Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch12 XII Permanent Archetypes

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

XII Permanent Archetypes

The concept of 'permanent archetype' ('ayn thabitah, pl. a'yan

thabitah) has a number of important facets. So, in order that we

might fully elucidate its essential structure, it must be considered

analytically from different points of view. Although most of these

different aspects of the 'permanent archetype' have been referred

to in the course of the preceding chapters, some of them having

been discussed at considerable length and others more or less

incidentally touched upon, we shall deal with them all in the present

chapter in a more systematic way.

I The Intermediary Nature of the Archetypes

That which we know best about the archetypes is their ontologically

intermediate status. Briefty stated, the plane of the archetypes

occupies a middle position between the Absolute in its absoluteness

and the world of sensible things.

As a result of this peculiar ontological position, the archetypes

have the double nature of being active and passive, that is, passive in

relation to what is higher and active in relation to things that stand

lower than themselves. Their passivity is expressed by the word

qabil (pl. qawabil) which Ibn 'Arabi often uses in his description of

the archetypes. They are 'recipients', receptive and passive in so far

as they are nothing but potentialities in the Divine Essence. Their

nature is passively determined by the very inner structure of the

Essence. But considered in themselves, they are of a self-

determining nature and exercise a determining power over the

possible things of the world. They are each the eidetic reality ('ayn)

of a possible thing. And all the possible things become actualized in

the phenomenal world each according to the requirement of its own

permanent archetype.

As we have remarked earlier,' the Absolute must 'breathe out'

because of the intense inner compression of Being. It is in the very

nature of the Absolute that it should externalize itself. The

111

1:11

111,

1

1

'111

il 1

Il

11

1

1

160 Sufism and Taoism

Absolute, in this respect, is nota static 'One', but a dynamic 'One'

with a natural propensity for self-externalization and self-

articulation. Outwardly and actually it is unquestionably 'One', but

inwardly and potentially it is Many.

It is important to note that this self-externalization of the Abso-

lute is done according to certain fixed patterns at both the first and

the second stage of tajalli. The Absolute, at the first stage of tajalli,

articulates itself not haphazardly but through certain definite chan-

nels. These channels have been fixed from eternity by the very inner

structure of the Absolu te. Theologically, they are the Divine

Names. And the permanent archetypes are the essential forms

of the Divine Names. Since, moreover, ail this is an occur-

rence within the Divine consciousness, the archetypes are realities

(IJ,aqa'iq) eternally subsistent in the world of the Unseen.

And these realities definitely determine the form of the second

stage of the self-manifestation, i.e., the self-manifestation of the

Absolute in the concrete individual things in the external world.

Here again the Absolute manifests itself in the phenomenal world

not in haphazard forms; the forms in which it manifests itself are

determined by the eternal realities that have been produced by the

first tajalli. If we suppose, for example, that there were in the plane

of the archetypes nothing but Horse and Man, there would be in our

world only horses and men, nothing else.

The archetypes are, in this sense, double-faced. On the one hand,

they are essentially determined by the Absolute, because they owe

their particular existenée to the latter. But, on the other, they

positively determine the way in which the Absolute actualizes itself

in the phenomenal world. As to this determining force of the

archetypes, details will be given presently. Here it is sufficient to

note that the intermediary nature of the archetypes is clearly

observable in the peculiarity which has just been mentioned.

The second important point in which the intermediary nature of the

archetypes stands out with utmost clarity is their 'being non-

existent' (ma'düm).

The essences of the possible things (i.e., the permanent archetypes)

are not luminous because they are non-existent. Certainly they do

have permanent subsistence (thubüt), but they are not qualified by

existence, because existence is Light. 2

The fact that Ibn' Arabi designates the archetypes by calling them

'the essences of the possible things', though in itself an important

statement, is not relevant to our present concern.3 Rather, we

should note here his judgment that the archetypes are 'non-

existent'. Similarly in another passage he says: 4

Permanent Archetypes 161

The archetypes are essentially characterized by non-existence

('adam ). Surely they are 'permanently subsistent' (thâbitah), but they

are permanently subsistent only in the state of non-existence. They

have not even smelt the fragrance of existence. Thus they remain

eternally in that state (i.e., non-existence) despite the multiplicity of

the forms ( which the y manifest in the existent things).

Ibn' Arabi judges the archetypes to be 'non-existent' because in this

particular context he understands the word 'existence' (wujüd) in

the sense of 'external existence'. Seen from the viewpoint of exter-

nal or phenomenal existence, the archetypes are not existent,

although they are 'permanently subsistent'. The 'permanent subsist-

ence' (thubüt) is different from external existence. Symbolically, the

arche types are 'dark'. They are dark because they are not yet

illumined by the bright daylight of existence. Existence as Light

belongs only to the individual things that exist concretely and

externally.

It is patent, then, that it is not Ibn' Arabi's intention to assert that

the archetypes are non-existent in an absolute sense. We have

already observed that the archetypes are permanent 'realities' that

subsist in the Divine Consciousness. They do exist in the same sense

in which concepts are said to exist in the human mind. He only

means to say that the archetypes do not possess a temporally and

spatially determined existence. And in this very particular sense,

the Divine Names, too, must be said to be non-existent. 'The Names

in their multiplicity are but relations which are of a non-existent

nature' .5

Thus we see that it is not strictly exact to regard the archetypes as

non-existent. More exact it is to say they are neither existent nor

non-existent. And, in fact, Ibn' Arabi himself explicitly says soin a

short, but exceedingly important article to which incidental refer-

ence was made in an earlier place. 6 It is to be noted that in this

passage he takes up a more philosophical position than in his Fu$Ü$

in dealing with the problem of the archetypes.

The third thing7 is neither qualified by existence nor by non-

existence, neither by temporality nor by eternity (a parte ante). But it

has always been with the Eternal from eternity ....

It is neither existent nor non-existent. ... But it is the root (i.e., the

ontological ground) of the world .... For from this third thing has the

world corne into being. Thus it is the very essential reality of ail the

realities of the world. It is a universal and intelligible reality subsist-

ing in the Mind. It appears as eternal in the Eternal and as temporal in

the temporal. So, if you say that this thing is the world, you are right.

And if you say that it is the Absolute, the Eternal, you are equally

right. But you are no Jess right if you say that it is neither the world

nor the Absolute, but something different from both. Ali these

statements are true of this thing.

162 Sufem and Taoism

Thus it is the most general Universal comprising both temporality

(hudùth) and eternity (qidam ). It multiplies itself with the multiplic-

ity of the existent things. And yet it is not divided by the division of

the existent things; it is divided by the division of the intelligibles. In

short, it is neither existent nor non-existent. It is not thè world, and

yet it is the world. It is 'other', and yet it is not 'other'.

The main point of this argument is that this 'third thing' is the world

in potentiality, but that, from the viewpoint of the world as a real

and concrete existent, it is not the world, but rather non-Being and

the Absolute.

Then Ibn 'Arabi proceeds to examine the problem from the

standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy and identifies this third thing

which can neither be said to exist nor not to exist with the hayülà or

Prime Matter,8

The relation of this thing ... with the world is comparable to the

relation of wood with (various things fabricated out of wood, like) a

chair, wooden case, pulpit, litter etc., or to the relation of silver with

(silver) vessels and objects made of silver like collyrium-cases, ear-

rings, and rings.

The comparison makes the nature and essence of this (third) thing

clear. Take, then, only the relation here suggested (between wood

and pieces of furniture made of wood) without, however, picturing in

your mind any diminishing in it (i.e., in the third thing) as you picture

actual diminishing in the wood when a writing-desk is taken out of it.

Know that wood itself is a particular form assumed by 'wood-ness'.

(Do not picture in your mind a piece of wood, but) concentra te your

attention upon the intelligible universal reality which is 'wood-ness'.

Then you will see that 'wood-ness' itself neither diminishes nor is

divided (by your actually fabricating real objects out of wood). On

the contrary, 'wood-ness' always remains in its original perfection in

ail the chairs and desks without ever diminishing. Nor does it increase

a bit in spite of the fact that in a wooden desk, for example, there are

many realities gathered together besides the reality of 'wood-ness',

like that of'oblong-ness', that of 'square-ness', that of'quantity' etc.,

ail of them being therein in their respective perfection. The same is

true of any chair or pulpit.

And the 'third thing' is precisely all these 'realities' in their respective

perfection. So call it, if you like, the reality of realities, or hayùlà

(Greek hyle), or Prime Matter, or the genus of ail genera. And call

these realities that are comprised by this third thing the 'primary

realities' or 'high genera'.

One special point is worthy of notice in this connection. Ibn' Arabi

here observes the intermediary nature of the archetypes not only in

their being neither existent nor non-existent, but also in their being

neither 'temporal' nor 'eternal'. Soit is wrong, or at least an over-

simplification, to say that Ibn' Arabi takes up the position that 'the

world is eternal (qadim)' 9 because the archetypes are eternal.

r"';r

Permanent Archetypes 163

Surely the archetypes are 'eternal' in a certain sense precisely

because they represent the intermediary stage between the Abso-

lute and the phenomenal world. But they are 'eternal' only secon-

darily and derivatively in the sense that they, as the content itself of

the Divine Consciousness or Knowledge, have been connected

(muqiirin) with the Absolu te from eternity. Their eternity is in this

sense essentially different from the eternity of the Absolute.

Generally speaking, and particularly in cases of this kind, the true

nature of anything intermediary is impossible to describe ade-

quately by language. Thus one is forced to resort, as Ibn 'Arabï

actually does, to a clumsy expression, like 'it is neither eternal nor

temporal, but it is, on the other hand, both eternal and temporal'. If

from the whole of this complex expression we pick up only the

phrase, '(it is) eternal' and draw from it the conclusion that Ibn

'Arabi maintained the doctrine of the eternity of the world, 10 we

would be doing him gross injustice.

In a passage of the Fw;Wj, in connection with the problem of the

absolute inalterability of the cause-caused relationship in this

world, Ibn 'Arabi discusses the 'eternity' -'temporality' of the

archetypes in the following way. 11

There is absolutely no way of making the causes eff ectless because

they are what is required by the permanent archetypes. And nothing

is actualized except in the form established for it in the archetypal

state. For 'there is no altering for the words of God' (X, 64). And the

'words of God' are nothing other than the archetypes of the things in

existence. Thus 'eternity' is ascribed to the archetypes in regard to

their permanent subsistence, and 'temporality' is ascribed to it in

regard to their actual existence and appearance.

These words clarify the intermediary state peculiar to the

archetypes between 'eternity' and 'temporality'.

II The Archetypes as Universals

As we have noticed in the preceding section, the archetypes in Ibn

'Arabï's thought are, theologically, 'realities' in the Knowledge of

God, i.e., intelligibles existing permanently and eternally in the

Divine Consciousness alone. But from the point of view of scholas-

tic philosophy, they are Universals standing over against Particu-

lars. And the relation of the archetypes to the world is exactly the

ontological relation of Universals to Particulars. The problem of

how the Divine self-manifestation is actualized in the realm of

external existence through the fixed channels of the archetypes is

nothing other than the problem of the individuation of Universals.

164 Sufism and Taoism

We must note that this aspect on Ibn' Arabi's philosophy is to a

considerable extent Platonic. In any event, the permanent

archetypes, in this particular aspect, remind us of the Ideas of Plato.

There is, in his FusWi, an important passage where he develops

this problem scholastically. 12 There he deals with the philosophical

aspect of Divine Attributes such as Knowledge, Life, etc. 13 It will be

clear by what has preceded that his theory of Attributes is identical

with the theory of archetypes.

We assert that the universal things (umur kullîyah, i.e., Universals

corresponding to Platonic Ideas), although they have no actual exis-

tence in themselves, are unquestionably (existent as) intelligibles and

objects of knowledge, in the mind (i.e., primarily in the Divine

Consciousness, and secondarily in the human minds). They remain

'interior' (batinah) and never leave the state of invisible existence 14

(i.e., the state of existence in the plane of the Unseen).

The passage is paraphrased by al-Qàshàni as follows: 15

The 'universal things', that is, those things that are essentially non-

material (mut/aqah) such as Life and Knowledge, have a concrete

existence only in Reason, while in the outer world they have an

invisible existence. This is because existence in the outer world is the

very same non-material intelligibles as determined by concrete, indi-

vidual conditions. But ( even when it is actualized in the outer world)

a non-material Universal still remains in the state of being an intellig-

ible and still stands under the name 'lnterior'. A Universal never

exists in the outer world in its universality, but only in a concretely

determined form. And in this latter capacity only does a Universal

corne un der the na me 'Exterior'.

Ibn 'Arabi goes on to argue: 16

But (i.e., although their existence is invisible) Universals have a

powerful and positive effect on everything that has a concrete indi-

vidual existence. Rather, the individualized existence - 1 mean, all

individual existents are nothing other than Universals. And yet Uni-

versals in themselves never cease to be pure intelligibles. Thus they

are 'exterior' in respect to their being concrete existents, but they are

'interior' in respect to their being intelligibles. So every concrete

thing that exists has its origin in the (realm of) these 'universal

matters' which have the above-mentioned peculiarity, namely, that

they are inseparably connected with Reason and that they can never

corne to exist in the plane of concrete existence in such a way as to

cease to be pure intelligibles. This basic situation does not change

whether a particular individual existent (in which a Universal is

actualized) happens to be something temporally conditioned ( e.g.,

ordinary material objects) or something beyond the limitations of

time (e.g., higher Spirits). For a Universal bears one and the same

relation to both temporal and non-temporal things.

Permanent Archetypes 165

The relation between Universals and Particulars is notas one-sided

as this passage might suggest; it has also an aspect in which Particu-

lars do exercise a determining force upon Universals. A Universal,

as we have just seen, remains eternally the same as it appears in

individual particulars, say, a b c d. But sin ce each one of these

particulars has its own peculiar 'nature' (tabî'ah ), the Universal

must necessarily be affected by abc d as it is actualized in them. The

Universal, in other words, becomes tinged in each case with a

particular coloring.

The 'universal matters', on their part, are also positively affected by

the concrete existents in accordance with what is required by the

individual realities of the latter.

Take for example the relation of 'knowledge' to 'knower', and 'life'

to 'living being'. 'Life' is an intelligible reality, and 'knowledge' is an

intelligible reality, both being different and distinguishable from one

another. Now we say concerning God that He has Life and Know-

ledge, so He is Living and He is a Knower. Likewise, we say concern-

ing an angel that he has 'life' and 'knowledge', so he is 'living' and he

is a 'knower'. Lastly, we say concerning man that he has 'knowledge'

and 'life', so he is 'living' and a 'knower'.

(Throughout all these cases) the reality of'knowledge' is one, and the

reality of 'life' is one. The relation of 'knowledge' to 'knower' and of

'life' to 'living' is equally one. And yet we say concerning the Know-

ledge of God that it is eternal, while concerning the 'knowledge' of

man we say that it is temporal. See what a positive effect has been

produced upon the intelligible reality (' knowledge') by the particular

attribution. See how the intelligibles are connected with the concrete

individual existents. Just as 'knowledge' affects the substrate in which

it inheres to make it deserve the appellation 'knower', the particular

substrate to which 'knowledge' is attributed affects the 'knowledge'

in such a way that it becomes temporal in a temporal being and

eternal in the eternal being. Thus both sides affect each other and are

affected by each other. 17

Asto the ontological status of Universals, Ibn' Arabi says that they

are 'non-existent', meaning thereby that they are not endowed with

concrete individual existence in the material world. But, of course,

as we know already, they are not sheer 'nothing'; they do have a

particular kind of existence, i.e., non-material, intelligible

existence.

A Universal becomes actualized in an individual thing and natur-

ally becomes tinged with a special coloring peculiar to the locus. But

since in such a case it is not individualized in itself, it does not

become qualified by the properties of distinction and divisibility

which are characteristic of individual things. While, therefore, the

relation between a Particular and a Particular is a solid one, being

based on the strong tie of concrete physical existence, the relation

Il

111111111

.,

166 Sufism and Taoism

between a Universal and a Particular, although far more essential

than the former relation, is weaker because it is an essentially

'non-existential', i.e., intelligible relation.

It is patent that these 'universal matters', although they are intellig-

ibles, are non-existent in terms of concrete physical existence, but are

only existent as an invisible (but real) force (affecting the concrete

individual things.) When, however, they enter into actual relation

with individual existents, they also are affected by the latter. They do

accept the positive effect ( exercised by the individual existents)

except that they do not thereby become physically distinct and

divided. For this is absolutely impossible to occur (to a Universal).

For it remains as it is in all individuals which are qualified by it - like,

for example, 'humanity' (insaniyah 'being-a-man') appearing in each

single individual of the species of man - being itself never particular-

ized, never becoming multiple despite the multiplicity of individuals,

and never ceasing to be intelligible.

Thus it is clear that there is a close reciprocal tie between things

possessed of a concrete existence (i.e., Particulars) and things that

are deprived of a concrete existence (i.e., Universals). And yet the

Universals are in the nature of 'non-existence'. So the reciprocal tie

existing between concrete things and concrete things is more easily

conceivable, because in this case there is always a third term which

connects the both sides together: I mean, concrete existence. In the

former case, on the contrary, there is no such connecting link, and the

reciprocal tie subsists here without a connecting link. Naturally, the

relation with such a link is stronger and more real. 18

III Necessity and Possibility

As we have seen already, Ibn 'Arabi often refers to the permanent

archetypes as 'essences of the possible things' (a'yiin al-mumkiniit)

meaning thereby the essential realities of the possible things. The

word mumkiniit or 'possible things' points, on the face of it, to

concrete individual existents in the world. This is justified in so far as

the concrete existents of Particulars are essentially 'possible'

because they do not have in themselves the principle of existence.

On the other hand, however, they are not 'possible' but rather

'necessary' in so far as they exist in actuality in definitely fixed

forms. From this point of view, what are essentially 'possible" are

the archetypes. For the archetypes, as has been made clear in the

preceding section, remain in themselves 'intelligible' without being

individualized.

There are some among the thinkers, says Ibn 'Arabi, who,

'because of the weakness of their intellect' deny the category of

'possibility' (imkiin) and assert that there are only two ontological

Permanent Archetypes 167

categories: 'necessity by itself' (wujüb bi-al-dhàt) and 'necessity by

(something) other (than itself)' (wujüb bi-al-ghayr). However, he

goes on to say, th ose who know the truth of the matter admit the

category of 'possibility', and know that 'possibility', though it is

after alla kind of 'necessity by other', does possess its own peculiar

nature which makes it the third ontological category. 19

Explicating this idea of his Mas ter, al-Qashâni analyzes the con-

cept of 'possible' (mumkin) as follows. 20 All existents are divisible

into two major categories according to the relation which the reality

of a thing bears to existence: (1) the thing whose reality by itself

requires existence, and (2) those whose reality by itself does not

require existence.

The first is the 'necessary by itself' or the Necessary Existent. The

second is further divided into two categories: (1) those whose very

nature requires non-existence, and (2) those whose nature by itself

requires neither existence nor non-existence. The first of these is the

category of the 'impossible', while the second is the 'possible'. Then

he says:

Thus the 'possible' is an ontological dimension (IJ,atf,rah, lit. 'Pres-

ence') peculiar to the plane of Reason, astate before external exis-

tence, considered in itself. Take, for example, 'black'. In itself it is

only in the plane of Reason, requiring neither existence nor non-

existence. But in the outer world it cannot but be accompanied either

by the existence of a cause or by the absence of cause, there being no

third case between these two.

And when the cause is present in its complete form, the existence of

the thing (the 'possible') becomes 'necessary'. Otherwise, its non-

existence is 'necessary' due to non-existence of a complete cause. (In

the first case, it is 'necessary by other', while in the second case) it is

'impossible by other'. Thus we see that the 'possible' in the state of

real existence is a 'necessary by other'. But in itself and in its essence,

i.e., apart from its actual state of existence, it is (still) a 'possible by

itself'.

The definition of the 'possible' by al-Qâshani, namely, that it is an

ontological state in which a thing finds itself previous to external

existence, makes it patent that a Universal is essentially and in itself

a 'possible', for a Universal in itself is an 'existent in Reason', that is,

a pure intelligible, before it goes into the state of external existence.

His explanation also makes it clear that a Universal, when it

becomes particularized and enters into the domain of external

existence in the form of an individual, obtains two features. In its

essence, it is still a 'possible' even in the state of external existence,

but it is a 'necessary by other' in so far as it is now existent externally

and has thereby what we inight call an on tic necessity. Such is the

real nature of everything that is called 'temporal' (IJiidith or

\'

168 Sufism and Taoism

· mulJ,dath ). 21 And that which causes this ontological transformation,

i.e., that which brings out an 'essentially possible' into the sphere of

external existence and changes it into an 'accidentally necessary'

can be nothing other than the 'essentially necessary', the Absolute.

There can be no doubt that a temporally originated thing (mul)dath)

is definitely something brough into existence (by an agent), soit has

an ontological need (iftiqâr, lit. 'poverty') towards an agent that has

produced it. This is due to the fact that, such a thing being essentially

'possible', its existence must corne from something other than itself.

The tie which binds such a thing toits originator is a tie of ontological

need.

That (agent) to which a 'possible' owes its existence in such an

essential way can be nothing other than something whose existence is

necessary in itself, and which does not owe its existence to anything

else and has, therefore, no need of anything else. It must be this thing

that - by itself - gives existence to ail temporal things so that the latter

are essentially dependent upon it.

Since, however, the coming into existence of the 'possible' is what is

required essentially by the 'necessary', the former acquires (in this

respect) a 'necessity' from the latter. And since, moreover, the

dependence of the 'possible' on the ('necessary') from which it cornes

into existence is essential, the 'possible' must necessarily appear in

the likeness of the 'necessary'. And this likeness ex tends to every

name and attribute possessed by the 'possible', except one single

thing: the essential necessity ( wujûb dhâtiy ), for this last thing can

never corne to a temporally produced thing. Thus it cornes about that

a temporal thing, although it is a 'necessary' existent, its 'necessity' is

not its own but is due to something other than itself. 22

IV The Absolute Power of the Archetypes

The archetypes are 'permanent' or 'permanently subsistent'

(thabitah), i.e., they have been fixed once for all in the eternal past,

and are, therefore, absolutely unalterable and immovable. 'There is

no altering for the words of God' (X, 64). This absolute unalter-

ableness of the archetypes restricts in a certain sense even the

activity of the Absolu te. This may sound blasphemous at first, but in

reality it is not so. For, theologically speaking, it is the very Will of

God that has given them this unalterableness, and in a terminology

more characteristic of Ibn 'Arabï, they are no other than inner

determinations of the Absolute itself.

It is not for the Divine Will to change what has been determined

at the stage of the arche types. And it is unthinkable that God should

will such a thing. The Qoranic statement concerning the disbeliev-

ers: 'but if He so willed, He would have guided you aright all

together' (XVI, 91) might seem to imply that it is quite possible that

Permanent Archetypes 169

God should will just the contrary of what has actually happened,

i.e., the contrary of what has been determined on the level of the

archetypes. This, however, is due, according to Ibn' Arabï, to a very

simple misunderstanding. The particle law meaning 'if' (in the

clause 'if He so willed' fa-law sha'a) is a grammatical device for

expressing a supposition of something which is actually impossible.

Thus the Qoranic verse suggests rather the absolu te impossibility of

God's wishing to guide aright the disbelievers. 23

We established in the preceding section that the archetypes are

'possibles'. But in the light of what we have just seen about the

immovable fixity of the archetypes, we must admit also that their

'possibility' is of a very particular nature. A 'possible' is a thing

which is capable of becoming either a or its contradictory, non-a.

Thus, to take an example directly relevant to the Qoranic verse just

mentioned, a man as a 'possible' is capable of becoming either a

'believer' or a that is, of receiving in actuality either

the 'guidance' of God or 'going astray from the Way'. In reality,

however, it is determined from the very beginning whether the thing

will be actualized as a or as non-a. If it happens to be determined in

the direction of a, for instance, even God cannot change its course

and actualize it as non-a.

A 'possible' is in itself capable of receiving either something or its

contradictory, on the level of rational reasoning. But as soon as it is

actualized as either of the two logically possible things, (we corne to

know that) that was the thing for which the 'possible' was destined

when it was in the archetypal state ....

Thus (it is clear in the case of those disbelievers referred to in the

above-quoted Qoranic verse that) God actually did not 'will' that

way, so that He did not guide aright all th ose people. Nor will He ever

'will' that way. 'lf-He-wills' will be of no avail. For is it at all imagin-

able that He should do so? No, such a thing will never corne to pass.

For His Will goes straight toits objects (in accordance with what has

been determined from eternity) because His Will is a relation which

strictly follows His Knowledge, and His Knowledge strictly follows

the object of Knowledge. And the object of Knowledge is you and

your states (i.e., the individual thing and its properties as they have

been immovably fixed in the state of archetypal permanence). It is

not the Knowledge that influences its object, but rather it is the object

of Knowledge that influences the Knowledge, for the object conf ers

what it is in its essence upon the Knowledge. 24

God knows each individual thing in its eternal essence, and exer-

cises His Will on the basis of that Knowledge. But, as we already

know, God' s exercising His Will is the same as His bestowing

existence. So, since God's bestowal of existence is done in this way

on the basis of His Knowledge about the eternal essence of each

,

170 Sufism and Taoism

. thing, the existence bestowed upon individual things must necessar-

ily assume a different form in each case.

But there is also another aspect to the matter. The existence itself

which God bestows upon the things is, in so far as it is existence,

always one and the same. Existence qua existence can never differ

from one case to another. God bestows upon all things one and the

same existence, but the individual 'recipients' receive it in different

ways, each according toits own particular nature, and actualize it in

different forms. Ibn 'Arabi describes this aspect of the matter by

saying: God does nothing more than bestowing existence; it is men

who de termine and delimit it individually, and give it particular

coloring, each according to his archetype.

'There is not even one among us but has his own determined position'

(XXXVII, 164). This (i.e., the 'determined position') refers to what

you were in the state of archetypal subsistence according to which

you have corne into being. You can look at the matter in this way

when you affirm that you do have existence. But even if you affirm

that existence belongs to the Absolute, not to you, still you have

unquestionably a determining power upon the existence coming

from the Absolute. Of course, once you are a real existent, your

determining power has undoubtedly a part to play in it, though

properly speaking the ultimate Determiner is the Absolute.

In this respect, then, to the Absolute belongs only the act of directing

existence toward you, while the actual determination of it belongs to

you. So do not praise except yourself, do not blame except yourself.

There remains for the Absolu te only the praise for having given (you)

existence. For that definitely is the act of the Absolute, not yours. 25

This way of thinking cannot but raise a number of crucial problems

within the framework of Islamic thought. Most noteworthy of them

is the repercussion it produces in the field of moral ideas.

Ail men are just as they are, according to Ibn' Arabi, because they

have been so determined by their own permanent archetypes from

eternity. No one in the world, whether he be good or bad, a believer

or a disbeliever, goes against the Will of God. Taking the example of

one who disobeys the Apostle of God, 'contender' (munàzi'), Ibn

'Arabi argues: 26

He who contends against him (i.e., the Apostle of God) is not thereby

deviating from his own reality in which he was in the archetypal state

when he was still in the state of non-existence. For nothing cornes

into being except that which he had in the state of non-existence, i.e.,

archetypal subsistence. So (by struggling in opposition to the Apostle

of God) he is not stepping over the boundaries set by his reality, nor

does he commit any fault on his (predetermined) road.

Thus calling his behavior 'contending' (nizii') is merely an accidentai

matter which is a product of the veils covering the eyes of ordinary

Permanent Archetypes 171

people. As God says: 'But the· majority of men do not know. They

know only the apparent surface of the present world, while being

completely neglectful of the Hereafter' (XXX, 6-7). Thus it is clear

that it (i.e., regarding their behavior as 'contending') is nothing but

an inversion (i.e., one of those things which the people whose eyes

are veiled turn upside down).

This argument on the 'contender' applies to every phenomenon in

the world. Everything, whether good or bad from the human point

of view, is what it is in accordance with what has been definitely and

immovably determined from eternity. Everything, in this sense,

goes the way prepared beforehand by the Divine Will, and nothing

can deviate from it.

If the distinction between good and bad is but an accidentai matter,

and if everything occurs as it has been determined by its own

archetype, the doctrine of the reward for the good and the chastise-

ment for the bad, which is one of the most basic articles of faith in

Islam, must necessarily be gravely affected. Here follows the pecul-

iar interpretation by Ibn 'Arabi of the problem of 'reward and

punishment' (thawiib-'iqàb). 27

The rise of the distinction between good and bad (from the

religious point of view) is a phenomenon which occurs only at the

level upon which human beings live a social life in a religious

community. He who, at this level, is regarded as morally responsible

is called by the Law a mukallaf meaning 'one who is charged with

responsibilities'.

Now when a mukallaf acts in the light of the Law, either he

'obeys' its injunctions or 'disobeys' and 'rebels' against it. lt is a

truism or even a tautology to say that in the former case the man is

mu(i.', i.e., one who is obedient to God. But the important point is

that, in Ibn' Arabi' s view, in the second case he is no less obedient to

God than in the first. For even in the second case, the man acts as he

does simply according to the dictates of his permanent archetype,

which, as we know, is a direct manifestation of the Divine Will.

Of course, when a man 'disobeys' God, there is no other way for

Him than either forgiving him or punishing him. But the remarkable

fact about this is that God, on His part, 'obeys' the man, and acts

according to the dictates of his actions. The 'obedience' (inqiyàd)

occurs here, as Bàli Effendi remarks, on both sides. And this, Ibn

'Arabi says, is the meaning of 'religion' ( din) in the sense of islam

( = inqiyad 'obedience') as well as in the sen se of jaza' 'requital'.

Religion, indeed, is 'requital', he says. When a man 'obeys' God,

He requîtes him with 'what pleases' him, while when he 'disobeys',

God requîtes him with 'what displeases' him. Requital with what is

pleasing is called 'reward', and requital with what is displeasing or

172 Sufism and Taoism

painfol is called 'punishment'. Subjectively, there is naturally a

serious difference between 'reward' and 'punishment', and the dif-

ference is keenly felt by the man who obtains 'reward' and 'punish-

ment' respectively. Objectively, however, there is no fondamental

difference between the two. For in both cases, God is just acting in

'obedience' to the requirement of the archetype. A certain

archetype necessarily requires a certain action on the part of a man,

and that action necessarily requires, on the part of God, either

'reward' or 'punishment'.

Thus when a man obtains something good (i.e., 'reward'), he himself

is the one who gives it to him. And when he obtains something bad

(i.e., 'punishment'), it is no other than himself that gives it to him.

Nay, he is the one who is bountiful (mun'im) to him, and he is the

who is his own chastiser (mu'adhdhib). So let him praise only himself,

and let him blame only himself. 'And God possesses the irrefutable

argument' (VI, 149) in His Knowledge about men, because Know-

ledge follows its objects.

There is, however, a still deeper understanding of the problems of

this kind, which is as follows. Ali the 'possible' things, in effect, have

their mot in non-existence. (What is usually regarded as their 'exis-

tence') is nothing but the existence of the Absolute appearing in

various forms of the modes of being peculiar to the 'possible' things in

themselves and in their very essences. And this will make you under-

stand who is the one who really enjoys and who is the one who really

suffers. (That is to say, he who is really pleased by the reward and

really pained by the punishment is not the man, but the Absolute

which manifests itself in the particular form of the man according to

his archetype, which, again, is no other than astate of the Absolute

itself.) You will also understand thereby what really is the consequ-

ence of every state (or action) of the man. (That is to say, the reward

or punishment, as the consequence of every action of the man is in

reality a self-manifestation of the Absolute in a particular form

determined by that action.) Properly speaking, any consequence (of

an action) is simply 'iqiib which is to be understood in the ( etymologi-

cal) sense of 'what follows or results' ('aqaba). 'Iqiib in this sense

comprises both a good consequence and a bad consequence, except

that in the conventional usage of Arabie, only a bad consequence is

called 'iqiib (in the sense of 'punishment'), while a good consequence

is called thawiib 'reward'.

If the true meanings of 'good' and 'bad', 'reward' and 'punishment'

are what we have just seen, what, then, is the significance of God's

raising among men 'apostles' whose fonction is generally thought to

be bidding people do good and avoid evil in order to attain happi-

ness? It is to be expected that in the particular context of Ibn

'Arabï' s theory, the conception of' apostle' (rasül) should turn out

to be radically different from the ordinary one.

Permanent Archetypes 173

Comparing the apostles to physicians, Ibn 'Arabï explicates his

idea about apostleship as follows: 28

Know that, just as a physician is said to be a 'servant of Nature'

(khiidim al-(abï'ah ), so the apostles and their successors are com-

monly said to be the 'servants of the Divine Command'. (i.e., It is

generally held that the apostles are physicians of the souls, whose

fonction it is to keep the souls in good health and, in case the souls

happen to be ill, to bring them back to their normal state.)

In reality, however, the apostles are servants of the ontological

modes of the possible things (i.e., their real fonction is to 'serve', that

is, to try to bring out exactly what is required by the essences of the

possible things in their archetypal states). But this service of theirs is

itself part of their own ontological modes (a/:lwiil) which are peculiar

to them in their state of archetypal subsistence. See how marvellous

this is.

Note, however, that the 'servant' to be sought after here, (whether

a servant of Nature or a servant of an ontological mode of a possible

thing) must remain within the boundaries which the object of his

service (i.e., either a sick person or an ontological mode) determines,

either by the actual state or by language. (i.e., A physician cures his

patient either according to the observed bodily state of the patient or

according to what the patient verbally asks for).

A physician would be entitled to be called (unconditionally) a 'ser-

vant of Nature' only if he consistently acted to help promote Nature,

(but actually no physician is supposed to do such a thing, as will be

evident from the following consideration). A physician (is usually

called for in those cases in which) Nature has produced in the body of

his patient a special state for which the patient is called 'ill'. Now if the

physician in such a situation (unreservedly) 'served' Nature, the

illness of the patient would thereby simply be increased. So (instead

of helping it) he tries to repel and keep off Nature for the sake of

health by producing in the patient another bodily state which is just

the opposite of his present state, although, to be sure, 'health' itself

belongs to Nature, too.

Thus it is clear that the physician is nota 'servant of Nature' (i.e., he

does not serve Nature consistently in all cases without distinction).

He is only a 'servant of Nature' in the sense that he brings the body of

his patient back to health by altering his present bodily state by

means of Nature. He serves Nature in a very particular way, not in a

general way.

The physician must not serve and promote Nature in all circum-

stances without discrimination. When, for example, Nature has pro-

duced an unhealthy state like diarrhea, he must try to restrain the

activity of Nature, and to produce a healthy state. But, since the

healthy state th us produced is also part of Nature, he is, by produc-

ing it, serving after all the same Nature. And this analogy elucidates

the fonction of the apostle who is the physician of the souls.

174 Sufism and Taoism

Thus the physician serves Nature and does not serve Nature. Like-

wise, the apostles and their successors serve and do not serve the

Absolute (i.e., they serve the Divine Command not in ail its aspects,

but only in its beneficial aspect).

This means that the apostle is a servant of the Divine Command

only, and nota servant of the Divine Will. The Divine Command

does not necessarily coïncide with the Will. On the contrary, there

often occurs discrepancy between the two. For the Command is

issued regardless of whether it will be obeyed or not, that is, whether

what is commanded will actually occur or not, while the Will is

absolute, what is willed being of such a nature that it necessarily

occurs. In those cases in which there is discrepancy between the

Command and the Will, the apostle serves the Command, not the

Will. If he served the Will, the apostle, instead of trying to curb evil,

would rather positively promote the evil-doers, and he would not

advise them to stop doing evil. But strangely enough, if the occurr-

ence of 'evil', when it does actually occur, is due to the Will, the

admonishing act of the apostle against it is also due to the Divine

Will.

In a similar way, the eff ect of a 'miracle' will also appear to be far

less powerful than is commonly imagined. For no matter how many

miracles may be performed, what is determined by the archetypes

can never be altered. The apostles are possessed of a special

spiritual power called himmah29 which enables them to perform

miracles. But whether they do exercise this supernatural faculty or

not, the result will ultimately be the same, because the actual course

of events will never deviate from what has already been determined

by the archetypes.

The apostles know very well that when a miracle is performed in the

presence of the ( disbelieving) people, some of them turn believers on

the spot, while some others recognize it but do not show any assent to

it, acting unjustly, haughtily, and out of envy. There are even some

who class it as magic and hypnotism. Ali the apostles are aware of

this, and know that no one becomes a believer except when God has

illumined his heart by the Light of belief, and that, if the person does

not look at (a miracle performed) with this light which is called

'belief', the miracle is of no avail to him. This knowledge prevents

them from exercising their himmah in search of miracles, because

miracles do not have an effect uniformly on ail the spectators and

their hearts.

To this refers the saying of God concerning the most perfect of the

apostles and the most knowledgeable of ail men: 'Verity thou dost

not guide aright whomever thou desirest to guide, but it is God who

guides whomever He wishes.' (XXVIII, 56) ... In addition to this He

says in the same place: 'but He is best aware of those who are guided

Permanent Archetypes 175

aright' (XXVIII, 56), that is to say, of those who have imparted to

God - through their own permanent archetypes, while still in the

state of non-existence - the knowledge that they would be guided

aright. Ali this because God has so decreed that the Knowledge

should follow its object in every case, and a man who was a believer in

the archetypal permanence and in the state of non-existence should

corne into existence exactly according to that fixed form: God knows

of every man that he will corne into existence in such-and-such a

form. And this is why He says: 'but He is best aware of those who are

guided aright' ,30

The gist of Ibn' Arabi's argument is given by al-Qàshàni in a more

logical form, as follows: 31

A perfect knowledge (possessed by the apostles) of the reality of the

things necessarily requires that they should behave with humble

modesty in the presence of God and that they should not display the

power of disposing things at will nor exercise their himmah upon

anything. For he who really knows the truth knows that nothing at ail

cornes into being except that which has been in the Eternal Know-

ledge. Everything that has been known (by the Absolu te) to occur

cannot but occur, and anything that has been known not to occur can

never occur.

The whole matter is th us reduced ultimately to a relation between an

Agent who knows what is in potentiality in the recipient, and a

recipient which does not receive except that which is in its essential

and natural 'preparedness'. And if such is the case, upon what is an

apostle to exercise his himmah? What is the use of his exercising the

himmah? For anything whose actual occurrence or non-occurrence is

known from the very beginning can in no way be altered by his

himmah. The himmah cannot even advance or retard the exact point

of time which is assigned to the thing from eternity.

Thus the recipient does not receive except that which the Agent

knows from the beginning that it will receive, while the Agent, on His

part, does nothing except that which the recipient essentially is to

receive. This because the archetypes strictly require by themselves

from eternity to eternity what will actually happen to them when they

corne out into existence, while the Agent-Knower knows only that

(i.e., that which is determined by the archetypes).

V The Mystery of Predestination

As we have repeatedly pointed out in the preceding, the way in

which each thing receives existence from the Absolute is strictly

determined by its own 'preparedness'. The determining power of

the 'preparedness' (isti'diid) is supreme and even the Absolute must

follow what it requires.32

Now the thesis of the absoluteness of the determining power of

176 Sufism and Taoism

the 'preparedness' is naturally and essentially connected with the

problem of predestination. The problem of predestination was

raised and discussed as something of a vital importance from the

earliest period of Islam under the key-terms qa<J,â' and qadar. Ibn

'Arabï takes up the same problem and discusses it from his particu-

lar viewpoint in terms of the theory of the archetypes.

Know that the 'pre-determination' (qaqii') is a decisive judgment

(hukm, or decree) of God concerning the things. God's decisive

judgment concerning things is given in strict accordance with His

Knowledge of the latter themselves and their properties. And God's

Knowledge about the things is based on what is given by the very

essences of the things.

And the 'allotment' (qadar) is the specification of the appointed time

at which each of the things should actually occur in accordance with

its archetypal state without any alteration. But the qaqa' itself, when

it decides upon the destiny of each thing, does so only in accordance

with its arche type. And this is the mystery of the qadar . ...

Thus, the Judge (hakim) who issues a decree turns out in reality to be

acting in obedience to the demand of the very thing upon which He

makes the decision in accordance with the requirement of its essence.

In this sense, the thing upon which the decision is made according to

its essence determines the Judge so that He should decide upon it in

strict accordance with what it requires. And, in fact, every 'judge'

who makes a decision upon something becomes determined (lit.:

decided) by the abject on which he makes a decision as well as by the

ground on which he makes the decision, be the 'judge' who he may

(i.e., whether he be the Absolute or a human being). 33

Everything, as we already know, has its essential constitution

irrevocably determined in the archetypal state of non-existence.

God knows it from eternity as it essentially is. And on the basis of

the requirement of this perfect Knowledge God makes a decisive

judgment concerning the thing. And this judgment is the qa<J,â' .34

The qadar specifies and determines further what has been

decided by the qa<J,â'. The specification is done in terms of time. In

other words, every state to be actualized in a thing is determined by

the qadar concretely as to the definite time at which it is to occur.

The qa<J,a' does not contain any time determinations. It is the qadar

that assigns to every event its peculiar time. And once determined in

this way, nothing can occur even a minute earlier or la ter than the

assigned time.

Al-Qashanï makes an interesting remark on the relation between

the qa<J,a' and the qadar in reference to the Tradition. It is related

that the Prophet once passed under a wall which was about to fall

down. Somebody gave him warning against it and asked, 'Do you

flee from the qa<J,a' of God?' To this the Prophet replied, 'I flee from

the qa<J,a' to the qadar!' The falling down of the wall may have been

-.-,,

'ï§

,if

Permanent Archetypes 177

a matter already decided upon, i.e., qa<J,â'. But, even if the falling

down of the wall was in itself an absolutely inescapable thing, the

question as to when it would actually occur was not part of the

qa<J,a'. So there was at least room for the Prophet to escape being

crushed by the falling wall by having recourse to the qadar of the

wall.

The relation between the qa<J,a' and the qadar has been described

here in such a way that it will naturally suggest to our mind that the

former precedes the latter. This description should not be regarded

as final and ultimate, for there is a deeper aspect to the whole

matter.

We have just said that the qadar is a 'further' specification of the

qa<J,a' in terms of time. In reality, however, God determines the

qa<J,a' of a thing in accordance with His Knowledge, which, in its

turn, follows in every detail the essential structure of the abject of

the Knowledge. And the abject of the Knowledge is, as we have

seen above, the permanent archetype of the thing. And most natur-

ally, the specification of time - or, for that matter, all the possible

specifications of the thing - is part of the archetype. 35 In this sense,

the qadar itself is determined by the archetype. Or we might even

say that the qadar is the permanent archetype. 36

There is, however, a subtle difference between the two. The

permanent archetype in itself is a Universal transcending the level

of time; it is an intelligible in the Divine Consciousness. When a

Universal is about to go into the state of actual existence and is

about to be particularized in the form of an individual thing, it

becomes first connected with a particular point of time and thereby

becomes temporally specialized. An archetype in such a state is

called qadar. It is, in other words, an archetype in a state where all

preparations have been completed for being actualized as a con-

crete existent. Since God, on His part, knows all the conditions of

the archetypes, He knows also that such-and-such an archetype is in

a fully prepared state for being actualized. And, based on this

Knowledge, He judges that this archetype will be actualized as

such-and-such a particular thing. This judgment or decree is the

qa<J,a'. Thus we see that there is a certain respect in which the qadar,

instead of being preceded by the qa<J,a', does precede the qa<J,a' and

determines it.

However this may be, it is certain that qadar is an extremely

delicate state in which an archetype is about to actualize itself in the

form of a concretely existent thing. To know qadar, therefore, is to

peep into the ineffable mystery of Being, for the whole secret of

Being extending from God to the world is disclosed therein. Ibn

'Arabï remarks that 'the mystery of qadar is one of the highest

knowledges, which God grants only to (a small number of) men who

178 Sufism and Taoism

are privileged with a perfect mystical intuition'. If a man happens to

obtain the true knowledge of qadar, the knowledge surely brings

him a perfect peace of mind and an intolerable pain at the same

time. 37 The unusual peace of mind arises from the consciousness

that everything in the world occurs as it bas been determined from

eternity. And whatever may happen to himself or others, he will be

perfectly content with it. Instead of struggling in vain for obtaining

what is not in his capacity, he will be happy with anything that is

given him. He must be tormented, on the other band, by an intense

pain at the sight of all the so-called 'injustices', 'evils', and 'suffer-

ings' that reign rampant around him, being keenly conscious that it

is not in his 'preparedness' to remove them from the world.

Ibn 'Arabi ends this passage by expressing a deep admiration

for the supreme dominion of the qadar over the entire world of

Being.38

The reality of the qadar ex tends its sway over the Absolu te Being (in

the sense that the Absolute is decisively inftuenced by the 'prepared-

ness' of each thing when the Absolute decides its qa4ii') as well as

over the limited beings (in the sense that no being is given anything

beyond what has been determined by its own archetype). Nothing

can be more perfect than the qadar, nothing can be more powerful

nor greater than it, because of the universality of its effect, sometimes

extending to all things and sometimes limited to particular things.

There is another passage in the Fu$Ü$, in which Ibn 'Arabi pursues

further the problem of the knowledge of the qadar. This time he

attempts a classification of men into several degrees based on the

extent to which they know about the qadar.

As we have seen above, to know something about the qadar is

nothing other than knowing something about the permanent

archetypes. But how can man know the truth about the archetypes?

The archetypes are a deep mystery, the true reality of which is

known only to the Absolute, because it is the inner structure of the

Divine Consciousness.

Thus it cornes about that the majority of people are simply

ignorant of the archetypes, and consequently, of the qadar. These

people constitute the lowest degree on the scale. They know

nothing about the determining force of the archetypes, i.e., about

the significance of the qalf,à' and qadar. Because of their ignorance,

they ask and implore God to do for them this and that; they naively

believe that by the power of prayer they can change the eternally

fixed course of events.

Higher than this degree is the degree of people who are aware of

the unalterableness of the archetypal determinations. They do not

ask for things against or beyond what they know is determined.

Permanent Archetypes 179

These people are restrained from asking ( God) by their knowledge

that God has already unalterably decided their qa</.â'. So they are

content with having prepared their places for accepting whatever will

corne from Him. They have already abandoned their egos and all

their selfish motives.39

Among people of this kind there are some who know more in

detail that the determining power of the qalf,à' and qadar is the

determining power of the 'preparedness' of their own permanent

archetypes. They know, so to speak, the inner structure of the qalf,à'

and qadar. These people constitute the third degree of men in terms

of their knowledge about the mystery of Being.

This kind of man knows that God's Knowledge concerning every-

thing about him completely coïncides with what he was in the state of

archetypal subsistence prior to his coming into existence. And he

knows that God does not give him except the exact amount deter-

mined by the Knowledge about himself with which his archetypal

essence has furnished Him. Thus he knows the very origin of God's

Knowledge about him.

There is no higher class among the people of God. They are the most

'unveiled' of all men, because they know the mystery of the qadar.40

But Ibn' Arabi <livides this highest class further into two groups,

higher and lower. The lower degree is represented by those who

know the mystery of the qadar in a broad and general way. The

higher degree is represented by those who know it in all its concrete

details.

In another place,41 Ibn' Arabi explains the same distinction be-

tween the higher and the lower degree of the highest class of' know-

ers' in terms of 'preparedness' and 'receiving' (qabül). The higher

people are those who corne to know the' receiving' by knowing first

the 'preparedness' by the experience of 'unveiling'. Once you know

your 'preparedness' itself in its integrity, you are in a position to

look over from above the whole field of the 'receiving', and nothing

of what you will be receiving (i.e., what will be happening to you)

will be unknown to you any longer. You are, in other words, the

master of your own destin y. In contrast to this, the lower people

corne to know their own 'preparedness' by experiencing first the

'receiving'. Only after taking cognizance of what actually has hap-

pened to them do they realize that they have such-and-such a

'preparedness'. So the knowledge they obtain of their destin y, being

conditioned by what actually happens, is necessarily partial.

Besides, as al-Qàshàni points out, the knowledge thus obtained is

always liable to be mistaken because the process involves inference

( is tidliil) .

Concerning this distinction within the higher degree Ibn 'Arabi

remarks: 42

I

ll

1

11

11:1,!1.1

l li 1

11

180 Sufism and Taoism

He who knows his own qadar in concrete details is higher and more

complete than the one who knows his qadar only in a broad and

general way. For the former knows what is in the Knowledge of God

concerning him. He obtains his knowledge in one of the two possible

ways: either (1) by God's instructing him according to the very

knowledge about him which his archetypal essence has first furnished

Him with, or (2) by his permanent archetype being directly revealed

to him together with ail the infini te states that unfold themselves from

it. This kind of man is higher because his position in regard to his

knowledge about himself is the same as that of God's Knowledge

about him, for both derive from one and the same source (i.e., his

permanent archetype).

This important passage may be clarified if we interpret it as

follows.

Everything in the world is eternally and permanently determined

by its own archetype. The inner structure or content of that

archetype, however, is an impenetrable mystery because it is part of

the Divine Consciousness. But there is only one small aperture, so

to speak, through which man can have a peep into this unfathom-

able mystery. That aperture is the self-consciousness of man. Very

exceptionally, when the spiritual force of a man is unusually ele-

vated in the experience of 'unveiling', he may be given a chance of

witnessing directly the content of his own archetype. And in such a

case, his knowledge about his own archetype is the same as God's

Knowledge about him, in the sense that both derive from one and

the same source. And by knowing his own archetype, not externally

but internally, he takes a peep at the great mystery of the qadar.

However, this does not mean that the Knowledge of God and the

knowledge of a highest 'knower' are exactly identical with each

other in every respect. For the knowledge of a man about his own

archetype is conditioned by the actual forms or states in which

the archetype is manifested. Though he looks into the content of his

archetype with an unusual penetration of insight through and

beyond the actual forms it assumes, he has no access to the

archetype as it was in the original state prior to existence.

(It is true that there occurs in the experience of 'unveiling'

identification of the human knowledge with God's Knowledge), but

if we consider this phenomenon from the side of the man, the whole

matter turns out to be a special favor on the part of God who has

prepared ail this for him from eternity. And (the greatest wonder

consists in the fact that) this special favor which God bestows upon

him is itself part of the very content of his archetype.

The man who experiences the 'unveiling' cornes to know the whole

content of his archetype when God lets him have a peep into it. But

'God lets him have a peep into it' means only that God allows him to

observe (with unusual clarity and penetration) the states of his

Permanent Archetypes 181

archetype (as actualized in existence). For it is not in the capacity of

any creature at ail - even in such a (privileged) state in which God

allows him to have an insight into ail the forms of his permanent

archetype in the state in which it receives existence - to gain the sa me

insight as God Himself into the archetypes in their state of non-

existence, because the archetypes prior to existence are but essential

relations having no definite form at all.43

From this we must conclude that although there is a certain respect

in which a man's knowledge about his archetype becomes identical

with God's Knowledge aboutit in that both derive from one and the

same source, there is also a fondamental difference between the two

in that the human knowledge about an archetype concerns it only in

the state of existence while God's Knowledge concerns it both

before and after its existence. Furthermore, even this partial

identification of the human knowledge with the Divine Knowledge

is due to a special 'concern' of God with the particular man in whom

it realizes.

The only way possible by which man can hope to get this kind of

insight into the archetypes is, according to Ibn 'Arabï, the experi-

ence of 'unveiling'. Apart from 'unveiling' nothing, not even Divine

Revelation to prophets, can give a knowledge of the inner structure

of the archetypes. But this does not mean that the experience of

'unveiling' reveals the whole secret of this problem. Ibn 'Arabï is

very reserved concerning this point. He merely says that in

extremely special cases, the people of 'unveiling' can corne to know

through their experience something of the mystery (ba'<J, al-umür

min dhalik).44 The true reality of the qadar in its entirety is the

deepest of all secrets into which God alone can penetrate, because it

concerns the very delicate ontological moments at which the Divine

act of 'creation' cornes into actual relation with its abjects. And in

this depth, 'There can be no "immediate tasting" (dhawq), no

self-manifestation, no "unveiling" except for God alone'.

Compared with Ibn' Arabï, al-Qâshânï is extremely daring in that

he admits straightforwardly that in the case of the mystics of the

highest degree there is even the possibility of knowing the reality of

the qadar in an absolu te way.

There is in these words of our Master a clear suggestion that it is not

impossible nor forbidden for a man to try to have an insight (into the

secret of the qadar) through the experience of 'unveiling' and 'illumi-

nation' (tajalli).45 It is possible for God tolet anybody He likes gain

an insight into 'something' of the mystery in a partial way.

Is it possible for a man to gain an unconditional insight into it? No, he

can never do that in so far as he is a man. However, when a

man becomes annihilated (i.e., in the mystical experience of

11111

182 Sufism and Taoism

'self-annihilation' fana') and loses his name and his personal identity

to such a degree that there remains in him no trace of his 1-ness and

his own essence, th us losing himself completely, then it is possible

that he gains an insight into the Reality through the Reality in so far

as he himself is the Reality. Of course such a thing never happens

except to a man of the most perfect 'preparedness' .46

A man who is allowed to have an insight into the depth of the qadar

through 'immediate tasting' and 'unveiling', whether the insight he

gains be partial (as Ibn 'Arabi suggests) or total and absolute (as

al-Qàshàni states), is not an ordinary man. We are in the presence of

a Perfect Man, a problem with which we shall be occupied in

Chapter XV of the present work.

VI The Mutual 'Constraint' between God and the World

We have seen in the preceding that, in the world-view of Ibn' Arabi,

the power of the 'preparedness' belonging to each of the archetypes

is absolutely supreme, so supreme that no force, not even God

Himself, can reduce it. Indeed, it is impossible for God even to

desire to change its fixed form.

Ibn' Arabi describes this fact in terms of the concept of reciprocal

taskhir between the Absolu te and the world. The word taskhir, or its

verbal form sakhkhara, means in ordinary Arabie, in the field of

human relations, that a person endowed with a strong power

humbles and overwhelms another and constrains the latter to do

whatever he wants him to do. Thus here again Ibn 'Arabi uses an

extremely daring expression which might look simply blasphemous

to common sense, and states that as the Absolute 'constrains' the

world, so the world, on its part, 'constrains' the Absolute.

The idea that God govems the world, things and men, with His

absolute power and 'constrains' everything to do whatever He

wants it to dois something natural in Semitic monotheism and does

not raise any difficulties; but its reverse, i.e., the idea that the world

'constrains' God, is beyond the comprehension of common sense.

This idea is understandable and acceptable only to those who know

thoroughly the basic structure of Ibn' Arabi's philosophy and who,

therefore, are able to see what he really means by this apparently

blasphemous expression. To put it in a nutshell, he means that each

thing determines existence in a particular way as required by its own

'preparedness', or that the self-manifestation of the Absolute is

actualized in each thing in a definite form in strict accordance with

the requirement of the archetype. Thus formulated, the idea tums

out to be one which is already quite familiar to us. But this does not

mean that the idea of taskhir discloses nothing new to our eyes. In

Permanent Archetypes 183

fact the ontological core itself of Ibn' Arabi's entire philosophizing

is surprisingly simple and solidly immovable; it is the different

angles from which he considers it that constantly move and change,

revealing at every step a new aspect of the core. Every new angle

discloses some unexpected aspect of it. As he goes on changing his

perspective, his philosophy becomes molded into a definite form.

This process itself is, in short, his philosophy. The concept of taskhir

is one of those crucial perspectives.

As we have already observed, there are, in Ibn 'Arabi' s view, a

number of degrees distinguishable among the beings of the world.

And the general rule is that a higher order exercises taskhir over a

lower order. And this not only applies to the relation between

genera and species, but the same phenomenon occurs even among

members of one and the same species. A man, for example, subju-

gates and subordinates another.

This is made possible in the particular case of man by the fact that

man has two different aspects: (1) 'humanity' (insàniyah) and (2)

'animality' (l)ayawàniyah). In the first aspect, man is 'perfect'

(kàmil), and the Arabie word for man in this sense is insàn. The

second aspect represents the material and animal side of man, and

the Arabie word for man in this sense is bashar.41 And the attribute

proper to this aspect of man is 'imperfect' or 'defective' (nàqi$).

In the first aspect, ail men are equal to each other; there is no

difference of orders or degrees among them, and, therefore, taskhir

cannot occur on this lev el. In the second aspect, on the contrary,

there is actually the 'higher'-'lower' relation among men in terms of

wealth, rank, dignity, intelligence, etc. Naturally, on this level, a

'higher' man subjugates a 'lower' man.48 To this we must add that

the 'animality' of man and the 'animality' of the animais, though

both are the same qua 'animality', are different in rank, the former

being superior to the latter. Thus the 'animality' of man subjugates

and constrains the 'animality' of the animais.

The animality of man maintains its control over the animality of the

animais, because, for one thing, God has made the latter naturally

subservient to the former, but mainly because animal in its ontologi-

cal root (a$l) is non-animal. This is why animal surpasses man in the

amount of taskhïr it suffers. For a non-animal (i.e., inanimate, which

happens to be the ontological root of animal) possesses no will; it is

completely at the mercy of one who controls it at will.49

Thus Ibn 'Arabi shows at the outset the descending order of

taskhir: man animal Animal vis-à-vis man dis-

closes its ontological 'root' which is non-animal. Thus, although

man himself is also an animal, his animality is superior to the

184 Sufism and Taoism

animality of animal, because non-human animal in the presence of

human animal stands naked, so to speak, in its non-animal root, and

behaves toward the latter as a non-animal devoid of will-power. But

an animal taken as a full-fledged animal, and not in its non-animal

root, is quite different from this.

But animal (not in its root but as an actual being) has will and acts in

pursuit of aims. Soit cornes about that an animal displays obstinate

refusai to obey in some cases when one tries to subjugate it. If the

animal in question happens to possess the power to manifest this

refusai, it does man if est it in the form of restiveness. But if it happens

to lack that power or if what a man wants it to do happens to coin ci de

with what it wants to do, then the animal obeys with docility the will

of the man.

Similarly a man standing in the same position (as animal vis-à-vis

man) to another man acts in obedience to the will of the latter

because of something - wealth, for instance - by which God has

raised the rank of the latter over the former. He acts this way because

he wishes to obtain (part of) the wealth, which in certain cases is

called 'wages'. To this refers the Qoranic verse:' And We have raised

some of the people above others by degrees so that they might force

one another to servitude' (XLIII, 32). If (of two men) one is subju-

gated and constrained by the other who is his equal (as a member of

the same species 'man'), it is only because of his 'animality', not

'humanity', for two equals qua equals remain opposed to each other

(and there can be no taskhir between them). Thus the higher of the

two in terms of wealth or social status subjugates the lower, acting

thereby on the basis of his 'humanity', while the lower is subjugated

by the former either from fear or covetousness, acting on the basis of

his 'animality', not 'humanity'. For no one can subjugate anybody

who is equal to him in every respect. Do you not see how the beasts

(that are so docilely subjugated by men) show among themselves a

tierce and determined opposition to each other because they are

equal?

This is why God says: 'And We have raised some of the people above

others by degrees', ... and taskhïr occurs precisely because of these

different degrees. 50

Ibn 'Arabï distinguishes between two kinds of taskhïr. One of them

is what has just been described. It is called 'constraining by will'

(taskhïr bi-al-irâdah). It refers to a descending order of taskhir, in

which a higher being cons trains a lower, and which is qui te a natural

phenomenon observable everywhere in the world of Being.

In contrast to this, the second is an ascending order of taskhïr, in

which a lower being subjugates and constrains a higher being. In this

phenomenon, 'will' (irâdah) has no part to play. A lower being does

not and can not constrain a higher one by exercising his will. Rather

the higher being is constrained by the very natural state in which the

lower being is found. It is therefore called 'constraining by the state

W" ,1;

Permanent Archetypes 185

(or situation)' (taskhir bi-al-}Jâl). Here the 'constraining' occurs by

the mere fact that the lower and the higher happen to be in a certain

relationship with each other. The difference between the two kinds

of taskhïr is explained by Ibn' Arabï in the following way: 51

The taskhir is of two kinds. The first is a taskhïr which occurs by the

will of the 'constrainer' (musakhkhir) who subdues by force the

'constrained' (musakhkhar). This is exemplified by the taskhïr exer-

cised by a master over his slave, though both are equal in 'humanity'.

Likewise the taskhir exercised by a Sultan over his subjects in spi te of

the fact that the latter are equal to him as far as their 'humanity' is

concerned. The Sultan constrains them by virtue of his rank.

The second kind is the taskhir by the 'state' or 'situation', like the

taskhïr exercised by the subjects over their king who is charged with

the task of taking care of them, e.g., defending and protecting them,

fighting the enemies who attack them, and preserving their wealth

and their lives, etc. In all these things, which are the taskhïr by the

'state', the subjects do constrain their sovereign. 52 In reality, how-

ever, this should be called taskhir of the 'position' (martabah), 53

because it is the 'position' that compels the king to act in that way.

Sorne kings (just ignore this and) act only for their own selfish

purposes. But there are some who are aware that they are being

constrained by their subjects because of their 'position'. The kings of

this latter kind know rightly how to estima te their subjects. And God

requites them for this with the reward worthy to be given only to

those who really know the truth of the matter. The reward which such

people obtain is for God alone to give because of His being involved

personally in the affairs of His servants. Thus, in this sense, the whole

world acts by its very 'state' as a 'constrainer' who constrains the One

who is impossible (on the level of common sense) to be called 'con-

strained'. This is the meaning of God's saying: 'Every day He is in

some affair' (LV, 29).

This makes clear that the proposition: 'the Absolute is "con-

strained" by the creatures' - a proposition which is unimaginable on

the level of common sense - has no other meaning for Ibn 'Arabi

than that the Absolute perpetually manifests itself in the affairs

(shu'ün, i.e., various states and acts) of the creatures and confers

upon them all kinds of properties in accordance with the require-

ments of their 'preparedness'. According to his interpretation, the

Qoranic verse: 'Every day He is in some affair' refers to this fact,

meaning as it does, 'every day (i.e., perpetually) the Divine "He"

(i.e., He-ness) is manifesting itself in this or that mode of being in

the creatures, according to the requirement of the "preparedness"

of each'.

Thus, from whatever angle he may start, Ibn 'Arabï ultimately

cornes back to the central concept of 'self-manifestation'. And the

186 Sufism and Taoism

problem of taskhïr in this context is reduced to that of the self-

manifestation of the Absolu te being determined variously in accor-

dance with the natural capacities of the individual existents. We

may express the same thing, still within the framework of Ibn

'Arabi's world-view, by saying that the permanent archetypes, or

the eternal potentialities, must obey the strictly necessary and

unchangeable laws laid down by themselves, when they become

actualized in individual things. Taskhir is after ail the supreme

power exercised by the 'preparedness' of each thing.

God's self-manifestation varies according to the 'preparedness' of

each individual locus. Junayd54 was asked once about the mystical

knowledge (ma'rifah) of God and the 'knower' ('arif). He replied.

'The color of water is the color of its vessel'. This is, indeed an answer

which hits the mark, for it describes the matter as it really is. 55

Water has no color of its own; it is rather colored by the color of

the vessel which contains it. This metaphor implies that the Abso-

lute has no particular form to which we might point as the Form of

the Absolute. The truth of the matter is that the Absolu te manifests

itself in infinitely various forms according to the particularities of

the recipients. And the receptive power of the latter plays a decisive

role in 'coloring' the originally 'colorless' Absolute. The Divine

Name, the 'Last' (al-akhir) expresses this aspect of the Absolute.

The 'Last', i.e., One whose place is behind ail, refers to that particu-

lar aspect of the Absolute in which it 'follows' the inborn capacity

(or 'preparedness') of everything. Taken in this sense, the taskhir of

God by the creatures is something quite natural, particularly in the

philosophical system of Ibn 'Arabi. But it is not for everybody to

understand the problem in this way.

A man who has but 'a feeble intellect', Ibn 'Arabi says, cannot

tolerate the dictum that God is 'constrained'. Such a man misunder-

stands the concept of the Omnipotence of God, and sets against this

dictum another dictum that God can do everything, even impossible

things. And by this he imagines that he has 'purified' (tanzïh) God

from weakness and disability.

Sorne of the thinkers whose intellect is feeble, being misled by the

conviction that God is able to do whatever He wants to do, have corne

to declare it possible for God to do even those things that ftatly

contradict Wisdom and the real state of things.56

VII Gifts of God

We know already that the self-manifestation of the Absolute

means, among other things, bestowal of Being. Being or existence is

Permanent Archetypes 187

in this sense a precious gift bestowed by God upon ail beings. Ibn

'Arabi discusses the nature of the archetypes from this particular

point of view and emphasizes here again the decisive part played by

them. In fact, the theory of the Divine gifts occupies a considerably

important place in his philosophy, and he develops in the a

very detailed analysis of this problem.

He begins by classifying the gifts of the Absolute. 57

Know that the Divine gifts and favors, which appear in this world of

Becoming through the medium of men or without their medium, are

of two kinds: (1) 'essential gifts' ('atiiyü dhâtïyah) and (2) 'gifts

given through the Na mes ('atiiyii asmii'ïyah ). The distinction be-

tween these two kinds is clearly discerned by the people of 'immedi-

ate tasting'.

There is also ( another way of classifying the Divine gifts, according to

which three kinds of gifts are distinguished:) ( 1) gifts that are given in

response to an act of asking (on the part of the creatures) concerning

some particular thing. This occurs when, for example, a man says, 'O

my Lord, give me such-and-such a thing!' The man specifies a par-

ticular thing which he desires; he does not think of anything else. (2)

Gifts that are given in response to a non-specified asking. This occurs

when a man says without any specification, '(My Lord,) give me what

Thou knowest to be beneficial to any part of my being, whether

spiritual or physical. (3) Gifts that are given independently of any act

of asking (on the part of the creatures), whether the gifts in question

be 'essential' or 'through the Names'.

The theory of the Divine gifts that underlies the first of these two

classifications is nothing else than the theory of the self-

manifestation of the Absolute considered from a somewhat new

point of view. The Essence (dhat) of the Absolute, as we saw above

in dealing with the concept of ontological 'breathing', pervades and

runs through ail beings. From the specific point of view of the

present chapter, this means that the Absolute gives its own Essence,

as it were, as a gift to ail beings. Likewise, the Attributes (or Names)

of the Absolute are manifested in the attributes of all beings. This

would mean that the Absolute has given its Attributes as gifts to the

creaturely world. lt is to be remarked that both these gifts corres-

pond to the (3) of the second classification mentioned above.

These gratuitous gifts are given by God to all, regardless of whether

they ask for them or not. In common-sense understanding, a gift is

generally given by God when someone asks Him to give it to him. In

the second classification given above, Ibn' Arabi di vides the' asking'

into specified and non-specified.

Whether in a specified form or in a non-specified form, however,

when a man asks anything of God, he is completely under the sway

188 Sufism and Taoism

of his own 'preparedness'. What he obtains as a result of his asking is

determined by his 'preparedness'. Even the fact itself that he asks

for anything is determined by his 'preparedness'.

If everything is predetermined in this way, and if nothing at all can

ever happen except that which has been predetermined, why do

people ask anything of God? In answering this question, Ibn' Arabï

<livides 'those who ask' (sà'ilün) into two categories, and says: 58

The first catégory is formed by those who are urged to ask by their

natural impatience, for man is by nature 'very impatient' (XVII, 11).

The second are those who feel urged to ask because they know that

there are in the hands of God certain things which are predetermined

in such a way that they shall not be obtained unless asked for. A man

of this sort thinks, 'It may be that the particular thing which we ask

God to give happens to belong to this kind'. His asking, in this case, is

a kind of precaution taken for any possibility in the matter. (He takes

su ch an attitude) because he knows neither what is in the Knowledge

of God nor what the 'preparedness' (i.e., his own 'preparedness' and

that of the thing he is asking for) will cause him to receive. For it is

extremely difficult to know concerning every single moment what the

'preparedness' of an individual will give him in that very fraction of

time. Besides, if the asking itself were not given by the 'prepared-

ness', he would not even ask for anything. Those, of the people of the

(constant) 'presence' (with God),59 who cannot attain to such a

( comprehensive) knowledge of their own 'preparedness', can at least

attain to the point at which they obtain a knowledge of their 'pre-

paredness' at every present moment. For due to their (constant)

'presence', they know what the Absolute has just given them at that

moment, being well aware at the same time that they have received

precisely what they have received because of their 'preparedness'.

These people are subdivided into two classes: 60 (1) those who obtain

knowledge about their own 'preparedness' judging by what they have

received, and (2) those who know on the basis of (their knowledge

of) their own 'preparedness' what they are going to receive. And this

last represents the most perfect knowledge conceivable of the 'pre-

paredness' within this class of people.

To this class also belong those who ask, not because of their natural

impatience (the first category) nor because of the possibility (of the

thing they want being dependent upon their asking (the second

category), but who ask simply in obedience to God's Command as

expressed by His words: 'Cali upon Me, and 1 shall respond to you'

(XL, 60).

Such a man is a typical 'servant'. He who asks in this way has no

personal intention toward anything, specified or non-specified. His

sole concern is to act in obedience to whatever his Master commands

him to do. So if the objective situation ( coming from the archetype)

demands asking, he does ask out of sheer piety, but if it demands him

to leave everything to God' s care and to keep silence, he does keep

silence. Thus, Job and others (like him) were made to endure bitter

Permanent Archetypes 189

trials, but they did not ask God to remove the sufferings with which

He tried them. But later, when the situation demanded them to ask,

(they asked God,) and God did remove their sufferings from them.

Thus there are recognizable three categories of 'those who ask',

each category being characterized by a particular motive from

which they ask and by a particular way of asking. But whatever the

motive and whatever the way, there seems to be practically no open

space for the act itself of asking to be effective. For as we observe at

the outset, everything is determined from eternity and the act of

asking cannot possibly produce even a slight change in the strictly

predetermined course of events. Indeed, man's asking for some

'gift' from God and God's granting him his wish are also predeter-

mined. As Ibn 'Arabï says: 61

Whether the request is immediately complied with or put off depends

upon the qadar which God Himself has decided from eternity .62 If the

asking occurs exactly at its determined time, God responds to it

immediately, but in case its determined time is to corne later, whether

in this world or in the Hereafter, God's compliance with the request is

also deferred. Note that by compliance (or response) here 1 do not

mean the verbal response consisting in God's saying, 'Here 1 am!' 63

What we have just dealt with concerns the situation in which man

positively asks of God something, in a specified or non-specified

way. And we have noticed the supreme determining power exer-

cised by the 'preparedness' and qadar in such cases.

We turn now to the problem of gifts that are given independently

of any positive act of asking on the part of man. Since this represents

the self-manifestation of the Absolute in its typical form, it will be

clear even without any further explanation that the nature of the

particular thing that receives a gift of this kind (i.e., the nature of the

locus of the self-manifestation) exercises a decisive influence upon

the whole process. Our main concern will be, therefore, with an

analysis of the way Ibn' Arabï deals with the problem on the level of

theoretical thinking.

He begins by pointing out that the word 'asking' in this particular

case means specifically verbal asking. Otherwise, everything is 'ask-

ing' in some form or another in a broad sense. So by the phrase:

'gifts that are not due to asking', he simply means, he says, those

gifts that are given independently of verbal asking.

Non-verbal 'asking' is divided into two kinds: (1) 'asking by

situation' (su' àl bi-al-}J,àl), and (2) 'asking by preparedness' (su' àl

bi-al-isti'dàd). Of these two kinds Affifi gives the following explana-

tion.64 The 'asking by situation' is reducible to the second type of

non-verbal asking, because the objective situation of a thing or a

person asking for something depends ultimately on the nature of the

190 Sufism and Taoism

'preparedness' of that thing or persan. When a man is ill, for

example, his situation or state 'asks for' something (e.g., being

cured), but the illness itself is due to the 'preparedness' of that

particular man. The 'asking by preparedness' concems this or that

attribute pertaining to existence, which the very nature of each

existent asks for. This is the only kind of 'asking' to which the

Absolute responds in the real sense of the word. Thus if something

has been predetermined from etemity that it should be such-and-

such, and if the nature of that thing actually demands it as it has been

predetermined, the demand is immediately satisfied. Everything

that happens in this world of Being happens only in this way.

To this Affifi adds the remark that this puts the determinist

position of Ibn 'Arabî beyond all doubt. Only it is not a mechanical

material determinism but is rather close, he says, to the Leibnizian

concept of pre-established harmony.

However this may be, Ibn 'Arabî himself explains his position in

his peculiar way. Here follows what he says about this problem.65

As regards (gifts) that are not due to asking, it is to be remarked that 1

mean by 'asking' here only the verbal expression of a wish. For

properly speaking, nothing can do without 'asking' in some form or

other, whether by language or situation or 'preparedness'. (The

'asking by situation' may be understood by the following analogy.) 66

An unconditioned praise of God is not possible except in a verbal

form. As to its inner meaning, (praise of God) is necessarily con-

ditioned by the situation which urges you to praise Him. And (the

situation) is that which conditions you (and determines your praise)

through a Name denoting an action or a Name denoting 'puri-

fication'. Asto the 'preparedness', man is not (ordinarily) aware of

it, he is only aware of the situation, for he is always conscious of the

motive (from which he praises God), and that motive is precisely

(what 1 mean by) 'situation'. Thus 'preparedness' is the most con-

cealed of ail (grounds of) 'as king'.

Let us first elucidate what is exactly meant by the analogy of

'praising'. Man praises God (in Arabie) by saying verbally al-}Jamd

li-Allâh (i.e., 'praise be to God!'). 67 Everybody uses the same for-

mula. The formula itself in its verbal form remains always uncon-

ditioned. But if we go into the psychology of those who cry out

al-}Jamd li-Allâh! and analyze it in each particular case, the persan

A, for example, is thinking of his own bodily state of health and says

al-}Jamd li-Allâh as an effusion of his thankfulness for his health,68

while the persan B praises God by the same formula because he is

keenly conscious of the greatness and etemity of 69 God. Thus the

motive, or the concrete situation, which drives man to use the same

formula differs from case to case. This particular motivating situa-

tion is called }Jâl, 'situation', or 'state'.

Permanent Archetypes 191

Now if we transpose this relation between the varying motives

and the use of the same formula to the context of Divine gifts, we

can easily grasp the basic structure of the latter. Everything in the

world is alw.ays 'asking' of the Absolute an ontological 'gift' accord-

ing to the requirement of its own 'preparedness'. This general form

or pattern is everywhere the same. However, if we take each single

unit of time and analyze minutely its content, we find that the

'asking' assumes at every moment a unique form according to

the concrete situation peculiar to that particular moment. This is

the requirement of the 'situation'.

The requirements of the 'situations', therefore, are concrete

details within the 'preparedness', and are ultimately reducible to the

latter. Subjectively, however, i.e., from the standpoint of a particu-

lar man, he is clearly conscious of his own 'situation', while he is

ordinarily unconscious of his 'preparedness'. A sick man, for

instance, asks for health because he feels pain. He is conscious of the

motive from which he is making urgent supplication for health. But

he is not conscious of the 'preparedness' which concems his very

existence and which dominates everything about himself.

The 'preparedness' for ordinary men is after all an insoluble

mystery. So the 'asking by preparedness', although it is the most

powerful of the above-mentioned three kinds of' asking', tums out

to be the 'most concealed' of all.

Reference has been made to the close relation that exists between

the theory of' gifts' and the theory of self-manifestation. In fact both

are, as we have observed above, but one thing considered from two

different perspectives. 1 would like to bring the present section to a

close by discussing a particular point which emerges when we put

these two perspectives together in one place.

At the outset of this section we saw Ibn' Arabi dividing the' gifts'

into two major class·es: (1) essential gifts and (2) gifts given through

the Names. Asto the first of these two classes, the word 'essential'

(dhâtiyah) itself will be enough to suggest that it has something to do

with the self-manifestation of the Essence (dhât).

In effect, 'the essential gifts' are, from the viewpoint of tajallï, a

self-manifestation of the Divine Essence. It is to be noticed, how-

ever, that it is a particular kind of essential self-manifestation which

is designated by the term 'holy emanation'. It is not what is desig-

nated by the term 'the most holy emanation'.70 Ibn' Arabî is evi-

dently thinking of this distinction when he says: 71

Self-manifestation does not occur from the Essence except in the

particular form determined by the locus in which it (the Essence) is

manifested. No other way of (essential self-manifestation) is poss-

ible. So the locus sees nothing else than its own form as reflected in

192 Sujism and Taoism

the mirror of the Absolute. It never sees the Absolute itself. It is

utterly impossible for it to see the Absolute although it is conscious

that it is perceiving its own form in no other (place) than (the mirror

of) the Absolu te.

The intended meaning of this passage is explicated by al-Qashani in

the following way: 72

There can be no self-manifestation coming from the pure attribute-

less Essence, because the Essence in its attributeless aspect does not

manifest itself to anybody (or anything). lndeed, that which manif-

ests itself is the Essence in its aspect of Mercifulness (ra/:tmânïyah }73

... , while the Essence qua Essence does not make self-

manifestation except to itself. Toward the creatures, the self-

manifestation is done exclusively according to the 'preparedness' of

the locus in each case.

And this kind of self-manifestation is, as Bali Efendi rightly

remarks, nothing other than the 'holy emanation'. lt is the self-

manifestation of the Absolute, the direct source of which is the

Presence (i.e., ontological level) of the all-comprehensive Name

(which comprises all the Names or Attributes gathered together

into a unity).

Bali Efendi, in the same place, explains with utmost lucidity the

relation between this 'holy emanation' and the 'essential gifts' and

'the gifts given through the Names':

The self-manifestation whose source is the Essence and which takes a

particular form according to the form of its locus is the 'holy emana-

tion'. (This latter is divided into two kinds).

( 1) When the locus is of such a nature that it receives the self-

manifestation of the Essence from the Presence of the comprehen-

sive Name, the Essence manifests itself (in that locus) directly from

the Presence of the comprehensive unity of all Names. This kind of

self-manifestation is called 'Divine74 self-manifestation', and the

result of it are the 'essential gifts'.

(2) But when the (locus) is of such a nature that it receives the

self-manifestation of the Essence from the particular Presence of one

particular Name, the Essence manifests itself from that particular

Presence. This is what is called the 'self-manifestation through an

Attribute or a Name', and there result from it the 'gifts given through

the Names'.

Notes

1. See Chapter IX on Divine Mercy.

2. Fu$.,p.114/102.

Permanent Archetypes 193

3. The point will be discussed later under III of the present chapter.

4. .• p. 63/76.

5. ibid.

6. Inshà' al-Dawà'ir, ed. Nyberg, pp. 16--17.

7. The first thing is the Absolute, the second is the world, and the third in the order of

description is the archetype.

8. op. cit., p. 19.

9. The English word 'eternal' in this context must always be strictly understood in

the sense of' eternal a parte ante'. The dictum: 'the world is eternal' means, therefore,

that 'the world has no temporal beginning', which would seem ftatly to contradict the

Qoranic teaching of the 'creation' of the world.

10. 'Ibn 'Arabi upheld the thesis of the eternity of the world (qidam al-'âlam) with

no less definiteness than the Peripatetic Philosophers' - Affifi, ., Corn., p. 314.

11. Fu$., p. 263/211.

12. Fu$., p. 16/51.

13. The Attributes dealt with here are only those that are analogically common to

the Absolute and the creatures. The Attributes like Eternity (a parte ante) and

Eternity (a parte post) are naturally excluded from consideration, because they are

never actualized in the creaturely world.

14. 1 read:fa-hiya biifinah lii tazül 'an al-wujüd al-ghaybiy. The last word in the Affifi

edition is al-'ayniy, 'individual and concrete'. What Ibn' Arabi means is clearly that

the Universals, even when they are actualized in the concrete things, remain in their

original state of being 'interior'.

15. p. 16.

16. pp. 16--17/51-52.

17. pp. 16--17/51-52.

18. FU$., pp. 17-18/52-53.

19. FU$., 43167.

20. p. 43.

21. The first term IJ,àdith, grammatically an active form, represents the thing as

something 'coming into temporal existence', while the second, mul],dath, which is a

passive form, represents it as something 'which has been brought into temporal

existence'.

22. p. 18/53.

23. p. 18/53.

1

1

IHl1

111

r 194 Sufism and Taoism

24. Fu$., pp. 75-76/82.

25. Fw;., pp. 76-77/83.

26. Fu$., pp. 157-158/128.

27. Fu$., pp. 104-105/95-96.

28. Fu$., pp. 107-108/97-98.

29. For details about himmah see Chapter XVII.

30. Fu$., pp. 159-160/130-1.

31. p. 160.

32. This conception which might strike corn mon sense as blasphemous will be found

to be not at ail blasphemous if one but reftects that the 'preparedness' of a thing which

is said to exercise such a tremendous power is after ail nothing but a particular

ontological mode of the Absolute. One must remember that, in Ibn' Arabi' s thought,

the whole thing is ultimately an inner drama which is eternally enacted within the

Absolute itself. Ali the other seemingly 'blasphemous' expressions which we are

going to encounter presently like 'God obeys the creatures', 'The world forces God

to compulsory service' etc., must be understood in terms of this basic framework.

33. Fu$., pp. 161-162/131-132.

34. So there is practically no positive part played by the Absolute in this process

except that the archetypes themselves are the manifested forms of the ontological

modes of the Absolute.

35. Fw;., pp. 162-163/132.

36. In effect, al-Qâshânï in a passage of his commentary simply identifies the qadar

with the archetype, cf. p. 163.

37. Fw;., p. 163/132.

38. FU$., p. 163/132-133.

39. Fus., p. 30160.

40. Fus., pp. 30-31160.

41. p. 42/67.

42. Fus., p. 31-32/60-61.

43. Fus., p. 32/61.

44. Fus., pp. 165-166/133-134.

45. Here the word tajalli, which usually means the self-manifestation of the Abso-

lute, is used to designate the reverse side of this phenomenon, i.e., the sa me tajal/i as

reftected in the individual consciousness of a mystic.

Permanent Archetypes 195

46. p. 167.

47. usually translated as 'mortal'.

48. For the explanation just given I am indebted to Aftifi, Fw;., Corn., p. 286.

49. Fu$., p. 243/192-193.

50. FU$., p. 244/193-194.

51. ibid.

52. In the same way, a child exercises taskhïr with his 'state' over his parents.

53. because, properly speaking, what 'constrains' the king is not so much the 'state'

of his subjects as the 'position' of kingship.

54. Junayd (d. 910 A.D.), one of the greatest names in the early phase of the

historical development of Sutism.

55. Fus., p. 280/225.

56. FU$., p. 42/67.

57. Fw;., p. 27/58.

58. Fus., p. 28/59.

59. The people of the presence (ah/ al-hu<f.ür), al-Qâshânï says, are 'those who see

whatever happens to them as coming from God, whether it (actually) occurs through

others or through themselves, and who do not recognize anything other than God as

the cause of any effect or anything existent.' - p. 29.

60. This problem has been dealt with earlier in (V) of the present chapter.

61. Fw; ., p. 29/60.

62. This corresponds to the Qoranic conception that everything has a 'clearly stated

term' (ajal musammà).

63. Whenever a man calls upon Godin supplication, God responds by saying, 'Here

I am!' (Labbayka) This verbal response (ijâbah bi-al-qawl) is always immediate. But

not always sois His response by action (ijâbah bi-al-fi'l) which is the actualization of

what the man has asked for.

64. Fw; ., Corn., p. 22.

65. Fw;., p. 30/60.

66. The analogy which Ibn 'Arabi off ers, however, is not easy to understand due to

his peculiar way of expressing himself. The meaning of the passage will be explicated

in the paragraph immediately after the quotation.

6 7. Strictly speaking, al-hamd li-Allâh is an exclama tory descriptive sentence mean-

ing 'ail praise belongs to God (and to God alone )'.

1 196 Sujism and Taoism

68. This is expressed by Ibn' Arabï by saying that 'the praise is done through a Name

denoting an action', e.g., Guardian (hâfiz), All-giving (wahhâb) etc.

69. This corresponds to the case in which a man praises God 'through a Name

denoting purification (tanzïh)', Most Holy (qaddûs), Eternal-Everlasting (alladhi

/am yazal wa-lâ yazâ/) etc.

70. On this basic distinction see Chapter XI.

71. Fu:f., p. 33/61.

72. pp. 32-33.

73. See Chapter IX.

74. ilâhiy, i.e., the self-manifestation that occurs on the level of 'God'. As we have

seen earlier, 'God' or Allâh is the all-comprehensive Name.