow, but no orange as yet. 
But a man who is born blind can never know what coluur 


Vide B. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol, II, Ch. XII. 
% Vide Outlines of o Philosophy of Religion, Ch. I. 
82— 160513 


250 AN INTRODUCTION TO INVIAN PHILOSOPHY 


is, however much he may argue and reason logically, If 
by some surgical operation, the man is blessed with the 
power of vision, @ single glance at some coloured ddjects 
shall reveal to him the world of colours. Lotze’ told us 
the truth about our knowledge of God when he said: 
‘Therefore, all proofs that God exists are pleas put 
forward in justification of our faith and of the particular 
way in which we feel that we must apprehend this 
highest principle.’’ This point becomes more clear 
when in his criticism of Anselm’s form of the ontological 
roof, he observes: ‘‘ To him (Anselm) the assumption 
that it (God) does not exist seemed to conflict with 
that immediate conviction of its reality, which all our 
theoretic, aesthetic. and moral activities constrain our 
souls to entertain’. ‘‘Although,’’ he goes on to say, 
** weak enough as a proof, Anselm's argument expresses an 
immediate fact about our minds, namely that impulse 
which we experience towards the supersensuous, and that 


God"s existence must 
be known = through 
direct experience and 
not by means of 
reasoning. 


faith in its truth which is the starting- 
point of all religion.’’ It bdecomes 
adundantly cieur from all this that 
God must be known through direct ex- 
« perience and not through any process 


of reasoning, If there is this direct experience, no proof is 
necessary, just as no reasoning is needed to convince you 
that you are now reading this book. If there ia no direct 
experience of God, we may pile up proof after proof and 
yet remain as unconvinced as ever with regard to the 


existence of God. 


For the knowledge of God or of any supersensuous 


Those who have no 
direct experience of 
God, must depend, for 
their knowledge sbout 
God, cn others who 
have that direct ex- 
perience. The éruti 
being the expression 
of euch direct ex- 
perience of God is a 
just source of our 
belief in God. 


reality, those who have no direct ex- 
perience must dapend on the authority 
of those rare blessed souls who are 
pure in heart and have seen God, 
like the Upanigadic seers and the 
Christian saints. So, fruti or the 
scripture, being the emoodiment of 
the knowledge imparted by the 
enlightened sages and seers of God, 
may be accepted as a source of right 
knowledge about God. Just as the 
great scientists and their sciences 


bave been, for all ages, the source of our knowledge of 


1 Op. cit., pp. ©, 12 (italics ours). 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY O51 


many scientific truths, co the Vedas and Upanigads (éruti) 
constitute a just ground of our belief in one universal 
spiritual truth, i.¢. God." 


3. Anti-theistic Arguments 


It may. be objected here that the last two proofs given 
above involve us in the fallacy of 
The charge of arguing reasoning in a circle. In the third 
a ours ilar proof, it is shown that God is the 
anewered. P author of the Vedas, while in the 
fourth, the Vedas are exhibited as the 
ground of our knowledge of God. It appears, therefore, 
that we prove God’s existence from the Vedas and that 
of the Vedas by the revelation of God. But that there is 
really no circular reusoning here becomes clear when we 
distinguish Letween the order of knowledge and the order 
of existence. In the order of existence, God 1s first and 
creates the Vedas, impurting to them their authoritative 
character. In the order of knowledge, however, the Vedas 
come Grst, and we rise from them to a knowledge of God. 
But for our knowledge of the Vedng, we need not be 
necessarily and absolutely dependent on God, since these 
may be learned from an ciigible and efficient, teacher. 
Al! reciprocal dependence is not ressoning in a eircle. Tt 
is only when there is reciprocal dependence with reference 
to the same order or within the same universe of discourse, 
that there arises the fallacy of reusoning io a circle. In 
the present case, however, the Vedas depend cn God for 
their existence but not for their knowledge, while Ged 
depends on the Vedes for cur knowledge of Him but not 
for His existence. So there is really no faliacy of reason- 
ing in a cireie.* 
Another objection to the Nyaya theory of God is this: 
If God be the creator of the world, 
He must have a body, since without 
body no action is possible. This 
objection, the Naiydyikas reply, fails because it is caught 
between the two horns of a dilemma. If God’s existence 
is proved by éruti, then the objection stands precluded, for 
there ig no point in arguing against what is already proved. 
On the other hand, if the very ezistence of God is not 


Reply to the second 
obection. 


1 Cf, Kusumanjals, 5- 
3 Vide Sorvadartana, Cb. X1. 


932 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


proved, ihere is no basis for an argument ‘against the 
possibility of his action without a body. 
Still another anti-theistic pine ar is based on the 
; het problem of the end of creation, In 
The third ob‘ection gyeating the world God must have 
and the Naiydyika’s : 
reply to it. some end in view, for nobody acts 
without a desire to realize-some end, 
But what may be the end of God’s creative activity ? It 
cannot be any end of His own, because there are no un- 
fulfilled desires or unnitained ends in the Divine Being 
who is perfect, Nor can it be the end or good ot others, 
He who labours enly for others must not be regarded as 
an intelligent person. It cannot be said that God was 
moved by compassion (karuna) in the act of creation. If 
it were really so, He should have made all his creatures 
perfectly happy and not so miserable as we actually find 
them. Compassion is just the desire to relieve the suffer- 
ing of other creatures without any self-interest. So it 
follows that tho world is not created by God. The 
Naiyayikas meet this objection thus: ‘'God’s action in 
creation is indeed caused by compassicn. But we must 
not forget that the idea of creation which consists oniy 
of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things. 
Certain eventual differences in the form of happiness or 
misery are bound to arise out of the good or bad actions 
of the beings who are tobe created. It cannot be said 
that this will limit God’s independence in co far as His 
compassionate Creative act depends on the actions of other 
beings. Ono’s own body does not hinder one. Rather. it 
helps one to act and achieve one’s ends. In a like 
manner, the created world dees not hinder and limit God, 
but serves as the means for the realization of God's moral 
ends and rational purposes.’’? 


VI. CoNcLUSION 


The value of the Nyaya system lies eepecially 
in its methodology or theory of knowledge on which it 
‘buildsits philosophy. One of the chargesagainst Indian 
philosophy is that it is based on religious authority and 


1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 


THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY 253 


is, therefore, dogmatic and not critical, The Nyaya 
philosophy is a standing repudiation of this charge. 
The theory of knowledge, formulated by the Nyaya, 
is made the basis not only of the Nyaya-Vaiéesika, but 
also of other Indian systeme, with slight modifications. 

he Nyaya applies the method of logical criticism to 
tolve the problems of life and reality. It is by means 
of a sound logic that it finds out the truth and defends 
it against hostile criticism. But the Nyaya theory of 
pluralistic realism is not as satisfying as its logic. 
Here we have a common-sense view of the world as 
a system of many independent realities, like material 
atoms, minds, individual souls and God, which are 
externally related to one another in space, time and 
akiéa. It does not give usa systematic philosophy 
of the world as a whole in the light of one universal 
absolute principle. The philosophical position of the 
Nydaya is said to be lower than that of the Sankbya or 
the Vedinta. This becomes manifest when we con- 
tider its theory of the individual self and God. 
According to it, the individual self is a substance which 
ig not essentially conscious and intelligent, but is 
accidentally qualified by consciousness when associated 
with a body. But such a view of the self is contra- 
dicted by the evidence of our direct experience which 
reveals the self as an essentially conscious subject and 
not as a thing with the quality of consciousness. 
Further, on this view, the liberated self has no cons- 
ciousness and is, therefore, indistinguihsable from a 
material substance. The Nyaya conception of God as 
the architect of the world, its efficient but not material 
cause, bas an obvious reference to human relations and 


254 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


reduces God to the position of a human artificer who 
makes things out of given material. There is indeed 
the suggestion that the world of things and beings is 
related to God as one’s body is to one’s self. But this 
idea is not properly developed.in the direction of a full- 
fledged theism. Still, as a philosophy of life, the 
Nyaya theism isno less edifying and aseuring than 
other forms of it. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 


A SELECT -BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Pragastapada 


Sridhara 


Ganganath Jha 


Jagadiéa Tarkalankara 
Vallabhicarya 


Laugaksi Bhaskara 


A. B. Keith 
Madhavacarya 


Nandalal Sinha 


J.C. Chatterji 


Padartha-dharma-sangraha 
(Chowkhamba, _Bena- 
res). 

Nyd@ya-kandali (Viziana- 
gram Sanskrit Series, 
Lazarus & Co., Bena- 
res). 

Padartha-dharma-sangraha 
of Pragastapida with 
Nydya-kandali of Sri- 
dhara (Eng.  trans., 
Lazarus & Co., Bena- 
res), 

Tarkamrta (Calcutta). 
Nydya-lildvati (Nirnaya 
Sagar, Bombay). 
Tarka-kaumudi (Nirnaya 
Sagar, Bombay). 

Indian Logic and Altomism, 
Sarva-daréana-satigraha— 
Ch. on Vaigesika. 

The VaiSesika Siitras of 
Kandda (with Eng. 
trans., Indian Tress, 
Allahabad). 

The Hindu Realism 
(Indian Press, Ailaha- 
bad). 


CHAPTER VI 
THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 


I. Intropuction 


The Vaisesika system was founded by Kanada. It 
; is so named in view of the fact that 
The Vaidesika sys: | . ; 
tem was founded by ‘Visesa’ as a category of know- 
epee, ledge has been e!aborately discussed 
in it. The founder of this philosophy, we are told, 
was surnamed ‘Kanada’ because he led the life of an 
ascetic and used to live on grains of corn gleaned 
from the field. He wa» also named Ulikse. So the 
Vaiéesika philoscphy is also known as the Kanada or 
Aulukya system. 

The first systematic work of this philosophy is the 
Vaiscsika-stitra of Kanada. It is 
divided into ten adhyayas or books, 
each consisting of two dhnikas or 
sections. Pragastapaida’s Paddrtha-dharma-sangrahe 
has not the character of a Bhasya, but reads like an 
independent exposition of the Vaisesika philosophy. 
Further, we know from two commentaries’ on 
Sankara’s Sdriraka Bhasya thai Ravana, King of 
Ceylon, wrote a commentary on the Varsestka-sitra. 


Sune Inport unt 
works of the systeu. 


Udayana'’s Kirandcali and Stidbara’s Nydya-kandali 
are two excellent commentaries on Pragistapdda’s 
work. Vallabbacirsa’s Nydyu-lildvati is a valuable 
compendium of Vaisesika philosophy. The later works 
on the Vaigesika combine this system with the Nydaya. 


Lo Vide Prakata:tha and Ratnaprabhd, 2.2.11, 
83—1605B 


258 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Of these Sivaditya’s Sapta-padartht, Laugaksi Bhaskara’s 
Tarka-kaumudi and Vigvanatha’s Bhdsdpariccheda with 
its commentary Siddhdnta-mukidvali are important. 


The Nydya and the Vaigesika are allied eystems of 
; philosophy (samanatantra). They 
Nyajesyaem.” °° have the came end in view, namely, 
liberation of the individual self. 
According to both, ignorance is the root cause of all 
pain and suffering ; and liberation, which consists in 
their absolute cessation, is io be attained through a 
right knowledge of reality. There is, however, some 
difference between the two systems on two fundamental 
points. While the Nyaya accepts four independent 
sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, 
comparison and testimony, the Vaiéesika recognizes 
only two, viz. perception and inference, and reduces 
comparison and veibal testimony to perception and 
inference. Secondly, the Naiyayikas give us a list of 
sixteen padarthas which, according to them, cover the 
whole of reality and include those accepted in the other 
system. The Vaiéesikas, on the other hand, recognize 
only seven padirthas and comprebend all reals under 
them. These seven categories of reality are (1) dravya 
Pig usceweieeetics or substance, (2) guna or quality, 
of the Veiéegika (3) karma or action, (4) simanya or 
system, ! ‘6 . ‘ 
generality, (5) visesa or particula- 
rity, (6) samavaya or the relation of inherence, and (7) 
abhiiva or non-existence. The Vaisesika philosophy is 
an elaboration and a critical study of these seven cate- 
gories. 
Padartha Jiterally means the object denoted bya 
word. So by padartha we propose to mean aj] objects 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY . 289 


of knowlédge or all reals. Now, according to the 
Vaisesikas, all objects, denoted by words, may be 
. . broadly divided into two classes, 
of which six are ; 
positive and one vega. namely, being and non-being (bhava 
ae and abhiava). Being stands for all 
that is or for all positive realities, such as existent 
physical things, minds, souls, etc. Similarly, non-being 
stands for all negative facts I:ke the non-existence of 
things. There are six kinds of being or positive 
realities, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, 
particularity and inherence. To these the later 
Vaisgesikas added a seventh padartba called abhiava 
which stands for all negative facts.” 


Il. THe Carecories 


6 
1. Substance or Dravya? 


A dravya or substance is that in which a quality 
Substence is the OF an action can exist, but which is 
substiatum of qualities distinct from both. Without sub- 
and acting end ibe 3 
material cuuse of com. Stance there can be no quality or 
PrehecChIPEP: action. A thing must be or exist, if 
it is to have any quality or action belonging to it. So 
a substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. 
Ii is aleo the constitutive or material cause (sama- 
vayikirana) cf other composite things produced from 
it. Thus acloth is a composite thing formed by the 


1 Vide Tarkamsta, Ch. 1; Tarkabhagd, p.20; Vaidesika-sit., 
1.1.14, 

2 Vide Tarkasangraha, Secs, on Uddeéa and Dravys; Tarkabhaga, 
pp. 20-28 ; Vatéegike-sat., 1.1.15 


960 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


combination of a nuniber of threads of a certain colour. 
Now the threads are the materia] or constitutive causes 
of the cloth, because it is made of threads and subsists 
in them. Similarly, wood and lead are the maierial 
causes of a wocden pencil because it is made of them ' 
There are nine kinds of substances, namely, earth or 

prthivi, water or jala, lizht or tejas, 
air or vayu, ether or akaéa, time or 
kala, space or dik, soul or atma, 
and mind or manas. Of these the first five are called 
physical elements (paficabhiita), since each of them 
possesses a specific or peculiar quality (visesa guna) 
which is sensed by an external sense. Smell is the 
peculiar property of earth. Other substances have 
smell only as they are mixed up with some quantity 
of earth. There is smell! in muddy water, but no smell 
in water which is pure. Taste is the peculiar property 
of water; colour of light, touch of air, and sound of 

_) As distinguished from samavayikdrana, the cclour of the threads 
is, according to the Nydya-Vais-sika, the ssamavayikérana or non- 
constitutive ceuse cf the co'our cf the cloth. It is ihe mediate 
esuse of an effect. The colour of the threads determines the 
colonr of ibe cloth throvgh being related to the thresds wh:ch 
are the constitutive causes. There is still anotber kind of cause, 
nomely, the nimittekasana or efficient cause. It stands for that cause of 
an effect which is neither constitutive nor non-constitutive, but ali!) 
necessary for the effect. Thus the sbuttle is the efficient cause of the 
cloth, because it ia the instrument by which the combination of threads 
is effected in order to manufacture a piece of cloth. It includes also the 
directive cause (prayojaka or nirvartaka) and final cause (bhokté) of the 
effect. In relation toacloth, the weaveris the prayoiaka or directive 
cause because he is the agent who ects on and directs the previous sanser 
to bring about the effect. Soalso, the bhokt& or final cause of the clot 
is the person or persons whose purpose it serves, i.e. tbe wearer of thr 
eloth - Cf, Aristotle's classification of causes into the formal, meterial, 
efficient and final. 


‘There.are nine kinde 
of substances. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 261 


ikaéa or ether. Thece five specific qualities are sensed 
by the five external senses. Each of the senses is con- 
stituted by the physical element whose epecific quality 
is sensed by it. The sense of smell is constituted by 
the element of earth, the sense of taste by water, the 
eense of sight by light, that of touch by air, and that 
of heariug by akaéa. We find that earthy substances, 
like odoriferous particles in smelling objecis, manifest 
the quality of smell. From this we conclude that the 
senre of smell which manifests smell is constituted by 
earth. For similar reasons it is heid that the senses 
of taste, sight, touch and hearing are respectively 
made of the elements of water, light, air and ether. 


The substances of earth, water, ligit and air are 
of two kinds, mamely, eternal 
The stems of earth. (nitya) and mnon-eternal (anitya). 
water, light and sir are ; Ps 
eternal, while com. The atoms (paraminu) of earth, 
pile tanec tk water, light and air aré eternal, 
becauce an atom is partless and can 
be neither produced nor destroyed. All other kinds of 
earth, water, etc. are non-eternal, because they are 
produced by the combination of atoms, and are, there- 
fore, subject to disintegration and destruction. “We 
cannot ordinarily perceive an atom. The existence of 
atoms is known by an inference 
The existence of Jike this: The ordinary composite 
atoms is proved by in- : inn 
ference. objects of the world like jars, tables, 
and chairs, are made up of parts. 
Whatever is produced must be made up of parte, for to 
produce a thing is to combine certain parts ip a certain 
way. Now if we goon reparating the parts of a com- 
posite thing, we shall pass from larger to smaller, from 


962 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


smaller to still smaller, and from these to the smallest 
parts which cannot be further divided in any way. 
These indivisible and minutest parts are called 
paramanus or atoms. An atom cannot be produced, 
because it has no parts, and to produce means to 
combine parts. Nor can it be destroyed, for to destroy 
a thing is to break it up into its parts, whereas the 
atom has no parts. Thus being neither produced nor 
destructible the atoms or the smallest parts of a thing 
are eternal. the atoms are different in kind. There 
are four kinds of atoms, namely, of earth, water, light 
and air, each having its peculiar quality. The Vaiée- 
sika view is ihus different from that of the Greek 
atomists like Democritus who believe that all 
atoms are of the came kind. and that they differ in 
quantity and not 7 quality. 


Akita i is the Afth physica} substance which is the 
substratum of the quality of sonnd. 
_ Bitte incor, em While sound is perceived, Akaéa 
sical substance which cannot be perceived. There are 
ie imperceptible. 5 
two conditions of the external per- 
ception of a substance, namely, that it must havea 
perceptible dimension (mahattva) and manifest colour 
(adbhitaripavattva). Akdéga is not a Jimited and 
coloured substance. Akééa is an all-pervading bearer 
of the quality of sound and is inferred from the percep- 
tion of that quality. Every quality must belong to 
some substance. Sound is nota quality of earth, water, 
light and air, because the qualities of these substances 
are not perceived by the ear, while sound is perceived 
by our ears. Further, there may be sound in regions 
relatively free from the influence of these substances. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 263 


Nor can eound belong as & quality to space, time, soul 
and mind, for these exist even when there is no sound 
to qualify them. So there must be some other aub- 
stance called akdsa or ether of which sound is the 
quality. It is one and eternal because it ia not made 
up of parts and does not depend on any other substance 
for its existence. It is all-pervading in the sense that 
it has an unlimited dimension and its effect or opera- 
tion is perceived everywhere. 
Space (dik) and time (kala) are, lik> akaéa, imper- 
ceptible substances each cf which is 
Space and tine also one, eternal and all-pervading. 
ste impeiceptible sub- ne 
atances. Space is inferred as the ground] of 
our cognitions cf ‘here ’ and ‘ there,’ 
‘near’ and ‘far.’ Time is the cause of our cognitions 
of ‘past,’ ‘present’ and ‘future,’ ‘older’ and 
‘younger.’ Although one and indivisible, akaga, space 
and time are distingui-hed into different parts and 
thus conventionally spoken of as many by reasan of 
certain limiting couditions (upadhi! which affect our 
knowledge of them. Thus the expressions ‘the ether 
enclosed by a jar,’ ‘that by a house,’ ‘filled and 
empty space,’ ‘the east und the west,’ ‘a m‘nute, an 
hour and a day’ are due to the apparent distinctions, 
made by certain conditions, in what is really one ether, 
one space and one time. 


The soul (atma) is un eternal and all-pervading 
. : substance which is the substratum 
The soul is an eternal ; 
and all-perva ting sub- of the phenomena of conscious- 
stance which as the : 
substratunn of cone ness. Thereare two kinds of souls, 
ences namely, the individual soul (jivat- 


ma) and the supreme soul (paramatma or IsSvara). 


964 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The: latter is one, and is inferred as the creator of 
the world. The former is internally or mentally 
perceived as possessing some quality when, fur example, 
one says, ‘Iam happy,’ ‘Tam sorry,’ aod so forth. 
The individual self is not one but many, being different 
in different bodies. 
Manas, which is a substance, is the internal sense 
(antarindriya) for the perception of 
Manas isan atomic the individual soul and its qualities, 
imperceptible Bub- A . ‘ 
stance, Proofs forthe like pleasureand pain. Itis atomic 
oristence of manaeor and cannot, therefore, be perceived. 
Its existence is inferred from the 
following grounds: (a) Just as in the perception of 
the external objects of the world, we require the exter- 
nal senses, so in the perception of internal objects, like 
the soul, cognition, feeling and willing, there must be 
an internal sense, to which we give the name of 
mind (manas). (b) Secondly, we find that although 
the five external senses may be in contact with 
their respective objects at the same time, we have 
not simultaneous perceptions of colour, touch, sound, 
taste and smell. But why must this be so ? If when 
talking to @ friend in your house, your eyes are in 
contact with his facial expressions, your ears are in 
contact with the rumbling sound of the tram car out- 
side, and your skin is in contact with the clothes you 
wear, you should have simultaneous perceptions of the 
friend’s face, of the tram car and of the clothes. But 
you do not get all these perceptions at the same time. 
This shows that over und above the contact between the 
external senses and their objects, there must be come 
other cause which limits the number of perceptions 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 265 


to one at a time, and the order of perceptions to 
one of succession, t.c. one after the other and not all 
together. Of the different objects which may be in 
contact with our external senses at one and the same 
time, we perceive only that to which we are attentive, 
This means that we must attend to, or turn our mind 
(manas) and fix it on (manoyoga), the object of percep- 
tion. So every perception requires the contact of the 
mind (manas) with the object through its contact with 
the sense organ jn question. That is, we must admit 
the existence of manas as an internal sense. That the 
Manas is partless or atcmic also follows from the 
order of succession among our experiences. If the 
miod were not an infinitesimal or partiess entity, there 
could have been simultaneous contact of its many parts 
with many senses, and so the appearance of many per- 
ceptions at one and the same time. "But as thie is not 
the case, we are to say that the manas is partless or 
atomic, and functions as an internal sense of percep- 
tion. Tz is the organ through which the soul attends to 
objects. 


2. Quality or Guna ' 


A quality or guna is defined as that which exists in 
A quality existeins 9 Substance and has no quality or 
sali 6. pear ‘a activity in itself. A substance exists 
a by itself and is the constituent 
(samavayi) cause of things. An attribute depends for 


1 Vide Vatéegike, sft., 11.10 ; Tarkasangraha, Sec. on gua; 
Tarkabhéed, pp. 24-28. 


34—-16068 


#286 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


its existence on some substance and is never a constitu- 
tive cause of anything. It isa non-constitutive or non- 
material cause of things in so far as it determines only 
their nature and character, but not their existence. All 
qualities must belong to substances and so there cannot 
be qualities of a quality. A red colour belongs to 
some thing and not to any other colour. A quality 
(guna) is an unmoving or motionless property 
of things. It inheres in the thing as something 
passive and inactive (niskriya). So it is different from 
both substance (dravya) and action (karma). 
There are altogether twenty-four kinds of qualities. 
These are riipa or colour, rasa or 
ner of ainies “four taste, gandha or smell, sparéa or 
touch, gabda or sound, sankhyé or 
number, parimana or magnitude, prthaktva or distinct- 
ness, saihyoga or conjunction, vibhaga or disjurction, 
paratva cr remoteness, aparatva or nearness, buddhi or 
cognition, sukha or pleasure, duhkha or pain, iccha or 
desire, dvesa or aversion, prayatna or effort, gurutva or 
heaviness, dravatva or fluidity, sneha or viscidity, 
saraskara or tendency, dharma or merit, and adbarima or 
demerit. Many of these qualities have subdivisions. 
Thus there are different kinds of colour like white and 
black, red and blue, yellow and green. There are diffe- 
tent kinds of taste, such as sweet, sour, bitter, etc. 
Smell is of two kinds, namely, good and bad. 
The quality of touch is of three kinds, viz. hot, 
cold, and neither hot nor cold. Sound is of two 
kinds, viz. dhvani or an inarticulate sound (e.g. the 
sound of a beil) and varna or an articulate sound (e.g. 
a letter-sound). 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY _ 267 


Number is that quality of things for which we use 
the words, one, two, three. There 
are many kinds of number from one 
upwards. Magnitude is that quality 
by which things are distinguished as large or small. It 
; : is of four kinds, viz. the atomic or- 
Magnitude isu qua- 
lity of which there are extremely small, the extremely 
tone hin great, the small and the large. 
Prthaktva is that quality by which we know that one 
thing is different and distinct from another, e g. a jar 
from a picture, a table from a chair. 


Nomber iss quality 
of things. 


Conjunction is the union between two or more 
Gato ycttea cig ania things which can exist separately, 
between two separable e.g, a book and a table. The 
things, and disjunc- : f 
tion 18 their eepara- relation between an effect and its 
PORORILER SOG/UBELIES: - Cange is Dol one of conjunction, 
since the effect cannot exist without relation to the 
cause. Disjunction is the disconnection between things, 
which ends their previous conjunction. Conjunction is 
of three kinds, according as itis due to motion in one 
of the things conjoined (as when a flying kite sits on a 
hill top), or to that of both the things (as when two 
balls moving from opposite directions meet and im- 
pinge): It may also be due to another conjunction. 
When the pen in my hand touches the table, there is 
conjunction between my hand and the table, brought 
about by the conjunction between my hand and the pen. 
Similarly, disjunction may be caused by the motion of 
one of the things disjoined, as when a bird flies away 
from a bill-top. Or, it may be due to the motion of 
both the things, as when the ballsrebound after impact. 
It may also be caused by another disjunction as when I 


268 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


drop the pen from my hand and thereby disconnect my 
hand from the table. 

Remoteness and nearness are each of two kinds, 
firea ca eiaile S namely, the temporal and the 
of remoteness ond spatial. As temporal, they mean 
vest the qualities of being older and 
younger, and as spatial, those of being far and near. 

Buddhi, knowledge or cognition, and its different 
forms have been explained before.’ Pleasure and pain, 
desire and aversion are well-known facts. Prayatna or 
effort is of three kinds, namely, 
pravriti or striving towards some 
thing, nivrtti or striving away 
from something, and jivanayoni or vital function. 
Gurutva or heaviness is the cause of the fall of bodies. 
Dravatva or fluidity is the cause of the flowing of 
cerlain substances like water, milk, air, ete. Sneha 
or viscidity is the cause of the adhesion of different 
particles of matter into the shape of a ball ora lump. 
This quality belongs exclusively to water. 

Sarmskara or tendency is of three kinds, tiz. vega or 
velocity which keeps a thing in 
notion, bhavana or menial impres- 
sions which help us to remember and recognize things, 
and sthitisthapaka or elasticity, hy which a thing tends 
towards equilibrium when disturbed, e.g. a rubber 
garter. Dharma and adharma respectively mean virtue 
and vice and are due to the performance of enjoined 
and forbidden acts. One leadsto happiness and the 
other to misery. 


Prayatoa is of three 
kinds. 


Bo also samskara. 


1 Vide Ch. V, pp. 191-93. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 269 


Thus we get a list of twenty-four qualities in the 
Vaisgesika system. Now one may 
Why just thie num- ask: Why should we admit just 
cealltioe? ier i this number? Can it not be more 
or less than that? To this we 
reply that if one takes into consideration the numerous 
subdivisions of these qualities, then their number 
would be very great. But in a classification of objects 
we are to reduce them to such kinds as are ultimate 
from a certan standpoint, i.c. do not admit of further 
reduction. So we come to the simplest forms or kinds 
of qualities. Thus while one compound colour like 
orange may be reduced to red and yellow, or a complex 
sound may be shown to arise out of the combination 
of other sounds, it is not possible for us to reduce 
colour to sound or any other quality. It is for this 
reason that we have to recognize cdlour. sound, touch, 
taste and smell ax distinct and different, kinds of 
qualities. The Vaisesika classification of qualities into 
twenty-four kinds is guided by these considerations of 
their simplicity or complexity, and reducibility or irre- 
ducibility. The gunas are what the Vaisesikas thought 
to be the simplest, passive qualities of substances. 


3. Action or Karma* 


Karma or action is physical movement. Like a 

guality, it belongs only to sub- 

Karma or action stance, but is different from both. 

ment peer are A substance is the support of both 

quality and action ; a quality is a 

1 Tarkasangraha, p. 67; Parkabhasd, p. 28; Varegika-siit , 1.1.17; 
Terkamrta, p. 90. 


. 270 AN INTRODUCTION .TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


static. character of things, but an action is dynamic. 
While a quality is a passive property that does not 
take us beyond the thing it belongs to, action is a 
transitive process by which one thing reaches another. 
So it is regarded as the independent cause of the 
conjunction and disjunction of thmgs. An action has 
no quality, because the latter belongs only to substance. 
All actions or movements must subsist in limited 
corporeal substances (mirtadravya), such as earth, 
water, light, air and the mind. So there can be no 
action or motion in the all-pervading substances lke 
akafa, space, time and the sou}. There can be no 
movement of an all-pervading thing because it cannot 
change its position. 
There are five kinds of action or movement, namely, 
utksepana or throwing upward, 
goo “avaksepana or throwing downward, 
‘ akuficana or contraction, prasdrana 
or expansion, and gamana or locomotion. Of these, 
utksepana is the cause of the contact of a body with 
some higher region, e.g. throwing a ball upward. 
Avaksepana is the cause of the contact of a body with 
some lower region, e.g. throwing down a bal] from a 
house-top. Akuficana is the cause of such closer 
contact of the parts of a body as did not previously 
exist, e.g. clenching the fingers or rolling up a cloth. 
Prasarana is the cause of the destruction of previous 
closer contact among the parts of a body, e.g. opening 
one’s clenched hand. All other kinds of actions are 
denoted by gamana. Such actions as the walking of a 
living animal, going up of flames, etc. are not separate- 
ly classed in so far as they may all be included within 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY O71 


gamena. All kinds of actions cannot be perceived. 
The action of the mind (manas) which is an imper- 
ceptible substance does not admit of ordinary perception. 
The actions or movements of perceptible subs- 
tances like earth, water and light can be perceived by 
the senses of sight and touch. 


4. Generality or Sémanya 


Things of a ceitain class bear a common name be- 
Saménys is the cless- C&Use Ley possess a common nature. 
eseence of theuniversal. Men, cowsand swans have,severally, 
tomething in common on acceunt of which they bear 
these general names. The thought of what they have 
in common, is called a general idea or clags-concept. 
Now the question is: What is it that they bave in 
common? Or, what is the something that is common 
in them, and is the ground of their being brought 
under one class and calied by the same pame? The 
first answer, which is only provisional, is that it is the 
class-essence corresponding to the class-concept. The 
Nyaya-Vaisesikas would say that it is their simanya 
or generality. Or, in the words of modern Western 
philosophers, it is the “‘ universal ’’ in them. Hence 
the previous question leads to a second, ciz what is 
simapya or the universal ? 


There are three main views of the universal or the 

class-essence in Indian philosophy. 

There are three In the Buddhist philosophy we have 
views of the universal : ares fle anaes “ys 

, 4 the nominalistic view, According to 

The Bauddhu view. , pee rieh 

it, the individual (svalaksuna) alone 

ig real and there is no class or universal other than the 

particular objects of experience. ‘The idea of sameness that 


we may have with regard to a number of individuals of a 


372 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


certain character is due to their veing called by the same 
name. It is oniy the name that is general, and the name 
does not stand for any positive essence that is present in 
all the individuals. Tt means only that the individuals 
called by one name are different from those to which u 
different name 1s given. Thus certain animals are called 
cow, not because they possess any common essence but 
because they are different from all animals that are not 
cows. So there is no universal but the name witha 
negative connotation. ' 

The Jainas? and the Advaita Vedantins® adopt the 
conceptualistic view of the universal. According to them, 
the universal does not stand for any independent cntity 

. over and above the individuals. On 
BY baie and the the other hand, it is constituted by 
, {he essential common attributes of 
all the individuals. Sothe universal is not separate from 
the individuals, but is identical with them in point of 
existence. The universal and the individual are related by 
way of identity. The universal has existence, not in our 
mind only, but also in the particular objects of experience. 
It does not, however. come to them from outside and ia nat 
anything like a separate ‘essence,’ butis only their com- 
mon natyre. 


The Nyadya-Vaisesikas* enunciate the realistic 
theory of the universal. According 

vite Nyfya-Vaitesike to them. universal, are eternal 
(nitya) entities which are distinct 
from, but inhere in, many individuals (anekanugata). 
There is the same (eka) universal in all the individuals 
of a class. The universal is the basis of the notion 
of sameness that we have with regard to all the 


1 Vide Tarkabhadsa. p. 28 : Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Ch. V. 

2 Vide Outlines of Jainism, p. 116: Prameya-kamala-martanda, 
Ch. IV. 

3 Vide Paribhaga, Ch. 1. 

4 Vide Tarkasanhgraha, p. 87: Bhagdpariccheda and Muktévali, 8, 
14,15: Tarkabhasé, p. 26 : Tarkdmrta, Ch. 1 : Padarthadharma., p. 164. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 273 


individuals of a certain class. It is because there 
is one common essence present in different individuals 
that they are brought undera class and thought of 
a8 essentially the same. Thus samanya or the uni- 
versal is a real entity which corresponds to a general 
idea or class-concept in our mind. Some of the modern 
realists' also hold that a ‘universal is an eternal 
timeless entity which may be shared by many 
particulars,’ They agree further with the Naiyayikas 
in maintaining that universals do not come under 
existence (satta). These do not exist in time and 
space, but have being and subsist in substance, 
attribute and action (dravya-guna-karmavrtti). There 
is no universal subsisting in another universal, because 
there is but one single universal for one class of objects. 
If there are two or more universals in the same class 
of things, then they would exhibit contrary and even 
contradictory natures and we could not classify them 
one way or the other. The same individuals could 
have bean men and cows at the same time. 
In respect of their scope or extent, universals may 
be distinguished into para or the 
detingutea "ints highest and all-pervading, apara or 
Meee a inaane” the lowest, and the pardpara or the 
intermediate." ‘Being-hood’ is 
the highest universal, since all oiher universale come 
under it. Jar-ness (ghatatva) as the universal present 
in all jars is apara or the lowest, since it has the most 
limited or the narrowest extent. Substantiality or 
1 Cf. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. IX. 
2 Vide Biudgapariccheda and Muktdvas,8, 9; Nydyelildcati, pp. 80-81. 


Cj. Tarkamria, Ch. 1. 
85—1605B 


274 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


thinghood (dravyatva) as another universal is parapare 
or intermediate between the highest and the lowest. 
It is para or wider in relation to substances like earth, 
water, etc., and apara or narrower in relation to the 
universal ‘being-hood’ which belongs to substance, 
quality and action. : 

6. Particularity or Visesa ’ 

' Particularity (videsa) is the extreme opposite of the 
Picton a ibe universal (simanya). By parti- 
unique individuality of cularity we are to understand the 
the eternal aubstances. 1 iGue individuality of substances 
which have no patis and are, therefore, eternal, such as 
space, time, akisa, minds, souls and the atoms of 
earth, water, light and air. How are we to distinguish 
one mind or soul from another ? How again is one 
atom of water distinguished from another atom of 
water ? That they are different from one another 
must be admitted by us. Yet we cannot explain it by 
the difference of their parts, because they have no 
parts at all. On the other hand, they are’ similar 
in other respects. So we have to admit some peculia- 
rity or unique character whereby they are distinguished 
from one another. The category of viéesa stands 
for this peculiar character of the otherwise indistin- 
guishable substances. 

As subsisting in the eterna] substances, visesas are 
Scie tiie  dte themselves eternal (nitya), We 
eternal and distin- ghould not suppose that videsa per- 
ri eat a tains to the ordinary things of the 

1 Vide Tarkasangraha, pp. 11, 88; Bhagdpariccheda and Muktd- 


ealt, 10; Tarkubhasa, p. 28; Tarkamyta, Ch. 1; Padadrthadharma, 
p- 168, 


THE VAISESIKA PHILUSOPHY 975 


world like pots, chairs and tables. It does not belong 
to anything made up of parts. Things which are made 
up of parts, 1. €. composite wholes, are easily distin- 
guishable by ihe differences of their parts. So we do 
not require any category like visesa to explain their 
distinction. It is only when we come to the ultimate 
Gifferences of the pariless eternal substances that we 
have to admit certain original or underived peculiarities 
called videsas. There are innumerable particularities, 
since the individuals in which they cubsist are innu- 
merable. While the individuals are distinguished by 
their particularities, the latter are distinguished by 
themselves (svatah) Hence particularities are so 
many ultimates (antya) in the analysis and explanation 
of the differences of things. There cannot be any 
perception of them ; like atoms, thay are eupersensible 
entities. 


6. Inherence or Samavaya ' 


There are two main relations recognized in the 
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy. These 

Bo ab ‘is iee sab- gre sarhyoga or conjunction and 
Salbestee tyne Nyéye gamavaya or inherence. Conjunc- 
tion is a temporary or non-eternal 

relation between two things which can, and usually do, 
exist in separation from each other. Two balls moving 
from opposite directions meet at a certain place. The 
relation which holds between them when they meet is 
one of conjunction. It is a temporary contact between 


' Tarkusahgraka, p. 88 ; Tarkabhdgd, p. 2; Padarthadharma , pp. 
171-75; Bhaégapariccheda and Muktérali, 11, 60. 


276 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


two substances which may again be separated and yet 
exist (yutasiddha). So long as the relation of conjunc- 
tion is, it exists as a quality of the terms related by it. 
Bat it does not affect the existence of those terms. It 
makes no difference to the existence of the balls 
whether they are conjoined to each other or not. Thus 
copjunction is an external relation which exists as an 
accidental quality of two substances related by it. 

As distinguished from conjunction, samavaya is a 
“How the two ere die. PeTmanent or eternal relation be- 
tinguished from each tween two entities, of which one 
a inleres in the other. The whole is 
in its parts, a quality or an action isin a substance, or 
the universal is in the individuals, and particularity is 
in some simple eternal substance. Thus we say that the 
cloth as a whole isin the threads, the colour red as a 
quality is in the rose, notion as an action belongs to 
the moving ball, manhood as a universal is in indivi- 
dua] men, and the peculiarity or the distinctive 
character of one mind or soul is in that mind or 
soul. 

Conjunction is a temporary relation between two 
things which can exist separately, and it is produced 
by the action of either or both of the things related, 
e.g. the relation between a man and the chair on 
which he may be seated for the time being. On the 
other hand, the whole is always related to its parts, a 
quality or an action is always related to some substance, 
and so forth. So long as any whole, say a jar, is not 
broken up, it musi exist in the parts. Soalso, any 
quality or action must be related to some substance as 
long as 1¢ existe. Thus we see that the relation of a 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 277 


whole to its parts, of eny quality or action to its 
substance, of the universal to the individual, and of 
particularity to the eternal substances is not produced or 
brought about by any external cause. Hence it is that 
they are-said to be inseparably related (ayutasiddha).. 
Samaviaya is this eternal relation between any two 
entities, one of which cannot exist withcut the other. 
Terms related by samavaya cannot be reversed like 
those related by samyoga. If there is a contact of the 
hand with a pen, the pen alsu must ve in contact with 
the hand ; but though a quality 1s in a substance, the 
substance is not in the quality. 


7 Non-cartstence or Abhidva 


We have dealt with the six positive categories above. 
ABhAee letheeerenth Now we come to the negative cate- 
category. gory of abhiva or non-existence, 
which does not come under any of the six categories. 
The reality of non-existence cannot be denied. Looking 
at the sky at night you feel as much sure of the non- 
existence of the eun there, as of the existence of the 
moon and the stars. The Vaisesika recognizes, there- 
fore, non-existence as the seventh category of reality. 
It is true that Kanada did not mention abhava asa 
separate category in the enumeration of the ultimate 
objects of knowledge (padartha), Hence some people 
think that he was in favour of accepting only six cate- 
gories. But in view of the facts that non-existence as 
a possible object of knowledge has been discuased in 
other parts of the Vatésesika-Satra and that Pragastapada, 
the most authoritative exponent of the Vaidesika 


278 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


philosophy, has treated it as the seventh category, we 
propose to consider it as such. * 
Abhiva or non-existence is of two kinds, namely, 
samsargabhiva and anyonyabhava. 
Sede oc aaa: Sarhsargibbiva means the‘ absence 
bhava aud aayonyé of something in something else. 
Anyonyabhiava means the fact that 
one thing is not another thing. Sarhsargabhava is of 
three kinds, namely, pragabhava, 
Peay gaa dhvarnsabhiva and atyantabhava. ” 
All kinds of satisargabhava can be 
expressed by a judgment of the general form ‘ S is not 
in P,’ whereas anyonyibhiva can be expressed by 4 
judgment like ‘ S is not P.’ 
Pragabhava or antecedent non-existence is the non- 
existence of a thing before its 
Prigabbéva is non- production. When one says ‘a 
meee ene house will be built with bricks,’ 
there is non-existence of the house 
in the bricks. This non-existence of a house in the 
bricks before its consituction is pragabhéva. It means 
the absence of a connection between the bricks and 
the house which has not yet been built with them. The 
house never existed before being built, 50 that its non- 
existence before construction has no beginning (anadi). 
When, however, the house is built, its previous non- 
existence comes to sn end (anta). Hence it is that 
prigabhava is said to be without a beginuing, but 
having an end (anadi and santa). 
t Vide Vatéegika-siit., 1.1.4, 9.1.1-10. 


2 Bhésdpariccheda and Muktaérali, 12; Tarkabhasa, p. 29; Tarka- 
so&graha, p. 89; Tarkamria Ch. 1. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 279 


Dhvathsibbava is the non-existence of a thing on 
account of its destruction after pro- 
DhvarhsAbhive is duction. A jar which has been 
non-existence after 
destruction. produced by a potter may be subse- 
quently broken into pieces. When 
the jar is broken into pieces, there is its non-existence 
in those pieces. This non-existence of a previously 
existing thing, due to its destruction, is called 
dhvarnsabhava. Itis said to have a beginning (sadi), 
but no end (ananta). The non-existence of the jar 
begins with ite destruction, but it cannot be ended in 
any way, for the very same jar cannot be brought back 
into existence. It will be seen here that although in 
the case of positive entities (bhiva padartha), the 
general rule 18 that, whatever is produced must be 
destroyed, in the case of negative entities (abhava 
padartha), something which is produced cannot be 
destroyed. The non-existence of the jar is produced by 
its destruction, but that non-existence cannot itseif be 
destroyed. To destroy or end the jar’s non-existence, 
we are to restore the same jar to existence, which is 
impossible. 
Atyantébhava or absolute non-existence is the 
; _ absence of a connection between two 
apatyantébbive ena, things for all time—past, present 
be Bye cal, Present = gnd future, e.g. the non-existence of 
colour in air. It is thus different 
from pragabhava and dhvaibsibhava. Pragablava is the 
non-existence of a thing before its production. Dhvarh- 
sibhiva is the non-existence of a thing after its destruc- 
tion. But atyantabbava is the non existence of a thing, 
not in any particular time, but for all time. So it is 


980 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


subject neither to origin nor to cessation, t.e. it is both 
begioningless and endless (anadi and ananta). 


While samsargabhava is the absence of a connec- 
tion between two things, anyonya- 
Anyonyébhéva im- bhava underlies the difference 
Lag eee Pipe te (bheda) of one thing from another 
thing. When one thing is different . 
from another thing, they mutually exclude each other 
and there is the non-existence of either as the other. A 
table is different from a chair. This means that a 
table does not exist as a chair, or, more simply, a table 
is not a chair, Anyonyabhava is this non-existence of 
one thing as another, from which it is different. Thus 
sarnsargibhava is the absence of a connection (sarhsarga) 
between two entities, and its opposite is just their 
connection. On the other hand, anyonyabhava is the 
absence of one thing as another, and its opposite is just 
their sameness or identity. Take the followiug illua- 
trations. ‘ A hare has no horn,’ ‘ there is no colour in 
air’ are propositions which express the absence of a 
connection between a hare anda horn, between colour 
and air. The opposite of these will be the proposi- 
tions ‘ a hare has horns,’ ‘ there iscolour in air. ‘A 
cow is not a horse,’ ‘ a jar is not a cloth ’ are proposi- 
tions which express the difference between a cow and a 
horse, a jar and a cloth. The opposite of these will 
be the propositions ‘a cow is a horse,’ ‘a jar is a cloth.’ 
Thus we may say that sarsargibhava is relative non- 
existence in the sense of a negation of the con- 
nection or relation (sarnsarga) between any two objects, 
while anyonyabhava is mutual non-existence or differ- 
ence in’ the sense of a negation of the identity 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 281 


(tadatmya) between two objects. Like atyantabhiva or 
absolute non-existence, anyonyabhiva or mutual non- 


existence is without a beginning and an end, i.e. is 
eternal. 


II. Tre Creation anp Destrrucrion 
OF THE WorLD! 


From the standpoint of Indian philosophy the world 
including physical nature is a moral 
The Vaiéegika theory stage for the educauon and emancipa- 
of a werd le: guided tion of individual souls. The Vaigesika 
foal celle at Indian theory of the world ig guided by this 
philosophy. general spiritual outlook of Indian 
philosophy. /In its attempt to explain 
the origin and destruction of the world, it does indeed | 
reduce all composite objects to the four kinds of atoms of 
earth, water, fire and air. So it is sometimes characterized 
as the atomic theory of the world. Bui it does not ignore 
the moral and spiritual principles governing the processes 
of composition and decomposition of atoms, Further, 
five of the nine kinds of substances, to which all things 
may be reduced, are not and cannot be reduced to 
materia] atoms. So the atomic theory of the Vaisesika has 
& background different from that of 
Itis different fron the atomism of Western science and 
the atomiem of West- philosophy. ‘The latter is in principle 
ern philosophy. a materialistic philosophy of the world. 
It explains the order and history of 
the world as the mechanical resultant of the fortuitous 
motions of innumerable atoms in infinite space and time, 
and in different directions, There is no mind or intelli- 
gent power governing and guiding the operations of the 
material atoms ; these act according to blind mechanical 
laws. The atomism of the Vaisesika, however, is a phase 
of their spiritual philosophy. According to it, the ultimate 
source of the actions of atoms is to be found in the 


1 Vide Paddrthadharma, pp. 19-23; Nydyakandali, pp. 50-54; 
Kusumaajali, 2 ; Tattvacintémani, ii. . 
86 —1605B 


AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


creative or the destructive will of the Supreme Being who 
directs the operations of atoms according to the unseen 
deserts (adrsta) of individual souls and with reference to the 
end of moral dispensation. /On this view, the order of 
the world is like that of a monarchical state, which 
ultimately expresses the will of a wise monarch and in 
which all things are so ordered and adjusted that the 
citizens get ample opportunities for self-expansion and 
seli-development as free and responsible beings. 


/ The utomic theory of the Vaiéegika explains that part 
of the world which is non-eternal, i.¢. 
The atomic theory subject to origin and destruction in 
of the Vsisesika ex- time. ‘The eternal constituents of 
Looaiea per pen ee the universe, namely, the four kinds 
tion of pon-eternal of atoms, and the five substances of 
objects. akasu, space, time, mind, and soul, 
do not come within the purview of 
their atomic theory, because these can neither be created 
nor destroyed. On the other hand, ajl composite objects, 
beginning with a dyad or the first compound of only two 
atoms (dvyanuka), are non-eternal, So the atomic theory 
explains the order of creation and destruction of these non- 
eternal objects. Ail composite objects are constituted by 
the combination of atoms and destroyed through their 
separation. The first comvination of two atoms is cailed 
a dvyanuka ordyad, and a combination of three dyads 
(dvyanukas) is culled a tryanuka or triad. The tryanuka is 
also called the trasarenu, and it is the minimum perceptible 
object according to the Vaiéegika philosophy. The puram- 
anu or atom and the dvyanuka or dyad, being smaller 
than the tryanuka or triad, cannot be perceived, but are 
known through inference, 


All the finite objects of the physica! world and the 
en a eee aps world itself are composed of 
oe the four kinds of atoms in the form 

iia fous kinds: of dyads, triads and other larger 
compounds arising outof these. How 

can we account for the action or motion of atoms, which 
is necessary for their combinution ? How, again, are we 
to explain this particular order and srrangement of things 
in the world ? In the Vaiéegika philosophy the order of the 
world is, in its broad outlines, conceived like this: The 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 283 


world, or better, the universe isa system of physical 
things end living beings having bodies 
Tt is a system of withsenses and possessing mind, in- 
i haga Oh as tellect and egoism. All these exist 
inteet with» one 80d interact with one snother in 
anotber. time, space’ and akaga. Living beings 
are souls who enjoy or suffer in this 
world actording as they are wise or ignorant, good or bad, 
virtuous or vicious. The order of the world is, on the 
whole, a moral order in which the 
The moral order of ife and destiny of all individual selves 
the world. are governed, not only by the pbysi- 
cal laws of time and space, but also 
by the universal mora] Jaw of karma. In the simplest form 
this law means ‘as you sow, so you reap,’ just as the phy- 
sical law of causation, in its most abstract form, means 
that there can be no effect without a cause. 


Kecping in view this morai order of the universe, the 
Vaigesikas explain the process of 

The creation of the creation and destruction of the world — 
world has its sterting- ag follows The starting-point of the 
point in the creative : A 
will of the fupreme Process of creation or destruction is 
Lord. the will of the Sipreme Lord (Maheé- 
vara) who is the ruler of the whole 

universe. The Lord conceives the will to create a universe 
in which individual beings may get their proper share of 
the experience of pleusure and pain sccording to their 
deserts. The process of ercation and destruction of the 
world being beginningless (anédi), we cannot speak of a 
first creation of the world. In truth, every creation is 
preceded by a stateof destruction, and every destruction 
is preceded by some order of creation. To create is to 
destroy an existing order of things and usher in a new 
order. Hence it is that God’s creative will has reference 
_,, to the stock of merit and demerit 
The adrats Ea agri {adrsta) ucquired by individual souls 
ater ot seater "* ima previous life lived in some other 
world. When God thus wills to 

create o world, the unseen forces of moral deserts in the 
eternal individual souls begin to function in the direction 
of creation and the active life of experiences (bhoga). And, 
it is the contact with souls, endowed with the creative 
function of adrsta, that first sets in motion the atoms of 
air, Out of the combination of air-atoms, in the form of 
dyads and triads, arises the gross physical element (mehi- 


284 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


bhiita) of wir, and it exists as an inoessantly vibrating 
medium in the eternal 4kaéa. Then, in a similar way, 
there is motion in the atoms of water and the creation of 
the gross element of water which exists in the air and is 
moved by it. Next, the atoms of earth are set in motion 
in 8 similar way and compose the gross element of earth 
which exists in the vast expanse of the gross elemental 
water. Then from the atoms of light arises, in a similar 
way, the gross element of light and exists with its lumino- 
sity in the gross water. After this and by the mere 
thought (abhidhyana) of God, there appears the embryo of 
a world (brahminda) out of the atoms 
Brahma is the archi- of light andearth. God animates that 
tect of the world. great embryo with Brahma, the world- 
soul, who is endowed with supreme 
wisdom, detachment and excellence (jfiiina, vairigya and 
aisvaryya). To Brahmi God entrusts the work of creation 
in its concrete details and with proper adjustment between 
merit and demerit, on the one hand, and happiness and 
misery, on the other. 


The created world runs its course for many years. But 
it cannot continue to exist and endure 
Creation ie followed for all time to come. Just as after 
by destruction. the stress and strain of the day’s work 
God allows us rest at night, so after 
the trials and tribulations of many lives in one created 
world, God provides a way of escape from suffering for 
all living beings for some time, This is done by Him 
through the destruction of the world. So the period of 
creation is followed by a state of destruction. The theory 
of cycles (kalpa) or alternating periods 
The theory of cycles of creation and destruction is accepted 
of creation and de- b i 
struction, y most of the orthodox systems of 
Indian philosophy. The belief that 
the world in which we live is not eternal, and that at some 
distant time there shall be its dissolution, is supported by 
an analogical argument. Just as earthen substances like 
jars are destroyed, so mountains which ere earthy shall 
be destroyed. Ponds and tanks are dried up. Seas and 
oceans being only very big reservoirs of water shall dry up. 
The light of a lamp is blown out. The sun being but a 
glorious orb of light must be extinguished at some distant 
time. 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 285 


The process of the world’s dissolution is as follows: 
te ea When ir the course of time Brahmi, 
world's “lestrnction j.  *H6 world-soul, gives up hia body like 
started by the de Other souls, there appears in Maheé- 
structive will of Ged vara or the Supreme Lord a desire 
to destroy the world. With this, the 

creative adrsta or unseen moral agency in living beings is 
counteracted by the corresponding destructive adrsta and 
ceases to function for the active life of experience. I¢ is 
in contact with such souls, in which the destructive adrsta 
begins to operate, that there is motionin the constituent 
atoms of their body and senses. On account of thia motion 
there is disjunction of the atoms and consequent disinte- 
gration of the body and the senses. The body with the 
senses being thus destroyed, what remain are only the 
atoms in their isolation. So also, there is motion in the 
constituent atoms of the elemental earth, and its conse- 
quent destruction through the cessation of their conjunction. 
In this way there is the destruction of the physical elements 
of earth, water, light and air, one after the other. Thus 
these four physical elements and al] bodies and sense 
organs are disintegrated and destroyed. What remain are 
the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, light and air in 
their isolation, and the eternal substances of akaéa, 
time, space, minds and souls with their stock of merit, 
demerit and past impressions (bhaivani). it will be 
observed here that while in the order of destruction, 
earth compounds come first, and then those of water, 
light and air in succession, in the order of creation 
air compounds come first, water compounds next, and 
then those of the great earth and light appear in 


IV. Conciusion 


Like the Nyaya system, the Vaiéesika is a realistic 
philosophy which combines pluralism with theism. 
It traces the variety of the objects of the world to the 
combination of material atoms of different kinds and 


1 The details of this account of creation and destruction are found 
in Prasastapéda's Padarthadharmasengraha which seems to draw on 
the Paurénika sccounts. 


286 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


qualities. But the creation of the world out of the 
combination of eternal atoms, in eternal time and 
space, has reference to the moral life of individual 
selves. The world is created and destroyed by God 
according to the moral deserts of individual souls 
and for the proper realization of their moral destiny. 
But the realistic idea of the soul and the apparently 
deistic conception of God in the Vaiéesika labour under 
the difficuties of the Nyays theory and are a3 unsatis- 
factory as the latter. or it, the soul is an independent 
substance, of which consciousness is an accidental 
property. It may be admitted by us that the mind or 
the empirical consciousness is not the real self and that 
the latter is different from the former. Stili it is not 
possible for us to explain mental phenomena or the 
empirical consciougness unless we admit that the real or 
the noumenal self is an essentiaily conscious and 
intelligent reality. Soalso the Vaigegika idea of God as 
wholly transcendent to and separate from man and the 
world, is not favourable for a deeply religious. view of 
life and the genuine religious consciousness of commu- 
nion with God./The special contribution of the Vaisesika 
philosophy is the classification of realities and its atomic 
cosmology. It recognizes the distinction between posi- 
tive and negative facts, both of which are said to be 
equally real and objective. Among positive facts, again, 
a distinction is made between those that exist in time 
and space, and those which do not possess such ex- 
istence. Substance, quality and action are positive and 
existent realities. Generality, particularity and inher- 
ence are positive facts indeed. but these do not exist as 
particular things or qualities or physical movements in 


THE VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 287 
time and space. But the Vaidesika division of reals 
into seven classes and of these into many other sub- 
classes is more a common-sense and empirical view of 
things than a philosophical classification of realities. 
From the latter standpoint a more fundamental distinc- 
tion would be that between the soul and the non-soul 
(as in the Jaina system), or spirit and matter (as in 
the Sankbya). The atomic theory of the Vaiéesika is 
an improvement on the ordinary view of the world as 
constituted by the physical elements c° earth, water, 
air and fire. It is also an advance on the materialistic 
theory that all things including life, mind and conscious- 
ness are transformations and mechanical products of 
material atoms. The Vaisesikas harmonize the atomic 
theory with the mora] and spiritual outlook of life and 
the theistic faith in God as the creator and moral gov- 
ernor of the world. But they do not carry their theism 
far enough and make God the author not only of the 
order of nature but also of its ultimate constituents, 
viz. the atoms, minds and souls, and see God at the 
heart of all reality. 


THK SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 


37—1605B 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Krenanatha Nyayapafici-... Tatteakaumudi (Calcutta). 
nana ; 
Kalivara Vedaintavagiéa ... Sdnkhya-sitra (with Ani- 
ruddha’s Vrttt, Calcutta). 
8. 8. Siryanarayana Sastri The Sdmkhya Kdrika of 
Tsvara Krsna (Eng. trans. 
Madras University). 


R. G. Bhatta ... Sdnkhya-pravacana-bhasya 
(Chowkhamba, Bena- 
res). 

Madhavicarya ... Sarva-dargana-sangraha, 

, Ch. on Saikhya. 

Nandalal Sinha ' -» The Sdtikhya Philosophy. 

8. Radhakrishnan ... Indian Philosophy Vol. 
TT, Ch. 1V. 

S. N. Dasgupta ... History of Indian Philo- 
sophy, Vol. 1, Ch. VIJ. 

A. B. Keith w. The Sdtikhya System. 

A. K. Majuindar ..» The Sdankhya Conception 


of Personality (Calcutta 
University). 


CHAPTER VII 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 


lL. Intropuction 


The Sankhya system is the work of a great sage of 
The Sétkbya system the name of Kapila. The Sankbya 
is the work of the must be a very old system of 
great sage Kapil. thought. ic. can tiquity appears 
from the fact that the Sankhya tendency of thonght 
pervades all the jiterature of ancient India including the 
grutis, smrtis and purinas. According to tradition, the 
first work of the Sankhya school is_the Sdnkhya-siitra 
of Kapila. This being very brief and terse, Kapila, we 
are told, wrote an elaborate work entitled the Sankhya- 
pravacana-siitra. Hence the Sinkhya philosophy is 
also known as Sankhyapravacana. This system is 
sometimes described as the ‘ atheistie Sankhya ’ 
(niriévara-sinkhya), as distinguished from the Yoga 
which is called the ‘theistic Sinkhya’ (sesvara-sankhya). 
The reason for this is that Kapila did not admit the 
existence of God and also thought that God's existence 
could not be proved. But thie is a controversial 
point. 

Next to Kapila, his disciple Asuri. and Asuri’s 
Some important disciple Paficasikha wrote some 
works of the S88Rby®. book» which aimed at a clear and 
elaborate exposition of the Sankhya system. But 
these works were lost in course of time and we 
have no information about their contents. Tévarakrena’s 


292 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Sankhya-karika is the earliest available and authorita- 
tive text-book of the Sankhya. Gaudapada's Sinkhya- 
karikd-bhasya, Vacaspati’s Tattoakaumudi and Vijfiane- 
bhikgu’s Sdnkhya-pravacana-bhasya and Sankhya-sdra 
are some other important works of the Sankhya 
system. 

The origin of the name ‘ sinkhya ' is shrouded in 
Tabuie anece mystery. According to some think- 
ip explained in differ. ers, the name ‘sankhya’ is an 
es adaptation from ‘sankhya’ meaning 
number, and has been applied to this philosopby 
because it aims at a right knowledge of reality by the 
enumeration of the ultimate objects of knowledge. 
A more plausible explanation is that the word ‘safikhya’ 
means perfect knowledge (samyag-jtiana), and a philo- 
Sophy in which we have such knowledge is justly 
named saikhya. Like the Nydya-Vaidesika system, 
the Sankhya aims at the knowledge of reality for the 

., practical purpose of putting an end to all pain and 
suffering. It gives us a knowledge of the self ‘which is 
clearly higher than that given by the other systems, 
excepting perhaps the Vedanta. So it may very well 
be characterized es the ‘sitkbya’ in the sense of a pure 
metaphysical knowledge of the self. It ig_a metaphy- 
ic of dualistic realism. While the Nyage nal the 
Vabake giantess reality of many entities— 
atoms, minds and souls—the Sankhya recognizes only 

“two kinds of ultimate realities, namely. spirit and 
matter (purusa and prakrti). The nature of these {wo 
ultimate and other derivative realities will be con- 
sidered in the Sinkhya metaphysice. 


THE SANKHAYA PHILOSOPHY 293 
II. Toe Satxuya Metapaysics 
1. Theorg of Causation’ 


The Sankhya Metaphysics, especially its doctrine 
of prakrti, rests mainly on its theory of causation 
which is known as satkarya-vada. It ia a theory ar 
to the relation of an effect io its material cause. The 
specific question discussed here is this: Does an effect 
originally exist in the material cause prior to its pro- 
Tha Bavddke ac duction, i.e. anpearance as ap 
the Nydiya-Veidegika effect ? The Bauddhas and the 
an ae Nyaya-Vaisesikas answer this 
quéstion in the negative. According to them, the 
effect cannot be said to exist before it is produced by 
some cause; |. If the effect already existed in the 
Jnaterial cause prior to its production, there is no sense 
in our speaking of it as being caused or produced in 
any way. Further. we cannot explain why the 
activity of any efficient cause is necessary for the 
production of the effect. If the pot already existed 
“in the clay, why should the potter exert himeelf and 
use his implements to produce it 2©Moreover, if the 
effect were already in its material cuuse, it would 
logically follow that the effect is indistinguishable 
from the cause, and that we should use the same name 
for both the pot and the clay, and also that the same 
purpose would be served by a pot and a lump of clay. 
Tt cannot be said that there is a distinction of form 
between the effect and its material cause, for then 
we have to admit that there is something in the 


1 Vide Sdnkhya-kérika und Taltrakoumudi, 8-9; Sankhya-prave- 
eana-bhdgya, 1, 118-21; Aniruddha’s Vrtti, 1. 118-21. 


294 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


effect which is not to be found in its cause and, there- 
fore, the effect does not really exist in the cause. This 
theory that the effect does not exist in the material 
cause prior to its production is known as asatkirya-vida 
(i.e. the view that the karya or the effect is asat or 
non-existent before its production). It is also called 
drambha-vada, t.e. the theory of the beginning of the 
effect anew. 

The Séakhyas repudiate this theory of causation 
he Séukhys theory and establish their view of sat- 
of satkérya-vida and karya-vada, nainely that the effect. 
Hy ermine, exists in the matesial cause even 
before it is produced. This view is based on the 
“following grounds: (a) If the effect were really non- 
existent in the materia] cause, then no amount of 
effort on the part of any agent could bring it into 
existence. Can any mao turn blue into red, or sugar 
into salt 9 Hence, when an effect is produced from 
some material cause, we are to say that it pre-exists 
in the cause and is only manifested by certain fayour- 
able conditions, as when oil is produced by pressinz 
seeds. The activity of efficient causes, like the potter 
and his tools, is necessary to manifest the effect, pot, 
which exists implicitly in the clay. (b) There is an 
invariable relation between a inaterial cause and its 
effect. A material cause can produce only that effect 
with which it is causally related. It cannot produce 
an effect which is in no way related toit. But it 
cannot be related to what does not exist. Hence the, 
effect must exist in the material cause before it is 
actually produced. (c) We see that only certain effects 
“can be produced from certain causes, Curd can be 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 295 


got only out of milk and a cloth only out of threads. 

This shows that the effect somehow exists in the cause. 

Had it not been so, any effect could be produced from 

any cause ; the potter would not have taken clay to 

produce pots, instead of taking wilk or threads or any 

other thing. (d) The fact that only a potent cause 

can produce a desired effect goes to show that the 

effect must be potentially contained in the cause. 

The potent cause of an effect is that which possesses 
some power that is definitely related to the effect. 

But the power cannot be related to the effect, if the 
-Jatter does not exist in some form. This means that 
the effect exists in the cause in an unmunifested form 
before its production or manifestation. (c) If the 
effect be really non-existent in the cause, then we have : 
to say that, when it is produced, the non-existent 
comes into existence, t.¢. scmethins comes out of 
nothing, which is absurd. «f) Lastly, we sée that the 
effect is not different from, but essentially identical 

with, the material cause. If, therefore, the cause 
exists, the effect also muot exist. In fact, the 

effect_ and the cause are the explicit and implicit 

states ofthe same substance. A cloth is not really 

different from the threads, of which it is made ;a 

statue is the bame as its material cause, stone, witb 

a new shape and form : the weight of a table is the 

same as that of the pieces of wood used in it. The 

conclusion drawn by the Sankhya from all this is that 

the effcet exists in the material cause even before its 

production or appearance. This is the theory of 

satkirya-vada (i.e. the view that the effect is existent 

before its appearance). 


996 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
1 


The theory of satkarya-vada has got two different forms, 
namely, parinaéma-vdda and vivarta- 
Two different forms vide. Ac®ording to the former, 
of sstkarya-vida. when an effect is produced, there is 
a real transformation (parinima) of 
the cause into the effect, ¢.g. the production of a pot from 
clay, or of curd from milk. The SafAkhyais in favour of 
this view as a further specification of the theory of 
satkarya-vida. The second, which is accepted by the 
Advaita Vedantins, holds that the change of the cause 
into the effect is mersly apparent. When we see a snake 
in s rope, it is not the case that the rope 1s really trans- 
formed into a snake ; what happens is that the rope only 
appears as, but is not really, asnake. So also, God or 
Brahman does not become really transformed into they 
world produced by Him, but remains identically the same, 
while we may wrongly think that He undergoes change 
and becomes the world. 


2. Prakrti and the Gunas ' 


The Sankhya theory that causation means a real 
Ba teal ‘transformation of the material cause 
mate cause ‘of the into the effect logically leads to the 
mo oteneee concept of prakrti as the ultimate 
cause of the world of objects. All objects of the world, 
including our body and mind, the senses and the 
intellect, are limited and dependent things produced 
by the combination of certain elements. So we see 
that the world is a series of effects and that it must 
have a cause. What, then, is the cause of the world ? 
It cannot be the puruga or the self, since the self is 
neither @ cause nor an effect of any thing. So the cause 
of the world must be the not-self, i.e. some principle 
which is other than and different from spirit, self or 
consciousness. Can this not-self be the physical 


1 Vide Karik® and Kaumudi, 3, 10-16; Pravecana-bhégys and 
Vytts, 1.110, 1.19987. 


THE SINKHYA PHILOSOPHY 997 


elements or the material atoms? According to the 

Carvakas or the materialists, the Bauddhas, the Jainas 

and the Nydya-Vaidesikas, the atoms of earth, water, 

light and air are the material causes of the objects of 

the world. The Sankhya demurs to this on the 

ground that material atoms cannot explain the origin ~ 
of the subtle products of nature, such as the mind, 

the intellect and the ego. So we must seek for some- 

thing which can explain the gross objects of nature 

like earth and water, trees and seas. as well as its 

rsubtle products. Now it is a general rule that the 

dese ncbriisheotn 

cause is subtler than the effect and that it pervades 
the effect. Hence the ultimate cause of the world 

must be soine unintelligent or unconscious principle 
which is uncaused, eternal and all-pervading, very 

fine and always ready to produce the world of objects. 

This is the prakrti of the Sanikbya System. It is the 

first cause of all things and, therefore, hag itself nu 
cause. As the uncaused root-cause of all objects it 

is cterng] and ubiquitous, because nothing that is 
limited and non-eternal can be the first cause of the 

world. Being the ground of such subtle products of 
nature as mind and the intellect, prakrti is a very 
ssubtle, mysterious and tremendous power which evolves 
and dissolves the world in a cyclic order. 


The existence of prakrti as the ultimate subtle cause 
of the world is known by inference 
from the following grounds: (a) 

*° All particular objects of the world, 
from the intellect to the earth, are limited and dependent 
on one another. Sv there must be an ublimited 
and independent cause for their existence. (6) Things 


88—1605B 


Proofs for the exist-- 
ence of prakrti. 


998 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


of the world possess certain common characters, owing 
, to which every one of them is capable of producing 
pleasure, pain and indifference. Therefore, they must 
have a common cause having these three characters. 
(c) All effects proceed from the activity of some cause 
which contains their potentiality within it. The world 
of objects which are effects must, therefore, be implicit- 
ly contained in some world-cause. (d) An effect arises 
from its cause and is again resolved into it at the 
moment of its destruction. That is, an existent effect 
is manifested by a cause, and eventually it is re-absorbed 
into the latter. So the particular objects of experience 
must arise from their particular causes, and these again 
from other general causes, and so on, till we come to 
the first cause of the world. Contrariwise, at the time 
of destruction, the physical elements must be resolved 
into atoms, the atoms into energies and so on, till all 
products are resolved into the unmanifested, eternal 
prakrti. Thus we get one unlimited and unconditioned, 
all-pervading and ultimate cause of the whole world 
including everything but the self. his is the eternal 
and undifferentiated causal matrix of the world of nol- 
self, to which the Sankhya gives the different names 
of prakrii, pradhina, avyakta, etc. We should not 
imagine a cause of this ultimate cause, for that will 
land us in the fallacy of infinite regress. If there be 
a cause of prakrti, then there must be @ cause of that 
“ause, and so on, ad infinitum. Or, if we stop anywhere 

and say that here is the first cause, then that first cause 

will be the prakrti which is specifically described as the 


supreme root cause of the world (paré or mila prakrti)." 
1 Vide Pravacena-bhagya, 1. 67-68, 1. 76-77, 6.96, 


v 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 299 


Prakrti is constituted by the three gunas of. sattva, 
rajas and tamas. {t is said to be 
Sete fee walled the unity of the gunas held in a 
settva, rajes 8nd state of equilibrium (sémyavastha). 
: Now the question is: What are 
these gunas ? Guna here means a constituent element 
or component and nof an attribute or quality. Hence 
by the gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas we are to under- 
stand the elements of the ultimate substance called 
prakrt1. The reason why they are cal'cd gunas is either 
their being subservient to the ends of the purusa which 
is other than themselves, ur their being intertwined 
like the three strands of a rope which binds the soul to. 
the world,’ al 
The gunas are not perceived by us. They are 
Proots for the eaist. inferred from the objects of the 
et.ce of gunas. world which are their effects. Since 
there is an essential identity (tidatinya)}e between 
the effect and its cause, we know the nature of 
the guaas from the nature of their products. All 
objects of the world, from the intellect down to the 
ordinary objects of perception (e.g. tables, pote, etc.), 
pre found to possess three characters capable of produc- 
ing pleasure, pain and indifference. respectively. The 
same things are pleasurable to some person, painful to 
another, and neutral to a third. The cuckoo's cry is 4 
pleasure to the artist, a pain to his sick friend and 
neither to the plain rustic. A rose delights the youth, 
dejects the dying man and leaves the gardener cold and 
indifferent. Victory in war elates the victor, depresses 


1 Op. cit., 1. 65. The word guna has many senses, such as 
* quality,” ‘strand,' ‘ subservient.’ 


300 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the vanquished and leaves the third party rether apathe- 
tic. _Now,.as the cause must contain what is in | 
effect, we can infer that the. ultimate cause of things 
must have been constituted also by the three elements 
of pleasure, pain and indifference. The Sankbya calls 
these three sattva, rajas and tamas respectively. These 
are constitulive of both prakrti, the ultimate substance, 
and the ordinary objects of the world. 


Sattva is that element of prakrti which is of the 
nature of pleasure, and is buoyant 
Peis susie ibe or light (laght), and bright or illu. 
Pc and illuminat- minating (prakiégaka), The mani- 
festation of objects in conscious- 
ness (jfiina), the tendency towards conscious manifesta- 
tion in the senses, the mind and the intellect, the 
luminosity of light, and the power of reflection in a 
mirror or the crystal are all due to the operation of the 
element of sattva in the constitution of things. Simi- 
larly, all sorts of lightness in the sense of upward 
motion, like the blazing up of fire, the upward course 
of vapour and the winding motion of air, are induced 
in things by the element of sativa. So also pleasure 
in its various forms, such as satistaction, joy, happi- 
nese, bliss, contentment, etc. is produced by things in 
our minds through the operation of the power of sattva 
inhering in them both. 


Rajas is the principle of activity in things. It always 


moves and makeg other things move. 


phon is br the ae That is, it is both mobile (cala) and 

0 in, Dd 1s mopDI . . . . 

con stiuelaing. stimulating (upastambbake). It is 
on account of rajas that fire spreads, 


the wind blows, the senses follow their objects and the 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 301 


mind becomes restless. On the affective side of our 
life, rajas is the cause of all paj riences and is 
itself of the nature of pain (dubkha). It helps the 
element of sattva and tamas, which are inactive and 
motionlegs in themselves, to perform their functions. 
Tamas is the principle of passivity and negativity 
in things. {t is opposed to sattva 
silere, of ladibersoes in being heavy (guru) and in 
and is heavy end obstructing the manifestation of 
enveloping. . : 
objects (varanaka,. It also resists 
the principle of rajas or activity in so far as it restrains 
(niyam) the motion of things. It counteracts the 
power of manifestation in the mind, the intellect and 
other things, and thereby produces igaorance and dark- 
ness, and leads to confusion and bewilderment (moha). 
By obstructing the principle of activity in us it induces 
sleep, d drowsiness, and laziness. It also produces the 
state of “apathy or or indifference (visida), Hence it is 
that sativa, rajas and tamas have been compared 
respectively to whiteness, redness and darkness. 


With rezard to the relation among the three gunas 

constituting the world, we observe 
Bes oP bab” peach that it is one of constant conflict 
and co-operation with as well as co-operation. They 
one another, 

always go together and can ney ever 
be separated from one ‘another. “Nor can any “one of 
them produce anything without the help and support of 
the other two. Just as the oil, the wick and the flame, 
which are relatively opposed to one another, co-operate 
to produce the light of a lamp, so the gunas co-operate 
to produce the he ubjects of the world; although they 
possess different and nd opposed qualities. So all the 


302 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


three gunas are present in everything of the world, 
great or small, fine or gross. But each of them tries 
to suppress and dominate the others. The nature of 
things is determined by the predominant guna, while 
the others are there in a subordinate position. We 
cannot point to anything of the world which does not 
contain within ii all the three elements, of course, in 
‘different proportions. The classification of objects into 
good, bad and indifferent, or into pure, impure and 
neutral, or into intelligent, active and indolent, bas 
reference to the preponderance of sativa, rajas and 
tamas respectively. 


Another characteristic of the gunas is that they 
Senate ibediin? oe constantly changing. ‘* Change 
constant change and or transformation belongs to the 
ee every essence of the gunas, and 
they cannot help changing even for s moment.”’ 
a, There are two kinds of trausforma- 

Two kinds of trans- 
formation of the tion which the gunas undergo. 
oer During pralaya or dissolution of 
the world, the gunas change, each within itself, 
~ without disturbing the others, That is, sattva changes 
into sattva, rajas, into rajas and so too with tamas. 
Such transformation of the gunas is called sariipa- 
parindma or change into the homogeneous. At this 
stage, the gunas cannot create or produce anything, 
because they do not oppose and co-operate with one 
another. No object o' cap arise ubless 
the gunas combine, and one of them predominates 
over the. others. So before creation, the gunas 
exist as a homogeneous mass in which there is no 
motion (although there is transformation), no thing, 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 303 


and none of the qualities of sound, touch, colour, 
taste and smell. This is the state of equilibrium 
(simyavasthé) for the gunas, to which the Saikhya 
gives the name of prakrti. The other kind of trans- 
formation takes place when one of the gunas dominates 
over the dthers which become subordinate to it. WHen 
this "happens, we have the productior—of particular 
objects. Such transformation is called  viripapari- 
nama or change into the heterogeneous, and it is the 
starting-point of the world’s evolution. 


3. Purusa or the Self? 


The second type of ultimate reality admitted by 
the Sainkhya is the self. The 

ae aa in” existence of the self must be admit- 
ted by all. Everybody feels and 

usserts that he or she exists, and has this or that 
thing belonging to him or her. The feeling "of one’s 
owo existence is the most natural and indubitabie 
expericote that we all have. In fact. no one can 
seriously deny the existence of his self, for the 
act of denial presupposes the reality of the self. So 


it has been said by the Sankbyas that the self exists, | 
because it is self-manifest and its non-existence 
cannot be proved in any way. : 
«ren geet eaeeed 
But while there is general agreement with regard tu 
the existence of the seli, there isa 
Different conceptions wide divergeuce of opmion about its 
of the self. ones : 
nature. Some Carvikas or material- 


ists identify the self with the gross body. some with the 





1 Vide Veddntasdra, 53-59; Karikd and Kaumudi, 17-20; Pra- 
tacana-bhdgye and Vrtli, 1.68, 1 138-64, 5. 61-68. 


804 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


senses, some with life, and some others with the 
mind. The Buddhists and ‘: empiricists regard the 






self as identical with the s of consciousness. The 
Nydya-Vaisesikas and the akara Mimarhsakas main- 
tain that the self is an uncofiscious substance which may 
acquire the attribute of consciousness under certain condi- 
tions. The Bhatta Mimarhsakas, on the other hand, 
think that the self is a conscious entity which is partially 
hidden by ignorance, as appears from the imperfect and 
partial knowledge that men have of their selves. The 
Advaita Vedanta holds that the self ispure eternal con- 
sciousness which is also a blissful existence (saccidénanda- 
svaripa). It is one in all bodies, and is eternally free and 
self-shining intelligence. 


According to the Sinkhya, the self is different from 
or ee the body and the senses\the manas 
eternal and all-pervad- and the intellect (buddhi). It is 
eager not anytbing of the world of ob- 
jects. The self is not the brain, nor the nervous 
system, nor the aggregate of conscious states. The 
self is @. ronscions..spirit.wbich is always the subject 
of knowledge and can never become the object of 


attribute. af consciousness, but it is pure consciousness 


as.such. “Consciousness is its very essence and not 
gos gg ACI. Nev mila we wy lanes a 
blissful consciousness (Anandasvaripa), as the Advaita 
Vedantin thinks ; bliss and consciousness being different 
things cannot be the essence of the same reality. The 
self is the ee 
gonsciousness. The light of the self’s consciousness 
ever remains the same, although the objects of 
knowledge may change and succeed one another. It is 


@ ateady constant consciousness in which there is 
neither change nor activity. The self is above all 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 305 


change and activity. Itis an uncaused, eternal and 
all-prevading reality whichgty ices Toon, “all attachinent 
and u Daffected by all objects. All change and activity, 
all pleasures and pains belong really to matter and its 
' products like the body, miod and intellect. It is 
sheer ignorance to think that the self is the body or 
the senses or the mind or the intellect. But when, 
through such ivnorance, the self confuses itself with 
(any of these things, it seems to be caught up in the 
flow of changes and activities, and merged in the mire 
of sorrows and wiseries. 
The existence of the self as the transcendent subject 
of experience is proved by the 
oe ree “* Sitkhya by several arguments: 
(a) All objects of the world are . 
weans to the ends of other beings, because they are 
so many collocations of parts, like chairs, tables, etc. 
These beings whose purpose is served by the things 
of the world must be quite difereat ad ‘distinct’ from 
them all. ‘That is, they cannot be said to be uncon- 
scious things, made up of parts like physical objects, 
for that would make them means to the ends of others 
and not ends in themselves. They must be conscious 
selves, to whose ends all physical objects are the means 
(L) All material objects including the mind and intellect 





must be controlled and directed by some ‘intelligent 
principle in “order thas they van_ achieve ~ anytbifig—or 
realize any end. A machine ora car does its work 
when put under the guidance of some person. So 
there must be some selves who guide the operations of 
prakrti and all her products. (c) All objects of ths 
world are of the nature of pleasure, pain and 


939—1605B 


‘306 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


indifference. But pleasure and pain have meaning only 
as they are experienced by some conscious experiencer. 
Hence there must be some conscious subjects or selves 
who enjoy and suffer pleasure and pain respectively. 
(d) Some persons at least of this world make a sincere 
endeavour to attain final release from all suffering, 
This is not possible for anything of the physical world, 
for, by its very nature, the physical world causes 
suffering rather than relieve it. So there must be some 
immaterial substances or selves_transcending the 
physical order. Otherwise, the concept of liberation or 
salvatioh and the will to liberate or fo be liberatéd as 
found in eaints and the saviours of mankind would be 
meaningless. 
There is not, as the Advaita Vedintiu says, one 
universal self pervading all bodies 
seal Sane wit’ alike. On the other hand, we must 
, admit a plurality of selves, of which 
one Js connected with each body. That there are many 
selves in the world follows froin the following con- 
siderations: (a) There is an obvious difference in the 
birth and death, and the sensgzy and motor cndow- 
ments of different individuals. The birth or death of 
one individual does not mean the same for all other ' 
individuals, Blindness or deafness in one man does 
not imply the same for all men. But if all persons 
bad one and the same self, then the birth and death 
of one would cause the birth and death of all, and the 
blindness or deafness of one would make all others 
blind or deaf. Since, however, that is not the case, 
we are to say that there is not one but many selves. 
(ob) If there were but one self for all living beings, 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 307 


then the activity of any one must make all others 
stive. But as a matter of fact, when we sleep, others 

make restless efforts, and vice versa. (c) Men and 
women are different from the gods, on the one hand, 
and birds and beasts, on the other. But there could 
not have been these _Gistinctions, if gods and human 
beings, birds and beasts possessed the same self. 
Thus we see that there must be a plurality of selves, 
which are eternal and intelligent subjects of knowledge, 
as distinguished from prakrti which is the one, eternal} 
and non-intelligent ground of the objects of knowledge, ' 
including manas, intellect and the ego. 


4. Evolution of the Werld' 


Prakrti evolves the world of objects when it comes 
The evolution of ato relation with the purusa. The 
aeaL ae wer evolution of the World his its start- 
tact between purusa Ing-print in the contact (sathyoga) 
a a between purusa or the self and 
prakrti or _ Primal matter. The contact (sathyoga) 
hetwéen puruga aod prakiti does not however mean any 
kind of ordinary conjunction like that between two 
finite material substances. It is a sort of eilective 
relation through which prakrti is mfuenced by — the 
presence of puruga in the same way in which our body 
is sometimes moved by the presence of a thought. 
There can be no evolution unless the two become 
somehow related to each other. The evolution of the 
world cannot be due to the self alone, for it is inactive ; 


nor can i¢ be due to roatter (prakrti) alone, for it is 


1 Vide Kénka end Kaumudi, 21-41; Pracacana-bhagya and Vrtti, 
. 64-74, 2. 10-82, 


808 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


noo-intelligent. The activity of prakrti must be guided 
by the intelligence of purusa, if there is to be any 
evolution of the world. It is only when purusa and 
prakrti co-operate that there is the creation of a world 
of objects. But the question is: How can two such 
different and opposed principles like puruga and prakrti 
co-operate ? What brings the one in contact with the 
other ? The answer given by the Sankhya is this: 
Just as @ blind man and a Jame man can co-operate in 
der to get out ofa forest, so the non-intelligent 
prakrti and the mactive puruga combine-and co-operate 
to serve their respective interests. ‘Prakrti requires the 
presence of purusa in order to be known or appreciated 
by someone (darganirtham), and purusa requires the 
help of prakrti in order to discriminate itself from the 
latter and thereby attain liberation (kaivalyirtham). 
With the confact between puruga and prakrti, there 
: _ isa disturbance of the equilibrium 
This contact dis. . : 
torbs the original equi in which the gunas were he-.d 
ea ol paket before creation. One of the gunas, 
* namely rajas, which is naturally active, is disturbed 
first, and then, through rajas, the other gunas begin 
to vibrate. This produces a tremendous commotion in 
the infinite bosom of prakrti and each of the gunas 
tries to preponderate over the rest. There is a gradual 
differentiation and integration of the three gunas, and 
as a result of their combination in different proportions, 
the various objects of the world originate. The course 
of evolution is as follows: 
/ The first product of the evolution of prakrti is 
mshat or buddbi.' Considered in its cosmic aspect, it 
ar ae 1 Vide Sankhyo-sit., 1, 71. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 309 


isthe great germ of this vast world of objects 
Pie Anak paen-at and is accordingly called mahat 
“emslstion is mabator OF the great one. In its psycho- 
q logical aspect, t.e. as present in 
individual beings, it is called buddhi or the intellect. 
The spetial functions of buddhi are ascertainment and 
decisian, It is by means of the intellect that the 
distinction between the subject and other objects is 
understood, and one makes decisions about things. 
Buddhi arises out of the preponderance of the element 
Jof sattva in prakrti. It is the natural function of 
buddhi to inanifest itself and other things. In its pure 
(sittvika) condition, therefore, it has such attributes 
as virtue (dharma), knowledge (jana), detachment 
(vairigya) and excellence (aisvaryya). But when 
vitiated by tamas, it has such contrary attributes as 
vice (adharma), ignorance (ajiiina>, attachment (dsakti 
or avairiigya) and imperfection (asakti or anaisvaryya). 
Buddhi,is different from purugsa or the self which 
transcends all physical things and qualities. But it is 
the ground of all intellectual processes in all individual 
beings. It stands nearest to the self and reflects the 
consciousness of the self in such a way as to become 
apparently conscious and inteiligent. While the senses 
and the mind function for buddhi or the intellect, the 
latter functions directly for the self and enables it to 
discriminate between itself and prakrti.* 
Ahankira or the ego ie the second product of 
The second is prakrti, which arises directly out 
ahathéra or the ego. = of mahat, the first manifestation. 
The function of ahankara is the feeling of ‘ I and 


\ Vide Karika, 36-97; Sankhya-sat., 2. 40-48 


310 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


mine’ (abhimana). It is on account of ahankara that 
the self considers itself (wrongly indeed) to be an agent 
or a cause of actions, a desirer of and striver for ends, 
and an owner of properties. We first perceive objects 
through the senses. Then the mind reflects on them 
and determines them specificaily as of this or that kind. 
Next there is an appropriation of those objects as 
belonging to and intended for me, and also a feeling of 
myself as somehow concerned in them. Ahasnkara is 
just this sense of the self as ‘I' (abam), and of objects 
as ‘mine’ (mama). When ahbanhkara thus determines 
our attitude towards the objects of the world, we pro- 
ceed to act in different ways inrelation to them. The 
potter constructs a pot when he accepts it us one of his 
ends and resolves to attain it by saying within himself: 
‘ Tiet me construct a pot.’ 
Abankara is said 40 be of three kinds, according ta 
the predominance of one or other 
Pinte age kinds of the three gunas. It is called 
vaikarika or sattvika when the 
element of sattva predominates in it, taijasa or rajasa 
when that of rajas predominates, and bhatadi or tamasa 
when tamas prelominates. From the first arise the 
eleven organs, namely, the five organs of perception 
(jfianendriva:, the five organs of action (karmendriya), 
and the mind (nanas). From the third (i.c. timasa 
abankara) are derived the five subtle elements (tanma- 
tras). The second (viz. rajasa) is concerned in both 
the first and the third, and supplies the energy needed 
for the change of sattva and tamas into their pro- 
ducts, 


The above order of development from shankira is 
laid down in the Sdakhya-karikd and accepted by Viacaspati 


THR SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 311 


Mitra.’ Vijfiinabhiksu,? however, gives a different order. 
According to him manas or the mind is the only sense 
which is pre-eminently sitfvika or manifesting, and is, 
therefore, derived from sattvika ahankara. The other ten 
organs are developed from rijasa ahankira, and the five 
subtle elements from the timasa. The Vedanta view is 
similar to, that held by Vacagpati. 

The five organs of perception (buddbindriya) are the 
senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste 
and touch. These perceive respec- 
tively the physical qualities of colour, 
sound, smell, taste and touch, and are developed from 
ahankira for the enjoyment of the self. It is the eelf’s 
desire to enjoy ubjects that creates ooth the objects of, 
and the organs for, enjoyment. The organs oi action 
(karinendriya) ure located in the mouth, hands. feet, anus 

and the sex organ. These perform 

Five organs of action. respectively the functions of speech, 

_ prehension. movement, excretion 

and reproduction, The real organs are not the perceptible 
external organs, like the eye-bails, ear-holes, skin, bands, 
feet, ete. There are certain ee at powers (Sakti) 
in these prrceptible end-organs which apprehend physical 
objects and act on them, and are. therefore, to be regarded 
us the organs (indriyas) proper. As such, au indriya cannot 
be sensed or perceived, but must be known by inference, * 
The mind (:nanus) is the central organ 

Manas or mind isthe Which partakes cf the nature of the 

central organ. orguns of both knowledge and action. 
Without. the guidance of the manas 

neither of them can function in relation to their ovjects. 
The manas is a very subtle sense indeed, but it is made up 
of parts, and so can come into contact wiih several senses 
at the same time. The mind, the ego and the intellect 
(manas, ahankira and buddhi) are the three inter- 
nal organs (antahkerana), while the 
senses of sight, hearing, ete. and 
the organs ot action are called the 
external organs (bahyakarana). The vital breaths or 
processes are the functious of theinternal organs. The ten 
external organs condition tbe function of the internal ones. 
The mind (mmanas) interprets the indetermimate sense- 


Five organs of know- 
ledge. . 


The antabkaraneas 
and babyakaranas. 


Cf. Kériké and Kaumudi, 25. 2 Cf. Pravacana-bhdgya, 2, 18. 
Cf. Sankhya-sit , 2.93; Karika and Kaumudi, 26 and 28. 


312 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


data supplied by the external organs into determinate 
perceptions ; the ego owns the perceived objects as desirable 
ends of the self or dislikes them ; and the intellect decides 
to act to attain or avoid those objects. The three internal 
and the ten external organs are collectively called the oe 
teen karanas or organs in the Siakhyap Ophy. 

the external organs are limtted~to~ preasnt opjects, rd 
internal ones deal with the past, preséat ‘and future? 


The Sankhya view of the manas and other or; organs has 
certain obvious differences from those 
The Saikhya view of the other systema. According to 
of manas and other the Nydya-Vaisesikas, manas is an 
organs is different I a ; 
from those of the other ternal atomic suvstance which has 
systems. neither parts nor any simultaneous 
contact with many senses. So we 
cannot have many experiences—many perceptions, desires 
and volitions—at the same time. For the Sinkhyas, the 
manas is neither atomic nor eternal, but a composite pro- 
duct of prakrti, and so subject to origin and destruction in 
time. ‘It is also held bythem that we may have many 
expcriences—sensation, perception, feeling and volition—at 
the same time, alihough ordinarily our experiences come 
one after the other. The Nyaya-Vaigesikas admit only the 
manas and the five external senses as indriyas und hoid 
that the external senses are derived from the physical 
elements (mabhabhiita). The Sainkhyas see eleven 
indriyas, ¢.g. the manas, the five seni Ore the, 
fiye motor organs, and derive them all from the ego (aban- 
kara), which is Hot recognized as a separate principle by the 
other systems, The Vedantins treat the five vital breaths 
(pafica-priina) as independent principles, while the Saikhyas 
reduce them to the general functions of antahkarana,? 


The five tanmitras are the potential elements or 
generic essences of sound, touch, 
colour, ‘taste and smejl. These 
are very subtle and cannot be ordinarily perceived. 
We know them by inference, aithough the yogins 
may have a perception of them. The gross physical 


Five tanmiatras. 


1 Cf Sankhya-siit,, 2. 26-32, 2. 98, 5. 71; Kériké and Kaumudi, 
.27, 29-80, 32-38. 
3 Cf. Saakhya-sit,, 2. 20-22, 2. 31-82, 5. 84; Karikd, 84 and 29-90. 


THE SARKHYA PHILOSOPHY 313 


elements arise from the tanmitras as follows: 
(i) From the essence of sound 
(ésbdatunmitra) is produced dkaéa 
with the quality of sound which 
is perceived by the ear. (ii) From the essence 
of touch (sparéatanmatra) combined with that of 
sound, arises air with the attributes of sound 
and touch. (ili) Out of the essence of colour (ripa- 
tanmatra) as mixed with those of sound and touch, 
there arises light or fire with the properties of sound, 
touch and colour. (iv) From the essence of taste 
(rasatanmaitra) combined with those of sound, touch 
and colour is produced the element of water with the 
qualities of sound, touch, colour and taste. (vy) The 
essence of smell (gandhatanmatra) combined with the 
other four gives rise to earth which pas all the five 
qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The 
five physical elements of akiga, air, light, water and 
earth have respectively the specific properties of sound, 
touch, cotour, taste and smell. In the order in which 
they occur here, the succeeding element has the special 
qualities of the preceding ones added to its own, since 
their essences go on combining progressively.* 


The whole course of evolution from prakrti to the gross 

; physical elements is distinguished 

ae stages of evola- into two stages, namely, the psychical 
jon, viz. the psychi- ' : 

cal and the physical, | (pratyayasarga or ouddhisarga) and the 

physica: (tanmatrasarga or bbautikea- 

sarga). The first inciudes the developments of prakrti 

us buddhi, ahankira and the eleven sense-motor organs. 

The second is constituted by the evolution of the five 

subtle physical essences (tanmatra), the gross elements 


Five gross physical 
elements. 


1 Cf. Kérikd and Kaumudi, 22. 
410—1606B 


814 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


(mahabhiita) and their products The tanmitras, being 
supersensible and unenjoyable to ordinary beings, are 
called avigega, i.e. devoid of specific perceptible charac- 
ters. The physical elements and their products, being 
possessed of specific characters, pleasurable or painful or 
stupefying, are designated as vigesa or the specific. The 
viéesas or specific objects are divided into three kinds, 
namely, the gross elements, the gross body born of parents 
(sthilagarira) and the subtle body (siksma or lingagarira). 
The gross body is composed of the five gross elements, 
although some think that it is made of four elements or ot 
only one element. The sudtle body is the combination of 
buddhi, ahankara, the eleven sense-motor organs and the 
five subtle elements (tanmiitra). The gross body is the 
support of the subtle body, in so far as the intellect (buddhi), 
the ego (ahankira) and the senses cannot function without 
some physical basis. According to Vicaspati there are 
only these two kinds of bodies as mentioned before. 
Vijfianabbiksu, however, thinks that there xs a third kind 
of body called the adhisthina body which supports the 
subtle one when it passes from one gross body into 
another." 


The history of the evolved universe is a play of 
twenty-four principles, of which prakrti is the first, 
the five gross elements are the last, and the thirteen 
organs (karanas) and five tanmiitras are the interme- 
diate ones. But it is not complete im itself, since 
it has a necessary reference to the world of selves as 
the witnesses and enjoyers thereof. : It is not the dance 
of blind atoms, nor the push and pull of mechanical 
forces which produce a world to no purpose. Op the 
other hand, it serves the most fundamental ends of 
the moral, or better, the spiritual, life. If the spirit 
be a reality, there must be proper adjustment between 
moral deserts, and the joys and sorrows of life. Agzin, 


1 Cf, Kériké and Kaumudi, 78-41. Sankhya-sut., 8. 1-17; P.atacana- 
bhagya, 8.11. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 315 


the history of the world must be, in spite of all appear: 
ances to the contrary, the progressive realization of the 
life of spirit. Inthe Sankhya, the evolution of prakrti 
into a world of objects makes it possible for spirits to 
enjoy or suffer according to their merits or demerits. 
“But the ultimate end of the evolution of prakrti is the. 
freedom (mukti) of self. It is through a life of moral 
training in the evolved universe that the self realizes 
its true nature. What that nature is and how it can 
be realized, we shall consider presently. Now the evo- 
lution of prakrti in relation to the puruga may be 
represerted by the following table: 


- Prakgti “ 


ge ee 


Puroga “——————. Ahattkare 


Se 





| \ 
Mind 5 Sense- 5 Motor- 5 Tanmatras 
organs orgaus ‘. 
. 5 Mehabhitas 


IU. Tue SaNxaya ToHeory or KNowLepcGE’ 


The Sinkhya theory of knowledge follows in the 
main its dualistic metaphysics. It 

salv ieese ieenaent accepts only three independent 
cage of valid know- sources of valid __ knowledge 
(pramina). These are perception. 

inference and scriptural testimony (gabda). The other 
sources of knowledge, like comparison, postulation 


1 Vede Nartka and Kaumudi, 4-6: Prarocana-bhagya, 1. &7-80, %0- 
108 ; 5, 97, 87, 42-51. Cy. The Ny&ya TLeory of Kaowledge (Ch. V 
ante} for a fuller account cf this subject. 


316 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


ite ate “recognized as sepa- 
rate sources of knowledge. 
Valid knowledge (pram4) is a definile and_an unerr- 
aera s ele e 
ing cognition of some object (artha. 
veld rel a paricchitti) through the modifica- 
tion of buddhi or the intellect 


which r reflects the consciousness of the self. in It. 


Serena 


scious material entity in the SafAkhya philosophy. 
Consciousness or intelligence (caitanya) really belongs 
to the self. But the seif cannot immediately appre- 
hend the objects of the world. If it could, we should 
always know all objects, since the eelf in us is not finite 
and limited, but all-pervading. The self knows objects 
through the intellect, the manas, and the senses. 
We have a true-Kiowledge of objects when, through 
the activity of the senses and the manas, their forme 
are impressed on the intellect which, in its turn, 
” reflects the light or consciousness of the celf. , 
Tn all valid knowledge there are three factors, 
namely, the subject (pramata), the 
Rikaalsiagsy of valid object (prameya), and the ground 
or source of knowledge (pramina). 
The subject being & conscious a conscious principle is no other 
than the self ag pere_consciou: pere_ consciousness (éuddha cetana). 
The modification (vrtti) of the it intellect, through which 
the self knows an object, _is_called pramapa. ~The 
object presented to the self through this modification 
is the prameya. Prama or valid knowledge is the 
reflection of the self in the intellect as modified into 
the form of the object, because without the self’s 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 317 


consciousness the unconscious intellect cannot cognise 
anything. 

Perception is the direct cognition of an object 
through its contact with some 
sense. When an object like the 

. table comes within the range of 
your vision, there is contact between the table and 
your eyes. The table produces certain impressions or 
modifications in the sense organ, which are analyeed 
and synthesised by manas or the mind. Through the 
activity of the senses and the mind, buddhi or the 
intellect becomes modified and transformed into_the 
shape of the table. The intellect, “however, being ap 
unconscious material principle, canuot by itself know 
the object, although the form of the object is present 
in_ it. “But as the intellect has an excess of " sattva, 
it Tellects, like a transparent mirrgr, the the consciousness 
of the self (purusa), With the reflection of the self’s 
conscioueness in it, the unconscious modification of the 
intellect into the form of the table becomes illumined 
‘into a* conscious state of perception. Just asa mirror 
reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests 
other things, so the material principte of buddhi, - _being _ 
transparent and bright (sattvika), reflects the conscious- 
ness of the self and illuminates or cognises the objects: 
of knowledge. 


The nature of per- 
ception. 


It is to be observed here that the véfleotioa theory of 
knowledge has been explained in two different ways by 
Viicaspati Migra and Vijiinabhikgu, We have followed 
the former in the account of the knowledge process given 
above. Viicuspati thinks that the knowledge of an object 
takes place when there is reflection of the self in the 
intellect which has been modified into the form of the 
object. According to Vijiinabhikgu, the process of 


318 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


perceptual knowledge is like this: When any object comes 
in contact with its special sense organ, the intellect 
becomes modified into the form of the object. Then 
because of the predominance of sattva in it, the intellect 
reflects the conscious self and seems to be conscious, in 
the same way in which a mirror reflects the light of a 
lamp and becomes itself luminous and capadle of mani- 
festing other objects. But next, the intellect, which is 
thus modified into the form of the object, is reflected back 
in the self. That is, the object is presented to the selt 
through a mental modification corresponding to the form 
of the object. Thus on Viacaspati’s view, there is a 
reflection of the self in the intellect, but no reflection of 
the intellect back into the self. Vijianabhiksu, on the other 
hand, thinks that there is a reciprocal reflection of the self 
in the intellect and of the intellect in the self. This view 
is accepted also in Vedavydsa’s commentary on the Yoga- 
Sitra."| What induces Vijiiinabhikgu to suppose that 
the mod:fied intellect is reflected in the self is perhaps the 
necessity of explaining the self’s experience of pleasure 
and pain. The self, being pure conscicusness, free from 
all pleasure and pain, cannot be subjected to these 
experiences. It is the intellect which really enjoys pleasure 
and suffers pain. So, the apparent experiences of pleasure 
and pain in the self should be explained by some sort 
of reflection’ of the intellect in the self. 


There are two kinds of perception, namely, nirvi- 
Nirvikelpske and kalpake or the indeterminate and 
savikalpaka percep gavikalpaka or the determinate. 
tlons: ks ——a ee 
The first arises at the first moment 
of contact between a sense and its object, and is 
, antecedent to all mental analysis and Synthesis of the 
sense-data. It is accordingly called dlocana or a mere 
. 7 : iret ae 
sensing of the object. In it there is a cognition of 
the object as a mete sonething without any recogni- 
tion of it as this or that kind of thing. It is an 
unverbalise] expsrience liks those of the iofant ani 
the damb. Just as babies and dumb persons cannot 


1 Vide Pravacana-bhagya, L 9}: Vyasa bhagya, & 32. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 319 


express their experiences in words, so we cannot 
communicate this indeterminate perception of objects 
to other people by means of words and sentences. 
The second kind of perception is the result of the 
‘analysis, synthesis and interpretation of sense-data 
by manas orthe mind. So it is called vivecana ot 
a judgment of the object. It is the determinate 
cognition of an object as a particular kind of thing 
having certain qualities and standing in certain rela- 
tions io other things. The determinate perception 
of an object in expressed in the form ofa subject- 
predicate proposition, e.g. ‘this is a cow,’ ‘that rose 
is red.” 
Inference is the knowledge of one term of a 
relation, which is uot perceived, 
through the other which is per- 
ceived and known to be invariably 
related to the firet. In it what is perceived leads us 
on tq the knowledge of what is unperceived through 
Ahe knowledge of a universal relation (vyapti) between 
the two. We get the knowledge - vyapti Dewwese 
two things from the repeated observ: 
comitance. One single instance of their relation is not. 
as some logicians wrongly think, sufficient to estabiish 
the knowledge of a universal relation between them. 
With regard to the classification of inference, the 
Sainkhya adopts the Nydya view, 
“a Sie although in a slightly different 
form. Inference is first divided 
into two kinds, namely, vita and avita. It is called 


ts Fora fuller accuunt of nirvikalpaka aod sav.kalpaka perceptions , 
vide 8, C. Chatterjee, The Nydya Theory of Knowledge, Ch. 1%. 


Vhe nature aud con- 
ditions of infercnee. 





320 _AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


vita or affirmative when it is based on a univergal 
based on a universal negative proposition. The vita 
. ig subdivided into the purvavat and the samanyatodrsta. 
A pirvavat inference is that which is based ‘on the 
observed uniformity of concomitance between tw6d 
things. This is illustrated when one infers the exist- 
ence of fire from smoke because one has observed that 
smoke is always accompanied by fire. Samanyato- 
drsta inference, on the other hand, is not based on 
any observation of the concomitance between the 
middle and the major term, but on the similarity of 
the middie with such facts as are uniformly related to 
the major. How do we know that we have the visual 
and other senses? It cannot ba by mans of parcep- 
tion. The senses ‘are supersensible. We have no 
sense to parceive our senses with. Therefore, we are 
to know the existence of the senses by an inference like 
this: ‘‘All actions require some me3n3 or instrumants, 
e.g. the act of cutting; the perceptions of colour, etc. 
are. s0 many acts; therefore, there must be some 
means or organs of perception.’’ It should be noted 
here that we infer the existence of organs from acts 
of perception, not because we have observed the organs 
to be invariably related to parceptive acts, but becau3s 
we know that perception is an action and that an action 
requires a means of action. The other kind of in- 
ference, namely, avita is what some Naiyadyikas cal! 
Segivat or parigesa inference. It consists in proving 
something to be true by the elimination of all other 
alternatives to it. This is illustrated when one argues 
that sound must be a quality because it cannot. be a 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 321 


substance or an activity or a relation or anything else. 
Agr ‘egards the logical form of inference, the Sankhyas 
admit, like the Naiyayikas, that the five-membered syl- 
logiem is the most convincing form of inferential proof.’ 
The third ptamana is éabda or testimony. It is 
= constituted by authoritative state- 
8 stats and 
forms of éabda or ments (aptavacana), and gives us 
ooo: the knowledge of objects which 
cannot be known by perception and inference. A 
statement is a sentence made up of -yords arranged in 
a certain way. A word is a sign which denotes some- 
thing (vacaka), and its meaning (artha) is the thing 
denoted by it (vacya). That is, a word is a symbol 
which stands for some object. The understanding of 
a sentence requires the uniJerstanding of the meanings 
of its constituent words. Sabda is generally said to be 
of two kinds, namely, laukika and Vaidika. The first 
ris the testimony of ordinary trustworthy, persons. 
This, however, is not recognized inthe Sinkhya as a 
separate pramina, since it depends on perception and 
inference. It is the testimony of Sruti or the Vedas 
that is to be adinitted a3 the third independent pra- 
mina. The Vedas give us trua knowledge about 
supersensuous realities which cannot be known through 
perception anlinference. As not made by any person, 
the Vedas are free from all defects and imperfections 
that must cling to tha products of persons! agencies. 
They are, therefore, infallible, and possess self-evident 
validity. The Vedas embody the intuitions of ealight- 
ened sesrs (rgia). These intuitions, being universal 


1 Vide, p. 210 ante. For an elaborate account of the theory of infer- 
enoe, vide 5. O. Chatterjee, The Nydya Theory of Knowledge, Be. 111. 


41—1605B. 


322 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


and eternal experiences, are not dependent on the will 
or consciousuess of individual persons. As such, the 
Vedas are impersonal (apauruseya). Yet they are not 
eternal, since they arise out of the spiritual experiences 
of seers and saints, and are conserved by 8 continuous 
line of instraction from generation to generation. 


IV. Tse Docrrine oF Liperation! 


Our life on earth is a mixture of joys and sorrows. 
There are iodeed many pleasures of life, and also 
many creatures who have a good share of them. But 
many more are the pains and sufferings of life, and all 
living beings are more or less subject to them. Even 
if it be possible tor any individual being to ehun all 
other pains and miseries, it is imp ssible for him to 
evade the clutches of decay and death. Ordinarily, 

however, we are the victims of three 
ae te kinds of pains, viz. the idhyatmika, 
@dhibbautike andédbi- =dhibhautika and adhidaivika, 
daivika. ; 

The first is due to intra-organic 
causes like bodily disorders and mental affections. It 
includes both bodily and imental sufferings, such as 
fever and headache, the pangs of fear, anger, greed, 
etc. The secoud is produced by extra-organic natural 
causes like men, baasts, thorns, etc. Instances of this 
kind are found in cases of murder, snake-bite, prick of 
thorns and so forth. The third kind of suffering is 
caused by extra-organic supernatural causes, e.g. the 
pains inflicted by ghosts, demons, etc. 


1 Vide Karika and Kaumudi, 44-68; Sankhya-stt., Pravacana- 
bhasya and Vrits, 3. 65-84. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 323 


Now all men earnestly desire to avoid every kind of 
pain. Nay more, they want, oncé 
Pr ea to get for all, to put an end to all their 
sufferings, and have enjoyment at 
all times. But that is not to be. We cannot have 
pleasure only and exclude pain ultogether. So long as 
we are in this frail body with its imperfect organs, al] 
pleasures are bound to be mixed up with. pain or, at 
least, be temporary. Hence we should give up the 
hedonistic ideal of pleasure and rest content with the 
lees attractive Lut more rational end of freedom from 
fiskhya mokti or pain. In the Sankhya system, 
rg ate asd natit liberation (mukti) is jist the abso- 
pain. lute and complete cessation of all 
pain without a possibility of return. It is the ultimate 
end or the sammum bonum of our life (apavarga or 
purusirtha), . 
How are we to attain liberation or absolute freedom 
from al! pain and suffering? All 
Tenerance istheeemse the aris and crafts of the modern 


of sufferit g. So free- . 
dom frem suffering is man snd all the blessings of 


to be attained through . . 
right knowledge. modern science give us but tempo- 
rary relief from pain or short-lived 
pleasures. These do not ensure a total and final 
release from all the ills to which our mind and body 
are subject. So the Indian philosopher wants some 
other more effective method of accomplishing the task, 
and this he finds in the right knowledge of reality 
(tattvajiaina). It isa general rule that our sufferings 
are due to our ignorance. In the different walks of 
life we find that the ignorant and uneducated man 
comes to grief on many occasions because he does not 


324 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


know the laws of life and nature. The more know- 
ledge we have about ourselves and the world we live 
in, the better fitted are we for the struggle for exist- 
ence and the enjoyments of life. But the fact remains 
tbat we are not perfectly happy, nor even completely 
free from pain and misery. The reason for this is 
that we have not the perfect knowledge about reality. 
When we bave that knowledge, we sball attain free- 
dom from al] suffering. Reality is, according to the 
Saikhya, a plurality of selves and 
the world of objects presented to 
them. The self is an intelligent 
principle which does not possess any quality or activity 
but is a pure consciousness free from the limitations of 
space, time and causality. It is the pure subject which 
trarecends the whole world of objects including physical 
things and organic Bodies, the mind and the senses, the 
ego and the intellect. All changes and activities, all 
thoughts and feelings, all pleasures and pains, al] joys 
and sorrows belong to what we cal] the mind-body sys- 
tem. (pe self is quite distinct from the mind-body 
complex and is, therefore, beyond all the affections and 
afflictions of the psychical life. Pleasure and pain are 
mental facts which do not really colour the pure self. 
It is the mind, and not self, that feels pleasure or 
pain, und is happy or unhappy. So also, virtue aud 
vice, merit and demerit, in short, all moral properties 
belong to the ego (abuikara) who is the etriver and doer 
of all acts.’ The self is different from the ego or the 
moral agent who strives for gcod or bad ends, attains 
them and enjoys or suffers accordingly. Thus we see 
1 Cf. Sankhyo-sit. and Vrtti, 5, 25-26. 


The nature and con- 
stitution of reality, 


THE SANEHYA PHILOSOPHY 325 


thet the self is the transcendent subject whose very 
essence is pure consciousness, freedom, eternity and 
immortality. It is pure consciousness (jidnasvaripa) 
in the sense that the changing states and processes of 
the mind, which we call empirical consciousness, do 
not belong’ to the self. The self is the subject or 
witness of mental changes as of bodily and physical 
changes but is as much distinct from the former as 
from the latter. It is freedom itself in so far as it is 
above the space-time and the cause-effect order of 
existence. It is eternal and immortal, because it is 
not produced by any cause and cannot be destroyed in 
any way.’ 
Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow really belong to 
buddhi or the intellect and the 
jg Cnorance «7 aviveks mind. The purusa or eelf is by its 
between self and not nature free from"them all. But on 
account of ignorance it, fails to 
distinguish iteelf from the mind and the intellect, and 
owns them as parts of itself so much so that it identi- 
fies itself with the body, the senses, the migg and 
the intellect. It becomes, so to say, somebody with a 
certain name, and a particular ‘combination of talent 
temperament and character.’ As such, we speak 
of it as the ‘ material self,’ the ‘ social self,’ the 
‘sensitive and appetitive self,’ the ‘ imagining and 
desiring self,’ or the ‘ willing and thinking self.’? 
According to the Sankhya, all these are not-self which 
reflects the pure self and apparently imparis its 


1 Cf. Pravacana-bhasya, L. 146-48. 

2° For on account of the different kinds of selves vide Jamea, 
Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Chap. X, and Ward, Psychological 
Principles, Chap. XV. 


826 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


affections and emotions to the latter. The self con. 
siders itself to be happy or unhappy when the mind 
and the intellect, with which it identifies itself, become 
60, in the same way in which a father considers 
himself fortunate or unfortunate in view of his beloved 
son’s good or bad luck, or a master feels insulted by 
an iusult to his own servant. It is this want of 
discrimination or feeling of identity (aviveka) between 
the self aod the mind-body that is the cause of all our 
troubles. We svfler pain and enjoy pleasure because 
the experiencing subject in us (drasta) wrongly identi- 
fies itself with the experienced objects (dréya) including 
pleasure and pain.’ 
The cause of suffering being ignorance (ajiina) in 
the sense of non-discrimination 
cr ines Bona or dis’ (aviveka) between the self and the 
the two leads to free- * not-self, freedom frem suffering 
dom frem suffering. 

E must come from knowledge of the 
distinction between the two (vivekujiiana).” But this 
saving knowledge is not merely an intellectual uoder- 
standing of the truth. It must be a direct knowledge 
or clear realization of the fact that the self is not the 
body and the senses, the mind and the intellect. Once 
we realise or see that our self is the unborn and 
undying spirit in us, the eternal and immortal subject 
of experience, we become free fromm all misery and 
suffering. A direct knowledge of the truth is necessary 
to remove the illusion of the body or the mind as my 
self. Now I have a direct and an undoubted percep- 
tion that 1am a particular psycho-physica) organism. 


1 Cy Kériké and Kaumudi, 62; Pravacana bydsye and Viti, 8. 72. 
3 Of Kariké and Kaumudi, 44, 68; Sénkhya-sit. and Vytti, 9, 28-24. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 327 


The kuowledge that the self is distinct from al) this 
must be an equally direct perception, if it is to con- 
tradict and cancel the previous one. The illusory 
perception of snake in a rope is not to be sublated by 
any argument or instruction, but by another perception 
of the rope 28 such. To realize the self we require a 
long coursp of spiritual training with devotion to and 
con:tant contemplation of, the truth that the spirit 
is not the body, the senses, the mind or the intellect.! 
We shall consider the natur~ and nethods of this 
trainipg when we come to the Yoga philosophy. 

When the self attains hberation, no change takes 
The nature of libera. Place in it and no new property or 
tion. quality accrues to it. Liberation or 
freedom of the self does not mean the development 
from a less perfect to a more perfect condition. So 
also, immortality and eternal life are hot to be regarded 
as future possibilities or events in time. If thgse were 
events and temporal acquisitions, they would be govern- 
ed by the laws of time, space and caunality, and, as 
such, the very opposite of freedom and immortality. 
The attainment of liberation means just the clear re- 
cognition Of the self asa reality which is beyond time 
and space, and above the mind and the body, and, 
therefore, essentially free, eternal and immortal.’ 
When there is such realization, the self ceases to be 
affected by the vicissitudes of the body and the mind 
and rests in itself as the disinterested witness of 
physical and psychical changes. ‘‘ Just as the dancing 
girl ceases to dance after having entertained the 


1 Cf. Saekhya-sit. and Vytii, 8. 66 and 75; Kavika and Kaumudi, 64. 
2 Of Setekhyoaat. and Vriti, 5. 74 83; Sdnkhya-siit., 1. 56, 6. 20. 


328 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


spectators, So prakrti ceases to act and ‘evolve the 
world after manifesting her nature to the self.’’ 
It is possible for every self to realize itself in this way 
i . and thereby attain liberation in 
Two kinds of mukti, ae 3 f 
viz. sivanmukti aod life in this world. This kind of 
videlenublt: liberation is known as jivanmukti 
or emancipation of the sou! while living in ‘this 
body. After the death of its body, the liberated 
self attains what is called videhamukti or emancipation 
of the spirit from all bodies, gross and subtle. This 
ensures absolute and complete freedom.” —Vijiiana- 
bhiksu, however, thinks that the latter is the real kind 
of liberation, since the self cannot be completely free 
from the influence of bodily and mental changes «£0 
long as it is embodied.* But all Siakhyas agree that 
liberation is only the complete destruction of the three- 
fold misery (duhkha-trayé-bhighata), It isnot a state 
of joy as,conceived in the Vedanta. Where there is 
no paipo, there can neither be any pleasure ; because 
the two are relative and inseparable. . 


V. THE PROBLEM oF Gop‘ 


The attitude of the Saakhya towards theism has 
been the subject of controversy 

Co:.troversy among 7 : 
Séikbyas with regard © among its commentators and inter- 
Se Ceie eaieienre: preters. While some of them 
clearly repudiate the belief in God, others tako 


1 Cf, Kariké and Kaumudi, 59, 65-66. 

3 Cf. Kanké and Kaumuadi, 67-68; Séakhya-s@t, and Vetti, 8, 78-84. 

3 Cf. Pravacana-bhagya, 8, 76-84, 6. 116. 

4 Cf. Karikd and Kaumudi, 56-57; Sénkhya-sit., Vrttt and 
Pravacana, 1. 92-95, 3, 86-57, 6.212. Vide sleo Gaudapéda, Sdakhyo- 
kérikd-bhagya, and A. K. Majumdar, The Sdnkhya Conception of 
Personality, Chapters I and II. 


THE siNKHYA PHILOSOPHY we 


great pains to make out that the Sankhya is 
no less theistic than the Nyaya. ‘The classical 
Saokhya argues against the existence of God on the 
following grounds: (a) That the world asa system of 
went effects must have a cause is no 
Rage car ve doubt true. But God or Brahman 
: cannot be the cause of the world, 

God is eaid to be the eternal and immutable 
self; and what is unchanging cannot be the 
active cause of anything. So it follows that the 
ultimate cause of the world is the eternal but ever- 
changing (parinami) prakrti or matter. (b) It may be 
said that prakrti being non-intelligent must be con- 
trolled and directed by some intelligent agent to 
produce the world. ‘The individual selves are limited 
in knowledge and, therefore, cannot* control the subtle 
material cause of the world. So there must be an 
infinitely wise being, i.c. God, who directs and guides 
prakrti. But this is untenable. God, as conceived 
by the theists, does not act or exert Himself in apy 
way; but to control and guide prakyti is to act or do 
something. Supposing (rod 1s the controller of prakrti, 
we may ask: What induced God to control prakrti 
and thereby create the world ? It cannot be any end 
of His own, for a perfect being cannot have any 
unfulfilled desires and unattuined ends. Nor can it be 
the good of His creatures. ‘No prudent man bothers 
himself about the welfare of other beings without his 
own gain. Asa matter of fact, the world is so full 
of sin and suffering that it can hardly be said to be 
the work of God who had the good of His creatures 
in view when He created. (c) The belief in God is 


42—1605 


330 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


inconsistent with the distinctive reality and immortality 
of individual selves (jiva). If tbe latter be included 
within God as His parts, they ought to have some of 
the divine powers, which, however, is not the case. 
On the other hand, if they are created by God, they 
must be subject to destruction. Tbe conclusion drawn 
from all this is that God does not exist and that prakrti 
is the sufficient reason for there being a world of 
objects. Prakrti creates the world unconsciously for 
the good of the individual selves (purusa) in the same 
way in which the milk of the cow flows unconsciously 
through her udder for the nourishment o! ihe calf. 
According 1o another interpretation of the Siankhya, 
which is not generally accepted, 
gone Li si this system is not atheistic. This 
_is the view of Vijiiinabhikgu and 
some modern writere.* They hold that the existence 
of God ‘as possessed of creative aclivity cannot bo 
adinitted. Yet we must believe in God as the eternally 
perfect spirit who is the witness of the world and 
whose mere presence (sannidhimatra) moves prakrti to 
act and create, in the same way in which the magnet 
moves a piece of iron. Vijiidnabhiksu thinks that the 
existence of such a God is supported by reason as well 
as by the scriptures. 


VI, ConcLusion 


The Sankhye may be called a philosophy of dualistic 
realism. It traces the whole course of the world to 
the interplay of two ultimate principles, viz. spirit 


1 Vide Pravacana-bhagya, ibid.; A. K. Majumdar, The Sdakhya 
Conception of Personality, ibid. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY 331 


and primal matter (purugs and prakrti). On the one 
hand, we have prakrti which is regarded as the ultimate 
cause of the world of objects including physical things, 
crganic bodies and psychical products like the mind 
(manas), the iniellect and the ego. Prakrti is both 
the material and the efficient cause of the world. It 
is active and ever-changing, but blind and unintelligent. 
How can such a blind principle evolve an orderly 
world and direct it towards apy rational end? How 
again are we to explain the first disturbance or 
vibration in prakrti which is said to be originally in 
state of equilibrium ? So, on the other hand, the 
Satkhya admits another ultimate principle, viz. purusa 
or the self. The category of purugsa includes a plurality 
of selves who are eternal and immutable principles 
of pure consciousness. These selves are intelligent 
but inactive and unchanging. It ‘is in contact with 
such conscious and intelligent selves that the uncons- 
cious and unintelligent prakrti evolves the world of 
experience. But how can the inactive and unchanging 
self at all come in contact with and influence prakrti 
or matter? The Sinkhya holds that the mere 
presence (sannidhi) of purusa or the self is sufficient 
to move prakrti to act, although it itself remains 
unmoved. Similarly, it is the reflection of the 
conscious self on the unconscious intellect that explains 
the cognitive and other psychical functions performed 
by the latter. But how the mere presence of the self 
can be the cause of changes in prakrti, but not in the 
self itself, is not clearly explained. Nor again is it 
quite clear bow an unintelligent material principle like 
the intellect can reflect pure consciousness (which is 


332 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


immaterial) and thereby become conscious and intelli- 
gent. The physical analogies given in the Sankhya 
are not sufficiently iiluminating. Further, the existence 
of many selves is proved by the Sainkhya from the 
difference in the nature, activity, birth and death, and 
sensory and motor endowments of differeft living 
beings. But all these differences pertain, not to the 
self as pure consciousness but to the bodies associated 
with it. So far as ther intrinsic nature (i.c. pure 
consciousness) is concerned, there is nothing to distin- 
guish between one self aud another. So there seems 
to be no good ground for the Sankhya theory of many 
ultimaie selves. It may be that the many selves of 
which we speak, are the empirical individuals or egos 
dealt with in ordinary life and experience. From 
the speculative standpoint there seem to be certain 
gaps in the Sankhya philosophy. Still we should not 
underrate its value a3 a system of self-culture for the 
attainment of liberation. So faras the practical end 
of altaining freedom from suffering is concerned, this 
system is a8 good as any other and enables the religious 
aspirant to realize the highest good of his life, viz. 
liberation. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Parnacandra Vedintacuficr ... 


Kalivara Vedantavapisa 


Madhavicarya 


8. Radhakrishnan 


8. N. Dasgupta 


G. Coster 


N. K. Brahma 


Haribarananda-Aranys 


Yoga-siitra with Bhadgya 
(Calcutta). * 


.. Patanjala-siitra with 


Bhoja-Vrtti (Calcutta). 


.. Serva-dargana-satigraha, 


Ch. on Patabjala. 


.. Indian Philosophy, Vol. 


I, Ch. V. 


« The Study of Patanjali. 


Yoga as Philosophy 
and Religion (Kegan 
Paul). 


. Yoga and Western Psy- 


chology ‘Oxford Uni- 
versity Press). 


.. The Philosophy of 
- Hindu Sddhand (Kegan 


Paul). 


Patafjala Yoga-daréana. 


CHAPTER VIII 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 


I. Iytropvucrion 


The Yoga philosophy is an invaluable gift of the 
pashinl Sekai great Indian ea,e Pataiijali to al! 
founder of the Yega bent upon spiritual realization. It 
i haa, is a great aid to those who wish to 
realize the existence of the spirit as an independent 
principle, free from all limitations of the body, the 
senses and the mind.’ It is known also as the 
Patafijala system after the name of its founder. The 
Yoga-stitra or the Pdtafjala-siitra is the first work of 

this schcol of philosophy. Vyasa 
Beli of hiceaca, wrote a brief but valuable commen- 
. tary on the Yoga-siitra called Yoga- 
bhasya or Vydsa-bhdsya. Vacaspati’s Tattva-vaisiradi 
is a reliable sub-commentary on Vydsa’s commentary. 
Bhojaraja’s Vriti and Yogamani-prabhd are very simple 
and popular works on the Yoga system. Vijiana- 
bhiksu’s Yoya-rdrttika and Yoga-sdra-satigraha are 
other useful manuals of the Yoga philosophy. 


1 Mise G, Coster bas the Yoga system in view when she says : ‘‘ We 
needa new kind of Society for Psychical Research . . . to demons- 
trate to the ordinary public the possibility (or impossibility) of genuine 
super-physical experience on this side" (ride Yoga and Western Psycho- 
logy, p. 246). 


336 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The Patafijala system is divided into four pidas or 
parts. The first is called the 
There are four eres 
piidas or parte of this samadhipida and treats of the 
pbitonopliy. nature, aim and forms of yoga, the 
modifications of citta or the internal organ, and the 
different methods of attaining yoga. The second, viz. 
the sidhanapida, deals with kriyayoga as a means of 
attaining samadhi, the kledas' or mental states causing 
afflictions, the fruits of actions (karmaphala) and their 
painful nature, and the fourfold theme of suffering, 
its cause, its cessation and the means thereof. The 
third or vibhitipida givesan account of the inward 
aspects of yoga and the supernormal powers acquired 
by the practice of yoga and so forth. The fourth part 
‘is called the kaivalyapida and describes the nature 
and forms of liberation, the reality of the transcendent 
self and the other world and so on. 
The Yoga is closely allied to the Safikhya system. 
It is the application of the, theory 
of the Sankhya in practical life. 
; The Yoga mostly accepts the 
Sankhya epistemology and admits the three praminas 
of perception, inference and scriptural testimony. It 
mostly accepts also the metaphysics of the Sinkhya 
with its twenty-five principles, but believes in God 
as the supreme self distinct from other selves. The 
special interest of this system isin the practice of yoga 


Its relation to the 
Séiklya system. 


1 The verb,‘ klié’ is ordinsrily intransitive (k!iéyati), meaning 
‘to be afflicted.’ ‘ Klegs,’ then means affliction or suffering. - But 
‘ klié ’ is sometimes also transitive (kilénéti) meaning ‘cause affliction,’ 
‘torment.’ The present word is more convesiently derived from this 
transitive sense Vide Vydsa-bhdgya, 1.5, where kliste =kleda-hetuks. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 337 


as the sure means of attaining vivekajiiana or discrimi- 
native knowledge which is held in the Saikhya as the 
essential condition of liberation. 


The value of yoga as an important method of 
realizing the spiritual truths of 
Indian philosophy has been recog- 
4 nized by almost all the Indian 
systems. We have clear evidence of the recognition 
of yoga practices even in the Upanisads, the Smrtis 
and the Puranas.’ So Jong as the mind or the intellect 
of a man is impure and unsettled, he cannot properly 
understand anything of pbilosopby and religion. We 
must have a pure heart and a tranquil miud if we are 
to know and realize the truths of philosophy and 
religion. Now the practice of yoga ia the best way 
of self- purification, i. €. purification of the body and the 
intellect. Hence it is that almost all the systems of 
Indian philoscphy insist on the practice of yqga as the 
necessary practical side of a philosophy of life. 


The value &f yogs 
for lite and philosop!:y. 


The Pataiijala system makes a special study of the 

The yoga lays down ature and forms of yoga, the 
aimee lieu different steps in yoga practice, and 
other important things connected 

with these. It holds, like the Sankhya and some other 
Indian systems, that liberation 13 to be attained through 
the direct knowledge of the self’s distinction from the 
physicai world including our body, mind and the ego 
(vivekajiiana). But thiscan be realized only if we 
can manage to suppress and terminate the functions 
of the body and the senses, the manas and the intellect 


1 Cf. Kotha Upanssad, 6. 11, 6. 18, Soetddvatara, 2.8, 8. LL. 
48—16065 15 


988, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


and finally, the ego (i.e. the empirical self) and yet 
have eelf-consciousness or experience of the transcendent 
epirii (puruga). This would convince us that the self 
is above the mind-body complex, the senses and the 
intellect and alro the suffering or enjoying individual 
ego. It will be seen to be above all physical reality 
with its spatio-temporal and cause-effect order. This 
is the reahzation of the celf as the free, immortal epirit 
which is above sin and suffering death and destruction. 
In other words, it is the attainment of freedom from 
all pain and misery, i. e. liberation. The Yoga system 
lays down a practical path of self-realization for the 
religious aspirant and the sincere seeker after the spirit. 
The Sahkhya lays greater stress on discriminative 
knowledge as ihe means of attaining liberation, 
although it recommends such practical methods as 
study, reasoning and constant meditation on the truth.’ 
The Yoya, on the other hand, emphasizes the ii:mpor- 
tance of the practical methods of purification and con- 
centration for realizing the self’s distinction from the 
body and the mind, and thereby attaining Jiberaiion. 
These will be explained in the Yoga ethics. Before 
we come to that we have to study the Yoga psychology 
which deals with the nature of the self, the mind and 
its function, and the relation between mind, body and 
the self. 


II. Yoca Psycuotocy 


In the Sankhya-Yoga system, the individual self 
(jiva) is regarded as the free spirit associated with the 


1 Vide Kariké and Kaumudi, 62 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY ‘339 


gross body and more closely related to a subtle body 
Tha self knows the COnstituted by the senses, the 
repageoe ee reid «manag, the ego and the intellect. 
ak of citta or the The self is, in its own nature, pure 
® consciousness, free from the’ limita- 
tions of the body and the fluctuations of the mind (citta). 
But in itseigaorance it confuses itself with citta. The 
citta is the first product of prakrti, in which the element 
of sattva or the power of manifestation naturuily 
predominates over those of rajas and tamis. It is essen- 
tially unconscious; but being in the closest proximity 
tothe self it reflects, through its manifesting power, 
the self’s consciousness so as to become apparently 
conscious and intelligent, It is different from manas 
which is the internal sense. \Vhen the citta is related 
to any object through manas, it assumes the form of 
that object. Tho self knows the objects of the world 
through the modifications of citta which correspond to 
the forms of the objects known. Although the self 
really undergoes no change or modification, yet because 
of its reflection in the chanzing states and processes of 
cilta, the self appxars to ba subject to changes and to 
pass through different states of the mind or citta, in the 
same way in which the moon appears to be moving 
when we seo it reflected in the moving waves.’ 
The modifications of citta, i.e. cognitive mental 
There are five kinds States, are many and varied. These 
of mental modiiva- may be classified under five heads, 
tions or citta-. pb. . woes 
namely, pramina or true cognition, 
viparyaya or false cognition, vikalpa or merely verbal 


1 Vide-Yoza-stt., and Vrt!i, 1. 4. Cf. Sddkhya theory of “Evolution 
of the World,"” ante. 


840 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


cognition, nidra or sleep, and smrti or memory. There 
are three kinds of true cognition, viz. perception, infe- 
tenze and verbal testimony. ‘These have been explain- 
ed in almost the same way as in the Sdatkhya. 
Viparyaya is the wrong knowledge of objects as what 
they ceally are not and it includes doubt or uncertain 
cognitions. Vikalpa isa mere verbal idea caused by 
words, to which no real facts correspond. When you 
hear the words ‘‘Rahu’s head,”’’ you have the idea of a 
distinction between Rahu and its head, although really 
there is no distinction between the two, Rabu being only 
ahead. Similarly, the phrase ‘‘consciousness of the 
soul’’ arouses the ideas of two different entities (soul 
and consciousness) related together, whereas in reality 
there is no distinction between them (soul and con- 
sciousness being identical).' Slesp (nidra) is another 
kind of mental modification (citta-vrtti). It isdue to 
the preponderance of tamas in citta and the consequent 
cessation of waking consciousness snd dream ex- 
periences. It thus stands for deep dreamless sleep 
(susupti). Some philosophers think that in sound sieep 
there is no mental function or conscious state at all. 
Bat this is wrong. On waking from sound sleep we 
say, ‘‘I slept well,’’ ‘‘I koew nothing,’’ etc. Such 
memory of what took place during sleep supposes 
direct experience of the state of sleep. So there 
coust be in sleep some cognitive mental state or 
process which is concerned in the experience of the 
absence of knowledge (abhavapratyayalambané vrtti). 
Smrti or memory is the reproduction of past 


| Yoga-bhdgye, 1,9. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY _ . 341 


experiences withont any alteration or innovation. All 
cognitive mental states and processes (citta-vrtti) may 
be included in these five kinds of modifications. We 
need not admit any other kinds of cognitive functions 
of the mind (citta-vrtti)." 

When citta is modified into any kind of vrtti or 
ae eee cognitive mental state, the self is 
to the mind or cittas reflected in it and is apt to appro- 
pnd the body: priate it as a state of itself. Hence 
it is that it appears to pass throug» different states of 
the mind (citta) and stages of life It considers itself 
to be subject to birth and growth, decay and death at 
different periods of time. It is led to believe that it 
sleeps and wakes up, imagines and remembers, makes 
mistakes and corrects errors, and so on. In truth, 
however, the self (purtsa) is above all the happenings 
of the body and the mind (citta!, all physical and 
psychical changes, like sleeping and walking, ebirth and 
death, etc. It is citta or the mind that really performs 
these functions of sleeping and waking, knowing and 
doubting, imagining and remembering. The self 
appears to be concerned in these functions because it is 
reflected in citta or the mind which is held up before it 
as a mirror before a person. It also appears to be 
subject to the live kleéas or sources of atilictions, 
namely, (i) avidyé or wrong knowledge of ihe non-eter- 
nal as eternal, of the not-self as the self, of the 
unpleasant as the pleasant, and of the impure as pure, 
(it) asmita, i.e. the false notion or perception of the 
self as identical with buddhbi or the mind, (iti) raga or 
desire for pleasure and the means of its attainment, 


1 Vide Yogo-sat., Bhagya avd Vrtti, 1.6-11. 


842 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


(io) dvega or aversion to pain and the causes thereof, 
(0) abhinivega or the instinctive fear of death in all 
ercatures.” 
So long as there are chinzes and modiifications in 
citta, the self is reflected therein 
gute sell's hondage 18 aod, in the absence of discrimi. 
with meutal modifica- ative knowledge, iden‘jties itself 
tions 8 liberation re- 
qrirea thei cessation. with them. As a consequence, the 
self feels pleasure or pain out of 
the objects of the world, and loves or hates them accord- 
ingiy. This mesus bondage for the self. If, there- 
fore, we are to attain liberation, we must somehow 
restrain the activities of the body, the senses and the 
roind (manas) and finally suppres: all the modifications 
of citta. When the waves of the empirical conscious- 
ness (kairya-citta) die down and leave the citta in a 
state of perfect placidity (karana-citta), the self realizes 
itself as distinct from the mind-body complex and as 
free, immortal] and self-shining intelligence. It is the 
aim of yoga to bring about this result through tbe 
cessation of the functions of citta. 


TH. Yocsa Ernics 
1. The Nature and Forms of Yoga* 


Yoga here means the cessation of mental functions 
ay or Modifications (cittavrttinirodba). 

Yozn is just the aia 
cessation of mvats! It does not mean any kind of con- 
ee tact between the individual  celf 
and some other reaiity hike God or the Absolute. The 


1 Op. cit., 23-9. 
3 Yoga-sit. and Bhagya, 1. 1-4, 1,12-18, 1. 23, 3. 1-8, 4.99-34. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY - 343 


aim of yoga, as we have already eaid, is to prevent 
the self from identifying itself with mental modifica- 
tions. But this is not possible so long as the modi- 
fications are there and the self has not realized its 
distinction from citta or the mind. So what yozs really 
stands for is the arrest ard negation of all rental 
modifications. 


There are five conditions or levels of the mental life 
(cittabhimi). The citta is constituted 

oh ete ate five levels by the elements of sattva, rajas and 
peat eonid Bs nut tamas, Its different conditions are 
determined by the different degrecs 

in which these elements are present and cperative in it. 
These conditions are calied kgipta or restless, midha 
or torpid, vikgipta or distracted, ekagra or concentrated, 
and nirudidha or restrained. In each of these there is 
some kind of repression of mental modifications. One 
state of the mind excludes other different states. Love 
and hate, for exampie, naturally oppose and cance! each 
other. .But still yoga cannot be attaired in all the 
levels of citta. In the first, called kgipia, the mind or 
citta is under the sway of rajas and tamas, and is 
attracted by objects of sense and the means of attaining 
power. It flits from one thing to another without 
resting inany. This condition is not at all conducive 
to yoga, because it does not hep us to control the 
tind and the senses. The second, viz. midha, is due 
to an excess of tamas in citta or the mind which, 
therefore, has a tendency towards vice, iguorance, 
sleep and the Jike. In the third level, called viksipta 
or distracted, the mind or citta is free from the sway 
of tamas and bas only a touch of rajasin it. 1t has 


344 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the capacity of manifesting all objects and makes for 
virtue, knowledge, etc. This is a stage of temporary 
concentration of citta or the mind on some object, 
which is followed by distraction. It cannot be called 
yoga, because it dues not permanently stop the mental 
mdificitions nor ead our troubles and destroy the 
mental afflictions of avidyd and the rest. 


The fourth level of citta is called ekagra or 
concentrated. Lere citta is purged 

Rctadi acti Pattee of the impurity of rajas and there 
baiji ore eae is the perfect manifestation of 
sattva. It marks the begioning 

of prolonged concentration of the mind or chitta on 
any object so as to reveal its true nature, and it 
prepares the way for the cessation of all mental 
modifications. In this state, however, the mind or 
citta continues to think or meditate on some object, 
and 80, even here, the mental processes are not 
altogether arrested. At the last level, called niruddha, 
there is the cessation of all mental functions including 
even that of concentration which marks the previous 
stage. Here the succession of mental states and 
processes is completely checked, and the mind (citta) 
is left in its original, unmodified state of calmness and 
tranquillity. These last two levels are conducive to 
yoga in so far as both manifest the sattva element 
of the mind to the highest degree and are helpful for 
the attainment of the ultimate goal, viz. liberation. 
In fact, ekagra or the state of concentration, when 
permanently established, is called samprajiiata yoga or 
the trance of meditation, in which there is a clear and 
distinct consciousness of the object of contemplation. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 345 


Tt is known also as samipstti or satnprajiiata samadhi 
inasmuch as cilta or the mind is, in this state, entirely 
put into the object and assumes the form of the object 
itself, So also the state of niruddha is called asarh- 
prajiiata yoga oc asarhprajiiata samadhi, because all 
menial modifications being stopped in this state, 
nothing is known or thought of by the mind. This 
is the tranze of absorption in which all psychoses aod 
appearances of objects are stopped and there are no 
ripples in the placid surface of citta oc: the mind. Bath 
these kinds of samadhi are known by tbe common name 
of samidhi-yoza or the cessation of mental modifica- 

tions, since both conduce to self-realization. 
There are, then, two main kinds of yoga or 
. samadhi, viz. the satprajiiata and 

There are four kinds ‘ pee ; 
of sathpra;iéta eamé- the asatprajidta. Four kinds of 
al samprajiata satnadhi are distin- 
guished according to the different objects of contempla- 
tion. It is called savitarka when the’ mind "(Citta is 
concentrated on any gross physical object of the exter- 
nal world, e.g. the image of a god or goddess. Having 
realized the nature of this object, one should concentrate 
on subtle objects like the tanmatra3 or subtle essences 
of the physical elements. The mind’s concentration 
on these subtle objects is called savicira samadhi. 
The next step is to take some subtler objects like the 
senses and concentrate the mind (citta) on them, till 
their real nature becomes manifest to it, in what is 
called sinanda samadhi. The last kind of samprajfiata 
samadhi is called sismita inasmuch as the object of 
concentration herein is asmit& or the ezo-substance with 
which the self is ordinarily identified. The fruition 
44—1605B 


346 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


of this stage of concentration is the realization of the 
true nature of the ego. But it also gives us a glimpse 
of the knowing self as something almost indistinguish- 
able from the ego." 
Thus the mind (citta) realizes the nature of different 
sds objects within or without the body 
Aearhpra‘fadte eami- j . 
ahi ia yoga par ercel- and leaves them behind, one after 
a the other, till it becomes com- 
pletely free from the thoughts of all objects and attains 
what is called asathprajiata samadhi or yoga par 
excellence. It puts a stop to all mental modifications 
and does not rest on any object at all. This is the 
final stage of samadhi, because when it is attuined the 
whole world of objects ceases to affect and to exist for 
the yogin. In this state the self abides in its own 
eSsence as pure consciousness, enjoying the still v.sion 
of isolated self-shining existence. When one attains 
this state, one reaches the final goal of life, namely, 
liberation or freedom from all pain and suffering. All 
life is a quest of peace and a search for the means 
thereof. Yoga is one of the spiritual paths that leads 
to the desired goal of a total extinction of ail pain and 
misery through the realization of the self’s distinction 
from the body, the mind and the individual ego. But 
this final goal cannot be attained all at once. Mven if 
it be possible for a self to attain once the state of 
samadhi and thereby release from pain, there is the 
possibility of a relapse and consequent recurrence of 
pain, so long as all the impressions and tendencies of the 


1 The final stage of satbprajhdta is called dharmamegha samédbi 
because it showere un the yogin the blessing of self-realization. 
Vide Yoga.stit, and Bhagya, 4.29, 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 347 


mind (citta) due to its past and present deeds are not 
wiped out. It requires a long and arduous endeavour 
to maintain oneself steadily in the state of samadhi and 
destroy the effects of the different kinds of karma, past 
and present. For this it is necessary to practise yoga 
with care’ and devotion for a sufficiently long time. 
The different steps in the practice of yoga will be 
explained in the next section. 


2. The Eightfold Means of Yoga.’ 


As we have already said, a man cannot realize 
thew: canes alge spiritual truths so long as his mind 
means of yoga called ig tainted with impurities and his 
TeeeEese intellect vitiated by evi] thoughts. 
[t is in the pure heart and the clear understanding that 
the truth of the spirit is revealed and directly experi- 
enced, The Sankhya-Youa system tolds that libera- 
tion is to be attained by means of spiritual insight 
(prajia) into the reality of the self as the pure immortal 
spirit which is quite distinct from the body and the 
mind. Bat spiritual insight can be had only when the 
rmaind is purged of all impurities and rendered perfectly 
calm and serene. For the purification and enlighten- 
ment. of citta or the mind, the Yoga gives us the 
eightfold means which consists of -the disciplines of 
(1) yama or restraint, (2) niyama or culture, (3) aeana 
or posture, (4) pranayama or breath-control, (6) pratya- 
hara or withdrawal of the senses, (6) dharana& or 


1 OY. Yoga-sat. and Bhasye, 2.28-55, 3.1.4. 


348 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


attention, (7) dhyana or meditation, and (8) samadbi 
or concentration. These are known as aids to yoga 
(yoganiga). When practised regularly with devotion 
and dispassion, they lead to the attainment of yoga, 
both samprajiidta and asamprajiiata. 
The first discipline of yama or restraint consists 
in (a) uhirhs& or abstention from 
abstection hom aai® all kinds of injury to any life, (6) 
to life, from falsehood, satya or truthfulness in thought 
thelt, incontinence and 
avarice, and speech, (c) asteya or non- 
stealing, (d) brahmacarya or control 
of the carnal desires and passions, and (e) aparigraba 
or non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts from other 
people. Although these practices seem to be too well- 
known to require any elaboration, yet the Yocra explains 
al) their details and insists that a yogin must scrupu- 
lously follow them.‘ The reason for this is obvious. 
Tt is a psychological law that a sound mind resides in a 
sound body, and that neither can be sound in the case 
of a man who does not control his passions and 
sexual impulses. Soalso,a man cannot concentrate 
his attention on any object when bis mind is distracted 
and dissipated by sin and crime and other evil propen- 
sities. This explains the necessity of complete absten- 
tion from all the evil courses and tendencies of life on 
the part of the yogin who is eager to realize the self in 
samadhi or concentration. 


The second discipline is niyama or culture. Jt 
id Miya “conaias consists in the cultivation of the 
in the cultivation of following good habits: (a) éauca or 
neers purification of the body by washing 


and taking pure food (which is babys or external puri- 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 349 


fication), and purification of the mind by cultivating 
good emotions and sentiments, such as friendliness, 
kindness, cheerfulness for the virtues and indifference 
to the vices of others (which is called abbyantera or 
internal purification), (6) santoga or the habit of being 
content with what comes of itself without undue exer- 
tion, (c) tapas or penance which consists in the habit 
of enduring cold and heat, etc., and observing austere 
vows, (d} svadhyéya or the regular habit of study of 
religious books, and (e) Iévarapranichana or meditation 
of and resignation to God. 


Asana is a discipline of the body and consiats 
in the adoption of steady and com- 
Sl ea {he fortable postures. There are vari- 
romnfortable postures. ous kinds of 4sana, such as padmi- 
sana, virasana, bhadrisana, etc. These can be properly 
learnt only under the guidance of experts. The disci- 
pline of the body is as much necessary for the attain- 
ment of concentration as that of the mind. If the body 
is not completely free from diseases and other disturb- 
ing influences, it is very difficult to attain concentration. 
Hence the Yoga lays down elaborate rules for main- 
taining the health of the body and making it a fit 
vehicle for conceatrated thought. It prercribes many 
rules for preserving the vital energy, and strengthening 
and purifying the body and the mind. The asanas or 
postures recommended in it are effective waye by which 
the body can be kept partially free from diseases, and 
all the limbs, especially the nervous system, can be 
brought under control and prevented from producing 
Gisturbances in the mind. 


350 AN INrRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Pranayama is the regulation of breath. It con- 
sists in deep inspiration (piraka), 
sehutot gare retention of breath <kumbhaka), 
oe exbsla- and expiration (recaka) with 
measured durations. The details 
of the process should be learat from experts. That 
respiratory exercises are useful for strengthening the 
heart and improving its function is recognized by 
medical men when they recommend walking, climbing, 
etc. in a graduated scale, for patients with weak 
hearts. The Yoga goes further and prescribes breath- 
control fot concentration of the mind, because it con- 
duces to steadiness of the body andthe mind. So 
long as the function of breathing continues, the mind 
also goes on fluctuating and noticing the current of air 
in and out. If, and when, it is suspended, the mind is 
in a state of audisturbed concentration, Hence by 
practising the control of breath, the yogin can suspend 
breathing for a long time and a prolong the state 
of concentration. . 
Pratyahira consists in withdrawing the senses 
; from their respactive external 
ciate ke ttdracan, Objects and keeping them under 
pr roca from their the control of the mind. When the 
senses are effectively controlled by 
the mind, they follow, not their natural objects, but 
the mind itself. So in this state the mind is not 
disturbed by sights and sounds coming through the eye 
and the ear, but makes these senses follow itself and 
see and hear its own object. This state is very difficult, 
although not impossible, of attainment. It requires 4 
resolute will and Jong practice to gain mastery over 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 361 


one’s senses. The above five dieciplines of restraint 
and culture (yama and niyama), bodily posture (isana), 
breath-control (pranayama) and control over the 
senses (pratyahara) are regarded as the external aids 
to yoga (bahiratiga-sidbana). As compared with these, 
ihe last three disciplines are said to be internal to 
yoga (antaratga-sidhana), because they are directly 
related to some kind of samadhi or yoga. These are 
dbarané dhyana and samadhi. 


Dhiarana or attention is a mental discipline which 

consists in holding (dhadrana) or 

et raartion “he xing the mind (citta) on the desired 

ae the desired object. The object thus attended: 

to may be a part of one’s body, like 

one’s navel, the mid-point of the eyebrows, etc., or it 

may be external to the body, like the moon, the images 

of gods, etc. The ability to keep one’s, attention 

steadily fixed on some object is the’ test of fitness for 
entering on the next higher stage of yoga. 


Dhyana or meditation is the next step. It means 
the even flow of thought about, 
ads ote ciptoten or rather, round about, the 
of the object without object of attention. It is the stead- 
any break. 
fast contemplation of the object 
without any break or disturbance. This has the effect 
of giving us aclear and distinct reprerentation of the 
object first by parts and aspects. But by long-continued 
meditation the mind can develop the partial representa- 
tion of the object into a full and hive presentation of it. 
Thue dhyana reveals the reality of the contemplated 
object to the yogin’s mind. 


352 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Semadhi or concentration is the final step in the 
practice of yoga. In it the mind is 
aH ie tncesioe fe so deeply absorbed in the object of 
oe of coutem- contemplation that it loses itself in 
the object and has no awareness of 
itself. In the state of dhyana, the act and the object 
of thought remain distinct aod separate states of 
consciousness. But in samadhi the act of meditation 
is not separately cognised; it takes on the form of the 
object and loses itself, as it were. So here only the 
object of thought remains shining in the mind, and 
we do not even know that there is a process of thought 
inthe mind. It should be observed here that this 
samidhi as a discipline is different from the samadhi 
or the yoga previously defined as ‘‘the restraint of the 
mind” (cittavrttinirodha). The former is but the 
means for the attainment of the latter which is its end. 
A long-continued practice of the one leads to the other. 
These last three steps in the practice of yoga are called 
internal means (antaranga-sidhana). They should 
bave the same object, i.e. the same object should be 
first attended to, then meditated and lastly concen- 
trated upon. When thus combined they are said to 
constitute sarhyama which is very necessary for the 
attainment of samadhi-yoga. 


A yogin is believed to acquire certain extraordinary 
powers by the practice of yoga in its 

The supernormal . 
powers accruing different stages. Thus we are told 
ream yOHe: that the yogins can tame all crea- 
tures including even ferocious animals, get any object by 
the mere wish of it, know directly the past, present and 


future, produce supernatural sights, sounds and smells 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 353 


and sée subtle entities, angels and gods. They can 
also see through closed doors, pass through stone 
walls, disappear from sight, appear at different places 
at the same time, and so forth. While these may be 
possible, the Yoga system warns all religious aspirants 
not to practise yoga with these ends in view. Yoga 
is for the attainment of liberation. The yogin must 
not get entangled ‘in the quagmire of supernormal 
powers. He must evercome the lure of yaugic powers 
and move onward till he comes to the end of the 
journey, viz. liberation. ’ 


IV. THe PLace oF Gop In THE YoGa.?” 


As distinguished from the Sankhya, the Yoga is 
nib rosanac eaten theistic. It admits the existence 
theoretical und a prec- of God on both practical and theo- 
tical interest in God. etical grounds. Pataiijaii himeelf, 
however, has not felt the necessity af God for solving 
any theoretical problem of philosophy. for him God 
has mdre a practical value than a theoretical one. 
Devotion to God is considered to be of great practical 
value, inasmuch as it forms a part of the practice of 
yoga and 1s one of the means for the final attainment 
of samadhi-yoga or “‘ the restraint of the mind."" The 
subsequent coimnmentators and interpreters of the Yoga 
evince also a theoretical interest in God and discuss 
more fully the speculative problems as to the nature 
of God and the proofs for the existence of God. Thus 
the Yoga system has both a theoretical and a practical 
interest in the Divine Being. 


I Vide Yoga-att. and Bhégya, 8 37, 3. 51, 4.1. * 
¥ Vide Yoga-sit,, Bhdgya and Vytti, 1, 28-29, 2.1, 32, 45, 9. 46. 
46—1605B . 


354 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


According to the Yoga, God is the Supreme 
Person who is above all individual 
sn ae — selves and is free from all defects. 
all-pe:veding, omni- He isthe Perfect Being who is 
potent and ompiscient. . a 
eternal and ajl-pervadizfg, omni- 
potent and omniscient. All individual selves are more 
or less subject to the afflictions (klega), of ignorance, 
egoism, desire, aversion and dread of death. They 
have to do various kinds of works (karma)—good, 
bad, and indifferent—and reap the consequences 
thereof (vipika). They are also infected and influenced 
by the latent impressions of theit past experiences 
(asaya). Even if the liberated self is released from 
all these troubles, it cannot be said that he was 
always free from them. It is God and God alone 
who ig eternally free from all defects, Godix the 
perfect immortal spirit who ever remains untouched 
by afflictions axl actions, and their effects and 
impressions (kleéa-karma-vipaka-éayai-raparamretah). 
He possesses a perfect nature, the like of which 1s not 
to be met with anywhere else. He has also the fullest 
possible knowledge of all facts and is, therefore, 
capable of maintaining the whole world by His mere 
wish or thought. He is the Supreme Ruler of the 
world, and has infinite knowledge, unlimited power 
and wisest desires, which distinguish Him from all 
other selves. 


The existence of God is proved by the following 


The proofs of God's ‘ 
existence ; arguments : 


The Vedas, the Upanisads and other important 
scriptures speak of the existence of God as the 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 355 


Supreme Self who is. also the ultimate reality 
and the final goal of the world. 
icnae of Therefore, God exists in the way 
in which the scriptures testify 


to His existence. 


According to the law of continuity, whatever 
has degrees must have a lower and 
ie a aT Mea to an upper limit. There are, for in- 
degrees of knowledge stance, different magnitudes, small 
and power. 
and great. An atom is the smallest 
magnitude, while 4kaéa or space is the greatest magni- 
tude. Similarly, there are different degrees of knowledge 
and power. So there must be a person who possesses 
perfect knowledge and perfect power. Such a supreme 
person is God, the highest. There cannot be any 
self who is equal to God in power,and knowledge, for 
in that case, there will be conflict and clash of desires 
and purposes between them, and 3 consequent chaos 
in the world. 


The cieation of the world is due to the asso- 
ciation of purusa with prakrti, and 

anf) The, ssvociation its dissolution to the dissociation 
purogs apd prakyti. of the one from the other. Purusa 
and prakrti being two independent 

principles cannot be said to be naturally related or 
associated. Nor are they naturally dissociated, for 
that would make their relation inexplicable. So there 
must be an intelligent cause which effects their asso- 
ciation and dissociation, according to the unseen moral 
deserts (adrsta) of individual selves. No individual 
self can guide and control its adrsta or destity, because 


356 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


it has no clear understanding about it. Therefore, 
there must be a perfect and an omniscient Being who 
brings about the association or dissuciation between 
puruga and prakrti, according as the adrsta of the 
individual selves requires the creation or the destruction 
of a world. This Reing is God, without whose 
guidance prakrti cannot produce just that order of the 
world which is suited to the moral education and final 
emancipation of individual selves. 
Devotion to God is not only a part of the practice 
of yoga but the best means for the 
reretion to God is attainment of concentration and 
centration and res: yestraint of the mind (samadhi-yoga). 
traint of mind. 
: The reason is that God is not only 
an object of meditation (dhyana), like other objects, 
but is the Supreme Lord who, by His grace, purges 
away the sins and eVils in the life of His devotee and 
makes the attainment of yoga easier for him. One 
who is sincerely ‘devoted to God and is resigned unto 
Him cannot but meditate on Him at ull times and see 
Him in all the walks of life. On such a devoted 
person God bestows his choicest gifts, viz. purity of the 
heart and eniightenment of the intellect. God removes 
all the serious impediments and obstacles in the path 
of His devotee, such as the klegas or afflictions of the 
mind, and places him under conditions most favourable 
for the attainment of yoga. But while the yrace of 
God can work wonders in our life, we, on our 
part, must make ourselves deserving recipients of it 
through Jove and charity, truthfulness and purity, 
constant meditation of and complete resignation 
to God. + 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY 357 


V. Concr.usion 


To an unsympathetic critic the Yoga may appear 
to be not so much 2 system of philosophy asa school 
of mysticis and magic. The Yoga conception of 
the self as a transcendent subject which is quite 
distinct fram the body, the mind and the ego, is far 
removed from the common-sense and the ordinary 
psychological concepts of it. As compared with these 
the spiritual conception of the self in the Yoga is apt 
to be regarded as unintelligible and mysterious. 
Similarly, the supernormal powers associated with the 
different stages in the practice of Yoga can hardly be 
reconciled with the known laws of the physical or” 
the psychical sciences. So these may appear to be 
reminiscent of some primitive religion of magic. But 
it is to be observed that the Yoga scheme of | self- 
realization has a solid foundation in the .Sankhya 
metaphysics which proves the reality of the self as 8 
metaphysical and *eternal principle of consciousness. 
If one believes in the transcendent spirit, one cannot 
but admit that there are deeper levels of consciousness 
than the empirical one, and wider possibilities and 
higher potencies than those of the physical and the 
sensuous. Glimpses of this deeper reality of our 
individual life have been caught not only by the seers 
and saints of different countries, but also by some 
great philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza 
and Leibniz, Kant and Hegel. The Society for 
Psychical Kesearch and the modern school of Psycho- 
analysis have of late contributed much towards our 
knowledge about the dark regions of the “psychical 


358 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


life, hidden from the ordinary view. The Yoga goes 
further in the same direction when it formulates 
certain practical methods of purification and self-control 
for the realization of the true self of man. Both 
from a theoretical and a practical standpoint, it occupies 
a better position than the Saakhya in so faras it 
admits the existence of God and relies mostly on actual 
experiences to carry conviction to its followers. What 
is necessary for an appreciation of this philosophy is 
&@ sympathetic understanding of it and a sincere 
endeavour to realize its truths. We find one such 
appreciation of it by Miss Coster when she says: ‘‘I 
am certain that there is a region beyond that painted 
“drop-scene which forms for so many the boundary of 
this life; and that it is penetrable and susceptible of 
exploration by those who are sufficiently determined .’"' 


Yoga and Western Psychology, pp. 246-47. 


THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Jaimini 


Kumirila Bhatta 


Ganganath Jha 


Parthasarathi 
Salikandtha 
Pagupatinath Sastri 


§. Radhakrishnan 


A. B. Keith 


Mimamsd-sitra (with 
Sabara's BhaSya) 
Sloka-vdrtika, 


Mimamsd-siitra of Jaimini 
(Eng. trans., Allahabad). 

Sloka-cdrtika (Eng. trans.). 

Prabhakara School of Pirva 
Mimamsd. 

Sdstra-dipikd, Tarkapada, 
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay). 


Prakarana-paiicika (Chow- 
khamba, Benares). 


Introductibn to the Purva 
Mimémsd (Calcutta). 


Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, 
Ch. V1. 


Karma Mimamed. 


CHAPTER IX 
THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 


I. IntTrRopuUcTION 


We have noticed in the General Introduction that 
the Pirva Mimamsa School or the 

The Mimémsé deve- Pate ae pied a 
loped out of the ritual. Mimims& School, as it is more 
istic aspects of Vedic usnally called, is the outcome of 
the ritualistic side of the Vedic 
culture just as the Vedanta (sometimes called also 
Uttara Mimirisi) is the development of its speculativ® 
side. The object of the Mimatiisi School is to help 
Wa din exashitowe: and support ritualism chiefly in two 
ment: Methodology ways, namely? (a) by giving a 
sel PENT: methodology of interpretation with 
the help of which the complicated Vedic injunctions 
regarding rituals may be understood, harmonized and 
followed without difficulty, and (0) by supplying 
philosophical justification of the beliefs on which 
ritualismd3pends. Weare concerned here with the 

second or the philosophical aspect of the Mimamsé. 

The faith underlying Vedic ritualism consists of 
different elements such as belief in 

As a philosopby, tho : . 
Mimatns& triesto up- the existence of a soul whieh sur- 
hold Vedic ritusliam, = ves death and enjoys the fruits of 
rituals in heaven, the belief in some power or potency 
which preserves the effects of the rituals performed, 
the belief in the infallibility of the Vedas on which 
rituals stand, the belief that the world is *resl and 

46—1605B 


562 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


our life and actions performed here are not mere dreams. 
The Buddhists, Jainas and Carvaékas challenge the 
authority of the Vedas. The reality of the world 
and the existence of the soul are denied by some 
Buddhists. Some Upanisads disparage the idea that 
‘ heaven ’ is the goal of man and rituals are” the best 
possible human activities. The Mimarhsa tries to 
meet all such criticisms and upholds the original faith 
underlying ritualism. 

Jaimini’s Sutra laid the foundation of the Pirva 
Mimaimsa. Sabarasvimi wrote the 
major commentary or Bhasya on 
this work. He is followed by a long line of commen- 
tetors and independent writers. The two most 
important among them are Kumiarila Bhatta and 
Prabhakara (nicknamed ‘Guru ’), who founded the 
two schools of Miniarisé, known after their names. 
Thus the Mimirsi philosophy gradually developed. 
Etymologically, the word Mimarhsi means ‘ solution 
of some problem by critical examination of grounds.’ 
As its subject-matter was karma or rituals, the 
Miméarhsa is also sometimes called Karma Mimamasi. 

The philosophy of the Mimais3 School may be con- 
veniently discussed under three heads, namely, Theory 
of Knowledge, Metaphysics, and Ethics and Theology. 


Literature. 


IT. Tae Mimassa Taeory or KnowLepaet 


In its attempt to justify the authority of the Vedas, 

inbraen china the Mimaihsa came to discuss very 

bution to the theory of elaborately the nature of knowledge, 
kuowledge. wie (a 

the nature and criterion of truth 

as well a8 of falsity, the different sources of valid 


THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 363 


knowledge (pramanas) and other cognate problems. 
The epistemology of the Mimamsa deals with some 
very interesting problems. Other schools, specially the 
Vedanta, freely draw upon the Mimarsa in epistemo- 
logical matters. We shall notice here very briefly some 
of the peculiar and important things. 


1. The Nature and Sources of Knowledge 


The Mimiinsi, like most oth: schools, admits 
two kinds of knowledge, immediate and mediate. 
Valid knowledge is one which yields some new informa- 
tion about something, is not 
contradicted by any other know-. 
ledge and is not generated by defec- 
tive conditions (such 4s defective ,sense-organ in the 
case of perceptual knowledge, fallacious premises in the 
cases of inference, etc.).’ ; . 

The object of immediate knowledge must be some- 
ican bie thing existing (sat). Only when 
ledge: its two stages such an object is related to sense 
of  development—in- 
determinate and deter. (one of the five external senses and 
innnase Serecptien®, the internal sense, manas), there 
arises in the soul an immediate knowledge about it. 
When an object is related to sense, at first there arises 
a bare awareness of the object. Wesimply know that 
the object is, but have not yet understood what it 18. 
This primary, indeterminate, immediate knowledge is 
called pirvikalpaka pratyaksa or dlocana-jfiaéna. When 
atthe next stage we interpret the meaning of this 


The meaning ef 
knowledge. 


1 Vide Sdstra-dipské on Jaimini's Sitra, 1 £. 5. 


364 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


object in the light of our past knowledge and come to 
understand what it is, that is, what class it belongs to, 
what quality, activity and name it possesses, we have 
a determinate (savikalpaka) perception, which is ex- 
pressed by judgments like ‘Thisisa man,’ ‘This has a 
stick,’ ‘This is white,’ ‘This is moving,’ ‘This is 
Ram.” 
Perception, thus completed in two stages, gives 
usa real knowledge of the world 
inpercertin are cea, composed of different objects. 
and possess diverse Though at the first stage the objects 
are not known explicitly, all that 

we know about them at the second stage are implicitly 
known even at first. In understanding the object at 
the second stage, the mind only interprets, in the light 
of past experience, what is given at first ; it does not 
ascribe to it any imaginary predicate. For if we did 
rot perceive at first a man, & white one, etc., how 
could we judge later that it was a man, it was white, 
etc., and that it was not a cow and ‘not black. ete. 
Hence it must be admitted that perception, inspite of 
containing an element of interpretation, is not 
necessarily imaginary and illusory as some Bauddhas 
and some Vedintins hold. Neither is it true that what 
we are immediately aware of, before the mind inter- 
prets, is a purely unique particular (svalaksana) without 
any distinguishing class character (as those Bauddhas 
hold), or is pure existence without any differentiating 
property (as those Vedantins say). The world of diverse 
objects with their different characteristics are given to the 


‘3 Jdid., and Sloka-cartika on 1.1. 4, 


THE MiIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 365 


mind ai the very first moment when we become aware 
of them.’ 


2. Non-perceptual Sources of Knowledge 


In addttion to perception, there are five other valid 
sources of knowledge, admitted by 
grrébhikerass tot the Mimathsd, namely, inference 
ieane: Boag Bhétiss /anumana), comparison (upamana), 
authority or testimony (éabda), 
postulation (art hapatti) and non-perception (anu- 
palabdhi), The last one is admitted only by the school 
of Kumirila Bhatta and not by that of Prabhakara. 
The Mimi:nsi theory of inference is more or lew 
similar to that of the Nyaya and need not be mentioned 
here, We shall discuss the other four non-perceptual 
sources of knowledge. > 


(i) Comparison (npamapa) , 


It has been previously seen that the Nyaya admits 
comparison as a unique source of 
The Miméthsé cvun- k led } 
ceives upaména in a ‘knowledge. But the Mimarmsa, 
different from the <eanti ; 
Naya erent from the though accepting comparison as an 
Independent source, accepts it in 
quite a different sense. According to it, knowledge 
arises from comparison when, on perceiving a present 
object to be like an object perceived 
iaity abou fm im the past, we come to know that 
object is obtained by the remembered object is like the 
comparison. 7 Z 
perceived one. Some examples will 


make this clear. On seeing a rat one perceives that 


! Vide Prakarana-paficikd, pp. 64-55. 


366 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


jt ig like a mouse perceived in the past, and thence 
he gets the knowledge that the remembered mouse 
is like the perceived rat. This knowledge, namely, 
‘that mouse, perceived in the past, 1s like this rat,’ 
is obtained from comparison, or from the ¢knowledge 
of a similarity of the rat to the mouse. Similarly 
one who has seen a cow previously at home, goes to 
a forest and finds a gavaya (nilgai) and perceives its 
similarity to the cow at home. He may thence obtain 
by comparison (i.e. by the knowledge of this similarity) 
the further knowledge that the cow at home is like 
the gavaya.’ 
Such knowledge cannot be classed under perception. 
For, the object (the mouse or the 
As acer ae cow) known to be similar is not 
at ape teatrmert’ perceived then. It does not come 
under memory, because though the 
object was perceived in the past, its similarity to the 
present object was not then known; and, therefore, 
this similarity cannot be said to be simply remewnbered. 
It is not also an inference. From a knowledge like 
‘vhis gavaya is like the cow at home’ we cannot infer 
‘the cow at home is like this gavaya,’ unless we have 
another premise like ‘all things are similar to other 
things which are similar to thein.’? And such a 
universal premise containing an invariable concomi- 
tance between two terms is not really used in tha above 
case where one arrives at the knowledge of the absent 


1 The Miméthsa view of upamana ie fully discussed in Sloka-vdrtika, 
Sastra-dipika (1. 1. 5) snd Prakorana-pafcské and bricfly in Ssbara- 
dbhagya on 1.1.5, 

3 Vide Sastra-dipika, 1.1. 5. 


‘THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY _ 367 


cow's similarity to the present yavaya, from the percep- 
tion of the gavaya being similar to 
the cow. ‘Again, such knowledge 
does not obviously arise from 
verbal testimony or authority. Hence it is given an 
independertt place. 

The Nyaya bolds that on learning from an authority 
Why the ; Nytys that a gavaya is like a cow, a 
view of upaméns is person goes to a forest, perceives 
patenesle. some animal like the cow and 
thence he has by upamana or comparison the know- 
ledge that such an animal is a gavaya. Against this 
Nyaya view it is pointed out by Mimanusaka writers 
that the knowledge that the particular animal perceivet 
is like the cow is derived from perception and the 
knowledge that euch an animal looking like the cow 
isa gavaya is obtained through revollection of what 
was previously learned from some authority, Lastly, 
the knowledge that this particular animal is a gavaya, 
is a mere inference from the last knowledge. Hence 
what the Nyaya considers to be derived from a new 
source, namely comparison, is not really so." 


Hence it is given a 
separate place. 


It may be noted here that though the account given 
above is the one generally accepted 

Sabare seems to by later Mimarhsakas, Sabarasvami* 
pica PB pr ti, Seems to understand upamiina as, 
jenn” 6what is called in Western logic 
analogical argument. The existence 

of another self is proved, he remarks, by an argument like 
this. ‘Just us you feel the existence of your own self, 
similarly by analogy you can believe that others also feel 


1. Vide Prakarana-pancthd. For a critical discussion of ‘upaména,’ 
ode D. M. Datta, The Siz Ways of Knowing, Bk. iI. 
1 Vide hie Bhégya ov Jaim. sit., 1.1. 5, 


3868 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the existence of their own selves.’’ Such an argument he 
calls upamina. Sabara’s definition of upamaina as ‘know- 
ledge of an unperceived object as being simiiar to some 
known object,’ is not incompatible with Lhe suggestion that 
he takes upaména as analogical argument. 


Tt should also ba remembered that ‘similarity’ (sadyéya), 
; which is the object of upamana is 
Similarity is not a regarded by the Mimaimsi os an 


quality. oe Omitiis independent category of reality. It is 
category. pointed out that similarity cannot be 


called a quality (guna), because a 
quality cannot be possessed by another quality ; but ‘simi- 
larity’ is possessed by qualities even, It cannot be 
treated ss a universal (simanya or jati). Because a 

- universal means something which is exactly identical in 
many individuals (e g. cowness in cows). Similarity does 
not mean any completely indentical character. 


= (ii) Authority or Testimony (éabda) 


The Mimamsa pays the greatest attention to this 
source of knowledge, because it has to justify the 
suthority of the Vedas. 

An intelligible sentence yields knowledge except 
ee Beso eases " when it is known to be the state- 
ity: Personul and ment of an _ duareliable .person 
a ea (anaptat-vakya). This is known as 
verbal testimony or simply testimony (éabda) or author- 
ity. There are two kinds of authority—~personal 
(pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). The first 
consists in the written or spoken testiinony of some 

person. The second denotes the 
efgain authority is authority of the Vedas. Again, 
oh emcee s source authority may either give infor- 

mation as to the existence of 
objects (siddhartha-vakya) or give directions for the 
performance of some action (vidhayaka-vakya). The 
Mimamea‘ is interested primarily in the impersonal 


THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 369 


authority of the Vedas and that again, because the 
Vedas give directions for perform- 
The Vedas are . Nepal 

valued by the Mimam- ing the sacrificial rites. The Vedas 
sé as the impersonal are looked upon a8 the Book of 
ments. a; Commandments ; and therein lies 
their value. The Mimathsi even holds that as the 
sole use ofthe Vedas lies in directing rituals, any part 
of them which does not contain such direction but gives 
information about the ezistence of anythiny is useless, 
unless it can be shown at least to serve the purpose 
of persuading persons to follow the injunctions for 
performing rituals.‘ The attempt is constantly made, 
therefore, to show all existential sentences (regarding, 
the soul, immortality, etc.) as indirectly connected 
with some commandinent, by way of persuading people 
to perform some ritual or dissuading them from for- 
Pha eieaniitis “eae: bidden activity. This attitude of 
matiern of the Mi- the Mimiatis& remjnds us df modern 
pas Pragmatism which holds that 
every type of knowledge—ordinary, scientific or philo- 
sophical—is valuable only in so far a3 it leads to some 
practical activity. The Mima:asa philosophy may bé 
called ritualistic pragmatism, for according to it the 

value of Vedic knowledge is for ritualistic activity. 
According to most of the pro-Vedic schools, the 
authority of the Vedas lies in their 
eee a not ne being the words of God. But the 
sheySre:'atornal: Mimiauisa, which does not believe 
in any Creator or Destroyer of the world, believes 
that the Vedas, like the world, are eternal.” They 


1 Vide Jaim. eat. 1, 2.1. and 1. 2. 7 and Sabara-bhagya thereon, 
1 Jbid., Adhikaranas, 6-8, Chap. I. 


47—1606B re 


370 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


are not the work of any person, human or divine. 
Hence the authority of the Vedas is said to be imper- 

sonal. Elaborate arguments are 
gees to prove advanced to support this view; 

namely, that no author of, the Vedas 
is known, that the names of sages that occur in the 
Vedic hymns are those of the seers or the expositora or 
the founders of the different Vedic schools (sampra- 
dayas), and not the authors, and so on. But the 
most important argument, possessing philosophical 
importance, is that based on the famous theory that 
the word-sound heard is only the perceptible sign of 
a real word (sabda) which is eternal.’ The chief 
reason in support of this view is that if the spoken 
word were the real word, then ten different pronuncia- 
tions of the word ‘cow’ would make as many different 
words. We could not then say that the same word 
had been spoken ten times. We must admit, then, 
that the real word ‘cow’ (which is admitted to be the 
same though uttered by different persons) is pot pro- 
duced by its pronunciations but is only revealed by 
them. Unless we take different pronunciations of a 
word as the vocal representations of one identical basic 
word, all of them could not convey the same meaning. 
The real word is not, therefore, produced by the 
speakers, but only manifested by their speech. Being 
unproduced, the real word is eternai. Therefore, the 
relation between the real word and its meaning is also 
natural and eternal, not conventional.” 


1 Jasm, siit., 1.1.6; Séstra-dipika, 1.1.5; Sloka-vdrtika, Sphots-vada. 
4 Jaim. pit. 1.1.6. For an elaborate discussion of the theory of eternal 
words (Sphota), vide D. M. Datta, The Siz Ways of Knowing, Bk. VI. 


THE MIMIMSA PHILOSOPHY 371 


The Vedas consist of ruch eternal, basic words; 
the written or the pronounced Vedas are only the re- 
velations of the eternal Vedas. "Tt follows also from 
this and the other grounds cited above that the Vedas 
are not cosgposed by any person. 


The infallibility of the authority of the Vedas rests 
° ’ on the fact that they are not vitiat- 
fein. vae* 1 it ed by any defects to which the work 

of imperfect persons is subject. 
But in addition to the impersonal Vedic authority, 
the testimony of a reliable person 
Re ianasanie of (apta) also is accepted by the 
a sorcery of valid Mimarhsi as a valid source gf 

knowledge. : 
knowledge. There is, however, a 
special value attached to Vedic authority, because the 
knowledge of the commandments (dharma) which we 
have from it is not to bz obtained from any other 
source, such as perception and inference. While the 
knowledge that personal authority may impart to us 
. * can be sometimes obtained other- 
But the kuowledge F ; . 

of daty is obteinable wise by perception, inference, etc. 
only from the Vedas. and is itself based on such previotfs 
knowledge, the knowledge derived from the Vedas is 
neither obtainable otherwise nor dependent on any 
previous knowledge, the Vedas being eternal. 
In reply to those who try to reduce all knowledge 
derived from testimony to infer- 
espa Rae ence on the ground that the vali- 
Pendent on inference. © gity of such knowledge is ascer- 
tained by inference based on the reliability of authority, 
the Mimainsi makes an important reply. It asserts 
that the validity of every knowledge is assured by the 


372 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


conditions which generate that knowledge, so that 
the knowledge imparted by author- 
terery, Knowledge bY ity, ‘like every other knowledge, 
carries with itself such assurance 
of its own truth. We shall see later on the full 
reasons in support of this view. 


e 


(i) Postulation (arthapatti) 


Postulation ’ (arthapatti) is the necessary supposi- 
Postulation is the tion of an unperceived fact which 
oy supposition glone can explain a phenomenon 
perceived fact 
to explain some con- that demands explanation. When 
flicting phenomena. ‘ . 
- a given phenomenon is such that 
we cannot understand it in any way without supposing 
some other fact, we have to postulate this other fact 
by way of explaining the phenomenon. This process 
of explaining an otherwise inexplicable phenomenon 
by the affirmati¢n of the explaining fact ie called 
arthapatti.?, Thus when a man, wha is growing fat, 
is observed to fast during the day, we find an apparent 
contradiction between his growing fatness and his 
fasting. We cannot in any way reconcile these two 
facts, namely, fatness and fasting, unless we admit 
that the man eats at night. That the man must eat 
at night explains the complex whole of apparently 


1 It is difficult to find an exact word in English for ‘arthapatti. 
Postulation in the Kantian sense has a close similarity to * artbapatti.’ 
A demand for explanation underlies the use of this method, and ‘ posta- 
lJare ’ in Latin means ‘ derasnd.’ 

2 Vide Sabara-bhagya, 1.1.5. Sloka-vdrttka, Sdastra-dipikd and 
Prakarana-paacikad on Arthapetti. For critical discussion, tide D. M. 
Datta, The Sig Ways of Knowing, Bk. V. 


THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 373 


conflicting facts, namely, fasting attended with in- 
creasing fatness. 


Knowledge obtained in “this way is distinctive 
because it is not reducible to percep- 
Knowledge so ob- . . ara 

tanned does got come tion or inference; and it is not, of 
under perception or in- course, a case of testimony or com- 
° : parison. Such knowledge cannot 

be explained as perception, since we do not see the man 
eat at night. Nor is it a case of inference, because 
there is no invariable concomitance (vyapti) between 
fatness and eating at night, so that we cannot say that ‘ 
whenever there is fatness there is eating at night, as 
we can say that wherever there is smoke there is fire. | 
Though we are not ordinarily aware of it, we. 

_ employ this method of arthapatti 

The use of this . . . 

methed of knowledge Very often iD | daily life. Some 
is very frequent in life. @samples will make this clear. 
When we call on a friend and do not, find him at home, 
though we are sure that he is alive, wesay: ‘He must 
be somewhere outside home.’ This last supposition is 
made by us because this alone can explain bow a man 
who is alive cannot be at home. This method is also 
largely used by us in the interpretation of language. 
When some words are omitted in a sentence, we suppose 
those words without which the meaning implied by 
the context cannot be explained. On reading or 
hearing a sentence like ‘shut up,’ we supply (by 
arthapatti) the words ‘your lips,’ because without them 
the meaning is incomplete. Similarly, when the 
primary meaning of a word does not suit the context, 
we suppose a secondary or figurative meaning which 
slone can explain the sentence. For example, when 


374 AN INPRODUCLION To INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


we are told, ‘Industry is the key to success,’ we 
sUppose that the meaning of ‘key’ here must be 
‘means’ and not 4 real key. 
Mimithsakas distinguish between two kinds of 
peut sees postulation, that which ig employed 
lation distinguished hy {0 explain something which is 
RUE: perceived (drstarthaipatti), such as 
fatness in a man who is fasting by day, and that which 
is used to explain the meanings of words heard 
(Stutarthapatti), such a3 those cited above. 
It will be found that arthdpatti resembles a hypo- 
thesis as understood in Western 
The distinction be- é ; 
tween postulation avd logic. It appears to be like an 
moe shebil explanatory hypothesis, But the 
difference is that it lacks the tentative or provisional 
character of a hypothesis. What is known by arthapuatti 
is not simply hypothetically supposed or entertained, 
but is beligved in as the only possible explanation. Ar 
arthapatti arises out of a demand for explanation, it is 
hee different from a syilogistic inference 
Rl Siciee a the object of which is to conclude 
seaue: from given facts and not to explain 
given facts Arthapatti is a search for grounds, 
whereas an inference is a search for consequents. 


t 


(to) Anupalabdhi or non-perception 


According to the Bhatta Mimarmsa and the Advaita 
aco Vedanta, non-perception (anupalab- 
ee deste dhi) is the source of our immediate 
ledge of non-exisience. Covnition of the non-existence - of 
an object. The question here is: How do I know the 
non-existence, say, of a jar on the table before me? 


THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 875 


It cannot be said that 1 perceive it with my senses, 
because non-existence is a negative 
Such knowledge can .? A 

be obtained neither fact which cannot stimulate any 
lise, pereepeion; sense as a positive fact like the 
table can,, The Bhattas and the Advaitins hold, there- 
fore, that the non-existence of the jar on the table is 
known frem the absence of its cognition, that is, from 
its non-perception (anupalabdhi). I judge that the jar 
does not exist on the table because it is not perceived. 
It cannot be said that the nun-exisience of the jar is 
inferred from its non-perception. 
For, such an inference is possible, 
if we already possess the knowledge of a universal 
relation between non-perception and non-existence, that 
is, if we know that when an object is not perceived it 
does not exist. Thus it would be begging the question 
or assumption of the very thing which wassoughtto be 
proved by inference. Nor can we explain the -knowledge 
of the jar's non-existence by comparison or testimony, 
since it is not due to any knowledge of similarity or 
of words and sentences. Hence to explain the direct 
knowledge of the jar’s non-existence we have to 
recognize non-perception (anupalabdhi) as a separate 

und an independent source of knowledge.’ 
Tt should, however, be remarked here that all non- 
perception does not prove the non- 


nor from inference: 


All non-perception : : : 
does not prove non- existence ol what is not perceived. 


Se IESeOEe We do not seea table in the dark, 
nor do we perceive any such supersensibie entities as 
le Vide Sloka-cdrtiku, Sdstra-dipikd and Veddnta-paribhagd on 


Anupalabdbi. For further critical discussion, vide The Siz Ways of 
Knowing, Bk. ITI. 


376 AN INTRODUCTION To INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


atoms, ether, virtue, vice. Yet we do not judge them 
to be non-existent. If a thing should have been per- 
ceived under certain circumstances, then only its non- 
perception under those circumstances is a proof of its 
non-existence. It is this appropriate non-nerception 
(yogyaénupalabdhi) that is the source of our knowledge 
of non-existence. ; 
3. The Validity of Knowledge 


Whenever there are sufficient conditions for the 
generation of a particular kind 
Por toad peerrine of knowledge (and, therefore, no 
knowledge arises with grounds for doubt or disbelief are 
a belief in its truth. ; 
Bsa; known), there arises at once that 
kind of knowledge containing an element of belief in 
the object known. For example, when our normal eyes 
light on an object conveniently situated in broad day- 
light, there is visual perception ; when we hear some 
one speak meaningful sentence, we have knowledge 
from his testimony. When there are sufficient 
premises, inference takes peace. That we act on such 
knowledge in everyday life as soon as we have it, 
without any attempt to test its validity by argument, 
shows that we believe in it as soon as it arises; and 
the fact that such knowledge leads to successful activity 
and not to any contradiction shows further that such 
knowledge is valid. When, however, the conditions 
required for the generation of that kind of knowledge 
are known to be defective or wanting (if, for ex- 
ample, the eyes are jaundiced, light is insufficient, 
premises are doubtful or words are meaningless, etc.) 
no such knowledge arises; neither, therefore, does any 
belief arise, so long as the grounds for--doubt and 


THE MIMASMSA PHILOSOPHY 377 


disbelief do not disappear. From these facts’ two 
conclusions are drawn by the Mimamsa: (a) The 
validity of knowledge arises from) 
cineca” pau the very conditions that give rise 
its validity and belief to that knowledge, and not from 
in the validitpa =. 
any extra conditions (pramanyam 
svatah utp3sdyate). (b) The validity of a knowledge 
is also believed iv or known as soon as the knowledge 
arises; belief does not await the verification of the 
knowledge by some other knowledge, ay, an inference 
(pramanyam svatah jiidyate ca). This Mimaisi view, 
in its double aspect, is known as the theory of intriasic 
validity (svatah-prawwanya-vada).* 
a | 
Truth is self-evident according to this view. Whenever 
any knowledge arises, it carries with it 
an assurance about its own truth, 
Sometimes another knowledge may gvint out that this 
assurance is misleading, or that ths conditions of the 
knowledge are defective. In such a case we infer from 
the existence of defective conditions tbe falsity of that 
oe koowledge. Thus the faisity of a 
b is falsity is known eknowledge is ascertained by inference, 
a epreeree et while truth is self-evident. To put 
the whole position simply, bdelef is normal, disbelizf is an 
exception. As perception, inference and any  othes 
knowiedge arise, we implicitly accep: them, believe in them 
without further argument, unless we are compelled by 
some contrary evidence to doubt their validity or to infer 
their falsity. On this unsuspe sting faith in our knowledge 
our life runs smoothly. 
Ayainst the Nyaya theory that validity is generated by 
some extra conditions {such as sound- 
yout i mere © he ness of organs), over and above the 
ence, there sould be ordinary conditions which generate a 
an infivite regress, knowledge, the Mimarhsi points out 
that those extra conditions really form 
& part of the normal conditions of that knowledge; without 


Truth is self-evident. 


L $loka-vartita, 2.1.1 and Sarva-darfana, on Jaimini dysvem. 
48—1605B 


378 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPH* 


them there would be no belief and, therefore, no know- 
ledge atall. Against the Nydya view that the validity of 
every knowledge is ascertained by inference, the Mimirhsa 
‘points out that this would Jead us to an infinite regress 
and activity would be impossible, If any koow!edge, say, 
.a perception, before being acted upon were to.be verified 
by av inference, then by the same Nyaya rule that infer- 
‘ence also would have to be verified by another inference 
and so on; and there would havc been no end to this pro- 
cess of verification and life would have been impossible. 
As soon as we perceive a tiger we run aw»y, 85 800n as we 
infer the approach of a car from its horn we guard our 
steps; if we are to wait for verifying our knowledge with 
the never-ending series of inferences, we would have to 
wait for ever before we cou'd act on any knowledge. It ia 
true that when there is any positive cause for doubt re- 
garding any knowledge, we take the help of verifying infer- 

e<ace; but that only does the negative work of removing 
the obstacles that stand in the way of knowledge, After the 
obstucles are removed, knowiedge arises out of its own 
usualconditions, if present there, and along with it arise 
its validity and beljef in its validity. If that verifying in- 
ference is unable to remove doubt, then that knowledge 
does not arise ut all. 

Belief in authority, personal or impersonal, Vedic or 
non-Vedic, arises in « siinilar way. On hearing a meaning- 
ful sentence we ut once believe in what it says unless there 
are reasons for doubt or disbelief. Therefore, authority 

fis eat GE Aalié of the eternal, impersonal Vedas also 
‘Vedas, therefore, ia Stands cn its own legs. Its validity is 
self-evident. self-evident and not dependent on 
interence. Arguments are necessary 
forthe negative work of clearing the mind of doubts. 
This being done, the Vedas themselves reveal their own 
meanings and belief invariably acccmpanies the under- 
slanding of these meanings. ‘To secure this belief all that 
the Mimamsa does isto refute the possible grounds on 
which the inofallibility of the Vedas may be doubted. and 
thus to prepare the mind for the immediate acceptance of 
what is known from the Vedas, 


4. What is Error? 


Iftruth is self-evident and every kaowledge claims. 
truth, how does error arise? The problem of error has 


THE MIMAMSi PHILOSOPHY 879 


been discussed threadbare by every Indian School. - 
Lies ep ia The Priébhakaras' bold that every 
ie denied by prathe, nowledge is true, that nothing false 
karus. ever appesrsin any knowledge. Even 
in a so-called case of error like the 

mistaking of a rope for a serpent, we have a mixture of two 
different kinds of knowledge, the perception of a long 
tortuous thing and the memory of a serpent perceived in 
the past, and each ofthese is true. Only owing to lapse 
of memory we forget that the serpent is a thing perceived 
in the part; and the distinction between the perceived and 
rem mbered objects is not observed; we behuve towards 
the rope us we should towards a serpent. It is this 
behuvivur which is faulty. The cognitive defect here is a 
Inpse of memory (smrti-pramosa) or its effect, non- 
dircrimination (vivekigraha). This is negative «nd is 
surely not the same thing as error, which means not 
merely a want of knowledge bul a pcsitive mental state, 
This Prabhikara theory of error is technically known as 
akhyiti-vida or denial of illusory appearance. The. 
Bbattas do not accept this theory.?, They point out that 
mere non-discrimination cannot explain error. We can- 
not deny that sometimes the illusgry object appears 
positively before us. No one can 

It is admitted by ‘deny that if the eye-bell is pressed 
Bh&ttas, but explain. while looking at the moon,’two moons 
ed as dueto wrong re- positively uppear before us. The 
lation of real cbjects: » serpent illusion is also similar. In 
explanation of error, the Bhattas 

point out that when we perceive a «snake in rope and 
judge ‘‘This is a serpent,”’ both the sudject and the predi- 
cate are real. The existing rope 1s brought under the 
serpent-class which also exists in the world, Error consists, 
however, in relating these two really existing but separate 
things in the subject-predicate way. Error always attaches 
to such wrong relation (sarnsarga), and not to the objects 
related which are always real. Even in the moon illusion 
two real parts of space perceived are attributed to the real 
moon perccived, and by such wrong relation the one moon 
appears to be in two places. Such wrong judgment makes 


1 Wide Prakarana-panciké, pp. 32-38. 


2 Sdstra-dipika, 1.1.5. 


.880 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


.one behave in a way which is the reverse of the right one. 
This Bhstta theory of error is, therefore, known as viparita- 
khyati-vada or the view that error is reversal of rigbt 
behaviour (akiéryasya kharyatava bhinam). 

Thus we find thatthe Prabhikaras exempt all know- 

; ledge from error, but the Bhittas 

Error ie an shea admit that error may affect some 

or cage Ptionsl Pheno-  gognitive relations of objets, though 

the objects themselves are always 

correctly perceived, But according to both, error chiefly 

affects our activity ruther than knowledge. Moreover, error 

is rather an exceptional case of the falsification of the nor- 

mal claim that every knowledge makes for truth. On the 

acceptance of this claim alone our everyday life becomes 

possible. Therefore, the falsification of the truth-claim in 
some cases does not affect the normal acceptance of it, 


TI MimamMtsx Merapnysics 


1. General Outlook 


‘Depending on the validity of sense-perception the 
The Mimathsa be. Miméarhsi believes‘in the reality of 
ee eye we the world with all its diverse objecte. 
and of other ob‘ects. It rejects, therefore, the Buddhistic 
theory of voidness and momentariness, as well as the 
Advaita theory of the unreality of the phenomenal 
world. In addition to objects perceived it comes to 
believe, through other sources of knowledge, in souls, 
heaven, hel] and deitiza to whom sacrifice isto be 
performed, according to the Vedic commandments. 
The souls are permanent, eternal 

eh ate fouls, substances, ‘and so also are the 
spiritual substances. = material elements by the com- 
bination of which the world is made. The law of 


THE MIMIMSA PHILOSOPHY 381 


karma is thought sufficient to guide the formation of 
the world. The world is composed of (a) living bodies 
wherein the souls reap the Sonsequences of their past 

deeds (bhogayatana), (b) the 
arise cot attiione ia sensory and motor organs, i.e. the 
accordance with the indriyas, which are instruments 
mors] lew of karma. 

. for suffering or enjoying those 
consequences (bhoga-sidhana), and (c) the objects 
which constitute the fruits to be suffered or enjoyed 
(bhogya-vigaya). No necessity is feit for admitting 
the existence of God. Some Mimiarthsakas’ believer 
like the Vaidesikas in the atomic theory. But the 
difference is that, according to the Mimarns’, atoms do 
not require. for their arrangement in the world? ah 
efficient cause like God. The autonomous law of 
karma independently regulates the atoms to form the 
kind of world deserved by the souls. 


The Mimathsi metaphysics is then, ploralistic 
and realistic. It is not empiricism, 
seis aylnies ea because it believes in the non- 
realism, but not em- empirical Vedic source of knowledge 
Pirieiarn. apn 
which is thought even to be mare 
dependable than sense-experience " and also because it 
believes in many realities like potential energy, the 
unseen motal principle, heaven, hell, etc., which cannot 
be known through sense-experience. 


T Not all (vide Sloka-rartska, Chap. on Inference, verse 188) For 
arguments in support of atomism, vide Prabhadkara-vijaya. 

3 In fact, Kumirils observes (in Sioka-vdrtika, verse 72, 1.1 2% 
that the fact that the Vedas contradict ordinary empirical knowledge 
ie @ proof of their supericr authority. 


382 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
2. The Theory of Potential Energy (Sakti and aptirea) 


In connection with the question of causation the 
Mimamsa formulates the theory 
ee poweri® of potential energy (éakti).’ A 
os oe eee wee seed possesses in it an ithpercep- 
tible power (gakti) with the help of 
which it can produce the sprout ; when this rower 
is obstructed or destroyed (as, for example, by the 
frying of the seed), it fails to produce that effect. 
Similarly, there is the power of burning in fire, 
the power of expressing meaning and inducing activity 
in a word, the power of illumination in light and so 
on.e The necessity of admitting such unperceived 
potency in the cause is that it explains why in some 
cases though the cause (i.e. seed or fire) is there, the 
effect (i.e. sprout er burning) does not take place. 
The explanation is that in such cases though the cause- 
substance is theré, its causal potency has been des- 
troyed or over-powered temporarily, as the case may 
be, by some obstructing conditions obtaining there. 
The Nyadya realists reject this theory. They say 
fas ctiticism— that even without admitting an 
enswered, imperceptible potency in causes 
the above difficulty may be solved by holding that a 
cause produces the effect in the absence of obstructions 
and does not produce it in their presence. The 
Mimamsa meets this objection by saying that as we 
have to admit, even according to the Nyiya, something 
else in addition to the cause (namely, absence of 
obstruction), for the production of the effect, the Nyaya 


1 Vide Séstra-dipika, p 89, and Prakarana-paftcikd, p. 146. 


THE MIMAMSK PHILOSOPHY 383 


suggestion is no improvement. If. you must suppose 
something, why not admi: a positive something in the 
very substance (say, seed) ‘which is taken by all as 
the cause (say, of the sprout), rather than an additional 
negative condition having a causal power. It would be 
reasonable, therefore, to suppose in the cause-substance 
@ positive power (Sakti) to explain the positive effect, 
and to “suppose the non-functioning of this power 
(owing to its destruction or suppression) to explain the 
negative fact of non-happening of the effect. 

One important application of thi. theory of potency 
made by the Mimimsé is for the solution of the problem 
how an action like a sacrifice performed now bears fruit 
after a long time (say, after this life, in Hea¥vevt) 
when the action has ceased. It is held that the ritual 
petformed here generates in the soul of the performer 
an unperceived potency (i.e. power for generating the 
fruit of the action) catled apirva, which remains 

in the soul an@ bears fruit when 
pi'the flue petcaey circumstances are favourable.’ It 
for epioyinen! of the will be found that the theory 

of aptuva is a limited hypothesis 
which tries to explain a part of the general problem of 
conservation of the fruits of all actions, ritualistic. and 
non-ritualistic, which the more universal] law of karma 
seeks to explain. 


8. The Mimdmsd Conception of Soul 


The conception of soul in the Mimarbsa is more 
or less like that of other realistic and pluralistic schools 


1 Vide Sastra-dipikd, p 90; Prakarana-paitcika, pp. 181-95; Sabara. 
bhagya, 2.1.5, ° 


384 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


such as the Nyaya-Vaisesika." The soul is an eternal, 
infinite substance, which is related to a real body in 
a real’world and it survives death 
ne ee oe cer to be able to reap the consequences 
hbteel nie Wenspacky of its action performed here. 
: pa 
Consciousness is not the essence 
of the soul, but an adventitious quality , which arises 
when some conditions are present. In dreamless 
sleep and in the state of liberation the soul has no con- 
sciousness, because its conditions, such as relation 
‘of sense to object, are absent. There are as many 
souls as there are individuals. The souls are subject 
to bondage and can also obtain liberation. In all 
theSe respects the grounds, on which the Mimamsa 
views are based, resemble those of the other schools 
mentioned previoey and we need not repeat them 
here. 
Regarding the knowledge of the soul, however, there 
How is the self 18 something worth mentioning. 
moa? The Bhatta School holds that the 
self is not known whenever any object is known : 
it,is known occasionally. When we reflect on the 
‘As the objert of self self, we know it as the object 
conscionsness "— say Of self-consciousness (abar-vitti). 
ane BERtIEE. But the Prabhakara School objects 
to this view on the ground that the very conception 
of self-conscionsness is untenable, becauce the self 
cannot be both subject and object of the same 
act of knowledge, any more than food can be both the 


3 Vide Sloka- edrtika, Atma-vida ; Sastra-dipika, atte: vida (p. 119 
et 8¢q.); Prakarana- paficika, Prakerana 8. 


THE MIMAS{SA PHILOSOPHY 385 


cook and the cooked. The functions of the subject 
and the object are mutually incompatible (karma-kartr- 
virodba) and cannot be attributed to the same thing at 
the same time. In evary act of knowing an object, 
however, the self is revealed as the subject by that 
‘Ray die. wubiecbae oY knowledge. It is thus that 
every knomedge'— Wwecan speak of the self as the 
say the Pribbékures, Le nower in judgments like “I know 
this pot.’”’ If I myself did not appear as the 
subject in every knowledge, the distinction bstween 
my koowledge und another man’s knowledge would 
have been impossible." The Bhattas reply to this that 
if the self were revealed whanever an object were 
known, we would have invariably bad then a judgment 
like ‘ft know this pot.’’ But this is not always’ 
the case. This sbows that self-consciousness does 
. not always accompany the cons- 

ean Faerie ciousness of an object ; but it only 
occasionally takes place and is, 

therefore, something diferent from the consciousness 
of cbjects. As for the opposition betwean subjectivity 
and objectivity, it is more verbal than real. If thene 
were any real opposition, then the Vedic injunstion 
“Know the self,’ and everyday judgments like ‘‘I 
know myself’ would have been meaningless. Besides, 
if the self were never the object of any knowledge, 
bow couid we remember the existence of the self in 
the past ? Here the pust seif cannot be said to be 
the subject or knower of the present memory-ktuow- 
ledge ; it can only be the object of the present self 


1 Prakarana-paftcska p. 148, 
49—1606B 


386 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


that knows it.’ This shows that the self can become 
the object of knowledge. 
Closely connected with this question is another, 
namely, ‘How is knowledge 
row, * Knowledge “known ?? The Prabbikaras hold 
that in every knowledge of an 
object, such as expressed by the judgment,‘ I know 
The Prabhakaras bis pol,’ three factors are present, 
hold that knowle 'ge namely, ‘I’ or the knower (jiiita), 
reveals itself as well : 
as its subject and the object known (jfieya) and the 
«object. knowledge itself (jiiina). All these 
three are simultaneously revealed  (triputtifiina!. 
Whenever knowledge arises, it reveals itself, its object 
‘and the subject. Knowledge is self-revealing (svayam- 
prakaga) and is the revealer of its subject and object 
as well. The Bhattas hold, on the contrary, that 
kaowledge by its very nature is such that it cannot 
: be the object of itself, just as the 
ee ucts jg Olt" finger-tip cannot touch itself. But 
ferred from the known- how then do we* at ull came to 
ness of its ubject. 
know that we have the knowledge 
of a certain object ? The Bhittas reply that whenever 
we perceive an object it appears to be either unfamiliar 
or familiar. If it appears to be familiar or previously 
known (jiidta), then from this character of familiarity 
or knownness (jiitata) which the object presents to us, 
we infcr that we had a knowledge of that object. 
Knowledge is thus known indirectly by inference on 
the ground of the fatniliarity or knowwness observed 
in the object. 


} Sastra-dipika, "pp. 122-28, ‘ 


THE MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 387 
IV. MimaMtsx Revicion ano Ernics 
1. The Place of tie Vedas tn Religion 


The Mimarsa does not balieve in a creator of the 
paligiea: 4 pases world. In its anxiety to secure 
on the Vedic command. the supreme place for the eternal 
baie r Vedas, the Mimarhsa could not 
believe in God whose authority would be superior to 
or at least on a pur with, that of thea Vedas. According 
to the Mimarnsa. the Vedas embody not so much eter- 
nal truths as eterna! injunctions or laws which enjom : 
the performance of the sacrificial rites. Religion or 
Dharina thus bezomes identical with the Vedic injuge- | 
tions §(codini-laksino'rtho dharmah). The Vedas 
supply the criterion of what is right, and what is 
wrong. A good life isa life led in, obedience to the 
Vedic commandments. 


Py . 
2. The Conception of Duty 
® 
The sacrifizes performed in the Vedic times were 
A ritual must be Calculated to please, by oblations 
performed becauce it is and hynins, different deities (the 
eatuine! by the Vedas, ; - : 
and not with any other Fire-god. the Sun-god, the Rain- 
motive. : s 
god and others) either to win some 
favour or avert some ill. Though the Mimathsa is a 
continuation of this Vedic cult. the ceremonial details 
of the rituals absorb its interest, rather than the gods 
themselves who gradually recede and fade into mere 
grainmatical datives. A deity comes to be described not 
by its moral or intellectual quilities, but as ‘that 
which is signified, in a sacrificial injunctién, by the 


888 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


fourth case-ending’ (the sign of a dative, to which 
something is given). In short,a deity is necessary 
merely as that in whose name an oblation is to be 
offered at a sacrifice. But the primary cbject of per- 
forming a sacrifice, says an eminent Mimirbsaka, is 
not worship: it is not to please any deity. “Nor is it 
purification of the soul or moral improvement. 7 A 
ritual is to be performed just because the Vedas 
command us to perform them. Some of these rituals, 
it is true, are to be performed in order to enjoy Heaven 
hereafter or to obtain worldly benefits, such as rainfall. 
Bat there are some (e.g. nilya and naimittika karmas) 
which must be performed just because they are enjoin- 


-- ed by the Vedas. Here the 
Duty for duty’s Mimarhsi ethics reaches, through 


Titualism, the highest point of its 
glory, namely, the conception of duty for duty’s sake. 

Like Kant, the Mimarhnsa believes 
Kant and , Mima 
sh: agreement and‘ that an obligatory action is to be 
eperenee, performed not , because it will 
benefit the performer but because we ought to ‘perform 
it. Like him again the Mimarhsa believes that though 
an obligatory duty is not to be done with any interested 
motive, yet {he universe is so constituted that a person 
who performs his duty does not ultimately go unreward- 
ed. The difference is that while for this purpose 
the Mimamea postulates in the universe the impersonal 
moral law of karma, Kant postulates God. Again. 
whereas the source of obligation for Kant is the 
higher self (which commands to the lower, ‘ thou 
oughiest to do what is good’), for the Mimat:hsakas it is 


“1 Vide Prakarena-paficikd, pp. 186 86, 


THE MIMAMSK PHILOSOPHY - 389 


the impertonal Vedic authority which categorically 
enjoins duty. 


3. The Highest Good 


The highest good in the early Mimarsa conception 
Hravie isthe ligied appears. to have been the atiain- 
good, ‘ceding: to ment of Heaven ora state in which 
many nites there is updalloyed bliss. Heaven is 
regarded as the usual end of rituals... The Mimirhsaka 
writers gradually fall in with the other Indian thinkers 
and accept liberation from bondage to the flesh as the’ 
highest good (nihSreyasa). They realize that the per- 
formance of actions, good or bad, if dictated by any 
desire for enjoyment of objects, causes repeated birth. 
When one understands that worldly 
pleasures are all mingled with pain, 
und becomes disgusted with life in 
the world, one tries to control one’s paseiqns, desists 
from forbidden actions, as well as actions with motives 
of future enjoyment. Thus the chance of future birth 
and bondage is removed. By the disinterested perfor. 
mance of obligatory duties and knowledge of the eef, 
the karmas accumulated in the past are also gradually 
worn out. After this life such a person, being ‘free 
from all karma-ties, is never born again. He is thus 
liberated. As bondage is the fettering of the soul to 
the world through the body including the senses, the 
iMotor-organs and manas, liberation is the total destruc- 
tion of such bondage through the stopage of rebirth.’ 


Liberation replaces 
Heaven later on. 


1 ‘grargak&émo yajete.’ 


3 Vide Prakerana-paitciké, Prakarana &, pp. 154-60. 


390 AN INTRODUCTION TO IXDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


‘We have seen already that, according to the 
Mimirmsi, consciousness and other 

uniberation | is 8° mentdl states are not inherent in 
ae Pleasure and the soul. They arise only when the 
soul is related to objects through 

the body and the organs. The liberated soul, being 
dissociated from the body and, therefore, from all fhe 
organs including manas, cannot have any consciousness; 
nor can it, therefore, enjoy bliss. Liberation is then 
desirable not as a state of bliss, but as the total cessa- 
ttion of painful experience. It is a state where the soul 
remains in its own iotrinsic nature, beyond pleasure and 
pain.’ The soul in its intrinsic state (svastha) can be 
Gefilied only as substance having existence and a poten- 
tiality for con3ciousness—though no actual consciousness. 


4. Is Mimdmsa Atheistic ? 


€ 

Should the Mimarhsa be called atheistic ? Though 
the. reply ‘to this, question would seem to be in the 
ge gee affirmative in the light of the 
that the Mimamaa is traditional conception of the 
eee Mimatasai philosophy we have de- 
scribed above, doubts are raised by such a competent 
authority as Max Miller.” Bearing in mini that of 
all schools the Mimarhsi claims to foilow the 
Vedas most faithfully, he finds it difficult to bsheve 
that it could reject the Vedic belief in God. The 
arguments adduced by the Mimimsukas against the 
conception of a creator of the universe mean, according 


1 Vide Sastra.dimka. pp. 125 31. 

2 Vide The Str Systems of Indian Philotophy, Ch. V. Dr. Payapate- 
néth Sastr? also advocates this view in his Introduction to the Parra 
Mimamea. a 


THE MiMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 391 


to Max Miler, that if God were supposed to be the 
creator, He would be liable tp the charges of cruelty, 
partiality, ete. But the rejection of a creator-God, he 
contends, is not necessarily the rejection of God. Even 
some foryns of pantheism ‘like those of the Advaita 
Vedanta and Spinoza, Max Miller contends, do not 
accept the reality of creation ; and it is unfuir to call 
them atheistic, just because they do not conform to the 
customary conception of God. 
If the Mimarmsi is to be judved by the Vedic, 
ancestry, of which it is so proud, 
idee see © then Max Miiller ie perhaps right. 
But judged by what the Mimagisi 
itself dces and says, his contention cannot be fully 
accepted. When we find that the early Mimiathsakas 
The Minirhes re‘ects Fe silent about God and iater ones 
eg of God's exist- reject the proofs for the existence 
Of God, like the Jainas, without 
replacing them by others, we have no positive proof 
that the early Vedic faith was still alive in them. The 
different Vedic deities of course still forin necessary 
parts of the sacrifices performed. Depending on this 
evidence one might say at best that the Mimamsa 
believes in polytheism. But even such a view is 
rendered doubtful by the facts that these deities are 
not regarded as cbjects of worship,’ nor even believed 
to have any existence anywhere except in the Vedic 
hymns (mantras) that describe them.* While the 
Vedic hyinne are inspired by the living presence of the 


Y Yagidingm devatérédhanahetutve pramanibbavat,’ Prakarana- 
paftcikd, p. 185. > : 
2 Vide Sha, Sloka-vdrtika, Eng. Tr., Introduction. 


392 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


deity in the place of worship, ths Mimaisaka wonders 
how the deity can ba simyltanzously present in different 
tis, “idee: thy ing places where he is invoked.’ Bo 
faith in deittes found polytheism of the ordinary kind 
inthe Neues: cannut also be attributed to the 
Mimirmsi without some qualification. The deities of 
the Mimithsaka are like the immortal characters 
of classical Epics ; they do not belong to the space-time 
world; they are not existing parsons, but typ3s. But 
» it a sense the deities are more thaa these characters, 
because they are nut the products of any imagination ; 
they are eternal and self-manifesting concepts, since 
ethey are the characters described by the eternal, self- 
revealing Vedas. There may be some grandeur and 
even purily in such a conception of deities, but one 
would miss here the living faith of tha Vedas. It would 
not be fair, then, to judge the Mimarasa simply by its 
Vedic antestry. ,_ Inherited elements of a faith, like 
inherited limbs, become atrophied by disuse. The 
Vedic conception of God had no active place in the 
Mimdamsa scheme of life, as it had in the Vedanta one, 
‘and it is nataral that it should gradually fade away. 
The Mimarhsa is one of the many examples in human 
history of how an overemphasized means becomes its 
own end, and how gods are sacrificed for temples, pro- 
phets and books. In its great anxiety to maintain 
the cupremacy of the Vedas, the Mimarmsi relegates 
God to an ambiguous position. It is here that the 
Vedanta comes to differ from it, utilising its faith in 
tbe Vedas to develop a still greater faith in God, ag we 
shall see, in the next chapter. 


1 Vide Prakaraye-pefctka, p. 186. 


THE VEDANTA lHILOSOPHY 


50 1605 is 


A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 


V. L. Sastri 
Hume 
R. D. Ranade ... 


Deussen 
Sankara 


Ramanuja oat 
G. Thibaut 

8. Radhakrishnan 
M. .N. Sarkar 
KokileSvar Sastri 


8: K, Das 
W. 8. Urquhart 


R. Das wet 


V. 8. Ghate 


M. Hiriyanna 


One Hundred and Eight Upanisads 
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay). 
The Thirteen Principal Upanisads 
(Eng. traos.). 
A Constructive Survey aj Upantsadic 
Philosophy (Poona). 
The Philosophy of the Upanisads, 
Brahma-sttra-bhdsya (Nirnaya 
Sagar). 
Do. (R. Venkate- 
var Co.). 
The Veddnta-Sitras, with the 
Commentaries of Sankara and 
Ramanuja (Eng. trans. 8. B. E. 
series). 
Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Chs. 
VII-IX. 


. , The System of Vedadntic Thought 


and Culture (Calcutta). 

The Introduction to Advaita: Philo- 
sophy (Calcutta). 

A Study of the Vedanta (Calcutta). 

The Vedanta and Modern Thought 
(Oxford University Press). 

The Essentials of Advuitism 
(Lahore). 

The Vedanta (a comparative account 
of Sankara, Ramanuja, Nim- 
birka, Madhva and Vallabha), 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research 
Institute, Poona. 

Outlines of Indians Philosophy, 
Chs. XIII-X1V. 


CHAPTER X 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 
I. Intropuction 


1. Origin and Development of the Vedanta 


‘ Vedanta ’ literally means ‘ the 2nd of the Vedas.’ 
Pie Gua Bas Primarily the word stood for the 
be regarded as the Upanigads though afterwards its 
a ™ denotation widened to include. all. 
thoughts developed out of the 
Upanisads. The Upanigads may be regarded as the 
end of the Vedas in different genges. (1) First, the 
Upanigads were the last literary 

(1) as the last : 
literary products of products of the Vedit period. 
ihe Vedie:period, Three kinds of literature of this 
period tan be broadly distinguished: the earliest being 
the Vedic hymns or mantras compiled in the different 
Samhitds (viz, Rk, Yajus, Sama), the next being the 
Brihmanas which are treatises guiding and encourag- 
ing the Vedic vituals and the last, the Upanigads which 
discuss philosophical problems. All thease three were 
treated as revealed texts (érutis) and sometimes also 
called the Vedas, in the wider sense of this term. 
(2) Secondly, in respect of study 

(2) as studied . 

after the other Vedic also, the Upanisids came last. As 
ed a Tule, a man studied the Sambitas 
first ; the Brihmanas were required next for zuiding 
him when.bé entered life and had to perform the 


396 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


rituals enjoined on a householder ; and last of all the 
Upanigads (some of which are also known as éranyakas 
or forest-treatises) were needed to help him when he 
retired from the world, led & eecluded life in forests and 
tried to understand the ,meaning of life and coutem- 
plate the mystery of the universe. (3) Thirdly, the 
eee eer Upanigads may be regarded as. the 
nation of the Vedio end of the Vedas also in the sense 
epltee: that they mark the culmination of 
the Vedic speculation. In the Upanigads themselves 
" we ars told that even after the study of the Vedas with 
other branches of Jearning a man’s education is not 
complete till he receives instructions in the 
~ Upanigads.’ 
The word ‘ Upanisad ' means either ‘ that which 
gets man near to God,’ or ‘ that 
tee gliteratare of ‘which gets man near to the teacher 
‘ (upa-ni-sad).?_ The last meaning 
tallies with the fact that the Upanisadic doctrines 
were esoteric, t.e. they were very secretly taught only 
to the select pupils seated close to (upasanna)’ the 
teacher. The Upanigads were regarded as the inner 
or secret meanings (rabasya) of the Vedas, bence their 
teazhings were sometimes called Vedopanigad ‘ or the 
mystery of the Vedas. The Upanigads were many’ 
in number and developed in the different Vedic schools 


1 Vide Chandogya, Chaps. 6 and 7. 

3 Vide Satkara's Introduction to Kathe, Taittirlya, Brhaddranyaka. 

3 The verb ‘ npased* {* go near’) ie repeatedly used in the Upo- 
nigsds to describe the pupil’s approaching the teacher for instruction. : 

4 Vide Teitlirtya, 1.11. 

5 Vide Ousgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. a p. 28, for 3 
list of 119 Upanigade. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 397 


(4akhés) at different. times and places. The problems 
discussed and solutions offered presented differences 
inspite of a umty of generd! outlook. The need was 
felt, therefore, in course of time for systematizing the 
different teachings so as to bring out the harmony 
underlying them. Badarayana’s Brahma-siira (also 
known ,variously as Veddnta-sitra, Sdriraka-sitra or 
Sariraka-mimamsa, Uttara-mimdsisa) undertakes this 
task. Badariyana attempted to set forth the unani- 
mous teachings of the Upanisads, and defend them 
against possible and actual objections. His sitra3, 
being brief, were liable to different interpretations. 
Various commentaries thus came to be written to 

elaborate the doctrines of tie 
woe chs of the Vedinta in ibeir own light. Each 

tried 1o justify its position as the 
only one consistent with the revealed texts (srutis) 
and the sitras. The author of each of, thece chief 
commentaries (bhasya) became the founder ‘of a 
particular schodl of the Vedanta. Thus we have the 
schools of Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhya, Vallabha, 
Nimbarka and many others.’ Each school of ,the 

Vedanta consists uot simply of the 
File eae glow. philorophers who theoretically 

accept its views but also of a large 
number of lay followers who try to mould their lives 
accordingly. It is in this way that the Vedanta in 
ite different forme still persists in the lives of millions. 
After the chief commentaries, the literature of the 


1 For « short ccumparative account of some of these achools vide 
P. Nagara‘a Rao's The Schools of Vedanta (Bhératiys Vidyé Bhavan, 
Bombay). . 


898° AN INTRODUOTION TO INDIAN PHELOSOPRY 


Vedanta developed through the innumerable sub-com- 
mentaries, glosses and indapendent treatises written by 
the leading intellects of each school to support its views 
and refute those of the othar schools, The total output 
of Vedinta literature thus became very large,. though 
only a small! fraction of it has been printed as yet. 
The most common question on which’ thee schools 
. of the Vedanta are divided is: 
- ecg th sent What is the nature of the relation 
of the Vedints difer. between the self (jiva) and God 
(Brahman)? Some, like Madhva, hold that the self 
and God are two totally different entities ; their view, 
is called dualism (dvaita). So ns3 others, like Satkara, 
hold that the two are absolutely idantical ; this view 
is known as monism (advaita). Some others, like 
Raminuja, again hold that the two are identical ouly 
in some special sense: this view may be called 
qualified monism (visigtadvaita). There were many 
other views, each specfying a particular type of 
identity (abhada', difference (bhadd) or idantity- 
in-differance (bhedibheda) between the self and God, 
too many to be mentioned here. But the best known 
among the Vedanta schools are those of Sankara and 
Raméaouja which will be discussed here. 
Three stages in the development of the Vedanta 
may be distinguished in the light 
ofthe Whose” «of what has been said above: (1) - 
The creative stage represented by * 
the revealed texts (érutis! or the Vedic literature, 
chiefly consisting of the Upanisads. The fundamental 
ideas of the Vedinta take shape bere mostly in the 
poetic visions and mystic intuitions of the ‘enlightened 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 399 


seers. (2) The stage of systematization represeDted by. 

the Brabms-siitras which gather, arrange and justify’ 

the ideas of the previous stage. (3) The stage ot- 
elaboration represented by all works beginning from the ’. 
chief commentaries downwegrds in which the ideas and 

arguments are cast into the proper philosophical forms, 

appeal heing.made not simply to earlier authority 

but aleo to independent reasoning. Though it is 

possible to consider separately the phbilocophical 

speculations of each of these periods, in consideration 

of space we shall discuss them together. Orthodox* 
Indian writers themselves generally look upon the 

entire current of thought, spread over tLe succeasive 

stages, as ove flow, inseparable at cource, but develop-— 
ing and ramifying in its onward course. Let us bave 

a bird's-eye view of the dévelopment of the Vedanta 

through the Vedas and Upanisade.” 


2. How the Vedanta Developed through the Vedas 
and the Upanisads 


Of the three Vedas, Rk, Yajus and Sama, the first 
is the basic work, the second two contain Rk hymns 
(mantras) in different ariangements to suit their 
The Vedic cone-p- application to sacrifices. The 
tion of gods and bymns of the Rg-veda mostly 
panes consist of praises of the different 
deities—Agni, Mitra, Varuna, Indra, and soon. They 
describe the mighty and noble deeds of the various 
deities, and pray for their help and favour. Sacrifices 
offered to the gods consisted in pouring oblations of 
clarified butter and other things into the sacrificial 
fire along with which the hymns in their prajse where 
recited and: sung. These deities were conceived as the 


400 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


realities uudarlying and governing ths different pheno- 
mena of nature, sush as fire, sun, wind, rain and 
others, on which life, agriculture and prosperity 
depenied. Nature, thoagh paopled with different 
gods, was concsived as gsudject to soma bisic law 
(called Rta) by which the whole world, objects of 
nature as well as living beings, was regulated. 
wie Sata Ag Oe Its function was not only the 
moral natare of the preservation of order and regularity 
beara in planets and other objects, but 
also the regulation of justice. 


Belief in many gods is called polytheism. The 
eae Vedas are, thecelore, often ssid 
gods. Is it poly 40 be polytheistic. But there is a 
en peculiarity in Vedic thought that 
makes this view doubtfal. Hachof many gods, whon 
praised, is extolled by the hyma as the supreme God, 
the Creator vf the universe and the lord of all gods. 

Max Miller thinks, therefore, that 

ee “’** polytheism is not an appropriate 
name for such a belief, and he 

coins a new word ‘henotheism’ to signify this. But 
whether the Vedic faith is really polytheism or 
henotheism, depends largely on the explanation of 
this phenomenon. It is polytheism, if the raising 
of each god to the supreme position bs not the indica- 
tion of real belief in the supremacy, but only a wilful 
exaggeration, a poetic hypsrbole. But if the Vedic 
poats really believed what they said, henotheism 
would be a better name. The latter view, is 
rendered more than probable by the fact that in the 
g-veds we come across passages where it is explicitly 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 401 


stated that the different gods are only manifestations 
of one underlying reality. ‘* The one reality is called 
by the wise in different ways: Agni, Yama, Matariéva "’ 
(Ekar sad vipra bahudha vadanti......).1_ Such a clear 
statemen€ leaves little doubt aa to the existence of a 
real belief in the unity underlying all gods. 
According to many writers, there is a development 
noticeable in Vedic thought and 
or fees persian ads they believe that the idea of God 
gradually developed from  poly-s» 
theism through henotheism, ultimately to monotheism, 
t.e. belief in one God. This hypothesis way be true. 
But let as not forget, in our eagerness to satisfy | 
critica, that even in its most developed form, Indisn 
monotheism retains the belief that though God is one, 
He has various manifestations in the many gods, any 
one of which imay be worshipped as a form of the 
Supreme Deity. Even to-day we°have in India‘ the 
divergent cults—Saivism, Vaignavism and the like— 
flourishing side by side and almost every one of them 
ia at bottom based on a philosophy of one Supreme 
God—perhaps even one all-inclusive reality. Indian 
monotbeiem in its living forms, from the Vedic agg till 
now, has believed rather in the unity’. 
ohne persistent feature of the gods in God, than the denial’ 
of gods for God. Hence Indian. 
monotheism has a peculiarity which distinguishes it 
from the Christian or the Mahomedan. This is a 
persistent feature of orthodox Indian faith throughout, 
not 8 mere passing phase of the Vedic times. 


1 By-vgda, 1. 164. 46 ‘vide aloo 10 114. 4, 10. 129, 10, 62, et 
passim). 
51—1605B 


402 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Belief in the unity of all gods which we find in 
the Rg-veda is only a part of a 
torube wnity ofalleris: §oreater thought which also we 
find there in a. clear form, namely, 
the unity of all existence. “In the famous Purugasikta 
which is even now daily recited by every devout 
Brahmin, the Vedic seer visualizes, 
tga ‘*® perhaps for the first time in human 
history, the organic unity of the 

whole universe. Some stanzas are quoted below: 

The Man had a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a 
thousand feet: he covered the eartb on all sides 
and stretched ten fingers’ length beyond it. 

The Man was all that is and all that will be: 
ruling over immortality, he was all that grows 
by food. © 

Such was his greatness ; and the Man was greater 
still: this whole world is a fourth of him, three- 
fourths of him are immortal in the sky. 

For with three-fourths the Man went on high ; but 
a fourth of him remained here, and then 
spread on ail sides, over the living and the 
lifeless world.’ 

All existence—earth, heavens, planets, gods, living 

and non-living objects—is conceived 

The transcendence here as the parts of one great 
and immanence of 

God. person (Puruga), who pervades the 

world, but also remains beyond 

it. In Him all that is, has -been and will be, are 

united. We have in this hymn the poetic msight 

not only info the universe as one organic whole, but 


1 Rg-veda, 10. 90 (Peterson's trans,), 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 403 


also into the Supreme Reality which is both immanent 

‘and transcendent ; God pervades the world, yet He 
‘18 not exhausted thereby ; He remains also beyond 
it." In terms of Western theology, this conception 
is panentheism (pan—all, en—in, theos—God), not pan- 
theism ; all is not equal to Ged, but all is in God, who 
is greater than all. One flash of the seer’s imagina- 
tion, in this ‘hymn, reveals a variety of ideas that 
inspired the Vedic mind, monism, panentheism and 
organic conception of the world. 

In anothor hymn (commonly known asthe Nasadiya- 
sikta), we are introduced further. 
to the Vedic conception of the 
Impersonal Absolute. The reality 
underlying all existence—the primal one from which 
everything originates—cannot be described, it says, 
either a3 existent or as non-existen{ (na sat, na asat). 
Here we have perhaps the first flash of a conception 
of the Indeterminate Absolute. whjch is the reality 
underlying all things, but is in itself indescribable. 

TRe hymn thus begins: 

There was then neither what is. nor what is not, 
there was no sky, nor the heaven which *is 
beyond. ° 

It concludes : : 

He from whom this creation arose, whether he 
made it or did not make it ; the highest seer in the 
highest heaven, he forsooth knows, or does even he not 
know? * 


The Impersonal Ab- 
solute. 


e} Sa bhimis vidvato eptv’ atyatisthad daédtguiam. 
Pédo’sys vidvS bhitsni, tripSdasys amptarh divi. [bsd. 
2 Rg-veda,gl0. 129 (Max Naller's trans.), ° 


404 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPRY 


As for the relation between the conception of Ulti- 

mate Reality as a Person and the 

be pect oe conception of it as an Indetermi- 

Eopestonst ideas of nate Absolute, we may note that 

even in the description of Reality 

as Person, there is also a mention of its transcendent 

aspect, which is not describable in terms of the objects 

of the world and, therefore, indeterminate. ‘They are 
thus conceived as the two aspects of the same Reality. 


Though many of the important elements of the 
Vedanta are to be found thus in 

Philosophy baeedon the Rg-veda, they are presented in 
inthe Vedss. ao a poetic way. The method by 
' which the sages arrive at these 
views is not mentioned, neither the arguments which 
support them. Philosophy- proper must be based on 
explicit reasoning tnd argument chiefly. There is, 
therefore, no regular philosophy, strictly speaking, 
‘in the Vedas. The first attempt 

It is found first in at philosophical epeculation is to 
radiountacy fora * be found in the Upanigads, where 
problems about self, God and 

the world are clearly put and discussed. But even 
heré the philosophical method of arriving at conclusions, 
rigorously supported by arguments, is only partly in 
evidence. Some of the Upanisads are written in 
verses and they contain, like the Rg-veda, inspired 
utterances on philosophical matters. So also are some 
other Upanisads, though written in prose. The only 
approach to philosophical method is to be found in 
the few Upanisads, where, through dialoguee—questions 
and answers—attempt is made to lead,the sceptical 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 405 


pupil, step by step, to some conclusion. But inspite 
of the lack of strict argumentative form, the Upani- 
sads have a profound charm and appeal. This is due 
to the joint effect of the loftiness of ideas, the depth 
of insight, the mysterious appeal to all that is good and 
sublime im man and the irreBistible force with which 
the views are asserted as though they are born of a 
direct vision of truth. A famous German philosopher, 
Schopenhauer, impressed by the Upanisads, declared: 
“In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and 
so elevating as that of the Upanisads. It has been the, 
solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death.” 


The problems of the Upanisads, to mention only 
some of the more frequent cnes, 
Ppa me olthe are: What is the Reality from : 
which qll things originate, by which 
Sa live and into which all dissolve when destroyed? 
What i is that by knowing which everything can be 
:known? What is that by knowing which the un-, 
known becomes known? What is that by knowing 
which'one can attain immortality? What is Brahman? 
What is Atman? As the very nature of these 
questions impliee, the Upanigadic . mind was.already 
steeped in the belief that there is an all-pervesive 
reality underlying all things which, arise. from, exist in 
and return to it.; that there is some reality by knowing 
which immortality can be attained. 
The name given to this Reality is sometimes 
Brabman (God), sumetimes Atman 
The belief in an all- 7 : 
pervasive reality called (Self), sometimes simply Sat 
Brahman or Atmen. © (Being). ‘ At first there was the 
Atwan along,’ say the Aitereya (1.1.1.). and the 


406 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Brhadéranyake (1.4.1.). ‘ All this is Atman,’ says the 
Chandogya (7.25.2.). “Atman being known . . . every- 
thiog is known,”’ says the Brhaddranyaka again (4.5.6.). 
Similarly we find, “There was only Being (Sat) at the 

4 beginning, it was one without a second’’ (Chand., 6.2.1.). 
Again, ‘‘All this is Brahman’? (Mundaka, 2.8.11. and 
Chand., 3.14.1.). Brahman and Atman are used syno- 
bymously in these different contexts. ' We are also 
told explicitly in some places that ‘‘This self is the 
Brahman’”’ (Brhad., 2.5.19.), ‘‘ I am Brahman’’ (Ibid., 
1.4.10.).? 


The Upanigads shift the centre of interest from 

the Vedic gods to the Self of man. 

” an goe Pag ogy They analyze the Self, distinguish 
between its outer husk and its 

ioner reality. The body, the senses, the manas, the 
intellect and pleasures arising out of them are all tested 
and found to be passing, changeful modes, not the 
permanent essence of the Self. These are merely the 
The real self behing Sheaths (kogas), the outer covers, 
the outer sheaths. so to say, which conceal an ‘inner, 
permanent reality, which cannot be identified with 
any of these, though all of these are grounded in it and 
are is manifestations. The Real Self is pure conscious- 
¥ ness, every particular consciousness of objects being its 
limited manifestation. Not being limited by any 


! The texts translated here are respectively : ‘Om atmé va idem eke 
eve egre Melt.’ ‘Atmé avaidam egre dsit.” ‘Atma evs ide sarvem.’ 
‘Ktmsni khsala are drete grate mate vijfidte idarh sarvath viditam.’ ‘Sed 
eve saumye idem agra dsit, ekaw eva advitiyam.’ ‘Ssrvach khalu idath 
brabma (Chand.). ‘Brahms eva idarn vidvam'’ (Mund). ‘Ayam Atmé 
brabma.’ ‘Akarh brabms asmi., ‘ 


area 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 407 


object, this pure consciousness is also infinite. The 
: Real Self ‘is called Atman. As 
It isthe same as the = | . . 
reality underlying alt infinite, conecious reality (satyam, 
things. jfiinam, anantam) the self of man 
is identical with the Self of all beings (sarva-bhiitatma) 
and therefore, with God or Brahman. In the Katha 
we are told: ‘‘This Self is concealed in all things, and 
does not, therefore, appear to be there. But it is 
perceived by the keen-sighted with the help of a sharp, 
penetrating intellect’’ (3,12). : 


All attempt is made to help man discover this his 
Real Self. Realization of the Self 
“ctadl creplatge: the (Gtma-vidyé or atma-jfiana)” is | 
regarded as the highest of ail know- 
ledge (para-vidyd), all othér knowledge and learning 
being inferior to it (apara-vidya). The method of self- 
realization lies through the control of the.lower self, 
its deep-rooted interests and impulses, and through 
study, ,reasoning* and repeated meditation (éravana, 
manana, nididhydsana), till the forces of past habits 
and thoughts are completely overcome by a firm belief 
in the truths learnt. It iss difficult path which can 
be followed only if one is strong and wise enouglt to 
reject what is pleasant (preyas) for what is good 
(éreyas). 


The Vedic belief in sacrifices is shaken by the 
Rituals are inade. Upanisads which declare that with 
guste. these one cannot achieve the 
highest goal of immortality. The Mundaka says that 
these sacrifices are like weak rafts (i.e. they are unable 
to take one aeross the sea of worldly qisery) ‘and those 
fools that take these as the superior means, suffer 


408 AN INTRODUCTION TQ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


again the pangs.of old age and death.' A ritual can at 
, best secure & temporary place in Heaven, and when the 
merit (punya) earned by it is exhausted there “is again 
birth into this world. A deeper significance is attached 
to sacrifice, when the worshipping self and the gods 
worshipped are realized to be the same. The tere- 
monies of offering oblations to gods thus come to be 
looked upon as mere external affairs fit for the ignorant 
who do. not understand the mystery of the universe. 
Sacrifice to the Self or Brahman is 
Knowledge of the i MCGEE SEV: meee * 
Self or God is the regarded as superior to sacrifice to 
highest geod @'"* gods. It is only through the resliza- 
: tion of the Self or Brahman that 
rebirth can be stopped and along with it all misery. 
One who truly realizes his’ unity with the Immortal 
Brahman, realizes ifamortality. 
The Upanisads conceive Brahman not only as the 
* pure ground of all reality and con- 
Rrahman is the ulti- sciousness, but al.o as the ultimate 
mate source of all joy. 
source of all joy. Worldly pleasures 
aye only the distorted fragments of that joy, just as 
worldly objects are limited manifestations of that 
Reslity.2_ One who can dive into the deepest recess 
of his Self, not only realizes his identity with Brabman 
but gets to the heart of Infinite Joy. The proof that 
the Self is the source of all joy (says YAajiiavalkya to 
his wife Maitreyi) is that it is the dearest thing to man. 
One loves another person or thing because he identifies 
himself with that person or thing, regards him or it as 


1 Mundaka, 1. 2.7. 
3 Brhadaranyoke, 4, 3. 32. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 409 


his dwn Self. Nothing is dear for its own sake, says 
Yajtiavalkya. The wife is not dear because she is wife, 
the hasband is not dear because of being a husband, 
the son is not dear because of being 
of abe fell area son, wealth is not dear for its 
5 own sake. All is dear because of 
the Self.’ That the Self in itself is bliss_is shown 
also by pointing out that when a man falls into dream- 
less sleep, forgets his relation with the body, the 
senses, Mind and external objects and thus retires into 
his owa intrinsic state, he ix at peace, he is_untouched_ 
by pleasure and pain. ‘ 
“Modern Biology tells us that self-preservation is a 
basic instinct in all living beings. But why is seff or 
esis golive detdae jife so dear a The answer is given 
to the joy that iies in by thee Upanisads. Life is so dear 
igs because life fs joy. Who would 
like to live if life was not joy ?* The joy that we 
have in daily life, however disturbed and meagre 
it might be, sustains our desire to live. Greater 
joy is not obtained by ranning further away from 
the Self, after worldly objects. Desires for objects are 
the fetters that bind us to the world, to the painful 
* vicious circle—birth, death and rebirth. The forces 
of desires take us away from the Self and condition 
our existence in the way we hanker after. ‘The more 
we give up our hankerings for objects and try to 
realize our identity with the true Self (Atman) or God 
(Brahman), the more do we realize true bappiness, 
To feel at one with’ the Self_is to be one with 





1 Tbsd., 4. 6. 6. 
2 Tait., 2.07. 
53-1605B 


410 AN -INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the Infinite God, the Immortal, the Infinite Joy. 
a Nothing then remains unattained, 
grentcat jantion is the nothing left to be desired. The 
; Katha declares, therefore, that a 
mortel attuins immortality and unity with Brahman 
even here, in this very life, when his heart is free from 
all desires." aan ' 
If Brahman or Atman is the Reality underlying 
ee re the whole universe then the ques- 
out of Brahmen or tion may arise as to the exact 
pas: relation between Brahman and the 
world. The accounts of creation given in the different 
Upanisads do not exactly tally. But all appear to be 
unanimous in holding that Atman (or Brahman or Sat) 
is both the creator and the material cause of the world. 
And in most of these accounts the starting-point of 
creation is described somewhat like this: At firet there 
was the soul. It thought, ‘I am one, [ will be many,’ 
‘I will creato the worlds.’ Description of the 
subsequent steps by which things are ucreated varies, 
some stating that out of Atman first arises the subtlest 
element ‘Akaéa.’ theace gradually all the grosser ones ; 
others give different accounts. 





From these stetements creation would appear to ba 

real and God (i.e. The Absolute 

jena of mul Soul) a real creator. But in man4 
places we are told that there is no * 

multiplicity here (‘neha nani asti kificana’),” that 
one who sees the many here is doomed to death 


1 Ratha, 9, 6. 14. 
3 Kathn,2. 4.1): Brhad., 4.4 19. 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY _ 411 


(‘ mytyoh sa mytyum dpnoti ya iba naneva padyati’).’ 
In explanation of the unity of all things, which 
appear to be many, examples like these are cited : 
Just a3 different articles made of gold are all really 
one, gold is the only real* substance in them and _ 
the different names and forms (nama-riipa) which 
make then n_appear as many, are merely matters of 
" verbal | distinctions, similarly io all objects there is. 
the same » Reality, and their differences are merely 
verbal.” The objects of the world a.c denied separate, 
individual existences. Brahman (or Atman) is also° 
described in many passages not as Creator, but asa — 
Reality which is indescribable, being not only unspeak- 
able, but even unthinkable. Brahman cannot be an 
object of worship even. Thus the Kena declares: 
“That (Brabman) is other than what is known and 
beyond the unknown. What is not expressed by speech 
and by which speech itself is expregsed, kuow that to 
be Brahman, and not what one worships as Brahman.’”* 
These two different kinds of statements about the 
world and God naturally present a 
yg ration then puzzle. Is God really the creator 
of the world and the world , also 
therefore real ? Or, is there really no creation arid is 
the world of objects a mere appearance ? Is God a 
determinate knowable reality which can be described 
by suitable attributes or is God indeterminate and 
unknowable ? What is the real view of the 
Upanigads ? Subsequent Vedanta treatises take up 


1 Ibid, 1 Chand., 6.1. 3 Keng, 149-4, 


‘412 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


these problems for solution. As already stated, the 
Brahma-sitra of Badarayana attempts to systematize 
and ascertain the real views of the revealed texts. But 
its brief statements themselves admit of different 
meanings. Subsequent writers who 
The different views commented on the Brahma-siitra 
leading to different ; 
schools of Vedinte. give their own interpretations to the 
Upanisads and the siitras very 
clearly and elaborately. Of the different rival schools 
that came into existence in this way, that of Sankara- 
rirya is the most popular. In fact what ordinarily 
passes now-a-days as the Vedanta, and sometimes even 
as Indian philosophy to outsiders, is really the Advaita 
Vedanta of the Sankara school. Next comes, in point 
of popularity, the Viéistadvaita school of Ramanuja- 
cirya. These two are the’ main and more widely 
known schools of the’ Vedanta. 


3. .The Unanimous Views of the main schools of the 
Vedanta 0 


_ Following Badarayana, both Sankara and Rimanuja 
reject theories which explain the 
ete Blisoe tikipr world a) either as the product of 
the world. materia] elements which by them- 
selves combine together to form 

objects, (2) or as the traneformation of an unconscious 
nature that spontaneously evolves all objects, (3) or as 
the product of two kinds of independent reality, such 
as matter and God, one of which is the material, the 
other the efficient cause which creates the world out 
of the first. Both agree that an unconscious cause 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 413 


cannot produce the world, and both bold that even the 
dualistic conception of two ultimately independent 
realities, orfe conscious and another 
unconscious, producing the world 
a by interaction, is unsatisfactory : 
Both take their stand on the Upanisadic view that ‘All 
is Brahmgn’ (sarvam kha!u idam Brahma), and matte matter 
and mind a are not independent realities but grounded ir in 
the same Brahman. Both are, therefore, wonsits or 
believers in one Absolute, Independent Reality which 
pervades the world of multiple objects and selves. 
Badarayana, whom both Sankara and Ramanuja 
follow, discusses at length the unsa- 
Both follow Bada- tisfactory nature of other alternative 
rayape and reject other theories of the world. Refutation 
of othe? views is based both on in- 
dependent reasoning and the testimony of earlier 
scriptures. We may briefly sum up here the indepen- 
dent arguments dy which the chief theories are 
refuted,’ , 
The Sankbya theory that unconscious primal matter 
(prakrti), composed of the three gunas (sattva, rajas 
and tamas), gives rise to the world 


® 
Refatation of tbe without the guidance of any oon- 
Satkhye view of crea- 


Satkara and Rimi. 
yor are both monists 


tion. scious agent, is not satisfactory, 
because the world is a harmonious 
system of nicely adjusted objects which cannot be 


believed-to be the accidental product of any unconscious 
cause. As the Sankhya itself admits, thie world consist- 


1 Vide Bec. 2, Chap. 11 of the Brahma-sit., end the Bhagyas of 
Aatkara and Rirapanje thereon. 


414 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
‘ 
ing of bodies, senses, motor organs and other objecte is 
made just to fit the diverse souls born into it in accor- 
dance with their past deeds. But how can an uncon- 
scious nature carry out such a complicated plan ? In 
i ce, Fe admittinz that there is a purpose in 
an ordered world is the world, but denying at the same 
set seh Pali time the existence of a conscious 
creator, the Sankhya commits itself 
to an absurd position. Unconscious teleology. is_unin- 
ctelligible. Adaptation of means to ends is not possible 
ithout conscious guidance. The spontaneous flow of 
milk from the cow for the sake of a calf is cited by the 
Sakkhya ae an example of unconscious but purposive 
act.. But it is forgotten that the cow is a living, 
conscious being and milk fipws impelled by her love for 
the calf. No undisputed example of an unconscious 
object performing a complicated purposeful act can be 
cited. The souls (purugas) that the Sinkhya admits 
are said to be inactive and, therefore, they also cannot 
help the evolution of the world. 
-, The Vaiéegika theory that the world is caused by 
* the combination of atoms is similarly untenable because 
these unconscious atoms me 
1D ettaion of produce this wonderfully adjusted 
world. For the regulation of the 
atoms in the formation of the world, the moral Jaw of 
adreta is, of course, admitted by the Vaiéegika. But 
this law ie also unconscious and the difficulty is not 
removed. Besides, how atoms at first begin to move 
in order to create the world is not explicable. If move- 
ment were the inherent nature of the atoms, they would 


' THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 415 


2 
never cease to move and the dissolution (pralaya) of 
objects, as the Vaiéesika admits, 
Unconscious stoms 
connot produce this would never occur. Souls are ‘of 
oot course admitted, but they are not 
admitted to !ave any intrivsic consciousness. Con- 
sciousness arises after the souls are associated with 
bodies and,the ergans of knowledge ; and these do not 
exist before creation. Hence atoms cannot receive any 
conscious guidance even from souls. 
Against those Bauddha thinkers who explain the 
objects of the world as aggregates - 
Refutation of the of different momentary elements, it 
Bauddha view. ‘ 
1s pointed out that momentary 
. . (an peecmase | 
things cannot possess any causality. Because to produce 
————— ‘ 3 
ap effect the cause must first arise and then act and, 
therefore, stay for more than one moment, which is 
against the doctrine of momentariness. Even if the 
separate momentary elements be somehowsproduced, 
no aggregate can be caused, far no substances are ad- 
mitted (py these Buuddhae) which can bring together 
the elements and produce the desired objects. As con- 


sciousness itself is admitted to be the effect of the 


aggregation of the different elements, it cannot exist 
before aggregation, and the difficulty of unconscidus 
cause, seen before, arises here also. 


Against those Bauddhas who bold the view of 
moe. subjective idealism (vijfidnavada) 
wtnddhe yo ceeliem and declare that the world, like a 
ternel world, is unten dream, is only an illusory product 
of the imagination, the following 


ito srtunt objections are pressed by Sankara. (a) The 


. exibtence of, external objects cannot be, denied because 


416 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


they are perceived to exist by all persons. To deny the 
existence of a pot, cloth or pillar while it is being per- 
ceived, is like denying te flavour of the food while it 
7 is being eaten: it is a falsification of immediate experi- 
ence by sheer force. (b) If immediate experience is dis- 
w believed, then even the reality of mental states cannot 
be believed in. (¢) To say that ideas of the’mind 
ulusorily appear as external objects is meaningless un- 
less at least something external is admitted to be real. 
Otherwise, it would be as good as to say that a certain 
* nan looks [tke the child of a barren woman. (d) Unless 
different perceived objects like pot and cloth are 
admitted, the idea of a pot cannot be distinguished 
from that of a cloth, since, as consciousness, they are 
identical. (e) There is a vital difference between dream- 
objects and perceived objeGts: the former are contra- 
dicted by waking eXperience, while the latter are not. 
“External objects perceived during waking experience 
” cannot be said to be unreal so long 
Baudba nihilism is 

therefore, untenable a8 they are not felt to be contra- 
ie dicted. So subjective idealism, and 
’ elong with it also nibilsm (sinyavada), fail to explain 

the world satisfactorily. 
‘ Even a deistic theory (beld by the Saivas, Pasupatas, 
fetes, ante G Kapilikas and Kalamukhas)' which 
creation are not teo- holds that God is the efficient cause 
— Snd matter is the material cause of 
the world is not accepted. The chief objection raised 
is that as such a view is based not on the Vedas, but 


1 Bor ebie fourfold olsssification of zon-Vedig — schools ne f 
R&m&ona’s Bhagye or 2.2.85 which quotes Scisdgamd. 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY 417 


on independent reasoning and ordinary human ex- 
perience, it should tally with what we observe in life: 
but it does not do so. So far as our experience goes, 
® spirit can act upon matter only through a body, 
consisting of organs of perception and movement. 
Again Bis activity is caused by some motive, such as 
attainment of pleasure and removal of pain, But God 
is said to be devoid of body as well as passions and 
desires. In the light of empirical experience we fail, 
therefore, to understand the manner as well as the 
motive of God's creation of the world. Ps 
We have seen that God is conceived even as early 
; as the Vedas in two aspects: God 
Theunsnimous 
Vedénta concepticn of pervades the world, but He is Tot. 
ae exhdusted in the world, He is aleo™ 
beyond it. God is bob Tmmanent wad Gruscen dent jent, 
'These two aspects “of God petsist throughout the 
Upanigads ‘ and the later Vedintu, though the meanings 
of transcendence and immanence’are not the same in 
all thiokers. It is usual to call the theory of the 
presence of God in all things ‘ pantbeism,’ and 
Vedinta is commonly describep by this name, 
Pantheism etymologically means ali-God-theory. Bat 
if all is God, the question remains open whether? God 
pJs the mere tolality of all cbjects of the world, or the 
totality of things and something more. When such 
distinction is made, the word ‘ pantheism ’ is generally 
“confined tu {ne first view, whereas ‘ panentheism ’° (a 
word coined by a German philosopher, Krause) is used 
for the second. To avoid the ambiguisy of the word 


; 
1 Of. ** Dwe viva brahmagordpe ets.”’, Brhadérapyake, 2.8.1. 
~"$8—1608B 


418 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


‘ pantheism,’ and to remind ourselves of the fact that 


{God in Vedanta is not simply immanent, but also 


be ‘transcendent, we should chll the Vedanta theory of God 


V*jainentheism, rather than psntheismn. 


It is necessary to mention here that in the Ufanisads, 
: and later Vedanta literature, the 
aun lanes . end word, Brahman, is used, for ‘the 
‘ad. Highest Principle or Absolute Reality, 
as well as for the creator of the world, 
the object of worship. The word, Iévara, is also sometimes 
used in later literature to denote the second aspect, In 
English ‘ Absolute’ is sometimes used for the first, and 
‘God’ forthe second. But ‘God’ 1s also used in a wider 
sense for both the aspects (e.g. in Spinoza, Hegel, 
Whitehead). In his Evolution of Theology in the Greek 
Philosophers (p. 82, Vol. I) Edward Caird even defines 
“* the’ idea of God as an absolute power or principle.’ We 
bave used the word, God, here, along with Brahman, in 
the wider sense (for both God of religion and Absolute of 
Philosophy) and the context in each case will show the 
precise meaning. ‘The‘use of two naines is apt to suggest 
two corresponding realities and obscure the truth of one 
reality having two aspects. 


Another point of agreement among Yedantins is that 
all of them beiieve thut the knowledge 

Belief in God starts of the existence of God is, at the first 
from an acceptance of instance, obtuined not by reasoning 
scriptural testimony. hut, from the testimony of the revealed 
soriptures. It is admitted, of course, 

that on the perfection of religious life the presence of God 
can bg realized by the devout souls. But to start with, we 
have to depend on indirect knowledge of God through 
the undoubted testimony of the scriptures. Scarcely 
any attempt is made, therefore, in the Vedanta, as 
in the Nyaéya and other theistic systems, to adduce 
purely logical proofs for the existence of God. Argu- 
ments are confined generally to 

No independent argr- Showing the inadequacy of all theories 
ment cen prove God. of God, not based on scriptures, and 
to the justification of the scriptural 

views. Thig attitude of the Vedanta appears to be 


: dogmatic and is sometimes made the object of criticism. 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY 419 


? 

It should be noted, however, that even many Western 
; philosophers (like Kant, Lotze and 
oo others) haye ever and anon rejected 
this, such proofs as inadequate. Lotze 
makes it clear that unless we start 
with some faith in God, the rational proofs are of little 
avail. 4s he puts it: ‘‘TBerefore, all proofs that God 
exists are pleas put forward in justification of our faith.’’ 
This faith acyording to him springs from ‘‘ the obscure 
impulse which drives us to pasa in our thought—as we 
cannot help passing—from the world given in sense to a 
world not given in sense, but alove and behind sense.’’! 
‘According to the Vedanta also an initia! faith is necessary 
for religious life and thought. This faith, though starting 
; from q personal feeling of inadequacy 
eacaitt foith ulready and disquiet and a longing for some- 
present. thing higher, remains u mere blind 
groping in the dark till it is enlightened 
by the teachings of the scriptures that show the way to the 
realization of God. Reasoning is necessury for the under- 
standing of the teachings, for removing doubts, and realizing 
their cogency. By itself reasoning is un emply form or 
method of thinking whichcan work énly when materiale are 
supplied. The scriptures supply to reason the matter for 
speculation, argumentation and medijation. ‘This kind of 
dependence of reason on matter supplied from 1 non-rational 
source is nothing peculiar to theology. Even the greatest 
discoveries in science can be traced back to some 
non-rational origm like intuitive flashes of truth in 
imagination which reasoning afterwards attempts to justify, 
by further observation, experiment, proof and elaboration. 
'* Dialectic,”” says Bergson,’ ‘' is necessary to put intuition 
to the proof.”” Though all Vedantins primarily depend on 
the scriptures for belief in God, they make full use of 
reasoning in the justification and elaboration of that belief. 
They Jearn from the Upanigads that God is the Infinite, 
Conscious, All-inclusive Reality, the Creator of the universe 
as well as ite Preserver and Destroyer. Each one tries in 
his owl way to dovelop what he thinks to be the most 

consistent theory of God. 


1 Lotse Onglines of @ Philosophy of Religion, pp. 8-10. 
1 Creatioe Boolution, p. 351. Eng. Tr. by*A. Mitchell. 


420 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


The sitras of Bidarayana have for their subject- 
matter God and are, therefore, 
named Brahma-sitra. But they 
are written for man, the embodied 
soul, and, therefore, called also Sdriraka-siitra,. Man, 
therefore, occupies a central place in the Vedanta. , It 
is for his enlightenment and his salvation that the 
Vedinta undertakes philosophical discussion. But what 
is the real nature of man ? The Upanigads teach us 
that man has no existence inlependent of God Both 
fankeara and Rimanuja accept this view. But they 
‘ interpret the self’s dependence on God in different waya. 


Man’s position is 
ceniral in Vedanta. 


II. Tae Monism oF SANKaRA (ADVAITA) 
1, Savtkara’s Conception of the World 
a 


Sankara finds it difficult to reconcile the Upani- 
padic statements about creation, 
Ssikara’s problem: 4, . : ; ; 
how to reconcile the taken in the litercl sense, | with 
Upanigadic accounts of those denying the world of multi- 


denial of plurality Me plicity. Considered in the light of 

: the general trend and apirit ruoning 
throughout the Upanisads, the stories of creation 
seem, to him, to be out of joint. Description of 
Brahman as really devoid of al! assignable marks 
becomes unintelligible if His creatorship is real. ‘The 
teachings about the disappsarance of all inultiplicity on 
the realization of Brahman cinn >t also be understood. 
If the world were real, how could it disappear ? The 
dawn of the knowledge of Reality can dispel only thie 
unreal appearing as real, not what is really 1 real, ‘This 


idea furnishes Sadkera with the clue to the mystery of 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 421 


the world. If the world me mere appearance, like an 
a, Object in dream or illusion, then the 
Reconciliation lies in ° 
understanding creation present appearance of the world and 
pr eriagie nner: its disappearance on the knowledge 
of Realitg become intelligible. This reconciliation 
is suggested by the Upanigads themselves. Fven in 
the Rg-veda’ the one Indra (God) is said to appear in 
many forms through powers of creating illusion (maya). 
The Brhaddranyaka also accepts this.? The Svetaé- 
vatara clearly states that the origin (prakrti) of the, 
world lies in the magical power ‘miayi) of God.” 
Miya as @ power of God is indistinguishable from 
Sisk ctic- aaa Him, just as the burning power of 
power of creation is fire is from the fire itself. It is by 
Co eeheetn this that” God; the Great Magician,, 
Conjures” up_ the w world-show with 
all its wonderful _ objects. “The ‘appearance of thi ‘eof thie 
world is taken as real by the ignorant, but the wise 
who can_see ough it finds nothing but God God, the on one 
Reality* behind this, illusory sh show. 
j ’ ordinary illusions in life take place, 
Creation understo>4 
in the light of an ordi. we find that an Illusion, say, of 
= shame snake in~a~rope, is due fo ‘our 
ignorance of what really is there behind the | appearance, 


i.é, ignorance of the substratum or - ground (ad hi istbana), 


in thie case, the rope. If we could know the rope as 


1 Rk., 6.47.18, 
* Andro m&yaébhih puru- ie tyate.' Vide Brhad., %, 5.19 and Saikers 
thereon. 
3 'Miyim to prakrtim vidyat, miyinam to oer Vide 
Soet., 4.10, ard Gatikars thereon. 


422 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the rope, there would be no illusion about it. But mere 
ignorance of the rope cannot give rise to the illusion. 
For, otherwise, even a person who has never known 
what a rope is Would always see serpents in things. 
‘The ignorance creating aa illusion 
Ignorance with its . 
double funetion of con- does not simply conceal from our 
cealment and distor. iow the real nature of the greund, 
the rope, but positively distorts it, 
i.e. makes it appsar as something else. Concealment 
(avarans) of reality and distortion (viksepa) of it into 
* something else in our mind are then the two functions 
of an illusion-producing ignorance (avidya or ajfidna). 
When an illusion is produced in us by some one 
else, for example, when a magician 
The magician’s show . 
deceives only the igno- Makes One coin appear as many to 
rent, but nothimeelf. 4, it ‘ig an illusion for us, the 
perceivers, and not for the conjurer. From our stand- 
point, then, illasion i is the prodact of our ignorance, 
which prevents us ‘from seeing the real nature of the 
thing and which makes us see something else. in its 
place. If any spectator can persist to see the one coin 
_asit is, the magician’s wand will create no illusion 
for ‘him. For the magician, the illusion is only a 
conjunng will, by which his spectators are deceived, 
and not himself. . 
Pr the ‘light of such cases, maya, the cause of the 
wi, world-appesrance, may also be under- 
he conception of 
mays as a megio power. stood stom _$wo stendpoiate. For 
woldshow. — _~=God, maya ia only the will to create 
the appearance. It does not affect 
God, does not deceive Him.' For ignorant people like 


€ 


. 


¢ 
1 Brakma-satra, 2.1.9, Sabke ra thereon. * 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 423 


us, who are deceived by it ahd see the many objects 
here instead of one Brahman or God, maya is an 
illusion-prodycing ignorance. If this aspect may& is 
also called, therefore, ‘ajfidna’ or ‘avidyaé’ (synonyms 
for ‘ignorance’) and is conceived as having the double 
function of c concealing the real “nature of Brahman, the 
ground of the world, and making Him appear as 
something else, namely, the world. In so far as maya 
positively produces some illusory appearance it is 
called positive ignorance (bhava-ripam ajfianam) ; and 
in so far as no beginning Can be assigned to the world, 
maya is also said to be beginuingless (anadi). But, 
for those wise few who are not deceived by the world- 
show, but who perceive in it nothing but God, there “is 
no illusion nor, therefore, illusion producing maya. God 
to them is not, therefore, the*wielder of maya at all. 


Ramanuja, following the Svetaévatara, speaks also of 
maya, but he means thereby either 

; Fives a lca God's wonderful crea- 
- *tion_or_ the e/ernal, unconscious, 
prima] _ matter which is in_Brabman and which is really 
transformed into the world. Sankara also speaks, of! 
maya as the power of God, but this creative powty, 
according to bim, is not & permanent character of Gol, 
us Ramanuja thinks, but only a free will which can, 
therefore, be given up at will, The wise who are not 
deceived by the world-appearance need not conceive 
God at all as the bearer of this illusion-producing power. 
Besides, even when conceived a8 a power, maya is not 
a distinct entity in Brahman, but ivs€parable and 
indistinguiahable from it as the burning power is from 
_ fire, or will is from the mind thet wills. Even when 


424 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


Sankara identifies maya with prakrti, he means nothing 
more by it than that this creative power is the source or 
origin (prakrti) of world-appearance, to those who 
perceive this appearance. The difference between! 
Ramanuja and Sankara, then, is that while, according 
to Ramanuja, the matter which exists in God (and, 
therefore, also God') really undergoes modification, 
Saikara holds that God does not undergo any real 
change ; change is only apparent, not real. 

TNusory modification of any substance, as of 
the rope into the snake, is called 
vivarta; and real modification, as 
; of milk into curd, 1s called 
pavindma, Sankara’s theory of creation, as described 
above, 1s, therefore, known as vivarta-odda and is 
distinguished from the Sdakbya theory of evolution 
(by the real modification of prakrti) which is called 
parindma-vdda. Ramanuja’s theory also is a kind of 
parindma-vada, be cause he admits that the uacooscious 

Beieeiiecies element in God really changes 
Vivarta-vida are the into the world. Vivarta-vada and 
oo of Batkérye- arindma-vada both agree, however, 

in holding that the effect is already 

cqntained somehow in its material cause and, therefore, 
both come under satkarya-vada, or the theory that the 
effect (karya)is existent (sat) in the material cause, and 
isnota new thing. The process of the imaginary 
attribution of something to where it does not exist is 
called adhydsa. In modern psychological terminology 

“ 
1 R&manuja himself tries, of course, to avoid this deduction" partly 


by saying thet the easence (svariipa) of God does not change. How far 
this is consistent we shall consider hereafter. « 


Ssikara does not 
believe in real change, 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 425 


& process of this kind is cafled projection. In all illu- 
sion there is such projectiun (adbyisa), the serpent is 
projected (adbyasta) by imagination on the rope, and 
the world on Brahman. 
The WU Panigadic accounts of creation, then, are to 
; be understood in the sense of the 
aia evolution of the world oat of 
Brahman through its power of 
maya. This maya, Sankara admits, is described in 
some scriptures also as avyakta or even prakrti having 
the three elements ofsattva, rajas and tamas. But this 
should not be mistaken to be the Prakrti of Saikhya, - 
an independent reality." It is s power of God, and 
absolutely dependent on God. . 
Vedaata works, like the Upanigads, are not always 
mise wlitac oh eas unanimous regarding the exact 
material elements out process by which, and the order in 
eee which, the world’s objects arise 
out of Brahman through maya. According to a well- 
known accounts at first there arise out of Atman or 
Brahman the five subtle elements, in the order—akada 
(ether), vayu (air), agni (fire), ap (water), kgiti earth). 
These five are again mixed up together in five different 
ways to give rise to the five gross elements of ; those 
pames. Gross &kisa is produced , 
aca the gioce clment® by the combination of the five. 
subtle elements in the proportion, 
4 akjge + % air + 3 fire + 3 water + 4% earth. 
Similarly each of the other four gross elements is pro- 
duced by the combination of the ssbtle elements, in 


1 VideSetkara on Brahma-sdt., 1.4. 3 and on Svetasoatara, ¢. 5 
acd 4.11, ° 


54—1408R 


426 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the proportion of half of that‘ element and one-eighth 
of each of the other four. This process is known as. 
combination of the fives (pafictkarana). The subtle 
body of man is made of the subtle elements, and the 
gross body, as well as all gross objects of nature, is 
produced out of the gross elements which arise by the 
mixture of the five subtle ones. Sankara accepts this 
account of creation ; but he understands the entire 
process in the light of his theory of vivarta (or 
adhyasa). 
' In addition tothe advantages of consistent inter- 
: _ pretation of scriptures, the theory 
The merits of San- : ‘ : 
kata’s view of crea- Of vivarta, Sankara points out, 
meee gives also a more rational explana- 
tion of creation. If God is the creator of the world 
and creates the world out of &ny other substance like 
matter, then in addition to God, another reality is to 
be admitted gnd God ceases to be the all-inclusive, only 
reality ; His infinity“ is lost. But if that matter be 
conceived as something real and within® God, and@ the 
world be conceived as a reai transformation of it, 
we have to face a dilemma.’ Either matter is a part 
of God, or identical with the whole of God. If the 
first alternative is accepted (as Ramanuja does), then 
we are landed into the absurdity that God, a spiritual 
‘substance, is composed of parts like material sub- 
stances, and is consequently also liable to destruction, 
like such objects. If the second alternative (namely 
that primal matter is the whole of God) be accepted 
then, by the traBsformation of matter,God is wholly 
reduced to the world and there is no God left after 


U Beshma-siit., 2, 1, 26-28, 


— 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY - 427 


creation. Whetber God ¢hanges partly or wholly, if 
change be real, then God is not a permanent, un- 
changing reality. He then eeases to be God. These 
difficulties are avoided by vivarta-vida according to 
which change is apparent. 


These difficulties are felt also by Ramanuja. But he 
ecu thinks that the mystery of creation 
Authority andresson. is beyond human intellect and we are 
to accept the account of creation given 
in the scriptures. As for difficulties, once we admit that 
God is cmnipotent, omniscient and bas wonderful powers, 
nothing should be thought impossible for him.’ Though 
Sankara also believes that without the help of the revealea 
scriptures the mystery cannot be solved simply by the 
unsided human reasoning (kevalena tarkena),? be points 
out that the scriptures themselves have told us how the 
many Can illusorily appear out of the one. Following the 
light shed by the scriptures we can employ our reasoning 
and understand, even in ,the likeness of our ordinary 
experiences of iilusion, the mystery of creation so far as 
it 18 humanly possible. 


(1) The Rational Foundation of, Sankar&’s Theory 
of the World 


lf we put together the arguments used by Sankara #0 
support the theory of apparent change (vivarta), and jhe 
cognate concepts of nescience (maya and avidya) and 
of projection or superimposition by imagination (adhyisa), 
we find that they constitute a strong rational fountatign 
of the Advaita theory. Those who do not believe in any 
revealed soripture or mm any mystic intuition, but try to . 
understand the real nature of the world in the light of 
common experience and reasoning based thereon, will also 
value these arguments if only for their great logical and 
philosophical merit. The followers of Sankara have 
multiplied such arguments in independent treatises in 


1 Vide Srighagya on 3. 1. 26-28 and 1. 1. 3. 
2 Vide Sankare on Brohma-sit., 2. 1, 27.¢ 


498 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


‘some cf which (e.g.. Tattvapradipika or Citsukhi, 
Advaita-Siddhi, Khandana-khanda-khddya) logical skill 
and dialectical subtlety attain heights scarcely reached by 
the most profound treatisés of this kind in the West. 
While the Vedinta was based on intuitive experience, 
embodied in the revealed texts, it did not ignore the fact 
that so long as the reasoning, faculty of man is pot fully 
satisfied and things are not explained by reasoning in the 
light of common experience, there is no possibility of his 
accepting the intuitions of others however-highe To give 
the beginner an idea of this aspect of Advaita philosophy 
we shall briefly mention below how Sankara tries to reach 
his theory of the world by subjecting common experience 
to rational criticism and logical construction :— 


‘ (a) If the relation between any effect and its material 


cause is carefully examined it is found 
_The arguments show- that the effect is nothing more than 
bch Past biel re the cause. Perception cannot show 
cause. in a pot made of clay anything other 
than clay, nor ina ring made of gold 
anything uther than gold. An effect is, again, inseparable 
from its material cause ; the effect cannot exist without it. 
We cannot separate the pot from the clay, nor the ring 
from the gold. It is not reasonable, therefore, to 
think that the effect,is a_new thing which is now produced, 
but'was absent before. In substance it was always there 
in its material cause. In fact we cannot even think 
of a non-existent entity coming intu existence. We can 
only think cfe substance changing from one form into 
another, If something non-existent could ever be brought 
into existence, there would be no reason why we could not. 
' presg oi] out of sand (where it is non-existent), and why we 
have to select only a particular material, namely oilseed, 
to produce the particular effect, oil. The activity of an 
efficient cause, the oilman, the potter or the goldsmith, 
cannot produce any new substance; it only manifests the 
form of the substance concealed by its previous state. The 
effect must thus be admitted to be non-different (ananya) 
from the cause, and to be existing in it from befor&.' 


1 Vide Batkara on, Br. eft, 2.1914-20; Chdnd..2; Tait,, 2.6; 
Brhod., 1.2.1; Gitd, 2.16" ‘ 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 429 


On these grounds Sankara admits the theory of 
Satkarya-vida which, we have seen, 
Saikbye theory of ig alsy accepted by the Sankhya. 
peripdina, realchange, But he finds that the Saikhya does 
is not wholly consiet- : pas bes 
ent with its grounds. not realize the full implication ot 
Batkarya-vada. For, it hoids that 
though the effect exists previously in its material cause, ‘ 
there is a real change (parinima) of the materia! into the 
effect, since the material assumes a new form. Now this view \ 
amounts fo th® confession thut this form which did not ! 
exist previously comes into existence. The,doctrine of 
satkarya-vada, that nothing which did not exist previously 
can come into existence, thus breaks down. If the yrounds 
on which that doctrine stands, are sornd, then we must 
be prepared toaccept all that logically follows from it,e 
and cannot hold any view’ which implies any violation 
of this doctrine, rationally established. 


But bow can we, it may ‘be asked, deny the perceived 
‘vnasteeteake feet that the effect does have o ‘new 
‘Mange of vor Cues form ? Sankara does not deny the 

sd eens perceptipn, vut only questions the 

interpretation, the logical significance, 
of it. Is the Sinkhya right in holding that change in form 
means a change in reality ? It wouid be right, only if a 
form had a reality of its own. But gioser ctnsideration 
shows that the form is but a state of the material or 
substance, und cunnot be separated from the latter even 
m thovght. Whatever status in reality o form may 
possess is in virtue of its substance. We have no reason. 
therefore, to interpret the perception of a change in fo 
as a change of reality, On the contrary, it is found that 
inspite of changes in form a substance is recognizad by 
us as the identical entity. Devadatta, sitting, standing or 
lying is recognized as the identica! person. How could 
thie be, if change in form implied change in reality ?* 

Moreover, if the form or, for the matter of that, any 

; quality were granted any distinct 
mee oF feces reality, we would fail to explain the 
tone relation between the quality and its 

substance. For, two distinct realities 
capnot be conceived to be related wit#6ut the help of a 
third entity to connect them. Now, as soon as we think of 


Sedkora, op Br, s&t., 2.3.18. 


430 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


this third entity (which must*be distinct from the two terms 

_it attempts to relute) we have to think of a fourth relating 
entity, and also a fifth, which would reiate the third with 
each of the first two terms respectively. Similarly, these 
fourth and fifth entities would require other similar media 
for relating them to the terms they themselves want to 
relate, and soon. There yould then be an infigite regress 
(anavastha). We can thus never come to the end of our 
supposition and there will never be a complete explanation 
of the relation between the quality an] its substance. 
In other words, the supposition of any distinction in 
reality between any quality and its substance would 
be logically indefensible. So a form cannot be treated 
as a distinct reality, «nd no change in form ean be 
logically accepted as a rev! change, unless there is change 
in substance, 


But we have seen that no causation involves any 
ae change in substunce. Hence causa- 
change a Haier tion does not imply any real change. 
sosiFibes: " Moreover, as every change is a process 
of causition, there cannot be «any 
change in reality. ‘This amounts to the position that 
though we perceive changes, we cannot rationally accept 
them as real. We have therefore to understand them 
in: the same waf as we do, when we perceive an 
illusory object. We do perceive a rainbow, a blue sky, 
movement of the sun and many other things wnich we 
cannot believe as real because reasoning proves them to be 
unreal. Such a perceived but unreal phenomenon is called 
dao appearance and distinguished from reality. On the 
same ground we must call chunge also an appearance, and 
distinguish it from reality. We can thus reach, on purely 
logical grounds supported py common observation, the 
theory of vivarta or apparent change, as a rational doctrine 
required for the explanation of the world. The acceptance 
of this theory also leads us to think that our perception of 
change is nothing more than a supposition or mental 
projection of change on reality. This is but Satkara's 
conception of adhyésa. Again, a wrong supposition of 
thie kind ae ee we are deluded by a sort of 
ignorance, which makes us perceive things where they« do 
oot really exist.‘ This’ is but Sankara’s conception of: 
ajfiana, avidyé or.maya, which he regards og the cause of 
the appearance of the world. , 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 431 


(6) But it may be asked? supposing that the world, 
with its changing objects ww an 
Existence alone com: appearance, whatis the substance or 
mon to ail objects. reality which *appears to us in various 
forms as objects ? Ordinarily we call 
anything which is the bearer of some qualities a substance. 
A potora ing is a substance in that sense. Lut we have 
seen that the qualities of a pot have no reality apart from 
the pot, and also that the pot itself has no reality apart 
from its case, ¢he clay, which is the real substance of 
which the pot isonly one formof manifestation. But as 
clay itself is liable to modification and may cease to be 
clay, even it cannot be called a real substance; it is only 
a form of manifestation, though more abiding than a pot, 
of some other substance which persists through all the 
modifications of clay, and is* also present im what clay 
itself comes from and in what it is changed into, after its 
destruction. If all so-called spbstances ' are thus liable to 
modification (vikaéra), then the substance underlying ull 
objects of the world would be that which persists through 
ull forms of objects. And we observe that existence (not of 
any specific form but existence pure and simple) 1s what is 
common to all forms of objects. Existence is revealed im 
the perception of every object, whatever be its nature. It 
can, therefore, be called the substance, the material cause 
or the underlying reality behind the work of objects. 


But when we exfmine the changing states within our 
minds what we also find there is that 
It is alaocommonto every state, every idea, whatever its 
ull mental states. ‘object, exists. Even un illusory idea ** 
which lacks an external object exists 
as an idea (avaygati), A state of deep dreamless sieep or $f 
swoon, also exists, though no objective consciousness is 
present there.’ Ixistence is thus found to be the one 
undeniable reality persisting through ail states, internal 


4 Modern’ Physios shows that even the so-called elementary sub- 
stances of Chemistry. are not immutable; that being mage of electrons 
and Protons, differently organized, these elements cau bé transmated into 
other forme. 

2 Sadkars on Br.sat., 2. L. 14. 

3 Sadtkera on Chand., 6.2. 1. 


432 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


and external.’ It can, tlferefore, be accepted as the 
substance, and material cause of which all determinate 
objects and mental states are the diverse manifestations. 
We find then that pure existence which is the common 
cause of oe sou world is itself 
Pare existence iathe formless, though appearing in various 
Lelie polity Belin’ forms, partisan: though, divisible 
intent into different forms ; it is infinite 
: though it appears in all finite forms. 
Sankara thus reaches the conception ¢of «sn infinite, 
indeterminate (nirvigega) existence as the essence or 
material cause of the world. He calls this Absolute or 
Brahman. 
(c) But is this Absolute existence conscious or 
: unconscious ? Ordinarily we think 
Beene _ that external objects are unconscious 
eae cell. -~—s«ad the internal states of our mind 
- are conscious. But what is the 
criterion of consciousness ? A mental state is conscious, 
because its existence is self-revealing. But when we 
perceive the external world jts existence also reveals itself. 
‘fhe power of appearing (bhati) is common to both iaternal 
and external forms ‘of existence; and it can, therefore, be 
argued that existence which is common to the internal and 
the exterusl world must possess the power of revealing 
itself. Therefore, it is more reasonable to hold that 
Absolute existence is of the nature of self-revealing 
consciousness. In fact, a little reflection shows that 
self-revelation may even be taken as the differentia that 
distinguishes existence from non-existence. What is non- 
existent (e.g. the son of a barren woman) cannot even 
appear or reveal itself for a moment. 
’ But two objections may be raised against this view. 
Are there not objects which exist but 
Two objections met. do not appear before us, and are there 
not also illusory objects which Iack 
existence and yet appear to be there ? As to the first, the 
reply ie that the non-perception or the non-appearance of 
some existing objects may be explained by supposing the 
existence of some obstruction to revelation, just as the 
non-appearan’, of the sun, which is capable of self- 


1 Cf. Mc Taggart’s The Nature of Existence, for a similar moder 
theory. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 433 


revelation, is explained as being due to obstruction of light 
by clouds (or as the non-revival, at a particular time, of 
some ideas existing in the mind, is explained by some 
obstruction to recollection)." As to the second objection, 
the reply is that even iniliusion there is existence under- 
lying the illusory appearance, and that is what appears 
before us® Existence is thu8 to-extensive with the power 
of self-revelation, that is, consciousness. 


(d) This cogclusion is also strengthened by another 
ae a sake Lahteaats there is 
sclousnesa © appearance of existence tHere is aware- 
Sas oe ness invariably present. Even an 
external object, say lay, which appears 
to us is presented by an awareness of clay (mrt-buddhi), 
When we perceive clay becoming a pot, our clay conscious- 
ness turns into pot-consciousness (ghata buddhij.* An 
imaginary object ia just the idea of the objec:, and so also 
is an tlusory object. So we find that awareness pervades 
all forme of existence known to us. 


By a series of arguments like these Sadkara reaches 

logically’ what he accepts on the 

The world origivstes guthority of *the revealed texts, 

- aml Abs” namely that the world originates from 

panes hates. Brahman, which is Absolute Existence 

and Consciousnes& and that Brahman 

has the power of ymanifesting itself in diverse apparent 
forms, ‘without really undergoing any modification. 

Though Brahman (or Existence-conaciousness) appears, 

in all our experiences, or in all that 

Brahman, or Exis- appears to exist, the forms vafy. 

areal teenie te Moreover, one een of Lp ee 

: (6.g. illusion or dream) is contradjcte 

ni i eee be another form of it (¢.g. normal 

waking experience). The contradicted 

form ia thus regarded as less real than the contradicting 

one. But inspiteof such contradictions among the diffe- 

rent forms, existence (or consciousness) a8 such remains 

uncontradicted. When we disbelieve an illusory serpent we 

only deny that the existence there is of the form of a 

serpent, but do not deny that there is some gxistence. Again, 

even when we deny a dream object, we do not deny that the 


1 Vide Sadkara om Byhad,, 1. 2. 1. 
2 Fide SadkSra on Chand., 6. 2, 2. 
66—16085 


434 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


& 
experience or idea existed. And when we think of a time 
or place where nothing exists, we are thinking of the 
existence of at leastthat time or place. So existence, in 
some form or other, is as wide as thought, and we cannot 
conceive of the absence or denial of existence. This univer- 
sal, pure existence (or consciousness) is thus the only thing 
whose* contradiction is urfthinkable. Satkaratcalis it, 
therefore; supreme reality (Paramarthika satté). He thus 
logically arrives also at his conception of reality as that 
which persists uncontradicted through aJl lorms of exis- 
tence in all places and times. 

About any definite or particular form of existence which 
may appear in our experience, we can 
Persistence is the never be certain that it will not be 
mark of reality and supplanted by a contradictory ex- 
exclusion that of un- : : 2 
reality. perience arising in future. So the 
theoreticul or logical possibility of its 
being contradicted is always there. ‘This is another reason 
why Sankara holds that such an object, or the world as the 
totality of such objects, does not enjoy the status of un- 
contradictable or supreme reakty. On account of the above 
reasons, he sometimes defines reality as that which persists 
(through all forms of existence) and unreality as that which 
does not do go. Persistence or pervasion (anuvrtti) is the 
criterion of the real, particularity or exclusion (vyabhicara) 
that of the unreal.” : 
It is in the light of this logic that we can understand 
. . the somewhat puzzling assertion of 
‘The two kinds of Sankara that a pot and a cloth which 
confradiction, experi- ‘ 
ential and logical. exclude each other, also contradict 
and faisify each other. There ure 
two finds of contradiction that Satkara has in mind, 
experiential and logical, The perception of an existence 
as a snake is contradicted by a stronger or better percep- 
tion of it as a rope. Actual experience is here corrected 
by another actual experience. We have here experiential 
contradiction. This is what is ordinarily and almost 
universally regarded as the mark of unreality. ‘Sankara 
also admits this. But be (like some thinkers ot the West 
6.g. Zeno, Kantand Bradley) also recognizes a kind of 
logical contradiction which consists in actual experience 
being proved incohsistett by thought, or one thought 


t 
1 Sadkara on Chands, 6.2. 2. Brahma-at., 2. 1. 12 and Gitd, 2. 16. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 435 


being contradicted by another thought. Wehave seen 
previously how change, which is actually perceived, is 
shown by Sankara as unreal: because it is found inconsis- 
tent by logical thinking. In o similar manner it is shown 
that though the perception of a pot is not experientially 
contradicted by that of a cloth, both are found logically 
inconsistent with the nature of reality. The experience 
of the truly real (viz. pure existence), we saw, is not only 
not actually contradicted, but also logically uncontradic- 
table, since the contradiction of it is unthinkable. The 
_.*  ® experience of a particular, e.g. the 
‘ - Lente peal ona experience of existence aaa pot or as 
ie logically open to 9 Cloth, does not however possess such 
contradiction. uncontradictable nature. On the 
contrary, the very ‘act that existence 
is expericnceable in different forms keeps the door oper? 
to the possibility that what is experienced to have one 
particular form now may be experienced to have a different 
form later (just as what was experienced as a snake is 
experienced later as a rope). This theoretical pobsibi- 
lity of change in perception, and of consequent contradic- 
tion, then makes the statug of every particular object 
precarious, in respect of its reality. We can never be 
absolutely certain that what appears’now as pot will not 
appear otherwise later. We see, therefore, how different 
particular forms of existence, like pot, and cleth, weaken 
and undermine each other's claim to indubitable redlity. 
Tf, however, these claimed only pure existence, and not 
existence of particular forms, their claims would not have 
heen mutually exclusive. Each would enjoy uncontradict, 
able reality as pure existence. The rival claims of parti- 
culars as particular existents thus prevent them from having 
the position of indubitable reality such as pure exisfence 
enjoys. sO 
Me) By assessing the claims to existence made by all 
: changing and particular objects of the 
ate Freseu's world, Satkara discovers a dual nature 
able, uature, «iD them. These objects cannot be 
; called real in so far as thev are parti- 
cular and changing; but they are not surely utterly unreal 
like the son of a barren wonman, since existence as such 
shines even through their appearance, tl is present in 
tRem. In view of this they can be described as neither 
real, nor as unrgal. They are indescribable (anirvacaniya). 
The world o$sppearance a8 n whole, and the power of 


~\ e 
436 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


ignorance (may or avidyé) which conjures up such 
puzzling world, are also indescribable in this sense, 


(ii) The Advaita Theory of Error : 


As Sankara tries to explain the appearance of the 
world in the light of jlusogy pertep- 

Pager fant czplsn®” tion, he and his followers discuss the 
te nature of perceptual error very 
elaborately, particularly because the 

explanations of such error offered by other schools make 
Advaita view of the world inconclusive. The Mimarhsakas 
altogether deny the possibilivy of error in perception, 
holding like some Western realiste, that all knowledge, at 
least of the immediate kind, istrue. If this view is correct, 
the Advaita position would be altogether unfounded. The 
Advaitins have, therefore, to examine this view. Now, the 
Mimérhsakas argue, as we bave seen, that the so-called 
case of illusion, ¢.g. of a snake in a rope, is really not 
one simple kind of knewledge, but a mixture of perception 
and memory, and non-discrimination between the two. 
Against thie the Advaitins tye tho following chief points. 
The, judgment expressing an illusory perception, ‘this is a 
snake’ shows that there is here a single piece of knowledge. 
It may be true that the perception of the thing present 
(‘this’) awakens the memory of a snake perceived in the 
past, but if this memory did not combine with the percep- 
tie to constitute one state of cognition, but simply lay 
undiscriminated in the mind alongside of the perception, 
a there would have been two judgments 

Mi srr to account ike, ‘I perceive this’ and ‘I remember 
unity tre tee a snake,’ or ‘This is’ and ‘That snake 
fudament. was.’ The judgment ‘This is a snake’ 
shows on the other hand, that snake- 

hood is predicated of ‘This’ or the present object ; and there 
is, therefore, a positive identification, and not merely non- 
recognition of difference, between the two elements, the 
perceived and the remembered. In fact, without such 
identification, ofibe belief that the present object is, & 
snake, the reaction (suck as fear and running away) which 
follows such knowledge would remain unexplained. Per- 
ceptual errof cannot, therefore, bedenied. * 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 487 


While admitting this the Nyfya-Vaiéesika school tries 
to expiaia perceptual error in a realistic 
way by showing that it is only an 
extraordindry case of perception, in 
which the memory-ides, for example, 
of a snake perceived in the past is so vividly aroused in the 
mind (by the perception of the similarity of the snake in 
the rope) that it amounts to an immediate awareness. So, 
what really existed in the past (¢.g. the snake previously : 
percetvedin argther place) is presented to the mind now 
through the instrumentality of a vivid idea. TNusfon does 
nof; therefore, show, a8 the AdVaitins think, the possibility 
of the perception of an eternally unreal thing; no unreal 
object can ever be perceived. The present perception of the 
world cannot be explained, therefore, like an illusion, witho 
supposing a real world perceived at least in the past; an 
the unreality of the world at all times can never be proved. 
The Advaitins reject this view on the following» chief 
grounds. The perception, at the present place and dime, 
of an object which existed at some other place and time is 
_ absurd. However vivid the memory- 
ae Fie abel oe idea may be it will he an idea of a 
man be immedieiely that (thing perceived there in the 
presented. past) and never of a this (object 
present here and now). So the 
quality of presence belonging to the ilhusory object remains 
unexplained. To hold that a memory-idea can really 
dislocate a rea} "object from its own time and place and 
transport it to a different time and place is equally absurd. 
In any case it has to be admitted that what does not 
really exist here ind now can appear as present, and that 
it is also duc to our ignorance of the thing (the rope) 
existing here and now. Construing these facts idto a 
consistent theory, the Adsaitins hold that in ilfusion 
ignorance conceals the form of the existing object (rope) 
and constructs tistéad, the appearaiice of another object. 
The non-pérception of the existing form is producéd by 
Jifferent factors such as defective sense organ, insufficient 
light. ‘She perception of similarity, and the revival of 
memory jdea caused by it, help 
Fc pe a! Red . ignorance to create the,positive appear- 
object must be admit. ace of an object esnake). This 
ted. apparent objact must be admitted to 
+ be present as an appearance, heer and 
now. It ig tlfen a temporary creation (srsti) of ignorance. 


The Nys&ya-Vaisesika 
theory aleo unestisfac- 


438 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


This creation is neither deseribable as real, since it is 
contradicted by later perception (of the rope), nor as unreal, 
because it appears, though for a moment, unlike what is 
unreal (¢.g. the child of a burren mother) which can never 
appear to be there. So it is called, by the Advaitin, an 
indescribable creation (anirvacaniya srsti), and his theory 
of illusion is called the theory of the appearance of the 
indescribable (anirvacaniya-khyati-vida). This view may 
appear as an admission of the mysterious. But every 
illusion does present 8 mystery, and fling a challenge to 
the unsuspecting realist and the naturalist. Even the 
Nydya-VaiseSika realist has to admit this; and he calls it, 
therefore, an extraordinary {alaukika) case-of perception. 


The explanation of the world-appearance, in the light 

of an ordinary illusion, as the creation 

The possibility of of an ignorance, with the power of 
the immediate appear- concealing and distorting reality, is 
a talib pss therefore, well-grounded. The ques- 
Age aired explana- tion may still be asked, however, as to 
tion of the world how the present world can appear 
plausible. unless there were the experience of a 
similar one in the past. But this 

would not present any difficulty, since the Advaitin, like 
the many other Indian schools, does believe that the present 
world is only one of a beginningless series of previous 
worlds, and the present birth is similarly preceded by a 
beginningless series of previous births. Satkara describes, 
therefore, the process of illusory superimposition (adhyasa) 
tis the appearance of what was previously experienced, in a 
subsequent locus.’ He means that through ignorance we 
superimpose on pure being (Brahman) the diverse forms of 
objects experienced in past lives. But even if this 
hypothesis of a boginningless scries is not admitted, the 
possibility of the appearance of existence in some other form 
can be maintained simply: on the strength of an illusory 
experience. In every case of iliusion the possibility of the 
appearance of some form of existence in place of another 
form of it is demonstrated—a fact which clearly skows that 
what does not really exist now can appenras such. The 
appearance of the unreal as real is.thus shown to be 
possible by everst illusion. 


Introduction to Br. Sat. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 439 


The Advaitu view of error should not be confused with 
hale Gestasaeh that of the nihilistic Bauddba, who 
eather ikiliam oe holds that {he utterly unreal appears 
subiectivism. as the world, or with that of the 

subjectivist Bauddha who holds that 
mental ideas uppear as the external world. Because 
unlike them Satkara and his followers clearly state that 
there is alwayg the background of pure existence 
(Brabman) behind every appearance, and that this ground 
is nasber unrdil nor a mere subjective idea, but existence 
iteelf, 


Though the world of normal waking experience is 
expluined in the light of illusion and as the product of an 
ignorance like the lutter, the Advaitin, we have alread 
seen, observes u distinction» between these two kinds o 
appearance. They distinguish, therefore, also the 
ignorance respunsible ior the normal world by culling it 
the root ignorance (mulavidya), from that causipg a 
temporary illusion by calling this latter similar ignorance 
(tulavidya). 

Objectivity is granted By the Advaitin to both the 

normal world arfd the Illusory object, 
The peculiur realism by admitting creation in both cases. 
of Advaita. In this the Advaitin is more reulistic 

than ordinary * realists. Where he 
differs from thera is that according to him objectivity 
does not imply reality, nor does uareality imply subjecti- 
vity (a position which, some contemporary American neo. 
realists like Holt also admit). On the contrary, on the 
strength of arguments already mentioned, every object 
which is particular and changeful is shown by him to have 
a contradictory nature, and therefore, to be not real in 
the sense in which pure existence is. 


(iii) Criticism of Sahkara’s Philosophy of the World 


Many, kinds of objections have been raised against 
Sankara’s theory of the world. The 

The charge thst chief one’s that Sankara does not 
ari yes idea the explain the world, gfut explains it 
bd away; that philosgphy has for ite 
business the explanation of the world, and if it explains the 
world away #s unreal, it only cuts away the ground on 
which it ttands, But such criticisnt is rather rash. It 


440 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


is true that thé task of philos8phy is to explain the world, 
that is the sum total of experienced facts. But it does 
not mean that philosophy is committed, from the beginning, 
to the view that the world of common sense must be totally 
accepted as real, It must examine common experience 
and common views of the world, but only to judge their 
natures and interrelations, in the light of reason, and find 
out what would be the most consistent viqw of the world. 
But it is found, on examination, as shown by Sankara, that 
all experiences cannét claim to be 
The world pyesents equally reliable, nor all common views 
different kinds of ex- about the world free from contradic- 
re eritioally dieri. ‘ion. One kind of experience actually 
minates on the basis contradicts and supplants another and 
& contradiction. claims greater reality. Agsin some 
; experiences and beliefs, in their parti- 
cular, forms, are found to bein conflict with possible 
future experience. Philosophy-must, therefore, rationally 
discriminate between belief and belief, exporience and 
experience, and critically assign to each its proper place. 
On such rational grounds Sankara grades and classifies 
common experience. As we saw, he, first of all, distinguish: 
es all objects of possibf and actual experience from utter 
unreality, like the child of the barren mother, The former 
again are clacsed under three heads: (1) those that only 
appésr momentarily* in illusions and dreams, but are 
contradicted by normal waking experience, (2) those 
that appear in normal waking experience—the particular 
and changing objects, which form the basis of our ordinary 
life and practice, but which are still not acceptable to 
reason as completely real (because they exhibit contra- 
dictign or are open to future contradiction), and (3) pure 
existence which reveals itself through all experience, and 
is neither contradicted nor contradictable. 


If ‘world’ is the name of all these kinds of experienced 
er ren facts, surely it 7 be irrational to 
ie three say that the world, a8 a whole, and in 
tea cite oF every aspect of it, is real. The first 
existence. kind of. facts possesses only ephemeral 
e, existence (pratibhasika satté or 

apparent existence); the second empirical or virtual exis- 
tence, the sort of ekistente necessary for ordinary Jife and 
practice (vyavaharika satta or practical exi&tence) and the 
third absolute existence (piramarthika satté or supreme 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 441 


existence). The world is this not a homogeneous concep- 
tion ; and if, inspite of this. one insists on being told what 
such a world (as a whole) is, the fairest reply cun only be, 
what Ssikra gives, namely that itis indescribable (unir- 
vacaniya), either as ren} or as unreal, But if the word, 
world, is confined only tothe second aspect, it would be 
again faigto say, that the ward is real only for practical 
purpose, more real than the first and less real than the 
third kind of existence. Tut if the word is taken in the 
third sense, S&ikara would emphatically sssert that the 
world is eternally rea}. As he puts it: ‘'§s the cause, 
Brahman, does not Inck existence at any time, past, 
present or future, so docs the world not lack existence 
in any of the three periods of time’’.’ Again, ‘All particular 
modes of existence with different names and forms are 
real a8 existence, but unreal as particulars’’.? 

It will be quite clear now that Sankara does not deny 
the world even in the secendor practical aspect, like a 
subjective idealist who reduces it toa mere idea of the 
perceiving individual, and who does not all.w it an 
extramental existence. This will be 
further tvident from the way in which 
he refutes the* subjectiviem of the 
Vijfianavadin.* Here be asserts that 
the objects of normal waking experience are not on a pat 
with dream-objects, since dream experfence is contradicted 
by waking experiqnce, which, therefore, is relatively more 
real ; that external objects like pillars, pots, etc., which are 
immediately felt to be outside the mind cannot be reduced, 
to the status of mere ideas in the mind, and that while 
the former are perceived by all, the latter only by the 
individual in whose mind they are. He also makes it 
clear that though he explains the world on the analogy; of a 
dreum he does not deny the difference betwien the 
contradicted dream-experience and the contradicting wak- 
ing experience on which the world is based, nor does he 
overlonk the fact that these two experiences are differently 
eaused.* The ignorance responsible for the first is of an 
individuat and temporary vature, and that at the root of 


Aatkara does not 
whally deny the 
world. 


1 Vide By, sat, 2. 1. 16. 
% Vide Chand,, 6 3. 2. 

3) By, e@t,, 3. 2928. 

4 Tbid,, 9. 9 99, 


5616058 


442 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


the second is public and relatively permanent. The first 
issometimes called avidya nde edual ignorance), the 
second miya (general ignorance), though these two terms 
are also sometimes used gynonymously in the sense of 
illusion-producing ignoranze in general. 


2. Sankara’s Conception of God «¢ 


God, according to Sankars, can be conceive i from 
i two different points of view. If 

From the enfpirical é 
standpoint God ie the we look at God from the ordinary 
Jomaiseeot and omni. practical standpoint (vyavaharika- 
|ad of qualities. drsti) from which the world is 
“believed to be real, God may be considered .as the 

causé, the Creator, the Sustginer, the Destroyer of the 
world and, therefore, also as an Omnipotent and Omni- 
scient Being. He then appears as possessed of all 
these qualities (saguna). Géd in this aspect is called 
‘Saguna Brahma or a or tévara in Sankara’s philosophy. 
He i is the pbject of worship. # 
~ “But the world, "as we hdve seen. is conceived by 
Sci alti Sica et Sankara as an appearance which 
God dees not reveal rests on our ignorance. Descrip- 
His ioe tion of God as the Creator of the 
world istrue only from the practical point of view, ‘ 
80 long as the world-appearance is regarded as real. 
Creatorship of the world is not God’s essence (svariipa- 
laksana); it is the description of what is merely 
accidental (tatastha-laksana) and does not touch His 
essence. ‘ 

Let us try to understand with the help of an 
ordinary exarftyle the distinction that Sankera wants 
to make here. A-sheplerd appears on the stage in the 
réle cf a king, wages war, conquere a country and 


r 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 443 


rules it. Now, the desci{ption of the actor as & 
shepherd gives what he is {rom the real point of view. 
It isan essentiai description éf him (svaripa-lakgana). 
But the description of him asa king, ruler and con- 
“queror, ig applied to him only from the point of view 
of the stage and his rdle there; it is merely a descrip- 
tion of what ,is accidenfal to the person (tatastha- 
laksana) and dcas not touch his essence. , 
Similarly, the description of God as conscious, real, 
infinite (satyam, ‘ianem, anantam 
FR pede ta pr Brahma)? is an attempt to describe 
is consciqusuess, real Tig essence (svaripa), whereas the 
and infinite. 
description of Him as Créator, 
Sustainer and Destroyer of the world, or by any other 
characteristic connected with the world, is a -mere 
accidental description and it holds | good only from the 
point of view of the world (vyavaharika arsti). As we 
can regard the actor on the stage from a paint of view 
other than that of the stage, so we “can look at God 
also from a non-Worldly point of view (paramarthika- 
drsti) and try to dissociate Him froin the characters, 
which we ascribe to Him from the point of view of 
the world. God inthis aspect of what He really is, 
without any reference to the world, iscalled by Sankara 
Pararhbrahma or the Supreme God. 
For understanding this higher aspect of God as He 
The analogy of the is really in Himself (without rela- 
magician. + tion to the world) along with the 
lower axpect, Sankara constartly draws on the analogy 


1 Vide Satkara on Brakmae-sit., 2.4.18. Por the analogy of the 
actor (nats). ‘ 
® Tait, ,°2. 1. 


444 AN INTRODUCTION TO iNDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


of the magician (miyavi) &s suggested in the Svetaé- 
vatara, The magician is a juggler only to those who are 
deceived by his trick and‘who fancy that they perceive 
the objects conjured up. But to the discerning few 
who see through the trick and have no illusion, the 
juggler fails to be a jug geler. Similarly, those who 
believe in the world-show thirtk of God through ‘this 
show and call Him its Creator, ete. But for those 
ise few who know that the world is a mere show, 
there is neither any real world nor any real Creator. 


This is the only way, thinks Sankara, in which we 
can understand in the light of com- 
ree the eam mon expérience how God can be 
Sorgeno ot the tran’ both in the world and yet beyond 
it—understand, that is to say, the 
immanence and the diranscendence of God, which are 
taight bythe Upanisads. The world, so long as it 
appears, is fa God, the only Reality, just asthe snake 
conjured out of the rope is nowhere else except in the 
rope. But God is not really touched ‘by the imperfec- 
tions of the world just as the rope is not affected by 
any Ulusory characters of the snake, or even as the 
actor ig not affected by the loss and gain of kingdom 
on the stage. 


Raménuja, we shall ste, finds difficulty in recon- 
i ac... ¢iling the immanence of God with 
Thie reconciliation f : 
is dificult for Ram’. His transcendence. He wacillates 
sais in hise explanation of how God can 
be said to be ifthe world and yet remain unaffected 
by the world’s imperfections. This difficulty, however j 
is not pecutiar to Raimanuja alone. It ig present in 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 445 


most Western forms of thejsm also which, like Rama- 
nuja’s, look upon creation as real. 

God as the object of worsbip is based essentially on 

a belief in the distinction between 

arte pap the worshipping self and the God 
alot the lower worshippéd. The reality of the 
limited self like that of a worldly 

object is based on ignorance—on the failure to realize 
that God is the only Reality. Besides, God is wor- 
shipped because God is thought of as the creator and 
controller of the world. So worsbip and the God wor; 
shipped are bound up ‘with our lower standpoint 
(vyavaharika drsti) from which the world appeass as 
real and God appears as endowed with the wany 
qualities iv relation to the world. It 1s this Saguna 
Brahma or Tévara whocam be regarded as an object 

of worship. ° 

Brahman from the higher or transcendental point 

of view (paramarthika-drgti) catinot 

wondedtal sevivat, ve described by qualities which 
is devoid of all quali- relate to the world or to the ego. 
ties aud distinctions. . 
- Brahman in this aspect is devgid 

of all distinctions, external as well as internal (sajatiya, 
vijatiya and svagata bhedas!. Here. therefore, Sadkara 
differs from Ramanuja who, we shall eee, believes that 
God is possessed of at least wnternal distinction (svagata 
bheds), because within Him there are the really 
distinct conscious and unconscious realities. Brahman, 
in this absolutely transcendent aspect, says Sankara, 
cannot be described at all and it is, giferefore, called 
indeterminate or characterless*or nirguna. The des- 
cription of Brahman even as infinite, real, comsciouspess, 


446 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


though more accurate thaeg accidental descriptions, 
cannot directly convey the idea of Brahman. It only 
serves to diract the mind towards Brahman by denying 
of it finiteness, unreality and unconsciousness. * 


Every quality predisated of any subject isa sort of 
limitation imposed on it. This follows 
To predicate a qua- from the logical principle of ooversion, 
lity is to limit God. If 5 is P, thon it is mt ndén-P and, 
Pi therefore, non-P is excluded from 8, 
which becomes then limited to that extent. A great 
Western philosopher, Spinoza, recognizes this and lays 
down the dictum, ‘ Every determination is negation’. He 
élso thinks, therefore, that God, the ultimate substance, is 
indeterminate and cannot be described 
God, from pe vi by any positive qualification. The 
ee te ipeeler-  Upanisade-recognize this principle and 
€ deny of God all predicates, cven 
worshipability.? This conception is developed vy Sunkara 
who calls Brahman, in this transcendent aspect, nirguna 
or attributeless. ‘ 


We have said previously that the world-appearance is 

‘ due to maya. God regarded as the 

Maya is attributable Creator cf the world is, therefore, 
pina ike si described as the wielder of maya, 
from the higher," Ignorant people like us believe that 
: the world is real and that, there- 

fore, God is reaily qualified by mayd, i.e, possessed of 
th power o! creating the world -(may4-visista). But 


_Yeally creativity is not an essential character of God, 
“it is, only an apparent accidental predicate (upadhi) 


- 


that we illusorily ascribe to God. God is only 
apparently associated with creativity (mayopahita). God as 


‘immanent (suguna) and God as transcendent reality (nir- 


guna) are not two, any more than the man on the stage 
and that man outside the stage are two. The firat is only 
the apparent aspect of the second, The first is relative ta‘ 
the world, the second is irrelative or absolute. 


1 Vide Setkera’s com. on Fait,, 2. 1. 
2 Vide Kena, 1. 5. 


e 
THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 447 


Distinction between standpoints is always made by 
tek tiaieticn op TOE life and is nothing new or 
ints of view is made queer in Advaita philosophy as it 

in daily life. 7 

may appear to some. In daily hfe, 
we say that a currency note is really paper, but conven- 
tionally ‘it is money; a photograph is really paper but 
appears asa man; the image ina mirror appeurs as a 
real object, bat is not really so; and 80 on. This 
ordinary kind of distinction between the apparent and 
the real is philosophically utilized by Vedanta for 
explaining the relation of God to the world. Thus the 
vyavahdrika and the paranarthika-- the empirical (con- 
ventional or practical) and the transcendenial (absolute 
or irrelative)—-which the Vedanta distinguishes * are 
neither uncommon nor unintelligible. It is only the 
extension of a common distinction. 


Though God as creator is only apparent, yet His 
re yeas importance ond yalue should not be 
immanent leadstothat ignored. It is only through ‘the 
Oh God as Wranecenteey io wer standpoint that we can 
gradually mount upto the higher. Advaita Vedanta, 
like the Upanisads, believes in the gradual revelation of 
truth in stages through which spiritual progrers takes 
place. The unreflecting man who regards the worldas a 
self-sufficient reality feels no urge to look beyond it and 
search for its cause or ground. When he comes to 
realize somehow the insufficiency of the world and 
e looks for something which sustains 

of wragual revelation the worldefrom behind, he comes to 
‘ discover God as taé Creator and 
Sustainer of the world. He fee® adnfiration and rever- 
ence and begins to pray to the Creator. * God thus 


a . e 
448 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


becomes the object of worsBip. With the further ad- 
vancement of thought, so the Advaita thinks, the man 
may discover that God‘, whom he reached through the 

, world, is really the only reality, the world is only an 
appearance. Thus at the first level, the world alone is 
real ; a& the second, both the world and God : at na 
last, only God. ‘The first is atheism. The second 
represents theism as we find in Ramanuja and others. 
The last is the Absolute monism of Sankara. Saakara 
recognizes that the last level has to bs reached only 
@radually through the second. He, therefore, be'ieves 
in the utility of worshipping God ‘as Saguna Brahma). 
For,*this purifies the heart and prepares one for 
gradually reaching the highest view, and without it no 
God, immanent or transcendent, would ever be found. 
Sankara gives a place even tw the worship of ‘ the many 
deities, because it relleems the spiritually backward at 
least from utter atheism, and it serves as a stage on the 
way to the highest*truth. 


(1) The Rational Basis of Sankara’s Theory of God 


‘¢ The different ideas about God, as explainad above, 
sre based primarily on the inter- 

Safkara’sconception pretation of the scriptures. But 

. Pee is logically they can also be logically deduced 
theory of Fxistence {fom the conclusions - established 
and Appearance. in the previous section by the 
critical analysis of ordinary  ex- 

perience and by reasoning based thereon. We saw there 
how Sankara demonstrates by argument that (1) pure exis- 
tence is the ground and material of all particular and 
changing formg of existence constituting the world, (2) that 
particular objec#s being open to contradiction caunot be 
taken as absolutely real, (3) that only pure existence is 
beyond actual and possible contradiction aud, therefore, the 
only Absolute Reality, and (4) that pure existence is pure 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPAY 449 


consciousness as well. It will be found, therefore, that 
this Absolute Existence-Consciousness is nothing other 
than God, described by the Upanisads as Brabman, real, 
conscious and infinite. Now thetwo uspects of God, the 
immanent and the trunscendent, can also be logically 
deduced. The idea of (Jod, us pure existence is reached, 
we saw, @hrough the worid 8? particular objects, by a 
logical enquiry into its nature and reality. Till such critical 
examination tukes place, the world of normal wuking 
experience pussés as the only reality. Our ordinary practi- 
cal Jife is bused on such an unsuspectiny acceptance 
of this world. But when on examination one comes to 
rewlize pure existence as the universai ground of the world, 
one perceives such existence in ever 
Piha ail phenomenon. In other words, God of 
ground of appearence. drabmian is found manifested through 
every particular furm 1 existence. 
Although the world appears to him in «ll its multiplicity, 
Ciod is thought to be its sole ground and substance. But 
when it is realized that though pure existence appoars in 
muny form’, these latter canpot be accepted oy renson as 
real, one has to think that the cause of the world has the 
inscrutable power of munitesting itself as many without 
" undergoing any real modification. This metaphysical idea, 
put ia terms of theology, is nothing byt the cSnception of 
(rod as the creator of the world and possessed of a mugicul 
creutiye power, miayi. This is also the conception of 
Tgvara or Saguna-brahinan, Brahman endowed with the 
aitributes of omnipotence (the power of causing all things> 
and omniscience- (consciousness revealing salt forms sof 
existence). Again, a8 all vbjects perish only to merge in 
existence of some other form, objects can be conceived as 
being withdrawn into their ground, that is existence. * God 
can thus be described as alsu the Destroyer or that into 
which the world’s objects lose dheir particular forms. 
But on still deeper thought il is realized that relation of 
the unreal to the real gannot be itself 
Nirgupa Brahman or real. The attribuies ascribed to God 
Existence in itself. to express his relation to the apparent 
world carmot, therefore, be taken as 
real, Thus emerges the iden cf Godin lis transcendent 
arfd truly real aspect of Parabrahmgan, the Supreme Reality, 
above all multipjicity and devoid ofall really ascribable 
attributes,tha Nirguna Brahman or Indetermindte Absolute. 
Sankara’s conception of Brahman, in its two-fold aspect 


53--1605B » 


450 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


and all ideas connected therewith are, therefore, found to 
be logically deducible aiso from a critical view of ordinary 
experience. e 
Like Spinoza’s conception of God, as substance, 
easy Sankara’s conception of God, as Para- 
irene view is not brahman or Nirguna Brahman, differs 
sheisai’ Per’ from the God of Religion, tb&t is, God 
conceived as an object of worship, 
distinct from the worshipper and endowed with the highest 
attributes. Itis no wonder, therefore, ihe like Spinoza, 
Safikeara aldo is sometimes uccused of atheism. This 
charge stands or falls according as God is taken in this 
narrow sense or in the wider one, we have previously dis- 
eussed. If God connotes, among other things, the Supreme 
Reality, Satkara’s theory is not surely atheism, but rather 
the logical perfection of the theistic faith. Indeed, whereas 
atheitm believes only inthe world-and not at all in God, 
and,ordinary Theiam believes in both, the world and 
God, Sankara believes only in God, Forhim God is the 
only Reality. Rather than denying God, he, makes the 
most of God. This view alsoomarks the highest extension 
of the ordinary religious emotion towards God. For it 
points to the stage where love of God becomes absolute, 
suffering neither the ego nor the world. If this type of 
faith is to be distinguished from ordinary theism (or 
belief in personal God), the word for it should be, not 


atheism, but rather ‘super-iheism.’ 7 ‘ 


In connection with the process of creation, we saw, 
that the Advaitin imagines the gradual 
‘three stages of on evolution of the world out of Brahman 
orlot God and Maya, t#Yough Maya, by a process of appar- 
metaphorically con. 0b change of the subtle to the gross. 
ceived. Three stages are sometimes distin- 
, guished' in this process of evolution 
in analogy with the developinent of a seed into a plant. 
namely, the undifferentiated seed stage or causal stage, 
the subtly differentiated germinating stage, and the fully 
differentiated piant stage. Brahman the utichanging 
reality cannot, of course, basaid to be undergoing evolu- 
tion, Allchbange and, therefore, evolution belong to the 
sphere of Maya.“ It is Maya, the creative power whick at 
first remains unumfanifedted, then becomes differentiated 
« 


e 
l Vide Vedantasdra of Sad&pands. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 451 


into subtle objects, and thenjnto the gross ones. Brahman 
conceived as the possessor of the undifferentiated Maya is 
named Igvara, and describéd as omniscient and omnipotent. 
Tt is the conception of God existing prior to actual crea- 
tion, but possessed of the power of creation. Brahman 
possessed of subtly differentiated Maya is called Hiranya- 
garbha (also Sitratma and Prima). God in this aspect 
would be the totality of ali**subtle objects. Brahman 
possessed cf Maya flifferentiated further into gross or 
perceptible objects is called’ Vaiévanara (also Virat). This 
aspect of God if the totality of all gross objects, the entire 
manifested world, including all individuals (jtvas). Some- 
times this gradual process of evolution is compared to the 
three states of the individual, namely deen sleep, dream and 
wakefulness. Tévara. 16 God in deep slumber. Hiranya- 
garbha is God indreaming state, and Vajiévanara is G 
fully awake. It should be remembered that whereas ordi- 
narily Tévara implies the entire immanent aspect of God, 
that is Brahman associnted'with Maya in all stages, the 
word is used in the present context in a narrower sense, and 
confined only to the first stage. . 
Countiig these three immanent aspects of God in 
relation to creation along with the 
The four sepects of transcendent aspect beyond all such 
Brahman, relation, we have the four possible 
aspects of Brayman nimely, Pure 
coneciousness- Existence (Para-brahman), Tévara, Hiranya- 
garbha and Vaigvinara. Though these are generally taken 
as the successive stages of manifestation, it is equally 
possible to think of them as simultaneously existing. For, 
Pure consviousness never ceases even when it seema, to 
evolve, nor do the subtle manifestations (e.g. buddhi, 
menas, pranas, senses and motor organs) cease when the 
gross ones come into existence. : 
Sankara does not seem to attach any serious importance 
to the different alternative accounts | 
taailes deere 2 of the order e arene ary ere mike 
in support thereof, though he tries to 
mn ee eelain all of them as they occur in 
the different scriptures, without any attempt to justify some 
and reject the rest. There art two P ait tag thet appear 
in the human mind as ‘to the world. Qne of them is: 
What is the ultimate ground, substance, or reality logically 
presupposed by jhe world ? The other is: Why or how the 
world originstes from what is accepted as the ultimate ? The 


452 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


solution of the first is the primary business of philosophy. 
Sadkara, Spinoza, Green, Bradley and most other great 
philosophers of the world address themselves to this prob- 
lem. They start frorn the world of experienced facts, 
anulyse it criticully andtry to find out what is logically 
presupposed by it. Reasoning or logic is the chief instru- 
ment here. We saw already how Sankara thus discovers 
pure existence und consciotfsness as the only ané@ ultimate 
‘reality. The solution of the second problem is the business 
of mythology which starts with God (or some other ultimate) 
and gives an imaginary uccount of why a:fd bow the world 
is created. Cmagination is the chief instrument here, and 
no logical rigour can be expected inits work. The mytho- 
logical explanation of the world has always been « pastime 
for the human mind in all lands, 18 all the scriptures and 
‘legends of the world would shew. Sometimes it is found 
intermingled also with philosophical speculation. .But all 
great philosophers have fought shy of mythological explana- 
tion, The hackneyed criticisth against Spinoza that his 
substance is like « lion’s den to which there ure many steps 
but out of which there ure none, points to this fact, though 
it misunderstands the primary business of the philosopher. 
Green’ and Bradley’ plainly confess that the why und how 
of creation cannot be explained by philosophy. Similarly 
Sankara does not tuke the stories and motives of erention, 
described inf differen scriptures, with the same seriousness 
with which lie tries to ustablish the reality of Bruhmun, the 
ultimate ground of ihe world, or expose ‘the contradictory 
character of all changing and particular finite modes of 
«existence. The accounts of creation are true, ior him, 
only from the lower point of view. 


Be Sarikara’s Conception of the Self, Bondage and 
; Liberation 


We have found already that Sankara believes in 
neeasll Ge chad mpquelined mohisht. Alf distine- 
ly identical with Brah- tions between objects and* objects, 
— the sbject and the object, the 
self and Gode are the illusory creation of maya. 


- Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 93. 
2 Appearance and Reality, p. 458. 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY 453 


He holds fast to the conception of identity 
without any real difference and tries to follow it out 
logically in every respect. ,He accepts, therefore, 
without any reservation, the identity of the Soul 
and God, that is repeatedly taught in the 
Upanigds. te 


Man is apparently composed of the body and the 
soul. But the body which we _per- 
ceive is, like every other material 
object, merely an illusory appearance. When this js 
realized, the reality that remains is the soul which 
is nothing other than God. The saying, ‘ That thou 
: art,’ means that there ig an unqua- 
ona thou art.” of ified identity between the, soul, ' 
that underlies the apparently finite 
man, and God. It is true that if we take the word 
‘ thou ’ in the sense of the empirical individual limited 
and conditioned by its body, and the word “that ' as the 
reality beyondothe world, there cannot be an identity 
between the ‘ thou ’ and ‘ that.’ We have to understand, 
therefore, the word * thou,’ to imply pure consciousneds 
underlying man and ‘ that ’ to imply also pure conscious- 
ness which forms the essence of God. Between 
these two complete identity exists and is taught by the 
Vedanta. An identity judgment like ‘ This is that, 
Devadatta ’ (which we pass on seeing Devadatta for a 
seconds time) makes the above point clear. The condi- 
tions which the man had the previous day cannot be 
exactly identical with those be hag the second day. 
Therefore, there cannot be any identity between the 
man qualified by one set of conditions with the man 


The body ia not real. 


454 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


qualified by another set. <What we mean, therefore, 
must be that the nan,-viewed-epart_from the different 
conditions, is the same. .Similar is the case with fhe 
identity taught between the Self and God. The Self, 
viewed apart from the conditions that differentiate it 
from pure consciousness i identical with Gof viewed 
apart from the attributes that 

Identity judgment is differentiate Him fr6m pure .con- 

a rie sciousness. Such identity judg- 
ment is not tautological and super- 

fluous, because it serves the purpose of pointing out 
that what are illusorily taken as different are really one. 
The ,identity that is taught between man and God 
is a, real identity between terms which appear as” 
different. Being identical with God, the soul is in 
reality what God aleo realy is. It is thé supreme 
Brahbman—the self-Fuminous, infinite, consciousness. 
The sou! appears as the limited, finite self because of ' 
its association with the body which is a product of 
ignorance, © 


; » rhe body is not composed simply of what we 

Tie ries body {60d perceive through the senses. In 
the subtle body are the addition to this groes percept. 
pee eee ible body, there is also a subtle 
one, composed of the senses, the motor organs 
(these two groups together being called indriyas), vita] 
elements (pranas) and the interna] mechanism of 
knowledge (antahkarana). , While the gross body per- 
ishes on death, the subtle body doee not, and it 
. Inigrates with theesoul to the next Bross: body. Both 
of these bodies are the products of maya. , 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY 455 


\. Owing to ignorance, thé beginning of which cannot 
Sted a estaly be assigned, the soul erroneously 
association with the 2680Clates ‘itself with the body, 
Bose through = igsor- ~ sross and subtle. This is called 
_ bondage. In this state it forgets 

that it is really Brahman. It behaves like a finite, 
limited, miserable being’ which runs after transitory 
worldly objects and is pleased to get them, sorry to 
miss them. It identifies itself with the finite body 
and mind ‘antahkarana) and think: ‘I am stout,’ 
‘I am lame,’-‘ 1 am ignorant.’ Thus arises the 
conception of the seif as the ‘ Ego’ or‘ I.’ This 
limited ego opposes itsejf to the rest of existence, 
which is thought to be different 

non ne, Ee, (atm) i* from it. The ego ie not, shere- 
fore. the real self, but is only. 


an apparent limitation of it. ; 


Consciousness of the self also becomes limited by 
; the conditions of the body. The 
The consciousness vf : 

the aelf'in bondage is Senses and antahkarana (the in- 
es ternal organ of knowledge) become 
the instruments through which limited consciousness 
of objects takes place. Such empirical, finite kpow- 
ledge is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. 
Immediate knowledge of external objects arises when, 
through any sense, the antahkarana flows out to the 
object and is modified into the form of the object. 
In addition to immediate knowledge (pratyaksa), the 
Advaitins admit five different kinds of mediate know- 
ledge, namely, inference (anumana),.te&timony (Sabda), 
comparison (upamana), postulation’ (arthapatti) and 
non-cognitidn (anupalabdhi). The Advaifins agree, 


456 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


in the main, with the Bhatta school of Mimamss 
regarding these sources of knowledge, As the Bhatta 
views have been already stated we need not repeat 
them here. * 

When a man is awake, he thinks himself identified 

Waking enpeasans: with the gross body, as well as with 

dream and dreemiess the interfial aud external orgahs. 
- Sate crease When he falls asleep and dreams, 
“— he is still conscious of objects that 
atise from memory-impressions, and, therefore, the 
feeling of his limitation as a subject or knower opposed 
to objects still persists there. When he has. deep, 
dreathless sleep, he ceases to, have any ideas of objects. 
In the absence of objects, he ceases to be a knqwer as 
well. The polarity of subject and object, the opposition 
between the knower afd the known, vanishes 
altogether. He no longer feels that he is confined to 
and limited, by the body. But yet consciousness docs 
not cease in dreamfess sleep ; for otherwise how could 
we remember af all on awaking from steep that we had 
such a state ? How could we report ‘ I had a peaceful 
slgep, had no dreams,’ if we were unconscious then ? 

The study of dreamless sleep g gives us a glimpse of 
what the self really is when dissociated from ‘its: 
feeling of identity with the body. The soul in its 
intrinsic state is not a ‘finite, miserable being, It 
does not separate itself from the rest of existence and 
does not limit itself by a feeling of the ‘ I¢ (aham) 
opposed to a ‘thou’ or, this’ or‘ that.’ It is also 


! Fora critical discussion of the Advaita theory of Raomieteni vide 
D.M. Datta, The Siz Ways of Knowing. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 457 


lree from all worries thé arise from hankerings after 


objects. The self, really, then is unlimited conscious- 
ness and bliss. ° 


The Rational Basis of Sankara’s Conception of Self : 


The gonception of self set forth above is chiefly based 
on revealed texts. But it is also 
The different mean. = fndependently reached by the Advaitin 
ings of ‘self’ gy through different lines of argument 
based on the logical, analysis of 
ordinary experience, We may briefly indicate them here. 
It shouid be clearly mentioned at the outset that Sankara 
does never think that the existence o: the self (atman) 
need be proved by any argument. The self is self-manifeast 
in every one. ‘‘ Every one believes that he exists, and 
never thinks ‘I am not’.’’' But there are so many 
different kinds of meaning, attached to‘1"’ or ‘self* that 
it reqyires a good deal of analysis and reusoning t find 
out what the self really is. 


i] 

One method of enquiry is the analysis of lunguage., 
The word ‘I, seems sumetimes to 

Analysis of themean- imply the body (e.g. ‘Iam_ fat‘), 
moe A srem sea sometimes a sense (6.g. ‘I am blind’), 
the essence of the self, SOmetimes a motor organ (e.g. ‘I am 
lame’), sometimes a mental faculty 

(e.g. «I am dufl'), sometimes consciousness (e.g. ‘I 
know ’). Which of these should be taken to be the real 
essence of the self ? To determine this we have té& 
remember the true criterion otereality, The reulity or éhe 
essence of a thing is, as we saw previously, that which 
persists through all ils states. The essence or the reality 
behind the world of objects was found, in this way, ‘to be 
pure existence because while other things about the world 

change and perish, this always reveais itself in every state. 
In « similar way it is found that what is common to the 
body, senso, mind, etc. with which the self identifies itself 
from time to time, is consciousness. The identification 


1 Brahma-satra. 1.1.1. - 
e? Vide Satkera on Br. sQt., 2.1, 11 (Eik-rapena hi avasthito 
yo'rthah sa paraméitheh) and on Gifs 2,18 (Yadvisay@ buddbir na 
vyabhicaratl teg sat, yadvigayd vyabbicarati tadasat). * 


58—1605B. 


4658 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


a € y 
of the self with any of these means some form of gonscioud- 
neas or other, that is the consciousness of the self as the 
body (‘I am fat’), as aesense (‘I am blind’) and the 
like Consciousness is therefore, the essence of the self 
in whichever form it may appear. But it is not conscious- 
ness of any particular form, but simple consciousness 
common to all its forms. Such consciousness is‘lso pure 
existence since existence persists through all forms of cons- 
ciousness. The different particular and changing forms of 
consciousness can be shown, from theft contradictory 
natures, to be mere appearances, in the same way as the 
different forms of existence were shown to be so before. 


This conclusion is further supported by the linguistic 

“ expressions ‘my body,’ ‘my sense,’ 

‘My consciousness,” =‘ my intellect,’ etc. which show that 

ine not really imply the self can alienate itself from these 

atincthin between 

self and consciousness. (body, sense etc.) and treat them as 
‘ external objects distinct from itself. 


These cannot, therefore, be regarded as the real essence of 

the self. It is true, one algo sometimes gays, ‘ my 
consciousness.’ But such an expression connot be tuken 
literally, as implying a distinction between the self (as 
possessor) and consciousness (as possessed). For, if the 
self tries to’ distingpish itself from consciousness, it only 
assumes the form of distinguishing consciousness. Con- 
sciousness thus proves insepsrable ands indistinguishable 
from the self. So ‘my consciousness ’ must be taken in 
a metaphorical sense. The possessive case here does not 
reglly imply distinction, byt rather identity or apposition 
(as in ‘ The city of London’), By comparing and analys 
ing the different meanings of the self expressed by ‘I' and 
‘mine ' we discover thus pure consciousness as the real 
essence of the self. 


If again we compare the three states, namely of waking, 
dreaming and sleeping without dreams, 
Comparison of wak- which the human self experiences 
ing, dreaming and  dgily, we can reach the samé concep- 
baie ngewe sleep states tion. ~The essence of the self must 
gain shows pure con- tt 
sciousness to be the | Yemain in all these or the self would 
essence of the self. ¢ cease to be. But what do we find 
_ © consmon to all these states ? In the 
firet state there is consciousness of extornal objects; in the 
second algo there is fonsciousness, but of internal objects 
present only to the dreamer. In the third state no objects 
appear, bet there is no cessation * of consciousness, for 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY abu 


therwise the subsequent memory of that state, as one of 

Nears and freedom from Worries, would not be possible, 
The persistent factor then is consciousness, but not 
necessarily of any object. This shows again that the- 
essence of self is pure consciousness without necessary 
relation to objects. 


But two more points of special importance also emerge 
- out of this consideration. The first 
Consciousness not ne is that consciousness, the essence 
produced by objects. of thé self, is not dependent on 
objects. There is no reason, therefore,’ 
to think that consciousness is produced by the relation of 
the self to objects through some proper medium. We have 
to revise then our ordinary theory of knowledge. If the 
self is self-existing and self.revealing consciousness, and 
every object also is, as we saw betore, a form of sel?- 
Tevealing existence-consciousness, the only way we Can - 
understand the non-cognition of an existing object ig that 
there is some obstacle which conceals the object. The 
relation of the self to the object through sense, etc. is 
required then only to remove this obstruction, just, as the 
removal of the obstacle of a cover is required for the, 
perception of a self-reveuling light. , 


The other point is that the self in its intrinsic nature, 
isolated from all objects, as it is in 
Pure consciousness  dreamless sicep, is found to have a 
is bliss. blissful or peaceful existence. Con- 
‘ “sciousness in that state is bliss. 
When in the light of this discovery we scan the other two 
states we can understand that even there some joy dr 
bliss does exist'though in distorted or mutilated forms. 
The fleeting pleasures which we have in wakefu) life. and 
in dream can be understood as the fragmentury martfesta- 
tion of the joy or bliss which forms the essence of the 
self. This explanation is further supported by the fact » 
that man derives pleasure by owning property, etc., that is, 
by identifying them with his self. The self can thus bé 
explained as the ultimate source of all joy. This joy is 
ordinafily finite and short-lived because the self limits 
itself by identifying itself with finite and fleeting objects. 
Sorrow is related to. want‘and joy to fulness. When the 
self can realize what it really is, nam@gly pure cons¢ious- 
ness which is infinite (being frse from all particularity), it 
is one with thy essence or self of the universe. It is then 


above wand and attains infinite blies._ > 


460 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


It is also found from the akove arguments, that pure 
; existence without any specific limita 
Pieahoienipt Sapien tion is common to the self and to the 
of both the eif aca World outside, that consciousness is 
the external world. also present in both, though it is 
patent in the former and concealed in 
the latter. The reality underlying the world is, therefore, 
/dentical with that unterlyligtthe self. Had the Self and 
the world not a common basis, knowJedge of the latter by 
“the former would not be possible; and far less possible 
would be the identification of the self with efternal objeots. 
In other words, Brahman, the infinite existence-conscious- 
ness ig the only reality that constitutes the self and the ex- 
ternal world. Brahman is also found to be bliss or joy, 
since the state of dreamless sleep exhibits the intrinsic 
n&ture of tbe self, pure objectless consciousness, to be 
-identical with bliss. The finite appearance of the self as 
the egg, ‘I,’ in different contexts must, therefore, be due to 
A eared (avidya) which makes {t identily itself now with 
the bbdy and then with a sense or any other + finite 
existenge. 
. How infinite, formless consciousness, which is the 
self's essence, can assume particular 
Mayé or Avidya, the forms is a problem which we already 
Principle of limitation — came across in another form, namely, 
and multiplication of : 
the One Brahmeninto ow pure existence can appear as 
many selves. particular objects. As no particular 
and changing phenomenon can be 
regarded as reui, we have to face here the same insoluble 
puzzle, namely the appearance, in experience, of what is 
unreal to thought. In admitting this unintelligible fact of 
experience logical thought has to acknowledge a mysterious 
or inscrutable power by which the Infinite Self can 
apparently limit itself into the finite ego. So Maya is 
admitted by the Advaitin as the principle of apparent 
jimitation and multiplicatiom in this as in every other_ 
sphere. But this Maya may be conceived in a collective © 
as well as in a distributive way. We can imagine 
Brahman, the Infinite Pure Consciousness-Existen¢e-Bliss 
limiting itself by an all-overpowering Maya and appearing 
as the universe of finite objects and selves. Or, we can 
think of each indivjdual self as labouring under a power of 
ignorance and seeing, ingplace of the One Brahman, thé ’ 
universe of many objects and selves. These would be but 
thinking of the same situation from two differemé points of 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 461. 


Yew, the cosmic and the indjvidual. When such distinc- 
lon is mgde the word, Mayi,is restricted, as we said before, 
to the first or collective aspect of the power of ignorance 
and avidya to the individual aspect. 


The individual (jiva) can then be imagined metaphori- 
cally as but the reflection (pratibimba) 
The métepbor of of the Infjnite Consciousness on the 
reflection, pratibimbs. —_ finite mirror of ignorance (avidya) end 
tompared to one of the many reflec. _ 
tions of tfe muon cast on different receptacles of water.” 
Just as there the reflection varies with the yature of the 
reflecting water, appearing clear or dirty, moving or 
motionless, according as the water is of one nature or 
another, similarly does the human self, the reflection of 
the Infinite, vary*with the nature of the avidyd. We saw 
previoysly that the human oody, gross and subtle, is the | 
product of ignorance, and the mind (the antabkarana) is 
one of the elements composing the subtle body: The 
mind is thus a product of avidyi. Now, the mind mmy be 
more or less cultured ; it may be ignorant, impure, swayed 
by passicnt or enlightened, pure and dispassionate.” These 
differences can be said to constitute differences in the* 
avidyas of the individuals. The analogy of reflection would 
thus explain how the same Brabman can appear as different 
kinds of individual solves, without really becoming different 
and only being reflected in differnt kinds of minds 
constituted by different avidyis. This conception would 
also point to the possibility of attaining to a better and 
better realization of the Brahman in us by purifying the 
mind more and more. The possibility of a more tranqui 
state is also shown by our daily experience of dreamfess 
sleep, wherein the self, dissociated from objects, enjoys 
temporary peace. Z 


The attempt to understand the appearance of individual ' 
souls on*the analogy of images, is» 
ae patna Rede called the theory of phir (prati- 
Poor oF the imitation bimba-vada). One great disadvantage 
rie ast mmaginery of this metaphor is that it reduces the 
souls to mere images, and liberation, 
which according to it would consist in breaking the mirror 
cf ignorance, would also mean the tota¥ cessation of the 
iHusory individuals. To secure & stats of greater reality 
for the indivitlual, there is an alternatiye metaphor 
preferred by some Advaitins, namely the imaginary division | 


462 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


of Space, which really remaing one and undivided, ints 
different particular spaces. Just as the same space it 
conceived to exist everywhere and yet itis conventionally 
‘divided, for practical convenience, into the space of the 
pot, that of the room, that of a town and so on, similarly 
though Brahman is the one and all-pervasive Reality, it is 
supposed, through ignorance, tobe limited and divided 
into different objects and souls. Really, however, there 
is no distinction between objects and, objects, souls and 
souls, since all are at bottom the same pure existence. 
What is illusory here (in this alternative infagery) is dnly 
the limitations the finitude imposed on Reality by ignorance. 
Every soul, even when supposed to be finite, is really 
nothing other than Brahman, Liberation consists only in 
breaking the illusory barriers, and what was limited by 
them, namely existence, is then left tmaffected. This 
alternative explanation is known as the theory of limitation 
(avacchedaka- vada). 


The attempt of Sankara and his followers is to 
‘show how the intrinsic, pure” condition of the self can 
be regained. The fact that ihe blissful state of 
dreamless sleep is not permanent and mao once more 
returns to his finite, limited, embodied consciousness 
on waking up, shows that there remain even in 
dreamless sleep, in a latent form, the forces of karma or 
avjdyé which draw man into the world. Unless these 
forces, accumulated from the past, can be completely 
stopped, there is no hope of liberation from the miser- 
able existence which the self has in this world. 


The study of the Vedanta helps man conquer these 
Vedinis' bape kato deep-rooted effects of long-standing 
destroy ignorance oom- ignorance. Butthe study of the 
pletely truths taught by the Vedanta would 
have no effect ufless the mind is previously prepared. 
This initial preparation, according to Gatkara, is not 
the study of the Mjmarhea sitra, as Ramdfiuja thinks. 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY 463 


Ihe Mimithsi, which téaches the performance of 
Preparation, neces: sacrifices to the various gods, rests 
nd far zy nua be on the wrong conception of & 
stady of any ritualistic distinction between the worshipper 
mre An and the worshipped. Its spirit is, » 
therefore, antagonistic to the absolute monism taught 
by the Vedanta. Far from preparing the mind for the 
reception of the monistic truth, it only heJps to perpe- 


tuate the illusion of distinctions and plurality from 
which man already suffers. 


The preparation necessary for undertaking the study 
: of the Vedanta is fourfold, accord . 
ate the fourfsld ing to Sankara.’ One should, first, 
slone makes cnee ft be able to discriminate between 
: what is eternal and whatis not 
eternal (nitydnitya-vastu-Viveka). He should, secondly» 
be able to give up all desires for enjoyment of ° 
objects here and hereafter (ibamutrartha-bbogaviraga). 
Thirdly, he should control his mihd and his senses 
and develop qualities like detachment, patience, power 
of concentration (Samadamadi-sidhana-sampat). Lastly, 
he should have an ardent desire for liberation 
(mumuksutva). 
With such preparation of the intellect, emotion 
. and will one should begin to study , 
aed siediaster ae the Vedanta with a teacher who 
necessary for the has himself realized Brahman. 
realization of truth. . 
° This study consists of the three- 
fold process : listening to, the teacher's instructions 
(éravana), understanding the instructions through 


reasoning until all doubts are eemoved and conviction 
td 


+ 1 Vide Sadkara’s Bhadgya on siira 1.1.1 


464 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


is generated (manana), and fepested meditation on thé 
tyoths thus accepted (nididhyacana). 

The forces of deep-rooted beliefs of the past do not 
disappear so soon as the truths of the Vedanta are 
learned. Only repeated peditation on the truths and 
life led accordingly can gradually root them out. When 
wrong beliefs thus become rethoved and belief in the 
truths of the Vedanta becomes permanent, the seeker 

after liberation is told by the 
Realization of the teacher ‘Thou art Brahman.’ He 
identity between the . : 
ssf and Brahman is begins then to contemplate this 
» liberation Tom bond” truth steadfastly till at last he bas 
an immediate realization of the 
truth in the form‘I am Brahman.’ Thus the. 
illusofy distinction between the self and Brahman at 
“last disappears and, bondage, too, along with it. 
Liberation (mukti) is thus attained. 
Even on the attainment of liberation the body may 
‘continue because it is the product 
ouinerstion 2 Possible of kartnas which hdd already borne 
toa with the their effects  (prarabdha-karma). 
But the liberated soul does never 
agaip identify itself with the body. The world still 
appears before him, but he is not deceived by it. He 
does not feel any desire for the world's objetts. He is 
therefore, not affected by ‘the world’s misery. He is 
in the world and yet out of it. This conception of” 
Sankera has become well-known in later Vedanta as 
Jivan-mukti' (the liberation of one while he is alive), 
t 

1 Vide Satikara’s Badgys 60 sit.1.1.4 : ‘‘siddham jivato'pi vidon 
aéariratvam ;"«also on Kaths., 6.14: ‘Atha martyo’ sruyto prevelraus 
brabma samafanute.” « 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY. 465 


If is the state of perfection attained here. Like Buddha, 
the Saikhya, the Jaina and some other Indian 
thinkers, Sankara believes that perfection can be 
reached even here in this life. It is not a mere extra- 
mundane prospect, like heaven, to be attained here- 
after in®an unperceived fiffure. It is true that the 
seeker after liberation is asked to begin with some 
faith in the vestimony of the scriptures regarding the 
utility of the spiritual discipline he is requirtd to follow. 
But his faith is fully justified and more than repaid by 
the end it secures in this very life. 


Three kinds of karma can be distinguished. Kyrmas 
gathered in past lives adnsit of a two-fold division, those 
that havye-borne their effects (prarabdhba-karma) and those 
that still he accumuiated (safivita-karma). In additjon to 
these two kinds, there are kagmas which are being gathered 
here in this Jife (saiiciyamana). Knowledge of reality 
destroys the second kind and prevents the third und thus 
*makes rebirth irnpossible, But the first kind which has 
already borne effects cannot be preyented. ‘Hence the 
present body, the effect of such karma, runs its natural 
course and ceases when the force of the karma causing it 
becomes automatically exhausted, just as the wheel of a 
potter which bas been ulready turned comes to a stop only : 
when the momentum imparted to it becomes exhausted. 
When the body, wross and subtle, perishes, the Jivan-mukta 
is said to attain the disembodied state of liberetion 
(videha-mukti). . 


Liberation is not the profluction of anything new, 

nor is it the purification of any old 

It is net 8 Dew state; it is the realization of what 
product. : : 

is alwayg there; even in the stage 

of bondage, though not known then. Jor, liberation is 

nothing but the identity of the self an@ Brahman, which 

is always rgal, though not always recognized. The 


69—14505B 


466 AN INTRODUCIION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


attainment of liberation ig, therefore, compared 

the Advaitins to the finding of the necklace On 
the neck by one who- forgot its existence there and 
searched for it hither and thither. As bondage 
is due to an illusion, liberation is only the removal of 


this illusion. ae ¢ 
e 


Liberation is not merely the gbsence of all 
Liberation {s posi. misery that arises from the illusory 
tive bliss. sense of distinction between ths 
self and God. It is conceived by the Advaitin, 
“after the Upanisads, as a state Sf positive bliss 
(Ananda), because Brahman is bliss and liberation 
is identity with Brahman. * 


-‘Fhough the liberated: soul, being perfect, has no 
; ‘ _ end to’achieve it can work still 
It is not incompati- «¢« , 

ble with work without without any fear of further bond-- 
attachment. . ; pet 
; age. Sankara, following the Gité 
holds that work fetters a man only when it is performed 
with attachment, But one who has obtained perfect 
knowledge and perfect patisfaction, is free from 
attachment. He can .work without any hope of 
gain and is not, therefore, affected by succese or 
failure, Sankara attaches great importance to dis- 
_ interested work. For one who has 
neil eae a not yét obtained perfect knowledge, 
both the wise and the sych work is necessary for self- 

ignorant, : : 
purification (étma-suddhi)s because 
it is not through inactivity but through the performance 
of selfless action that one can gtadually free oneself 
from the yoke ofethe ego and its petty interests. Even 
for one who has obtained perfect knowledge or libera- 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 467 
‘ 
tion, eelfiges activity is necessary for the good of those 


who are stili in bondage.’ 

The liberated man is the ideal of society and his 
life should be worthy of imitation 

itened mora ‘te by the panple at large. Inactivity 
pie a ideal cf of activity that would mislead 
, A >» them should, therefore, be avoided 

by the perfect.” Social service is not, therefore, thought 
by Sankara to be “incompatible with the perfect life; 
but rather desirable. In bis own life of intense social 
service Sankara follows this ideal. This ideal is alec 
advocated by some eminent modern Vedantists like 
Svami Vivekananda’ and »-Lokamanya B. G. Tilak.‘ . 
The critics of Advaita Vedanta have often urged 

° that if Brahman be the only téality 

Pricsnidl use torah and all distinctions false, the distine- 
ae right 8nd tion between Fight and wrong also 
would be false. Such a»philosophy 

is, therefore, fruitful of dangerous consequences for 
Fociety. This objection is due to the confusion of the 
lower and the higher standpoint. From the empirical 
standpoint, the ‘distinction between right and wrong, 
like other distinctions, is quite valid. For one who,bas 
not yet attained liberation, any action which directly or 
indirectly lekds him towards the realization of his unity 
with Brahman, is good and that which hampers such 
realization, directly or indirectly, isbad. Truthfulness, 


3 Vide Satkara’s Bhasya on the Bhagabadgitd, 4.14, 8,20-26 and 
passim 

4 Sdid. 

3 Vide his Practical Vedanta. 

4 Vide his Gitdrchasya (a Marathi treatise on the Gita) on the above 
verses and Introduction, sec, 12, 


463 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


charity, benevolence, self-céntrc] and the like would he 
found to fall under the first category even according to 
this criterion, whereas falsehood, selfishness, injury to 
others would come under the second. One who has 
altained perfect knowledge and liberation would look 
back upon these moral distinctions as being relative to 
the lower standpoint and, ‘therefore, not Absolutely 
valid. But neither would he perform a bad action in 
so far as the motive of every bad action is based on the 
ignorant identification of the self with the body, the 
‘senses and the like, in a word, on the*lack of the sense 
of unity between the Self and Brahman." 


- A pragmdtic critic, for whom practical utility is the 
highest value, often complains that Satkara indulges in 
visionary speculation which reduces the world to an 
, empty show, deprives life ofall zest and causes failure in 
the struggle for exigtence. The reply to such a charge 
is that if man chooses to live the unreflecting life of an 
animal, or of the primitive, he need not go beyond the 
world of practical «reality. But if he isto use his reason 
eR AG Le and think of the nature and meaning 
_ Saiikara’s philosophy of this world he is itresistably Jed by 
is not detrimental to ee ise . 
practical life. logical necessity to realize, as we saw, 
‘ the contradictory and unreal nature of 
itand search for its real ground, Reason demands again 
that he should reshape his life on a rational basis in the 
light of what it discovers to be the highest reality. As 
a child grows into an adult he has to remodel life gradually 
in accordance with bis changing outlook The play 
things which were once valved more than things precious 
to the adult, yield place to the latter. Remodelling life 
: to suit a truer conception of reality 
mat, Places lise on 2 and value causes no harm te practical 
‘tichie baile. ‘life, but, on the contrary, places life 
on ae more rational, real and 
permanent footing. Jt surely deprives life of its zest ic 


1 For a fuller discussion tide Radbakrishoan, Ind, Phil., Vol. TY, 
pp. 612-34, snd speechea of Vivekénanda quoted by James in Prag- 
malism, pp. 152 f. : 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPRY 469 
4 
the sense that it control -the passions and impulses 
which push the animal, the child, and the primitive man 
blindly from behind. But it gradually replaces these blind 
forces by conscious and ration&l ideals which can create 
in Hi an enthusiasm of a higher and a more abiding 

ind. 
As tp the question of sprvival in the struggle for 
a re ie oe existence, it should be borne in mind 

280 1M, 8 lo ° 
Mea preatet en rvival “that, what constitutes fitness for 
value, 2 survival in the plant world, is not the 

same in the animal world, and it is 
all the more different in the human world. Social qualities , 
like love, unity, self-sacrifice and rational conduct possess 
greater survival value than egoism, jealousy, selfishness 
and blind passicnate conduct. And uo view of the world 
and life can supply a better fuundation for such superior 
qualities than the one which inspires man with the belief’ 
in the unity of all men, oll creation and, all existence. 
Such, is the view, we have found, of Satkera. Jt is a 
misunderstanding then to suspect it of baneful effect on 
practicaldife. The moral and spiritual discipline;which he 
recommends, ainis at the @ctual realization, in immediate 
experience, of the unity of existenve or the presence of , 
Brahman in all things, the unity which reasoning convinces 
us to be rea! by its irresistible logic, out whigh our present 
uctual experience of difference and ‘multiplicity tries- to sat 
aside. 

In conclusion, we ehould observe that the Vedanta 
of Sankara, in its different aspects, 
is an attempt to follew out the 

Upanisadic idea of the unity of all existence .to its” 
logical cdénclusion. With al] its defects and excellence, 
it stands in the bistory of human thought as the most 
consistent system of monism. As William James puts 
it (in appreciation of Sankara’s Vedanta as presented 
by Svémi Vivekinanda in,America) : ‘‘The paragon of 
,ail monistic systems is the Vedagta philosophy of 


Hindostan.’’' It is true that sudh a system fails to 
® 


Concjusion 


' Vide James, Pragmatiem, p. 151 


470 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


appeal io those who turn to philosophy for the justifica- | 
tion of tteir imperfect ideas of worldly distinctions and 
worldly values. Like the teachings of early Buddhism 
and Jainism, the monistic philosophy of Sadkara is 
only for the strong-hearted who can follow logic 
dauntlessly and face conditsions however subversive 
of ordinary ideas of reality and-vaiué. But, for those 
few who have the heart for it, Advaita mnism is not 

_ without recom pence and is not even without emotional 
satisfaction. As James puts it: ‘‘ An Absolute One, 
ang I that one,—surely we have here ageligion which, 
emotionally considered, has a high praginatic value ; 
it imparts a perfect sumptuosity of security.” 7 «We 
all havs some ear for this monistic music: it eleyates 
and reaggures.** 


Ill. Tae Qvarivirp Monism oF RAMANUJA 
(VisIsTADVAITA) 


. © 
1. Rdmdnuja’s Conception of the World 


, Ramanuja takes the Upanisadic accounts of 
Baindiuujs: accepts ths creation, stated previously, in a 
Upanigadic account of literal sense. He holds that 
one pee God, who is omnipotent, creates 
the manifold world out of Himself by a gragious act 
ef wil]. Witbin the All-inclusive God (Brabman) 

there are both unconscious matter 

The world is created 
_byGod from matter (acit) and the finite apirits ‘ (ci ‘(city 
which exists in Him. The first is the source of the 
materia! objects and as such called prakrti fie, root. 


1 Loe. eit., , P, 158. 
3 Loc, cit., tp: 154. 


"HE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 471 


er origin) after the ,Svetdseatara-Upanisad,’ the 
* Purands and Smrtis, whose authority Ramanuja highly 
values. This prakiti is admitted, as in the Sankbya, 
to be an uncreated (aja), eternal reality. But unlike 
Y Pei Sankhya, Ramanuja believes that it isa part of 
God ahd controlled by Géd just as the human body 
is controlled from. within by the human soul. 
During’ the “state of dissolution (pralaya) this primal 
unconscious nature or prakrti remain’ in a latent, 
subtle (sikgma) and undifferentiated (avibhakta) furm. 
God crea‘es out of this the world of diverse objects 
in accordance with the deeds of the souls in the world, 
Threc subtle elements Prior to the last dissolution. Im- 
ate fie gues on pelled by the omnipotent will of 
ther to form gross God the undifferentiated subtle 
plementes ® matter gradual:y becomes trans; 
formed into three kinds of ‘subtle elements-— fire, 
water and earth. These differentiated elements 
manifest also the three kinds of- qualities known as 
sattva, rajas and tamas. Gradually the three subtle 
elements become mixed up together and vive rise to 
all gross objects which we perceive in the material 
world.” In every object in the world there is a 
mixture of three elements. This process of triplication 
is known,as trivrtkarana. 


= 


t Svet., 4,5 (aiain ekith lobita-sukla-kpsnam, ete.) and 4.10 (mayath 
ta prakjtith vidyét, méyinath tu Maheévaram; tas) dvayavabbdtaiew 
vyaptaih sarsam ida jagat). Also vide Brahma-sit., 1.4.6. and 
Raménuja's Bhaégya thereon. 

+ 3 Vide Sribhdgya, Vedintasdra and Veddndadipa oH 1.4.8-10, 1.1.3 
and 2.1.15 inote that the gunas are eonceived here, after the Gité, as 
qualities, anceas produced by Prukyti, not ae the essenc® thereof), 


472 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


-Raménuja holds, thereforq, that creation is a fact 
and the created world is as ‘real as 
of Gatton is arealact Brahman, Regarding. the Upa- 
nigadic texts which deny the multi- 
plicity of objects and assert the unity of all things, 
Ramanvja holds that thesé‘fexte'do not mean tb t deny 
the reality of the many objects, but only te teach ach that 
in all of- then ‘there is the same Brahafan, on witch 
all are dependent for existence, é, just asall gold articles 
are dependent on gold. What the Upanisads deny 
is. the independence (aprthaksthiti)’ gf objects, but 
not their dependent existence. 
It ,is true, Kamanyja admits, that God has been 
ey . described (in the Svetdévatara) as 
Eon hee oe wielder of a magical power imiaya), 
Pay hae that is but this oply means that the inseru- 
takle power by which God creates 
the world is’as wonderful as that of a magician, The 
word. ‘ maya’ stanés for God's power of creating 
wonderful objects (vicitrartha-sargakari Aakti). It also 
stands sometimes for prakrti to signify ber wonderful 
creativity. : 





Ramanuja denies, therefore, that creation and the 
created world are illusory. To 

Réminuja holds that strengthen this position pe further, 
B knowledge is true. holds that all knowledge is true’ 
(yathartharh sarve-vijianam)* and that 

are is no illusory object anywhere. Even in the cause of 
the so-called illusory snake in the rope, he points qut that 
the three elements (fire, water, earth) by the mixture of 
which a snake is made, ure alsp the elements by the inixture 


a Sribhagya, LLL Ap. 101, B. V. Co. ed.t. 
3 Ibid., p. 88, 
3 Ibid., p. 83. 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPEY 473 


4 

of which a rope is made, #o that even in a rope there is 

sémething of a snake and this common element really 

existing in & rope is perceived when we take it for a snake. 

No unreal object is perceived® then. The constituent 

elements of every object being in every other thing, every 

so-called illusion can be similarly explained away. This 

theory of Ramanuja resembles in essential respects the 
view of some modern realists like Boodin, who bold that 

all immediate experiance of objects is true on the strength. 
of the quantum theory of Schrédinger, according to 
which each of the electrons, which compose material: 
objects, pervades the whole world, so that ‘‘Kverything is 

immanent in everything else.’"! 


(i) , Rimanuja’s Criticism of the Advaita Theory 
of Illusion 


Ramanuja, who lived long aiter Saukara, had the 
ma opportunity of criticizing séverely 
Aes pao ofthe the vies of Satkara as well as of. 
ais his followers, ¢n the course of his 
commentary on the Brahma-sitra. 
We are indebted to him for exposing many of the obscure 
points of the Advaita school. Though the ebarges raised 
by Raménuja have been replied to by the Advaitius, they 
have*great value for understanding more clearly both 
Ramanuja and Sankera. We shall mention here 
Ramanuja's chief objections against the Advaita theory of 
Maya or ajiiana and also show briefly how they can *be 
met from the stundpoint of Sankara. 


Where does the Ignorance (ajiiina), that is said to 
produce the world, exist ? It cannot be said to 
exist in, an individual self (jiva}, 
(1) Where docs Ignor- because individuality is itself produced 
ance exist ? by Ignorance and the cause cannot 
’ depend on its effect. Neither can 
Ignorange be said to be in Brahman, because then it 
ceases to be omniscient. > 


1 Vide J. BE. Bgod'n's paper ou ‘Functional Realism, The Philo- 
sophical Review, March, 1084. 


60 —1605B 


474 AN INTRODUCTION TO iNDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


t 
The reply to this, in defence of Satkara, would be that 
even if Ignorance be said to be in thb 
These difficulties are individual self, the difficulty arises 
based on some miscon- only if we regard the one as preceding. 
ceptions. . the other. But if we regard ignorance 
and individuality as but the two inter- 
dependent aspects of the game fact, as a cap and 
circumfereaice, or a triangle ‘and its sid&s; or fathérhood and 
souship, the difficulty does not arise. Gut if on the other 
hand, Brahman be regarded as the locus of Jgnorance, oven 
then the difficulty can be removed by removing a misunder- 
, Standing on Which it is based. Mayi im Brahman is 
Ignorance only in the sense of the power of producing 
ignorance and illusion in individuals ; it does not affect 
Brahman any more than the magician’s gower of creating 

_ an illusion affects bis own knowledge. 


It is said, that maya or gejfiina conceals the real 

mi a nature of Brahman. But Brahman is 
'2) Tf Ignorance con- admitted, to be essentially self-reveal- 
i ae ee ae ing. If Maya conceals Brahman it 
‘nature is destroyed. 8 means thdt His self-revealing nature 
is‘ destroyed by it and Brahman 


ceases to be. 


The reply to this i$ that ignorance conceals Brahman 
in the sense of preventing the ignorant ,ndividual from 
realizing His real nature, just as a patch of cloud conceals 
the sun by preventing a person from perceiving the sun. 
So Ignorance does no more destroy the nature of Brahman 
than the cloud destroys the self-manifesting nature of the 
sun. , Self-manifestation means manifestation of itself in 
the absence of obstacles—and not inspite of obatacles,. 
The sun does not cease to be self-revealing pecause the 
; blind cannot see it. ; 
What is the nature of the Ignorance ? Sometimes 
the Advaitios eay that miyé is in- 
(8) Ignorance is said =~ describable (anirvacaniya), it ig neither 
to be neither real nor = rea} nog unreal. This is absurd. 
unreal, but indescrib- Bec na 
able. P ecause our experience shows that 
€ things are either real or unreal. How 
can ee be a third'categbry besides these two contradic- 
tories . Fi 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY AG5 


The reply to this is that maya, as well as every illusory 
‘ object, is said to be indescribable 
The real meaning of Owing to a genuine difficulty. Ingo far 
‘indescribeble’ (anir- ag it appears to be something, an illu- 
vacsniya). sion or illusory object cannot be suid 
to be unreal like a square circle or the 
son of a barren woman, which never even appears to exist, 
Again in‘so far as it is sublated ‘or contradicted afterwards 
by some experience, is cannot be ssid to be absolutely real 
like Atmap or Brahman whose reality is never contradicted. 
Maya and evety illusory object have this nature and 
compe! us to recognize this nature as som&thing unique 
and indescribable in terms of ordinary reality or unreality. 
To say that maya is indescribable is only to describe a fact, 
namely, our inabiity to bring it under any ordinary cata- 
gory, and it does not mean "any violation of the law of 
contradiction. In fact as ‘real’ means here the ‘ abso- 
lutely real ’ and ‘ unreal ’ ‘ the absolutely unreal,’ they do 
not constitute a pair of contradictories any more thar, to 

words fike ‘extremely cold’ and ‘extremely hot’ do. 

eo 
Again Sometimes, may4 or avidya is said by the 
: Advaitins to ,be positive ignorance 
eink iy (bhiiva-ripam ajfianam). This is also 
ec are “mi gles. Tgnorante’means want 
of knowledge, and how ean it be positiye then ,? 


The reply-in defence would be that as the illusion- 
producing ignorance is not merely an absence of the know- 
ledge of the ground of illusion, but positively: makes this» 
ground appear as some other object, it is properly dgs- 
cribed as positive, in this sense. 


Gronting that miya is something positive, how can _ 
it be destroyed by the knowledge of ! 
Brahman ? Nothing that positively ‘ 
exists can be removed from existence ' 
by knowledge. 


(5) How can positive 
Ignorance be destroy- 
ed ? 


The *reply is that if the word ‘positive’ be understood 
in the sqnse given above, this misunderstanding would not 
arise. In our daily experieace of illusory objects, like 
the.serpent in a rope, we find that the objet positively 
#ppeara to be there and yet it vanishes when we have 
a clear knowledge of the ground of the illusion, vtz. 
the rope. 


476 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


2. Raménuja’s Conception of God 


God, according to "Ramanuja, is the. Absolute 
Gch ks teases Reality possessed of two integral 
Heality, poteessed of parts,matter and the finite spirits. 

Brahman jis the only reality in the 

universe in the sense that outside or,independert of 
God there is no other reality, But God contains within 
Himself the material objects as well as the finite souls 
which are real. The Absoiute One contains the many, 
This monism of Ramanuja is known, therefore, as 
Vibigtadvaita which means the Unity (advatta) of 
Brahman possessed (vigista) of real parts (the conscious 
and the unconscious). It is not a distinctionless unity, 
Threetypes of distinction (bhedaj are generally distin- 
guished by the Vedantins. The distinction that 
anything—say, 2 cow—has from things of other classes,« 
such as horges, asses, is called heterogeneous dietinc- 
tion (vijatiya-bheda). The distinction that one cow 
has from‘ another cow (i.e. an object of the same‘ class) 
‘is called a homogencous distinction (sajatiya-bheda). In 
alidition to these two kinds of externa) distinctions, 
there is a third kind, t.e. internal distinction (svagata- 
bheda), which exists within an object, between it~ 
different parts, such as between the tail and the leys 
of the same cow. In the light of this threefold 
classification of distinctions, Ramanuja holds that 
Brahman is devoid of the two kinds of externg! distine- 
tions (vijatiya and sajattya), becayse there is nothing 
besides God, either similar or dissimilar to Him. ‘ Rut 
God is Posseseed of internal distinctiong (svagata-bheda), 
as there are within Him different cotiscjous and 


THE VEDINTA PHILOSOPHY 477 


” unconscious substances which can be mutually a 
* tinguished. 
God is possessed of an ipfinite number of infinitely 
good qualities such as omnipotence, 
wacntion all good omniscience, benevolence. There- 
a fore, *@od is not characterless 
(nirguna’, or indetermjnute, but possessed of qualities 
(sagund). When the Upanisads deny qualities of 
Brahman, they really mean that God is free from all 
bad qualities or imperfections.’ God really creates the ? 
world, sustains it and withdraw: it. Even when the 
world is withdrawn and ‘its objects are destroyed, there 
remains in God matter in an undifferentiated, homo- 
geneous state, as well’ as the souls, because both are 
eternal. Objects made hy the modification of malter 
undergo change, growth and decay, but matter out of 
which they are created always remains there. Similarly . 
the spirits always remain, though their bodies may 
change or perish. In the state of digfolution, when 
objects are absent, Brahman remains with pure matter 
and bodiless souls in an unmanifested form (avyakta). 
This nay be caHed the caukal 
tenn a nomani state of Brahman (karana-bralima). 
When again objects are sreated, 
God becpmes manifested as the world of objects and 
embodied souls. This sepond manifested form of God 
: may be called its effect-state (karya- 
ede mani‘est- brahma). Those texts of the 
Upanisads which deny the existence 
af objects and describe God negatively as being beyond 
’ 
1 ' Nirgupayadééea — parasya Yrabmepo beya-gundsambandhéd 
upapadyante’ —Sribhagya, 1.1.1. (p. 108, R. V. Co. edi). * 


478 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


thought, speech, etc. really indicate the unmanifested ‘ 
state of Brahman.’ ‘ . 


If matter and spirits are parts of God, as Ramanuja 
repeatedly asserts, then does not God 
_ Hamanuja’s diffcul- really undergo modification with the 
ues regarding the rela- Change of matter? Does He not 
_ tion of God to matter b . os 
and spirits. ecome, glso subject to the miseries 
from which the spirits suffer? Are 
not then ull the imperfections and défects which we find 
in the world really inGod ? In the face of tese défiiculties 
Ramanuja seems to give up sometimes the imagery of parts 
and whole and employ other similies. Sometimes he takes 
recourse to the analogy of the body ‘and the soul. God is 
the soul of which the material objects and spirits compose 
the body. Just as the soul controls the body from within 
so God controls matter and spirits. He is thus congeived 
as the Antaryamin or regulator of the universe from within. 
With the help qf this analogy, Rimanuja tries to explain 
awhy «ihe charge of God’s being subject to misery and 
imperfection. The--seul,-he--gsays, is not affected by the 
bodily thanges and imperfections ; similarly Gtd is not 
affected by the changes in the universe; He remains 
. beyond them or transtends them. Soffietimes again 
Ramanvuja tries to prove God’s immunity by the.analogy of 
the king and kis subjects. The ruler; inspite of having a 
body, ‘is not affected by the pleasures and pains suffered by 
the subjects owing to their obeying or disobeying the ruler’s 
laws.” These explanations of Ramanuja show that he is 
not very sure in his mind-as to the exact nature of the 
relation between God and the universe. The relation 
betWeen the soul and the body is surely very much different 
from that between the king and his subjects; and none of 
these fwo again contains the relation of whole and parts. 
Besides, when Ramanuja also speaks of the universe as a 
“qualifying character (videsana) and God as the substantive 
{videsya), it is difficult to ufderstand bow God remains 
unaffected by the imperfections of the universe. Ramanuja 
himself is aware of the unsatisfactory character,of his 
explanation and in one place he makes an important 
confession which is not quite,in harmony with his general 
position. The essence (svariips) of: Gotl, he says there, 


t 
} Josd, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 291.15, 
2 Ibid., 2.1.34, 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 479 


remains unchanged by changes in the Universe, and,’ 


therofora, God is unaffected.' If this admission is to be 
logically followed, then, Ramanuja has to admit turther 
that malter which is subject to thange is not essential and 


‘internal to God, but externally related to Him, Then his 


central theory that matter and spirits form real parts of 
God and God is resily quajified by them becomes con- 
siderably weakened. To conceive matter and spirits as 
reaily existing withingGod and as really undergoing change, 
and to hold at the sdme time that God is not affected by 
these chunges, is td hold a very precarious position. 


Raémanouja’s conception of God is a kind of theism. 

ae Theism, in this narrow sense, means 

a eee of belief in God who is both immanent 

: and transcendent,’ and is also a 

Person, i.c. a self-conscious being posseseed of, will. 

We have seen that all these characters are present in 
Rimanuja’s conception of 470d. 

~ God is the object of worship and the goal of our 


religious aspiration. It is by pleasing God through - 


prayer that we can obtain salvation ‘hrough . His 
mercy. 
¢ 


3. Radmdnuja’s Conception of the Self, Bondaye ’ 
and Liberation . 


Ramannja holds that the identity between God and 
’ man taught by the Upanisade is 
Betweeu self aud ; 

God there is identity not really an unqualified one. Tt 
as woll ss difference, i. unthinkable that man who is 
finite c&an be identical with God in every respect. 
Man is hot different from God in the sense that God 
pervades and controls inan as well as overy other 


1 ibid. 
£ Vide,Watd, The Realm of Euds, p. 234., 


480 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


thing in the universe. Just as the existence of a part, 
is inseparable from the whole, that of a mode or 
quality from its substancé, or a living body from the 
soul which controls its life from within, similarly the 
existence of man is inse arable from God. Identity 
cannot be asserted, it is true, between two altogether 
different terms ; but it is also theaningless te assert any 
identity between exactly identical terms; because it 
would be a needless tautology. Identity can be asserted 
between two forms of the same substance. The 
statement, ‘This is that’ Devadatta assests, for example, 
‘identity between the person seen at present and the 
Looe in fhe past. The person can bé understood 

as the same in spite of different 
rae of positions; since the posjtions are 
‘ occupied ‘at different times. The 
Upanisadic dictum “That thou art’ (Tat tvam asi) 
should be understood in a similar way. ‘ That ‘ stands’ 
for God, the émniscient, omnipotent creator of the uni-' 
verse. ‘Thou ’ stands for God existing in‘the form of 
yan, the embodied soul (acid-visista-jiva-sarirakam). 
The identity asserted herg is, therefore, between God 
with certain qualification and God with certain other 
qualification—an identity of the two 
forms of the same * substance 
‘ (vidistasyaikyam). In view of this Ramanuja's Philo- 
sophy is called Visistadvaita or the identity’ of ‘the 

qualified.’ 


Qualified monism. 
R 


1 Vide Sribhagyd, ell, “ Prakéradvaya-visiqtaika-vastu-prati- 
pidanens séménidbikarapyath ca siddham."’ (Pp. 94-95 of B.V.Co. 
ed.). 


‘THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY 481 


Raminuja’s conception of the relation between the self 
and God is a veritable ‘ Serbonian bog ' which allows no esey 
footingyto any well-known logical category (such as identi- 
ty, difference and identity-in-difference). While refuting 

ahkara’s view that this relation is one of identity (ablieda) 
3 ee 80 much the difference between the self and 

od that the reader would be quite justified to suppose 
that proording to Rimiinyja the relation is one of' 
difference (bheda).! This supposition is further confirmed 
when one reads Lis commentary on Badarfyana’s sitra 
(2.1.22) which points out that Brahman is other than the 
embodied self. But the impression is reversed when one 
reads his Commentary on the sitra (2.1.13) teaching the 


Se ee A. eee 
Jivas itwcause, Brahman. He ‘hus seems to support: 
9 


two contradittcry views. | 


This conflict disappears, however, on reading his com 
mentary on the siitrn (2.3.42) purporting that the 
individual self is a pat of Brahman, * For, Ramipuja 
cleazly says there that if the relf is regarded as « part of 
Brahman we can reconcile the two opposite ,kinds of 
teachings of the revealed texts and of the aforesaid 
siitras, namely —thit—there is difference (bheda), and 
that there 1s also identity (abheda) between the two. 
Tn — ee there are both aeree i identity 
(bhedaébheda) between the part apd the ‘whole, so also 


18 there tetmilar relation between the self and God. 


‘It is Yeastnable 10 conclude then that according to 
Rimanuja, in different. respects, there are different kinds 
of relations between the self and God. In so far as vhe 
eelf ig finite ‘and subject 0 imperfection, and God is just 
the opposite in nature, there is difference; in so far as the 
self is insep.table from God who is its inuer substance 
(itma) there is identity (avheda or ananyhtva or 
tadatmy «)? =~ but as the self is a part of God, both identity 
and difference are tenablo. This is the final impressicn 
eveated by Rimianuja’s writings on many competent 
readers, among whom there is no less an authority than 
Madifavicirya, who says m the Suarvadarsana-saigraha 
that Ramaauja believes in all kinds of refations, bheda, 
abheda, and bhedibheda, it different respects, 


1 Vide Sribhagya 1.1.1, passim. 4 e 
2 -All these words are used by Ramanuia. 


482 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


But unfortunately even this well-founded conclusiot 
regarding Raminuja’s view regeives a rude shock from 
his rather surprising statements here and there ist whick 
he launches a wholesale attack on all the three kinds o! 
philosophers who advocate fespectively identity (abheda) 
difference (bheda) and identity-in-difference (bhedibheda).' 
The reader is thus swept away even from the last footholc 
‘and is left wonderimg whethere the writer who repeatedly 
demolishes his position, as soon as established, knows hie 
own mind ; and whether his sole purpoge is only to destroy 
the positions of otbers without constructing ay of Itis own. 


One can unéerstand why Raminuja should reject un: 
«qualified identity (abheda) or difference (bheda); but it ir 
difficult to see why he criticizes even the theory of identity- 
in-difference (bhedibheda), if he himself advocates the 
vie& that both difference and édentity, d& taught by the 
scriptures, are real. It appears that in criticizing. the 
advocates of bhedivheda, he has two classesof them in 
ming: (1) those who hold that* the self is nothing but 
Brahmén imagined as limited by some extraneous or 
accidental, adjunct (upddbi)—juet as the space of the room 
is nothing but the all-pervasive space imagined as* limited 
e by the room; and (2) 7 who hold that the self is but a 
‘mode of Brahman who bas really assumed a finite form.’ 
In respect of the farmer, Rimiinuya’s objection és that as 
they hold that the self ip really Brahman (the distinguish- 
ing limiting adjunct being imaginary), the imperfections 
of the self would also really belong to ®Brakman. an 
respect of the latter, he points Ou at as Brahman 
aceording to them is really reduced toa finite self, He 
really becomes subject to all, the imperfections of the 
latter. Tut these objections are obviated, he further 
pointa put, by bis own theory according to which the 
conscious souls (cit) and unconscious matter (acit), though, 
pessessing different natures (svaripa) from the albinclusive 
Brahman, are eternally and inseparably related to Hirn 
as parts to their whole, effects to their material cause, 
attributes to their substance. 

What Ramianuja struggles to make out is. that 
Brahman never becomes in any way asclf, just es the 
whole never becomes a part, ora substanco never becomca 
ao attribute. ,Rrabman is eternally ‘Brihman, and the 

¢ 

1 Big. Sribhdgya, 11 tp. 06): 1.1.4 
« 3 Ibid, p.97.° 


THE AVEDANTA PIHLLOSOPHY 4&3 


selves within Him eternally exist as such. But how then 
can Réfevinuja speak of Brahman ag the cause ‘of thé 
Jiva (or of matter) if the latter does not arise ftom the 
former ? It would appear thet by calling Brahman the 
causo he does not mean the immediate unconditional 
anteccdent but only the material or the substance. God. 
as the» ultimate whole of eaistence (sat) is the substance 
eternally underlying all finites. The whole does not 
precede the partS, not do parts succeed the whole 
Brahmah always exists asa whole possessed of parts, an 
never becomes, parts, and therefore, dces not becom 
subject to the imperfections of the parts. 

Though it is doubtful whether this analogy of the part 
aud tbe whole saves Brahman from all imperfections, it 
would be ciear itom the above that Raminuja’s objection is 
not s9 much against the relation of identity-in-difference as’ 
such (which he himself advocates under sittra 2. a, 42) but 
ugainst the particular iugrmulations of it. Identitwin-. 
difference means, for him, identity of the one’ subs- 
tance existing in two real forms (‘eham eva vastu dyiripam 
pratiyate” ; ‘ prakira-dvaygvasthitatvat simanadhikaranya, 
sya'*), What he rejects are (1) jdentity of the one subs- 
tance appearing as two owing to misconception, and (2) 
identity of-the one which has become really two. Between 
the whole and the part there is identity-in-difference, not of 
any of these last two kinds, but of the first kind. The 
whde really pessesses different parts from which it is 
always different as a whole, but the same identical whole is 
also in every part, though it does not become reduced a 
many (in which.case the whoje would be divided and cgase 
to be a whole), - 

Tt wiil also be found that in upholding the unity.of the 
substance, and muking it the foundation, and in treating 
multiplicity only us a dependent character of the ono 
Ramanoja’s emphasis is on the aspect of identity rather, 
than on that of difference, though he treats both as real. 

Thia view also enables us to distinguish the position of 
Ramanyja from that of Nimbirka, tor example, who too 
believeg in a kind of identity-in-difference (bhedabhedu). 
As Ghate rightly points ouf, ‘'Thus we see that the 
doctrine of Nimb:itka has very much in commpn with that 
ef Rimanyju, both regard the differencetas well as the non- 


1 Ibid. pod dv. 
2 Tbid. p. 94. 


484 AN INTRODUCTION 'TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 


difference as real. But, for Nidtbarka, difference and non- , 
difference ere on the same level, they co-exist and Have the 
same importance; while for Ramanuja, non-difference is 
the principal; it is qualified by difference, which is thus 
subordinate to it. This also explains why Riméanuja’s 
philosophy is called qualified moniem, rather than qualified 
dualism or monism dualism (deaitidvaita). e 

The extremely puzzling statements of Raméanuja, 
regarding his attitude to identity, diffekence, and identity; 
in-difference tempt some writers to uvoid the atfempt to 
bring his view sunder any of these usual categories of rela- 
tion ; and lead them to hold that Ramiiouja’s conception of 
the relation between self and God, is a category by itself; 
it is inseparability (‘aprthaksthiti’). But this is merely °. 
givéng up the game of logical understunding. For, insepa- 
rability of existence is itself o vague relation, admitting 
of various formulations. Even Sadkara’s conception of the 
relation betweer the effect and the cause (ananyatva) can 
come under this. Besides, logical thought is not silenced 
by this, new-fangled name; <t requires to understand 
what this relation means in terms of identity arfd differ- 
eice ; or, failing this, why this relation defies such uffilia- 
tion. Wehave seen above that it is possible to interpret 
Ramanuja’s conception as one of identity-in-difference of « 
specific kind,« and that he himself accepts this io 
some ‘places. “There “is no necessity. therefore, of 
dodging the issue by resorting to u ‘ bianket term’ (jke 
‘aprthak-sthfci' or ‘aprthaksiddhi’) whivh conceals, rather 
than explains the difficulty. 

Man, according to Ramdanuja, has areal body and 

: a soul. The body is made of matter 
ot rapan body and which is a part of God. It is obvi- 
< ously finite. The soifis, Uf course, 
bof made ; it is eternally existing. Tt is also a part of 
God, and cannot, therefore, be infinite. The all-perva- 
sive nature of the soul which the Upanisads describe 
cannot, therefore, be taken.,in the literal sense. The 
real sense oft the pervasiveness of the soul is that the , 
soul isso subtle (siksms£) that it can penetrate into 
On a Je ‘ 


en ae ete oe ee 


1 V. 8, Ghaté. The Vedauia, p. 82. € 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPAY | 485 
every Unconscious materialeubstance.’ Having denied 
i that the sou) is infinite, Ramanuja 
but inGotely smell, as to hold that Wie infinitely small 
(anu). For, if the soul has neither 
of these two extreme dimensions, it myst be admitted 
to have the medium one, whieh “Things composed Ty 
the combination | “Ot jurts “uch as tables and chatrs) 
have ; and thei like such objects the soul alno would 
be liable to destruction. The conxcionsnexx of the 
Ee eae soul is not accidental to it ; a ig uot 
essential quahty of dependent on its connection with 
nee the body. Consciousness is an 
intrinsic quality of the soul and it remaips under all 
conditions. In dreamless sleep and even in» the 
state of liperatiou, when the soul is altogether dis- 
embodied, the soul remamé conscious of itself asx ‘1 um.’ » 
The soul is, therefore, identified’ by Ramanuja with 
what we mean by the word ‘1’ or the ‘ ego,” (abam).* 
The bondage of the sual to tie body is due to its 


eI mai, 


~ * + karma. Ae the effect of its karma, 
The bondage of the 
Soir tide te ketina the soul is associated with the parti. 


cular kind cf body it deserves. 
Being embodied, its consciousness is limited by the 
conditions of the organs of knowledge, und the body it 
possesses. * Though the soul is infinitely smail, it, 
illumines ur renders conscivts every part of the body - 
in which it is, just ax a small light ilumines the entire 
room ist which i is, It identities itself with the body 
and regards it asilself. [goism (ahahkara) isa name 


» “ vyapi, ati-eukgmataya earveretantulel pie reeyie: avabbavah," 
SHibhdsya, 1.1.1. 


oss Svardpeys gva abawartbah Sima; ee tedetatl api shamarthal 
prakadate,’” Jted. . 


486 AN INTRODUCTION ‘to INDIAN PHILOSOPHY ; 


for this identification of the self with the not-self. 
Avidya or ignorance consists in this base propensity.’ 
Karma also is sometimesidentified by Ramanuja with 
this ignorance. 

The attaiament of liberation must be, sought 
The liberation of the thrqugh work and knowledge, 
sou! ie sought through 
work and knowledge. | because they have the ,way for 
devotion. By work (karma) Ramanuja means here 
the different‘ obligatory rituals enjoined by the Vedas 
on persons according to their respective castes and 
tutions in life (varnadgrama), These *should be per- 
formed life-long as bounden duties without any ‘desire 
for reavard, like heaven, Lisinterested ‘performance 
ha aks sapave of such duties destroys the accumu- 
forming, yituals for lated eff—ctx of the pagt deeds 
dosteoy ing Katmai, which stefnd in the way of know. 
ledge. For the correct performance of these rituals it 
is necessary to study the Mimaiisa philosophy. 
Raméuuja regards, therefore, the study of the Mimatisa 
as a necessary pre-requisite to the Study of “the 
Vedinta. By the study of the Mimamsa and perfor- 
mance of the duties in its light, one comes to realize 
also that the sacrificial rites cannot lead to any 
permgnent good and cannot help man to attain salva- 

etion. This persuades him to study the Vedahta. The 
e Vedinta! reveals to him the regal 
karate of Veddate. nature of the Universe. He comes 
to know that God is the creator, 
sustainer and controller of al! beings, and that hie soul 
is not identieal with the body, but is really a part, 


e € 
1 “ Sarfragocaré ce shathbuddhir uvidyaiva "3 ¢ anétmani dehe 
é hambhéva-karapu-hetut vena abafikérah,” Ibid. . 


THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPBY " 487 
»\ 
of God who controls it fromewithin. He further learns 
thut liberation can be attained not by ‘study and 
reasoning,’ but only if God is pleased to choose him 
for liberation. 
The study of the Vedanta produces only book- 
bg learning and does not bring about 
Bare ones a liberation. It is true, as the Upani- 
See manee sads say, that liberation is brought 
about by knowledge. But that 
real knowledge is not a verbal knowledge of scriptures ; 
for then everyone who reads them would be liberated: 
at once. Real knowledge is a steady, constant remem- 
brance of Ged (dhruva smrti). This is varivusly 
dex ribed as meditation (dhyana), prayer (np&sana), 
devotion (bhakti). Constant meditation on God as 
the dearesé object of love; should be practised conti- 
nuously along with the performance of the obligatory 
rituals which remove the obstacles to knowledge. 
Intense remembrance of God, or devotion thus prac- 
7 » o tised, ultimately matures Into an 
precbtaet ree” immediate knowledge (darsana or 
inediate knowletye of = siksatkara) of God. This is, there- 
fore, the fina] means to liberation. 
This brings about the destruction of all ignorance gnd 
karmas by which the body is caused. Therefore, the 
soul that realizes God is libgrated from the body for 
ever,* without any chance of rebirth, We should 
remembes, however, that liberation cannot be attained 
simply by human efforta, God, pleased by devotion, 


helps the devotee -to - attain perfect knowledge by 
e 
1 ** Ato...dhydnop&ssnddi-sabde-vacyafa jnanv ; "ve danam upé- 
sanam svat ;"’ ‘ypisanh-poryayntvat bhakti-dnbdasya,” Srifhdsya, 1.1,1. 


488 AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PAILOSOPHY 
removing obstacles. (tod* lifts from bondage and 
God's help ia neces: Misery the man who flings himself 
ary for liheration. at the mercy of God and constantiy 
remembers Him as the only object of love. 
Liberation is not the soul's becoming identical with 
God. The liberated soul having 
Tte liberated coulis pure cotiscioleness., untainted: by 
lke God, not tdentica! : 7 : i 
with God. any imperfection, necomes, in this. 
respect, similar {o God (brahma-- 
prakaéra). This similarity of nature is what is meant 
‘by the Upanisads which say that the liberated soul 
attains unity with God." ; 
We saw previously that according to tne unqualified 
monism of Sankara, the highest good 
Conclusion. : . : 

: lies im a complete denial of the 
separate self and the realization of its unity with 
God. The religious sentiment of the monist attains | 
full satisfaction by total self-effacement which leaves 
nothing but God, vhe sole, self-shining Reality. But 
for the ‘theist, like Ramanuja, this ‘is « dismal: pros- 
pect. ‘The highest satisfaction of the religious emotion 
demands no doubt self-purification and self-surrender, 
but not complete self-effacement. The highest good 
for the devotee is the pure and constant contemplation 
of the infinite glory of God, and the liverated one 
needs his self if only for the enjoyment of this highest 
bliss. Free from ignorance and bondage of every kind, 
the liberated soul enjoys, in perfect love and wisdom;’ 
infinite joy born of complete communion with God.’ 


A 
1 “ShdnsikdkGrc ‘syé Brabma-prokdratfi ucyate."" Sribhdgya, p. 71 
(R. V. & Co, edition). 
2 Tbid., 4th Pada of 4th Adhydya, passim, 


INDEX 


Abbéva (non-existence), 44. 277f, 874f. 
Abhidharma, 176 

Absolute, 408.404, 432f, 
Acardtga-sitra, 128, 124 

Adhy&us, *124f., 430 

Adrgta, 18, 70, 2eat., 262f., 355 
Advaita, 420 

Advaitasiddhi, 204% 428 

Ahadkara, 3001., 814, 494, 485 
Abit (von-violence), 85, 122-23, 345 
Akésa, 29, 41, 70, 104, 111, 2320, 260f., 318, 425, passtm 
Aksapada, 187 

Alayavijiiane, 172 

Alexander, 8., 107 

Amitabha, 182 

Anslogy, 367f, 

Ansattavada, 153 

Anekantaviida, 85, 99f. 
Anguttara-nikaya, 142 

Aniruddha, Vyt!i, 200, 243, 298, 303, 307. $22, 324, passin 
Anselm, 250 

Ant.-theisti¢ Arguments, 251f., 329f. 
Anupalabdhi (non-perceptivn), 54, $16. B74f., 45¢ 
Anvikgiki, 187 

Aparva, $82f. 

Aranibha-vad- , 294 

Aristotle. 222, 260, 357 

Arthépatti, 53 316, 372f.. 155 
Arya-satye. 16, 3ef,. 134f, 

Aspuka, IR - 

Asatkarya vada, 2941. 

Agcka, 177 

Astika, 6,4 

Ashkaya, 104{, 

Rauri, 291 

Aévaghosa, 164 

Athewm 73, 125f., 291f., 330 

Atomic theory, 261f., J8if., 381 
Authority, 8-11. Q4TT., 368f., 374 


Badaréyana, 397, 412, 420 

Borua, B.M., 4 History of Pre-Buddhislte Indian Philosophy. 120 
Bunsendjne, M., 152 

Bergson, H., 140, 4 ot 

Berkeley? 98, 175 

Bhadrsbabu, Kalpasiiira, 83 

Bhagavadgita, 28, 248; 467- 

Lh iipariccheda, 186, 210, 219, 228, 230, 272, pagsim 
Bhojaraja, Vrtti, $35, 888, $41, 353 

Bodhicitte, 180 

Bodbisattva, 

Body, grods and sige $14, 426, 454 


§2-—1606B 


490 " INDEX 


Bondage, 115f., 842, 452f., 479f. 

Boodin, J. B., 98, 473 : 

Bradley, F. H., Principles of Logic ,221; Appearance and Reality, 454 

Brabma, N. K., The Philosophy of Hindu Sédhand, 934 

apr 69, 405f.; saguna, 442fr; nirguna, 445f., 449f.; four aspects 
ar, 

Brahmajalasiitra, 134, 135. 162 

Brahma-siitra, 18, 54, 397, 412, passim 

* Brahma, 25, 2odf. " 

Brhada@ranyaka, 248, 396. 406, 4U8, 410, passim 

Brhaspati, 64 

Brhaspati-sitra, 74 . ; 

Buddha, 131; amitabha, 182; anti-metaphysical, 144; as God. 181; 
enlightenment, 186; silence, 136, 168f., 465 

Buddhacarita, 16% 

Buddhi, 189, 196, 266, 31M, 308f. 


Caird, E., The Critical Philosophy of Kant, 249; The Evolution of 
“Theology in the Greek Philosophers, 418 " 
Carvéka, 27, 68f., 85, 212, 288 808, 354; sudiksita and dhirta, 74 
Causation, 67, 187, 152, 259f , 293f., 382, 428 
Chandogyc, 396, 406, 411, passim ‘ 
Chatterjee, 8. C., The Nydya Theory of inowiedge, 202, 204, 210, 216, 
222, 227, 319, 321 @ 
Chatterj:, J.C., The Hindu Realism, 256 
Cttsukhi, 428 
omparison, see Upaméana = 
soncentration, )49f., 344f., 352 
Copreloustcet: 71f. 85f., 100f., 109, 159, 174, 233, 804. 384, 406, 432, 


Contemporary American Philosophy, 1° 
Coster,,G., Yoga and Western Peychology, 384, 335, 358 
Creation, 241f., 855f., 420f. 


Daréana (philo ophy), 2, 9 
Darwin, 24, 140 
Las, R., The Essentials of Advaitism, 394 
Das, 8. K.. A Study of the Vedanta, 394 : 
Dasgupta, 8. N., History of Indian Philosophy, 290, 896; The Study of 
Patanjali. 384; Yoya as Philosophy and Heligion, 354 
Datta, D. M., The Sir Ways of Knowing, 367, 870, 372, 376, 456 
Deism, 244, 416 
Descartes, 107,111 
“vestruction (pralaya), 281f., 431 
Dedasen, P., The Philosophy of the Gpanigads, 39% 
Dhamma, 158f., 1&9 
Dhammapada, 180, 155 
Dharmakéya, 182 
Dharmakirti, 170 
Dharmamegha, $46 
Diatogues of the Buddha, 134, 135, pussem 
Digambera, 84 , 
Dighanikaya, 136, 148 o 
Dignaga, 172 i 
Dream, 456f. 
Dreamless sleep! 340, 409, 456f., 485 
(Duty, 61f., 871, 387. : 


INDEX - 491 


Eaton, R. M., General Logie, 215, 222 
Bightfold Noble Path, 145f. ® 
ncyclopagd® Britannica, 203 
Epicureans, 77 
Error, 197f., 378f., 486f., 472f. 
Evolution, 4Bf., 807f., 414 


Fallacy (hetvabhésa), 221f. 

Fatalisrn, 18 

Four Nok} Traths, 16, 33-35, 184f., » 
Free W5ll, 18 

Fanciional Realism, 473, 


Gatgefa, Tattva: nfamani, 188, 200, 216, 281 

Gandapada, 169, ath ya-karika- -bhdgya. 292, 328 

Gautewa (or Gotama), 37, 187 

Ghate, The Vedanta, 304, 434 

God, 28, 32, 89f., 72f , 1981, 176f., 240f., S2xHf,, 353f., 387f., 400f., 410F., 
449f., 476f., 


Green, Prolegomerfa to Ethics, 452 


Guna (quality), 1OOf., 265f., 296f., 368 
Gunaratna, nes 91, 94, 99, 103, 106, 108-14, 118 


Haribhadra, Grgtacionaceernct aya, 62, 64, R2, 87, 31, 118, 41 
Harih@rananda-Aranya. Patanjala Yoqa- ~daréana, 334 
Heaven and hell, 73f,, 389 

Hedonism, #4, on 

Nogel, 357, 418, 426 

Uemacandra, 87 

Henotheiam, 400f, 

Hibbert Jougnal, 144, 169 

Hinayana, 46f., 132f., 163. 1761, 

lliriyanna, M., ” Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 240, 394 
Héffding, H The Philosophy of Religion, 18 

Husw, Dr., The Thirteen Principal Upanigads, 304 
Huxley, Aldous, Ends and Meona, 2 

Uypothesis, 874 


Identity, 39d. 453f., 479f. 

igacianss (ajanns avidya, avivekal, 19, 39, 58f., 119, 139f., 323, “4ulf., 
4 4 

THusion, 421f.. 478f. 

Immanencre, A. 417, 444 

Lintortality# 405f. 

Indeterminable questions (avyakatam:), 135 

Indriya, 22, 201f., 312f., 381 ¢ 

Influction, 66f., 212f., 216 

Taference, 65f.; 89f., 206f., 819f., 865, 375, 455 

Inherertce (samavaya,, 375 


Jacobi,"H., The Jaina Sitras, 82, 83, 128 

Jaimini, 50, 63, 460 . 

Jmmini-sitea, $63, 963, 869, 870, passim 

*Jaini, J., Outlines of Jainism, 979 

ane W..17 158 ; Prag gmatism, 17,78, 46d, in; Principies of Peycho- 
ogy, 2 

Janet, Ph, inal Causes, 248 


. 


492 - INDEX 


Jétaka, 182 

Jayanta, Ny@yomanijari, 188, 236 

Jeans, J. H., 24 

Thé, Gatganath, Nydye-sitras, 186; Pad&rthadharmasahgroha, 256 ; 
Mimathsd-stitra of Jaimini, 360; Prabhdkara School of Parva 
Mimétnsé, 360; Sloka-varttika, 360, 391 


Jina, 29, 88 
Jivanmuktiand videhatuukti, 47, 328, 464f. 
Kalpa, 284 - 


Kama-siiira (of Vitsyayans), 62, 75, 78-79 

Kanéds, 12, 40. 257, 277 

Kant, 246, 249, 857, 888, 419 

Kapila, 44, 291 

Karma, 17f., 31, 115f., 154f.. 260f., 881, 466F., 488f. 

Katha, 837, 396, 407,.410f. 

Kausitaki, 248 , 

Keith, A. B., Indian Logic and Atomism, 256; The Samhkhya System, 
290; Karma Mimathea, 360 : 

Kei, 446 ' 

Khandana-Khanda-.Khadya, 428 ' 

Knowledge, theory of, 64f., 95f., 195f.. 315{., 8362f., knowledge of, 386; 
of self- 236f , 384f. ; truth of, 376f., 472 ‘ 

Krause, 417 . 

Kumarils, 53, 860, 362, 365, 381 


Language, logical analysis of. 229f., 321, 868f. 
rari 166, 172 . 
ibniz, 357 


. Liberation (mukti), 19, 23. 47, 55, 74f., 118f., 141f., 923f,, 829F,, 349f., 


389{., 452f , 479f., passim 
Locke, J,, 111. 175 
Lokfyatika,64 x 
Lotze, H., Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, 243, 249f., 419 


Mackenzie, J., Hindu Ethics, 12: ‘ 
Madhavacirya, Sarca-daréana-sangraha, 4,62, 64,198, 110, 164, 166, 
172, 210, 248, 251, 256, 377 

Madhya, 379 

Médlyamika, 35, 162-63, 164f. . 

Mahanidana-sutta, 154 

Mahdaparinirodna-sitra, 155 

Mehavira, 29, 83 

Mahéyana,'S6f., 182f., 161, 163. 176f. ‘ 
Majjhimanikaya, 195, 142-43, 145, 148 

Majimdar, A. K., The Sankhya Comeeption of Personality, 200, 328, 

330 

Mallisena, Syadodda-manjasi, 82, &9, 102, 104, 107, 126 

Manas (mind), 41, 201, 264f., 310f. 

Martineau, J , A Study of Religion. 244 

Materialism, 63f., 70f 

Matter. 110f., 116f., 470F. “ 

Max Miiller, 391, 400: The Siz Systems of Indian Philosophy, 390 
Mayé, 57f., 431, 4281. 4POf., 446f., 472f. 
MeTaggart, The Nature of Hzista:ce, 482 

Meditation {(d@by&na), 20, 344f., 351, 487 
. Milinda, 145 


INDEX . 4938 


M:lindapaftha, 145, 159 

Moinentariness  Ckgaike. rede), Wt, 158F. 
; wars 

Moore, Gy 175 

Moral osder, 16, 18, 281f. 

Mundaka, 406f. 

Mysticism, 161f., 357 


Nagarjuna, Madhyamika-éastra or -kérik@, 164, 166- 68, 189 8] 
Nagaserg, 145 

Nastikae 6 

Neturslism, 78 

Nature, 24 4 

Nemichaadra. Deavya-satgraha, 82, 104, 107, 113, 124-292 126 
Nidana, 139. 

Nibilism, 416; see Madhsamika 

Nimbarka, 379 

Nirvana, 135, 141-45, 169 

Nydya-sitra. 188-89, 199, 217, 226.29, 999. 235, 240 
Nyaya-varthika, 189, 222, 281 

Nyaya-varttika-tatpaya-tiké, 188.196, 202 

Nydya varitika-tiiparya-pariéuddht, 188 


One Hundred and Eight Upanjéads. 894 
Optimism. 16-18 


Padartba, 189f., 25@f, 
Palmer, G. H. 7 
Paficakérani, 212 . 
Paficamahavrata, 122f. 
Paficaprana, 332 
Paficadikha, 291 

Paneasila, 122 
Paficaskandha, 159 
Paficikarana, 126 
Panentheisn, 402, 417-18 
Panthriew, 391, 408, 417-18 
Parinama-vida, 3 6, 424 


Parsons, LL. M , Everyday Science, 25 

Pairévanatha, 83 . 

Paryaya, 1COF , 113 

Patatiiali, 48, 335, 353 

Perception, Gif. 86f., L99f., 315f., 363F. 

Perry, R. B, Philosophy of the Recent Past, 18 

Pessimism, 16 136 

Plato, 107, 357 

Tolytheism, 391f., 400. * 

Potthapdda Sutta, 125, 150), 158 

Trabbikaera, 52, 362, a ee 

Prabhakara- -vijaya, 88 

Pragniatiam, 869 

Prakarana-paftcikd, 365-67, 372, 979, 882-85, 388 92 
_ Prokatartha, 257 
. Prameyakamalamartanda, $9, 98, 125, 227 
Pragastapadn, Padarthe-dharma- sangvaha, 934, 256, 272-75, 281, 285 
Praéna, 239 
Pratitygeanaitpada, 187, 153 


we 


494 "INDEX 


Protagoras, 98 

Psychical Research, 857 
Peycho-analysis, 357 
Purénsa, 25, 285, 337, 47] 
Pyrrho, 98 


Radhakrishnen, 8., 144, 169; Indiatt Philosophy, 16, 68, 186, 290. 960, 
894, passim ; 
Réménuja, 56, 412, 424; world, 170f.; may&, 472; ilusion, 478f ; 
God, 476f.; self, 479f.; bondage and liberation, 479f.; Sribhasya 
471-72, 4771., 485-88, "passim "a 4 
Ranade, R. D., A Constructive Survey of Upanigadic Philosophy, 394 
Rao, P. Nagaraja, The Schools of Vedanta, 807 * 


Ratngprabha, 257 
Ravana, 257 
Rocognition (pratyabhijaa), 206 
~ Relations, 275f. - 
a verte Dialoques of the Buddha, 190, 134-35, 148, 145, 152, 154; 


Rhys Davids, Mrs , Buddhism, 180, 187 ; Buddhist Psychology, 159 
Ritwaliem, 61, 361f., 869f., 407, 463, 486° 

Rg-veda, 399F. : . 
Rgabhadeva, 83 

Rta, 17, 400 ; « 

“Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, 278 


Sabara-bhagya, 360, 862, 366, passim 

Saivdgame,Al6 

Samadhi, 49f,, 344f., 852 

Samanfa-phala-sutta, 144 

« Rarhyoga, 266-67, 3071, 

Satnyuttanikdya, 135, 153, 159 ‘ 

Sankara, 56, 412f,; world, 420f., 427f., 489f.; maya, 428f.; errar, 436f ; 
God, 4421. ; self, 452f ; byndage, 455f.; liberation 480%. 

Sankara-bhdsya, 396, 421-28, 429, 431, 443, 446, passim 

Sankhya-kartke, 13, 292f . 296, 803, 307, 399. passim « 

Sankhya karika-bhasya,, 292, 298 

Sankhya-pravacana-bhasya, 292, 293, 296, 298, 38-09, 814, passim 

Sdakhya-praracana.siitra, 291 

Sarkhya-sdea, 292 

Sankhya-siitra, 201, 808, 309-12, 814, 892, 324-28, passim 

Santaraksita, Tattvasangraha, 172 

Saptapaéartht, 257 

Sarker, M1. N., The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, 394 

Sastradipikd, 227, 360, 863, 864, 966, 970, 872, 375, 379, paskin 

Batri, K., The Introduction to Advaita Philosophy, 394 

Shatri. P., Introduction to the Pirna Kimdmnsé, 860 890 

Sastri, 8. The Sénkhyo-Karika of lérarakrsna, 200 

Satkarya-vada, 203f, 424f. 

Schiller. F.C, 8., 97, 98 

Schopenhauer, 405 

Schrodinger, 473 

Seal, B. N., 3 ; The Positive Sciences of the Ancien! Hindus, 186, 207 

Self (or Soul), @if., T06f,, 156f,, 238f., 268!., 308f., 341f., SBSE . 4NG., 
459f., 479F. passim = ¢ 

Shastri, D., A Short Hislbry of¢Ind‘an ‘Materialism, 62; Charvéka- 
Shashti, 62 ¢ ; 

« Siddhaniamuktdvali, 186, 200-01, 207, 210, 216, 219, £28, 225, passim 


INDEX "495 


Biadhasena D Divikars, Nydydvaléra, 89, 91, 109; Nydydvatdra-viorti, 89, 


Silécara, 45, 148 

Similarity, 366- G0 

Sinha, N., The Vaséegika Sutra 8{ Kanada, 256; The Saémkhya 
Philosophy, 290 

Siz Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, 272 

Slokavdrttika, 360, 366, 370, 375-377, ele 484 

Socrates,@1 

Sogen, VY, 8 ystems of LGuddhistic Thought, 189, 115, 155, 162-64, 167, 
172, 174, 176, 181 

Sonadand -sutto, 151 

Sphota, 3 

Spinoza. 357,891 6, 450 

Sridhara, Nydyakandali, 256-57, 281 

Stace, W. T.. A Critica! Rastary of Greek Philosophy, 15 

Mcherbatsky, The Cenira! Cufception of Buddhism, 130, 163 

Stebbing LoS, A Modern Introductivn to Logie, O25 

Stevenson, 8., The Meart of Jasnism, $2. 88 

Stoui, G. F, “ Munual of Psychology, 203 ‘ 

Substance, 401 , 100f., 150f. 

Snpernorwal powers, 336, 852f, 

Sulrakr tanga, 123 

Stilra-gitaka, 174 

Suzuki, D. T., Outlnes of Mahayéna Buddhism, 130, 159, 167, 179F. 

Svetambera, St 

Seetasvataca, Wy, 837, 421, zy 425, ATL, passim 


Taslliriya 305, 404, 42%, 443 > 
Tarkabhasa, 196, 20, But, 210. 218, Boy, 237, B54, 265, 26, 272 
Yarkakaumuili 937, 256 ’ 


Tarkdmrta, 256, 250, 269, 272 . 
Tarbasengraha. ria 217-19, 221. 226-4u, 239, 259, passim 
Tarkikarakga, 228 

Tathagata, 16 6h 

Tailradipiké, 186, 218, 227 

Tattrakaumudi, 227, 22-02, 298, 208-U7, B13, passin 
Tattrapradipila, Ags 

Tatlvartha-raja varttika, V1 

Taltracaigearadt, 835 

The New Reaitsm, 3 

The Philosophient Review, 173 

Th iam, 244 9285, 99st... 459, 47u 

Thibant, G., The Feddnra-sttras, 301 

Thilly, F. ollislony of Philosuphy, 6 

Tilsk, B. G., Gitdrahasya, 467 

Tirthatkars. 2. 34-32, 83. 110-20 

Tripitaka, 182 A 

Triratng, 12 $ 
Trivrtkarans, 471 
Truth, 188, 373, 3766, 4417, 172 © 
arernteads ‘b A Theory of Direct Realism, 176 


“Uaazene, Kusumdajali, 186, 188, 241,43, 2% 27, 251, 281; Kironaeali. 
7 


Umasvapi, ‘Gottedethadhigama-satra, 82, 8 7, 106-07, 120-11, 117, 120 
Univeraal, 271€. 


496 - “INDEX 


’ 


Upadhi, 67f., 212f., 446 
Urquhart, W. S., The Veddnia and Modern Thought, 894 


Vacaspati, 188, 292, 810, 314-18, 335 
Vaibbasika, 36, 162, 176f. . 
Vatéestka-sdtra, 240, 257, 259, 265, 269, passim 
Valiabha, 997 
Vallabhacarys, Naguatilecad, 204, 256, 273, passim 
‘Vardhamana, 29.83 > -. 
Vasubandho, 172 
Vatsyayana Nydya-bhasya, 188-91, 204, 216-17, 236-28, 982, passim 
Veda, 9, 12, 861, 362,,368!., 387f., 395f., 390f., 416 ‘ 
Vedaxta-dipa, 471 
Vedanta-paribhasd, 186, 204, 210, 227, 272, 875 
Vedanta-sadra, 303, +7} 
- Veddanta-sitra, see Brahma-sitra 
Vifdnabhiksu, 292, 810, 314 18, 330, 385 * 
Vijtna-vada, 171f., 175 
Visikidveita, 470 
Vignu-purana, 25 
Visuddhi-magga, 158 
Viévandtha, 186, 255 
Vivartavada, 296, 424 
Vivekunanda Svami, 467, 469; Practicul Vedanta, 467 
Vyfipti, 34, 66, 2108. 
Vydsa-bhéeya, see Yoya-bhagya 


Whrd,J.. article “Psychology, 208: Psychological Principles, 325 ; 
Realm of Ends, 479 . 

Warren H. C., Buddhism in Translations, 131, 149, 158 

Whitebead, A. N., 98, 418 

Woodworth, R. 5., Psychology, 203 

Wondt, Human and Animal Psychotoyy, 203 


Yéjfiavalkya, $00 
Xasodbaera, 79 
Yoga, nature and forms of, 342f.; eightfold means cf, 347f. 
Yoga bhdgya 318, 334, 335-36, 340-42, 346 47, 353 
Yopachra, 35, 162-64, 1691. $ 
Yoga-maniprabh4, 335 
Yoganga; 4M... 347/. 
Yoga-sara-sangraha, 335 
Yoga-siitra, $18, 334-35, 389, 341-42, 346-47, 53 
Yoga; vdrtitka, 835 

ak s 


*' WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHORS 





The Ny&ya Theory of Knowledge: A critical. 
study of some problems of Logic and. Metaphysics. 
By 8. @ Chatterjee, M.A.,Pb.D. (Published by the 
University of Calcutta.) 

OPINIONS 7 


“ Professor Chatterjee’s book which is full, thorough 
and clear is a model of philosophical writing... .”’ 
—Projesscr C. E. M. Joad. 


“The author bas rendered a very substantia: service 
to tHe study of Indian philosophy by his careful 
expositicn of the essential Nyfya doctrines .: . the 
most effective way of making Indian philosophy a real 
and living factor in present-day metaphysical theory.”” 

—ProfessurrA, B. Keith. 


“a clear, comprehensive and objective gccount of 
the Nyiya theory of knowledge.” 
; —The New Review. 
“The book reveals a logic and a theory of percep- 
tion which appear to be worked out in much more 
detail than those who have been taught to believe that, 
Indian philogopby is a thorough-going mysticism 
determined by purely religious considerations would be 
likely to suspect.""" 
: —Philosophieyl Review, 
0° Dr. Chatterjee’s bouk is as scholarl} as Suali’s 
Introduzione allo Studio deta Filusofia Indiana, and 


WORKS BY THE SAMI AUTHO?8 


it, has the novel feature of Being the firgt syster ..., 

critical and comparatite teatment of the Myaye 

Epistemology.*’ c 
—Philogophy. ' 


"Whe Six Ways of Knowing: A critical study of 
the Vedanta Theory of Kiewledge. *By D. MN. Datta, 
M.A., Ph.D. (Publislied by George. Allen & Unwin 
Ltd. London.) 


’ 
OPptNions 


ae A work of very wade ‘cholarship ... a very 
" jmportant work pot only, for philosophy, bul for the 

ubion of the tno civilizations.” 
. —Professor J. H. Muithead, 


‘« There are, 1 am conetrainmed to believe, very few 
scholars, eaat and west, so well equipped for this task 
as Dr. Datta, I can think of no Western Sanskritists 
wwho five anything? like his acquaiptance with con- 
temporary British and American philosophy ; , . . ‘io 
the light of this wide reading, he defends most of the 
positions of the Vedanta with surprising effectiveness.’’ 

—Professur J B. Prat, Jour. of Philosophy. 


66 


. rare thing . . . and thoroughly competent.”’ 
—Philosophy. 
. adinirable work : . . abudge between the 
systems of Eust and West.’’ 
—Philosophical Réview, 
f 
. . suggestions of genuine philosophical value...’ 


—M lei 


66 
. 


====
Posted by at
Labels: