SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
===
X The Water of Life
In the preceding chapter we have seen that the Mercy of God
pervades all beings on all levels of Being. We know also that this is
another way of saying that the Being of the Absolute pervades all
beings which are at all entitled to be described as 'existent', and that
the Form of the Absolute runs through the entire world of Being.
This thesis, in this general form, is the same as that which was
discussed in Chapter IV under the key-word tashbih. In the present
chapter the same general problem will be reconsidered from a
particular point of view.
The key-word to be considered as the starting-point of discussion in
this particular context is la(if, meaning roughly 'subtle', 'thin' and
'delicate'. Latif stands opposite to kathif. This latter word connotes
the quality of things 'thick', 'dense' and' coarse', that is, th ose things
that are characterized by dense materiality. As the semantic oppo-
site of this, la(if means the quality of things, the materiality of which
is in the extreme degree of rarefaction, and which, therefore, are
capable of permeating the substances of other things, diffusing
themselves in the latter and freely mixing with them. The fact that
this word, la(if, is one of the Divine Names is, for Ibn 'Arabï,
extremely significant.
The Name latif or 'Subtle' with this particular connotation rep-
resents the Absolute as a Substance (jawhar) which, immaterial and
invisible, permeates and pervades the entire world of Being just as a
color permeates substances. This Substance which is infinitely vari-
able runs through everything and constitutes its reality. Ali indi-
vidual things are called by their own particular names and are
thereby distinguished one from the other as something 'different',
but these differences are merely accidentai. Seen from the view-
point of the invisible Substance running through the whole world,
all things are ultimately one and the same. Let us listen to Ibn' Arabï
himself as he explains this point in his peculiar way. 1
(God) says of Himself: 'Verily God is la(if' (XXXI, 16). lt is indeed
the effect of His la(iifah (i.e., His being la(if, in the above explained
142 Sufem and Taoism
sense of non-material flexibility) and His lu(f (i.e., His being la(ifin
the sense of graciousness) 2 that He is (immanent) in every particular
thing which is determined as such-and-such by a particular name, as
the inner reality of that particular thing. He is immanent in every
particular thing in such a way that He is, in each case, referred to by
the conventional and customary meaning of the particular name of
that thing. Thus, we say (usually), 'This is Heaven', 'This is the earth',
'This is a tree', 'This is an animal', 'This is a king', 'This is food' etc.
But the essence itself that exists in every one of these things is simply
one.
The Ash'arites uphold a similar view when they assert that the world
in its entirety is homogeneous in its Substance, because the world as a
whole is one single Substance. This corresponds exactly to my thesis
that the essence is one. The Ash'arites go on to say that the world (in
spite of the homogeneousness) differentiates itself (into different
things) through accidents. This also is identical with my thesis that
(the one single Essence) differentiates itself and becomes multiple
through forms and relations so that (the things) become distinguish-
able from one another. Thus in both of these theories, this is not that
(i.e., the particular things are different from one another) in regard to
the 'form' or 'accident' ('aratf,), or 'natural disposition'
(mizaj) - you may call this ( differentiating principle) by whatever
name you like - but, on the other hand, this is the same as that in
regard to their 'substance'. And this is why the 'substance' itself (as
'matter') must be explicitly mentioned in the definition of every thing
(having a particular) 'form' or 'natural disposition'.
However (there is also a fondamental difference between my posi-
tion and the Ash'arites; namely), 1 assert that (the Substance here in
question) is nothing other than the' Absolute', while the (Ash'arite)
theologians imagine that what is called Substance, although it is a
'reality', is not the same absolute Reality as understood by the people
who (uphold the theory of) 'unveiling' and 'self-manifestation'.
But this (i.e., what 1 teach) is the profound meaning of God's being
latïf.
It is remarkable that in this passage Ibn 'Arabi recognizes to a
certain degree an identity between his thesis and the Ash'arite
ontology. The theologians of this school take the position that the
world is essentially one single Substance and all the differences
between individual things are due to accidentai attributes. How-
ever, Ibn 'Arabi does not forget to emphasize the existence of a
basic difference between the two schools. As al-Qâshâni says, 'the
Ash' arites, although they assert the unity of the Substance in all
the forms of the world, assert also the essential duality, namely,
that the essence of the Substance pervading the world is different
from the Absolute' .3
The Qoran, immediately after stating that 'God is la(if', declares
that 'God is khabir', that is, God has information about everything.
-., ' .· i;\
The Water of Life 143
This, too, has a very special significance for Ibn' Arabi. If the latïf is
a reference to the relation of the Absolute with the external things
existing in the world, the khabir refers to the relation of the Abso-
lute with the 'interior' i.e., consciousness, of all those beings that
possess consciousness. The Absolute, in other words, not only
pervades all things that exist outwardly in the world, but runs
through the interior of all beings possessed of consciousness and
constitutes the inner reality of the activity of consciousness.
The Absolute is Omniscient, and His Knowledge is eternal. So, in
this sense, all without exception are known to the Absolute from
eternity. But in addition to this kind of eternal Knowledge, the
Absolute also penetrates into the interior of each one of the beings
endowed with consciousness and knows things through the organs
of cognition peculiar to those things. If one looks at the matter from
the opposite, i.e., human, side, one will find that all those things that
man thinks he sees or hears are in reality things that the Absolute
residing in his interior sees and hears through his sense organs.
This latter kind of Knowledge is called by Ibn' Arabi - in contrast
to the 'absolute' Knowledge ('ilm mutlaq) - the 'experiential'
Knowledge ('ilm dhawqiy or 'ilm 'an ikhtibar). According to him,
the Qoranic verse: 'Surely We will try you in order to know'
(XLVII, 31) refers precisely to this kind of Knowledge. Otherwise,
it would be completely meaningless for God to say 'in order to
know', because God knows (by the 'absolu te' Knowledge) every-
thing from the beginning. The verse is meaningful because it con-
cerns the 'experiential' Knowledge.
It is characteristic of the 'experiential' Knowledge, which is evi-
dently a temporal phenomenon (IJ,adith), that it necessarily requires
an organ of cognition through which it is obtained. Since, however,
God has no organs, the cognition is operated through the organs of
individual beings,4 although, as we know by the principle of latiifah,
the things that outwardly appear as human organs are nothing other
than various phenomenal forms assumed by the Absolute itself.
God (in the Qoran) qualifies Himself by the word khabïr, that is, one
who knows something by persona! experience. This applies to the
Qoranic verse: 'Surely We will try these people in order to know'.
The words 'to know' here refer to the kind of Knowledge obtainable
through persona! experience. Thus God, despite the fact that He
( eternally) knows everything as it really is, describes Himself as
'obtaining Knowledge' (in an non-absolute way) ... And he distin-
guishes thereby between 'experiential' Knowledge and 'absolute'
Knowledge.
The 'experiential' Knowledge is conditioned by the faculties of cogni-
tion. God affirms this by saying of Himself that He is the very
cognitive faculties of man. Thus He says (in a Tradition), 'I am his
'I l 1111
1 J•1i
1
Il
144 Sufism and Taoism
hearing', hearing being one of the faculties of man, 'and his sight',
sight, being another of man's faculties, 'and his tongue', tongue
being a bodily member of man, 'and his feet and hands'. And we
see, He mentions in this explanation not only faculties of man, but
even goes to the length of mentioning bodily members (and identifies
Himself with them). And since man is after ail no other than these
members and faculties, the inner reality itself of that which is called
man is (according to this Tradition) the Absolute. This, however, is
not to say that the 'servant' (i.e., man) is the 'master' (i.e., God). 5
Ail this is due to the fact that the relations in themselves are essen-
tially distinguishable from each other, but the (Essence) to which
they are attributed is not distinguishable (i.e., divisible). There is only
one single Essence in ail the relations. And that single Essence is
possessed of various different relations and attributes. 6
The Absolute, in this sense, pervades and runs through all. The
Absolute is in all beings of the world, according to what is required
by the reality (i.e., the eternal 'preparedness') of each thing. If it
were not for this permeation of the Form of the Absolute through
the things, the world would have no existence. 7 For, as al-Qâshâni
says,8 'The fundamental ground of the possible things is non-
existence. And existence is the Form of God. So if He did not
appear in His Form, which is existence qua existence, the whole
world would remain in pure non-existence'.
All beings in the state of ontological possibility absolutely require
the permeation of Existence in order to leave the original state of
non-existence and to corne into the state of existence. This state of
affairs is considered by Ibn 'Arabi analogous to the notion that any
attribute or quality shown by a concrete particular thing cannot
exist in actu except as an individualization of a Universal.9 Inciden-
tally, there is in Ibn 'Arabi's thought-pattern a conspicuous ten-
dency toward Platonizing, although we surely cannot call him
offhand a Platonist. The present case is an example illustrating this
phase of his thought. The following remark by al-Qâshâni makes
this point very explicit. 10
(Ibn' Arabî here) compares the essential dependence of the existence
of the world on the 'form' (i.e., the essential reality) of the Existence
of God to the dependence of particular properties on universal
realities, like 'life' in itself and 'knowledge' in itself.
The existence, for example, of 'knowledge' in a particular person,
Zayd, is dependent on the uni versai' knowledge' perse. If it were not
for the latter, there would be no 'knower' in the world, and the
property of 'being a knower' would rightly be attributed to nobody.
In exactly the same manner, every determinate individual existent is
dependent on the Existence of the Absolute, Existence being the
Absolute's 'Face' or Form. Apart from the Existence of the Abso-
lute, nothing would be existent, nor would existence be predicated of
anything.
l . .· The Water of Life 145
Since, in this way, nothing can be called an 'existent' (mawjüd),
except when it is pervaded by the Form of the Absolute, all the
existents essentially need the Absolute. This need resides deep in
the very core of every existent. 1t is not one of those ordinary cases
in which something needs externally something else. This inner
essential dependence is called by Ibn' Arabi iftiqàr 11 (lit. 'poverty',
i.e., 'essential need').
But the Absolute, on its part, cannot be actualized on the level of
the Names and Attributes without the world. The Absolute, in this
sense, needs the world. And thus the relation of iftiqiir is reciprocal;
the iftiqàr of the world to the Absolute is in its existence, and the
iftiqiir of the Absolute to the world concerns the 'appearance' or
self-manifestation of the former. This is expressed by Ibn' Arabi in
verse: 12
We (i.e., the world) give Him that by which He appears in us, while
He gives us (the existence by which we corne into outward appear-
ance). Thus the whole matter (i.e., Being) is divided into two,
namely, our (giving) Him ( appearance) and His (giving us existence.)
Ibn 'Arabi describes this particular relation that obtains between
the Absolute and the creaturely world by a bold and vividly evoca-
tive image of Food (ghidhii') which he ascribes to Sahl al-Tustari.
As al-Qâshâni says: 13
The Absolute is the 'food' of the creatures in regard to existence,
because the creatures exist, subsist, and are kept alive by the Abso-
lute just in the sa me way as food keeps the man existent and alive who
eats it and gets nourishment out of it ....
The Absolu te, on its part, eats, and is nourished by, the properties of
the phenomenal world and the forms of the creatures ... in the sense
that by virtue of the latter alone do the Na mes, Attributes, Properties
and Relations make their actual appearance in the Absolute.
The Names and attributes would not have existence if there were no
world, no creatures. The creatures' nourish' the Absolute as its' food' by
making manifest all the perfections of the Names and Attributes.
You are God's food through (your) particular properties. But He is
also your food through the existence ( which He con fers upon you). In
this respect He fulfils exactly the same fonction (toward you) as you
do (toward Him). Thus the Command cornes from Him to you, but it
also goes from you to Him. 14
Certainly, you are called mukallafin the passive form (i.e., you are in
this world a morally responsible person who is 'charged' with the
responsibilities imposed upon you by the Sacred Law) and yet God
has 'charged' you only with what you yourself asked Him, saying
'charge me (with such-and-such)!', through your own state (i.e.,
permanent archetype) and through what you really are. 15
146 Sufism and Taoism
The thesis that the Absolute qua Existence is the food and nourish-
ment of all the creatures is relatively easy to understand even for
common-sense. But less easily acceptable is the reverse of this
thesis; namely, that the creatures are the food of the Absolu te.
Nourishing things nourish those who assimilate them. As nourish-
ment penetrates the body of the living being in su ch a way that finally
there does not remain a single part that has not been pervaded by it,
so does the food go into all the parts of one who has assimilated it.
The Absolute, however, has no parts. So there is no other way than
the 'food' penetrating all the ontological stations (maqâmât) of God
which are usually called the Names. And the Divine Essence
becomes actually manifest by means of those stations (when the
latter become penetrated by the 'food'). 16
Food cannot act as food, that is, cannot nourish the body unless it
penetrates all the parts of the body and is completely assimilated by
the bodily organism. So the condition is that the body has parts. But
the Absolute has no part, if we understand the word 'part' in a
material sense. However, in a spiritual sense, the Absolute does
have 'parts'. The spiritual 'parts' of the Absolute are the Names.
This conception has a grave implication, for it affirms that the
Absolute on the level of the Names is thoroughly penetrated by the
creatures, and that only by this penetration do all the possibilities
contained in the Absolute corne into concrete existence.
Thus we see that the tajalli or Divine self-manifestation is not at
alla unilateral phenomenon of the Absolu te permeating everything
in the world and making itself manifest in the forms of the world.
The tajalli involves, at the same time, the permeation of the Abso-
lute by the things of the world. Sin ce, however, it is absurd even to
imagine the things of the world qua substances penetrating the
Absolu te in such a way that they be assimilated by the latter, we
must necessarily understand the process as something purely non-
substantial. And the same is true of the other side of the process, 1
mean, the penetration of the world by the Absolute and the self-
manifestation of the Absolute in the things of the world. The
interpenetration of the two which takes place in the process of tajalli
is not something that occurs between the Absolute as an Entity and
things as entities. lt is a phenomenon of pure Act on both sides. This
point, 1 think, is of paramount importance for a right understanding
of Ibn 'Arabi' s conception of tajalli, for, unless we understand it in
this way, we fall into a most coarse kind of materialism.
We shall bring this section to an end by quoting with running
commentary a few verses in which Ibn' Arabi describes this process
of reciprocal penetration: 17
'Thus we are to Him, as we are to ourselves. This has been proved by
our proofs'. (Thus we, the world, are 'food' for God because it is we
The Water of Life 147
who sustain Him in concrete existence, as we are 'food' to ourselves,
i.e., we sustain ourselves in existence by being ourselves).
'He has no Being except my Being. And we owe Him our existence as
we subsist by ourself'. (1, the world, am the only thing by which He
manifests Himself in the world of Being. We, the world, exist only in
the capacity of a locus for His self-manifestation, but, on the other
hand, we are independent beings existing by ourselves as determi-
nate things).
'Thus 1 have two faces, He and/. But He does not have l through
(my) !'. (1, as a concrete individual being, am possessed of two faces
opposed to each other. One of them is the Absolute qua my inmost
essence, i.e., my He-ness. The other face is turned toward the world,
and is my outer 1-ness by which 1 am a creature different from the
Absolute. Thus every creature obtains through the Absolute both
He-ness and 1-ness, while the Absolute does not obtain 1-ness from
the world, because the 1-ness of any individual creature does not
constitute by itself the lof the Absolute).
'But He finds in me a locus in which to manifest Himself, and we are
to Him like a vessel'. (By manifesting Himself in my I-ness, He
establishes His I-ness in Himself.)
With these preliminary remarks, we tum now to the proper subject
of the present chapter, the permeation of the entire world by Divine
Life.
As we have seen, 'existence' (wujüd), in the world-view of Ibn
'Arabi, is primarily and essentially the Absolu te itself in its dynamic
aspect, i.e., as Actus. 'Existence' here does not simply mean that
things are just there. The concept of' existence' as the Absolu te qua
Actus is given special emphasis by Ibn 'Arabi when he identifies it
with Life.
To say that the Absolute pervades and permeates all beings is to
say that Divine Life pervades and permeates the world of Being in
its entirety. The whole universe is pulsating with an etemal cosmic
Life. But this pulsation is not perceptible to the majority of men.
For them, only a small portion of the world, is alive, i.e., only some
of the beings are 'animais' or living beings. In the eyes of those who
see the truth, on the contrary, everything in the world is an 'animal'
(IJ,ayawân).
There is nothing in the world but living beings, except that this fact is
concealed in the present world from the perception of some men,
while it becomes apparent to all men without exception in the
Hereafter. This because the Hereafter is the abode of Life. 18
Existence-Life pervades all and ftows through all. The Existence-
aspect of this fact is easy to see for everybody because everybody
understands without any difficulty that all 'things' are existent. But
the Life-aspect is not so easily perceivable. This is the reason why
148 Sujism and Taoism
the majority of people do not see that everything in the world is
alive. To see this, the special experience of 'unveiling' (kashf) is
necessary.
The Absolute in its self-manifestation does not, as we have
already observed, possess uniformity; on the contrary, the self-
manifestation is infinitely variable and multiple according to the loci
of manifestation. Thus, although it is true that Existence or Life
pervades all, it does not pervade all uniformly and homogeneously.
The modes of this pervasion vary from case to case according to the
degree of purity ($afa') and turbidity (kudürah). The Philosophers
understand the differences thus produced in terms of the degree of
the right proportion (i'tidiil) in the mixture of the 'elements'
('anii$ir). 19 In those cases, they maintain, in which the elemental
mixture is actualized in a well-proportioned form, the result is the
birth of animais. And when the mixture occurs in such a way that the
right proportion of the elements is no longer maintained, we get
plants. And if the mixture is further away from the right proportion,
we get minerais or 'in anima te' things.
From the viewpoint of Ibn' Arabï such a theory is characteristic of
th ose who are blind to the basic fact that Divine Life is manifested in
the things of the world in various degrees of 'purity' and 'turbidity'.
Ordinary people will see the real fact only in the Hereafter when the
'veil' over their sight will be removed. But the people of 'unveiling'
know already in the present world that everything is alive with the
all-pervading Life of the Absolute.
For Ibn 'Arabï, the most appropria te symbol of Life is afforded by
'water'. Water is the ground of all natural elements, and it flows and
penetrates into even the narrowest corners of the world. 'The secret
of Life has diffused into water' .20 And everything in existence has a
watery element in its very constitution, because water is the most
basic of all elements. Everything is alive because of the 'water' it
contains. And the 'watery' element contained in all things in varying
degrees corresponds to the He-ness of the Absolute which, as
Actus, runs through all.
It is significant that Ibn' Arabï mentions 'water' in this sense at the
outset of the chapter which deals with the 'wisdom of the Unseen'
symbolized by Job. Affifi points out quite appropriately in this
connection that Job is, for Ibn' Arabï, a symbol of a man who strives
to obtain 'certainty' (yaqin) about the world of the Unseen. The
excruciating pain which Job undergoes is, therefore, not a physical
pain, but the spiritual suffering of a man who strives for, but cannot
attain to, 'certainty'. And when Job implores God to remove from
him this pain, God commands him to wash himself in the running
water beneath his feet. Here 'water' symbolizes Life that runs
The Water of Life 149
through all the existents, and 'washing oneself in water' means to
immerse oneself in the 'water of existence' and to know thereby the
reality of existence. 21
Thus the Water of Life is eternally flowing through all. Each
single thing is in itself a unique existent, and yet it is immersed in the
limitless ocean of Life together with all the other existents. In the
first aspect, everything is unique and single, but in the second
aspect, everything loses its identity in the midst of the 'water' that
flows through all.
Everything in the world has, in this way, two distinct aspects: ( 1)
the aspect in which it is its own self, and (2) the aspect in which it is
Divine Life. The first aspect, which is the creaturely aspect of each
individual existent, is called by Ibn' Arabï niisüt or the 'human (or
persona!) aspect' and !the second, which is the aspect of the Abso-
lute in each individual existent, is called liihüt or the' divine aspect'.
According to Ibn' Arabï, 'life' is of a spiritual nature. For it is of
the very essential nature of 'spirit' that it vivifies everything which it
touches. As Balï Efendi remarks,22 'life' is the primary attribute of
'spirit', and 'spirit' strikes whatever it touches with this primary
attribute.
Know that all spirits have a peculiar property by which they bring to
life everything that cornes under their influence. As soon as a spirit
touches a thing, there ftows through it life. 23
And in the view of Ibn' Arabï, the whole world of Being is un der
direct influence of the Universal Spirit. So all the things that exist
are without a single exception in touch with it, and are, therefore,
alive. Only the way they are influenced by it actually varies from one
individual to another in accordance with the particular 'prepared-
ness' of each. In other words, things differ one from the other in the
intensity of Life they manifest, but all are the same in that they
maintain their 'selves' in the midst of the all-pervading Life.
The (uni versai) Life which ftows through all things is called the
'divine aspect' (lâhüt) of Being, while each individual locus in which
that Spirit (i.e., Life) resides is called the 'human aspect' (nâsüt). The
'human aspect', too, may be called 'spirit', but only in virtue of that
which re51ides in it. 24
The intimate relationship between niisüt and liihüt in man may be
compared to the relationship that exists between 'dough' ('ajïn) and
'leaven' (khamir). 25 Every man has in himself something of the
Divine 'leaven'. If he succeeds in letting it grow in a perfect form, his
'dough' will corne completely un der its influence and will finally be
transformed into something of the same nature as the 'leaven'. This
is what is called in the terminology of mysticism 'self-annihilation'
(fana').
I
ll
111
i1l'I 1
]1
1,1
111:1
11
150 Sufism and Taoism
Notes
1. FW/., p. 239/188-189.
2. La(ifhas two meanings: (1) 'subtle' and (2) 'gracious'. The property of being (1) is
called latafah and the property of being (2) is called lutf.
3. p. 239.
4. In truth, however, the things that are called the organs of cognition in man are
nothing other than particular phenomenal forms assumed by the Absolu te itself. We
know this by the above-explained principle of latâfah.
5. i.e., the He-ness (inmost essence) of 'servant', considered independently of the
relation of servant-ness, is the Absolute as considered independently of the relation
of its being God and Master. But, of course, the essence of 'servant' qua 'servant',
i.e., considered in his servant-ness, is not 'master' qua 'master'. - al-Qâshânï p. 240.
6. p. 240/189.
7. Fw;., p. 24/55.
8. p. 24.
9. 'If it were not for those universal, intelligible realities (IJaqâ'iq ma'qûlah kullïyah,
corresponding to the Ideas of Plato), there would never appear anything in the world
of concrete individual existents (mawjûdât 'ayniyyah)' - Fus., p. 24/55.
10. p. 24.
11. FW/., p. 24/55.
12. Fus., p. 1811143.
13. pp. 180-181.
14. The Command is issued to Him by you in the sense that, in bestowing existence
upon man, He never deviates from the way which has been eternally determined by
the archetypes.
15. Fus .• pp. 76-77/83.
16. Fus., p. 79/84.
17. ibid.
18. Fus., p. 194/154.
19. See, for instance, the t;xplanation given by al-Ghazâlï in his Maqâsid al-
Falâsifah, pp. 274-275, Cairn (Sa'âdah), 1331 A.H.
20. Fus., 213/170.
21. Affifi, Fus., Corn., p.245.
l ' '
The Water of Life 151
22. p. 172.
23. Fus., p. 172/138.
24. Fus., p. 173/138.
25. Fus., p. 189/149.
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[.김현주] [8:37 PM] 10장 The Water of Life
10장 The Water of Life
latif : subtle, thin, delicate
kathif : thick, dense, coarse
latif는 비물질적이고 보이지 않으며 온 세상에 스며들고 퍼지는 물질로서의 the Absolute를 나타낸다. ?
Ash’arites (sunni) 는 온 세상이 단일 물질이라는 불이론을 주장한다. 개별 사건에 따라 세상이 분화된다고 한다. 그러나 나(이븐 아라비)는 수니가 물질(substance)이라고 말하는 것은 절대 (the Absolute)와 다르지 않다고 주장한다.
알 카샤니의 말대로, 아샤라이트는 세상의 모든 형태가 동일한 물질이라고 주장하지만, 온 세상에 퍼지는 물질이 the Absolute와 다르다는 점에서 결국 본질적 이원론을 주장한다.
쿠란은 “God is khabir(expert, 전지하다)”라고 말한다. khabir는 the Absolute 가 내면(즉 의식)과 연결됨을 의미한다. 신은 전지하며 그의 지식은 영원하다.
“Surely we will try you in order to know” 우리는 알기 위해 당신을 시험할 것입니다.에서 지식은 경험적 지식이다.
알 카샤니의 말대로, 가능한 것들의 근본적인 바탕은 비존재(non-existence)이다. 존재는 the Form of God.
그래서 the Form of the Absolute에 의하여 퍼질 때 이외에는 존재라고 할 수 있는 것이 없다.
내적 본질적 의존을 이븐 아라비는 iftiqar(가난, 본질적 필요)라고 했다. the Absolute에 대한 세상의 iftiqar는 실존이고, 세상에 대한 the Absolute의 iftiqar는 나타남, 자기현현이다.
the Absolute는 피조물에게 양식(food)이다. 먹고 살아가는 것.
피조물은 the Absolute의 양식이다. 피조물은 이름과 속성을 완전케 함으로써 절대를 양육한다.
양식이 몸 속으로 투과되어 들어가야지만 먹여 살릴 수 있다.
절대의 영적인 부분은 이름들이다.
맑음(safa’)과 흐림(kudurah). 원소들의 조합이 적절한 분량으로 이루어지면 물질이 생겨난다.
이븐 아라비에게 가장 적절한 생명의 상징은 물이다. 물은 모든 자연 요소의 근본이며, 흐르고 통과한다. ‘삶의 비밀은 물에 용해된다.’ 모든 존재는 물을 포함하고 있다. 이것이 the Absolute 의 He-ness에 해당한다.
욥은 ‘보이지 않는 지혜’를 상징한다. 욥이 겪은 고통은 육체적인 것이 아니라 ‘certainty’를 추구하는 인간의 영적인 고통이다. 신은 욥이 발 아래에 흐르는 물로 자신을 씻기를 요구했다. 여기서 물은 모든 존재를 통해 흐르는 생명을 상징한다.
Bali Efendi 의 표현처럼 생명은 영의 일차적인 속성이다.
