2022/05/25

sunyata | Buddhist concept | Britannica

sunyata | Buddhist concept | Britannica

Alternate titles: śūnya, shunyata
By The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica • Edit History

Key People: Nagarjuna
Related Topics: emptiness
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sunyata, in Buddhist philosophy, the voidness that constitutes ultimate reality; sunyata is seen not as a negation of existence but rather as the undifferentiation out of which all apparent entities, distinctions, and dualities arise. 
Although the concept is encountered occasionally in early Pāli texts, its full implications were developed by the 2nd-century Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna. The school of philosophy founded by him, the Mādhyamika (Middle Way), is sometimes called the Śūnyavāda, or Doctrine That All Is Void.

The term sunyata may also be used as a recognition of anattā, or the absence of any self apart from the five skandhas (mental and physical elements of existence).
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anatta

Buddhism
Alternate titles: anatman
By The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica • Edit History
anatta, (Pali: “non-self” or “substanceless”) Sanskrit anatman, in Buddhism,

 the doctrine that there is in humans no permanent, underlying substance that can be called the soul. Instead, the individual is compounded of five factors (Pali khandha; Sanskrit skandha) that are constantly changing. The concept of anatta, or anatman, is a departure from the Hindu belief in atman (“the self”). The absence of a self, anicca (the impermanence of all being), and dukkha (“suffering”) are the three characteristics of all existence (ti-lakkhana). Recognition of these three doctrines—anatta, anicca, and dukkha—constitutes “right understanding.”


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Śūnyatā

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"Sunyata" redirects here. For other uses, see Sunyata (disambiguation).
Translations of
Śūnyatā
Englishemptiness, voidness, vacuity, openness, thusness
SanskritŚūnyatā
(Dev: शून्यता)
PaliSuññatā
(Dev: सुञ्ञता)
Bengaliশূন্যতা
(Shunnôta)
Burmesethone nya ta, သုညတ
Chinese空
(Pinyin: Kōng)
Japanese空
(Rōmaji: Kū)
Khmerសុញ្ញតា
(UNGEGN: Sŏnhnhôta)
Korean공성(空性)
(RR: gong-seong)
Mongolianхоосон
Tibetanསྟོང་པ་ཉིད་
(Wylie: stong-pa nyid
THL: tongpa nyi)
Thaiสุญตา
VietnameseKhông ̣(空)
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Śūnyatā (Sanskrit: शून्यता, romanized: śūnyatā; Pali: suññatā) pronounced in English as /ʃuːnˈjɑː.tɑː/ (shoon-ya-ta), translated most often as emptiness,[1] vacuity, and sometimes voidness,[2] is an Indian philosophical and mathematical construct. Within Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and other philosophical strands, the concept has multiple meanings depending on its doctrinal context. It is either an ontological feature of reality, a meditative state, or a phenomenological analysis of experience.

In the Chandah-sutra of Pingala, dating perhaps the third or second century BC, Pingala's use of a zero symbol, śūnya, as a marker seems to be the first known explicit reference to zero.[3]

In Theravāda Buddhism, Suññatā often refers to the non-self (Pāli: anattā, Sanskrit: anātman)[note 1] nature of the five aggregates of experience and the six sense spheres. Suññatā is also often used to refer to a meditative state or experience.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism, śūnyatā refers to the tenet that "all things are empty of intrinsic existence and nature (svabhava)",[5][6] but may also refer to the Buddha-nature teachings and primordial or empty awareness, as in Dzogchen, Shentong, or Chan.

Etymology[edit]

"Śūnyatā" (Sanskrit) is usually translated as "devoidness", "emptiness", "hollow", "hollowness", "voidness". It is the noun form of the adjective śūnya, plus -tā:

  • śūnya, in the context of buddha dharma, primarily means "empty", or "void," but also means "zero," and "nothing,"[7] and derives from the root śvi, meaning "hollow"
  • -tā is a suffix denoting a quality or state of being, equivalent to English "-ness"

Development of the concept[edit]

The concept of śūnyatā as "emptiness" is related to the concept of anatta in early Buddhism.[8] Over time, many different philosophical schools or tenet-systems (Sanskrit: siddhānta)[9] have developed within Buddhism in an effort to explain the exact philosophical meaning of emptiness.

After the Buddha, emptiness was further developed by the Abhidharma schools, Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamaka school, an early Mahāyāna school. Emptiness ("positively" interpreted) is also an important element of the Buddha-nature literature, which played a formative role in the evolution of subsequent Mahāyāna doctrine and practice.

Early Buddhism[edit]

Main article: Pre-sectarian Buddhism

Pāli Nikāyas[edit]

A simile from the Pali scriptures (SN 22.95) compares form and feelings with foam and bubbles.
See also: Sati (Buddhism)

The Pāli Canon uses the term śūnyatā ("emptiness") in three ways: "(1) as a meditative dwelling, (2) as an attribute of objects, and (3) as a type of awareness-release."[10]

According to Bhikkhu Analayo, in the Pāli Canon "the adjective suñña occurs with a much higher frequency than the corresponding noun suññatā" and emphasizes seeing phenomena as 'being empty' instead of an abstract idea of "emptiness."[11]

One example of this usage is in the Pheṇapiṇḍūpama Sutta (SN 22:95), which states that on close inspection, each of the five aggregates are seen as being void (rittaka), hollow (tucchaka), coreless (asāraka). In the text a series of contemplations is given for each aggregate: form is like "a lump of foam" (pheṇapiṇḍa); sensation like "a water bubble" (bubbuḷa); perception like "a mirage" (marici); formations like "a plantain tree" (kadalik-khandha); and cognition is like "a magical illusion" (māyā).[12]

According to Shi Huifeng, the terms "void" (rittaka), "hollow" (tucchaka), and "coreless" (asāraka) are also used in the early texts to refer to words and things which are deceptive, false, vain, and worthless.[12] This sense of worthlessness and vacuousness is also found in other uses of the term māyā, such as the following:

"Monks, sensual pleasures are impermanent, hollow, false, deceptive; they are illusory (māyākatame), the prattle of fools."[12]

The Suñña Sutta,[13] part of the Pāli Canon, relates that the monk Ānanda, Buddha's attendant asked,

It is said that the world is empty, the world is empty, lord. In what respect is it said that the world is empty?" The Buddha replied, "Insofar as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self: Thus it is said, Ānanda, that the world is empty.

According to the American monastic Thanissaro Bhikku:

Emptiness as a quality of dharmas, in the early canons, means simply that one cannot identify them as one's own self or having anything pertaining to one's own self ... Emptiness as a mental state, in the early canons, means a mode of perception in which one neither adds anything to nor takes anything away from what is present, noting simply, "There is this." This mode is achieved through a process of intense concentration, coupled with the insight that notes more and more subtle levels of the presence and absence of disturbance (see MN 121).[14]

Meditative state[edit]

Main article: Buddhist meditation
Further information: Samadhi § Vimokṣamukha

Emptiness as a meditative state is said to be reached when "not attending to any themes, he [the bhikku] enters & remains in internal emptiness" (MN 122). This meditative dwelling is developed through the "four formless states" of meditation or Arūpajhānas and then through "themeless concentration of awareness."[10]

The Cūlasuññata-sutta (MN III 104) and the Mahāsuññata-sutta (MN III 109) outline how a monk can "dwell in emptiness" through a gradual step-by-step mental cultivation process, they both stress the importance of the impermanence of mental states and the absence of a self.

In the Kāmabhu Sutta S IV.293, it is explained that a bhikkhu can experience a trancelike contemplation in which perception and feeling cease. When he emerges from this state, he recounts three types of "contact" (phasso):

  1. "emptiness" (suññato),
  2. "signless" (animitto),
  3. "undirected" (appaṇihito).[15]

The meaning of emptiness as contemplated here is explained at M I.297 and S IV.296-97 as the "emancipation of the mind by emptiness" (suññatā cetovimutti) being consequent upon the realization that "this world is empty of self or anything pertaining to self" (suññam idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā).[16][17]

The term "emptiness" (suññatā) is also used in two suttas in the Majjhima Nikāya, in the context of a progression of mental states. The texts refer to each state's emptiness of the one below.[18]

Chinese Āgamas[edit]

Main article: Chinese Buddhism

The Chinese Āgamas contain various parallels to the Pheṇapiṇḍūpama Sutta. One partial parallel from the Ekottara Āgama describes the body with different metaphors: "a ball of snow", "a heap of dirt", "a mirage", "an illusion" (māyā), or "an empty fist used to fool a child".[12] In a similar vein, the Mūla-Sarvāstivādin Māyājāla Sūtra, gives two sets of metaphors for each of the sensory consciousnesses to illustrate their vain, illusory character.[12]

Other Sarvāstivādin Āgama sutras (extant in Chinese) which have emptiness as a theme include Samyukta Āgama 335 - Paramārtha-śunyatā-sūtra ("Sutra on ultimate emptiness") and Samyukta Āgama 297 - Mahā-śunyatā-dharma-paryāya ("Greater discourse on emptiness"). These sutras have no parallel Pāli suttas.[19] These sutras associate emptiness with dependent origination, which shows that this relation of the two terms was already established in pre-Nagarjuna sources. The sutra on great emptiness states:

"What is the Dharma Discourse on Great Emptiness? It is this— 'When this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises.'"[20]

The phrase "when this exists..." is a common gloss on dependent origination. Sarvāstivādin Āgamas also speak of a certain "emptiness samadhi" (śūnyatāsamādhi) as well as stating that all dharmas are "classified as conventional".[21]

Mun-Keat Choong and Yin Shun have both published studies on the various uses of emptiness in the Early Buddhist texts (Pāli Canon and Chinese Āgamas).[22][23] Choong has also published a collection of translations of Āgama sutras from the Chinese on the topic of emptiness.[24]

Early Buddhist schools and Abhidharma[edit]

Many of the early Buddhist schools featured śūnyatā as an important part of their teachings.

The Sarvastivadin school's Abhidharma texts like the Dharmaskandhapāda Śāstra, and the later Mahāvibhāṣa, also take up the theme of emptiness vis-a-vis dependent origination as found in the Agamas.[25]

Schools such as the Mahāsāṃghika Prajñaptivādins as well as many of the Sthavira schools (except the Pudgalavada) held that all dharmas were empty (dharma śūnyatā).[25] This can be seen in the early Theravada Abhidhamma texts such as the Patisambhidamagga, which also speak of the emptiness of the five aggregates and of svabhava as being "empty of essential nature".[26] The Theravada Kathavatthu also argues against the idea that emptiness is unconditioned.[27] The Mahāvastu, an influential Mahāsāṃghika work, states that the Buddha

"has shown that the aggregates are like a lightning flash, as a bubble, or as the white foam on a wave."[28]

One of the main themes of Harivarman's Tattvasiddhi-Śāstra (3rd-4th century) is dharma-śūnyatā, the emptiness of phenomena.[28]

Theravāda[edit]

Sea froth at sunset

Theravāda Buddhists generally take the view that emptiness is merely the not-self nature of the five aggregates. Emptiness is an important door to liberation in the Theravāda tradition just as it is in Mahayana, according to Insight meditation teacher Gil Fronsdal.[29] The classic Theravāda text known as the Patisambhidamagga (c. 3rd century BCE) describes the five aggregates as being empty (suññam) of essence or intrinsic nature (sabhava).[30] The Patisambhidamagga also equates not-self with the emptiness liberation in a passage also cited by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga (Vism XXI 70):

"When one who has great wisdom brings [volitional formations] to mind as not-self, he acquires the emptiness liberation" -Patis. II 58.[31]

The Visuddhimagga (c. 5th century CE), the most influential classical Theravāda treatise, states that not-self does not become apparent because it is concealed by "compactness" when one does not give attention to the various elements which make up the person.[32] The Paramatthamañjusa Visuddhimaggatika of Acariya Dhammapala, a 5th-century Theravāda commentary on the Visuddhimagga, comments on this passage by referring to the fact that we often assume unity and compactness regarding phenomena or functions which are instead made up of various elements, but when one sees that these are merely empty dhammas, one can understand the not-self characteristic:

"when they are seen after resolving them by means of knowledge into these elements, they disintegrate like froth subjected to compression by the hand. They are mere states (dhamma) occurring due to conditions and void. In this way the characteristic of not-self becomes more evident."[32]

The modern Thai teacher Buddhadasa referred to emptiness as the "innermost heart" of the Buddhist teachings and the cure for the disease of suffering. He stated that emptiness, as it relates to the practice of Dhamma, can be seen both "as the absence of Dukkha and the defilements that are the cause of Dukkha and as the absence of the feeling that there is a self or that there are things which are the possessions of a self."[33] He also equated nibbana with emptiness, writing that "Nibbana, the remainderless extinction of Dukkha, means the same as supreme emptiness."[33] Emptiness is also seen as a mode of perception which lacks all the usual conceptual elaborations we usually add on top of our experiences, such as the sense of "I" and "Mine". According to Thanissaro Bhikku, emptiness is not so much a metaphysical view, as it is a strategic mode of acting and of seeing the world which leads to liberation:[34]

Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them. This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise — of our true identity and the reality of the world outside — pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve the problem of suffering.

Some Theravādins, such as David Kalupahana, see Nagarjuna's view of emptiness as compatible with the Pali Canon. In his analysis of the Mulamadhyamikakarika, Kalupahana sees Nagarjuna's argument as rooted in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (which Nagarjuna cites by name). Kalupahana states that Nagarjuna's major goal was to discredit heterodox views of Svabhava (own-nature) held by the Sarvastivadins and establish the non-substantiality of all dharmas.[31] According to Peter Harvey, the Theravāda view of dhammas and sabhava is not one of essences, but merely descriptive characteristics and hence is not the subject of Madhyamaka critique developed by Nagarjuna (see below).[35]

In Theravāda, emptiness as an approach to meditation is also seen as a state in which one is "empty of disturbance." This form of meditation is one in which meditators become concentrated and focus on the absence or presence of disturbances in their minds; if they find a disturbance they notice it and allow it to drop away; this leads to deeper states of calmness.[34] Emptiness is also seen as a way to look at sense-experience that does not identify with the "I-making" and "my-making" process of the mind. As a form of meditation, this is developed by perceiving the six sense-spheres and their objects as empty of any self, this leads to a formless jhana of nothingness and a state of equanimity.[34]

Mathew Kosuta sees the Abhidhamma teachings of the modern Thai teacher Ajaan Sujin Boriharnwanaket as being very similar to the Mahayana emptiness view.[36]

Mahayana Buddhism[edit]

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There are two main sources of Indian Buddhist discussions of emptiness: the Mahayana sutra literature, which is traditionally believed to be the word of the Buddha in Mahayana Buddhism, and the shastra literature, which was composed by Buddhist scholars and philosophers.

Prajñāpāramitā sūtras[edit]

In the Prajñaparamita sutras, the emptiness of phenomena is often illustrated by metaphors like drops of dew.
Main article: Mahayana sutras

The Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) Sutras taught that all entities, including dharmas, are empty of self, essential core, or intrinsic nature (svabhava), being only conceptual existents or constructs.[37][38] The notion of prajña (wisdom, knowledge) presented in these sutras is a deep non-conceptual understanding of emptiness.[39] The Prajñāpāramitā sutras also use various metaphors to explain the nature of things as emptiness, stating that things are like "illusions" (māyā) and "dreams" (svapna). The Astasahasrika Prajñaparamita, possibly the earliest of these sutras, states:

If he knows the five aggregates as like an illusion, But makes not illusion one thing, and the aggregates another; If, freed from the notion of multiple things, he courses in peace— Then that is his practice of wisdom, the highest perfection.[12]

Perceiving dharmas and beings like an illusion (māyādharmatām) is termed the "great armor" (mahāsaṃnaha) of the Bodhisattva, who is also termed the 'illusory man' (māyāpuruṣa).[40] The Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra adds the following similes to describe how all conditioned things are to be contemplated: like a bubble, a shadow, like dew or a flash of lightning.[41] In the worldview of these sutras, though we perceive a world of concrete and discrete objects, these objects are "empty" of the identity imputed by their designated labels.[42] In that sense, they are deceptive and like an illusion. The Perfection of Wisdom texts constantly repeat that nothing can be found to ultimately exist in some fundamental way. This applies even to the highest Buddhist concepts (bodhisattvas, bodhicitta, and even prajña itself).[43] Even nirvana itself is said to be empty and like a dream or magical illusion.[44] In a famous passage, the Heart sutra, a later but influential Prajñāpāramitā text, directly states that the five skandhas (along with the five senses, the mind, and the four noble truths) are said to be "empty" (sunya):

Form is emptiness, emptiness is form
Emptiness is not separate from form, form is not separate from emptiness
Whatever is form is emptiness, whatever is emptiness is form.[45][note 2][note 3]

In the Prajñāpāramitā sutras the knowledge of emptiness, i.e. prajñāpāramitā is said to be the fundamental virtue of the bodhisattva, who is said to stand on emptiness by not standing (-stha) on any other dharma (phenomena). Bodhisattvas who practice this perfection of wisdom are said to have several qualities such as the "not taking up" (aparigṛhīta) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) of anything, non-attainment (aprapti), not-settling down (anabhinivesa) and not relying on any signs (nimitta, mental impressions).[46][47] Bodhisattvas are also said to be free of fear in the face of the ontological groundlessness of the emptiness doctrine which can easily shock others.[48]

Mādhyamaka school[edit]

Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, two classic Indian philosophers of the Buddhist emptiness doctrine.
Main article: Madhyamaka

Mādhyamaka is a Mahāyāna Buddhist school of philosophy which focuses on the analysis of emptiness, and was thus also known as śūnyatavāda. The school is traditionally seen as being founded by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna.[49][50] Nāgārjuna's goal was to refute the essentialism of certain Abhidharma schools and the Hindu Nyaya school.[51] His best-known work is the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), in which he used reductio arguments (Skt: prasanga) to show the non-substantiality of everything. Nāgārjuna equated the emptiness of dharmas with their dependent origination, and thus with their being devoid any permanent substance or primary, substantial existence (svabhava).[52][53][54][note 4] Nāgārjuna writes in the MMK:

We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18)

Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19) [55]

Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka states that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (niḥsvabhāva), all things are mere conceptual constructs (prajñaptimatra) because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions.[56] Because of this, Mādhyamaka is also known as Niḥsvabhāvavāda. This also applies to the principle of causality itself, since everything is dependently originated.[57] If one is unaware of this, things may seem to arise as existents, remain for a time and then subsequently perish. In reality, dependently originated phenomena do not arise or remain as inherently existent phenomena and yet they still appear as a flow of conceptual constructs.[58][59][note 5] Thus both existence and nihilism are ruled out.[60][61] Any enduring essential nature would prevent the process of dependent origination, or any kind of origination at all. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change.[62][note 6] For Nāgārjuna, the realization of emptiness is a key understanding which allows one to reach liberation because it is nothing but the elimination of ignorance.

There has been significant debate, both in ancient India and in modern scholarship, as to how to interpret Mādhyamaka and whether it is nihilistic (a claim that Mādhyamaka thinkers vehemently denied).[63][64][65] Some scholars like F. Shcherbatskoy have also interpreted emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental absolute, while other scholars such as David Kalupahana consider this interpretation to be a mistake.[66][67] According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with the ultimate truth but his conception of emptiness is not some kind of Absolute, but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the conventional reality of things and events in the world.[68]

For Nāgārjuna the phenomenal world is the limited truth (samvrtisatya) and does not really exist in the highest reality (paramarthasatya) and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation. This limited truth includes everything, including the Buddha himself, the teachings (Dharma), liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments.[69] This two-truth schema which did not deny the importance of convention allowed him to defend himself against charges of nihilism. Because of his philosophical work, Nāgārjuna is seen by some modern interpreters as restoring the Middle way of the Buddha, which had become influenced by absolutist metaphysical tendencies of schools like the Vaibhasika.[70][52]

Nāgārjuna is also famous for arguing that his philosophy of emptiness was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position or thesis whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging. In his Vigrahavyavartani Nāgārjuna outright states that he has no thesis (pratijña) to prove.[71] This idea would become a central point of debate for later Mādhyamaka philosophers. After Nāgārjuna, his pupil Āryadeva (3rd century CE) commented on and expanded Nāgārjuna's system. An influential commentator on Nāgārjuna was Buddhapālita (470–550) who has been interpreted as developing the 'prāsaṅgika' approach to Nāgārjuna's works, which argues that Madhyamaka critiques of essentialism are done only through reductio ad absurdum arguments. Like Nāgārjuna, instead of putting forth any positive position of his own, Buddhapālita merely seeks to show how all philosophical positions are untenable and self contradictory without putting forth a positive thesis.[72]

Buddhapālita is often contrasted with the works of Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 – c. 578), who argued for the use of logical arguments using the pramana-based epistemology of Indian logicians like Dignāga. Bhāvaviveka argued that Madhyamika's could put forth positive arguments of one's own, instead of just criticizing others' arguments, a tactic called vitaṇḍā (attacking) which was seen in bad form in Indian philosophical circles. He argued that the position of a Mādhyamaka was simply that phenomena are devoid of inherent nature.[72] This approach has been labeled the svātantrika style of Madhyamaka by Tibetan philosophers and commentators. Another influential commentator, Candrakīrti (c. 600–650), critiqued Bhāvaviveka's adoption of the pramana tradition on the grounds that it contained a subtle essentialism and argued that Mādhyamikas must make no positive assertions and need not construct formal arguments.[73]

Yogācāra school[edit]

Main article: Yogacara

The central text of the Yogācāra school, the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, explains emptiness in terms of the three natures theory, stating that its purpose is to "establish the doctrine of the three-own-beings (trisvabhāva) in terms of their lack of own-nature (niḥsvabhāvatā)."[74] According to Andrew Skilton, in Yogācāra, emptiness is the "absence of duality between perceiving subject (lit. "grasper", Skt: grāhaka, Tib: 'dzin-pa) and the perceived object ("grasped", Skt: grāhya, Tib: bzhung-ba)."[75] This is seen in the following quote from the Madhyāntavibhāga:

There exists the imagination of the unreal, there is no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this there is that.[74]

In his commentary, the Indian Yogācāra philosopher Vasubandhu explains that imagination of the unreal (abhūta-parikalpa) is the "discrimination between the duality of grasped and grasper." Emptiness is said to be "the imagination of the unreal that is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus in Yogacara, it can be said that emptiness is mainly that subject and object and all experiences which are seen in the subject–object modality are empty.[74]

According to Yogācāra thought, everything we conceive of is the result of the working of the Eight Consciousnesses.[note 7] The "things" we are conscious of are "mere concepts" (vijñapti), not 'the thing in itself'.[76] In this sense, our experiences are empty and false, they do not reveal the true nature of things as an enlightened person would see them, which would be non-dual, without the imputed subject object distinction.

The Yogācāra school philosophers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu criticized those in the Madhymamika school who "adhere to non-existence" (nāstikas, vaināśkas) and sought to move away from their negative interpretation of emptiness because they feared any philosophy of 'universal denial' (sarva-vaināśika) would stray into 'nihilism' (ucchedavāda), an extreme which was not the middle way.[74] Yogacarins differed from Madhyamikas in positing that there really was something which could be said to 'exist' in experience, namely some kind of nonobjective and empty perception. This Yogacara conception of emptiness, which states that there is something that exists (mainly, vijñapti, mental construction), and that it is empty, can be seen in the following statement of Vasubandhu:

Thus, when something is absent [in a receptacle], then one, seeing that [receptacle] as devoid of that thing, perceives that [receptacle] as it is, and recognises that [receptacle], which is left over, as it is, namely as something truly existing there.[74]

This tendency can also be seen in Asaṅga, who argues in his Bodhisattvabhūmi that there must be something that exists which is described as empty:

Emptiness is logical when one thing is devoid of another because of that [other's] absence and because of the presence of the empty thing itself.[74]

Asaṅga also states:

The nonexistence of duality is indeed the existence of nonexistence; this is the definition of emptiness. It is neither existence, nor nonexistence, neither different nor identical.[74]

This "existence of nonexistence" definition of emptiness can also be seen in Asaṅga's Abhidharmasamuccaya where he states that emptiness is "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self."[74]

In the sixth century, scholarly debates between Yogacarins and Madhyamikas centered on the status and reality of the paratantra-svabhāva (the "dependent nature"), with Madhyamika's like Bhāvaviveka criticizing the views of Yogacarins like Dharmapāla of Nalanda as reifying dependent origination.[74]

Buddha-nature[edit]

Main articles: Buddha-nature and Tathāgatagarbha Sutras

An influential division of 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts develop the notion of Tathāgatagarbha or Buddha-nature.[77][78] The Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest, probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.[79]

The Tathāgatagarbha is the topic of the Tathāgatagarbha sūtras, where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing Tathāgata (Buddha). In the Tathāgatagarbha sūtras the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self. The ultimate goal of the path is characterized using a range of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously by essentialist philosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the Buddhist path.[80]

These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that 'all sentient beings contain a Tathāgata as their 'essence, core or essential inner nature'.[79] They also present a further developed understanding of emptiness, wherein the Buddha-nature, the Buddha and Liberation are seen as transcending the realm of emptiness, i.e. of the conditioned and dependently originated phenomena.[81]

One of these texts, the Angulimaliya Sutra, contrasts between empty phenomena such as the moral and emotional afflictions (kleshas), which are like ephemeral hailstones, and the enduring, eternal Buddha, which is like a precious gem:

The tens of millions of afflictive emotions like hail-stones are empty. The phenomena in the class of non-virtues, like hail-stones, quickly disintegrate. Buddha, like a vaidurya jewel, is permanent ... The liberation of a buddha also is form ... do not make a discrimination of non-division, saying, "The character of liberation is empty".'[82]

The Śrīmālā Sūtra is one of the earliest texts on Tathāgatagarbha thought, composed in the 3rd century in south India, according to Brian Brown. It asserted that everyone can potentially attain Buddhahood, and warns against the doctrine of Śūnyatā.[83] The Śrīmālā Sūtra posits that the Buddha-nature is ultimately identifiable as the supramundane nature of the Buddha, the garbha is the ground for Buddha-nature, this nature is unborn and undying, has ultimate existence, has no beginning nor end, is nondual, and permanent.[84] The text also adds that the garbha has "no self, soul or personality" and "incomprehensible to anyone distracted by sunyata (voidness)"; rather it is the support for phenomenal existence.[85]

The notion of Buddha-nature and its interpretation was and continues to be widely debated in all schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Some traditions interpret the doctrine to be equivalent to emptiness (like the Tibetan Gelug school); the positive language of the texts Tathāgatagarbha sutras are then interpreted as being of provisional meaning, and not ultimately true. Other schools, however (mainly the Jonang school), see Tathāgatagarbha as being an ultimate teaching and see it as an eternal, true self, while Śūnyatā is seen as a provisional, lower teaching.[86]

Likewise, western scholars have been divided in their interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha, since the doctrine of an 'essential nature' in every living being appears to be confusing, since it seems to be equivalent to a 'Self',[note 8][88] which seems to contradict the doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts. Some scholars, however, view such teachings as metaphorical, not to be taken literally.[81]

According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature which these sutras discuss does not represent a substantial self (ātman). Rather, it is a positive expression of emptiness, and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In this view, the intention of the teaching of Buddha-nature is soteriological rather than theoretical.[89][90] According to others, the potential of salvation depends on the ontological reality of a salvific, abiding core reality – the Buddha-nature, empty of all mutability and error, fully present within all beings.[91] Japanese scholars of the "Critical Buddhism" movement meanwhile see Buddha-nature as an essentialist and thus an un-Buddhist idea.[90]

Tibetan Buddhism[edit]

Main article: Madhyamaka § Tibetan_Buddhism
In Tibetan Buddhism, emptiness is often symbolized by and compared to the open sky[92] which is associated with openness and freedom.[93]

In Tibetan Buddhism, emptiness (Wylie: stong-pa nyid) is mainly interpreted through the lens of Mādhyamaka philosophy, though the Yogacara- and Tathāgatagarbha-influenced interpretations are also influential. The interpretations of the Indian Mādhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti are the dominant views on emptiness in Tibetan Buddhist philosophy.[94]

In Tibet, a distinction also began to be made between the autonomist (svātantrika, rang rgyud pa) and consequentialist (prāsaṅgika, thal 'gyur pa) approaches to Mādhyamaka reasoning about emptiness. The distinction was invented by Tibetan scholarship, and not one made by classical Indian Madhyamikas.[95]

Further Tibetan philosophical developments began in response to the works of the influential scholar Dolpopa (1292–1361) and led to two distinctly opposed Tibetan Mādhyamaka views on the nature of emptiness and ultimate reality.[96][97]

One of these is the view termed shentong (Wylie: gzhan stong, 'other empty'), which is a further development of Indian Yogacara-Madhyamaka and the Buddha-nature teachings by Dolpopa, and is primarily promoted in the Jonang school but also by some Kagyu figures like Jamgon Kongtrul. This view states that ultimate reality is empty of the conventional, but it is itself not empty of being ultimate Buddhahood and the luminous nature of mind.[98] Dolpopa considered his view a form of Mādhyamaka, and called his system "Great Mādhyamaka".[99] In Jonang, this ultimate reality is a "ground or substratum" which is "uncreated and indestructible, noncomposite and beyond the chain of dependent origination."[100]

Dolpopa was roundly critiqued for his claims about emptiness and his view that they were a kind of Mādhyamaka. His critics include Tibetan philosophers such as the founder of the Gelug school Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419) and Mikyö Dorje, the 8th Karmapa of the Karma Kagyu (1507–1554).[101]

Rangtong (Wylie: rang stong; 'self-empty') refers to views which oppose shentong and state that ultimate reality is that which is empty of self-nature in a relative and absolute sense; that is to say ultimate reality is empty of everything, including itself. It is thus not a transcendental ground or metaphysical absolute, but just the absence of true existence (svabhava). This view has sometimes been applied to the Gelug school because they tend to hold that emptiness is "an absolute negation" (med dgag).

However, many Tibetan philosophers reject these terms as descriptions of their views on emptiness. The Sakya thinker Gorampa Sonam Senge (1429-1489), for example, called his version of Mādhyamaka, "freedom from extremes" or "freedom from proliferations" (spros bral) and claimed that the ultimate truth was ineffable, beyond predication or concept.[102] For Gorampa, emptiness is not just the absence of inherent existence, but it is the absence of the four extremes in all phenomena i.e. existence, nonexistence, both and neither (see: catuskoti).[103]

The 14th Dalai Lama, who generally speaks from the Gelug perspective, states:

According to the theory of emptiness, any belief in an objective reality grounded in the assumption of intrinsic, independent existence is simply untenable.
All things and events, whether 'material', mental or even abstract concepts like time, are devoid of objective, independent existence ... [T]hings and events are 'empty' in that they can never possess any immutable essence, intrinsic reality or absolute 'being' that affords independence.[104]

Chinese Buddhism[edit]

Sānlùn school[edit]

Main article: Madhyamaka § Sānlùn_school

When Buddhism was introduced in China it was initially understood in terms of indigenous Chinese philosophical culture. Because of this, emptiness (Ch., kong, 空;) was at first understood as pointing to a kind of transcendental reality similar to the Tao.[105] It took several centuries to realize that śūnyatā does not refer to an essential transcendental reality underneath or behind the world of appearances.[105]

Chinese Mādhyamaka (known as Sānlùn, or the "three treatise school") began with the work of Kumārajīva (344–413 CE) who translated the works of Nāgārjuna into Chinese. Sānlùn figures like Kumārajīva's pupil Sengzhao (384–414), and the later Jizang (549–623) were influential in introducing a more orthodox and non-essentialist interpretation of emptiness to Chinese Buddhism. Sengzhao argues, for example, that the nature of phenomena could not be said to be either existent or non-existent and that it was necessary to go beyond conceptual proliferation to realize emptiness. Jizang (549–623) was another central figure in Chinese Madhyamaka who wrote numerous commentaries on Nāgārjuna and Aryadeva and is considered to be the leading representative of the school.[106] Jizang called his method "deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what is corrective". He insisted that one must never settle on any particular viewpoint or perspective but constantly reexamine one's formulations to avoid reifications of thought and behavior.[106]

In the modern era, one major Chinese figure who has written on Mādhyamaka is the scholar monk Yin Shun (1906–2005).[107]

Tiantai and Huayan[edit]

Later Chinese philosophers developed their own unique interpretations of emptiness. One of these was Zhiyi, the intellectual founder of the Tiantai school, who was strongly influenced by the Lotus sutra. The Tiantai view of emptiness and dependent origination is inseparable from their view of the "interfusion of phenomena" and the idea that the ultimate reality is an absolute totality of all particular things which are "Neither-Same-Nor-Different" from each other.[108]

In Tiantai metaphysics, every event, function, or characteristic is the product of the interfusion of all others, the whole is in the particular and every particular event/function is also in every other particular. This also leads to the conclusion that all phenomena are "findable" in each and every other phenomena, even seemingly conflicting phenomena such as good and evil or delusion and enlightenment are interfused with each other.[109]

The Huayan school understood emptiness and ultimate reality through the similar idea of interpenetration or "coalescence" (Wylie: zung-'jug; Sanskrit: yuganaddha), using the concept of Indra's net to illustrate this.[110]

Chán[edit]

Main articles: Zen and Chinese Chán

Chan Buddhism was influenced by all the previous Chinese Buddhist currents. The Mādhyamaka of Sengzhao, for example, influenced the views of the Chan patriarch Shen Hui (670-762), a critical figure in the development of Chan, as can be seen by his "Illuminating the Essential Doctrine" (Hsie Tsung Chi). This text emphasizes that true emptiness or Suchness cannot be known through thought since it is free from thought (wu-nien).[111] Shen Hui also states that true emptiness is not nothing, but it is a "Subtle Existence" (miao-yu), which is just "Great Prajña."[111]

The Chinese Chan presentation of emptiness, influenced by Yogacara and the Tathāgatagarbha sutras, also used more positive language and poetic metaphors to describe the nature of emptiness. For example, Hongzhi Zhengjue (1091–1157), a key figure in the Caodong lineage, wrote:

"The field of boundless emptiness is what exists from the very beginning. You must purify, cure, grind down, or brush away all the tendencies you have fabricated into apparent habits. [Those tendencies are the clouds in our eyes.] Then you can reside in a clear circle of brightness. Utter emptiness has no image. Upright independence does not rely on anything. Just expand and illuminate the original truth unconcerned by external conditions. Accordingly, we are told to realize that not a single thing exists. In this field birth and death do not appear. The deep source, transparent down to the bottom, can radiantly shine and can respond unencumbered to each speck of dust [each object] without becoming its partner. The subtlety of seeing and hearing transcends mere colors and sounds. The whole affair functions without leaving traces and mirrors without obscurations. Very naturally, mind and Dharmas emerge and harmonize."[112]

Western Buddhism[edit]

Various western Buddhists note that Śūnyatā refers to the emptiness of inherent existence, as in Madhyamaka; but also to the emptiness of mind or awareness, as open space and the "ground of being," as in meditation-orientated traditions and approaches such as Dzogchen and Shentong.[113][114][web 1][note 9]

Hinduism[edit]

Influence on Advaita Vedanta[edit]

Gaudapada has developed his concept of "ajāta", [115][116] which uses the term "anutpāda":[117]

  • "An" means "not", or "non"
  • "Utpāda" means "genesis", "coming forth", "birth"[118]

Taken together "anutpāda" means "having no origin", "not coming into existence", "not taking effect", "non-production".[118]

According to Gaudapada, the Absolute is not subject to birth, change and death. The Absolute is aja, the unborn eternal.[119] The empirical world of appearances is considered Maya (unreal as it is transitory), and not absolutely existent.[119] Thus, Gaudapada's concept of ajativada is similar to Buddhist term "anutpāda" for the absence of an origin[115][117] or śūnyatā.[120][note 10]

But Gaudapada's perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna.[124] Gaudapada's perspective found in Mandukya Karika is based on the Mandukya Upanishad.[124] According to Gaudapada, the metaphysical absolute called Brahman never changes, while the phenomenal world changes continuously, so the phenomenal world cannot arise independently from Brahman. If the world cannot arise, yet is an empirical fact, then the perceived world has to be a transitory (unreal) appearance of Brahman. And if the phenomenal world is a transitory appearance, then there is no real origination or destruction, only apparent origination or destruction. From the level of ultimate truth (paramārthatā) the phenomenal world is māyā, "illusion",[124] apparently existing but ultimately not metaphysically real.[125]

In Gaudapada-Karika, chapter III, verses 46–48, he states that Brahman never arises, is never born, is never unborn, it rests in itself:

When the mind does not lie low, and is not again tossed about, then that being without movement, and not presenting any appearance, culminates into Brahman. Resting in itself, calm, with Nirvana, indescribable, highest happiness, unborn and one with the unborn knowable, omniscient they say. No creature whatever is born, no origination of it exists or takes place. This is that highest truth where nothing whatever is born.

— Gaudapada Karika, 3.46-48, Translated by RD Karmarkar[126]

In contrast to Renard's view,[115] Karmarkar states the Ajativada of Gaudapada has nothing in common with the Śūnyatā concept in Buddhism.[127] While the language of Gaudapada is undeniably similar to those found in Mahayana Buddhism, states Comans, their perspective is different because unlike Buddhism, Gaudapada is relying on the premise of "Brahman, Atman or Turiya" exist and are the nature of absolute reality.[124]

In Shaivism[edit]

Sunya and sunyatisunya are concepts which appear in some Shaiva texts, such as the Vijñāna Bhairava Tantra, which contains several verses mentioning voidness as a feature of ultimate reality - Shiva:

"The Absolute void is Bhairava who is beyond the senses and the mind, beyond all the categories of these instruments. From the point of view of the human mind, He is most void. from the point of view of Reality, He is most full, for He is the source of all manifestation."[128]

"The yogi should concentrate intensely on the idea (and also feel) that this universe is totally void. In that void, his mind would become absorbed. Then he becomes highly qualified for absorption i.e. his mind is absorbed in the absolute void (sunyatisunya)."[129]

In a series of Kannada language texts of Lingayatism, a Shaivism tradition, shunya is equated to the concept of the supreme. In particular, the Shunya Sampadane texts present the ideas of Allama Prabhu in a form of dialogue, where shunya is that void and distinctions which a spiritual journey seeks to fill and eliminate. It is the described as a state of union of one's soul with the infinite Shiva, the state of blissful moksha.[130][131]

In Vaishnavism[edit]

Shunya Brahma is a concept found in certain texts of Vaishnavism, particularly in Odiya, such as the poetic Panchasakhas. It explains the Nirguna Brahman idea of Vedanta, that is the eternal unchanging metaphysical reality as "personified void". Alternative names for this concept of Hinduism, include shunya purusha and Jagannatha (Vishnu) in certain text.[130][132] However, both in Lingayatism and various flavors of Vaishnavism such as Mahima Dharma, the idea of Shunya is closer to the Hindu concept of metaphysical Brahman, rather than to the Śūnyatā concept of Buddhism.[130] However, there is some overlap, such as in the works of Bhima Bhoi.[130][133]

In the Vaishnavism of Orissa, the idea of shunya brahman or shunya purusha is found in the poetry of the Orissan Panchasakhas (Five Friends), such as in the compositions of 16th-century Acyutananda. Acyutananda's Shunya Samhita extols the nature of shunya brahman:

nāhi tāhāra rūpa varṇa, adṛsha avarṇa tā cinha.
tāhāku brahmā boli kahi, śūnya brahmhati se bolāi.

It has no shape, no colour,
It is invisible and without a name
This Brahman is called Shunya Brahman.[134][full citation needed]

The Panchasakhas practiced a form of Bhakti called Jnana-mishrita Bhakti-marga, which saw the necessity of knowledge (Jnana) and devotion - Bhakti.[citation needed]

Alternative translations[edit]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ A common translation is "no-self", without a self, but the Pāli Canon uses anattā as a singular substantive, meaning "not-self".[4]
  2. ^ Original: "Rupan śūnyatā śūnyatāiva rupan. Rupan na prithak śūnyatā śūnyatā na prithag rupan. Yad rupan sa śūnyatā ya śūnyatā tad rupan."
  3. ^ The Five Skandhas are: Form, Feeling, Perceptions, Mental Formations and Consciousness.
  4. ^ Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24:18
  5. ^ Chapter 21 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā goes into the reasoning behind this.[58]
  6. ^ Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in Chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
  7. ^ Translations do differ, which makes a difference. Vijñāna can be translated as "consciousness", but also as "discernement".[76]
  8. ^ Paul Williams: "Some texts of the tathagatagarbha literature, such as the Mahaparinirvana Sutra actually refer to an atman, though other texts are careful to avoid the term. This would be in direct opposition to the general teachings of Buddhism on anatta. Indeed, the distinctions between the general Indian concept of atman and the popular Buddhist concept of Buddha-nature are often blurred to the point that writers consider them to be synonymous."[87]
  9. '^ Quotes:
    * John Snelling: "At the core of Mahayana philosophy lies the notion of Emptiness:     Shunyata. This is very much in the spirit of anatta (Skt. anatman) as first taught by the Buddha. It is often used to imply, not mere or sheer nothingness (that would be the nihilistic view), but 'emptiness of inherent existence; that is, the absence of any kind of enduring or self-sustaining essence. There is also a sense in which it has connotations of 'conceptual emptiness': absence of thoughts. It could be regarded too as a non-term signifying the ineffable understanding arising within the practice of meditation. Although seemingly negative, it also has its positive uses - and of course ultimately points beyond the positive negative dichotomy."[113]
    * Hans Knibbe: "There are at least to important meanings of this concept of emptiness, namely:
    - empty of independent existence;
    - openness and space as grounf of being.[114]
    * Nigel Wellings:[web 1] "Thus we have two types of emptiness, the emptiness of self in the skandhas that reveals the absence of an empirical and metaphysical self. And the emptiness of the self in Nirvâ.na that reveals nothing of the empirical self existing within the Nirvâ.na consciousness.
    Harvey seems to confirm this view when he tells us that all conditioned dharmas are empty of self because they are impermanent and a source of suffering, while the unconditioned dharma, Nirvâ.na, is empty because it does not "support the feeling of 'I-ness'", that is, the impermanent skandhas. (1990:52). This is very similar to the teaching of the modern Kagyu Nyingma Lama, Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche, a Shentong exponent:

    All appearances are empty, in that they can be destroyed or extinguished in some way [...] The whole universe vanishes at some point, destroyed by the seven fires and one immense deluge. In this way, all appearances are empty.
    Mind is also ultimately empty, but its way of being empty is not the same as appearances. [My italics] Mind can experience anything but it cannot be destroyed. Its original nature is the dharmakaya of all Buddhas. You cannot actually do anything to mind – you can't change it, wash it away, bury it or burn it. What is truly empty, though, is all the appearances that appear in the mind. (Tulku Urgyen (1999), As It Is vol.1 Rangjang Yeshe, Boudhanath, Hong Kong & Nasby. p.53)

  10. ^ The term is also used in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.[121] According to D.T Suzuki, "anutpada" is not the opposite of "utpada", but transcends opposites. It is kenshō, seeing into the true nature of existence,[122] the seeing that "all objects are without self-substance Śūnyatā".[123]
  1. ^ Jump up to:a b Nigel Wellings (2009), Is there anything there? – the Tibetan Rangtong Shentong debate Archived 2015-05-18 at the Wayback Machine

References[edit]

  1. ^ Dale Mathers; Melvin E. Miller; Osamu Ando (2013). Self and No-Self: Continuing the Dialogue Between Buddhism and Psychotherapy. Routledge. p. 81. ISBN 978-1-317-72386-8.
  2. ^ Suñña – Palikanon.com
  3. ^ Plofker, Kim (2009). Mathematics in India. Princeton University Press. pp. 54–56. ISBN 978-0-691-12067-6.
  4. ^ Bronkhorst 2009, p. 124.
  5. ^ Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. pp. 68–69. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  6. ^ Christopher W. Gowans (2014). Buddhist Moral Philosophy: An Introduction. Routledge. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-1-317-65934-1.
  7. ^ Monier-Williams, Sir Monier (2nd edn, 1899) A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Reprinted Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1986: p.1085.
  8. ^ Sue Hamilton (2000). Early Buddhism: A New Approach : the I of the Beholder. Routledge. pp. 21–27. ISBN 978-0-7007-1357-8.
  9. ^ Klein, Anne C. (1991). Knowing Naming & Negation a sourcebook on Tibetan, Sautrantika. Snowlion publications, ISBN 0-937938-21-1
  10. ^ Jump up to:a b MN 122. See, e.g., Maha-suññata Sutta: The Greater Discourse on Emptiness translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu," Retrieved on 30 July 2013 from "Access to Insight" at www.accesstoinsight.org
  11. ^ Analayo, Bhikkhu (2012). Excursions into the Thought-World of the Pali Discourses. Pariyatti. p. 272. ISBN 9781928706984.
  12. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f Shi Huifeng, Is "Illusion" a Prajñāpāramitā Creation? The Birth and Death of a Buddhist Cognitive Metaphor, Fo Guang University, Journal of Buddhist Philosophy , Vol.2, 2016.
  13. ^ Bhikkhu 1997d.
  14. ^ Thanissaro Bhikku, The Buddhist Religions: An Historical Introduction, P 96.
  15. ^ "Kamabhu Sutta: With Kamabhu (2)". www.accesstoinsight.org.
  16. ^ "Mahavedalla Sutta: The Greater Set of Questions-and-Answers". www.accesstoinsight.org.
  17. ^ "Godatta Sutta: To Godatta". www.accesstoinsight.org.
  18. ^ MN 121 and MN 122. See, e.g., respectively, Thanissaro (1997a) and Thanissaro (1997b).
  19. ^ Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness"—Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 26
  20. ^ Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness"—Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 28.
  21. ^ Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness"—Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 22, 27.
  22. ^ Choong, Mun-Keat; The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publishe, 1999.
  23. ^ Yìn Shùn; An Investigation into Emptiness (Kōng zhī Tànjìu 空之探究) (1985)
  24. ^ Choong; Annotated Translation of Sutras from the Chinese Samyuktagama relevant to the Early Buddhist Teachings on Emptiness and the Middle Way (2004); second edition, International Buddhist College, Thailand, 2010.
  25. ^ Jump up to:a b Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness"—Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources
  26. ^ Potter, Karl H; Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D., page 98
  27. ^ Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness"—Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 36.
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  43. ^ "No wisdom can we get hold of, no highest perfection, No Bodhisattva, no thought of enlightenment either. When told of this, if not bewildered and in no way anxious, A Bodhisattva courses in the Well-Gone's [Sugata's] wisdom." (Conze 1973a: 9) quoted in Williams, Paul. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations 2nd edition.Routledge, 2009, pages 50.
  44. ^ "Even Nirvana, I say, is like a magical illusion, is like a dream. How much more so anything else! ...Even if perchance there could be anything more distinguished, of that too I would say that it is like an illusion, like a dream." (trans. Conze: 99) quoted in Williams, Paul, and Anthony J. Tribe. Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. London: Routledge, 2000, p 135.
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  48. ^ Orsborn, Matthew Bryan. "Chiasmus in the Early Prajñāpāramitā: Literary Parallelism Connecting Criticism & Hermeneutics in an Early Mahāyāna Sūtra", University of Hong Kong , 2012, page 139-40.
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  54. ^ Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 142.
  55. ^ Bronkhorst (2009), p. 146.
  56. ^ Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 141.
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  59. ^ Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 151-152.
  60. ^ Tsondru, Mabja. Ornament of Reason. Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417
  61. ^ unclear
  62. ^ Tsondru, Mabja. Ornament of Reason. Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 40-41, 322-333.
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  64. ^ Hajime Nakamura (1991). Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 590–591 footnote 20. ISBN 978-81-208-0764-8., Quote: "Already in India, 'sunyata' was liable to be misunderstood as nothingness or nihil'. (...) The Sarvastivadins of Hinayana Buddhism viewed the Madhyamika school as 'one that argues that everything is nothing. (...) It is only natural that most of the Western scholars call the prajnaparamita sutra or the doctrine of the Madhyamika school nihilism since criticisms were already expressed in India. Against such criticisms, however, Nagarjuna, founder of the Madhyamika school says, 'you are ignorant of the function of sunyata, the meaning of the sunyata and sunyata itself'."
  65. ^ G. C. Nayak (2001). Mādhyamika Śūnyatā, a Reappraisal: A Reappraisal of Mādhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti. Indian Council of Philosophical Research. pp. 9–12. ISBN 978-81-85636-47-4.
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  80. ^ Sallie B. King (1997),The Doctrine of Buddha Nature is Impeccably Buddhist. In: Jamie Hubbard (ed.), Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism, Univ of Hawaii Press 1997, pp. 174-192. ISBN 0824819497
  81. ^ Jump up to:a b Hopkins 2006.
  82. ^ Hopkins 2006, p. 210.
  83. ^ Brian Edward Brown (1991). The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 3–4. ISBN 978-81-208-0631-3.
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  85. ^ Brian Edward Brown (1991). The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 5–7, 32. ISBN 978-81-208-0631-3.
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  88. ^ Merv Fowler (1999). Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 101–102. ISBN 978-1-898723-66-0.
  89. ^ Heng-Ching Shih. "The Significance Of 'Tathagatagarbha' —- A Positive Expression Of Sunyata". Archived from the original on 2013-08-07.
  90. ^ Jump up to:a b King, Sallie B. "The Doctrine of Buddha Nature is Impeccably Buddhist. In: Jamie Hubbard (ed.), Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism, Univ of Hawaii Press 1997, pp. 174-192. ISBN 0824819497" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-27.
  91. ^ Yamamoto, Kosho (1975). Mahayanism, Tokyo: Karin Bunko, p.56
  92. ^ Vessantara; Meeting the Buddhas: A Guide to Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Tantric Deities. "They [conditioned things] are sky-like, and un-graspable, like clouds."
  93. ^ The Collected Works of Chogyam Trungpa: Volume Four, Dawn of tantra, page 366
  94. ^ Dunne, John D. (2011). "Madhyamaka in India and Tibet." In Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy." Edited by J. Garfield and W. Edelglass. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 206-221.
  95. ^ Brunnholzl, 2004, page 333.
  96. ^ Cornu 2001, p. 145, 150.
  97. ^ Stearns, Cyrus (2010). The Buddha from Dölpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen(Rev. and enl. ed.). Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications. ISBN 9781559393430. Retrieved 2 May 2015.
  98. ^ Brunnholzl, Karl, Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p 108.
  99. ^ Brunnholzl, 2004, page 502.
  100. ^ Stearns, Cyrus (1999), The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen, State University of New York Press, p. 82.
  101. ^ Brunnholzl, 2004, page 446..
  102. ^ Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism), p. 46-48.
  103. ^ Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism), p. 50.
  104. ^ Dalai Lama (2005). The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality (Hardcover). Broadway. ISBN 0-7679-2066-X & ISBN 978-0-7679-2066-7
  105. ^ Jump up to:a b Lai & Year unknown.
  106. ^ Jump up to:a b Fox, Alan, Self-reflection in the Sanlun Tradition: Madhyamika as the "Deconstructive Conscience" of Buddhism, Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 19 (1992) pp. 1-24.
  107. ^ Travagnin, Stefania. The Madhyamika Dimension of Yin Shun. A restatement of the school of Nagarjuna in 20th century Chinese Buddhism, University of London, 2009. https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/28877/1/10673046.pdf
  108. ^ Ziporyn, Brook (November 19, 2014). "Tiantai Buddhism" – via plato.stanford.edu.
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  111. ^ Jump up to:a b Zeuschner, Robert B., The Hsie Tsung Chi (An Early Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist Text) Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 3 (1976) pp. 253-268.
  112. ^ Taigen Dan Leighton, with Yi Wu. Cultivating the Empty Field: The Silent Illumination of Zen Master Hongzhi (Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 2000, revised and expanded edition; original edition published by North Point Press, 1991), p. 45.
  113. ^ Jump up to:a b Snelling 1987, p. 101-102.
  114. ^ Jump up to:a b Knibbe 2014, p. 46.
  115. ^ Jump up to:a b c Renard 2010, p. 157.
  116. ^ Comans 2000, p. 35-36.
  117. ^ Jump up to:a b Bhattacharya 1943, p. 49.
  118. ^ Jump up to:a b "Sanskrit - Asien.net".
  119. ^ Jump up to:a b Sarma 1996, p. 127.
  120. ^ Renard 2010, p. 160.
  121. ^ Suzuki 1999.
  122. ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 123-124.
  123. ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 168.
  124. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Comans 2000, p. 36.
  125. ^ Hiriyanna 2000, p. 25, 160-161.
  126. ^ RD Karmarkar, Gaudapada's Karika, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
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  129. ^ Jaideva Singh, Vijnanabhairava or Divine Consciousness: A Treasury of 112 Types of Yoga, page 55
  130. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Roshen Dalal (2010). Hinduism: An Alphabetical Guide. Penguin. pp. 388–389. ISBN 978-0-14-341421-6.
  131. ^ Stephan Schuhmacher (1994). The Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion: Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Zen. Shambhala. p. 202. ISBN 978-0-87773-980-7.
  132. ^ Chittaranjan Das (1994). Bhakta Charana Das (Medieval Oriya Writer). Sahitya Akademi. pp. 9, 101–112. ISBN 978-81-7201-716-3.
  133. ^ Bettina Bäumer (Translator) (2010). Bhima Bhoi, Verses from the Void: Mystic Poetry of an Oriya Saint. Manohar Publishers. ISBN 978-81-7304-813-5. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
  134. ^ Acyutānanda, Brahma Saṃhitā, translated by Patnaik, p.117
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  136. ^ "Mulamadhyamakakarika". Sri Satguru Publications. September 13, 1993 – via Google Books.

Sources[edit]

Primary[edit]

Secondary[edit]

  • Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara (1943), Gauḍapādakārikā, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
  • Boruah, Bijoy H. (2000), Atman in Śūnyatā and the Śūnyatā of Atman, South Asia Seminar, University of Texas at Austin.
  • Bronkhorst, Johannes (2009), Buddhist Teaching in India, Wisdom Publications
  • Comans, Michael (2000), The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
  • Cornu, Philippe (2001), "Nawoord", Schijn en werkelijkheid. De twee waarheden in de vier boeddhistische leerstelsels, KunchabPublicaties
  • Jackson, Roger R. (1993), Is Enlightenment Possible?, Snow Lion Publications, ISBN 1-55939-010-7
  • Hookham, S.K. (1991), The Buddha within : Tathagatagarbha doctrine according to the Shentong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791403587
  • Hopkins, Jeffrey (2006), Mountain Doctrine: Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha Matrix, London: Snow Lion
  • Kalupahana, David J. (1992), The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, Delhi: ri Satguru Publications
  • Kalupahana, David J. (1994), A history of Buddhist philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
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  • Walser, Joseph (2018), Genealogies of Mahāyāna Buddhism: Emptiness, Power and the Question of Origin, New York: Routledge

External links[edit]



===

공 (불교)

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

불교
Dharma Wheel (2).svg
교의와 용어
인물
역사와 종파
경전
성지
지역별 불교

공(空)은 순야타(산스크리트어: शून्यता, Śūnyatā, →비어 있음 · 공허(空虛))를 번역한 것으로, 일체개공(一切皆空)을 주장하는 공 사상(空思想)은 불교를 일관하는 기본 교의 또는 사상이다.

공 사상은 대승불교(大乘佛敎)가 흥기하게 되자 특히 《반야경(般若經)》 계통의 근본사상으로 강조되었다. 원래, 공 사상은 부파불교(部派佛敎) 시대에서 상좌부(上座部) 계통의 설일체유부(說一切有部)를 중심으로 주장된 법유(法有)의 입장을 예리하게 비판하고, 일체의 존재를 상의상대(相依相待: 서로 의존함)라는 연기(緣起)의 입장에서 파악하며, 일체의 아집(我執)과 법집(法執)을 배격한 무애자재(無礙自在)의 세계를 전개하려고 한 것이다.

《반야경(般若經)》과 용수의 《중론(中論)》 등에 나오는 공 사상을 바탕으로 성립된 인도 불교의 종파가 중관파이다. 중국 · 한국 · 일본 불교의 삼론종은 《중론》·《십이문론》·《백론》의 삼론을 연구 · 강술하는 종파로 인도 불교의 중관파에 해당한다.[1]

공 사상은 인도 대승불교의 이대조류인 중관파와 유가유식파 모두의 근저가 되는 사상이다. 유가유식파에서도 공 사상이 중시된 것은 유가유식파와 법상종의 소의 논서인 《성유식론(成唯識論)》의 서두에서 논의 저술 목적 중의 하나로, 이공(二空: 두 가지 공)에 대해서 미혹된 견해나 잘못된 견해를 가진 사람들이 이공(二空)의 교의를 바르게 이해할 수 있게 하여 그들이 해탈(열반)과 보리(반야)로 나아갈 수 있게 하기 위한 것이라고 말하는 것에서 잘 알 수 있다.[2] 또한, 중국 · 한국 · 일본 · 티베트 등의 대승불교는 모두 인도의 대승불교를 바탕으로 하므로, 공 사상은 대승불교 전체의 기초적인 또는 근본적인 교의라고 할 수 있다.

공 사상[편집]

대승불교에서 공은 여러 가지 뜻으로 설명되는데, 특히 허무적(虛無的)인 뜻으로 이해하는 것을 강력하게 배척하고 있다. 대체로 다음과 같은 내용이라 할 수 있다.

일체개공(一切皆空)은 만유의 모든 현상은 그 성품으로 보면 다 공하다고 주장하는 것으로 《반야경(般若經)》 계통의 경전과 중관론의 주장이다. 이러한 불교 교의를 공 사상(空思想)이라고 한다.

공(空)은 존재물(存在物)에는 자체(自體) · 실체(實體) · 아(我)라는 것이 없음을 뜻한다. 이 교의는 이미 고타마 붓다 당시의 원시불교에서, 모든 현상은 인연소생(因緣所生), 즉 인(因)과 연(緣)이 가적(假的)으로 화합해서 생겨난 것이기 때문에 거기에는 아(我)라는 실체는 존재하지 않는다고 주장한 불교의 근본적인 입장인 제법무아(諸法無我)에 해당한다.

즉, 각 개인 자신의 존재를 포함한 모든 존재("법 · 法")는 인연(因緣)에 따라 생기(生起)한 것이기 때문에 연기(緣起)의 법칙에 의해 지금 존재하고 있다는 측면에서만 그 존재성이 가적(假的)으로(임시적으로) 인정될 수 있는 것("오온의 가화합")이며, 실제로는 거기에는 어떠한 항상불변(恒常不變)한 자아(自我)나 실체(實體) 같은 것은 없는 제행무상 · 제법무아이며, 때문에 모든 것은 "공(空)"이라고 설명하는 것이다.

따라서, 공 사상에서는, "공(空)"을 관조하는 것이 곧 연기(緣起)의 법칙을 보는 것이며 또한 진실한 세계인 중도(中道)의 진리에 눈을 뜨는 것이라고 주장한다. 그리고 이러한 관점은 또한 대승불교 실천의 기초가 된다고 주장한다. 이에 대해서는 특히 대승경전 중 《반야경(般若經)》과 이에 입각하여 용수(龍樹)가 저술한 논서인 《중론(中論)》에서 명백하게 밝혀 두고 있다. 《중론》 제24장 〈관사제품(觀四諦品)〉에는 아래와 같은 유명한 "인연소생법(因緣所生法: 법 · 존재 또는 현상은 인과 연에 의해 생겨난다)"의 게송이 있다.

諸法有定性。則無因果等諸事。如偈說。

 眾因緣生法 我說即是無
 亦為是假名 亦是中道義
 未曾有一法 不從因緣生
 是故一切法 無不是空者

眾因緣生法。我說即是空。何以故。
眾緣具足和合而物生。是物屬眾因緣故無自性。
無自性故空。空亦復空。但為引導眾生故。
以假名說。離有無二邊故名為中道。

是法無性故不得言有。亦無空故不得言無。
若法有性相。則不待眾緣而有。
若不待眾緣則無法。是故無有不空法。

각각의 법이 고정된 성품(定性)을 지니고 있다면 곧 원인과 결과 등의 모든 일이 없어질 것이다. 때문에 나는 다음과 같은 게송으로 설명한다.

 여러 인(因)과 연(緣)에 의해 생겨나는 것이 법(法: 존재)이다.
 나는 이것을 공하다(無)고 말한다.
 그리고 또한 가명(假名)이라고도 말하며,
 중도(中道)의 이치라고도 말한다.
 단 하나의 법(法: 존재)도 인과 연을 따라 생겨나지 않은 것이 없다.
 그러므로 일체의 모든 법이 공하지 않은 것이 없다.

여러 인(因)과 연(緣)에 의해 생겨나는 것인 법(法: 존재)을 공하다(空)고 나는 말한다. 왜 이렇게 말하는가? 여러 인과 연이 다 갖추어져서 화합하면 비로소 사물이 생겨난다. 따라서 사물은 여러 인과 연에 귀속되는 것이므로 사물 자체에는 고정된 성품(自性 · 자성)이 없기 때문이다. 고정된 성품(自性 · 자성)이 없으므로 공(空)하다. 그런데 이 공함도 또한 다시 공한데, (이렇게 공함도 다시 공하다고 말할 수 있는 이유는, 사물이 공하다고 말한 것은) 단지 중생을 인도하기 위해서 가명(假名)으로 (공하다고) 말한 것이기 때문이다. (사물이 공하다고 말하는 방편과 공함도 공하다고 말하는 방편에 의해) "있음(有)"과 "없음(無)"의 양 극단(二邊)을 벗어나기에 중도(中道)라 이름한다.

법(法: 존재)은 고정된 성품(性 · 自性 · 자성)을 가지고 있지 않기 때문에 법(法: 존재)을 "있음(有)"이라고 말할 수 없다. 또한 법(法: 존재)은 공한 것도 아니기 때문에 법(法: 존재)을 "없음(無)"이라고 말할 수도 없다. 어떤 법(法: 존재)이 고정된 성품(性相 · 성상 · 自性 · 자성)을 가지고 있다고 한다면, 그 법은 여러 인과 연에 의존하지 않은 채 존재하는 것이 된다 (따라서 연기의 법칙에 어긋난다). 여러 인과 연에 의존하지 않는다면 (연기의 법칙에 어긋나므로 생겨날 수 없고, 따라서) 그 법(法: 존재)은 없는 것(존재할 수 없는 것)이다. (연기의 법칙에 의해 지금 존재하고 있는 것을 존재하고 있지 않다고 말하는 것은 자가당착이다. 이러한 모순이 일어나지 않으려면 다음을 대전제로 인정할 수 밖에 없다.) 그러므로 공하지 않은 법(즉, 연기하지 않는 존재 또는 고정된 성품을 가진 존재)이란 존재할 수 없다.
— 《중론(中論)》 4권 24장 〈관사제품(觀四諦品)〉. 한문본

2공[편집]

대승불교의 교의에서 공은 크게 아공(我空)과 법공(法空)의 2공(二空: 두 가지 공)으로 나뉜다.[3][4] 2공(二空)을 아법2공(我法二空)이라고도 하며,[5] 아공(我空)은 인공(人空)이라고도 하는데 이 때문에 인법2공(人法二空)이라고도 한다. 이공(二空)의 교의는 초기 대승불교의 근본적인 교의 또는 사상이 되었다.

이치로서의 2공[편집]

아공[편집]

아공(我空)은 인공(人空)이라고도 하는데, 인간 자신 속에는 실체로서의 자아가 있다고 보는 아집(我執)에 대해, 인간 자신 속에는 실체로서의 자아가 없다고 보는 견해 혹은 이치[4], 또는 이러한 깨우침을 증득한 상태 또는 경지이다.[4] 아집(我執)은 번뇌장(煩惱障)이라고도 하는데, 번뇌장은 중생의 몸과 마음을 번거롭게 하여 열반(또는 해탈)을 가로막아 중생으로 하여금 윤회하게 하는 장애라는 의미이다.[2][6]

법공[편집]

법공(法空)은 존재하는 만물 각각에는 실체로서의 자아가 있다고 보는 법집(法執)에 대해, 존재하는 모든 것은 인연에 의해 생기는 것이므로 실체로서의 자아는 없다는 견해 혹은 이치[4], 또는 이러한 깨우침을 증득한 상태 또는 경지이다.[4] 법집(法執)은 소지장(所知障)이라고도 하는데, 소지장은 참된 지혜, 즉 보리(菩提)가 발현되는 것을 가로막는 장애라는 의미이다.[2][7]

아공(我空)을 인무아(人無我)라고도 하며 법공(法空)을 법무아(法無我)라고도 한다.[4] 그리고 이 둘을 통칭하여 2무아(二無我)라고 하는데, 2무아(二無我)는 2공(二空)과 같은 뜻이다.[8]

2공(二空)의 교의 또는 사상은 후대에 아공(我空) · 법공(法空) · 구공(俱空)의 3공(三空)의 교의 또는 사상으로 발전하였다.

경지로서의 2공[편집]

불교에서, 수행에 의해 깨달음을 성취해 간다는 입장에서는 2공(二空)은 실제로 증득될 수 있고 또한 증득되어야 하는 특정한 경지를 뜻한다.

예를 들어, 유가유식파의 경우, 이 종파의 소의 논서인 《성유식론》에 따르면 2공 중 아공의 경지에 다다르면 아집인 번뇌장이 소멸되어 열반(해탈)이 성취되고, 법공의 경지에 다다르면 법집인 소지장이 소멸되어 보리(반야 · 대지혜 · 완전한 깨달음)가 성취된다.[2][9]

《성유식론》에서는 이와 관련된 수행 단계를 더 자세히 설명하는데, 크게 자량위(資糧位) · 가행위(加行位) · 통달위(通達位) · 수습위(修習位) · 구경위(究竟位)의 다섯 단계("5위 · 五位")로 나누고 있다.[10] 이 중에서 네 번째인 수습위는 다시 십지(十地)의 열 단계로 나뉘는데, 십지는 극희지(極喜地) · 이구지(離垢地) · 발광지(發光地) · 염혜지(焰慧地) · 극난승지(極難勝地) · 현전지(現前地) · 원행지(遠行地: 제7지) · 부동지(不動地) · 선혜지(善慧地) · 법운지(法雲地: 제10지)이다.[11] 《성유식론》에 따르면 아집인 번뇌장은 수습위의 십지 중 제7지인 원행지(遠行地)에서 완전히 제거되어 제8지부터는 아공의 경지에 있게 된다.[11] 그리고 법집인 소지장은 수습위의 십지 중 제10지인 법운지(法雲地)에서 완전히 제거 될 수 있는데, 완전히 제거되면 다섯 단계("오위 · 五位")의 마지막인 구경위(究竟位)에 이르게 되고 해당 보살, 즉 대승불교의 수행자는 비로소 부처가 되어 법공의 경지에 있게 된다.[11]

유가유식파는 열반과 해탈은 동의어로 사용하는 반면, 열반과 보리는 용어를 구분해서 사용한다. 유가유식파의 문맥에서 열반(또는 해탈)은 아집인 번뇌장이 완전히 제거된 아공의 상태를 의미한다.[9] 그리고 보리는 법집인 소지장이 완전히 제거된 법공의 상태를 의미한다.[9] 《성유식론》에서는 열반을 진해탈(眞解脫: 참다운 해탈)이라고도 표현하며 보리를 대보리(大菩提: 큰 깨달음 · 완전한 깨달음)라고도 표현하고 있다.[2][9]

3공[편집]

3공(三空)은 아공(我空) · 법공(法空) · 구공(俱空)을 통칭하는 불교 용어이다. 3공의 각각은 증득한 경지를 뜻하기도 하고 또는 경지를 증득하기 위한 수단을 뜻하기도 한다.[12]

아공[편집]

아공(我空 · ātma-śūnyatā)은 실아(實我)가 없다는 것으로 사람들이 일반적으로 "나"라고 부르는 존재는 색 · 수 · 상 · 행 · 식의 5온(五蘊)이 화합하여 이루어진 존재로, 진실로 "나"라고 집착할 것이 "없다"(공무 · 空無)는 것을 뜻한다.[13] 또한, 수행에 의해 나라는 관념과 나의 소유물이라는 주관적 미집(迷執)인 아집(我執)을 벗어난 경지를 뜻한다.[14]

법공[편집]

법공(法空)은 제법(諸法) 또는 만유(萬有), 즉 물질(색·色)과 마음(심·心)의 모든 존재는 모두 원인과 결과, 즉 인연법에 의해 생긴 임시적인 가짜 존재로서 거기에는 고정된 실체로서 집착할 것이 없다는 뜻으로, 이러한 의미에서 만유(萬有)의 체(體)가 "없다"(공무 · 空無)는 것 뜻한다.[15] 또한, 수행에 의해 물질과 마음의 여러 가지에 대한 객관적 미집(迷執)인 법집(法執)을 벗어난 경지를 뜻한다.[14]

구공[편집]

구공(俱空): 아공(我空)과 법공(法空)의 경지에 차례로 도달한 후, 다시 그 아공(我空)과 법공(法空)까지도 버려 비로소 제법(諸法)의 본성에 계합하는 것을 뜻한다.[14] 또한, 수행에 의해 이러한 경지를 증득한 것을 뜻한다.

원효는 자신의 저서 《금강삼매경론(金剛三昧經論)》에서 《금강삼매경(金剛三昧經)》의 대의를 기술하는 문단에서, 본성, 즉 마음의 근원[心之源]은 있음(有)과 없음(無)을 떠나 있어 홀로 청정[淨]하며 또한 아공(我空) · 법공(法空) · 구공(俱空)의 3공(三空)의 바다 즉 마음의 근원은 진제(眞諦)와 속제(俗諦)를 원융하고 있어서 담연하다(湛然: 편안히 다 비추다, 적정한 가운데 대지혜가 있다, 적조(寂照)하다)고 말하고 있다. 또한 원효는 마음의 근원은 깨뜨림이 없으면서도 깨뜨리지 않음이 없고 세움이 없으면서도 세우지 않음이 없으므로 무리(無理: 이치가 끊어진 자리)의 지리(至理: 모든 것을 세우는 지극한 이치)이자 불연(不然: 그러한 것이 끊어진 자리)의 대연(大然: 크게 그러한 것, 즉 만법을 세우는 큰 것)이라고 말하고 있다.[16][17]

같이 보기[편집]

참고 문헌[편집]

각주[편집]

  1. ↑ 고익진 (1989). 《한국 고대 불교 사상사》, 동국대학교 출판부, p. 99.
  2. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 마 호법 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 현장 한역. 《대정신수대장경》. 제1권. T31, No. 1585, CBETA, T31n1585_p0001a09(12) - T31n1585_p0001a12(10). 2011년 5월 16일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 
    원문
    今造此論為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。生解為斷二重障故。由我法執二障具生。若證二空彼障隨斷。斷障為得二勝果故。由斷續生煩惱障故證真解脫。由斷礙解所知障故得大菩提。
    편집자 번역
    지금 이 논서를 저술하는 이유는 이공(二空: 두 가지 공)에 대해서 미혹하고 오류가 있는 사람들이 이공(二空)을 바르게 이해하도록 하기 위해서이다. 이공(二空)을 바르게 이해하는 것이 필요한 이유는 두 가지 무거운 장애(二重障: 번뇌장과 소지장)를 끊기 위한 때문이다. 아집(我執)과 법집(法執)의 (두 가지) 집착으로 인해 이 두 가지 장애가 함께 일어난다. 이공(二空)을 증득하게 되면 그에 따라 이들 (두 가지) 장애도 끊어진다. (이들 두 가지) 장애를 끊는 것이 필요한 이유는 두 가지 뛰어난 과보(二勝果: 열반과 보리, 또는 해탈과 보리)를 얻기 위한 때문이다. (이것을 더 자세히 말하자면) 윤회하는 삶(生)을 계속되게 만드는 원인인 번뇌장(煩惱障)을 끊음으로써 참다운 해탈(眞解脫: 유식학에서 해탈은 열반과 같은 것이다)을 증득하게 되기 때문이며, 지혜(解: 앎 · 이해 · 지식)를 장애하는 소지장(所知障)을 끊음으로써 대보리(大菩提: 큰 깨달음 · 완전한 깨달음 · 출세간의 무분별지혜 · 무상정등보리 · 아뇩다라삼먁삼보리)를 증득할 수 있기 때문이다.
     |인용문=에 라인 피드 문자가 있음(위치 13) (도움말)
  3. ↑ 운허. 〈二空(이공)〉. 《불교 사전》. 동국역경원. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  4. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 마 바 호법(護法) 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 현장(玄奘) 한역, 김묘주 번역. 《대정신수대장경》. 제1권, 한글대장경 검색시스템. 동국역경원. 2쪽. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 번역자 김묘주 주석: 두 가지 공[二空]은 아공(我空)과 법공(法空)이다. 아공(我空)은 인무아(人無我)라고도 하며, 유정의 심신(心身)에 상일주재(常一主宰)하는 인격적 실체[我]가 존재하지 않는 이치, 또는 그것을 깨쳐서 아집(我執)이 소멸된 경지를 말한다. 법공(法空)은 법무아(法無我)라고도 하며, 외계 사물은 자기의 마음을 떠나서 독립적으로 실재하지 않는 이치, 또는 그것을 깨쳐서 법집(法執)이 소멸된 경지를 말한다.[깨진 링크(과거 내용 찾기)]
  5. ↑ 星雲, "二無我". 2012년 10월 17일에 확인.
  6. ↑ 운허. 〈煩惱障(번뇌장)〉. 《앞의 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  7. ↑ 운허. https://web.archive.org/web/20110719191033/http://buddha.dongguk.edu/bs_detail.aspx?type=detail&from=&to=&srch=%EC%86%8C%EC%A7%80%EC%9E%A5&rowno=1 |archive-url=은 제목을 필요로 함 (도움말). 《앞의 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 장=所池障(소지장) 원본 문서 |장url= 값 확인 필요 (도움말)에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  8. ↑ 〈二無我(이무아)〉. 《같은 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  9. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 호법(護法) 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 《앞의 책》. 2쪽. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 번역자 김묘주 주석: 아공의 도리를 깨쳐서 번뇌장을 끊으면 해탈, 즉 열반을 증득한다. 법공의 도리를 깨쳐서 소지장을 끊으면 곧 큰 깨달음[大菩提]을 성취해서 붓다가 된다.[깨진 링크(과거 내용 찾기)]
  10. ↑ 호법(護法) 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 《대정신수대장경》. 제9권. T31, No. 1585, CBETA, T31n1585_p0048b11(07) - T31n1585_p0048b15(06). 2011년 5월 16일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 何謂悟入唯識五位。一資糧位。謂修大乘順解脫分。二加行位。謂修大乘順決擇分。三通達位。謂諸菩薩所住見道。四修習位。謂諸菩薩所住修道。五究竟位。謂住無上正等菩提。
  11. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 《같은 책》. T31, No. 1585, CBETA, T31n1585_p0050c17(00) - T31n1585_p0051b07(01). 2011년 5월 16일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 

    次修習位其相云何。頌曰。
    　２９無得不思議　　是出世間智
    　捨二麤重故　　便證得轉依
    論曰。菩薩從前見道起已。為斷餘障證得轉依。復數修習無分別智。此智遠離所取能取。故說無得及不思議。或離戲論說為無得。妙用難測名不思議。是出世間無分別智。斷世間故名出世間。二取隨眠是世間本。唯此能斷獨得出名。或出世名依二義立。謂體無漏及證真如。此智具斯二種義故獨名出世。餘智不然。即十地中無分別智。數修此故捨二麤重。二障種子立麤重名。性無堪任違細輕故令彼永滅故說為捨。此能捨彼二麤重故便能證得廣大轉依。依謂所依即依他起與染淨法為所依故。染謂虛妄遍計所執。淨謂真實圓成實性。轉謂二分轉捨轉得。由數修習無分別智斷本識中二障麤重故能轉捨依他起上遍計所執及能轉得依他起中圓成實性。由轉煩惱得大涅槃。轉所知障證無上覺。成立唯識意為有情證得如斯二轉依果。或依即是唯識真如。生死涅槃之所依故。愚夫顛倒迷此真如。故無始來受生死苦。聖者離倒悟此真如。便得涅槃畢究安樂。由數修習無分別智斷本識中二障麤重故能轉滅依如生死及能轉證依如涅槃。此即真如離雜染性。如雖性淨而相雜染。故離染時假說新淨。即此新淨說為轉依。修習位中斷障證得。雖於此位亦得菩提而非此中頌意所顯。頌意但顯轉唯識性。二乘滿位名解脫身。在大牟尼名法身故。

    云何證得二種轉依。謂十地中修十勝行斷十重障證十真如二種轉依由斯證得。言十地者。一極喜地。初獲聖性具證二空能益自他生大喜故。二離垢地。具淨尸羅遠離能起微細毀犯煩惱垢故。三發光地。成就勝定大法總持能發無邊妙慧光故。四焰慧地。安住最勝菩提分法燒煩惱薪慧焰增故。五極難勝地。真俗兩智行相互違合令相應極難勝故。六現前地。住緣起智引無分別最勝般若令現前故。七遠行地。至無相住功用後邊出過世間二乘道故。八不動地。無分別智任運相續相用煩惱不能動故。九善慧地。成就微妙四無閡解能遍十方善說法故。十法雲地。大法智雲含眾德水蔽一切如空麤重充滿法身故。如是十地總攝有為無為功德以為自性。與所修行為勝依持令得生長故名為地。

     |인용문=에 poem stripmarker가 있음(위치 1) (도움말)
  12. ↑ 운허. 〈三空(삼공)〉. 《앞의 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 3월 4일에 확인함.
  13. ↑ 〈我空(아공)〉. 《같은 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 3월 4일에 확인함.
  14. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 〈俱空(구공)〉. 《같은 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 3월 4일에 확인함.
  15. ↑ 〈法空(법공)〉. 《같은 책》. 2011년 7월 19일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 3월 4일에 확인함.
  16. ↑ 원효. 〈금강삼매경론(金剛三昧經論)〉. 《대정신수대장경》. 제1권. CBETA. T34n1730_p0961a07(01) - T34n1730_p0961a21(00). 2011년 5월 16일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2011년 4월 4일에 확인함. 第一述大意者。夫一心之源離有無而獨淨。三空之海融真俗而湛然。湛然融二而不一。獨淨離邊而非中。非中而離邊。故不有之法不即住無。不無之相不即住有。不一而融二。故非真之事未始為俗。非俗之理未始為真也。融二而不一。故真俗之性無所不立。染淨之相莫不備焉。離邊而非中。故有無之法無所不作。是非之義莫不周焉。爾乃無破而無不破。無立而無不立。可謂無理之至理。不然之大然矣。是謂斯經之大意也。良由不然之大然。故能說之語妙契環中。無理之至理。故所詮之宗超出方外。無所不破故名金剛三昧。無所不立故名攝大乘經。一切義宗無出是二。是故亦名無量義宗。且舉一目以題其首。故言金剛三昧經也。
  17. ↑ 글로벌 세계 대백과사전 > 동양사상 > 한국의 사상 > 통일신라시대의 사상 > 통일신라시대의 불교사상 > 금강삼매경론, 《글로벌 세계 대백과사전》
    "금강삼매경론: 金剛三昧經論 신라의 고승 원효가 지은 <금강삼매경> 해석서. 신문왕 6년(686)에 이룩된 것으로 3권 1책의 목판본이다. 권1에서는 <금강삼매경>의 대의(大意)를 논하고, 마음의 근원은 홀로 정(淨)하여 아공(我空)·법공(法空)·구공(俱空) 3공(空)의 바다는 담연(湛然)한 것이라 하고, 결국 무리(無理)의 지리(至理)와 불연(不然)의 대연(大然)으로서 이 경의 종지는 개합(開合)의 별(別)이 있어서 합하면 일미관행(一味觀行)이 요(要)가 되고 열(開)면 10중법문(十重法門)이 종(宗)이 된다고 하였다. 권3에서는 경제(經題)를 말하고, 다음에는 분과(分科)하고, 이어서 본문에 대하여 논석(論釋)을 했으나 장귀(章句)에 대한 주석이 아니고, 경의 이론에 대한 구명(究明)이다. 그는 이 책 속에서 불교의 진리를 비유하여 "물이 양자강 속에 있으면 이름지어 강수(江水)라 하고, 물이 회수(淮水) 속에 있으면 이름지어 회수(淮水)라 하며, 물이 황하(黃河) 속에 있으면 이름지어 하수(河水)라 하나, 함께 모여 바다속에 있으면 오직 이름하여 해수(海水)이니, 법(法)도 역시 이와 같아서 다함께 모여 진여(眞如)에 있으면, 오직 이름하여 불도(佛道)일 뿐이다.(水在江中, 名爲江水, 水在淮中, 名爲淮水, 水在河中, 名爲河水, 俱在海中, 唯名海水, 法亦如是, 俱在眞如, 唯名佛道)"라고 하였는데, 이것은 그가 만법귀일(萬法歸一) 또는 만법귀진(萬法歸眞)을 굳게 믿고, 이에 따라 그의 모든 사상과 생활을 이끌어갔음을 잘 나타내는 하나의 예증이라 하겠다. 그는 '하나'를 강조하였는데, 그 '하나'의 이해는 원효의 사상과 생활을 아는데 있어서 가장 중요한 열쇠가 된다. 그 '하나'를 원효는 '1심(一心)'이나, '제9식(第九識)'이니 또는 '대승(大乘)'이니, '불성(佛性)'이니, '열반(涅槃)'이니 하고 불렀던 것이다. 결국 그에게 있어서 이러한 이름들은 앞서 보아온 강수(江水)·회수(淮水)·하수(河水) 등의 예와 같다고 볼 수 있다."

===

하늘 (불교)

출처 : 무료 백과 사전 "Wikipedia (Wikipedia)"
네비게이션으로 이동검색으로 이동
불교 용어
하늘, 슈냐
파리어suññatā
( Dev : suññatā)
산스크리트어nyatā
( Dev : 공허함)
티베트어པོ་ ཉིད་
( Wylie : stong-pa nyid
THL : tongpa nyi )
벵골어공허
슌요타
버마어톤 냐 타, 제로
중국인비어
있음 ( 병음 :  Kōng )
일본어하늘
( 로마자 : Kū )
한국어공성 (공성)
( RR : 공성 )
영어공허함, 공허함, 개방성, 이리함 등.
몽골어놔줘
베트남어아니오(空)
템플릿 표시

불교 의 하늘 ( 쿠, 梵: śūnya [ 슈냐 ] 또는梵: śūnyatā [슈냐타] ,巴: suññatā [순냐타] [1] )이란, 일체법 은 인연 에 의해 생긴 것이므로 우리 몸 ·본체· 실체 라고 칭한다 해야 할 일이 없고 비어있는 것 (2) [주석 1] . 하늘은 불교 전반에 통하는 기본적인 교리이다 [2] .

원어·원의 [ 편집 ]

원어는 산스크리트 의 형용사 슈냐(śūnya), 명사형은 슈냐타(Śūnyatā)로, 후자는 '비어 있는 것'을 의미하기 때문에, 종종 공성 으로 한역된다 [3] [2] . śūnya는 현과 음사를 하고 śūnyatā는 현과(음) 를 음사 한다 .

인도의 슈냐의 개념 [ 편집 ]

슈냐 ( 산스크리트어 : शून्य , śūnya )는 śū (= śvA, śvi, 성장과 번영을 의미하는 동사)에서 만들어진 śūna에서 발전하여 "...이 부족하다"는 의미이다. 또한, "부푼다", "우울한"을 의미한다. 돌아서 팽창한 것은 중공이라는 의미도 있고, 초기 불전에도 그 의미로 등장하는 일이 있다. 슈냐는 인도의 수학 에서 0 (제로)의 명칭이기도 하다.

분류 [ 편집 ]

두 하늘 (인공과 공공) [ 편집 ]

인간은, 다양한 요소가 집합해 생긴 것이며, 그 자체의 본질은 존재하지 않는다고 하는 것이 인공. 이 세상에 존재하는 모든 것은 인연에 의해 생긴 것이며, 불변적인 실체가 아니라고 하는 것이 법공.

법상종의 삼공 [ 편집 ]

네공 [ 편집 ]

법과 법이 공허하고(법이 공허하다), 불가능한 것이 공허할 수 없다(불가능이 공허하다), 자기법은 자기법이 공허하고(자기법이 공허하다), 다른 법과 다른 법칙은 비어 있습니다(다른 법칙은 비어 있습니다) [2] . 큰 컬렉션은 5월 4일이고 Dapin Prajna는 다섯 번째로 かれる[2] 입니다.

육공 [ 편집 ]

칠공 [ 편집 ]

십공 [ 편집 ]

십일공 [ 편집 ]

16공 [ 편집 ]

18공 [ 편집 ]

불전의 취급 [ 편집 ]

초기 불교 [ 편집 ]

  • "항상 조심하고 세상을 하늘이라고 봅시다"- " Staniperta "
  • "이 강당에는 소가 없다, 소에 대해서 말하면 하늘(부족)이다. 그러나 히오카 가 있어, 히오카에 대해서 말하면 하늘(부족)이 아니다" -- 『소공성경』(중부 경전, 나카아 함경 )

반청경 [ 편집 ]

' 반청경 '이 설설되어 처음으로 대승불교의 근간을 이루는 가르침이 완성되었다. 그 안에서 하늘이 반복 주장되고 있다 [주석 2] .

『대품 반 젊음』에서는 '하늘'을 '제법은 환상과 같이, 화염(양염)과 같이, 수중의 달과 같이, 허공과 같이, 울림과 같이, 간달바의 성 [주석 3] 과 같이, 꿈처럼, 그림자처럼, 거울 속의 상처럼, 화(변화)같이'라고 십유를 열거해 설명하고 있다. 또한 하늘을 분류하고,

  1. 내면의 공허함( Adhyātma-śūnyatā )
  2. 外空( Bahirdhā-śūnyatā )
  3. 내부 및 외부 공간 ( Adhyātmabahirdhā-śūnyatā )
  4. 비어 있음( Śūnyatā-śūnyatā )
  5. 대공( Maha-śūnyatā )
  6. 첫 번째 공( Paramārtha-śūnyatā )
  7. 공허( Saṃskṛta-śūnyatā )
  8. 무 ( Asaṃskṛta-śūnyatā )
  9. 결국 공허함( Atyanta-śūnyatā )
  10. 시작 없는 공허( Anavarāgra-śūnyatā )
  11. 空 空 ( Anavakara-Shunnyat )
  12. 성적인 공허함( Prakṛti-śūnyatā )
  13. 모든 법공 ( Sarvadharma-śūnyatā )
  14. 자기 비움( Svalakṣaṇa-śūnyatā )
  15. 사용할 수 없음( Anupalambha-śūnyatā )
  16. 비어 있을 수 없음( Abhāva-śūnyatā )
  17. 공허한 법( Svabhāva-śūnyatā )
  18. 공허함은 있을 수 없다( Abhāvasvabhāva-śūnyatā )

의 18공 [7] (경전에 따라서는 20공)을 들고 상세히 설명하고 있다.

중론 [ 편집 ]

『중론』은 승의 포기 와 진속의 두 가지 진리가 있다고 하는 이념 설을 말한다. 전자는 직접 인식된 비상대적인 세계이고, 후자는 언어에 의해 개념적으로 인식된 상대적인 세계이다. 말로는 표현할 수 없는 석가의 '사토리'는 진상이며, 말로 표현된 석가의 말을 모은 경전 등은 속속이라고 한다. 게다가 류키는 「무자성 하늘」에서 「중」또는 「중도」도 거의 동의어로서 취급해, 석가의 중도에의 회귀를 설명하고 있다.

각주 [ 편집 ]

주석 [ 편집 ]

  1. ^ 모든 것들은 비어 있다고 보는 것을 공관 이라고 한다 [2] .
  2. ^ 단, 『금강반 젊음』과 같은 초기기의 것으로 보인다 [ 누구? ] 반 젊음 전에는 ' 하늘 ' 의 어휘는 나오지 않는다 .
  3. ↑ 음악신인 간다르바 가 환술로 만들어내는 성으로, 신기루 의 것 [5] [6] .

출처 [ 편집 ]

  1. ^ "suññatā ( f .) [suñña-tā, abstr . fr . suñña] emptiness た る こと. emptiness. emptiness. " Yunjing Zhaoshan "일본어 불교 사전의 새 판", 2008년 7월 개정, Shanxifang 불교 책의 숲, p.954
  2. ^ a b c d e f g 종합 불교 대사 사전 1988 , p. 279-281.
  3. ^ 나카무라 모토 , 산에다 미츠키 　「바우다」 쇼가쿠칸〈쇼가쿠칸 라이브러리〉, 1996년, p.373 .
  4. ^ 나가오 마사토 · 도자 키 히로사키 역 『대승 불전〈1〉반청부 경전―금강반 젊음・선용 맹반 젊은 경』 중앙 공론사〈중공 문고〉, 2001년.
  5. ↑ 「간달바」 - 브리타니카 국제대백과사전 소항목사전
  6. ↑ 「건영 할성」 - 대사림 제3판
  7. ↑ 와타나베 1983 , 202쪽.

참고 문헌 [ 편집 ]

  • 종합 불교 대사전 편집 위원회(편) 『종합 불교 대사전』 상권 법장관, 1988년 1월.
  • 와타나베 쇼오 「반청경에 있어서의 하늘의 법수와 공의의 이유구 -『2만5천반반 젊음』을 중심으로-」『인도 학부교학 ​​연구』 제32권 제1호, 일본 인도학 불교 학회, 1983년, 202-205페이지, doi : 10.4259/ibk.32.202 .

관련 항목 [ 편집 ]


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