The Oxford Handbook of JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY
Edited by BRET W. DAVIS, © Oxford University Press 2020
====
Contents
PART I SHINTŌ AND THE SYNTHETIC NATURE OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT
1 Prince Shōtoku’s Constitution and the Synthetic Nature of Japanese Thought -- Thomas P. Kasulis
2 Philosophical Implications of Shintō -- Iwasawa Tomoko
3 National Learning: Poetic Emotionalism and Nostalgic Nationalism Peter Flueckiger
PART II PHILOSOPHIES OF JAPANESE BUDDHISM
4 Saichō’s Tendai: In the Middle of Form and Emptiness -- Paul L. Swanson and Brook Ziporyn
5 Kūkai’s Shingon: Embodiment of Emptiness -- John W. M. Krummel
6 Philosophical Dimensions of Shinran’s Pure Land Buddhist Path Dennis Hirota
7 Modern Pure Land Thinkers: Kiyozawa Manshi and Soga Ryōjin Mark Unno 83
8 The Philosophy of Zen Master Dōgen: Egoless Perspectivism Bret W. Davis 201
9 Dōgen on the Language of Creative Textual Hermeneutics Steven Heine
10 Rinzai Zen Kōan Training: Philosophical Intersections -- Victor Sōgen Hori
11 Modern Zen Thinkers: D. T. Suzuki, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, and Masao Abe
Mori Tetsurō (trans. Bret W. Davis), Minobe Hitoshi (trans. Bret W. Davis), and Steven Heine
PART III PHILOSOPHIES OF JAPANESE CONFUCIANISM AND BUSHIDŌ
12 Japanese Neo-C onfucian Philosophy -- John A. Tucker
13 Ancient Learning: The Japanese Revival of Classical Confucianism John A. Tucker
14 Bushidō and Philosophy: Parting the Clouds, Seeking the Way Chris Goto- Jones 215
---
PART IV MODERN JAPANESE PHILOSOPHIES
15 The Japanese Encounter with and Appropriation of Western Philosophy 333
John C. Maraldo
THE KYOTO SCHOOL
16 The Kyoto School: Transformations Over Three Generations 367 Ōhashi Ryōsuke and Akitomi Katsuya (trans. Bret W. Davis)
17 The Development of Nishida Kitarō’s Philosophy: Pure Experience,
Place, Action- Intuition 389
Fujita Masakatsu (trans. Bret W. Davis)
18 Nishida Kitarō’s Philosophy: Self, World, and the Nothingness Underlying Distinctions 417
John C. Maraldo
19 The Place of God in the Philosophy of Tanabe Hajime 431
James W. Heisig
20 Miki Kiyoshi: Marxism, Humanism, and the Power of Imagination 447 Melissa Anne-M arie Curley
21 Nishitani Keiji: Practicing Philosophy as a Matter of Life and Death 465 Graham Parkes
22 Ueda Shizuteru: The Self That Is Not a Self in a Twofold World 485 Steffen Döll
26 Japanese Christian Philosophies, Terao Kazuyoshi
27 Yuasa Yasuo’s Philosophy of Self-C ultivation: A Theory of Embodiment, Shigenori Nagatomo 563 575
OTHER MODERN JAPANESE PHILOSOPHIES
23 Watsuji Tetsurō: The Mutuality of Climate and Culture and an Ethics of Betweenness -- Erin McCarthy
24 Kuki Shūzō: A Phenomenology of Fate and Chance and an Aesthetics of the Floating World -- Graham Mayeda
25 Comparative Philosophy in Japan: Nakamura Hajime and Izutsu Toshihiko - John W. M. Krummel
26 Japanese Christian Philosophies Terao Kazuyoshi
27 Yuasa Yasuo’s Philosophy of Self-C ultivation: A Theory of Embodiment - Shigenori Nagatomo 563 575
28 Postwar Japanese Political Philosophy: Marxism, Liberalism, and the Quest for Autonomy -- Rikki Kersten
29 Raichō: Zen and the Female Body in the Development of Japanese Feminist Philosophy -- Michiko Yusa and Leah Kalmanson
30 Japanese Phenomenology -- Tani Tōru
31 The Komaba Quartet: A Landscape of Japanese Philosophy in the Thought -- Bret W. Davis 685
PART V PERVASIVE TOPICS IN JAPANESE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT
32 Philosophical Implications of the Japanese Language 665 Rolf Elberfeld (trans. Bret W. Davis)
33 Natural Freedom: Human/N ature Nondualism in Zen and Japanese
34 Japanese Ethics Robert E. Carter
35 Japanese (and Ainu) Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art - Mara Miller and Yamasaki Kōji
36 The Controversial Cultural Identity of Japanese Philosophy Yoko Arisaka
Index
====
Ch 25 Comparative Philosophy in Japan Nakamura Hajime and Izutsu Toshihiko
John W. M. Krummel
Two thinkers who cannot be ignored when discussing comparative philosophy in Japan are Nakamura Hajime (1912–1999) and Izutsu Toshihiko (1914– 1993). Contemporaries, they emerged during the postwar period and were respected for scholarly accomplishments in their respective fields—B uddhist studies and Indology for Nakamura, Islamic studies for Izutsu. Yet both authors, in their inexhaustible appetite and with their multilingual capacity, expanded their investigations to produce numerous comparative studies. Furthermore, each worked on an explicit and distinct theory of comparison.
Nakamura was versed in Sanskrit and Pali and became initially known in Japan for producing the first Japanese translation of the Tripitaka, followed by many other translations and commentaries of Buddhist texts ranging from South to East Asia, as well as of non- Buddhist Indian philosophical texts. His broad knowledge of Asian thought, extending beyond India to include the East Asian traditions, along with his knowledge of Western philosophy and multiple languages, allowed him to author comparative works, many of which were translated into Western languages and won him an international reputation. Astonishingly, his entire oeuvre consists of more than a thousand works, including books and articles he authored and dictionaries and encyclopedias he edited.
Izutsu, on the other hand, first made his mark as a pioneer of Islamic studies in Japan and for the first published translation of the Qur’an from the original Arabic. Based on his knowledge of Middle Eastern languages, he came to author many studies on Islamic thought, especially Persian philosophy and Sufi mysticism and theology. But, in addition, he also studied Western medieval philosophy as well as Jewish thought, and, in his later years and on the basis of his Buddhist background, he expanded his research into the domain of Eastern thought, both East Asian and South Asian. His oeuvre in fact extends beyond the domain of philosophy to include works on literature and the arts, linguistics, history, and Islamic jurisprudence. And his mastery of more than twenty languages enabled him to engage in comparative investigations. His comparative work is unique in providing not only an encounter between East and West, but also between Far East (East Asia) and Near East (Islam, including Arabia and Persia). Both his works on Islamic thought, as well as his comparative studies have been translated and are appreciated the world over.
The comparative project for each is distinct: Nakamura aimed to construct a world history of ideas that uncovers some basic patterns in the unfolding of human “thought.” Izutsu aimed to (re- )construct an original “Oriental philosophy” that would encompass the vast terrain of his studies. In this chapter, I examine their respective comparative philosophies, compare and contrast them, and conclude with an assessment of their merits and demerits.
Nakamura Hajime
Project
Why does Nakamura engage in comparative philosophy? Nakamura has been vocal concerning the pitfalls of overspecialization in academia and the need for a comprehensive framework that can clarify the significance of each subject within the contemporary context. He especially expresses opposition to the division in the study of philosophy in Japanese academia between “Indian philosophy,” “Chinese philosophy,” and so- called pure philosophy (junsui tetsugaku 純粋哲学) that concentrates on Western philosophy. On the one hand, he criticizes scholars who only research Western philosophy while ignoring other regions. On the other hand, he critiques the predominantly philological approach taken in the other two philosophical fields and their lack of any critical spirit willing to tackle universal philosophical issues. He stresses that Indian and Buddhist philosophies have contemporary relevance, with implications for our lives. Hence, their study belongs within a philosophically broader perspective, a global context that would make their relevance evident. Philosophical claims and ideas in general possess value and meaning for the entire human race, transcending country and period despite the particularities of historical-c ultural context. Therefore we ought to overcome traditional boundaries so that we can obtain a comprehensive understanding of certain philosophical issues that may be universal. And this requires both a universal history of thought (fuhenteki shisōshi 普遍的思想史) and an investigation into the taxonomy of thought (shisō keitaironteki kenkyū 思想形態論的研究).
Especially in today’s world of mass communication and transportation, “our sense of belonging to one world has never been keener than the present.” But world peace can only be secured by greater mutual understanding between cultures and nations. Although becoming one in terms of technological civilization, the world is still divided in spirit, involving mutual suspicion and ideological conflict. This makes the comparative study of different currents of philosophy, their different views concerning similar issues, increasingly indispensable. Nakamura laments, however, that there has not yet been any systematic gathering of the facts or features common to the different intellectual traditions within such a comprehensive perspective. And this is the motivation for his own comparative project. Nakamura’s hope is that comparison can open the gates to realizing peace and understanding among humanity as a whole. He also states that only through comparison that would connect our lives to the essence of human existence may we hope to reach the truth—a truth that can lead to a new philosophy that corresponds to the world, a “new world philosophy.” His comparative project aims to open that possibility.
Method
Nakamura’s comparative work is, for the most part, directed toward the analysis of “ways of thinking” or “thought” (shisō 思想) rather than philosophy (tetsugaku 哲学) per se. By “thought” he means the thinking habits of a culture, expressed in “the characteristic popular sayings, proverbs, songs, mythology, and folklore of that people,” as opposed to coherent, self- conscious systems of thought that would be “philosophy.”9 As such, it is a cultural phenomenon (bunka genzō 文化現像), involving sociohistorical, psychological, aesthetic, and linguistic phenomena, and so on. He prefers this broader significance of “thought” over the more restrictive connotation of “philosophy” that might exclude religious scriptures and literary works, because thought is the site of concrete issues encountered in everyday life that also serves as the cultural foundation indispensable to the growth of philosophy in the more restrictive sense. It is the link connecting the philosopher to his or her environment, whereby “the ways of thinking of philosophers cannot be freed completely of national or historical traditions.” Philosophy has developed within distinct cultural spheres, each with its own mode of thinking. And thus Nakamura takes human thought itself (ningen no shisō sonomono 人間の思想そのもの) to be the fundamental issue of his comparative analyses. And thought as such should be studied regardless of who it belongs to. The focus of the investigation ought not to be on the personalities or authors traditionally regarded as authority figures, because the individual is “strongly influenced by the ways of living and thinking in his own nation and culture,” and it is thought itself vaguely diffused throughout society that becomes concentrated and crystallized in that single thinker.
Not only do ways of thinking differ on the basis of the sociocultural environment, they also change as those environing conditions change. We cannot ignore their historical development. The comparative investigation of thought therefore must be undertaken historically. But, in his historical investigations, Nakamura found that comparable modes of thought have emerged in entirely unrelated cultural spheres. On this basis, he also proposes the necessity in the comparative history of thought of a conceptual terminology that can be universally applicable to distinct philosophical currents. Furthermore, he proposes such comparative research to be carried in two distinct directions: particularization and universalization. Particularization will either clarify the philosophical-i ntellectual tradition of a particular people of a particular region or make conspicuous the philosophical- intellectual particularities of a specific period common to distinct cultural areas (e.g., the medieval periods of both Europe and India). Universalization entails the application of an intellectual taxonomy in order to summarize specific types of philosophical or intellectual positions (e.g., materialism) regardless of the area, period, or developmental stage. This latter might allow us, for example, to compare Buddhist psychology with modern psychology, as Rys-D avis did. Nakamura attempts to realize some of these ideas concerning comparison in two monumental works.
Nakamura’s Comparative History of Thought
Two major and massive works from the 1960s, in which Nakamura engages in such a comparative history of thought, are Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (Tōyōjin no shisō hōhō, 1960 and revised 1964) and History of World Thought (Sekai shisōshi, 1975 based on 1964 lectures). In his slightly earlier work, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, Nakamura compares the thinking of distinct cultural spheres within the so- called East: India, China, Tibet, and Japan. He follows a common plan by first discussing the language and logic unique to a specific people and then discussing the manifestations of those linguistic- logical patterns in concrete cultural phenomena. He argues that the cultural life of a people, including their way of thinking, is intimately related to the grammar and syntax of its language. That mode of thinking is also often made explicit and systematized in a logic (ronri 論理), the inductive and deductive modes of inference and judgment. But even logic as such is inseparable from sociocultural conditions. So, characteristic differences in ways of thinking between each people become reflected in patterns of logic.
Nakamura also examines in Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples how each cultural sphere received and modified Buddhism in different ways. His purpose was to isolate indigenous thought patterns that resisted and endured under Buddhist influence. Throughout his study, he makes comparisons and contrasts with Western ways of thinking as well. But his main focus here seems to be the differences among these peoples of “the East,” differences that would undermine the stereotypical notion that there is a monolithic culture of “the Orient” that can then be contrasted with “the Occident.” For example, he points out in another work of the same period how Indian thought tends to stress universals and disregard individuals or particulars, leading to the Indian disregard for history. Chinese thinking, however, tends to emphasize the particular while lacking consciousness of the universal, with the consequence that the Chinese are uneasy concerning attempts to abstract fixed laws from particular facts of history.23 In general, in Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, Nakamura underscores the same point he makes in On Comparative Thought (Hikaku shisōron, 1976, first edition 1960)24: there are conspicuous differences in thought due to environing sociocultural conditions that preclude reduction to simplistic dichotomies such as East versus West.
In History of World Thought, Nakamura extends his investigation beyond Asia to “the world,” by which he actually means the advanced cultures of Eurasia. He maintains his view that thought is influenced by the sociocultural and linguistic setting, but he also attempts to “isolate, describe, and analyze certain key philosophical problems that have appeared historically in almost parallel developments within different cultural areas, East and West.” Here, “philosophical problem” has the same broad significance as “thought” in the above- mentioned sense. But by “parallel developments,” Nakamura has in mind the fact that similar intellectual core issues have emerged in certain stages of cultural development in culturally unconnected areas and that particular issues characterize particular stages and lead to similar solutions. Because closely related problems were met in similar stages, the developmental process itself proved to be similar among different cultural areas. Similar to how civilizations worldwide have generally proceeded through the same stages from Stone Age to Bronze Age to Iron Age, and so on, Nakamura points to common stages in the intellectual history of the major Western and Eastern cultural spheres, moving from (1) ancient thought (in early agricultural societies) to (2) the rise of philosophy to (3) universal thought (with the early universal religions and the ideology of the universal state) to (4) medieval thought, and to (5) modern thought. An example of a core issue emerging in distinct spheres in parallel stages would be the realism- nominalism debate concerning the status of universals that occurred in both Western Europe and in India during their respective medieval periods. Another would be the relativisms of Heraclitus in ancient Greece and of the Jains in ancient India during the second stage of intellectual history. Nakamura does not neglect to point out important contextual differences as well. Nevertheless, his focus here is on the similarity in development of intellectual history and in its stages among unrelated cultural areas. He concludes that human beings, despite distinct traditions, face much the same problems of life, more or less, and have demonstrated comparable responses to them, due to similarity in human nature and human concerns. In On Comparative Thought, he had already noticed that there are many philosophical issues universal to humanity and that truth may be discerned among every ethnic group regardless of tradition. But, at the same time, those universal issues, as concrete problems, are dealt with differently in response to different environments.
Nakamura’s Rejection of Stereotypes
One point that significantly distinguishes Nakamura from many other comparativists is his rejection of common stereotypes, whether Orientalist essentialism and the purported dichotomy between East and West on the one hand or a simplistic universalism and perennialism on the other. Although his History of World Thought was focused on showing the similarities in stages of development in intellectual history among cultures, he was careful to discuss significant differences that are due to linguistic and sociocultural conditions, as he already had in Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples. His analysis precludes the dichotomization of the world into two hemispheres, East and West. Throughout his comparative works, Nakamura repeatedly critiques such dualist formulas as Western logic versus Eastern intuition, Western individualism versus Eastern collectivism, Western analysis versus Eastern synthesis, Western secularism versus Eastern religiosity, Western materialism versus Eastern spirituality, and the like by providing counterexamples and showing the complex diversity within the so- called East. He concludes, concerning “Eastern thought,” that we are “incapable of isolating a definite trait which can be singled out for contrast with the West” and that “there exists no single ‘Eastern’ feature.” In this regard, he points out the difficulty in Watsuji Tetsurō’s theory of summing up the characteristics of the whole of what Watsuji called “the monsoon zone”— India, China, and Japan—a nd labeling them as “Asiatic.” In connection to this, he also criticizes the tendency among Western scholars to take everything east of Marseilles together as “the Orient.” And, just as the East is not a cultural unity but rather a diversity, the same can be said of the West, that “as far as ways of thinking are concerned, we must disavow the cultural unity of the West.” He thus finds the purported East– West dichotomy, according to which each is taken as a monolithic entity, to be conceptually inadequate and believes such commonly repeated clichés need to be reexamined. This point is important to bear in mind as we turn now to examine Izutsu’s comparative work.
Izutsu Toshihiko
Project
The trajectory informing Izutsu’s comparative work is ultimately the formulation of a new type of “Oriental philosophy” (tōyō tetsugaku 東洋哲学) “based on a series of rigorously philological, comparative studies of the key terms of various philosophical traditions in the Near, Middle, and Far East.” ---
Whereas Western philosophy, founded upon the two pillars of Hellenism and Hebraism, presents a fairly conspicuous organic uniformity in its historical development, there is no such historical uniformity or organic structure in the East. Instead, Eastern philosophy consists of multiple coexisting traditions with no cohesion that can be juxtaposed to Western philosophy as a whole. Izutsu thus proposes to engage in the systematic study of the philosophies of the East in order to arrive at a comprehensive structural framework—a meta- philosophy of Eastern thought— that could gather those philosophies into a certain level of structural uniformity, a single organic and integral philosophical horizon. What initially strikes today’s reader, however, is that in his categorization of what is “Eastern” or “Oriental” in philosophy, he includes Islamic thought in conjunction with the South and East Asian traditions. Once having encompassed all the Eastern schools of thought, Izutsu ultimately hopes that such a meta-p hilosophy can then be broadened to encompass Western philosophy as well.
Izutsu claims that today’s world more than ever before is in need of what Henry Corbin has called a “dialogue in meta- history” (un dialogue dans la métahistoire) between East and West. And philosophy provides the suitable common ground for opening such intercultural meta-historical dialogue. Comparative philosophy in general thus has the significance of promoting deep understanding between cultures. ---
But we first need better philosophical understanding within the confines of the Eastern traditions. Once this is done, the West can be included in the meta-h istorical dialogue. He adds that, despite the global dominance of the West, texts of the Orient can stimulate and enrich modern thought and can contribute, ultimately, to the development of a new world philosophy based on the convergence of the spiritual and intellectual heritages of East and West. In other words, meta- historical dialogue, conducted first for the construction of “Oriental philosophy,” can eventually be expanded to crystallize into a philosophia perennis— “for the philosophical drive of the human mind is, regardless of ages, places and nations, ultimately and fundamentally one.” Here, Izutsu, while focusing on “Oriental philosophy,” unabashedly assumes the final goal of “perennial philosophy.”
===
Izutsu Toshihiko 프로젝트
Izutsu의 비교 작업을 알리는 궤적은 궁극적으로 "근처의 다양한 철학적 전통의 핵심 용어에 대한 엄밀한 철학적, 비교 연구 시리즈에 기초한 새로운 유형의 "동양 철학"(tōyō tetsugaku 東洋哲学)의 공식화입니다. , 중동 및 극동.” ---
헬레니즘과 히브라이즘의 두 기둥에 기초한 서양철학은 역사적 발전과정에서 상당히 두드러진 유기적 획일성을 보여주지만 동양에는 그러한 역사적 획일성이나 유기적 구조가 없다. 대신, 동양 철학은 전체적으로 서양 철학과 병치될 수 있는 응집력이 없는 공존하는 여러 전통으로 구성됩니다. 따라서 Izutsu는 포괄적인 구조적 틀(동양 사상의 메타 철학)에 도달하기 위해 동양 철학에 대한 체계적인 연구에 참여할 것을 제안합니다. 완전한 철학적 지평. 그러나 오늘날 독자를 처음 놀라게 하는 것은 철학에서 "동양" 또는 "동양"을 범주화할 때 그가 남아시아 및 동아시아 전통과 함께 이슬람 사상을 포함한다는 것입니다. 일단 동양의 모든 학파를 포괄한 Izutsu는 궁극적으로 그러한 메타 철학이 서양 철학도 포함하도록 확장될 수 있기를 희망합니다. Izutsu는 오늘날의 세계가 Henry Corbin이 동양과 서양 사이의 "메타 역사에서의 대화"(un dialogue dans la métahistoire)라고 부른 것이 그 어느 때보다 필요하다고 주장합니다. 그리고 철학은 그러한 문화 간 메타-역사적 대화를 열기 위한 적절한 공통 기반을 제공합니다. 따라서 일반적으로 비교 철학은 문화 간의 깊은 이해를 촉진하는 의미를 갖는다. ---
그러나 우리는 먼저 동양 전통의 범위 내에서 더 나은 철학적 이해가 필요합니다. 이것이 완료되면 서구도 메타- 역사적 대화에 포함될 수 있습니다. 그는 서양의 세계적인 지배에도 불구하고 동양의 텍스트는 현대 사상을 자극하고 풍부하게 할 수 있으며 궁극적으로 동양과 서양의 정신적, 지적 유산의 융합에 기반한 새로운 세계 철학의 발전에 기여할 수 있다고 덧붙입니다. . 즉, '동양철학'의 구축을 위해 최초로 진행된 메타역사적 대화는 결국 '영원한 철학(philosophia perennis)'으로 구체화될 수 있다. 궁극적으로 그리고 근본적으로 하나입니다.” 여기서 이즈츠는 '동양철학'을 중시하면서 '영원철학'이라는 최종 목표를 뻔뻔스럽게 내세운다.
===
Method
In Creation and the Timeless Order of Things, Izutsu complains that comparative philosophy has failed hitherto mainly due to its lack of a systematic methodology. He proposes that the comprehensive structural framework that would constitute the hoped- for meta-p hilosophy would consist of a number of substructures, each consisting of a network of key philosophical concepts abstracted from the major traditions and semantically analyzed. The product should be a complex but “well- organized and flexible conceptual system in which each individual system will be given its proper place and in terms of which the differences as well as common grounds between the major schools of the East and West will systematically be clarified.”49 In his later years, in Consciousness and Essence (Ishiki to honshitsu; published in 1983), he calls this theoretical operation, “synchronic structuralization” (kyōjiteki kōzōka 共時的構造化). He proposes that, on its basis, we can conduct a meta-h istorical analysis of traditions that would be a meta- philosophy of Oriental philosophies. That is, by abstracting the philosophical traditions from the complexities and contingencies of their historical context and transferring them to an ideal plane—t he dimension of what he calls “synchronic thought” (kyōjiteki shisō 共時的思想) where they are spatially juxtaposed and temporally co- current— he purports to construct a new “Oriental philosophy as a whole.” Within this structural field, the various traditions can be rearranged paradigmatically, enabling us to extract fundamental patterns of thought. He admits that the development of such an organic unity out of disparate traditions would involve a certain artificial, theoretical, and, indeed, creative operation. It requires the imposition of a common linguistic (or conceptual) system that would permit a meta- historical dialogue between the traditions. But he also claims that these extracted patterns of thought are primordial and regulative archetypes in the deep layers of philosophical thinking of the “Oriental peoples.”
On this basis, the second step of Izutsu’s comparative methodology involves a subjectification of that system of extracted patterns by internalizing them into oneself, thereby establishing one’s own “Oriental philosophical viewpoint.” This existential move can, in turn, contribute to establishing, from out of the philosophical product of “synchronic structuralization,” a new philosophy in the world context. The postulation of this second stage seems to have personal significance for Izutsu when he states that the very premise of his comparative project was his self- realization that the root of his own existence lies in “the Orient” (tōyō 東洋), although he acknowledges here that what he means is rather vague and incoherent. He says that he began to feel this root only as a participant in the Eranos Conference (1967– 82). It was during those years that he decided he ought to pay greater attention to the Eastern traditions.
Izutsu’s “Oriental Philosophy”
With the goal of such a meta- philosophy of Eastern thought in view, Izutsu constructs an elaborate ontology using the concepts of existence, essence, and articulation. He begins this in his study of Sufism by taking the Islamic concept of the “oneness/u nity of being” (waḥdat al- wujūd), stemming from Ibn al- ’Arabī and developed in Iran by Mullā Sadrā, as the partial field of such a meta-p hilosophy. The concept of existence or being— wujud in Arabic and existentia in Latin—h as the same basic connotation in the Islamic and Christian traditions. But the issue of identifying this concept is compounded when there is no historical connection between the ideas being compared, as in Sufism and Daoism. In his study comparing the two (Sufism and Taoism, 1984, first edition 1966– 67) as represented by ‘Arabī on the one hand and Laozi and Zhuangzi on the other, he expresses the need to pinpoint a central concept active in both even if having its linguistic counterpart in only one of the systems while remaining implicit in the other. We must then stabilize it with a definite “name,” which may be borrowed from the one system in which it is linguistically present. He thinks the concept of “existence/ being” from the Arabic wujud serves this purpose because it is simple and does not color what it intends with unnecessary connotations. Izutsu believes the Sufi notion of the “unity of being,” if structurally analyzed and developed properly, can provide a theoretical framework or basic conceptual model for clarifying the fundamental mode of thinking characterizing Eastern philosophy in general, not only Islamic philosophy. As such, it provides a broad conceptual framework or common philosophical ground— an archetypal form— on the basis of which a meta- historical dialogue between Eastern philosophies historically divergent in origin can be established. For example, beyond Islam and Daoism, he includes Buddhism in the mix, with its notion of “suchness” (Sk. tathatā; Jp. shinnyo 真如), which he interprets to mean “being as it really is.” He also includes Western existentialism in its recognition of the fundamental vision of existence itself as primary.
Another conspicuous example of his method of extracting a common concept to construct a meta-p hilosophy is his examination of the concept of “essence” (honshitsu 本質) in his Consciousness and Essence. He extracts this notion of the whatness of a thing from the context of the scholastic debates that dominated the history of post- Greco philosophy (as quidditas, essentia, and māhīyah) since Aristotle and extends its application into the context of Eastern thought. He does this on the basis of his claim that at least conceptual equivalents to it played a significant role in Eastern philosophies as well. What he stresses as noticeable in all cases is its connection with the semantic function of language and the multilayered structure of human consciousness. In fact, it is the distinction and relationship between the two key concepts of existence (being) and essence, constituting an ontological dynamic, that forms the thematic of the full flowering of Izutsu’s entire comparative project of “Oriental philosophy” in his later years.
Whether the focus is on existence or on essence, one fundamental theme that reappears throughout Izutsu’s project of “the synchronic structuralization of Oriental philosophy” is articulation (bunsetsu 分節)— both ontological and semantic (the two being inseparable). Articulation for Izutsu is the process whereby beings are discriminated or differentiated through meaning. Language plays an important role in this process, and it is also inseparably connected with consciousness, whereby “the self- same reality is said to be perceived differently in accordance with different degrees of consciousness.”
On the basis of this theme of articulation, involving both existence and essence, he constructs a general ontology for his Oriental philosophy in Consciousness and Essence. Accordingly, the source or foundation of reality is originally indeterminate and without form or name (musō mumei 無相無名). In different traditions, it is called absolute (zettai 絶対), true reality (shinjitsuzai 真実在), dao (道), emptiness (kū 空), nothing (mu 無), the one (issha 一者), true suchness (shinnyo), al- ḥaqq, wujud, or being/ existence (sonzai 存在), and more. In its original state prior to any linguistic partitioning, Izutsu calls it
“absolute non- articulation” (zettai mubunsetsu 絶対無分節). But we find this idea in his earlier comparative works as well, such as in his study of Sufism and Daoism, wherein he identifies the pure act (actus purus) of existence in both ‘Arabī’s “unity of being” and in Zhuangzi’s “heavenly leveling” or “chaos” (Ch. hundun; Jp. konton 混沌) as unconditionally simple, without delimitation, and not a determinate thing, a nothing (in Zhuangzi, wuwu 無無). As further references indicative of absolute nonarticulation, he includes Shingon’s “originally unborn” (honpushō 本不生), Vedānta’s Brahman, the nonpolarity (Ch. wuji; Jp. mukyoku 無極) beyond ultimate polarity (Ch. taiji; Jp. taikyoku 太極) in Neo- Confucianism, Nāgārjuna’s emptiness (śūnyatā), Neoplatonism’s “the one,” Kabbalah’s ein sof, and the like. In that original state of being an undifferentiated whole, things are without essence.
The vision of that undifferentiated unity of being is obtained in an “abnormal” spiritual state that Izutsu finds exemplified in a variety of traditions, as in the Daoist practice of “sitting in oblivion” (zuowang), the Sufi experience of “self- annihilation” (fanā’), the Buddhist experience of nirvāna, the Zen experience of nothing (mu) or emptiness (kū), and the ātman- Brahman identification in Vedānta. In all of these cases, what takes place is the emptying of the ego into that nonarticulated source. In such a state, consciousness loses its intentionality to correspond to existence in its original nonarticulation. In Consciousness and Essence Izutsu takes this state of consciousness to be a meta- consciousness of the profound subtlety of being as absolutely unarticulated.
He asserts this to be a fundamental characteristic of Oriental thought. Moreover, in many of these traditions, this state of world- and-e go annihilation is followed by a return to the manifold, whereby one engages with the world anew, this time with the awareness that everything is an articulation of the originally unarticulated. For example, in Sufism, that state following fanā’ would be baqā.
The nothingness of undifferentiation obtained in that vision is at the same time the plenitude of being as the ground of everything. Hence, the empty vessel that is the dao in Laozi is infinitely full of being and the undivided chaos crumbles into “an infinity of ontological segments.” In Shingon Buddhism, emptiness is simultaneously the dharmakāya (hosshin 法身), symbolized by the letter A, meaning both negation and origination. In Vedānta, that duplicity between nothing and being in the absolute is expressed in the notions of nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman. In Sufism, it would be the inner essence of God (dhat) and his self-r evealing exteriority (zāhir), and in Neo- Confucianism, it would be nonpolarity (wuji) and ultimate polarity (taiji). Izutsu also refers to Zhuangzi, Nāgārjuna, Zen, and the Jewish Kabbalah as exemplifying parallel ideas. He does point out differences, however, such as between Mahāyāna Buddhism’s emphasis on the nothingness of all essences of things and Vedānta’s emphasis on Brahman as the one true essence behind everything.83 On the basis of that duplicity of the ontological ground, the world serves as the locus for the continuous and inexhaustible self-a rticulation of what is originally unarticulated. For example, in ‘Arabī, the process moves from the divine essence (haqq) to the created world (khalq); in Laozi, from the mystery of mysteries to the ten thousand things. Everything in the world is thus indicative of the absolute, as its delimitation, and the many as such eventually returns to ascend back into its source, the one. What unifies the one and the many here is existence itself as the all-c omprehensive reality of which things are determining qualities or attributes; hence, Izutsu’s generalization of “the oneness of being” (wadhat al- wujūd). What characterizes these “Oriental” philosophers for Izutsu is that they have learned to see things simultaneously in those two directions— reality as indeterminate and as determined, as one and as many, as nothing and as being, with “compound eyes.” And all of these examples of Eastern thought that he cites indicate, each in its own way, that process of reality as the self- articulation of absolute nonarticulation (zettai mubunsetsu) into discrete things and events. Through this “articulation” (bunsetsu) theory, Izutsu thus extracts what he views to be the common structure behind the disparate texts of the “Eastern” traditions, including those of the Near East, Persia, and Semitic thought.
According to Izutsu, the process of ontological articulation corresponds to psychological states or degrees of awareness. He accordingly takes to be another major characteristic of Eastern thought the notion that consciousness is a multilayered structure in correspondence with the articulation process of being. The mandala in esoteric Buddhism, for example, depicts that dynamic process between nonarticulation and articulation as a matrix not only of cosmological events but also of psychological events. As usual, he refers to multiple sources from distinct traditions as exemplifying this idea: Mullā Sadrā, Śankara, ‘Arabī, Yogācāra, and others. In the case of ‘Arabī, he cites the middle realm between the absolute and the world, the mundus imaginalis or realm of primordial images (a’yān thābitah), where so- called essences unfold as archetypes in the deep structures of both being and consciousness. He finds equivalents in the Yijing’s hexagrams and the Kabbalah’s sefirot as all depicting the dynamic process of articulation, involving degrees or levels, moving from the unarticulated to the articulated, in both being and mind. Izutsu creatively interprets Yogācāra’s notion of the alaya- vijñāna together with the Buddhist notion of karma in correspondence with this theory as well.
Izutsu approaches articulation further in terms of the cultural environment or network of linguistic meanings that contextualizes the emergent entity. Such semantic articulation (imi bunsetsu 意味分節) is linguistic; it happens through naming, and this determines— particularizes and specifies— what is thus articulated. Everything— facts and thing- events in the empirical world as well as ourselves—i s nothing but ontological units of meaning or meaningful units of being that have been articulated semantically through language. Hence, for Izutsu, “semantic articulation is immediately ontological articulation” (imibunsetsu soku sonzaibunsetsu 意味分節即存在分節), and he regards this to be one of the main points of Eastern thought in general. Although this became his thesis concerning “Oriental philosophy,” it is interesting to note that even prior to the initiation of his comparative project, in his early anthropological- sociological study from 1956, Language and Magic: Studies in the Magical Function of Speech, he states that the grammatical and syntactic structure of language is to a great extent responsible for the way we think and that it constitutes for its speakers a special sort of meaning. With his theory of articulation, he extends that early interest in the importance of language in the ontological direction, whereby consciousness draws lines of articulation through the semantic function of words.
In Izutu’s mature thought, it is that articulative function of language, in connection with the multilayered structure of consciousness, that gives rise to “essences” (honshitsu) in the various traditions. Consciousness is naturally directed toward grasping the “essence” of some thing, and this directedness is connected to the semantic indicative function of language. Through the reception of a name, something X obtains an identity and crystallizes into such and such a thing. Thus, in Laozi and Zhuangzi, the originally unarticulated dao that is a nothing (Ch. wu; Jp. mu) transforms into beings by receiving names. Izutsu views that articulation into “essences” to be an a priori occurrence through a cultural and linguistic framework as a kind of transcendental structure, whereby ancient Greece had its own system of “essences” expressed in Socrates’ search for the eternal and unchanging ideas, and ancient China had a distinct system of “essences” expressed in Confucius’ theory of the rectification of names. Every phenomenon receives its form by passing through this culturally or linguistically specific mesh of archetypal semantic articulation.
Borrowing Buddhist terminology, Izutsu calls that culturally specific collective framework, operating in the deep layers of consciousness, “the linguistic alaya- consciousness”
(gengo araya- shiki 言語アラヤ識). As a “linguistic a priori,” it is the storehouse of semantic “seeds” (shuji 種子) of meaning, as karmic traces of our mental and physical activities, their semantic effects, conditioned by the cultural-l inguistic mesh, accumulated and stored, but in constant flux. Eventually, these seeds, as they surface into our conscious states, become objectified, hypostatized, and reified into the concrete images we take to be ontological realities. On this basis, we tend to polarize the subject and object realms as mutually exclusive, and we come to recognize “essences” in the empirical world that had been produced through the activation of the semantic “seeds.” In effect, this is a superimposition of essences upon reality, articulating the originally unarticulated into discrete unities with names.
Essences as such, in themselves, are fictions. This is in contrast to the essentialist positions that would reify essences into absolutes. In his view, essentialism alone cannot comprehend the true nature of reality that is originally undifferentiated. Izutsu notices as common to the Eastern traditions a deep- seated mistrust of language and its function of articulating reality into such essences. He refers to the ontological currents of Mahāyāna Buddhism, such as Madhyamaka, Cittamatra, Zen, and Shingon, as well as Advaita Vedānta, Neo- Confucianism, Daoism, and Sufism, to make his case. He does point out, however, differences among Mahāyāna, ‘Arabī, and Śankara concerning the degree of reality essences possess. And he also discusses cases that do not fit his view of the “existentialism” of “Oriental philosophy”; for example, the “essentialisms” of primitive Confucianism’s “rectification of names,” of Song Neo-C onfucianism’s notion of li (Jp. ri 理, “principle”), and of the Nyāya-V aisesika of India. But he seems to regard them as exceptions to the main current of the East. The main philosophical current is this “existentialism,” founded on the intuitive grasp of the “unity of being,” existence as it dynamically unfolds essences, as expressed in Izutsu’s formula “semantic articulation qua ontological articulation” (imi bunsetsu soku sonzai bunsetsu). This also means that essences are not absolutely nonexistent because they are pervaded by existence and are the unfolding of existence. Izutsu finds this ontological dynamism exemplified in the Mahāyāna phrase, “true emptiness, profound being” (shinkū myōu 真空妙有). That is to say, essences exist as the articulation of the unarticulated. True suchness thus both resists and permits articulation.
Izutsu finds that ontology of “true emptiness and profound being”— the semantic qua ontological articulation of the unarticulated— to be the meta- structure common to the various traditions of “Oriental philosophy.” According to Nagai, “the Orient” as a philosophical concept signifies for Izutsu nothing other than that negation of the reification of essence and the ontological dynamism between nonarticulation and articulation. According to Izutsu’s wife Izutsu Toyoko, this dynamic of articulation is the key perspectival stance and structural hypothesis that Izutsu conceptually designed and intentionally assumed in his attempt to realize “the synchronic integrative structure of Oriental philosophy” (tōyōtetsugaku no kyōjironteki seigō kōzō 東洋哲学の共時論的整合構造). With this idea, he attempted to integrate the various cultural-t extual horizons he had traversed in his lifelong studies into a single meaningful and organic all- inclusive horizon to bring his philosophical search to closure.
The last work he completed before his passing, The Metaphysics of Consciousness in the Philosophy of the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Ishiki no keijijōgaku— Daijōkishinron no tetsugaku), published in 1992 was supposed to initiate the full- scale concretization of this “synchronic structuralization of Oriental philosophy.” And he allegedly had plans to further incorporate other texts, traditions, and doctrines— alaya- vijñāna, Kegon and Tendai, Suhrawardi’s Illuminationism (Ishraqi), Platonism, Confucianism, Shingon, and Daoism (of Laozi and Zhuangzi), as well as texts of Jewish thought, Indian philosophy, and the Japanese classics, among others— as key topics in the establishment of such a “synchronic structural horizon” (kyōjironteki kōzō chihei 共時論的構造地平).115 The general sense one gets of his concept of “Oriental philosophy,” as we can see, seems expansive enough to include almost anything outside of the mainstream dualist strand of Western philosophy, such that one can find traces of “the East” within “the West” (e.g., Plotinus, Eckhart, etc.) as well as within the Semitic, Persian, and Islamic traditions.
Conclusion
We are now in a position summarize the comparative philosophies of each thinker before comparing and contrasting them and discussing their merits and demerits. We might summarize important features of Nakamura’s comparative philosophy in the following manner. He claims that his work proves philosophy is not confined to the West.116 But, at the same time, he prefers the term “thought” (shisō) over “philosophy” as having a broader significance to encompass intellectual ideas expressed in religion, literature, and mythology as well. In the historical development of such thought, he recognizes similar patterns throughout the advanced cultures due to our common humanity. And yet he also recognizes important differences that result from distinct sociocultural environments. This makes him reject the stereotypical dichotomy of East versus West that would essentialize each or reduce them to monolithic entities because he recognizes diversity within each hemisphere, as well as commonalities between them. To make his point, Nakamura succeeds in compiling an abundant amount of historical information. But while emphasizing the need to go beyond mere philology or historiology in doing comparative philosophy, Nakamura keeps to a minimum his speculations concerning any metaphysical or ontological implications of his comparative analyses.
The scope of Izutsu’s research activities, like Nakamura’s, is vast. But the true trait of his comparative work is really in its speculative depth and originality. I believe Izutsu’s comparative project of “Oriental philosophy” has merit when read as his creative construction of a unique ontology on the basis of concepts appropriated from a variety of
115 Izutsu Toyoko in Izutsu 1993, 186–1 87.
116 Nakamura 1992, 567.
traditions. But his project becomes problematic if we read him as merely a comparativist aiming to unfold the true essence of “the Orient” common to the disparate traditions he groups under the category of “the East.” In doing this, he appropriates conceptual schemes from a single tradition and uses them to explicate the others. Izutsu admits, for example, to the Greek origin of the Islamic concept of existence and its relation to the Western scholastic concept, existentia. This connection with philosophical schemes stemming from the scholastic traditions of both Islam and the West becomes obvious especially in Consciousness and Essence when he refers to the essence- existence contrast and the opposition of essentialism and existentialism. One thus cannot help but ask whether Izutsu is reading Daoism and the other traditions of Asia under a light originally cast by ancient Greece. And, if so, would this undermine his claim that what he is uncovering is a truth unique to “the Orient”? Of course, he often includes “ancient Greece” within what he means by “the Orient,” but the essence-e xistence scheme he borrows was fully developed within Western medieval philosophy. And he never provides an explicit defense or justification for his extension of “the Orient” to ancient Greece, which is commonly referred to as the origin of “the Occident.” When he writes that the thought patterns he extracts from his comparative analyses are primordial patterns regulative of the philosophical thinking of Eastern peoples, “the Orientals” (tōyōjin 東洋人), one cannot help but ask: Who are “the Orientals”? He includes not only the peoples of East Asia and South Asia, but also the Persians and the Semites and even the ancient Greeks. How can the extraction of “the Orient” out of such disparate traditions and diverse peoples not be arbitrary? Is this not an invention of “the Orient” rather than its discovery? Is he ignoring his own ontological premise of “Oriental philosophy,” that is, the linguistic-c ultural contingency of essences, by constructing an “essence”— “Orient”—t hat defies the manifold fluidity of “existence”? Certainly, his project is to construct an ontological standpoint out of the variety of nondualist traditions that fall outside of the mainstream dualist and essentialist current of Western philosophy. But even if we grant this much, why must we call it “Eastern” or “Oriental”? In the end, the question of whether Izutsu’s ontological theory of “existentialism” and “Oriental philosophy” is viable depends largely on how one reads Izutsu—a s a comparative philosopher comparing traditions or as a comparative philosopher creating his own ontology.
Both thinkers were incredibly prolific as comparative philosophers, covering a wide range of traditions based on penetrating analyses of major texts. Moreover, they both reflected on the nature of comparison, and each constructed a theory of comparative philosophy. Having examined their work, we are now in a position to compare and contrast their comparative projects and evaluate their strong and weak points. Both possess a firm foundation in their respective fields—I zutsu in Islamic studies and Nakamura in Indology and Buddhist studies—w ith unsurpassed knowledge of languages permitting them to read texts from multiple traditions. Significantly, both stress the importance of language and its analysis as a starting point for their comparative work. Nakamura focuses on the differences between languages as a basis for sociohistorical differences in ways of thinking among distinct cultures. Izutsu focuses on the universal function of language as semantic articulation that also leads to culturally specific distinctions. Both speak of the need for a common conceptual terminology in comparing the traditions. But in the intellectual history of distinct cultures, both East and West, Nakamura recognizes a pattern they all follow in their stages of development. Izutsu, on the other hand, discerns within the multiple traditions of “the East” a core sensibility that distinguishes them from Western philosophy. Certainly, Nakamura’s project, especially in History of World Thought, aims to show those common patterns through which intellectual history unfolds in response to human situations. But he is careful to point out culture- specific sociohistorical conditions that account for important differences as well. It may then be too simplistic to regard his comparative theory as merely a “universalism.” On the other hand, Izutsu, while emphasizing “the Orient,” attempts to construct a kind of transcultural transhistorical metaphysics that bypasses those cultural- historical specifics that Nakamura is keen on pointing out. Moreover, it encompasses a vast range of traditions that broadens “the Orient” from the Far East to the Near East and includes Semitic, Persian, and even Greek thought. His “relativism” thus harbors within itself a tendency toward “universalism” in its own right. And, like Nakamura, he speaks of the ultimate aim of a “world philosophy,” even a philosophia perennis. I raise these points to underscore the complexity of each of their comparative theories and to prevent us from simplistically characterizing Nakamura as a universalist and Izutsu as a relativist.
Stylistically, their methods of comparison and philosophizing are quite distinct. Nakamura is meticulous in his examination of the relevant historical and sociocultural data. He seems both historically and sociologically, as well as philologically, well- grounded in his claims. But his claims are modest in speculation and do not extend deep into the realms of metaphysics or ontology. Izutsu, by contrast, is much more speculative and metaphysically bold. But, in his enthusiasm, he tends to overlook significant contextual differences between the traditions as he liberally overlays conceptual schemes borrowed from one tradition upon other traditions. Nakamura was keen in debunking popular stereotypes, such as the reductive dichotomy of East and West. Under Nakamura’s penetrating gaze, Izutsu’s entire project of “Oriental philosophy” may appear suspect. But Nakamura, while admonishing scholars of Asian thought for being too philological and lacking any philosophical depth, himself seemed to shy away from venturing into the kind of metaphysical speculation that he might have attempted on the basis of his comparative analyses. Although stating that comparison ought to lead to a new world philosophy, he fails to provide one himself. Izutsu, on the other hand, in his zeal to construct the sort of “world philosophy” to which Nakamura thinks comparison ought to lead, ends up committing the fallacies Nakamura warns against. In short, we can say that Nakamura was too cautious and Izutsu was too daring. Nevertheless, comparative philosophers today need to pay attention to these two intellectual giants of Japan in the field of comparative philosophy. We can learn from both their strengths and weaknesses.
Bibliography and Suggested Readings
Izutsu, Toshihiko (1956). Language and Magic: Studies in the Magical Function of Speech. Tokyo: Keio Institute of Philological Studies.
Izutsu, Toshihiko (1974). “The Philosophical Problem of Articulation in Zen Buddhism,” Revue internationale de philosophie 28: 165– 183.
Izutsu, Toshihiko (1982). Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism, Boulder, CO: Prajñā Press.
Izutsu, Toshihiko (1984). Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Izutsu, Toshihiko (1987). “The Ontological Ambivalence of ‘Things’ in Oriental Philosophy.” In The Real and the Imaginary: A New Approach to Physics, edited by Jean E. Charon. New York: Paragon House, 187−197.
Izutsu Toshihiko (1993). Tōyō tetsugaku kakusho—I shiki no keijijōgaku—Daijōkishinron no tetsugaku [Notes on Oriental Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Consciousness: The Philosophy of The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna]. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha.
Izutsu, Toshihiko (1994). Creation and the Timeless Order of Things: Essays in Islamic Mystical Philosophy. Ashland, OR: Cloud Press.
Izutsu Toshihiko (2001). Ishiki to honshitsu [Consciousness and Essence]. Tokyo: Iwanami.
Izutsu, Toshihiko (2008). The Structure of Oriental Philosophy: Collected Papers of the Eranos Conference, Vols. 1 & 2. Tokyo: Keio University Press.
Nakamura, Hajime (1963). “Comparative Study of the Notion of History in China, India and Japan,” Diogenes 42 (Summer): 44– 59.
Nakamura Hajime (1960). Tōyōjin no shisō hōhō [Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples]. Tokyo: Shinkōsha.
Nakamura, Hajime (1964). Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan, translated and edited by Philip P. Wiener. Honolulu: East- West Center Press.
Nakamura, Haijme (1967). “Interrelational Existence,” Philosophy East and West 17.1/ 4 (January– October):107– 112.
Nakamura, Hajime (1970). “Pure Land Buddhism and Western Christianity Compared: A Quest for Common Roots of their Universality,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1, 2(Summer): 77– 96.
Nakamura, Hajime (1974). “Methods and Significance of Comparative Philosophy,” Revue internationale de philosophie 28: 184– 193.
Nakamura Hajime (1975). Sekai shisōshi [History of World Thought]. Tokyo: Shunkōsha.
Nakamura Hajime (1976). Hikaku shisōron [On Comparative Thought]. Tokyo: Iwanami.
Nakamura, Hajime (1992). A Comparative History of Ideas. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Nakamura, Hajime (2002). History of Japanese Thought 592– 1868: Japanese Philosophy before Western Culture Entered Japan. London: Kegan Paul.
