SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
XIII Creation
1 The Meaning of Creation
'Creation' (khalq) is unquestionably one of the concepts upon
which stands the Islamic world-view. It plays a prominent role in all
aspects of the religious thought of Islam. In theology, for example, it
constitutes the very starting-point of all discussions in the form of
the opposition between the 'temporality' (IJ,udüth) and 'eternity a
parte ante' (qidam). The world is an 'originated' (or 'temporally
produced') thing because it is the result of Divine creation. And this
conception of the world's being 'originated' (mu}J,dath) forms the
basis of the entire system of Islamic theology.
In the world-view of Ibn 'Arabi, too, 'creation' plays an import-
ant part as one of the key-concepts. The creative word of God,
'Be!' (kun) has a decisive meaning in the coming-into-being of all
beings. As we have seen, however, the most basic concept of Ibn
'Arabi's ontology is self-manifestation, and the world of Being is
after all nothing but the self-manifestation of the Absolute, and no
event whatsoever occurs in the world except self-manifestation. In
this sense, 'creation' which means the coming-into-being of the
world is naturally identical with self-manifestation.
But we would make a gross mistake if we imagine that since the
ontology of Ibn 'Arabi is based on self-manifestation and since
there is nothing but self-manifestation, 'creation' is after all, for
him, a metaphor. To think that Ibn 'Arabi used the term 'creation'
making a concession to the established pattern of Islamic thought,
and that he merely described self-manifestation in a more tradi-
tional terminology, is to overlook the multilateral nature of his
thought.
One of the characteristic features of Ibn 'Arabi's thought is its
manifoldness. In the presence of one important problem, he usually
develops his thought in various directions and in various forms with
the help of rich imagery. This, 1 think, is due largely to the unusual
profundity and fecundity of his experience which always underlies
his thinking. The depth and richness of mystical experience
demands, in his case, multiplicity of expression.
198 Sufism and Taoism
The theory of 'creation' which we are going to examine is not to
be considered as a mere religious metaphor, or some esoteric teach-
ing disguised in traditional theological terminology. 'Creation' is to
him as real as 'self-manifestation'. Or we might say that one and the
same fondamental fact existing in his consciousness has two differ-
ent aspects, one 'creation', and the other 'self-manifestation'.
The first thing which attracts our attention about his theory of
'creation' is the important part played by the concept of 'triad' or
'triplicity', thalâthiyah. This marks it off from the theory of 'self-
manifestation'.
The starting-point is as usual the Absolute. The ontological
ground of existence is, as we already know, the One-Absolute. But
the One, if considered in its phenomenal aspect, presents three
different aspects. They are: (1) the Essence not qua Essence in its
absoluteness, but in its self-revealing aspect), (2) the Will or irâdah
(here the Absolute is a 'Willer', murid), and (3) the Command or
amr 1 (here the Absolu te is a 'Commander', âmir).
These three aspects in the order given here represent the whole
process of 'creation'. The process may be briefly described as fol-
lows. First, there arises in the One-Absolute self-consciousness -or
Knowledge ('ilm) - and the permanent archetypes appear in the
Divine Consciousness. This marks the birth of the possible Many.
And thereby the Presence of the Essence (i.e., the ontological level
of the Absolu te qua Absolu te) descends to the Presence of Divinity
(ilâhiyah, 'being God').
Tuen, in the second place, there arises the Will based on this
Knowledge to bring out the archetypes from the state of non-
existence into the state of existence. Then, on the basis of this Will,
the Command - 'Be!' (kun) - is issued, and thus the world is
'created'.
Having these preliminary remarks in mind, let us read the passage
in which Ibn' Arabi describes the process. 2
Know- may God assist you in doing so! - that the whole matter (i.e.,
'creation') in itself has its basis in the 'singleness' (fardîyah ). But this
'singleness' has a triple structure (tathlîth ). For the 'singleness' starts
to appear only from 'three'. In fact 'three' is the first single (i.e., odd)
number.
What Ibn' Arabi wants to convey through these laconic expressions
may be made clear if we explain it in the following way. He begins by
saying that the very root of 'creation' is the 'singleness' of the
Absolute. It is important to remark that he refers here to the
Absolute as 'single' (fard), notas 'One'. In other words, he is not
speaking of the Absolute as Absolute in its essential absoluteness.
Creation 199
We are here at a lower stage at which the Absolute has self-
consciousness or Knowledge.
According to Ibn 'Arabi, 'one' is not a number at all; it is the
principle and 'birth-place' of all numbers from 'two' onwards, but it
is not itself a number. 'One' is absolutely above all relations; it is
naturally above the concept itself of number.
'Single' is not like that. Outwardly it is 'one', but in its
structure it is not 'one', because the concept of singleness contains in
itself the concept of 'other'. It is 'one' in so far as it is other than
others. In this sense, 'single' is internally divisible and divided,
because we cannot represent it without at the same time represent-
ing - negatively, to be sure - the idea of otherness. In this sense it is
'one' composed of more than one unit. And 'three' is the smallest,
i.e., first, 'single' number in the infinitely extending series of num-
bers - which makes it particularly appropria te for functioning as the
starting-point of the Divine act of creation.
And from this Presence of Divinity (i.e., the ontological plane where
the Absolute is no longer One but Single endowed with an inner
triplicity) the world has corne into existence. To this God refers when
He says: 'Whenever We decide (lit. 'will' the existence of) something,
We only say toit, 'Be!', and it cornes into existence' (XVI, 40). Thus
we see (the triplicity of) the Essence, the Will, and the Word. 3
Anything would not corne into existence if it were not for (1) the
Essence and (2) its Will - the Will which is the drive with which the
Essence turns towards bringing something in particular into exis-
tence - and then (3) the Ward 'Be!' uttered to that particular thing at
the very moment when the Will turns the Essence in that direction. 4
The passage just quoted describes the structure of the triplicity on
the side of the Agent, i.e., the Absolu te. But the triplicity on the part
of the Creator alone does not produce any effect. In order that the
creative activity of the Absolute be really effective, there must be a
corresponding triplicity also on the part of the 'receiver' (qâbil), i.e.,
the thing to be created. Creation is actualized only when the active
triplicity perfectly coincided with the passive triplicity.
(The moment the creative Word of God is uttered) there arises in the
thing to be created, too, a singleness having a triplicity. And by this
triplicity alone does the thing, on its part, become capable of being
produced and being qualified with existence. The triplicity in the
object consists of (1) its thing-ness (shay'iyyah), (2) its hearing
(samà'), and (3) its obeying (imtithàl) the Command of the Creator
concerning its creation. So that the ( creaturely) triad corresponds
with the (Divine) triad.
The first ( 1) is the permanent archetypal essence of the thing in the
state of non-existence, which corresponds to the Essence of its
Creator. The second (2) is the hearing of the Command by the thing,
]i •111
11
200 Sufism and Taoism
which corresponds to the Will of its Creator. And the third (3) is its
obedient acceptance of what it has been commanded concerning its
coming into existence, which corresponds to the (Creator's) Word
'Be!' Upon this, the thing actually cornes into being.
Thus the 'bringing-into-being' (takwïn, or 'production') is to be
attributed to the thing (created). For if the thing had not in itself the
power of coming into being when the Word ('Be!') is uttered, it
would never corne into existence. In this sense it is the thing itself that
brings it into existence from the state of non-existence. 5
It is remarkable that a special emphasis is laid here in the process of
creation on the 'power' (quwwah) of the thing to be created. A thing
is not created ih a purely passive way, that is, mechanically and
powerlessly, but it participa tes positively in its own creation. This is
another way of looking at the supreme power of the 'preparedness',
which we have discussed in the preceding chapter.
When God decides to bring something into existence, He simply
says toit 'Be!' And the thing, in response, cornes into existence. In
this process, the coming-into-being (takawwun) itself is an act of
that thing, not an act of God. This conception is explained by
al-Qâshâni in the following terms: 6
The coming-into-being, that is, the thing's obeying the Command,
pertains to nothing else than the thing itself, for it (i.e., coming-into-
being) is (as Ibn' Arabi says) in the power of the thing; that is to say, it
is contained potentially in the thing, concealed. This is why God (in
the above-quoted Qoranic verse) ascribes it (i.e., coming-into-being)
to the thing, by saying, 'and it cornes into existence' .7 This sentence
means that the thing (upon hearing the Word) immediately obeys the
order and cornes into existence. And the thing is capable of doing so
simply because it is already existent in the Unseen (i.e., potentially),
for the archetypal subsistence is nothing other than a concealed inner
mode of existence. Everything that is 'inward' has in itself the power
to corne out into 'outward' existence. This is due to the fact that the
Essence (designated by the) Name 'Inward' (biitin) is the same
Essence ( designated by the) N ame 'Outward' (zàhir), and be cause
the 'receiver' (qiibil) is (ultimately) the same as the' Agent' (fo'i/).
Such is the original theory of 'creation' put forward by Ibn' Arabi.
He affirms very emphatically that the 'production' (takwïn) is to be
ascribed to the thing produced, not to be Absolute. Such a position
will surely be criticized by ordinary believers as considering God
powerless' ('ajiz). But, as I have repeatedly pointed out, this posi-
tion is not at all blasphemous in the eyes of those who really know
the structure of Ibn' Arabi' s world-view. Surely, in this world-view,
the things (creatures) are described as being so positively powerful
that they leave but a limited space for the direct activity of the
Absolute. On a deeper level, however, those things that are provi-
Creation 201 sionally considered as independently existent are nothing but so many particularized, delimited forms of the Absolute, and all are involved in an ontological drama within the Absolute itself; all are a magnificent Divina Commedia. The idea of 'production' (the last stage of the 'creation') being ascribable to the things and not to the Absolute is further explained by Ibn 'Arabi in the following way: 8 God states categorically that the 'production' pertains to the (cre- ated) thing itself, and not to God. What pertains to Godin this matter is only His Command. He makes His part (in the creative process) clear by saying: 'Whenever We decide (the existence of) something, We only say toit "Be!", and it cornes into existence' (XVI, 40). Thus the 'production' is ascribed to the thing though, to be sure, the latter acts only in obedience to the Command of God. And (we must accept this statement as it is because) God is truthful in whatever He says. Besides, this (i.e., the ascription of the 'production' to the thing) is something quite reasonable, objectively speaking. (This may be illustrated by an example.) Suppose a master who is feared by everybody and whom nobody <lares to disobey commands his slave to stand up by saying to him, 'Stand up!' (qum); the slave will surely stand up in obedience to the command of the master. To the master pertains in the process of slave's standing up only his commanding him to do so, while the act of standing up itself pertains to the slave; it is not an act of the master. Thus it is clear that the 'production' stands on the basis of triplicity; in other words, three elements are involved on both sides, on the part of the Absolute as well as on the part of the creatures. It will be evident, then, that in Ibn' Arabi's thought, the principle of creatio ex nihilo holds true. But what makes his thesis fundamen- tally different from the ordinary Islamic creatio ex nihilo is that the nihil, for Ibn' Arabi, is nota total unconditional 'non-existence', but 'non-existence' in the particular sense of something being as yet non-existent as an empirical or phenomenal thing. What he regards as nihil is 'existence' on the level of the intelligibles, or - which cornes to the same thing - in the Consciousness of God. Ontologi- cally, his nihil is the 'possible' (mumkin ), i.e., something that has the power (or possibility) to exist. The ordinary view which makes 'creation' a sort of Divine monodrama has its origin in the ignorance of the positive power to be attributed to the 'possibles'. All things, in Ibn' Arabi's view, have enough power to corne out from the conce- alment into the field of existence in response to the ontological Command of God. Thus the creaturely world is possessed of 'efficiency' (fa.'iliyah). And the things that constitute this would participate actively and positively in the creation of themselves.
202 Sufism and Taoism
Looking at an artisan who is engaged in molding things out of
clay, one might make a superficial observation that the clay has no
positive 'efficiency' of its own, and that it lets itself molded into
whatever form the artisan likes. In the view of such a man, the clay
in the bands of an artisan is sheer passivity, sheer non-action. He
overlooks the important fact that, in reality, the clay, on its part,
positively determines the activity of the artisan. Surely, the artisan
can make qui te a considerable variety of things out of clay, but
whatever he may do, he can not go beyond the narrow limits set by
the very nature of the clay. Otherwise expressed, the nature of the
clay itself determines the possible forms in which it may be actual-
ized. Somewhat similar to this is the positive nature of a thing in the
process of 'creation'.
The same observation, however, clearly shows that, although the
things do possess 'efficiency', the latter is after all secondary, not
primary. Herein lies the fondamental difference between God and
the world. 'As women are by nature a degree lower than men', the
creatures are a degree lower than the Absolute. The things, with all
their positive powers and capacities, have no essential priority.
As women are a degree lower than men according to God's saying:
'and men are a degree above them (i.e., women)' (II, 228), the things
that have been created in the image (of God) are naturally a degree
lower than the One who has brought them into being in His image, in
spite of the fact that their forms are God's Form itself.
And by that very degree which separates God from the world, God is
completely independent (i.e., has absolutely no need) of the whole
world, and is the primary Agent. As for the 'form', it is but a
secondary agent and has no essential priority which pertains only to
the Absolute. 9
II The Feminine Element in the Creation of the World
In the last part of the preceding section reference bas incidentally
been made to the idea that women are by nature a degree lower than
men. This, however, should not be taken to mean that Ibn' Arabï
considers the role played by the feminine in the process of world
creation qui te secondary, let alone unimportant. On the contrary,
the entire creative process, in his view, is governed by the principle
of femininity.
The starting-point of bis thinking on this problem is fumished by
a famous Tradition which runs: 'Of ail the things of your world,
three things have been made particularly dear to me, women,
perfumes, and the ritual prayer, this last being the "cooling of my
eye" (i.e., a source of my highest joy)'. In this Tradition, Ibn' Arabï
Creation 203
observes, the number 'three' - triplicity again! - is put in the
feminine form (thalâth ), in spite of the fact that one of the three
things here enumerated (tïb 'perfume') is a masculine noun. Ordi-
narily, in Arabie grammar, the rule is that, if there happens to be
even one masculine noun among the things enumerated, one treats
the whole as grammatically masculine, and uses the numeral in the
masculine form (thalâthah, for example, instead of thalâth, meaning
'three').
Now in this Tradition, the Prophet intentionally - so thinks Ibn
'Arabï - uses the feminine form, thalâth, and this, in his view, has a
very deep symbolic meaning. lt suggests that all the basic factors
that participate in creation are feminine, and that the whole process
of creation is governed by the principle of femininity (ta'nïth). Ibn
'Arabï draws attention to the process by which a man (male) cornes
into being: 10
The man finds himself situated between an essence (i.e., the Divine
Essence) which is his ( ontological) source and a woman (i.e., his own
mother) who is his (physical) source. Thus he is placed between two
feminine nouns, that is to say, between the femininity of essence and
the real (i.e., physical) femininity.
The Essence (dhât), which is the original ground of ail Being, is a
feminine noun. The immediate ontological ground of the forms of
ail beings, i.e., the Divine Attributes, si fat (sg. sifah ), is a feminine
noun. The creative power of God, qudrah is a feminine noun. Thus,
from whatever aspeêt one approaches the process of creation, one
runs into a feminine noun. The Philosophers (falasifah) who blindly
follow Greek philosophy assert that God is the' cause' ('illah) of the
existence of the world. This is a mistaken view, and yet it is
significant, Ibn' Arabï adds, that even in this wrong opinion about
creation, a feminine noun, 'illah, is used to denote the ultimate
ground of the creation of the world.
The whole problem is dealt with by al-Qashanï in a far more
scholastic way as follows: 11
The ultimate ground (or origin) of everything is called Mother
(umm), because the mother is the (stem) from which ail branches go
out. Do you not see how God describes the matter when He says:
'And He created from it (i.e., the first soul, meaning Adam) its mate,
and out of the two He spread innumerable men and women' (IV, 1).
As you see, the 'wife' (of Adam) was feminine. Moreover, the first
unique 'soul' from which she was created was itself feminine. 12
Just in the same way, the Origin of ail origins over which there is
nothing is designated by a (feminine noun), haqïqah or 'Reality' ...
Likewise the words designating the Divine Essence, 'ayn and dhât,
are feminine.
204 Sufism and Taoism
..
Thus his (i.e., Mubammad's) intention in making (the femininity)
overcome (the masculinity) 13 is to draw attention to the special
importance of the femininity which is the very origin and source of
everything that spreads out from it. And this is true not merely of the
world of Nature but even of Reality itself.
In fact, Reality is the Father (ab) of everything in that it is the
absolu te Agent (i.e., the absolutely Active, fa' il). But Reality is also
the Mother (because of its passivity). It gathers together in itself both
'activity' (fi'!) and 'passivity' (infi'âl), for Reality is 'passive'
(munfa'il) in so far as it manifests itself in the form of a 'passive' thing,
while in the form of the 'active' (Agent) it is 'active'. The very nature
of Reality requires this unification of the 'determination' (ta'ayyun)
and 'non-determination' (lâta'ayyun). 14 Thus Reality is 'determined'
by all determinations, masculine and feminine, on the one hand. But
on the other, it stands high above all determinations.
And Reality, when it becomes determined by the first determina-
tion, 15 is One Essence requiring a perfect balance and equilibrium
between 'activity' and 'passivity', between the exterior self-
manifestation (zuhür) and the interior self-concealment (butün). 16
And in so far as it is the' Inward' (bâ(in) residing in every form, it is
'active', but in so far as it is the 'Outward' (zâhir), it is 'passive' ....
The first determination, which occurs by (the Absolute's) manifest-
ing itself to itself, attests to the fact that the Essence is absolute and
non-determined, for its self-determination (ta'ayyun bi-dhâti-hi)
must necessarily be preceded by non-determination (lâ-ta'ayyun).
Likewise when Reality qua Reality is actualized in every determined
(i.e., concretely delimited) existent, its determination (also) requires
that it be preceded by non-determination. Nay, rather, every deter-
mined existent, considered in its reality apart from all consideration
of its actual delimitations, is an absolute (i.e., every determined
existent is in its ontological core an absolute - which is nothing but
the Absolute itself). A determined existent, in this sense, depends
upon the Absolute (which is inherent in it) and is sustained by it. So
everything is 'passive' in relation to that absolu te ( ontological)
ground, and is a locus of self-manifestation for it, while that ground is
'active' and remains concealed in the thing.
Thus everything is 'passive' considered from the point of view of its
being determined, but' active' in itself, 17 considered from the point of
view of its being absolu te. But the thing itself is essentially one .... So
Reality, wherever it goes and in whatever way it appears, has (two
different aspects; namely), 'activity' and 'passivity', or 'fatherhood'
(ubuwwah) and 'motherhood' (umümah). And this justifies the
(Prophet's having used) the feminine form.
The Absolute, which is the ultimate and real origin of 'creation',
has something feminine in it, as indicated by the feminine form of
the word 'Essence' (dhat). Furthermore, if we consider analytically
the ontological structure of the creative process, we find, even at its ·
first stage, the 'first determination', a feminine principle, the
Creation 205
'motherhood', co-operating with a masculine principle, the 'father-
hood'. The Divine Essence, in brief, is the Mother of everything in
the sense that it represents the 'passive' element which is inherent in
ail forms of Being.
III Perpetual Creation
We turn now to one of the most interesting features of the theory of
creation peculiar to Ibn' Arabi. This part of his theory is historically
of primary importance because it is a critique of the atomistic
philosophy of the Ash' arite theologians. 18
We have already seen in connection with another problem that, in
Ibn' Arabï's world-view, the self-manifestation of the Absolute is a
perpetual process whose major stages - (1) the 'most holy emana-
tion', (2) the 'holy emanation', and then (3) the appearance of
concrete individual things - go on being actualized one after
another like successive, recurrent waves. This ontological process
repeats itself indefinitely and endlessly. At every moment, and
moment after moment, the same eternal process of annihilation and
re-creation is repeated. At this very moment, an infinite number of
things and properties corne into being, and at the next moment they
are annihilated to be replaced by another infinity of things and
properties.
Thus we cannot experience the same world twice at two different
moments. The world we actually experience is in perpetual flow. lt
changes from moment to moment. But this continuai and perpetual
change occurs in such an orderly way according to such definite
patterns that we, superficial observers, imagine that the sarne one
world is there around us.
Describing this perpetual ftow of things in terms of the concept of
'creation' which is the central topic of the present chapter, Ibn
'Arabï says that the world goes on being created anew at every
single moment. This he calls 'new creation' (al-khalq al-jadïd). The
expression must not be taken in the sense of a 'new' creation to be
contrasted with the 'old', i.e., the earlier, creation of the world. The
word 'new' (jadïd) in this context means 'ever new' or 'which is
renewed from moment to moment'. The 'new creation' means, in
short, the process of everlasting and ever new act of creation.
Man, being endowed with self.:·consciousness, can have a real
living feel of this 'new creation' both inside and outside himself, i.e.,
both in his mihd and in his body, by becoming conscious of'himself,
which goes on changing from moment to moment without ever
stopping as long as he lives. However, ordinary people are not
'
206 Sujism and Taoism
aware of the process of 'new creation' even with regard to them-
selves.
Ibn 'Arabï describes this process also as a 'perpetual ascent'
(taraqqi dii'im). This is a very important point at which we can look
into the very basis of his idea of the 'new creation'.
The wonder of ail wonders is that man (and consequently, every-
thing) is in a perpetual process of ascending. And yet ( ordinarily) he
is not aware o( this because of the extreme thinness and fineness of
the veil1 9 or because of the extreme similarity between (the success-
ive forms). 20
That everything is involved in the process of the ever new crea-
tion means primarily that the Absolute is continually manifesting
itself in the infinity of 'possible' things. This is done by the ontologi-
cal 'descent' (nuzül) of the Absolu te towards the lower lèvels of
Being, first to the archetypes and then to the 'possible'. But the
same process of perpetual 'descent' is, when it is looked at from the
side of the 'possible', turns out to be a perpetual process of ontologi-
cal 'ascent'. Everything, in this sense, is perpetually 'ascending'
towards the Absolute by the very same 'descending' of the latter.
The 'ascent' (taraqqi) of the things, in other words, is nothing but
the reverse side of the 'descent' of the Absolute towards them. The
things in the state of non-existence receiving the mercy of
the Absolute and obtaining thereby existence, produces, from the
stand point of these things, the image of their 'ascending' toward
the original source of existence. Al-Qashani paraphrases the above-
quoted passage in the following way: 21
One of the most miraculous things about man is that he is in a
perpetual state of ascent with regard to the modes of the 'prepared-
ness' of his own archetypal essence. For all the modes of the
archetypes are things that have been known to God (from eternity),
permanently fixed in potentiality, and God brings them out to actual-
ity incessantly and perpetually. And so He goes on transforming the
possibilities (isti'dâdât, lit. 'preparednesses') that have been there
from the beginningless past and that are ( therefore) essentially
uncreated, into infinite possibilities that are actually created.
Thus everything is in. the state of ascending at this very moment
because it is perpetua.lly receiving the endlessly renewed ontological
( wujûdïyah) Divine self-manifestations, and at every self-
manifestation the thing goes on increasing in its receptivity for
another (i.e., the next) self-manifestation.
Man, however, may not be conscious of this because of his eyes being
veiled, or rather because of the veil being extremely thin and fine. But
he may also become conscious of it when the self-manifestations take
on the forms of intellectual, intuitive, imaginative, or mystical
experiences.
Creation 207
The concept of 'new creation', th us comprising the ontological
'descent' and 'ascent', is a point which discloses most clearly the
dynamic nature of the world-view of Ibn' Arabi. In this world-view,
nothing remains static; the world in its entirety is in fervent move-
ment. The world transforms itself kaleidoscopically from moment
to moment, and yet ail these movements of self-development are
the' ascending' movements of the things toward the Absolu te-One,
precisely because they are the 'descending' self-expressions of the
Absolute-One. In one of the preceding chapters dealing with the
coincidentia oppositorum, we have already considered the same
phenomenon from a different point of view. There we saw how the
One is the Manifold and the Manifold is the One. In fact the
'descent' and 'ascent' describe exactly the same thing.
(As a result of the 'new creation', we are constantly faced with similar
forms, but of any two similar forms) one is not the same thing as the
other. For in the eyes of one who recognizes them to be two similar
things, they are different from one another. Thus a truly perspicaci-
ous man discerns Many in the One, while knowing at the same time
that the Divine Na mes, in spi te of their essential diversity and multi-
plicity, point to one single Reality, for the Names are nothing but
multiplicity posited by the reason in Something which is essentially
and really one.
Thus it cornes about that in the process of self-manifestation the
Many becomes discernible in one single Essence. This may be com-
pared to the Prime Matter which is mentioned in the definition of
every form. The forms are man y and divergent, but they all go back in
reality to one single substance which is their Prime Matter. 22
In this passage, Ibn' Arabï seems to be speaking of the horizontal
similarity-relationship between the concrete beings. He emphasizes
the particular aspect of the 'new creation' in which the concretely
existent things in the phenomenal world are after ail infinitely
various forms of the Divine self-manifestation, and are ultimately
reducible to the One. But the sàme applies also. to the vertical, i.e.,
temporal, relation between the ever new creations. In what is seem-
ingly one and the same thing, the 'new creation' is taking place at
every moment, so that the 'one and the same thing', considered at
two successive moments, is in reality not one and the same, but two
'similar' things. And yet, despite ail this, the thing maintains and
never l.oses its original unity and identity, because ail the new and
similar states that occur toit succesively are eternally determined by
its own archetype.
These two aspects of the 'new creation', horizontal and vertical,
are brought to light by al-Qashanï in his commentary on the passage
just quoted. 23
208 Sufism and Taoism
A truly perspicacious man discerns a multiplicity of self-
determinations in the one single Essence which appears in an infinite
number of 'similar' forms. Ali the Divine Names like the Omnipo-
tent, the Omniscient, the Creator, the Sustainer, etc., point in reality
to one single Essence, God, despite the fact that each of them has a
different meaning from the rest. This shows that the divergence of the
meanings of the Na mes is merely an intelligible and mental multiplic-
ity existing in what is called the 'essentially One', that they are nota
really and concretely existent multiplicity. Thus the self-
manifestation in the forms of ail the Names is but a multiplicity
discernible within one single Essence. The same is true also of the
events that take place successively (in 'one and the same thing'). Ali
the successive self-manifestations that are similar to each other are
one in reality, but many if taken as individual self-determinations.
(The Master) illustrates this with the example of the Prime Matter
(hayülà). You mention the Prime Matter in defining any substantial
Form. You say, for example, 'Body (jism) is a substance having
quantity', 'Plant (nabàt) is a body that grows up', 'Stone (IJ,ajar) is a
body, inorganic, heavy, and voiceless', 'animal (IJ,ayawàn) is a body
that grows up, has sense perception, and moves with will', 'Man
(insàn) is a rational animal'. In this way, you mention 'substance' as
the definition of'body', and you mention 'body' -which is 'substance'
(by definition) - in the definitions of ail the rest. Thus all are traced
back to the one single reality which is 'substance'.
This fact can be known only by mystical vision, and is never dis-
closed to those who understand everything through rational think-
ing. Thus it cornes about that the majority of men, including the
Philosophers, are not aware of the phenomenon of the 'new crea-
tion'. They do not see the infinitely beautiful scene of this kaleido-
scopic transformation of things.
How splendid are God's words concerning the world and its per-
petual renewal with each Divine breath which constitutes an 'ever
new creation' in one single reality. (But this is not perceived except
by a few), as He says in reference to a certain group of people -
indeed, this applies to the majority of men - 'Nay, they are in utter·
confusion with regard to the new creation.' (L, 15).24 These people
(are in confusion with regard to it) because they do not know the
(perpetual) renewal of the things with each Divine breath. 25
Al-Qâshânï describes the scene of this perpetual renewal of the
things as he sees it in his philosophico-mystical intuition in the
following terms: 26
The world in its entirety is perpetually changing. And every thing (in
the world) is changing in itself from moment to moment. Thus every
thing becomes determined at every moment with a new determina-
tion which is different from that with which it was determined a
moment ago. And yet the one single reality which is attained by all
' Creation 209
these successive changes remains forever unchanged. This is due to
the fact that the 'one single reality' is nothing but the reality itself of
the Absolute as it has taken on the 'first determination', and all the
forms (i.e., the successive determinations) are accidents that occur to
it successively, changing and being renewed at every moment.
But (ordinary) people do not know the reality of this phenomenon
and are therefore 'in utter confusion' regarding this perpetual pro-
cess of transformation which is going on in the universe. Thus the
Absolute reveals itself perpetually in these successive self-
manifestations, while the world is perpetually being lost due to its
annihilation at every moment and its renewed birth at the next
moment.
Al-Qâshânï goes a step further and asserts that this perpetual 'new
creation' not only governs the concrete existents of the world, but
that even the permanent archetypes are under its sway. The
archetypes in the Divine Consciousness appear and disappear and
then appear again, repeating the same process endlessly as innum-
erable lamp-lights that go on being turned on and put out in every
successive moment. He says: 27
The ontological emanation (al-fay4 al-wujüdiy) and the Breath of
the Merciful are perpetually ftowing through the beings of the world
as water running in a river, forever being renewed continuously.
In a similar way, the determinations of the Absolute-Existence in the
form of the permanent archetypes in the eternal Knowledge (i.e.,
Divine Consciousness) never cease to be renewed from moment to
moment. (And this happens in the following way). Thus, as soon as
the first ontological determination leaves an archetype in a place, at
the next moment the next determination is attached toit in a different
place. This is nothing other than the appearance of an archetype
belonging in the sphere of Divine Knowledge in the second place
following its disappearance in the first place, while that archetype
itself remains forever the same in the Knowledge and in the world of
the Unseen.
It is as if you saw millions of lights flickering against the background
of an unfathomable darkness. If you concentra te your sight on any
one of these illumined spots, you will see its light disappearing in the
very next moment and appearing again in a different spot in the
following moment. And the Divine Consciousness is imagined as a
complicated meshwork formed by ail these spots in which light goes
on being turned on and extinguished at every moment endlessly.
This is indeed an exceedingly beautiful and impressive image. But
Ibn 'Arabï himself in his does not seem to describe the
permanent archetypes in this way in terms of the 'new creation'. The
'new creation' he speaks of in this book concerns the concrete things
of the sensible world.
210 Sufism and Taoism
Let us return to Ibn' Arabï and analyze his concept of' new creation'
as he develops it in relation to his atomistic philosophy. He finds in
the Qoranic account of the miracle of Bilqïs, Queen of Sheba, an
admirable illustration of this incessant annihilation and re-creation
which is going on in the world of Being. The account is found in the
Qoran, XXVII, 38-40.
Once Solomon asked those who were there in his presence, jinn
and human beings, whether any of them could bring him the throne
of the Queen. Thereupon one of the jinn said 'I will bring it to thee
before thou risest from thy place!' But a man 'who had knowledge
of the Scripture' 28 said, 'I will bring it to thee before thy gaze returns
to thee (i.e., in the twinkling of an eye )'. And he did bring the throne
on the spot from the far-off country in South Arabia and set it in
front of Solomon.
How could he accomplish this miracle? Ibn' Arabï says that the
man simply took advantage of the 'new creation'. The throne of the
Queen was not transported locally from Sheba to the presence of
Solomon. Nobody, in fact, can carry any material object from one
place to a distant place in the twinkling of an eye. Nor did Solomon
and his people see the throne in hallucination. Rather the throne
which had been with Bilqïs was annihilated and, instead of been
re-created in the same place, was made to appear in the presence of
Solomon. This is, indeed, a miraculous event, in the sense that a
thing disappeared and in the next moment appeared in a different
place. From the viewpoint of the 'new creation', however, such an
event is not at all an impossibility. For, after all, it is nothing but a
new throne being created in an entirely different place.
The superiority of the human sage over the sage of the jinn consists in
the ( deeper knowledge possessed by the former concerning) the
secrets of the free disposai of anything at will and the particular
natures of things. And this superiority can be known by the amount
of time needed. For the 'return of the gaze' towards the man who
looks is faster than the standing up of a man who stands up from his
seat. ... For the time in which the gaze moves to an object is exactly
the amount of time in which the gaze gets hold of the object however
great the distance may be between the man who looks and the object
looked. At the very moment the eye is opened, its gaze reaches the
sphere of the fixed stars. And at the very moment the perception
stops, the gaze returns to the man. The standing up of a man from his
seat cannot be done so quickly.
Thus b. Barakhiyà was superior to the jinn in his action. For the
moment spoke, he accomplished his work. And Solomon saw at
the same moment the throne of Bilqis. The throne was actually
placed in his presence in order that no one should imagine that
Solomon perceived (from afar) the throne in its original place with-
out its being transferred.
Creation 211
In my opinion, however, there can be no local transference in one
single moment. There occurred (in Solomon's case) simply a simul-
taneous annihilation and re-creation in such a manner that no one
could perceive it, except those who had been given a true knowledge
(of this kind of thing). This is what is meant by God's saying: 'Nay,
they are in utter confusion with regard to the new creation'. And
there never occurs even a moment in which they cease to see what
they have seen (at the preceding moment). 29
Now if the truth of the matter is as I have just described, the moment
of the disappearance of tire throne from its original place coincided
with the moment of its appearance in the presence of Solomon as a
result of the 'new creation' occurring with every Breath. Nobody,
however, notices this discrepancy (between two moments of the 'new
creation').
Nay, the ordinary man is not aware of it (i.e., the 'new creation') even
with regard to himself. Man does not know that he ceases to exist and
then cornes to existence again with every single breath.30
As we see, Ibn' Arabi here writes that man ceases to exist at every
moment and then (thumma) cornes to existence again. But he
immediately adds the remark that the particle thumma, meaning
'then' or 'after that', should not be taken as implying a lapse of time.
Y ou must not think that by the word thumma I mean a temporal
interval. This is not correct. The Arabs use this word in certain
particular contexts to express the priority in causal relationship. 31 •••
In the process of 'the new creation with each Breath', too, the time of
the non-existence (i.e., annihilation) of a thing coïncides with the
time of the existence (i.e., re-creation) of a thing similar toit (i.e., the
thing that has just been annihilated). This view resembles the
Ash' arite thesis of the perpetual renewal of the accidents (tajdïd
al-a'riiz).
In fact, the problem of the transportation of the throne of Bilqis is of
the most recondite problems understandable only to th ose who know
what I have explained above about the story. In brief, the merit of
consisted only in the fact that (thanks to him) the 're-creation' in
question was actualized in the presence of Solomon ....
When Bilqis (thereafter came to visit Solomon and) saw her own
throne there, she said: 'It is as though (ka'anna-hu) it were (my
throne)' (XXVII, 42). (She said 'as though') because she knew the
existence of a long distance (between the two places) and because she
was convinced of the absolute impossibility of the throne's having
been locally transported in such a (short) period of time. Her answer
was qui te correct in view of the above-mentioned idea of the 'renewal
of creation' in similar forms. And in reality it was (i.e., it was the same
throne of hers in terms of its permanent archetype, but not as a
concrete individual thing). And ail this is true, just as you remain
what you were in the past moments through the process of the
perpetual re-creation.32
I'
:lj
'I
11
212 Sufism and Taoism
Qui te incidentally, Ibn 'Arabi mentions in the passage just quoted
the atomistic thesis of the Ash'arite theologians and points out the
existence of a certain resemblance between his and their atomism.
But what is more important and more interesting for our purpose is
rather the difference between them which Ibn' Arabi does not state
explicitly in this passage, but which he explains in considerable
detail in another part of the
The most salient feature of Ash'arite atomism is the thesis of the
perpetual renewal (tajdïd) of accidents. According to this theory, of
all the accidents of the things there is not even one that continues to
exist for two units of time. Every accident cornes into being at this
moment and is annihilated at the very next moment to be replaced
by another accident which is 'similar' toit being created anew in the
same locus. This is evidently the thesis of 'new creation'.
Now if we examine Ibn 'Arabi's thought in relation to this
Ash' arite thesis, we find a striking similarity between the m. Every-
thing is, for Ibn' Arabi, a phenomenal form of the Absolute, having
no basis for independent subsistence (qiwiim) in itself. All are, in
short, 'accidents' which appear and disappear in the one eternal-
everlasting Substance (jawhar). Otherwise expressed, the existence
itself of the Absolute cornes into appearance at every moment in
milliards of new clothes. With every Breath of God, a new world is
created.
From the point of view of Ibn 'Arabï, the atomism of the
Ash' arites, though it is nota perfect description of the real structure
of Being, does grasp at least an important part of the reality.
Mentioning together with the Ash'arites a group of sophists known
as /fisbiiniyyah or lfusbiiniyyah, he begins to criticize them in the
following manner: 33
The Ash' arites have hit upon the truth concerning some of the
existents, namely, accidents, while the I;Iisbânites have chanced to
find the truth concerning the whole of the world. The Philosophers
consider these people simply ignorant. But (they are not ignorant;
the truth is rather that) they both (i.e., the Ash'arites and the I;Iisbâ-
nites) are mistaken.
First, he criticizes the sophists of the I:Iisbanite school. The I:Iisba-
nites maintain that nothing remains existent for two units of time,
that everything in the world, whether it be substance or accident, is
changing from moment to moment. From this they conclude that
there is no Reality in the objective sense. Reality or Truth exists
only subjectively, for it can be nothing other than the constant flux
of things as you perceive it in a fixed format this present moment.34
Though the l;Iisbânites are right in maintaining that the world as a
whole and in its entirety is in perpetual transformation, they are
• ,,,
f
'\îf
"V·
Creation 213
mistaken in that they fail to see the real oneness of the Substance
which underlies ail these ( changing) forms. (They thereby overlook
the fact that) the Substance could not exist (in the external world) if it
were not for them (i.e., these changing forms) nor would the forms be
conceivable if it were not for the Substance. If the I;Iisbânites could
see this point too (in addition to the first point), their theory would be
perfect with regard to this problem. 35
Thus, for Ibn 'Arabï, the merit and demerit of the I:Iisbanite thesis
are qui te clear. They have hit upon a part of the truth in that they
have seen the constant change of the world. But they overlook the
most important part of the matter in that they do not know the true
nature of the Reality which is the very substrate in which all these
changes are happening, and consider it merely a subjective con-
struct of each individual mind.
Concerning the Ash'arites, Ibn 'Arabi says: 36
As for the Ash'arites, they fail to see that the world in its entirety
(including even the so-called 'substances') is a sum of 'accidents', and
that, consequently, the whole world is changing from moment to
moment since no 'accident' (as they themselves hold) remains for two
units of time.
And al-Qashani: 37
The Ash' arites do not know the reality of the world; namely, that the
world is nothing other than the whole of ail these 'forms' which they
call 'accidents'. Thus they only assert the existence of substances (i.e.,
atoms) which are in truth nothing, having no existence (in the real
sense of the word). And they are not aware of the one Entity ('ayn)
which manifests itself in these forms ('accidents' as they call them);
nor do they know that this one Entity is the He-ness of the Absolute.
This is why they assert ( only) the (perpetual) change of the accidents.
According to the basic thesis of the Ash' arite ontology, the world is
reduced to an infinite number of 'indivisible parts', i.e., atoms.
These atoms are, in themselves, unknowable. They are knowable
only in terms of the 'accidents' that occur to them, one accident
appearing in a locus atone moment and disappearing in the next to
be replaced by another.
The point Ibn 'Arabi makes against this thesis is that these
'accidents' that go on being barn and annihilated in infinitely var-
iegated forms are nothing but so many self-manifestations of the
Absolu te. And th us behind the kaleidoscopic scene of the perpetual
changes and transformations there is always a Reality which is
eternally 'one'. And it is this one Reality itself that goes on manifest-
ing itself perpetually in ever new forms. The Ash'arites who over-
look the existence of this one Reality that underlies all 'accidents'
are, according to Ibn 'Arabi, driven into the self-contradictory
11lli
214 Sufism and Taoism
thesis that a collection of a number of transitory 'accidents' that
appear and disappear and never remain for two moments constitute
'things' that subsist by themselves and continue to exist for a long
time.
This (i.e., the mistake of the Ash'arites) cornes out clearly in their
definitions of things. In fact, when they define anything, their
definition turns the thing into (a collection of) accidents. And it is
clear that it is ail these accidents enumerated in the definition that
constitute the very 'substance' and its reality which (they consider to
be) self-subsistent. However, even that substance (being a totality of
the accidents) must ultimately be an accident, and as such it is not
self-subsistent. Thus (in their theory) accidents which do not subsist
by themselves, when put together, produce something that subsists
by itself .38
The passage is explicated by al-Qâshânî as follows. The Ash'arites,
whenever they define something, define it as a whole (majmü') of
accidents. Defining 'man', for example, they say: 'a rational animal'.
The word 'rational' (natiq) means 'possessed of reason' (dhü nutq).
The concept of 'being possessed of' is a relation, and 'relation' is
evidently an accident. 'Reason' (nutq), on the other hand, being
something added to the essence of'animal', is also an accident. Thus
to say that man is 'a rational animal' is to say that man is 'an animal
with two accidents'. Then the Ash'arites go on to define 'animal' by
saying that it is a 'physical body that grows, perceives, and moves by
will'. The 'animal' turns in this way into a whole of accidents. And
the same procedure is applied to the definition of the '(physical)
body' appearing in the definition of 'animal'. As a result, 'man'
ultimately turns out to be a bundle of accidents which are by
definition momentary and transi tory. And yet this bundle itself is
considered to be something subsistent by itself, a substance.
The Ash'arites, Ibn 'Arabî continues, are not aware of the fact
that the very 'substance', which they consider a self-subsistent
entity, is of exactly the same nature as 'man', 'animal', and other
things; it is also a bundle of accidents.
Thus, in their theory, something (i.e., a bundle of accidents) which
does not remain for two units of time remains (i.e., as a bundle of
accidents) for two units of time, nay, for many units of time! And
something which does not subsist by itself (must be said to) subsist by
itself, according to the Ash'arites! However, they do not know that
they are contradicting themselves. So (1 say that) these are people
'who are in utter confusion with regard to the new creation' .39
Ibn' Arabî brings out the contrast between the 'wrong' view of the
Ash'arites and the 'true' thesis upheld by the people of 'unveiling'
by saying: 40
y
Creation 215
As to the people of 'unveiling', they see God manifesting Himself
with every Breath, no single self-manifestation being repeated twice.
They see also by an immediate vision that every single self-
manifestation gives rise to a new creation and annihilates a creation
(i.e., the 'creation' that has preceded), and that the disappearance of
the latter at every (new) self-manifestation is 'annihilation' whereas
'subsistence' is caused by what is furnished (immediately) by the
following self-manifestation.
Thus in Ibn' Arabî' s thought, everything in the world (and therefore
the world itself) is constantly changing, but underlying this universal
flux of changing things there is Something eternally unchanging.
Using scholastic terminology he calls this unchanging Something
the 'Substance', the absolute substratum of all changes. In this
particular perspective, all things - not only the 'accidents' so called
but the 'substances' so called - are represented as 'accidents'
appearing and disappearing at every moment. lt is interesting to
observe how the theory of Divine self-manifestation becomes trans-
formed, when translated into the language of the scholastic philos-
ophy of 'substance' and 'accident'.
Notes
1. It is also called Word (qawl).
2. pp. 139-140/115-116.
3. Reading: hadhihi dhat wa-iradah wa-qawl.
4. Fu:j., pp. 139-140/115-116.
5. FU:f., p. 140/115-116.
6. p. 140.
7. The point is that God does not say in this verse fa-yukawwin ('and He brings it
into existence') but says fa-yakün ('and it cornes into existence'), the subject of the
sentence being the thing itself.
8. FU:f., p. 140/115-116.
9. Fu:j., p. 273/219.
10. Fll:f., p. 274/220.
11. pp. 274-275.
12. Although Adam is a man, he is, as a 'soul' (nafs), feminine.
13. The reference is to the above-quoted Tradition, in which the Prophet uses the
1•111
216 Sufem and Taoism
feminine numeral thalàth in spite of the presence of a masculine noun among the
three things enumerated.
14. 'Determination' (or more strictly 'being determined') refers to the passive side
of the Absolute, i.e., the Absolute as manifesting itself in a concrete (determined)
thing. 'Non-determination' refers to the active side of the Absolute, i.e., the Absolute as the absolute Agent.
15. The 'first determination' (al-ta'ayyun al-awwal) means the self-manifestation of
the Absolute to itself as a unifying point of ail the Divine Names. The Absolute is
here the 'one' (wàlJ,id), and the ontological stage the wàhidîyah, 'Oneness'.
16. The Absolute qua One is potentially ail beings but it is in actuality still one. Soit
is neither in the state of pure exterior self-manifestation nor in that of pure interior
concealment, but it keeps, so to speak, a perfect balance between these two terms.
17. I read: [wa-jà'il] min nafsi-hi, etc.
18. The idea presents a very important and interesting problem from the viewpoint
of comparative Oriental philosophy. See my 'The Concept of Perpetua! Creation in
Islamic Mysticism and Zen Buddhism' (in Mélanges offerts à Henry Corbin', ed.
Seyyed Hossein Nasr Tehran, 1977, pp. 115-148.
19. When you look at something through an extremely fine and transparent fabric
you do not become aware of the existence of the veil between you and the thing. The
'veil' here refers to the outward form shown by the act of 'ascending'.
20. Fw;., p. 151-152/124.
21. p. 152.
22. Fw;., p. 152/124-125.
23. p. 152-153.
24. Ibn' Arabï, as he often does, is giving qui te an arbitrary meaning to the Qoranic
verse. The actual context makes it clear beyond any doubt that God is here speaking
of Resurrection after death, which is conceived of as a 'new creation'. The 'new
creation' does not certainly mean in this verse the ever new process of creation which
is Ibn 'Arabi' s thesis.
25. Fw;., p. 153/125.
26. p. 153.
27. pp. 195-196.
28. The Qoran does not give his name. Commentators assert that the man was a sage
whose name was b. Barakhiyâ.
29. This annihilation/re-creation is done so quickly that man does not notice any
discontinuum between the two units of time in his sense perception and imagines that
everything continues to be as it has been.
30. Fw;., pp. 195-196/155.
• 9:-,1
Creation 217
31. 'A thumma B' in certain contexts means that A, as the cause of B, logically
precedes the latter. It does not imply that A necessarily precedes B in terms of time;
A and B may very well occur simultaneously.
32. Fw;., p. 1971156-157.
33. Fuoî., p. 153/125.
34. The Na me /fisbàniyyah is derived from the root tISB (the verb IJ,asiba) meaning
'to opine' 'to surmise', i.e., the subjective act of estimation. The appellati-0n implies
that Reality or Truth consists in the subjective estimation of this or that individual
person, and that, consequently, there is no such thing as an objectively uni versai
Truth (cf. Affifi, Corn., p. 153).
35. Fw;., p. 153/125.
36. Fw;., pp. 153-154/125-126.
37. p. 154.
38. pp. 154-155/125-126.
39. Fw;., p. 154/126.
40. ibid.
