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2] A History of Christian Thought Paul Tillich

 A History of Christian Thought: From its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism by Paul Tillich | Goodreads





A History of Christian Thought: From its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism

by
Paul Tillich,
Carl E. Braaten (Editor)
4.17 · Rating details · 245 ratings · 14 reviews
Previously published in two separate volumes entitled 
A history of Christian thought and Perspectives on 19th and 20th century Protestant theology.

Paperback, 550 pages
Published November 15th 1972 by Touchstone 
(first published January 1st 1968)
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URL  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Tillich

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 The Concept of Dogma xxxvi

I]The Preparation for Christianity 1
A. The Kairos 1
B. The Universalism of the Roman Empire 2
C. Hellenistic Philosophy 3
1. Skepticism 3
2. The Platonic Tradition 6
3. The Stoics 7
4. Eclecticism 9
D. The Inter-Testamental Period 9
E. The Mystery Religions 13
F. The Method of the New Testament 14

II Theological Developments in the Ancient Church 17
A. The Apostolic Fathers 17
B. The Apologetic Movement 24
1. The Christian Philosophy 27
2. God and the Logos 29
C. Gnosticism 33
D. The Anti-Gnostic Fathers 37
1. The System of Authorities 38
2. The Montanist Reaction 40
3. God the Creator 41
4. The History of Salvation 43
5. Trinity and Cliristology 46
6. The Sacrament of Baptism 48
E. Neo-Platonism 50
F. Clement and Origen of Alexandria 55
1. Christianity and Philosophy 55
2. The Allegorical Method 57
3. The Doctrine of God 59
vi Contents
4. Christology 61
5. Eschatology 63
G. Dynamic and Modalistic Monarchianism 64
1. Paul of Samosata 65
2. Sabellius 66
H. The Trinitarian Controversy 68
1. Arianism 69
2. The Council of Nicaea 71
3. Athanasius and Marcellus 73
4. The Cappadocian Theologians 76
I. The Christological Problem 79
1. The Antiochean Theology 80
2. The Alexandrian Theology 84
3. The Council of Chalcedon 86
4. Leontius of Byzantium 88
J. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite 90
K. Tertullian and Cyprian 98
'L. The Life and Thought of Augustine 103
1. The Development of Augustine 104
2. Augustine's Epistemology 111
3. The Idea of God 115
4. The Doctrine of Man 119
5. Philosophy of History 121
6. The Pelagian Controversy 122
7. The Doctrine of the Church 131

III Trends in the Middle Ages 134
A. Scholasticism, Mysticism, Biblicism 135
B. The Scholastic Method 137
C. Trends in Scholasticism 140
1. Dialectics and Tradition 140
2. Augustinianism and Aristotelianism 141
3. Thomism and Sootism 141
4. Nominalism and Realism 142
5. Pantheism and Church Doctrine 144
D. The Religious Forces 145
E. The Medieval Church 149
F. The Sacraments 154
G. Anselm of Canterbury 158
H. Abelard of Paris 167
I. Bernard of Clairvaux 172
J. Joachim of Floris 175

K. The Thirteenth Century 180
L. The Doctrines of Thomas Aquinas 192
M. William of Ockham 198
N. German Mysticism 201
0. The Pre-Reformers 203

IV Roman Catholicism from Trent to the Present 210
A. The Meaning of Counter-Reformation 210
B. The Doctrine of Authorities 211
C. The Doctrine of Sin 212
D. The Doctrine of Justification 213
E. The Sacraments 215
F. Papal Infallibility 218
C. Jansenism 221
II. Probahilism 223
1 11ccent Developments 224

V Ilir Iiiiiiigy iI Ihi Protestant Reformers 227
/\ Niiiiiiii I .iitIiii 227
I. Tho Itrukt Iiroiigii 227
2. I ,iiIlii'i ( iilirisrn of the Church 234
:i. I lh ( oiilIlit vlIIi iiiis,niis 237
I. Ilk Coidlicl wit ii tile Ivangelical Radicals 239
5. liii liii N I )O(t rules 242
a. iiie iihiical Principle 242
b. Sin and Faith 245
c. The Idea of God 247
d. The Doctrine of Christ 249
e. Church and State 251
B. Huldreich Zwingli 256
C. John Calvin 262
1. The Majesty of God 262
2. Providence and Predestination 264
3. The Christian Life 270
4. Church and State 272
5. The Authority of Scripture 274

VI The Development of Protestant Theology 276
A. The Period of Orthodoxy 276
1. Reason and Revelation 278
2. The Formal and Material Principles 280
B. Pietism 283
C. The Enlightenment 287

PART II
Introduction: Problem and Method 297

I Oscillating Emphases in Orthodoxy, Pietism,
and Rationalism 305
A. The Period of Orthodoxy 305
B. The Reaction of Pietism against Orthodoxy 311
C. The Rise of Rationalism 313

II The Enlightenment and its Problems 320
A. The Nature of Enlightenment 320
1. The Kantian Definition of Autonomy 320
2. Concepts of Reason 325
a. Universal Reason 326
b. Critical Reason 327
c. Intuitive Reason 328
d. Technical Reason 329
3. The Concept of Nature 330
4. The Concept of Harmony 332
B. The Attitude of the Enlightened Man 341
1. His Bourgeois Character 341
2. His Ideal of a Reasonable Religion 342
3. His Common-sense Morality 344
4. his Subjective Feeling 348
C. Intrinsic Conflicts of Enlightenment 349
1. Cosmic Pessimism 350
2. Cultural Vices 352
3. Personal Vices 353
4. Progress Based on Immorality 355
D. The Fulfillers and Critics of Enlightenment 356
1. Rousseau, The French Revolution, and Romanticism 356
1. Hume, The History of Religion, and Positivism 357
1. Kant, Moral Religion, and Radical Evil 360

III The Classic-Romantic Reaction against the
Enlightenment 367
A. Lessing, Historical Criticism, and the Rediscovery of Spinoza 367
B. The Synthesis of Spinoza and Kant 370

C. The Nature of Romanticism 372
1. The Infinite and Finite 372
2. The Emotional and the Aesthetic Elements in Romanticism 378
3. The Turn to the Past and the Valuation of Tradition 379
4. The Quest of Unity and Authority 382
5. The Negative and the Demonic in Romanticism 383

D. The Classical Theological Synthesis: Friedrich Schleiermacher 386
1. The Background of Schleicrmacher's Thought 388
2. His Concept of Religion as Feeling 391
3. His Positivistic Definition of Theology 398
4. His Interpretation of Christianity 405

E. The Universal Synthesis: Georg W. F. Hegel 410
1. The Greatness and the Tragic Hybris of Ilegels System 411
2. The Synthesis of God and Man (Mind and Person) 414
3. The Synthesis of Religion and Culture (Thought and  Imagination) 419
1. The Synthesis of State and Church 424
Providence, History, and Theodicy 426
The Christ as Reality and Symbol 430
Eternity against Immortality 431


IV The Breakdown of the Universal Synthesis 432

A. The Split in the Hegelian School 432
1. The Historical Problem: Strauss and Baur 423
1. The Anthropological Problem: Ludwig Feuerbach 435

B. Schelling's Criticism of Hegel 437

C. The Religious Revival and Its Theological Consequences 448
1. The Nature of the European Revival 449
2. The Theology of Repristination 453
1. Natural Science and the Fight over Darwinism 454

D. Kierkegaard's Existential Theology 458
1. Kierkegaard's Criticism of Hegel 460
2. Ethical Existence and the Human Situation (Anxiety, Despair) 462
3. The Nature of Faith (The Leap and Existential Truth) 464
4.  Criticism of Theology and Church 472

E. Political Radicalism and its Theological Significance 476
1. The Bourgeois Radicals 477
2. Marx's Relation to Hegel and Feuerbach 478
3. Marx's View of the Human Situation (Alienation) 480
4. Marx's Doctrine of Ideology and His Attack on Religion 481
5. Marx's Political Existentialism 484
6.    The Prophetic Element in Marx 485

F. Voluntarism and the Philosophy of Life 487
1. Schopenhatier's Idea of the Will 488
2. Nietzsche's Idea of Will-To-Power 493
3. Nietzsche's Doctrine of Resentment 494
1. The "Death of God" and the New Ideal of Man 497

V New Ways of Mediation 504
A. Experience and the Biblical Message 506
1. The Erlangen School 506
2. Martin Kähler 509
B. The "Back to Kant" Movement 511
C. Adolf von Harnack 515
D. Miscellaneous Movements in Theology 520
1. The Luther-Renaissance 520
2. Biblical Realism 520
3. Radical Criticism 521
4. Rudolf Bultmann 523
5. The History-of-Religions Approach 524
6. Ernst Troeltsch 526
7. Religious Socialism 530
8. Karl Barth 535
9. Existentialism 539
Index of Names 543
Index of Subjects 547
===

CHAPTER II Theological Developments in the Ancient Church

A. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

WE come now to the apostolic fathers, the earliest post-biblical writers we know of, some of them even earlier than the later books of the New Testament. These apostolic fathers, Ignatius of Antioch, Clement of Rome, "The Shepherd" of Hermas, and others, were more dependent on a Christian conformism that had gradually developed than on the outspoken position of Paul in his Letters. Paul's influence during this period was felt more indirectly through John and Ignatius. The reason for this, at least in part, was that the controversy with the Jews was a matter of the past; Paul's conflict with the Jewish Christians did not have to be continued. Instead of that, the positive elements in the faith which could provide an understandable content for the pagans had to be brought out. In general one could say that in the period of the apostolic fathers the great visions of the first ecstatic break­through had disappeared, leaving in their place a given set of ideas which produced a kind of ecclesiastical conformity, and making the missionary work possible. Some people have com­plained about this development, deploring that so early after the second generation of Christians the power of the Spirit was on the wane. This is an unavoidable thing, however, in all creative periods. One needs only to think of the Reformation. After the breakthrough and after the second generation which received the breakthrough, a fixation or concentration on some special points begins. There are the educational needs to preserve what was given earlier.

Nevertheless, this period of the apostolic fathers is extremely

18             A History of Christian Thought

important, even though it may have considerably lost its spiritual power in comparison with the preceding period of the apostles, since it preserved what was needed for the life of the congrega­tions. The first question to be asked was: Where could one find the expression of the common spirit of the congregation? Origin­ally the real mediators of the message were those who were bearers of the Spirit, the "pneumatics", those who had the pneuma. But as we know from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, especially chapter 12, he already encountered difficulties with the bearers of the Spirit because they produced disorder. So he laid stress on order together with the Spirit. In the Pastoral Epistles, which were attributed to Paul, the emphasis on ecclesiastical order became increasingly important. By the time of the apostolic fathers the ecstatic spirit had almost disappeared. It was con­sidered dangerous. And why, they asked, do we need it? Every­thing the Spirit had to say has already been classically expressed in Scripture and tradition. Therefore, instead of the prophets who traveled from place to place as the apostles did, we now have definite norms and authorities arising in the Christian congrega­tions. What were these norms and authorities?

The first and basic authority was the Old Testament. Next to that was the earliest collection of writings which are now in the New Testament. The limits of the New Testament had not yet been definitely set. It took more than two hundred years for the church to make a final decision on all the books in the New Testament canon.

Besides these writings there was already a complex of dogma­tic and ethical doctrines which had become traditional. In I Clement these are called "the canon of our tradition". This tradi­tion had various names, like truth, gospel, doctrine, and com­mandments. This, however, was a large amount of material; it had to be narrowed down for those who were to be baptized. So a creed was created which they could confess when they became members of the church. This creed had a similarity to our present Apostles' Creed, because its center was also christological. Christology was at the center because this is what distinguished the Christian communities from Judaism as well as paganism.

Baptism was the sacrament of entrance into the church. The baptized person, who at that time, of course, was a pagan adult, had to confess that he would accept the implications of his

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      19

baptism. Then he was baptized in the name of Christ. Later on the names of God the Father and the Spirit were added. As yet there were no accompanying explanations; this was faith and liturgy, not yet theology.

All these things were going on in the church. This church was the ekklesia, the assembly of God or Christ. The original meaning of ekklesia was "called out". They were called out of the houses and nations to form the church universal; they were called out of the barbarians, out of the Greeks and the Jews, to become the true people of God. Of course, the Jews anticipated this and were a kind of ekklesia themselves. But they were not the true people of God, for the true people of God are universally called out of all the nations. If this is the case, it becomes necessary for those called together unto the conformity of the ecclesiastical creed to distinguish themselves from those outside and from heretics inside. How can this be done? How is it possible to determine whether a doctrine conforms to the doctrines of the church instead of being introduced from barbarian, Greek, or Jewish teachings? The answer was that this can be done only by the bishop who is the "overseer" of the congregation. The bishop represents the Spirit who is supposed to be within the whole congregation. In the struggle against pagans, Jews, barbarians, and heretics, the bishop became more and more important. In his letter to the Smymeans Ignatius wrote: "Where the bishop is, there the con­gregation should be." Prophets who appear may be right or wrong, but the bishop is right. The bishops were representatives of the true doctrine. Originally the bishops were not distinguished from the presbyters or elders. Gradually, however, the bishop became a monarch among the elders, giving rise to the monarchi­cal episcopate. This is a natural development. If the authority which guarantees truth is embodied in human beings, it is almost unavoidable that there will be a tendency to narrow down upon one individual who holds the final decision. In Clement of Rome we already find traces of the idea of apostolic succession, that is, that the bishop represents the apostles. This shows clearly how early the problem of authority became decisive in the church and started a trend toward its fuller development in the Roman Church.

We shall now take up some of the special doctrines of this period. In view of the pagan world in which these Christians

20              A History of Christian Thought

lived it was essential to emphasize above all a monotheistic idea of God. Thus the Shepherd of Hermas says: "First of all, believe that Cod is one, who has made all things, bringing them out of nothing into being." The doctrine of creation out of nothing is expressed here. Although we cannot find this doctrine explicitly in the Old Testament, it might be said to be implicit there, and certainly was expressed prior to Christianity by the Jewish theo­logians during the inter-testamental period. This doctrine was decisive for the separation of the early church from paganism.

Along the same line was the emphasis on the almighty God, the despotës, as he was called, the powerful ruling Lord. Clement exclaims, "0 great demiurge", speaking of him as the great builder of the universe and the Lord of everything. These con­cepts which seem so natural to us were important because they were a defense against paganism. Creation out of nothing means that Cod did not find an already pre-existent matter when he started to create. There was no matter which resists form, as it was in Neo-Platonic paganism, and which must therefore be trans­cended. Instead, the material world is an object of God's creation; it is good and must not be disparaged for the sake of salvation. The word "demiurge" was used in Plato and Gnosticism for some­thing below the highest Cod. The highest God is beyond doing such a lowly thing as creating the world, and so he leaves that to the demiurge. This means that the divine reality is not present in the act of creation. Against this notion Clement says that the great demiurge is Cod himself; there is no dichotomy between the highest Cod and the maker of the world. Creation is an absolute act out of nothing. This implies Cod's almighty power. To say that Cod is almighty does not mean that Cod is one who sits on a throne and can do anything he wants to do like an arbit­rary tyrant. Rather, almightiness means that God is the sole ground of everything created, and that there is no such thing as matter which resists him. This is the meaning of the first article of the Apostles' Creed; "I believe in Cod the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." We should read this with great awe, because by this confession Christianity separated itself from the dualistic interpretation of reality in paganism. There are not two eternal principles, an evil principle of matter as eternal as a good principle of form. The first article of the Creed is the great wall which Christianity erected against paganism. Without this wall

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      21

christology inevitably deteriorates into gnosticism in which Christ is one of the cosmic powers alongside others, although perhaps the highest among them. Only in the light of the first article is the second article of the Creed meaningful. Do not reduce God to the second Person of the Trinity.

As the ruler of everything God has a plan of salvation. Ignatius in particular develops this idea of a plan of salvation. In his letter to the Ephesians he speaks of the economy towards the new man". This is a wonderful summary of the Christian message. Economy here means "building a house". It is used for the structure of the relationships between God and the world. There is an economy of trinitarian thinking: Father, Son, and Spirit. Only all three together are God. There is an economy of salvation, that is the building up of the different periods which finally lead to the new man. This idea of the new man, the new creature or new being, as the aim of the history of salvation is an important contribution of these theologians. This economy of salvation is already present in the period of the Old Testament. So Ignatius says: "Judaism has believed towards Christianity." The Christ, the new man, is the perfect fulfillment in which the disruption of the old man is overcome and death is dissolved. This leads to Christology.

Generally one can say that Jesus as the Christ was considered to be a pre-existent spiritual being who had transformed the historical Jesus into an agent of his saving activity. The Spirit is a hypostasis in God, an independent power in complete union with God. The Son came into the realm of flesh. "Flesh" here always means historical reality. He accepted flesh; or the flesh co­operated with the Spirit in him. The Holy Spirit dwelt in the flesh which he chose. He became the Son of God by his service.

Alongside this there was another idea. One could also say that the first Spirit, the proton pneuma, became flesh. For instance, Ignatius said: "Christ is God and perfect man at the same time. He comes from the Spirit and the seed of David." This means that he is not only some spiritual power which has accepted flesh, but that he as the spiritual power has become flesh.

Another term that was used was iatros, physician. Salvation was still understood here as healing. This physician heals both fleshly and spiritually. Very mixed ideas were used to emphasize that something paradoxical has happened, that a divine spiritual

22              A History of Christian Thought

power has appeared under the conditions of humanity and exist­ence. Thus, he is depicted as one having genesis and at the same time without genesis; he has come into the flesh; he has entered into death. But he is Cod who came into flesh and in death has eternal life. He is both from Mary and from Cod; he is able to suffer and not able to suffer, because of his elevation to God.

Ignatius could say: "For there is one Cod who made himself manifest through Jesus Christ his Son, who is his logos, proceed­ing from his silence." And II Clement: "Being the first Spirit, the head of the angels, he became flesh. Being he who appears in human form, Christ is the word proceeding out of the silence." He proceeds from silence, apo siges. The Christ breaks the eternal silence of the divine ground. As such he is both God and com­plete man. The same historical reality is the one as well as the other, both as one person. One could speak of a double message (a dip/on kerygma), the message that this same being is both Cod and man.

Here we see the chief religious interest of this whole period, the interest, as Clement says, to speak theologically of Christ as of Cod. "Brothers, so we must think about Jesus Christ as about God, for if we think small things about him, we can hope to receive small things only." The absoluteness of salvation demands an absolute divine Savior. We are confronted here by the prob­lem of two possible ways of thinking: Did Christ come into the flesh, accepting it? Or did he come as the Logos, being trans­formed into it? Both types of christology already appear, taking on flesh, or being transformed into it.

The idea of the divine Logos breaking the silence of God is very profound. It means that the divine abyss in itself is without word, form, object, and voice. It is the infinite silence of the eternal. But out of this divine silence, the Logos breaks forth and opens up what is hidden in this silence. He reveals the divine ground.

The christology we find here is not a theoretical problem; rather, the christological problem is one side of the soteriological problem. The interest is to have a safe salvation; the desire is to get the courage which overcomes the anxiety of being lost. The question of salvation is the basis of the christological question. What is this salvation? The work of Christ is twofold, first, gnösis (knowledge) and secondly zo (life). This is the way sal‑

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      28

vation was conceived of in the early Greek church. Christ brings knowledge and life. Sometimes the two things are combined in the phrase athanatos gnösis, immortal knowledge, knowledge of that which is immortal and which makes immortal.

Christ called us from darkness into light; he made us serve the Father of truth. He called us who had no being and willed that we have being, out of his new being. This means that knowledge brings being. Knowledge and being belong together; so do he and non-being. Truth is being; new truth is new being. Whoever has this knowledge of being has saving knowledge. This has to be emphasized against a gross misunderstanding. Harnack and his followers viewed ancient Christianity as being infected by Greek intellectualism. There are two things wrong in this view­point. First, Greek intellectualism is an inappropriate term be­cause the Greeks were extremely interested in truth. With but some exceptions, the truth they wanted to have was existential truth, truth concerning their existence, truth that saves them out of this distorted existence and elevates them to the immovable One. The early Christian congregations understood truth in the same way. Truth is not theoretical knowledge about objects, but cognitive participation in a new reality that has appeared in the Christ. Without this participation no truth is possible, and know­ledge is abstract and meaningless. This is what they meant when they combined knowledge and being. Participating in the new being is participation in truth, in the true knowledge.

This identity of truth and being mediates life. Christ gives immortal knowledge, the knowledge which gives immortality. He is the Savior and leader of immortality. In his own being he is our imperishable life. He gives both the knowledge of immortality and the drug of immortality, which is the sacrament. Ignatius called the Lord's Supper the remedy against our having to die, the antidoton to me apothanein. There is a very profound mean­ing in this idea that the sacramental materials of the Lord's Sup­per are, so to speak, drugs or remedies which produce immortality. First of all, it shows that the apostolic fathers did not believe in the immortality of the soul. There is no natural immortality, otherwise it would be meaningless for them to speak about im­mortal life which Christ offers. They believed that man is natur­ally mortal, just as the Old Testament held that in paradise man was able to eat from the food of the gods, called the "tree of life",

24             A History of Christian Thought

and to keep alive by participating in this divine power. Similarly the apostolic fathers taught that with the coming of Christ the situation of paradise has been re-established. Again we may par­ticipate in the food of eternity, which is the body and the blood of Christ. In doing this we build into ourselyes a counter-balance to our natural having to die. Death is the wages of sin only insofar as sin is separation from God. Because of this sin Cod's power to overcome our natural having to die does not work any more. But with Christ's coming it works again. It works in a sacramen­tally realistic way in the materials of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In the light of this we can conclude that our traditional way of speaking of the immortality of the soul is not classically Christian doctrine, but a distortion of it, not in a genuine, but in a pseudo-Platonic sense.

B. TRE APOLOGETIC MOVEMENT

The Apologetic movement can rightly be called the birthplace of a developed Christian theology. Christianity needed apologetics for different reasons. An apologia means a reply or answer to a judge in the court, if someone should accuse you. Socrates' apologia, for instance, was his answer to those who accused him. Likewise, Christianity expressed itself in terms of answers to particular accusations. Those who did this systematically are called the Apologists.

Answers were needed because of a double accusation against Christianity: (1) Christianity was a threat to the Roman Empire. This was a political accusation; Christianity undermines the structure of the empire; (2) Christianity was, philosophically speaking, nonsense, a superstition mixed with philosophical fragments. These two attacks supported each other. The philo­sophical attack was taken over by the political authorities and used in their accusations. Thus the philosophical attacks became dangerous in terms of their political consequences. Celsus, the physician and philosopher, was the most important representa­tive of these attacks. It is important to know his thinking if we want to see how Christianity was regarded at that time by an educated Greek philosopher and scientist. Celsus saw Christianity as a mixture of fanatic superstition and piecemeal philosophy. According to him the historical reports in the Bible are contra‑

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church         25

dictory and lack any certain evidence. Here for the first time we have historical criticism of the Old and New Testaments, some­thing which will be repeated later again and again. In Celsus it is criticism motivated by hate. Later, in the eighteenth century, we witness a criticism moved by a love toward the reality which lies behind these reports.

In turning to Celsus' attack on Christianity, we find that one of the main points is the resurrection of Jesus. Celsus observed that this event, which is supposed to be so important, was witnessed only by adherents of the faith, and at first only by a few ecstatic women. The deification of Jeins is not any different from the processes of deification which we know of elsewhere in history. For example, Euhemerus, the Cynic, has given enough examples of the way in which a human being, a king or hero, was deified. What is particularly disgusting, Celsus said, is that when the stories are most incredible, as many of the Old Testament stories, they are explained away allegorically. Of course, this was actually done. An element of anti-Judaism is visible in Celsus' criticism of the Old Testament miracle stories. This is understandable because Celsus was directing his criticisms against the Jews as much as against the Christians.

Celsus charged that the descent of God contradicts the

un‑

changeable character of God which the Christian writers had also strongly emphasized. But if the divine Being has descended to earth, why did this happen in a despised corner of the world, and why did it happen only once? Particularly disgusting to the educated pagan—and we have here another element of anti‑

Jiidaistic feeling—is the fight between the Jews and Christians whether the Messiah has or has not appeared. The argument from prophecy to fulfillment that was used so much by Christians is also a stupid one. Celsus was historically educated enough to sri, that the prophet did not anticipate a fulfillment in the terms in which the fulfillment happened. Thic is an especially sore point iii all of church history. For the sound idea of a universal pre-jiaratory revelation was distorted into a mechanism of "foresee-i i ig " events which later happened.

Celsus' deepest criticism of Christianity was neither scientific Willi respect to history nor philosophical with respect to the idea oil'Incarnation; instead, it was one which arose out of a basically ii'Ilgious feeling. He said that the demonic powers which,

26             A History of Christian Thought

according to Paul, had been conquered by Christ are actually ruling the world. The world has not changed since the beginning of Christianity. And Celsus adds that there is no sense in trying to overcome thse powers; they are the real rulers of the world. Therefore, one should be obedient to the Roman rulers on earth; at least they have reduced the power of the demons to some extent—which is also a Pauline idea. They have established a certain order in which the demonic forces are limited. However questionable the Roman emperors may be as persons, they must be obeyed and venerated, for Rome has become great through obedience to the orders of this world, to the necessities of law and nature. Christians are guilty of undermining the greatness and the glory of Rome, and thus undercut the only power that can prevent the world from falling into chaos and the demons from having a complete victory.

That was a serious attack, one which has been heard fre­quently in the history of Christianity. christians who had the same philosophical education that Celsus had tried to answer for the church. The Apologists did not answer the attacks so much on the level of historical criticism as on the philosophical level. They did it in a way which shows three things that characterize every apologetic. First of all, if you want to speak meaningfully with someone, there must be a common basis of some mutually accepted ideas. The truth that is common to both Christians and pagans must first be elaborated. If they have nothing in com­mon, no conversation is possible and no meaningful address to the pagans is possible. A rule for all Christian missionary work is that the other one must understand what you say; but under­standing involves at least partial participation. If the missionary speaks an absolutely different language, no understanding is pos­sible. Thus, the Apologists had to show that there is something in common.

Secondly, the Apologists had to point out defects in the ideas of paganism. There are things which contradict the pagan ideas. It can be shown that for centuries pagan philosophers have brought forth criticisms of these ideas. This is the second step of apolo­getics, namely, showing the negativity in the other. Thirdly, it must be shown that one's own position is not to be accepted as something from the outside, but rather that Christianity is the fulfillment of a longing and desire in paganism. This is the apolo‑

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church         27

getic form of theology which I use in my own systematic theology, that is, the correlation between question and answer.

There is, however, one danger in apologetics; the common ground may be overemphasized at the expense of the differences. Then you merely accept the other as he is, without giving him anything different. A way must be found between the two extremes of either throwing indigestible material at the other from an external position, or telling him what he already, knows. The latter is the way liberal theology has often acted, while the former is the way of fundamentalism and orthodoxy.

1. The Christian Philosoph!,

Justin Martyr was perhaps the most important of the Apolo­gists. In speaking of Christianity he said: "This is the only philo­sophy which I have found certain and adequate." What does this mean? Some anti-apologetic theologians interpret this as evidence that Christianity was dissolved into a philosophy. They say further that this is what every apologetic theology does to Christi­anity. But when Justin said that Christianity was a philosophy, we must understand what he meant by philosophy. Philosophy at that time referred to the spiritual, non-magical and non-supersti­tious character of a movement. So Justin was saying that Christi­anity is the only certain and adequate philosophy because it is not magical or superstitious. For the later Greeks philosophy was not only a theoretical but more a practical matter. It was a matter of existential interpretation of life, a matter of life and death for the existence of the people at that time. To be a philosopher ordinarily meant to belong to a philosophical school, a sort of ritual community in which the founder of the school was sup­posed to have had a revelatory insight into the truth. Accep-I once into such a school was not a matter of having a Ph.D., h1t of being personally initiated into the atmosphere of this school.

Jiistin taught that this Christian philosophy is universal; it is I I iv all-embracing truth about the meaning of existence. From this it follows that wherever truth appears, it belongs to the Christians. 'liuth concerning existence, wherever it appears, is Christian Iruth. "What anybody has said about the truth belongs to us, the Christians." This is-not sheer arrogance. He does not mean that

28             A History of Christian Thought

Christians now possess all the truth, or that they alone discovered it. He means, in terms of the Logos doctrine, that there-cannot be truth anywhere which is not in principle included in Christian truth. This is what the Fourth Gospel says: the Logos appeared, full of truth and grace.

And vice versa, Justin said: "Those who live according to the logos are Christians." He included people like Socrates, Hera-clitus, and Elijah. He added, however, that the total logos which appeared in Christ has become body, mind, and soul. Therefore, the philosophers apart from Christianity are partly in error and even partly subjected to demonic inspirations which come from the pagan gods. The gods of the heathen are not non-existent; they are real demonic forces and have destructive power.

What does all this mean? It removes the impression that these Christians felt themselves to be just another religion. Actually we find here the negation of the concept of religion with respect to Christianity, as though it were one religion among others, and as though Christianity is right and all other religions wrong. The Apologists would not say that their religion is right, the others wrong, but that the Logos has appeared on which their religion is based. He is the full Logos of God himself, appearing in the center of his being, appearing in his totality. This is more than religion. This is truth appearing in time and space. So the word "Christianity" is understood not as a religion but as the negation of all religions. In virtue of its universality Christianity is able to embrace them all. Justin said what I think is absolutely neces­sary to say. If anywhere in the world there were an existential truth which could not be received by Christianity as an element of its own thinking, Jesus would not be the Christ. He would be merely one teacher alongside other teachers, all of whom are limited and partly in error. But that is not what the early Chris­tians said. They said—and we should say—that if we call Jesus the Christ, or the Logos as the Apologists called him, this means that by definition there cannot be any truth which cannot in principle be taken into Christianity. Otherwise the application of the term "Logos" to Jesus as the Christ would not have been possible. This does not mean that this Logos knew all the truth; that would be nonsense and would destroy his humanity. But it does mean that the fundamental truth which has appeared in him is essentially universal, and therefore can *ke in every other

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      29

truth. For this reason the early theologians did not hesitate to take in as much Greek philosophical truth as they could, and also as much Oriental mysticism as they could.

The appearance of the Logos in Christ makes it possible for even the most uneducated human being to receive the full exis­tential truth. In contrast, the philosophers may lose it in discus­sing it. In other words, the Apologists are saying that Christianity is far superior to all philosophy. Since philosophy presupposes education, only a few human beings have access to its truth. Others are excluded from truth in its philosophical form. How­ever, they are not excluded from the truth that is manifest through the Logos in a living person. The message of Jesus as the Christ is universal in embracing all mankind, all classes, groups, and social stratifications of mankind.

Another argument that was used in defense of Christianity was the moral power and action of those who belong to the church. Therefore, the Christian congregations could not be dan­gerous to the Roman Empire. They help to prevent the world from falling into chaos. Even more than the Roman Empire itself, they are supporters of world order. So Justin could say: "The world lives from the prayers of the Christians and from the obedience of the Christians to the law of the state. The Christians preserve the world, and on the other hand, for their sake Cod preserves the world."

2. God and the Logos

The philosophical idea of God is inborn in every human being. All the characteristics which Parmenides attributed to Being are here attributed to God eternal, without beginning, needing nothing, beyond passions, indestructible, unchangeable, and invisible. There is, however, one point of difference between classical Greek philosophy and Justin's doctrine of God. This difference comes from the Old Testament and changes every­thing. It is the statement that God is the Almighty Creator! The moment this statement is made, the personal element enters the ahstract and mystical description of God's identity. Cod as Creator is acting, and as the Almighty he is the acting power behind everything which moves.

It is interesting to observe that in such a statement about God,

30             A History of Christian Thought

Christian monotheism oscillates between the transpersonal ele­ment of Being and the personal element of God as Creator and, of course, also as Savior. This oscillation is necessary as soon as the idea of God is made an object of thought. One cannot escape some elements of the eternal, the unconditional, the unchange­able, etc. On the other hand, practical piety and our experience of creatureiness presuppose a person-to-person relationship. Christianity must oscillate between these two elements, because both elements are in God himself.

Between Cod and man there are angels and powers, some good and some evil. But their mediating power is insufficient. The Logos is the real mediator. It is difficult to explain what the word "logos" means, especially to those who are nominalists from birth. It is difficult because thisconcept is not the descrip­tion of an individual being, but of a universal principle. If one is not used to thinking in terms of universals as powers of being, such a concept as Logos remains impossible to understand. The concept of the Logos can be explained best against the back­ground of Platonism or medieval realism.

Logos is the principle of the self-manifestation of God. The Logos is God manifest to himself in himself. Therefore, whenever God appears, either to himself or to others outside himself, it is the Logos which appears. This Logos is in Jesus as the Christ in a unique way. And this, according to the Apologists, is the great­ness of Christianity and the basis of its claim about salvation. For if the divine Logos in its fullness had not appeared in Jesus as the Christ, no salvation would be possible. This is an argu­ment from existence, not from speculation. This means that the classical theologians start from the experience of salvation, and then proceed to speak of Jesus as the Christ in terms of the Logos.

The Logos is the first "work" or generation of Cod as Father. The Father, being eternal mind, has the Logos in himself; he is "eternally logical", as Athenagoras, one of the Apologists, said. Here "logical" does not mean that he can argue well; he leaves that to us. As "logikos" he is adequate to the principles of mean­ing and truth. God is not irrational will; he is called eternal nous (mind), and this means he has within himself the power of self-manifestation. This analogy is taken from our experience. There is no mental process that is going on in some way or other except

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church       81

in silent words. Likewise, the inner spiritual life of God includes the silent word in him.

There is a spiritual procession that goes out from the Father to the world in which he manifests himself to himself and to the world. But this procession does not produce separation. The Word is not the same thing of which it is the Word. On the other hand, the Word cannot be separated from that of which it is the Word. The Word of God is not identical with God; it is the self-manifestation of God. But if you separate it from Cod, it becomes empty, without content. This is an attempt to describe the meaning of the term "Logos," in analogy with the mental processes of man. The process of generation of the Logos in God—eternally, of course—does not make God small. He is not less than he was by the fact that he generates his Word. So Justin\ can say: "The Logos is different from Cod according to number, but not according to concept." He is God; he is not the God, but he is one with God in essence. Justin used also the Stoic doctrines of the immanent and the transcendent Logos. The Logos in God is logos endiathetos, that is the indwelling Logos. This eternal, indwelling Logos, the Word in which Cod expresses himself to himself, becomes with the creation the logos prophorikos, the proceeding, outgoing Logos. The Logos is then a word that is spoken toward the outside, toward the creature, through the prophets and the wise men. Logos means both word and reason. If one thinks in Old Testament terms, one would prefer to trans­late logos by "word"; if one thinks in Creek terms, as the Apolo­gists did on the whole, then one would translate logos by "reason". "Reason" here does not mean "reasoning", but refers to the meaningful structure of reality.

As the immediate self-expression of the divine, the Word (the Logos, form, or reason) is less than the divine abyss, because the divine abyss is always the beginning, and out of the depths of divinity his self-manifestation toward the world comes. The Logos is the beginning of the generations of God; he has, so to speak, a diminished transcendence or divinity. But if this is so, how can he reveal God fully? This became a problem for later times. As soon as the Apologists used the term "logos" the prob­lem arose and could not be silenced any more, if the Logos is the self-expression of God in movement, is he less than God or fully God? One continued to call Christ God, but how could the

32              A History of Christian Thought

statement be made understandable to pagans that a historical individual who lived and died is to be called "God"? The diffi­culty was not the incarnation as such. "Incarnation is one of the most ordinary events in Greek mythology and in all mythology. Gods come to earth; they take on animal, hUman, or,plant form; they do certain things and then return to their divinity. Such a concept, however, could not be accepted by Christianity. The difficulty was that this Son of Cod, who was a historical man and not a mythical figure, is supposed to be the absolute and unique incarnation of God.

The incarnation is a once-for-all event; and it is not a particu­lar element or characteristic of God which becomes incarnate. Rather, it is the very center of divinity which becomes incarnate, and to express this the idea of the Logos was used. The problem was to combine monotheism, which was emphasized so strongly against pagan polytheism, with the idea of Christ's divin­ity. Both aspects of Christ, his humanity and his universality, had to be kept together. This was the need of that time which the Apologists fulfilled. And therefore they were success­ful.

In the Apologists the incarnation is not the union of the divine Spirit with the man Jesus; rather, the Logos really becomes man. This transformation christology becomes increasingly important through the Logos doctrine. Through the will of God the pre­existent Logos has become man. He has been made flesh. Here we have the first clear decision for the transformation christology over against the adoptionist christology. If the Logos (or Spirit) adopted the man Jesus, then we have quite a different kind of christology from the idea that the Logos is transformed into flesh.

The saving gifts of the Logos are gnosis (knowledge) of God, of the law, and of the resurrection. As the Logos Christ is, first of all, a teacher; not a teacher who teaches us many things he knows better than we, but a teacher in the Socratic sense of giving us existential power of being. The Logos gives us truth about God and moral laws which we are to fulfill through freedom. Thus a kind of intellectualization and some educational elements come into the doctrine of the Christ. This was a possible consequence of the Logos doctrine, and for this reason there have always been reactions against it.

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      83

C. Gosi'icis

The Apologists defended Christianity against the philosophers and emperors. However, the threats to Christianity did not come only from the outside. A much greater danger came from the inside; this was the danger of gnosticism. The term "gnosticism" is derived from the Greek word gnO.s'is, meaning "knowledge". It does not mean scientific knowledge. Gnösis is used in three ways: (1) as knowledge in general terms; (2) as mystical communion; (3) as sexual intercourse. All three meanings can be found in the New Testament. Gnösis is a knowledge by participation. It is as intimate as the relation between husband and wife. It is not the knowledge resulting from analytic and synthetic research. It is a knowledge of union and of salvation, existential knowledge in contrast to scientific knowledge. The Gnostics were the Greek intellectuals; but they understood the cognitive function of man in terms of participation in the divine.

The Gnostics were not a sect; if anything, they were many sects. Actually, however, gnosticism was a widespread religious movement in the late ancient world. This movement is usually e1led syncretism. It was a mixture of all the religious traditions of that time. It spread all over the world, and was strong enough to penetrate Greek philosophy and the Jewish religion. Philo of Alexandria was a typical forerunner of gnosticism. It was also strong enough to penetrate Roman law and Christian theo­logy.

The basic elements of this religious mixture are the following: (1) The destruction of the national religions by the conquests of Alexander and Rome. The great world empires undercut the national religions. This is the negative presupposition. (2) The philosophical interpretation of mythology. When you read the systems of the Gnostics, you have the feeling that they have rationalized mythology. And this feeling is accurate. (3) The renewal of the ancient mystery traditions. (4) The revival of the psychic and magical elements which appeared in the religious propaganda of the East. While the political movement went from West to East, the religious movement went from East to West. Hence, gnosticism was an attempt to combine all the relig­ious traditions which had lost their genuine roots, and to unite

34              A History of Christian Thought

them in a system of a half-philosophical, half-religious charac­ter.

There were many similarities and differences between the gnostic groups and original Christianity. Against the public tradi­tion of the Christian churches, they claimed to possess secret traditions known only to the initiated. They rejected the Old Testament because it contradicted many of the their fundamental tenets, especially their dualistic and ascetic tendencies. The New Testament was not rejected but purged. Marcion was the man who tried to purge the New Testament, leaving the ten main Letters of Paul and the Gospel of Luke, which most clearly bears Pauline influence. Presumably, they did not contain elements which contradicted the basic ideas of gnosticism, as did the other Epistles and Gospels in the New Testament.

Marcion was not primarily a speculative philosopher, but a religious reformer. He founded congregations of followers which lasted for a long time. The title of his book is Antitheses. He was a Gnostic in his distinction between the God of the Old Testa­ment and the God of the New Testament, the God of the law and the God of the gospel. He rejected the former and accepted the latter. This problem should not be seen in terms of the fantastic idea of two gods. Rather, it should be seen in terms of the prob­lem with which Harnack wrestled at the end of his life. That is the problem whether the Old and New Testaments are not so different that they cannot be combined. Marcionism is a form of radical Paulinism which exists throughout church history. In the modern period we have it in the Barthian school, when the God of revelation is placed against the God of natural law. In natural law and in history man is thought to be by himself. Of course, this school does not speak of a second God; such a fantastic mythology would be impossible today. Rather, it speaks of a radical tension between the natural world of reason and of morality and the religious realm of revelation which stands against all other realms. This was Marcion's problem, and be solved it by a radical separation in terms of a gnostic dualism.

For the Gnostics the created world is evil; it was- created by an evil god whom they equated with the God of the Old Testa­ment. Therefore, salvation is liberation from the world, and had to be accomplished through ascetic means. There is no place for eschatology in this dualistic world view, for the end of the world

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      35

is seen in the light of a dualism. A dualistic fulfillment is not a fulfillment; it implies a split in God himself.

The Savior is one of the heavenly powers, called "aeons" or "eternities". The word "eternity" does not have the connotation of timelessness here, but of cosmic power. The higher aeon, the savior aeon, the savior power of being, descends to earth and takes on human flesh. It is self-evident, however, that a divine power cannot suffer. So he takes on either a strange body, or a body which only seems to be a body, but he does not become flesh. (The early Christians rejected the Gnostics on this point.) The Savior descends to the different realms in which the various astrological powers rule. This has special reference to the planets, which were considered as astrological powers long after the Renaissance, even in Protestantism. He reveals the hidden weapons of these demonic powers by trespassing their realm and overcoming them on his descent. He brings down the seals of their power, their names and their characters. If you have the name of a demonic power, you are superior to it; if you call it by name, it falls down. One of the Gnostic texts says: "Having the seals, I shall descend, going through all aeons. 1 shall recog­nize all mysteries. I shall show the shape of the gods. And the hidden things of the holy path, called gnOsis, I shall deliver." Here we see the claim of the good God, of the power of mystery which comes down to earth.

The demonic powers are the representatives of fate. The human soul which has fallen into their hands is liberated by the Savior and by the knowledge he brings. One could say: What the Savior does in gnosticism is somehow to use white magic against the black magic of the planetary powers, the same powers of whom Paul in Romans 8 speaks when he says they have been subjected by Christ. Therefore, the magic power of the sacraments is ack­nowledged. The highest power comes to earth in them.

Besides these speculative and sacramental features, gnosticism had ethical values of community and asceticism. The ascent of the soul is demanded, following the Savior who has ascended. The Savior liberates from demonic powers for the sake of union with the fullness, the plërOma, the spiritual word. On the upward way the human soul meets these rulers; the soul tells the rulers what it knows about them. He knows their names, and therefore their mysterious power, the structure of evil they represent. When

36             A History of Christian Thought

he tells them their names, they fall down and tremble and cannot stop the soul on its way any more. These poetic images show that gnosticism was a religion of salvation from the demonic powers. This was the problem of the whole period, both in and outside of Christianity. Somehow man is better than his creator. Man must be saved from the powers of the demiurge, the one who created the world. But not all men are able to be saved. There are three classes of human beings: the pneuinatikoi, i.e., the spiritual ones; the psychikoi, i.e., those who follow the soul; and the sarkikoi, i.e., those who follow the flesh. The sarkikcd are lost; the pneurnatikoi are saved; but the middle group, the psy-chikoi, can go either way. In order to be elevated on high, man must participate in the mysteries. These are mostly mysteries of purification, and usually connected with baptism. The Spirit in baptism enters the sacramental water and dwells in it. The Spirit is brought down by a special formula of initiation.

These ideas formed a great temptation to Christianity. Christ remained in the center of history as the bringer of salvation; but he was put into the framework of the dualistic world view of Hellenism. The religious mood of this period is beautifully ex­pressed in the Acts of Andrew, one of the apocryphal writings. "Blessed is our generation. We are not thrown down, for we have been recognized by the light. We do not belong to time, which would dissolve us. We are not a product of motion, which would destroy us again. We belong to the greatness toward which we are striving. We belong to him who has mercy towards us, to the light which has expelled the darkness, to the One from whom we have turned away, to the Manifold, to the Super-heavenly, by whom we have understood the earthly. If we praise him, it is because we are recognized by him." This is really religi­ous piety, not mere speculation, as the critics of gnosticism have said.

There are many people today who would like to renew gnostic religion as their own daily expression of religious experience, not because of the fantastic speculation, but because of the real piety expressed in it. Gnosticism was a great danger for Christi­anity. If Christian theology had succumbed to this temptation, the particular character of Christianity would have been lost. Its unique basis in the person of Jesus would have become meaning­less. The Old Testament would have disappeared, and with it the

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      37

historical picture of the Christ. All of this was avoided because of the work of the men whom we call the anti-gnostic fathers. These fathers fought against gnosticism and expelled it from the church.

D. THE ANTI-GNOSTIC FATHERS

The first great Christian theologians developed their systems in opposition to—and partly in acceptance of—the ideas of gnosti­cism. Their defense against attacks from the outside was made in terms of the Logos doctrine. However, some of the spirit of the world which was conquered by Christianity entered into Chris­tianity itself. The fight then had to be waged against a Chris­tianized paganism. Such a fight, however, is never simply a negation, but always involves reception as well. The result of this partial rejection and partial reception of the religious mood of that time is what we call "early Catholicism". The theologians with whom we now have to deal are important because they represent this early Catholicism. They express ideas which grew out of a rejection and an acceptance of the pagan religious move­ment of their time. To do this they accepted the Logos doctrine which had been developed by the Apologists. But now they brought it constructively—not only apologetically—into a frame­work of Bible and tradition. In doing this they deprived this doctrine, at least partly, of its dangerous implications, one of them, of course, being a relapse into polytheism, tritheism, or ditheism. The greatness of theologians like Irenaeus and Tertul-han is that they saw this danger, and used the Logos doctrine to develop constructive theological ideas in relation to the religious movements of their own period.

Irenaeus was the greatest of the anti-gnostic fathers, religi­ously speaking. He understood the spirit of Paul and had a feel­ing for what Paul's theology meant for the Christian Church. However, the Pauline doctrine that was important for Irenaeus was not so much the one with which Paul fought against Judaism —the doctrine of justification by grace through faith—but it was more the center of Paul's own teaching, his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In some ways Irenaeus' theology stands closer to Protes­tant Christianity than most of early Catholicism; yet he was the father of early Catholicism—and ultimately not a Protestant—

88              A History of Christian Thought

inasmuch as the Pauline doctrine of justification through faith, which I like to call the "corrective side" in Paul's theology, was not at the center of Irenaeus' thought.

Tertullian was another anti-gnostic father, the master of Latin rhetoric. He was the creator of ecclesiastical terminology in the Latin language. He had a juristic mind, although not a jurist himself. He was possessed of a very aggressive temperament and a Strong character. He understood the primacy of faith and the paradox of Christianity. lInt he was not artificially primitive, for he accepted the Stoic philosophy and with it the idea that the human soul is by nature Christian—anima naturaliter chrirtiana. He also accepted the Logos doctrine of the Apologists, because he did not only accept the paradox of Christianity but, having a sharp rational mind, he believed that Greek philosophy could not surpass Christianity in rational sharpness and clarity.

The third anti-gnostic theologian was Hippolytus, more scholarly than the other two. lie carried on polemics against the gnostic movement in his exegetical works and writings on church history. These three theologians saw clearly the situation of the early church. It is important for Protestants to see how early the main fundamentals of the later Roman system were already

present in the third century.      -

1. The System of Authorities

The problem which the Gnostics posed for the church was in the realm of authority, the question whether the Holy Scriptures were decisive as over against the secret teachings of the Gnostics. The gnostic teachers said that Jesus had passed on secret in­sights to them during the forty days after his resurrection when he was together with his disciples. These insights formed the con­tent of gnostic philosophy and theology. Against this notion the anti-gnostic fathers had to establish a doctrine of Scripture.

The Holy Scripture is given by the Logos through the divine Spirit. Therefore, it became necessary to fix the canon. The very foundations of the church were threatened by the intrusion of secret traditions which asserted quite different things from what the biblical writings said. Thus, the decision to fix the canon arose out of the life-and-death struggle with gnosticism. This meant that the church must always return to the classical period,

-  Theological Developments in the Ancient Church       39

namely, the apostolic period of Christianity. What was written at that time is valid for all later times; anything really new that comes later can never be canonical. This is one of the reasons that so many of the books in the Bible go under apostolic names even though they were written during the post-apostolic period.

That which is canonical, it was felt, must be canonical in an absolute sense, including the letters of the text. Here Christianity simply followed the legalistic interpretation of the law in Judaism in which every Hebrew letter in the Old Testament text has an open and a hidden meaning, and is absolutely inspired. This, of course, was not enough, because the Bible must be interpreted. This is true whenever the Bible is made an absolute norm. The Gnostics interpreted the Scriptures differently from the official church. Therefore, the principle of tradition was bound to come up. The tradition was identified with the regula fldei, the rule of faith. When this happened, not the Bible but the rule of faith became decisive, just as the confessional documents written after the Reformation became the decisive canon for theological in­struction, and not the Bible.

The rule of faith was also called the canon of truth; something is true because it comes from the apostles. It is apostolic tradi­tion (traditio apostolica) which is mediated through presbyters or bishops. This, however, is still too indefinite; there are too many elements in the tradition, ethical and dogmatic. So a concentrated summary of the Bible and the rule of faith was needed in con­nection with the confession at baptism, the main sacrament at that time. This, of course, presupposes that the bishops who are responsible for the rule of faith and the baptismal creed have the gift of truth. They have it because they are the successors of the apostles. Here already we have a clear expression of the episcopal doctrine of apostolic succession. The apostolic succession is most visible in the Roman Church, which was founded by Peter and Paul, according to these anti-gnostic fathers. Irenaeus says about this church: "To this church all nations must come, because of its greater principality, the church in which the apostolic tradition has been always preserved."

Thus we have a very impressive system of authorities: the Bible, the apostolic tradition, the rule of faith, the baptismal creed, and the bishops, created in the struggle against the Gnostics. What is astonishing is how early all this happened.

40              A History of Christian Thought

2. The Montanist Reaction

A reaction set in against the developing order, a reaction of the Spirit against the order, represented by a man named Montanus. This reaction was very serious, as evident in the fact that Tertul-han himself later became a Montaiiist. This Montanistic reaction against- ecclesiastical fixation of Christianity runs throughout church history in one form or other.

The Montanists had two basic ideas: the Spirit and the "end". The Spirit was suppressed by the organized church. There was a fear of spiritual movements because the Gnostics had claimed to have the Spirit. It was denied that prophets necessarily have an ecstatic character. A churchman at this time wrote a pamphlet to the effect that it is unnecessary for a prophet to speak in ecstasy. The church was unable to understand the prophetic Spirit any more. It was understandably afraid of the Spirit because in the name of the Spirit all kinds of disruptive elements entered into the church.

The other idea was that of the "end". After the expectation of Jesus and the apostles that the end was very imminent had been disappointed, the apostolic fathers began to establish themselves in the world. The disappointment that the end did not come caused great difficulties and led to the necessity of creating a worldly church, a church that is able to live in the world. Mon-tanism was a reaction against this worldly church. But the Mon-tanists experienced what the earlier Christians had experienced; the end they expected did not come. So they also had to establish themselves in the world; they also became a church. It was a church with a strict discipline, and to a certain extent it was an anticipation of the sectarian type of church which arose during the Reformation and in later Protestantism. The Montanists be­lieved that they represented the period of the Paraclete, following the periods of the Father and the Son. The sectarian revolutionary movements in the church have generally made the same claim; they represent the age of the Spirit.

It happens, however, that when the attempt is made to fix the content of what the Spirit teaches, the result is extreme poverty. This happened, for example, to the Quakers after their initial ecstatic period. When the content is fixed it turns out that there

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church       41

is nothing new, or what is new is more or less some form of a rational moralism. This happened to George Fox and his fol‑

lowers, and to all ecstatic sects. In the second generation they become rational, moralistic, and legalistic; the ecstatic element disappears; not much remains that is creative compared to the classical period of apostolic Christianity. The Montanists fixed their poor contents in new hooks; they adopted the idea of a prophetic succession, Of course, this is self-contradictory, because succession is an organizational principle, whereas prophecy is an anti-organizational principle. The attempt to combine them was unsuccessful, and will always he unsuccessful.

The Christian Church excluded Montanism. However, its vic­tory over Montanism also resulted in loss, This loss is visible in four ways: (1) The canon was victorious against the possibility of new revelations. The solution of the Fourth Gospel that there will be new insights, always standing under the criticism of the Christ, was at least reduced in power and meaning. (2) The tradi­tional hierarchy was confirmed against the prophetic spirit. This meant that the prophetic spirit was more or less excluded from the organized church and had to flee into sectarian movements. (8) Eschatology became less significant than it had been in the apostolic age. The ecclesiastical establishment became much more important. The expectation of the end was reduced to an appeal to each individual to be prepared for his end which can come at any moment. The idea of an end of history was not important in the church after that. (4) The strict discipline of the Montanists was lost, giving way to a growing laxity in the church. Here again something happened which has frequently happened in the history of the church. Small groups arise with a strict dis­cipline; they are regarded with suspicion by the church; they form themselves into larger churches; then they lose their original disciplinary power in themselves.

3. God the Creator

We must now deal with what the anti-gnostic fathers taught within the framework of the strict safeguards which they built up against gnosticism. The Gnostics had contrasted God the Father and God the Savior. Now the gnostic theory was called a bla.sphemia creatoris, a blasphemy of the Creator. This ought

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to be kept in mind by all neo-orthodox theologians today. There is much gnostic Marcionism in them, that is, a dualistic blasphemy of the Creator God. They put the Savior God in such opposition to the Creator God that, although they never fall into any real heresy, they implicitly blaspheme the divine creation by identify­ing it with the sinful state of reality. Against this tendency Irenaeus said that God is one; there is no duality in him. Law and gospel, creation and salvation, are derived from the same God.

This one God is known to us not speculatively but existentially. He expresses this in saying: "Without God, you cannot know God." God is never an object. In all knowledge it is he who knows in us and through us. Only he can know himself; we may partici­pate in his knowledge of himself. But he is not an object whom we can know from the outside. God is unknown according to his greatness, his absoluteness, his unconditional character. He is known according to his love in which he comes to us. Therefore, in order to know God, you must be within God; you must partici­pate in him. You can never look at him as an object outside yourself. This God has created the world out of nothing. This phrase "out of nothing" is not a description of the way God created, but a protective concept that is only negatively meaning­ful, It means that there is no prior resisting matter out of which God created the world, as in paganism. In creating the world God is not dependent on a matter which resisted the form which the demiurge, the world-builder, wanted to impose on it. The Chris­tian idea is that everything is created directly by God without any resisting matter. God is the cause of everything. His purpose, the immanent telos of everything, is the salvation of mankind. The result is that the creation is good, and the Creator God is the same as the Savior God. We should see that the blasphemy of the Creator, new or old, is always based on a confusion of the created goodness of the world with its distortion.

This one God is a trias, a trinity. The word trinitas appears first in Tertullian. Although God is one, he is never alone. Irenaeus says: "There is always with him the word and the wis­dom, the Son and the Spirit, through which he has made every­thing freely and spontaneously." God is always a living God and, therefore, never alone, never a dead identity with himself. He always has his word and his wisdom with himself. These are symbols of his spiritual life, his self-manifestation and his self‑

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church       48

actualization. The motive of the doctrine of the trinity is to speak of God as living and to make understandable the presence of the divine as a living, creative ground. According to Irenaeus, these three are one God because they have one dynamis, one power of being, essence, or potentiality. "Potentiality" and "dynamics" are the Latin and Greek terms respectively for what we can best translate as "power of being".

Tertullian spoke of the one divine substance which develops itself in the triadic economy. "Economy" means "building-up". The divinity builds up eternally in a unity. Any polytheistic interpretation of the trinity is sharply rejected. On the other hand, God is established as a living God, not as a dead identity. Thus Tertullian used the formula una substantia, tres personae to speak of God.

Contrary to gnosticism, man is created good. He has fallen by his own freedom. Man who is mortal by nature was supposed to become immortal through obedience to God, remaining in para­dise and participating in the food of the gods, in the tree of life. But he lost this power by disobedience to God. So it must be regained. Immortality, as we said before, is not a natural quality but something which must be received as a gift from the realm of the eternal. There is no other way to get it. Sin is spiritual as well as carnal. Adam has lost the possible similitudo (similitude) to God, namely, immortality, but he has not lost the natural image, because the natural image makes him human. Here we have Irenaeus' famous distinction between similitudo and imago. These two words are used in the Vulgate translation of Genesis 1:26, which states that God made man in his image, after his likeness. Irenaeus places a theological interpretation on these two words. Every man has the natural image of God; man as man, as a finite, rational being, is able to have a relationship to God. Similitudo means that man has the possibility of becoming similar to God. The main point in this similarity with God is eternal life. If someone gets eternal life, he overcomes his natural mortality and participates in the eternal life as a gift of God.

4. The History of Salvation

The history of salvation was described in three or four coven­ants. The first covenant is that which is given with creation.

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This is the natural law which is ultimately the law of love innate in man. Secondly, the law is reinstated after it faded away when man lost his immediate innocent participation in it. The third' stage is law as it is re-established in Christ, after Judaism dis­torted the law of Sinai. The law is the same throughout, namely, the law of love innate in man by nature. God does not give arbitrary commandments, but he restates those commandments which are identical with man's essential nature and which are, therefore, valid under all circumstances. Then, in Tertullian, we have a fourth covenant, because he became a Montanist. This is the covenant with the Paraclete, the divine Spirit, who gives the new law at the end of the days. This means that the history of salvation was understood as the education of mankind in terms of a law. This made it possible to understand why the Old Testa­ment belongs to the Christian Scriptures and why philosophy belongs to Christianity. They are all stages in the one history of salvation. They are not negated but confirmed by the revelation in Christ. The problems connected with a dualism were solved in terms of a history of salvation in different covenants. There is not only one revelation. The biblical idea of kairos means that there is a revelation adapted to each new covenant situation, first, that of paradise, then that of the elected nation, then that of the followers of Christ, and, sometimes, that of the divine Spirit. In each case there is a different kairos, a different "right time". This kind of thinking liberates Christianity from a nar­rowness in which its own revelation is declared to be the only one and is not viewed within the whole context of the history of revelation. Such a narrowness leads, as in the case of Marcion and, partly at least, in the Barthian school, to an isolation of revelation over against the whole history of mankind.

Turning to christology, Irenaeus said: "The invisible of the Son is the Father; the visible of the Father is the Son." This is eternally so. There is always something which is potentially visible in God, and there is always something which remains as mystery and abyss in God. These are two sides which symbolically are distinguished as Father and Son. The Son who is eternally the visible of the Father becomes manifest in the personal appear­ance of Jesus as the Christ. The anti-gnostic fathers emphasized the monotheistic aspect in Christianity more strongly than the Apologists because they had to deal with Christian polytheistic

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church       45

tendencies. The Apologists, with their Logos doctrine, were drawn into a dangerous approximation to polytheistic thinking, or tritheistic, if the Spirit is handled in the same way as the Logos. In the line of thought which leads from John to Ignatius and Irenaeus, the Logos is not so much a lesser hypostasis, an inferior form or power of being in God, but is much more God himself as revealer, as his self-manifestation.

Irenaeus called salvation artakephalaiösis, or fecapitutatio, meaning recapitulation. He was pointing to Ephesians 1.10 which speaks of all things in heaven and earth being gathered up into Christ. Irenaeus built his idea of the history of salvation on these words in Ephesians. It means that the development which was broken in Adam is resumed by Christ and fulfilled in him. In Christ the new mankind has started. That which man­kind was supposed to become, once disrupted by Adam, has finally reached its fulfillment in Christ. However, not only man­kind but the whole cosmos finds its fulfillment in the appearance of the Christ. In order to accomplish this, Christ had to partici­pate in the nature of Adam. Thus Christ is the beginning of the living as Adam is the beginning of the dead. Adam is fulfilled in Christ; this means that Christ ts the essential man, the man Adam was to become but did not actually become. Adam was not in a state of fulfillment fmm the beginning; he lived in childish inno­cence. Here we have a profound doctrine of what I calla trans­cendent humanism, a humanism which says that Christ is the fulfillment of essential man, of the Adamic nature. Such a ful­fillment became necessary because a break occurred in the devel­opment of man; Adam fell away from what he was to become. The childish innocence of Adam has been lost; but the second Adam can become what he was to become, fully human. And we can become fully human through participation in this full human­ity which has appeared in Christ. This includes eternal life, similitude with God with respect to participation in infinity.

When I go into these matters, I am always surprised how much better the theology of the ancient church was than the popular theology which developed in the nineteenth century, how much profounder and more adequate to the paradox of Christianity, without becoming irrationalistic, nonsensical, or absurd. Of course, there were absurd elements on the borderline, on the edges, with respect to miracles, etc. But the central position was

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utterly profound, namely, the understanding of Christ, not as an accidental event or a transmutation of a highest being, but as fulfilled or essential humanity, therefore always related to Adam, to man's essential being and to his fallen state.

S. Trinity and Christology

Tertullian provided the fundamental formula for the trinity and christology. He used juristic language in a skillful way so that it became decisive for the future. The formulae of Tertullian entered the Latin creeds of the Roman Catholic Church. "Let us preserve the mystery of the divine economy which disposes the unity into trinity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, three not in essence but in grade, not in substance but in form." Here we have for the first time the word trinitas, introduced by Tertul-lian into ecclesiastical language. He also spoke of the unity in the trinity, denying any form of tritheistic tendencies. Instead, he speaks of "economy", an important word in ancient Christian theology. To speak of divine economy is to speak of God "build­ing up" his manifestations in periods of history. In a living and dynamic way the trinity is built up in historical manifestations. But in this trinity there is but one divine essence. If we translate "essence" by "power of being", we have what this word meant. There is one divine power of being, and each of the three eco­nomic manifestations of the power of being participates in the full power of being.

God has eternally the ratio (reason) or logos in himself. It is an inner word. This is, of course, the characteristic of spiritual existence. If we say God is Spirit, we must also say he is trini-tarian; he has the word within himself and has the unity with his self-objectivation. The word proceeds from God just as the beam proceeds from the sun. In the moment of creation the Son be­comes a second person, and the Spirit a third person. The divine substance or essence, meaning power of being, is in all three persons. Tertullian's term "persona" does not mean the same as our word "person". You and I are persons because we are able to reason, to decide, to be responsible, etc. Such a concept of per­son was not applied to God at all, nor to the three hypostases in God. What then does persona mean? Persona, like the Greek word prosöpon, is the mask of the actor through which a special

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      47

character is acted out. Thus we have three faces, three counten­ances, three characteristic expressions of the divine, in the pro­cess of divine self-explication. These are the classical formulae of trinitarian monotheism.

Tertullian also provided basic formulae with respect to christo-logy. He said: "We see a double essence, not confused but

united in one person, in God and the man Jesus." In this statement

we have the formula of the doctrine of the two natures, or powers of being, in the one person of Christ. Here persona means one

individual face or being of personal character, namely, Jesus. In

this person two different powers of being are united, one divine and one human. Each of these powers is independent; neither is

confused with the other; yet they are united in one person. If we ask how this is possible, we are anticipating the later discus­sions.

On the question whether the incarnation is a metamorphosis, that is, God becoming man, or the acceptance of a human essence,

Tertullian decides for the latter. Like most of the theologians

Tertullian is certain that God is ultimately unchangeable, and that the two powers of being must be preserved in their respec‑

tive identities. Jesus as man is not a transformed God; he is a real

man, true man. He can be true God also, but he is not a mixture of both. If the Logos were transfigured or transformed into some‑

thing else, he would have changed his nature; but the Logos remains Logos in the man Jesus. So Tertullian thinks more in terms of the Logos adopting a human nature instead of the mytho­logical idea of transmutation.

According to Irenaeus the saving power is the divine Spirit who dwells in the church and renews the members out of what

is old into the newness in Christ. Christ gives them life (zoe) and

light (phos); he gives them the new reality. This is God's work in man, accepted by faith. Therefore, no law is needed since we

love God and the neighbor. That is the Pauline element, but it is

not strong enough to overcome the anti-Pauline elements. Ulti­mately, the new being is mystical and ethical. In this sense

Erenaeus' conception is the highest form of early Catholicism, but it is not Protestant. In Protestantism the renewal takes place by justification through faith.

Irenaeus thinks of the process of salvation in terms of a mysti­cal regeneration into immortality. In contrast to this, Tertullian

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speaks of a wholesome discipline as the content of the Christian life. He speaks of a process of education by the law, and the reality of obedience to it is eternal life. Here we have Tertullian, the Roman juristic mind, who likes the law, and at the same time the ascetic pietist, who became a Montanist. In Irenaeus we have mystical participation, in Tertullian subjection to the law. These are the two sides of early Catholicism. The second aspect, subjection to law, became decisive just before the Protestant breakthrough. But the Protestant movement denied also the Irenaean form, and returned to the other side of Paul, namely, justification through faith.

In Tertullian we have the Roman Catholic form of Jewish legalism. The relationship to God is legal. Christianity is merely the new law. Christianity returns to the religion of the law, but is prevented from becoming simply another Jewish system of laws and rules by the sacramental salvation. Therefore, he could say: "the evangelium, the Gospel, is our special law." Trans­gressing the law means that guilt is produced and punishment is required. "But if we do his will, he will make himself our debtor. Then we can gain merits." There are two classes of demands: precepts and counsels. In this way every man can acquire a treasury of holiness in which he returns to Christ what Christ has given him. The virtue of the Christian is crowned. The sacrifice of asceticism and martyrdom moves God to do good to us. "In the measure in which you do not spare yourselves, in this measure, believe me, God will spare you." Here at the end of the second century we meet many ideas that were to become im­portant in later Roman Catholicism. Already we have the idea that while the precepts are for everybody, there are special counsels for monks; and we already have the idea of Christ as the new law. Roman Catholicism emerged quickly in Christianity. The reason for this is that Roman Catholicism was the form in which Christianity could be readily received, including all the Roman and Greek forms of thinking and living.

6. The Sacrament of Baptism

At this time baptism is still the most important sacrament. It removes past sins. Baptism has two meanings: it means the wash­ing away of sins and the reception of the divine Spirit. This, of

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course, presupposed the baptismal confession of the creed, the consciousness of one's sins and the certainty of the Savior.

The practice of baptism had three characteristics: (1) One lays the hand on the candidate for baptism, and gives him sacred oil, the medium which makes the reception of the Spirit possible. (2) One rejects the devil, with all his pomp and angels. One leaves the demonic sphere; this meant the end of one's participation in paganism. This was not simply a moralistic formula; it went much deeper. It was breaking away from the demons which ruled the world, the rejection of polytheistic paganism. (3) The third element in baptism is the unity of forgiveness and regen­eration. The pagan existence has come to an end, and the Christian existence begins. At baptism the preparatory stage of introduction into the church has come to an end. Those who are baptized are called the teleioi, the perfect ones. For they have reached the telos, the inner aim, of man's existence itself.

The theory of baptism in the anti-gnostic fathers was that the Spirit is united with the water, as it was in the gnostic mysteries. It was easy for Tertullian, with his Stoic background, to think of the Spirit as a material force in the water. This force somehow physically extinguishes the former sins and physically gives the Spirit. Here we see what has been called Tertullian's "material­ism". This is important because it made infant baptism possible. If the water is the saving power, the child can be saved as much as the adult. It was not without some hesitation that Tertullian accepted this doctrine. But Christianity had to accept it as soon as it ceased to baptize individuals, one by one, called out of paganism, but baptized "all nations". Then the children cannot be excluded. However, if children are to be included, it is neces­sary to have a completely objective theory of baptism, because infants are not subjects who can decide.

The Lord's Supper was for Irenaeus the physical mediation of immortality. In it the union with heavenly and divine elements takes place.

These ideas are the making of the Roman Church; in the long run they were to become very influential. The Catholic Church was ready around the year A.D. 300. For this reason we cannot say that Protestantism is a restatement of the early centuries. The Catholic features were powerful very early. This is one of the reasons that the "middle way" of Anglicanism, which in itself

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would be an ideal solution to-the schism of the churches, does not work. The so-called agreement of the first five centuries is by no means an agreement with the principles of the Reformation. Therefore, if someone says that we should unite by going back to the development which runs from Irenaeus to Dionysius the Areopagite, I would say that he had better become a Catholic, because Protestantism cannot do that. In these first centuries there are many elements which Protestantism cannot accept, for example, in the doctrine of the church, the system of authorities, the theory of the sacraments, not so much with respect to trinity and christology, although the implications are present there also.

E. NEO-PLATONISM

The end of Greek philosophy reached a state in which philosophy had become religion, and religion had become mystical philo­sophy. So when philosophers now became Christian, they could use a philosophy which was already half-religious. Philosophy at this time was not the philosophy taught today by empiricists, logical positivists, or naturalists. In the period of the New Testa­ment philosophy itself included a religious attitude. This is why Christianity had to deal with philosophy, for it was a rival re­ligion. The name of this religious philosophy was Neo-Platonism. In Neo-Platonism, Platonic, Stoic, and Aristotelian ideas were brought into a system which was philosophical and religious at the same time. Neo-Platonism expressed the longing of the ancient world for a new religion. It expressed the dissolution of all parti­cular religions and at the same time the collapse of autonomous reason, the impossibility for reason to create by itself a new con­tent of life. Therefore, these philosophers became mystics and, as mystics, they tried to create a new religion under the imperial protection of Julian the Apostate. In doing this they had to clash with Christianity. The great Alexandrian theologians, Clement and Origen, met the challenge of Neo-Platonism, and used its concepts to express Christianity.

Neo-Platonism is important not only because of its influence on Origen, who produced the first great theological system, but because through Dionysius the Areopagite it influenced all later forms of Christian mysticism and most forms of classical Christian

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      51

theology, especially with respect to the doctrines of God, the world, and the soul. It is impossible to understand the further development of Christian theology without knowing something about Neo-Platonism, the last great attempt of paganism to express itself in terms of a philosophical theology, which was both science and life for the ancient mind.

Plotinus was the philosopher most responsible for the system of Neo-Platonism. There is not only a scientific and a religious side to it, but also a political aspect. The emperor, Julian the Apostate, tried to introduce the Neo-Platonic system against Christianity, which shows that he considered it not only as science or philo­sophy, but as an all-embracing system of religious elevation of the soul.

For Plotinus God is the transcendent One; he is the one who transcends every number, even the number "one" inasmuch as it is a number which includes 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. It is that which is beyond number, and for this he uses the word "one". Thus, whenever we hear the word "one' in mystical language, it is not to be understood as one number alongside others, but as that which transcends all numbers. The One points in particular to that which is beyond the basic cleavages of reality, the cleavage between subject and object, and between the self and the world. Therefore, the divine is the abyss of everything specific, the abyss in which everything definite disappears. But this abyss is not simply something negative; it is the most positive of all because it contains everything that is. When you read in mystical litera­ture about "transcendent nothingness", do not interpret this as "nothing" but as "no-thing", that is, nothing definite, nothing finite, but the ground of everything finite and definite. Since it is without differentiation within itself, it is immovable, unchange­able, and eternal. Out of this eternal ground of everything, in which everything disappears, all things have their origin at the same time. The whole system is a description of the way in which the world and all its forms originate in the ultimate ground of being. The first thing which is originated, like the light which is radiated out of the sun, is what in Greek is called the nous, which can be translated as "mind" or "spirit". It is the second principle after the ultimate principle, after the ground of being from which it has emanated. This second principle, the nous, is that in which the first principle, the eternal ground, looks at itself. It is the

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principle of the self-intuition of the eternal. Cod is manifest to himself in the principle of the nous. This self-intuition of the divine in the nous is the source of all forms and structures, of all possibilities and of what Plato called "ideas". These "ideas" are the essential potentialities of being. Everything true and beauti­ful is contained in the nous, in the divine mind and his eternal self-intuition. Not only are the universal essences—treehood, red­ness, etc.—in the eternal mind, but also the essences of the indivi­duals. In Cod is the form of each of us, independent of the changes in every moment of our lives, that form which a great painter would see and express in his portrait of us.

But there is a third principle which Plotinus called the "soul". The soul is the principle of life in all Creek thinking. It is not primarily an immortal substance, but the principle of movement. It is the principle which moves the stars, so the stars have souls; the principle which moves the animals and plants, so they also have souls; the principle which moves our bodies, so we have souls; the principle which moves the whole universe, so there is a world-soul. This soul-principle is midway between the nous and the bodily reality. It is the productive power of the existing world; it forms and controls matter, as our life-principle forms and controls every cell in our body. The soul of the world actualizes itself in many individual souls. Everything has an individual soul. These individual souls give movement and life to everything, but they all have their common principle in the world-soul.

This principle of soul, universally and individually, is the principle of ambiguity. Plotinus knew that life is ambiguous, that ambiguity is a definite characteristic of life. The soul is turned both toward the spirit (or nous) and toward matter. It looks in two directions, so to speak; it looks always to meaningful con­tents. In our language we call this man's spiritual life, expressed in knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, etc. At the same time it looks to our bodily existence and the whole world of material embodi­ment.

In this system of hierarchies, coming down from the ultimate to the mind and soul and matter, everything which is has a place. In this way Plotinus could place the whole mythological world into his system, after it was purified by philosophy. The gods of the pagans become limited powers of being which have their place in the whole of reality. This world is harmonious; it

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      53

is directed by the principle of providence. This union of provi­dence and harmony—the main principle of the Enlightenment and of the modern belief in progress—forms the basis of an opti­mistic world-view. This optimism immediately makes itself felt in another 'statement of Plotinus, namely, that the planetary forces, the demonic forces, are an illusion. They have no independent power; they are subjected to providence, just as Paul described it in Romans 8. The difference is that Plotinus derived this state­ment from his philosophy of cosmic harmony, while Paul derived it from the victorious triumph of Christ over the demons.

There are many different souls in the cosmos: mortal souls, such as plants, animals, and human beings, and immortal souls, such as the half-divine and divine beings of ancient mythology. These mythological gods are re-established in this system as powers of being. They do not contradict each other but have their definite place in this system of hierarchies.

The principle which orders this whole world, in terms of provi­dence, is the logos. The logos is the rational side of the nous or mind. It is not another hierarchy but is only the dynamic side of the flour; it is the principle of reason which organizes everything providentially and gives it its place. To use a modern expression, it is the natural law to which everything is subjected, in physics and living bodies. The nous is not the logos; it is the source of all contents, but the logos gives order to them. The logos is the more dynamic principle, the providentially working power which directs the natural and moral laws.

Because of its 'ambiguity the soul is able to turn away from the nous, and with it from its eternal source in the abysmal One. It can separate itself from its eternal origin and turn to the lower realms. Nature is the realm of the unconscious; it stands be­tween matter and the conscious soul. But nature has uncon­scious souls; in man alone the soul is completely conscious. This turning away of the soul from the nous toward matter, toward the bodily realm, is the source of evil. Evil is not a positive power; it is the negation of the spiritual. It is participation in matter, in non-being, in that which has no power of being by itself. Evil arises when the soul turns to non-being. Neither Greeks nor Christians could admit that evil is an ontological reality. The idea that there is a divine ground of evil, a divine being which produces evil, is the Manichaean heresy. Evil is non-being. When

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this statement is made, whether by Plotinus, Augustine, or my­self, the charge is made that this means that sin is not taken seriously, that sin is nothing. The sound of the word "non-being" conveys the impression to some that sin is imaginary, not real. However, a distortion of something which has being is as real as the undistorted state of that being, only it is not ontologically real. If sin were ontologically real, this would mean that there is a creative principle of evil, as in Manichaeism; but this is what the Christian doctrine of creation denies. Augustine said, "Esse qua esse bonum est", being as being is good. Evil is the distor­tion of the good creation.

Plotinus described this non-being (me on) as that which is matter and can become being. This non-being of which he speaks is that which as yet has no being and which resists against having being. He calls it that which lacks measure, limit, form. It is always in want, indefinite, hungry; it is the absolute poverty. In other words, evil is the presence of this non-being in our bodily existence. It is the absence of the power of being, the power of the good.

The soul turned toward this non-being because it believed that with its help it could stand upon itself. Thus, it separated itself from the ground and from the nous toward which it looked origi­nally. But the soul looks back and yearns for the ground from which it came. Lovingly the soul ascends to that which is worth being loved, namely, the ground and origin of being itself. When the soul reaches the ultimate aim of its longing, it becomes like Cod. He who has the ultimate intuition of the divine has become one with God. But this way is hard. This way goes first through the virtues, next to the ascetic purification. The ultimate union with God cannot be reached either by morals or by asceticism in this life. It can only be reached by grace, that is, when the divine power of the transcendent One grasps the mind in ecstasy. This happens only rarely, only in great experiences which cannot be forced.

In the highest ecstasy there happens what Plotinus calls the flight of the one to the One, that is, of us who are individual ones to the ultimate One who is beyond number. What is the telos, the inner aim, the goal, the purpose, of man's being? Plato had already given the answer: homoiösis tou theou kata to dynaton, that is, becoming similar to God as much as possible. This was also the aim of the mystery religions, in which the soul was sup‑

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church       55

posed to participate in the eternal One. This is the Alexandrian scheme of thought. It is a circle which starts in the abysmal One, descending by emanation through the 'hierarchies until the ambi­guous situation of the soul is reached, then through the soul fall­ing into the power of the material world, which is determined by non-being. The circle continues then through the elevation of the soul, back through all these different grades up to the highest one, and in ecstasy this goal is reached. We must keep this system in mind, for we cannot understand the relationship of Christianity to mysticism and to Greek philosophy apart from it.

F. CLEMENT AND ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA I. Christianity and Philosophy

The Neo-Platonic system was developed in Alexandria. Am-monius Saccas was the teacher of both Plotinus and Origen. Origen was the great theologian and philosopher of the school in Alexandria. This was a catechetical school, a kind of theo­logical seminary. The first great teacher in this school was Clement of Alexandria. Clement used the Logos doctrine in a radical way. In this respect he was more dependent on Stoicism than on the Platonic school. God is the One who is beyond numbers. The Logos, however, is the mediator of everything in which the divine becomes manifest. The Logos, he said, is the itian-loving organ of God, and therefore the educator of mankind in past and present. The Logos, as the self-manifestation of the divine, is always working in human minds. The Logos prepared the Jews by the law, and the Greeks by their philosophy. He has prepared all nations in some way. The Logos is never absent I n) in people.

When Clement speaks of philosophy, he does not have in mind ii particular philosophy, but that which is true in all philosophers. In his thought many elements from Greek philosophy are pitixed with biblical materials. He quoted whole sections from Stoic sources. He introduced Christianity not only into philosophy but also into a philosophical way of life. Phi loso phein was defined by Clement as a striving for a perfect life. Living a philosophical life in the late Greek development was striving to become as near to ()d as possible. Clement's idea was to live according to the

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Logos, a logikon life; perhaps we could translate this as a "mean­ingful life", a life in terms of objective meanings. Christians start first with faith, pistis. Pistis is not adequately translated by "faith". It is a state of being in faith. In this sense faith is a state of partici­pation in the reality of the new being. It includes conversion, ascetic tendencies, passions, and hope. This is the presupposition of everything else in Christianity, and here Clement deviates from the Creek philosophers. Living according to the Logos means participation in the realm of faith and love, that is, in the realm of the church. The Alexandrian theologians were not independent philosophers, but members of the Christian Church. Therefore, they participated in the state of faith which is presupposed by all knowledge. However, the state of faith is insufficient since it is un(lerstcxxl only as assent and obedience. A real participation demands something more, a drive toward knowledge or gnösis. The Christian is the perfect "gnostic". Gnösis is a cognitive faith, a faith which develops its contents cognitively. It is a scientific explanation of the traditions of faith. "Scientific" here is used not in the sense of the natural sciences but in the methodo­logical sense. Everybody is on the way of this development, but only a few reach the aim. The perfect ones are only those who are, as Clement says, "gnostics according to the ecclesiastical canon". This means that philosophers are bound by the ecclesi­astical tradition which they accepted when they entered the church. The highest good for these perfect gnostics is the know­ledge of God. This knowledge is not a theoretical knowledge in terms of arguments and analyses, but a participation in God. It is not cpistemë, that is, scientific knowledge; it is gnosis, that is, mystical or participating knowledge. It is not a gnãris of free speculation but of participation in the congregation and in God. The tradition remains the canon, that is, the criterion, and the church is the mother without which gnösis is unattainable.

Clement's thought is a great example of a synthesis of Christian thinking and Greek philosophy. Christianity had to cope with Neo-Platonism as a universal and extremely impressive system. All the values of the past were united in it. Christianity had to use it and conquer it at the same time. This was done by the school of Alexandria. Christianity was elevated to a state of highest education.

Porphyry was one of the most important Neo-Platonists. He

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acknowledged the high educational standing of the Alexandrian school, especially of Origen. He expressed regrets, however, that Origen would live in a barbaric and irrational way as a Christian. Participation in the Christian congregation was incomprehensible to him as a Neo-Platonist. Porphyry acknowledged Origen's philo­sophical creativity; he said that Origen "hellenized" by interpret­ing the strange myths of the Bible by Greek thought. Clement and Origen were both Greek philosophers, and at the same time faithful and obedient members of the Christian Church. They had no doubt that it is possible to combine these two things.

Origen begins his system with the question of sources. He takes the sources much more seriously than Clement. The sources are the biblical writings and their summary in the ecclesiastical teach­ing and preaching. The ancient "rule of faith" provided the systematic scheme of his thought, but the Scriptures are the basis of its contents. The first step for the true theologian is the acceptance of the biblical message. Nobody can be a theologian who does not belong to the church. A free-soaring philosopher is not a Christian theologian. But more than this is required of the theologian. He must also try to understand things philosophically, and that means for Origen in terms of Neo-Platonic philosophy.

2. The Allegorical Method

The basic authority for Origen was Scripture. He introduced the famous distinction between three meanings of the Scripture. (1) The somatic, literal or philological sense. Everybody can understand the somatic sense (from söma, meaning "body"); it is identical with the literal historical meaning. (2) The psychic or moral sense. The moral sense means the application of the bibli­cal text to our situation, its existential application to ourselves. (3) The pneumatic or spiritual sense. It is understandable only to those who are perfect, not in the moral sense but in the mysti­cal sense. There are some cases in which the biblical text has only a mystical meaning; then this coincides with the literal sense. Ordinarily, however, the mystical sense has to be distinguished from the literal meaning. The mystical sense is to be found through the allegorical method; this is a method of finding the hidden meaning behind the texts.

This doctrine of the allegorical method, or the idea of a mystical

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meaning in the texts, was strongly attacked by the sixteenth-century reformers, and it is alien to our realistic philological mind. What is the reason behind the allegorical method? This is easily understood. It arose in order to make a text that is abso­lutely authoritative applicable to the situation of the interpreter. It became necessary to find a meaning other than the literal one. Every sermon does this with the biblical texts. Today it is done by those interpreters of the Old Testament who find the christo-logical pronouncements of the New Testament in it. It is almost inescapable; if you have a text that is an absolute authority, and its literal meaning does not say anything to you, then consciously or unconsciously you use a method which transfers the original meaning into an existential meaning. Of course, this can lead to a complete undercutting of the authority of the text. For this reason the Lutheran Reformation re-established the genuine, literal, philological text as the real authority. But when we examine the dogmatic statements and their proofs derived from the Bible that we find in orthodox or fundamentalist authors, we notice immediately that they do exactly what Origen did; they use a method which interprets the Bible beyond itself. Only if you are completely honest can you have the literal text, and then say, "This does not say anything to us," or "We must say some­thing else; we recommend beyond the text, and we do not mean to express a hidden meaning in the text." I think this is the only consistent attitude. But think of another example—the American Constitution and its Amendments. They have absolute, legal validity, but in order to make them applicable, there is the Supreme Court which interprets them. Interpreting always means applying something to the present situation. The justices of the Supreme Court do not apply the allegorical method; instead they speak of the "spirit" of the law, and the spirit of the law may often contradict the letter of the law.

There are two classes of Christians: (1) The many simple ones, who accept on authority the biblical message and the teachings of the church without understanding them fully. They take the myths literally. As Origen said, they prefer the healing miracles to the story of Jesus going with his three apostles to the mount of transfiguration, which is an allegorical or metaphorical expres­sion for those who go beyond the literal meaning to a trans­formed interpretation of it. Origen referred to the attitude of

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the primitive believers as "mere faith". This represents a lower degree of Christian perfection. All Christians begin at this level. (2) There are those to whom the charisma of gnosis, the grace of knowledge, is given. In this way the converted, educated Greek becomes the perfect Christian, but he always does it on the basis of faith. This concept of faith is different from the meaning of faith in Protestantism. Here faith means the acceptance of doe-trines, whereas in Protestantism faith is acceptance of the re­uniting grace of God. For Origen the first step is the acceptance of authority; the second is the autonomous rational understanding of the biblical message. The second step does not do away with the first step, but is possible only on the basis of it.

3. The Doctrine of God

The first doctrine in Origen's system was the doctrine of God. God is being-itself, and therefore beyond everything that is. He is beyond knowledge, because knowledge presupposes the cleav­age between subject and object. He is beyond change and pas­sion. He is the source of everything. But he has his Logos, his inner word, his self-manifestation. This Logos makes God mani­fest first to himself and then to the world. The Logos is the crea­tive power of being; all powers of being are united in him. The whole spiritual world is united in the Logos. It is the universal principle of everything in particular, of anything that has being. This divine Logos radiates eternally from the ground of being, from the divine abyss, as splendor radiates from the source of light. Therefore, one is not supposed to say: "There was a time when the Son did not exist." To say this is to deny the eternity of the Logos. There never was a time in which the Son, the eternal Logos, did not exist.

The eternal Logos is eternally generated out of the divine sub­stance. He is not created "out of nothing"; he is not finite. He has the same substance with the Father. Here the formula homoousios tO patri (being of one substance with the Father) first arises. In spite of the eternity of the Logos, however, the Logos is less than the Father. Only the Father is without origin; he is not even generated. He is auto theos, God by himself, whereas the Son is God by the Father. The Son is the picture of the goodness or essence or nature of God, but not God himself.

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Thus, we have two trends in this Origenistic thinking. First, the Son is co-eternal with the Father; secondly, the Son has a kind of lesser validity and power of being than the Father. The Son is the highest of all generated realities, but he is less than the Father. The same thing is true of the Spirit, who is working in the souls of the saints. Although the religious tradition of the congregations demands that the trias (the three) be the object of adoration, the Spirit is called less than the Son and the Son less than the Father. And sometimes the highest spiritual beings are even called gods. This means that two principles are in conflict in Origen's thought. The one is the divinity of the Savior; he must be divine in order to be able to save. The other is the scheme of emanation. There are degrees of emanation from the absolute, the Father, down to the lowest levels. The line of division between the highest three (Father, Son and Spirit) and the rest of spiritual beings is somewhat arbitrary.

The rational natures, or spirits, which are eternal were origin­ally equal and free, but they fell away from their unity with God in different degrees of distance. As result of their revolt in heaven against God, they may have fallen into material bodies. This is their punishment and at the same time the way of their purifica­tion. The human soul is the mediation between these fallen spirits and the human body. The human soul is the spirit which has become cold. That is, the intensive fire, which is the symbol for the divine Spirit, is reduced to a life process. The fall is a transcendent fall. It precedes our existence in time and space. And it is a free fall; it is decided in freedom. The freedom is not lost by the fall, but it is actual and present in all concrete actions. In these concrete actions the transcendent fall becomes historical reality. We could say that the individual act represents the eter­nal nature of the fall. In other words, our individual existence in time and space has a prelude in heaven. The decisive thing about us has already happened when we appear on earth. This has particular reference to sin. Sin is based on the transcendent fall. This doctrine of the transcendent fall is difficult to understand for people who have grown up in nominalistic thinking. It is understandable only if one realizes that transcendent powers are realities and not individual things. There is a profound meaning in this doctrine which makes it necessary as a symbol in Christian theology. It means that our human existence and the existence of

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reality as a whole are considered not only as creation but also as guilt and judgment. When we look at the world, we see that it is universally fallen. Its fallenness penetrates through everything, even through nature outside of man. If we ask: Where did it come from? Why is the fall universal? Why are there no exceptions? Then the answer is: Because the fall precedes the creation, just as the fall follows the creation. Origen has two myths of the fall. The one is transcendent; mythologically speaking, it is not in space. It is the eternal transition from union with God to separa­tion from God. The other is the immanent, inner-historical fall. The transcendent fall becomes actual through special acts on the historical plane. Sin is spiritual, but the bodily and social exist­ence strengthens sin. It is transcendent and a destiny which, like every destiny, is united with freedom.

As in Plotinus, sin for Origen is a turning away from God. It is not something positive. Being evil means being without goodness. Sin, therefore, has a double relation to creation. With respect to the creation of the free and equal spirits, creation precedes the fall; with respect to the bodily world, creation follows the fall and follows the freedom of the spirits. On account of the freedom of the spirits, it is possible for the fall to happen again even in eternity. The end of the world process is not necessarily the end of history. The fall may repeat itself, and then the whole process starts over again. In these ideas we see the cyclical thinking of Greek philosophy with respect to history. This way of thinking was not overcome by Origen, as it was done later by Augustine.

4. Christologg

The most difficult part of Origen's thought has to do with his christology. The Logos unites itself with the soul of Jesus, who is an eternal spirit as everyone else is. He is pre-existent as all souls are. But the Logos unites himself with just this soul. The soul of the man Jesus has received the Logos completely. The soul of Jesus has merged into the power and the light of the Logos. This is a mystical union which can be emulated in all saints. The soul mediates between the Logos of God and the body of man. In this way there are two sharply separated natures united in Jesus. The statement of the Fourth Gospel that the Logos became flesh is a literal way of speaking. The froth is that the Logos took

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on flesh so much that it could be said that he had become it. This is more like adoptioriistic thinking. Popular feeling in the East, on the other hand, wanted to have a God on earth who walks with us, not a divine transcendent power who merely takes on flesh, and then returns after he has taken it on. But for Origen this idea was unacceptable because the Logos can never cease to be also outside of Jesus. The Logos is the form of everything that has form. After the incarnation the Logos ceased to be a man, but this is somehow the case  with all spiritual beings, who for this reason are called gods. But if they are gods, where does the dividing line come between them and the third person of the trinity? This problem was not solved, and could not be solved on the basis of the doctrine of emanation. In the doctrine of emana­tion there is a continuous going down and returning. Christianity, however, belonged to monotheism. How can monotheism be maintained if there are two emanations which are lower than God and at the same time divine?

When men follow the example of the Logos, they themselves become logikoi, that is, determined by meaning, reason, and creative power. They are led back to deification. However, Jesus had to do something else to make this possible for men. He had to give his body as a sacrifice. To whom did he give it? To Satan, as a ransom! Satan demands such a price for letting the others go free; but Satan was betrayed. Satan was unable to keep Jesus, because Jesus was pure and therefore not within the pale of Satan's power. This idea of the betrayal of Satan was not only a theological notion in Origen but was also to be found in popular piety. The Middle Ages was full of stories of how the peasants, especially their wives, betrayed the devil when lie came, so he had to leave them alone. To us this seems to be a grotesque mythological idea, and it certainly is if taken literally. But it con­tains a profound religious insight, namely, that the negative element can never ultimately prevail; it cannot prevail because it lives from the positive. When Satan takes Jesus into his power, he cannot keep in his power that from which be himself lives, namely, the divine nature. This shows the ultimate futility of sin. It cannot indefinitely keep in its control the positive power of being, because this power of being is derived from the good. The good and the power of being are one and the same thing. So the meaning of Origen's doctrine is that it is impossible for Satan

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to prevail ultimately, because he lives from that against which he strives to prevail.

Origen's interpretation of the Song of Songs in terms of the mystical love of the soul with Christ introduced into practical piety an idea which had a tremendous effect on later church history. The human soul is the bride of the Logos; this is the mean­ing of this love song. The soul receives the bridegroom in herself; she is sometimes visited by the Logos. That is, the divine Spirit is sometimes experienced by us, sometimes the soul is left alone, and no one visits her from the eternal. This is the first mystical interpretation of the Song of Songs that is directly related to the individual. In Judaism it was interpreted in terms of the relation between Cod and the synagogue. Here we see an example of the necessity for allegorical interpretation. The Song of Songs itself is nothing more than a Jewish love song, perhaps a wedding song which was performed at weddings or festivals. Yet it is in the canon and has divine authority. What can be done with it? The answer of the Jews was that it concerns the relationship between God and the nation. And in my old Luther Bible, which I love dearly because I received it for my baptism, there is something that is said in the superscription of the Song of Songs about the relationship between God and the church. But Origen interpreted it in terms of the mystical marriage between Christ and the soul. This is, of course, an example of mysticism, but it is a transforma­tion of non-Christian mysticism. It is concrete mysticism. The soul, being grasped by the Spirit of God, does not go beyond itself into the abyss of the divine, but the Logos, the concreteness of the divine, comes into the soul. This is the first step in what I call the "baptizing" of mysticism. Mysticism could be introduced into the church by becoming concrete. If Origen, and later on Bernard of Clairvaux, speaks of the mystical marriage between the Logos and the soul, the centered personality is not destroyed. It is pre­served, as in a marriage there is a complete union in which the persons are not destroyed.

5. Eschatology

The last point in Origen's theology is the doctrine of the final al of history and the world. He interprets this end spiritualisti-ally. The primitive imagery is interpreted in spiritual terms.

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The second coming of Christ is the spiritual appearance of Christ in the souls of the pious. He comes back to earth again and again, not in a dramatic appearance in physical terms, but into our souls. The pious people are fulfilled in a spiritual experience. The "spiritual body" of which Paul speaks is the essence or the idea of the material body. It is that which is painted by a great portrait painter. This is what partcipation of the body in the eternal means.

The punishment for sin is hell. Hell is the fire which burns in our conscience, the fire of despair because of our separation from God. This, however, is a temporary state of purging our souls. At the end everyone and everything will become spiritualized; the bodily existence will vanish. This famous doctrine of Origen is called apokatastasis ton panton, the restitution of all things. Because freedom is never cancelled out, there is the possibility that the whole process could start over again. Origen was a thoroughgoing philosopher of freedom, and this is what dis­tinguishes him from Augustine.

This spiritualization of eschatology was at least part of the reason that Origen became a heretic in the Christian Church, although he was its greatest theologian. The simple ones revolted against this great system of scientific theology. Monks and others did not want to yield their literalism with respect to the future life, the final catastrophe, the eternal judgment, etc. The motives of the simple ones were mixed. Partly this reaction to Origen's doctrine was due to a Jewish type of realism of bodily existence, against a Greek dualism, and partly it was motivated by the idea of revenge against those who were better off on earth. So they fought for a very realistic and literalistic idea of judgment, final catastrophe, and heaven. The church took their side and con­demned the heretical side of Origen.

G. DYNAMIC AND M0DALIsTIc MONAIICHIANISM

The simple ones revolted also against Origen's Logos christology which he had received from the Apologists. The laymen, the simple ones, were not interested in the cosmological speculations of the Logos concept. They wanted to have Cod himself on earth in Christ. This group was called the Monarchians, from monarchia, meaning "one man's rule". They wanted to have only one ruler,

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one God not three, as they felt was entailed by the Logos christo-logy. Against the Logos as a second God, they stressed the "monarchy" of the Father. This movement was a monotheistic reaction against the tritheistic danger of the Logos doctrine. The Logos doctrine hypostasized the Son beside God, and the Spirit beside both of them.

A man named Theodotus, a craftsman from Rome, thought that Jesus was a man on whom the divine Spirit descended in bap­tism, giving him the power of his messianic vocation. But this did not make him God. People of this type of thinking were most interested in those passages in the Gospels which deal with Jesus as a man. There is perhaps a connection between Theodotus and a group in Asia Minor called the Alogoi, so called because they denied the doctrine of the Logos. And since the Logos idea appeared in the Fourth Gospel, they rejected it. They tried to establish the true text and to stress its literal interpretation against allegorizing. They were in a sense predecessors of many later movements in church history which emphasized the humanity of Jesus, from the school of Antioch through medieval adop-tionism to modem liberal theology, over against the Logos as God becoming man. This is called the adoptionistic or dynamic christology. The man Jesus is adopted; he is filled by the Logos or the Spirit, but he is not God himself. This is the one wing of the monarchic, monotheistic reaction against the Logos Christology.

1. Paul of Samosata

Paul of Samosata, a bishop of Antioch, was in the line of think­ing we have just presented. He said that the Logos and Spirit are qualities of God, but not persons. They are eternal powers or potentialities in God, but not persons in the sense of independent beings. Jesus is a man who was inspired by this power from above. The power of the Logos inhabited Jesus as in a vessel, or as we live in houses. The unity that Jesus has with God is the unity of will and love; it is not a unity of nature, because nature has no meaning with respect to God. The more that Jesus developed in his own being, the more he received of the Spirit. Finally he achieved eternal union with God, and then he became the judge and received the status of God. He became God, but somehow he had to deserve to become God. Such an idea is, of

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course, the negation of the divine nature of the Savior. This denial is what made him a heretic, although many people of his time and even today would prefer to follow his way of thinking.

The Monarchian movement itself was split. The one side fol­lowed the adoptionist christology. It says that God, or the Logos, or the Spirit, adopted a fully human individual, made him into Christ, and gave him the possibility of becoming fully divine in his resurrection. In the West we find this way of thinking in Theodotus of Rome and in the East in Paul of Samosata. This christology started with human existence, then it emphasized those biblical statements which refer to the humanity of Christ, and finally it showed that Jesus was driven by the Spirit while on earth and in the end elevated into the divine sphere. The other side of Monarchianism is called modalistic Monarcliianism; it was more in line with the basic feeling of the masses of Christians. "Modalism" means that God himself appears in different modes, in different ways. It was also called Patripassianism, which means that the Father himself suffered in Christ. Another name for this movement is Sabellianism, from its leading representative, Sabel-lius. This became a widespread movement in the East and the West, and was a real danger to the Logos christology.

In the West there was a man named Praxeas with whom Tertullian was fighting. His idea was that God the Father himself was born through the Virgin Mary, that God the Father himself, the only God, suffered and died. To be Cod means to be the universal Father of everything. If we say that God was in Jesus, this means that the Father was in him. Therefore, Praxeas and his followers attacked the so-called ditheoi, those who believed in two Gods, and the tritheoi, those who believed in three Gods. They fought for the monarchy of Cod and for the full divinity of Christ in whom the Father himself appeared. Both notions had great popular support because the popular mind wanted to have God himself present on earth, a God who is with us, who partici­pates in our fate, and whom we can see and hear when we see and hear Jesus.

2. Sabellius

Sabellius was the leader of the modalistic Monarhians. He said: "The same is the Father, the same is the Son, the same is the

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Holy Spirit. They are three names, but names for the same reality. Do we have one or three Gods?" Father, Son, and Spirit are names, they are prosöpa (countenances, faces), but they are not independent beings. They are effective in consecutive energies; one follows the other, but the same God appears in different faces. It is the same God acting in history in three countenances. The prosOpon (countenance) of the Father appears in his work as creator and law-giver. The prosopon of the Son appears from the birth to the ascension of Jesus. Since the ascension of Jesus the countenance of the Spirit appears as the life-giver. Through' all appearances it is the same monarchic Father-God. Therefore, it is not adequate to speak of a trias in heaven. There is no transcendent, heavenly trinity. Instead of being transcendent, the trinity is historical or "economically", in the sense of oikonomia, building a house. The trinity is built up in history.

When Sabellius says that the same God is essentially in the Father, Son, and the Spirit, that there are only differences of faces, appearances, or manifestations, he is saying that they are all homoourios. That is, they all have the same essence, the same divine power of being. They are not three beings, but they have the same power of being in three manifestations. Although this trend of thinking was condemned, it has never disappeared. It reappeared as a strong monotheistic trend in Augustine and through him in Western theology in general. This modalistic thinking was in opposition to the Logos christology. If you are able to distinguish these two basic trends, you have an insight into what was involved in these seemingly incomprehensible struggles over an iota in homoous-ios and homoiouios. This was not a fight over abstract concepts, but it was a conflict between a monotheistic trend and the attempt to establish divine hier­archies between God and man. The East in general, dependent as it was on Plato, Plotinus, and Origen, was interested in hier­archical essences between God and man. This, of course, would make of Christ a demi-god, as we shall see. The West, and some groups in the East, were interested in the divine monarchy, on the one side, and in the humanity of Jesus, on the other. For us as Westerners, the problem of hierarchies is an abstract one, not a problem of living realities.

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H. THE TIUNiTARIAN CONTROVERSY

First we must see how the trinitarian problem developed after Origen. Origen was so powerful in his constructive thinking that he conquered all rivals, also the Monarchian and Sabellian theo­logians. And his christology was so impregnated with mystical piety that his statements could become formulae of a creed. We must not forget that when the Greek thinkers produced a con­fession or creed, it may seem like abstract philosophy to us, but to them it was the mystical intuition of essences, of powers of being. For instance, in Caesarea a creed was used in baptism which had added mystical formulae from Origen: "We believe in Jesus Christ, the Logos of God, God from God, Light from Light, Life from Life, first-born of all creatures, generated out of the Father before all generations." This is both philosophy and mysti­cism. It is Hellenistic and not classical Greek philosophy. Hellen­istic philosophy was united with the mystical traditions of the East. Therefore, seemingly abstract philosophical concepts could become mystical confessions.

This combination of mystical philosophy with a Christian con­fession was endangered when the emanation system of Origen was called into question from the point of view of Christian con­formism. For example, the eternity and the pre-existence of all spirits, the idea of the transcendent fall, the spiritual body-less resurrection, and the spiritualized eschatology, were all questioned. The place of the Logos was also questioned. Common-sense conformism, supported by the Monarchian reaction, demanded nothing less than God on earth. The theory of emanation by degrees, in hierarchies of powers of being, demanded something less than that which is ultimately transcendent, the One which is beyond everything given.

Out of this conflict a division occurred in the school of Origen between a left wing and a right wing of Origenistic thinking. The right wing said: Nothing is created or subordinate in the trias; nothing has been added which is not in the trinity from the begin­ning. The Son is not inferior to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son. Representatives of this position wanted what is today called a "high christology". The Son in Jesus is not less than the Father himself.

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The left wing opposed the traditionalism of the right wing; it was "scientific" and modernistic. This position held that the Son is essentially strange to the Father; he was a created being; he had no being before he was generated. This means that the Logos christology is developed in hierarchical terms. First, there is God the Father, the highest hierarchy, the eternal One beyond everything; then there is the Logos, the second hierarchy and inferior to the first; the Spirit is the third hierarchy, and inferior to the secoiicl. The immortal spirits form the fourth hierarchy, lower than the three others. These are the two wings involved in a great struggle which almost ruined the Christian Church.

Besides theological differences politics became involved in the trinitarian controversy. The attempt was made to find a practical way to solve the problem without going into its theoretical depths. This was the way of Roman eclecticism, something like our American pragmatism. Rome provided the direction for a practical solution which avoided the depths of Greek thinking. Dionysius, the pope in Rome, declared: "Two things must be preserved: the divine trias and the holy message of monarchy." These were the two main terms of the two wings, the one affirm­ing the holy message of the monarchy, which stood against the Logos christology, the other affirming the divine trias, which expressed the Logos christology. So the pope took the main formulae of both groups and said they must both be preserved. But he did not say how that was possible. This was practical church politics, an approach which finally prevailed, as we shall see. But it prevailed only after a tremendous conflict of almost eighty years. This conflict, which we call the Arian controversy, had a lasting effect on the church, and the decision which was finally reached became valid for all periods of Christianity.

1. Arianism

The Arian controversy was a unique and classical struggle which was caused by many motives. The politics of the emperors was involved in it. They needed a unity in the church because Christianity had by this time become the favored religion of the Roman Empire. This threatening division in the church would split the whole empire into pieces, it was feared. Personal feuds between bishops and theologians were involved. There was also

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a conflict between a narrow traditionalism and an unrestrained speculation. A strong emphasis on theoretical solutions to prob­lems collided with popular monastic fanaticism. But that is not the whole story. The really decisive issue, its basic meaning and permanent significance, had to do with the question: How is salvation possible in a world of darkness and mortality? This has been the central question ever since the apostolic fathers, and it was the question involved in the great trinitarian and christo-logical controversies.

Athanasius, the great foe of Anus, answered that salvation was possible only on one condition, namely, that the Son of God was made man in Jesus so that we might become God. This is pos­sible only if the Logos is eternal, if it is really God who has ap­peared to us in Jesus. God is Father only because he is the Father of the Son. Thus, the Son is without beginning; eternally the Father has the Son. The Son is the eternal Son of the Father; and the Father is the eternal Father of the Son. Only if they are co-eternal can Jesus, in whom the Logos is present, give us eternity. He can make us like God, which always means to make us im­mortal, and to give us eternal knowledge, the knowledge of eternal life. Not even the highest of all created spirits can give us a real salvation. A created spirit, even the highest, is less than God. But we are separated from God. We are dependent on God and must return to him. So God himself must save us.

According to Anus, a presbyter from Alexandria, only God the Father is eternal and unoriginated. The Logos, the pre-existent Christ, is a creature. He is created out of nothing; there was a time when he was not. Origen had made the statement that there was no time in which he was not. Against this the left-wing Origenistic theology said that there was atime in which he was not. This time was prior to our temporal existence, but it was not eternity. The Logos is not eternal. The power of God at worlz in Jesus is not the eternal divine power itself, but is a limited and lower hierarchy. This Logos is strange to the divine nature and dissimilar in every respect from the Father's essence. The Logos can neither see nor know the Father completely and exactly. He becomes God only in the way in which every saint may become deified. This deification happened, as it happens in every saint, through his freedom. The Logos had the freedom to turn away from Cod, but he did not do that. This Logos, a half-divine power,

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is the soul of Jesus. This means that Jesus is not fully man with a natural human soul. Mary gives birth to this hall-God, who is neither fully God nor fully man. This solution of Anus is in line with the hero cults of the ancient world. This world is full of half-gods, gods who even in heaven (i.e., Olympus) are not fully gods but derived forms of Cod. Jesus is one of these gods, but he is not God himself.

2. The Council of Nicaea

Anus' christology was rejected at the Council of Nicaea, A.D. 325. The Nicene Creed begins: "We believe in one Cod, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible." These are important words. The word "invisible" has reference to the Platonic "ideas". God is the creator not only of the things on earth, but of the "essences" as they appear in Plato's philo­sophy. The Creed continues: "And in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, the only-begotten of the essence of the Father, God of God, and Light of Light, true Cod of true God, begotten not made, being of one substance [hoino-ousios] with the Father, by whom all things were made in heaven and on earth, who for us men and our salvation came down and was incarnate and was made man. He suffered and the third day he rose again, ascended into heaven. From thence he comes to judge the quick and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost." Then it goes on to say: "And those who say there was a time when he was not, or he was not before he was made, and he was made out of nothing, and out of another substance or thing, or the Son of God is created or changeable, or alterable, they are condemned by the Catholic Church." This is the fundamental Christian confession. The central phrase is "of one substance with the Father". Nothing like this is said of the Holy Ghost. And this was the reason for further struggles and decisions. The condemna­tions are interesting; the all-embracing one is directed against the Arians: "Those who say there was a time when he was not... are condemned by the Catholic Church."

Now we will present the significance of the decision of Nicaea for world history and the history of the church:

(1) The most serious Christian heresy was overcome. Christ is not one of the many half-gods; be is not a hero. He is God

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himself appearing in divine essence within a historical person. It meant a definite negation of paganism. In Anus paganism again raised its head after it had been defeated in the anti-gnostic struggle. The victory of Arianism would have made Christianity only one of many possible religions.

(2)The confession of Nicaea was expressed in terms' more pleasing to Rome and the West than to the East. The East did not like the homoousios; instead it wanted a ladder of hierarchies. Rome and her allies in the East insisted on the homoousios. For this reason the decision of Nicaea was immediately attacked. A sixty-year struggle ensued until in A.D. 381 a settlement was reached more satisfying to the East.

(3)The decisive statement is: "Being of one substance with the Father." This is not in the scheme of emanation but in the scheme of Monarchianism. Consequently it was accused of being Sabel­lian; and so were the main defenders, Athanasius and Marcellus.

(4)The negative character of the decision is especially evident in the condemnations. The creatureliness of Christ is negated. He has no other ousia than the Father; but what the homoousios is was not explained. It was not decided whether the three prosöpa are really differences in God, and if so whether they are eternal or historical. And no doctrine of the Spirit was given. Only one thing was determined: Jesus Christ is not an incarnated half-god; he is not a creature above all others; he is God. And God is creator and unconditioned. This negative decision is the truth and the greatness of the Council of Nicaea.

(5)There were some other implications. The statements were made in philosophical, non-biblical terms. Some Greek concepts were taken into the dogma, not so much as classical philosophy but as mystical philosophy of religion.

(6)From now on the unity of the church is identical with the majority of the bishops. A conciliarism had developed in hier­archical terms; the majority of the bishops replace all other authorities. Only much later did the claim of the Roman bishop to a special status among the bishops become dominant, until finally the authority of the majority of the bishops was abolished.

(7)The church had become a state church. This was the price which had to be paid for unity. The emperor did not command the content of the dogma, but he exercised pressure. When there were revolts against the dogma, the emperors after Constantine

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church      73

had to exert even more pressure. This means that a new develop­ment in church history, indeed, of world history, had begun.

3. Athanasius and Marcellus

The chief defender of the decision of Nicaea was Athanasius. He was primarily a great religious personality. His basic religious convict-ion was unalterable, and therefore he was able to use a variety of scientific means and political ways to advance his cause. His style was clear; he was consistent and cautious, although at times he could be compromising in his terminology. Several times he was expelled from his episcopal see in Alexandria. He was persecuted, but in the end he was victorious over heretics and emperors. Athanasius saved the decision of Nicaea, but in order to do so he had to compromise with a more Origenistic inter­pretation of the Nicene formulae.

For Athanasius sin is overcome by forgiveness, and death, which is the curse of sin, is overcome by the new life. Both are given by Christ. The new life includes communion with God, moral renewal, and eternal life as a present possession. Positively speaking, eternal life is deification, becoming like God as much as possible. Thus, two things are needed, a victory over finitude and a victory over sin. There must be both participation in the infinity of God and participation in the holiness of God. How can this be provided? Only by Christ who, as true man, suffers the curse of sin and, as true Cod, overcomes death. No half-god, no hero, no limited and relative power of being can do that. Only as historical man could Cod change history, and only as divine could he give eternity. There is no such thing as a half-forgive­ness or half-eternity. If our sins are forgiven, they must be fully forgiven; if we are eternal, we must be fully eternal. No half-god could be the Savior. Salvation is the problem of christology.

The Christ who performs this work of salvation is not under­standable to the human mind except through the divine Spirit. Only through the Spirit can we come into unity with the Christ. This implies that the Spirit of Christ must be as divine as Christ himself. Groups arose after the Nicene decision to deny the divinity of the Spirit. Athanasius fought against them too, and \aid: They are wrong, for they want to make the Spirit into a reature. But if the Spirit of Christ is a creature, then Christ also

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is a creature. The Spirit of Christ is not the human spirit of the man Jesus; the Spirit of Christ is not a psychological function. The Spirit of Christ is God himself in Jesus and through him in us. In this way the trinitarian formula which remained unfinished at Nicaea was finally completed. In order to be able to unite us with Christ, the Spirit must be as divine as Christ himself, not half-divine, but fully Cod.

One of Athanasius' supporters was Marcellus, by whom the Monarchian tradition entered the discussion. Although he was an intimate friend of Athanasius, Marcellus was condemned by the more Origenis tic theologians who did not like his Monarchian tendencies. Marcellus' emphasis was on monotheism. Before the creation God was a monas, a unity without differentiation. His Logos was in him, but only as a potential power for creation, but not yet as an actual power. Only with the creation does the Logos proceed and become the acting energy of God in all things, through whom all things have been made. At the moment of creation the divine nwnas has become a dyas, the unity has be­come a duality. In the incarnation, the act in which the Logos took on flesh, the second "economy" is performed. An actual separation occurs between Father and Son, in spite of the remain­ing potential unity, so that now it is possible for the "eyes of faith" to see the Father in the Son. Then a further broadening of the monas and of the dyas occurs, when after the resurrection of Christ the Spirit becomes a relatively independent power in the Christian Church. But these separations are only preliminary; the independence of the Spirit and of the Son is not final. The Son and the Spirit will finally return into the unity with the Father, and then the flesh of Jesus will wither away. The poten­tial or eternal Logos should not be called the Son; he becomes the Son only through the incarnation and the resurrection. In Jesus a new man, a new manhood, appears, united with the Logos by love.

What we have described is a dynamic Monarchian system. The trinity is dynamized, is put into movement, approaches history, and has lost the static character it has in genuine Origenistic thinking. But this system was rejected. It was accused of being Sabellian, of representing that kind of Monarehianism in which Cod the Father himself appears on earth. The Origenistic system of degrees and hierarchies triumphed against Marcellus.

Theological Developments in the Ancient Church 75

But the struggle continued. The Origenistic protest against the homoousios led not only to conflict with people like Athanasius or Marcellus, but also against the Nicaenum itself. This happened in the East, of course. The Origerrists who had been overwhelmed by the pressure of the emperor at Nicaea gathered their forces again and insisted, against the Nicaenum, on three substances in the trinity. This was, so to speak, a pluralistic interpretation of the trinity, in the scheme of emanation, of hierarchies and powers of being. The trinity is seen in degrees, but only the Father is unconditioned and unlimited. He alone is the source of every­thing eternal and temporal. This was the mood of the Eastern theologians and the popular piety in the East. This mood pre­vailed again and again, in some cases with strong support of the emperor, who defied the decision of his predecessor Constantine and tried to press the supporters of Nicaea against the Nicaenum.

There was, however, a shortcoming in Eastern theology; it was united only negatively and not on a positive decision. So it was easy to split it and reduce its power of resistance against the Nicaenum. There were some in the East who practically returned to Anus; they were called the arzomoioi (Anomoeans), which means "the Son is unlike the Father in all things". He is com­pletely a creature. There were still others who mediated between the Nicaenum and the mood of the East. They were called the homoiourianoi, for they accepted the homoioiirios, but not the homoousios. Ilornoiousios is derived from homoios which means "similar". This means that the Son is similar in essence to the Father. So now we have the struggle between the homoousios and the Jiomoiousios. The hostile pagans in Alexandria cracked jokes about this fight going on in the streets, barbershops, and stores, in which Christians were arguing over an iota, the smallest letter in the alphabet, the only letter that distinguishes homoiousios from homoousios. But this was more than a fight over an iota; a different piety lay behind it. For the homoiousianoi the Father and Son are equal in every respect, but they do not have the identical substance. This group interpreted the Nicene formula homoousios, which they could not remove any more, in the sense of homojousiog. And even Athanasius and the West finally agreed that this could be done, if only the formula itself were accepted. The West in turn accepted the eternal generation of the Son, a formula which derived from Origen and which the

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West did not like, and with it the West accepted the inner-divine, eternal trinity, which is a non-historical (non-economic) view of the trinity. The East, on the other hand, accepted the homoousios after it was possible to interpret it in the light of the homoiousios. And under these same conditions the East also accepted the homoousia of the Spirit.

This means that theological formulae were discovered which were able to resolve the struggle, but theological terms are never able to overcome the religious difference itself. We shall see how this worked itself out in the later developments of the Eastern and Western churches, in the coming fights and struggles and in the final separation. But for the time being the Synod of Con­stantinople, A.D. 381, was able to make a decision in which both East and West agreed, in which the homoousios and the Izomoi-ousios could come together. Before this was possible, however, new theological developments had to occur. These developments are represented by the three great Cappadocian theologians.

4. The Cappadocian Theologians

The three Cappadocian theologians were Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, his brother, and Gregory of Nazianzus. Basil the Great was the bishop of Caesarea; he was many things, a churchman, bishop, the great reformer of monasticism, a preacher, and a moralist. He fought against the old and neo- and semi-Arians, against everything which followed the idea that Christ is a half-god and a half-man. Basil died, however, before the favorable decision of Constantinople was reached.

Basil's younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa, was called "the theologian". He continued the Origenistic tradition and its "scientific" methods. After Christianity became victorious under Constantine and after the Nicene dogma became fixed, it was possible now again for theology to attempt a union of Greek philosophy and Christian dogma. But this theology no longer had the freshness of the first great attempts made by the Apologists and Origen. It was much more determined by the ecclesiastical situation and the Creed of Nicaea, thus, it was more a matter of formulae than of material creativity. Gregory of Nazianzus created the definitive formulae for the doctrine of the trinity. He had become an intimate friend of Basil when both of them were

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students in Athens. They were united not only in their common theological convictions but also in their common asceticism. Gregory of Nazianzus became bishop and was president of the synod of Constantinople for a certain period.

These Cappadocian Fathers, especially Gregory of Nazianzus, made sharper distinctions between the concepts that were used in1 the trinitarian dogma. Two series of concepts were used: the first is one divinity, one essence (otsia), one nature (phyris); the second series is three substances (hypostaseis), three properties (idiötêtes), three persons (prosopa, personae). The divinity is one essence or nature in three forms, three independent realities. All three have the same will, the same nature and essence. Never­theless, the number three is real; each of the three has its special characteristics or properties. The Father has the property of being ungenerated; he is from eternity to eternity. The Son has the characteristic of being generated. The Spirit has the char­acteristic of proceeding from the Father and the Son. But these characteristics are not differences in the divine essence, but only in their relations to each other. This is complex and abstract philosophy, but it offered the formula which made the reunion of the church possible. The Council of Constantinople removed the condemnations which bad been added to the Creed of Nicaea, because they did not apply to the new terminology any more. It also said something about the Holy Spirit which was not included at Nicaea: "And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified." These phrases have mystical power and could be used liturgically.

This decision ends the trinitarian struggle. Anus and Sabellius and their many followers were excluded. The negative side of this decision is clear, but its positive implications for developing the doctrine of the trinity pose extreme difficulties. I shall point not four of them.

(1) On the one hand, the Father is the ground of divinity; on the other hand, he is a special persona, a particular hypostasis. Now, if these two points of view are taken together, it is possible to speak of a quaternity instead of a trinity. It is possible to speak of the divine substance as the one divine ground, and of the three persons, Father, Son, and Spirit, as the manifestations of the ground. Then we have a quateriuty rather than a trinity. There

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was always an inclination in this direction, and Thomas Aquinas still had to fight against it. As a rule theology said: The Father is both the source of all divinity and of each of the manifestations.

(2)The distinctions in the eternal trinity are empty. The doc­trine of the trinity was created in order to understand the historical Jesus. As long as this was kept in mind, the difference between Cod and Jesus was evident. But how can differences be maintained in the realm of a transcendent trinity? Distinctions are made by words like non-gererated, generated, and proceed­ing. And what do such words mean? They are words without content, because there is no perception of any kind which can confirm their meaning. To anticipate a bit, Augustine said these differences are not expressed because something is said by them, but in order not to remain silent. This means that if the motives for the doctrine of the trinity are forgotten, the formulae become empty.

(3)The Holy Spirit even now remains an abstraction. The Spirit can be brought in concretely only if he is defined as the Spirit of Christ, of Jesus as the Christ; but if he is placed into the transcendent trinity, he is more an abstraction than a person. For this reason the Spirit was never very important for Christian piety. In the moment in which he was deified in the same sense that Christ was considered divine, the Spirit was replaced in actual piety by the Holy Virgin. The Virgin who gave birth to Cod acquired divinity herself to a certain extent, at least for popular piety.

(4)The idea of three hypostaseis, three different personae, could lead to tritheism. This danger became much more real when the philosophy of Aristotle replaced that of Plato. Plato's philosophy was always the background of mystical realism in the Middle Ages. In this philosophy the universals are more real than their individual exemplars. In Aristotle the matter is quite dif­ferent. Aristotle called the individual thing the telos, the inner aim, of all natural development. If this is the case, the three powers of being in God become three independent realities, or more exactly, the three manifestations of God become indepen­dent powers of being, independent persons. Those who are nominalists by education have a great difficulty in understanding the trinitarian dogma. For nominalism everything which is must be a definite thing, limited and separated from all other things.

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For mystical realism, as we have it in Plato, Origen, and the Middle Ages, the power of being in a universal can be something quite superior to and different from the power of being in the individuals. Therefore, the danger of tritheism was very minimal as long as the trinitarian dogma was interpreted in terms of the Platonic philosophy. Tritheism became a danger as soon as the Aristotelian categories came to predominate, and with it the nominalistic trend which placed great emphasis on the indivi­dual realities. Then the Son and the Spirit could become, so to speak, special individual beings; then we are in the realni of tritheism.

The great theologian in the East, John of Damascus, protested against this consequence. He emphasized the unity of action and being among the three manifestations of God. However, some­thing else happened. For practical piety the trinitarian dogma became just the opposite of what it was originally supposed to be. It was supposed to be an interpretation of Jesus as the Christ; it was supposed to mediate this understanding to the Greeks with the help of the Logos doctrine. But the consequences of the Logos doctrine had become so dangerous in Anus, in particular, that traditional theology reacted against it. When it was still used, its philosophical meaning had been broken. In this way the trini-tarian dogma became a sacred mystery. The sacred mystery was placed on the altar, so to speak, and adored. It was introduced into the icons, the pictures which are so important for the cult in the Eastern church, into liturgical formulae and hymns, and there the mystery has lived ever since. However, it lost its power to interpret the meaning of the living God.

I. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

The christological problem is historically a consequence of the trinitarian controversy. In principle, however, it is the other way around. The trinity is the answer to the christological problem. It is an answer whose final formulae seem to deny the basis on which it arose. The question was: If the Son is of one substance with the Father, how can the historical Jesus be understood? this was the purpose of the whole trinitarian dogma. But with tile trinitarian dogma formulated as it was at Nicaea, is it still possible to make Jesus understandable? How can he who is of

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divine nature, without any restriction, be a real man at the same time? The christological controversy, which lasted for several centuries and brought the church once again to the edge of self-destruction, was an attempt to answer this question.

There were always two main types of christologial thought: Either Cod as Father (or as Logos or Spirit) used the man Jesus of Nazareth, begetting, inspiring, and adopting him as his Son, or a divine being (the Logos or eternal Son) became man in an act of transformation. The Creed of Nicaea, with its homoousios and its Monarchian tendency, favors the former solution. And so does the Roman theology. The emphasis on the divinity of the eternal Son makes the emphasis on the humanity of the historical Son much easier. A half-god can he transformed into man; God himself can only adopt man. But this former solution was not in the line of Origenism. In Origen the eternal Logos is inferior to the Father and has, by his union with the soul of Jesus, in eternity the traits of the historical Jesus. Therefore, he can easily be transformed into Jesus with the help of the body, and a trans­formation christology can result. No sharp distinction between these two possibilities was made. The honioousios could be inter­preted closer to Sabellius or to Anus. This means that the chzisto-logical interpretations that followed Nicaea could be either in the sense of adoption or in the sense of transformation. This un­certainty was 50011 discovered by some theologians. It became a matter of controversy when a man arose to do what Anus had done in the trinitarian struggle, namely, to draw out the conse­quences of the Origenistic position, but now in the sphere of christology. This man was Apollinarius of Laodicea.1

1. The Antiochean Theology

The West never followed the Alexandrian line, of which Apollinarius was the most radical expression. The religious interest of the Alexandrians really had to do with the problem of salvation. How is salvation possible unless the humanity of Jesus is more or less swallowed up into the divinity, so that we can adore him as a whole, so that his mind is identical with the divine

1 Editor's note: At this point in Tillich's lectures, Father Georges Florovsky delivered two lectures on Apollinarius and on Cyril of Alexandria. For this reason Tillich did not himself deal with their positions at any length.

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Logos? The answer is: It would be impossible. Therefore, the general trend moves in the direction of what was later called Monophysitism. According to Monophysitism there is only one nature; the divine nature has swallowed up the human nature.

The West and the school of Antioch protested against this tendency in Alexandrian theology. One of the first theologians of

this school was Theodore of Mopsuestia. The Antiochean school has definite characteristics which distinguish it from the school of Alexandria, and which make this school the predecessor of the emphasis on the historical Jesus in modern theology.

(1)The school of Antioch had a strong philological interest and wanted an exact interpretation and emphasis on the historical picture of Christ. In this way it anticipated the historical criticism developed in the modern period.

(2)The school had a rational tendency—just as liberal theology also had—in the sense of Alexandrian philosophy.

(3)The Antiochean theologians also had strong ethical-personalistic—instead of mystical-ontological—interests, just as Rome and the Stoics had.

Rome and the West were not always on the side of Antiochean theology, but on the whole Antioch represented the main trends

of the West. In alliance with Antioch in the East, it was possible

for Rome, with its emphasis on history and personality, to be­come victorious over the mystical ontological interest of the East.

Popular religion, however, was on the whole on the side of

Alexandria and against Antioch. Antioch could not prevail for a number of reasons. The basic structure of the dogma was against

it, coming as it did from Origen and being much more in line with

Alexandrian thinking. Politics was against it and there was also a lack of moral resistance against the superstitions which had developed widely in Christianity at that time. The personalities

were not great enough to resist the demands of the people for a

magically working God who walks on earth and whose human nature is only a gown for his divine nature. Nevertheless, Antioch,

in alliance with Rome, saved the human picture of Christ in its religious significance. Without Antioch the church would probably have lost entirely the human picture, and the historical conscious-I eSS of the West would not have been able to develop.

Antioch defended the church against the Monophysites for whom the human character of Christ was swallowed up in divinity

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and who also gave rise to numerous magical and superstitious ideas. Thus, Antioch paved the way for the christological empha­sis of the West. It is perhaps impossible for someone from the West fully to understand the religious meaning of the East. This is even more difficult for Americans than for Europeans, because Europe is much closer to the East, not only geographically but historically. The mystical-ontological elements permeate the whole of Western culture in Europe. This is not the case in the United States. Your heritage is indebted to the Antiochean school and to Rome which, in alliance with this school, saved the kind of atti­tude which is natural to you.

Theodore of Mopsuestia emphasized against Apollinarius that in Christ there is a perfect nature of man in union with the perfect nature of God. He said: "A complete man, in his nature, is Christ, consisting of a rational soul and human flesh; complete is the human person; complete also the person of the divinity in him. It is wrong to call one of them impersonal." It was common in the East, in Monophysitism, to hold that only one nature is personal, the divine nature and not the human. Therefore, Theodore said: "One should not say that the Logos became flesh." For Theodore this was a vague, metaphorical way of speaking and should not be used as a precise formula. Instead, one should say: "He took on humanity." The Logos was not transformed into flesh. This idea Of transformation, or transmutation, was felt by him to be pagan, so he rejected it. The pagan spirit of superstition wanted to have a transformed God walking on earth. But then Theodore was confronted by a difficult problem. If the human and divine sides of Christ are themselves persons, is he not then a being with two personal centers? Is he not a combination of two sons, a monster with two heads, as Theodore's enemies put it? Theodore tried to show the unity of the two persons. He rejected the unity in essence or nature. In essence they are absolutely different be­cause the divine nature cannot be confined to an individual man. The Logos is universally present. Even when Jesus lived, the flowers were blooming, animals were living, men were walking, and culture was going on. The Logos was active in all this. He said that it is impossible for the Logos to be only the man Jesus. He spoke, therefore, of a unity by the Holy Spirit, which is a unity of grace and will. In this way he established in Jesus an analogy with the prophets, who were driven by the Spirit. How‑

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ever, this is a unique event in Jesus, for in the prophets the Spirit was limited, whereas in Jesus the Spirit was unlimited.

The union of the two natures started in the womb of Mary. In it the Logos connected himself with a perfect man in a mysterious way. This Logos directed the development, the inner growth, of Jesus, but never by coercion. As every man Jesus had grace, even unlimited grace. Grace never works through coercion but through the personal center. By the grace of Cod Jesus increased in perfection. In this way, he said, there is one person in Jesus, but the natures are not mixed. He denied that he spoke of two Sons; instead, he said, he affirmed two natures. The divine nature does not change the human nature in its essence. Jesus had a human nature which by grace could follow the divine nature. Thus, one could speak of Mary giving birth to God. This was the decisive formula. It was against the tradition of the Antiocheans, but they could not deny the phrase theotokos (Mother of God). He justified the acceptance of this phrase by saying that Mary also gave birth to a man. This is a direct and adequate way of speaking; the other, that Mary gave birth to God, is only indirectly adequate, because the body of Jesus was united with the Logos of Cod.

In the same way Theodore agreed that the human nature must he adored and, conversely, that God had suffered. These things can be said only of the unity of the person. Of this unity one can say these things because what can be said of the unity can be said of the whole being. But he rejected the idea of a transforma­tion of the Logos into a human being. The Western theologians said that the oneness of nature is reached only when Christ is elevated to the throne of God at the resurrection, with the bod' and the human soul being glorified and transformed. This event of the human side being swallowed up is a transcendent event which happens in heaven, not on earth. So Theodore said that only the flesh, that ,i.§, the historical person, suffered and died, oct the divine nature in him. It is blasphemy to say that divinity mid flesh belong to one nature. Ambrose said that though Christ had two natures, he suffered only in his human nature. The same grace which accepted the human nature in Christ and made him the Son of Cod also justified us before Cod and made us his chil­dren.

Thus we see here two allies: Rome, with her empirical, per-'i inal, and historical interest; Antioch, having the same interest,

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but using it for philological studies and philosophical considera­tions. This alliance of Rome and Antioch might have led perhaps to a full victory of the Antiocheans over the Alexandrians. But this did not happen. For Rome had more of a political than a theological interest. Rome was the great center of the church and as such it did not want to surrender Christianity on account of a theological formula.

Nestorius was one of the leaders of the Antiochean school. In A.D. 429 he preached against the doctrine of theotokos, that the Virgin Mary gave birth to God. Nestorius taught that Mary gave birth to a man who became the organ of divinity. Not the divinity but the humanity of Christ suffered. Thus, one could say that Mary is christotokos. Later Nestorius admitted that indirectly one could speak of Mary as theotokos in the sense that God the Logos came down and united himself with the man to whom Mary gave birth. But this was not a divine being coming down to become a man in terms of a transmutation myth.

The two natures of Christ preserve their qualities in the per­sonal union. They are connected without being mixed in the humanity of Jesus. The term "man" describes the one nature in him, the term "God" or "Logos" the other nature. These ideas brought the charge of heresy against Nestorius. They were generally present in the Antiochean tradition, but with Nestorius they became suspect and finally repudiated. If we say that Nestorius became a heretic, we could say that he was the most innocent of all heretics. Actually he was a victim of the struggle between Byzantium and Alexandria.

2. The Alexandrian Theology

There were other developments which supported the Alexan­drian cause.

(1)For a long time the Mary-legend, for which there is little basis in the Bible, had grown out of the pious imagination. The figure of Mary attracted the novelistic mind.

(2)The second reason for the predominance of Alexandria over Antioch was the high valuation placed on virginity strengthening the trend toward asceticism.

(3)There was also a spiritual vacuum in the religious life of that period. The empty space which wanted to be filled was the

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desire to have a female element in the center of religion. Egypt had such an element in its myth of Isis and Osiris, the goddess and her son, but Christianity did not. In this it followed Judaism, which discarded every female element. The Spirit was not able to replace the female element. First of all, the Spirit appears, in the stories of Jesus' birth, as the male factor. Secondly, the Spirit is an abstract concept. Thus, in the popular mind the Spirit could never replace the different forms of male-centered religion which came from the Old Testament.

(4) The transformation christology of Alexandria had a popular appeal. Imagine a simple-minded human being who wants to have God. If you tell her: "There is God, on the altar; go and have him there", then she will go. But how is this possible? Because of the incarnation, for in the incarnation God became something which we can have, whom we can see, with whom we can walk, etc. This is popular feeling, and this feeling became decisive against the Antiocheans.

Cyril of Alexandria wanted to show that the human nature was taken into the unity of the Logos, who remained what he was. So he could say that the Logos himself experienced death, since he received into himself the body of Jesus. In his formula, "out of two natures, one", he accepted the abstract distinction of the natures, but in actuality there is no difference between the two natures. This made it possible for him to be the protagonist in the fight for the theotokos. His religious motive was this: It is not a man who has become King over us, but God himself who ap­peared in the form of a man. If Nestorius were right, then only a man, and not the Logos, would have died for us; if he were right, then in the Lord's Supper we eat the flesh of a man. What the people wanted was the physical presence of the divine.

At first it seemed that the Antiocheans and the Alexandrians rould be united. Then, however, the Alexandrians reacted so vigorously and victoriously that Rome took the side of Antioch. Home put a condition to the Antiocheans; they had to remove Nestorius because he was under too much suspicion. After a (ompromise was worked out at the Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431) nud a number of other synods, including the famous Latrocinium Of Ephesus (the synod of robbers), a final settlement was reached tit the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451). Here the alliance of flame and Antioch proved its strength. They were helped by the

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fact that one from the opposition, Eutyches, a monk in Constanti­nople, put forth such a radically Monophysitic position that he was condemned. This was both a condemnation of Alexandria and a victory for Antioch.

3. The Council of Chalcedon

Pope Leo I wrote a letter which became decisive for the out­come at Chalcedon. It said that the properties of each nature and substance were preserved entire, and came together to form one person. Humility was assumed by majesty, weakness by strength, mortality by eternity. There was one true God in the entire and perfect nature of true man. The Son of God therefore came down from his throne, from heaven, without withdrawing from his Father's glory, and entered this lower world, because of the unity of the person in each nature, which can be understood that the Son of Man came from heaven, and conversely that the Son of Cod has been crucified and buried. Here we have the same phenomenon as in the theology of Antioch. A radical statement is combined rather easily with traditional ideas. The decision of Chalcedon was made on this basis. In significance it was not surpassed by Nicaea, and together with Nicaea it surpasses all other synodal decisions. No one can study systematic theology today without knowing something about this decision at Chal-cedon. The substance of it was expressed in paradoxical formulae.

(1)"Therefore, following the holy Fathers, we all with one consent teach men to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same complete in Godhead and also complete in manhood."

(2)"True God, and at the same time true man, of a reasonable soul and body."

(3)He is "consubstantial with the Father, according to his God­head, and consubstantial with us according to his manhood; in all things like unto us, apart from sin."

(4)He is "begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salva­tion, born of the Virgin Mary, the God-bearer (theotokos), accord­ing to the manhood."

(5)"One and the same Jesus Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, in two natures. These two natures must not be confused, and they

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are natures without any change, without division, without separa-lion."

(6) "The distinction of natures being by no means annulled by the union, but rather the characteristic of each being preserved and coming together to form one person and one substance. He is not parted or divided into two persons but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ."

In this document, as in similar ones, we see how readily philo­sophical terms could have a transition into liturgical and poetic language. The negative side of these statements is clear. The posi­tive side is more doubtful. The position of Rome was victorious, but different interpretations were possible. The East was dis­appointed by the decision; the delegates from Alexandria did not subscribe. If they had subscribed to something so contrary to popular demand back home, they would have been beaten to death by the fanatic monks on their return. The reaction of the East against Chalcedon, in its radical aspects, was strong enough to divide the East from Rome to such a degree that it became an easy prey to the Islamic puritan reaction. This is especially true of the Monophysitic churches of Egypt and neighboring countries. They were all swallowed up by the reaction of Islam, which I would call a puritan reaction, that is, a reaction against the sacramental superstitious form into which Christianity had fallen more and more. I have a thesis—I do not know whether Father FlOrovsky would agree with it—that the attacks of Islam would never have been successful if Eastern Christianity had taken into itself the elements of personality and history. Instead, Christianity in this region fell deeper and deeper into popular superstition, and so became vulnerable to the Islamic type of reaction.

The decision of Chalcedon was partly denied, partly set aside. From A.D. 482-519 the first schism occurred between the East aIt(l the West. Chalcedon was maintained by the West; the East ither rejected it or veered toward a Monophysitic interpretation ii it. After the reunion under Emperor Justin (519), Mono-1hysitism became victorious in Alexandria. It was a radical ,itiirn to Cyril and his emphasis on the unity of the natures. After he union in the incarnation only one nature is present. Christ IN one, according to his composite nature, according to his person, oeording to his will. After the union there is no duality of natures

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or energies. The more radical Monophysites said that Chalcedon and Pope Leo, who asserted two natures and two energies, should be condemned. These Monophysites taught that with the conception in Mary the flesh of Christ became progressively deified. That really made Mary a goddess. The radicals said their enemies adored something mortal. They wanted nothing less than God on earth, without human relativity.

4. Leontius of Byzantium

Emperor Justinian wanted a reunion of the Chalcedonians and the Monophysites. He was aided in this by the teaching of a monastic theologian, Leontius of Byzantium. By combining Cyril and Leo with a new scholastic idea he found a solution to the christological problem which endured in the East for a long time. Leontius said that the human nature in Christ does not have its own hypostasis; it is anhypostas-is (without hypostasis). Here hypostasis means being an "independent being". Instead, the human nature is enhypostasis, which means that the human nature is in the hypostasis of the divine Logos. Here we have reached scholasticism. When it comes to the formula enhypostasis, we do not really know what that means. But the reason it was invented is clear. The question was: Can two natures exist with­out an independent head, an hypostasis? The answer was, they cannot. Therefore, Christ has one hypostasis representing the two natures.

The being of the human nature is in the Logos. This meant that the theology of Antioch had to be condemned, including Theo­dore. The religious meaning of this Byzantine theology became visible in the fight about the suffering of Cod which was expres­sed in liturgical and theological formulae. The treis-hagion (thrice holy) was also enlarged to the formula: "Holy God... Almighty

immortal, who for us was crucified, have mercy upon us." One of the holy trias has suffered in the flesh. This was carried through and dogmatized in A.D. 553, at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople, in spite of protests from Rome. The Council expressed itself in fourteen anathemas. The two natures are dis­tinguished only in theory, not in practice. The person of the Logos has become the personal center of a man. The human nature has no personal characteristics of its own. This was the

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decisive point, because if this is the case, how can he help us? The Crucified is the true Cod and Lord of glory, and one of the trinity. The identification of Jesus Christ with the Logos is com­plete. As in the icons in which Christ appears in gold-ground setting, the human personality has disappeared.

But the West could not be so easily conquered. A new reaction of the West occurred. The question arose whether the one person of Jesus Christ has one or two wills. This time the fight was be­tween the Mon.othelites and the Dyothelites. This time the West prevailed. Christ who has two natures also has two wills. The human nature is not swallowed up by the divine. This whole development can be grasped only if we realize that the key to it is the problem of how salvation is related to the individual, to history, and to personal life. On this point the West was clear, the East was not.

The last controversy in the East had to do with the icons. Eikôn means "image". Icons were the images of the fathers and saints in the churches. The icons deserve veneration and not adoration. However, if one asks what this distinction actually means, we must say that in popular understanding veneration always develops into adoration.

We have been surveying the rise and further fate of the christo-logical doctrine as formulated at the Council of Chalcedon. Through all this there has probably been a hidden protest against this emphasis on the Eastern church. This is understandable because it does not have the same vital significance to you as, let is say, the Reformation or modern theology. However, the situa­tion is such that if you know the fundamentals of the early development, and really understand it, everything else becomes iumparatively easy. If, on the other hand, you know only the contemporary situation, and not the foundations, then everything is in the air. It is like a house built from the roof rather than from the foundations. I believe that the developments in ancient Christian theology are really foundations, foundations that must be considered immediately after the biblical foundations.

The doctrine of Chalcedon, whatever we think of the use of Creek terms in Christian theology, saved the human side of the hIi'tllre of Jesus for our Western theology, and even for the East. Ihe human side was on the verge of being completely swallowed up by the divine' nature, so that succeeding developments in the

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West, including the Reformation, would not have been possible. This is the importance of the Council of Chalcedon and its decision, which the East never really accepted, but transformed it and let it become swallowed up in its sacramental way of thinking and acting.

To understand the steps in the christological doctrine, always keep in mind two pictures: (1) The being with the two heads, God and man, where there is no unity; (2) The being in which one head has disappeared, but also humanity has disappeared. The one remaining head is the head of the Logos, of God himself, so that when Jesus acts, it is not the unity of something divine and something human, but it is the Logos who is acting. Thus, all the struggles, the uncertainties, the despair and loneliness, which the Gospels present, were only seemingly experienced by Jesus, but not really. They are inconsequential. This was the danger in the Eastern development. The fact that this danger was overcome is due to the decision of Chalcedon. We must be grateful to the Eastern church that it was able to do this against its own basic feeling. The power of the Old Testament and the power of the full picture of the human side of Jesus prevented the East from failing in this respect.

J. PsEuno-DIoNysIus THE ABEOPACITE

Dionysius the Areopagite is the classic Christian mystic, one of the most interesting figures in Eastern church history. He was also of extreme importance to the West. In Acts 17.84 we read of a man called Dionysius who followed Paul after he had preached in the Areopagus. His name was used by a writer who lived around A.D. 500. In the tradition this man was accepted as the real Dionysius who talked with Paul. He wrote his books under the name of Dionysius. What seems to us now a falsification was a custom in ancient writing. It was not a betrayal in any technical or moral sense to launch one's books under famous names. Not until the fifteenth century was this falsification historically estab­lished. It is an established historical fact that the man who wrote these books wrote around A.D. 500 and used the name of Paul's companion in Athens in order to lend authority to his books. He was translated into Latin by John Scotus Eriugena, a great theo­logian of the West, around 840. This Latin translation was used

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throughout the Middle Ages and had many scholastic commenta­tors. Dionysius represents the main characteristics of the Byzan­tine end of the Greek development. He is the mediator of Neo-Platonism and Christianity, and the father of most of Christian mysticism. His concepts underlie most Christian mysticism in the East as well as the West. Some of his concepts, such as that of hierarchy, entered the ordinary language and helped greatly to form the Western hierarchical system of Rome.

We have two basic works of his, On the Divine Names and On the Hierarchies. The latter book is divided into the heavenly and the ecclesiastical hierarchies. The word "hierarchy" was probably created by him; at least we do not know whether anyone else had used it before. The word is derived from hieros, meaning "holy, sacred" and archë, meaning "principle, power, beginning". Thus, hierarchy is defined by Dionysius as a "holy system of degrees with respect to knowledge and efflcaey". This characterizes all Catholic thinking to a great extent; it is not only ontological, but also epistemological; there are degrees not only in being, but also in knowledge. The system of holy degrees is taken from Neo-Platonism, where it was first fully developed after Aristotle and Plato (Symposium). The man who is most important is Proclus, a Neo-Platonic philosopher who has often been compared with Hegel. He has the same kind of triadic thinking-_thesis, anti­thesis, and synthesis—and brings all reality into such a system of holy degrees.

The surprising thing about Dionysius is that this system, which was the end of the Greek world and summarized everything Greek wisdom had to say about life, was introduced into Christi­anity and used by it. A short time before, this system had been used by Julian the Apostate in order to combat Christianity. Thus, .Julian and the Christian theologians who fought against each other in a life-and-death struggle were united in a Greek Chris­tian mystic and theologian, Pseudo-Dionysius.

The other book is On the Divine Names. The term "Divine Names" is also a Neo-Platonic term, which the Neo-Platonists used when they brought all the gods of the pagans into their system. How could they do this? Because they followed the philo­sophical criticism in terms of which no educated Greek of that time believed literally in the pagan gods. Still there was the tradition, there was popular religion, and so something had to be

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done about these divine names. They tried to show that the qualities of the divine were expressed in these names. These names express different degrees and powers in the divine ground and divine emanation. They point to principles of power, of love, of energy, and other virtues, but they cannot be taken as names for special beings. This means that they discovered, in present-day terminology, the symbolic character of all our speaking about God. Writings on the divine names can be found throughout the medieval period. The theologians wrote on the symbolic meaning of everything we say about God. They did not use the word "symbol" at that time, but they spoke of "name" as an expression of a characteristic or quality. If we follow the insight of classical theology in this respect, we will not say, as is often done, that our speaking of God is only symbolic. This "only" is very wrong! The wrong is on our side when we fall into a literalism, against which also the Reformers, especially Calvin, fought.

The symbolic interpretation of everything we say about God corresponds to the idea of God which Dionysius developed. How can we know about God? Dionysius answered: There are two ways of recognizing God. First, there is the way of positive or affirmative theology. All names, so far as they are positive, must be attributed to God because he is the ground of everything. So he is designated by everything; everything points to him. God must be named with all names. Secondly, however, there is the way of negative theology which denies that he can be named by anything whatsoever. God is beyond even the highest names which theology has given to him. He is beyond spirit, beyond the good. God is, as Dionysius says, super-essential. He is beyond the Platonic ideas, the essences, beyond all the superlatives. He is not the highest being but beyond any possible highest being. He is supra-divinity, beyond God, if we speak of God as a divine being. Therefore, he is "unspeakable darkness". By this com­bination of words he denies that God, in view of his nature, can be either spoken of or seen. Thus, all the names must disappear after they have been attributed to God, even the holy name "God" itself. Perhaps this is the source—unconsciously---of what I said at the end of my book, The Courage to Be, about the "God above God", namely, the God above God who is the real ground of everything that is, who is above any special name we can give to even the highest being.

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It is important that the positive and the negative ways lead to the same end. In both cases the forms of the word are negated. If you say everything about God, you can just as well say that you say nothing about him, that is, not anything special. This is the first thing, of course, which must be said about God, because it is this which makes him Cod, namely, that which transcends everything finite. In this sense even the problem of unity and trinity disappears in the abyss of God. Since that which is super-essential, beyond the Platonic ideas, is also beyond all numbers, it is even beyond the number "one"—so that there is no differ­ence between three or one or many in this respect. Whenever it is said that God is One, translate this to mean that Cod is beyond all numbers, even the number "one". Only on this basis can we then speak of "trinity", and of the infinite self-expression in the world.

From this abysmal One, which is the source and substance of all being, the light emanates, and the light is the good in all things. Light is a symbol not only for knowing but also for being. It is as the Greek philosopher Parmenides said, that where there is being there is also the logos of being. This light, which is the power of being and knowledge, is identical with itself; it is un­shaken and everlasting. There is a way downward and a way upward. We have this already in Heraclitus who said that in everything there is a trend from earth over water over fire to air, and an opposite trend from the air to earth. That is, there is a fun­damental tension in every living being, a tension of the creative power of being going down, and the saving power of being going up. The three stages of the way upward are purgation, illumination, and union. Purgation is purification in the ethical-ascetic realm; illumination is in the realm of mystical understand­ing; union is the state of perfection, the return into unity with God. In this last stage something takes place which Dionysius (ailed the mystical ignorance. The same thing was mediated to he modern world through Nicholas of Cusa in his idea of learned ignorance (docta ignorantia). These two men say that this is the only ultimate true knowledge. This word "ignorance" says that we do not know anything special any more when we have pene­trated into the ground of everything that is. And since everything special is changing, it cannot be ultimate reality and truth. If you penetrate from everything changing to the ultimate, you reach

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the rock of eternity; you have the truth which can rest on this rock alone.

This fundamental reality is represented in degrees called hierarchies. The line from above to below is the line of emana­tion. The line from below to above is the line of salvation. The hierarchies represent both ways. They are the way in which the divine abyss emanates. At the same time, they are the revelations of the divine abyss, so far as it can be revealed, in the upward way of saving union with God. From the point of view of the way upward, the hierarchies have the purpose to create the greatest possible similarity and union of all beings with Cod. The old Platonic formula, "being equal to Cod as much as possible", was used also by the Areopagite—coming nearer and nearer to God and finally uniting with him.

Every hierarchy receives its light from the higher one and passes it down to the Lower one. In this way each hierarchy is active and passive at the same time. It receives the divine power of being and gives it in a restrictive way to those which are lower than it. However, this system of degrees is ultimately dualistic. There are two fundamentally different hierarchies, the heavenly and the earthly. The heavenly hierarchies are the Platonic essences or ideas above which there is Cod. These are the first emanations from God, which Dionysius interpreted as hierarchies of angels. This is a development which had already occurred in later Judaism (the inter-testamental period). The concept of angels—which is a symbolic personalistic concept—amalgamates with the concept of hypostatized essences or powers of being. They become one and the same being and represent the heavenly hierarchies. If you want to interpret the concept of angels in a meaningful way today, interpret them as the Platonic essences, as the powers of being, not as special beings. If you interpret them in the latter way, it all becomes crude mythology. On the other hand, if you interpret them as emanations of the divine power of being in essences, in powers of being, the concept of angels becomes meaningful and perhaps important. The sentimental picture of angels as winged babies has nothing to do with the great concept of divine emanations in terms of powers of being.

The ecclesiastical hierarchy on earth is an image of the heavenly hierarchy. The angels are the spiritual mirrors of the divine abyss. They always look at him and are the immediate

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recipients of his power of being. They are always longing to become equal with him and to return to him, With respect to us, they are the first revealers. If we understand the matter in this way, we can understand what it means that they are the essences in which the divine ground expresses itself first. There are three times three orders of angels—which is, of course, a scholastic play—making it possible to give a kind of analogy to the earthly hierarchies. The earthly hierarchies are powers of spiritual being. Here we can learn something about medieval realism. The earthly hierarchies are:

(1)The three sacraments: baptism, the Lord's Supper, con­firmation;

(2)The three degrees of the clergy: deacons, priests, bishops;

(3)The three degrees of non-clergy: the imperfect, who are not even members of the congregation, the laymen, and the monks, who have a special function.

These nine earthly hierarchies mediate the return of the soul to God. They are all equally necessary and are all equally powers of being. As children of nominalism, you will immediately ask: What does it mean that sacraments are equal with people (clergy, laity) as hierarchies? This can be understood only if you realize that the people here function as bearers of sacramental power, as hearers of the power of being. The same is true of the sacraments. '['his is what makes it possible for Dionysius to call all nine of them hierarchies. They are all sacred powers of being, some of Iliem embodied in persons, some in sacraments, and some in per­sons who only have the functions of being believers in the con­gregation.

This brings the earthly world into a hierarchical system, hecause earthly things such as sounds, colors, forms, stone, etc. are used, especially in the sacraments, to express the ecclesiasti­cal hierarchy. All reality belongs to the ecclesiastical reality, liicause the ecclesiastical reality is the hierarchical reality as ex­pressed in the different degrees of being and knowledge of God. In

I lii' mystery of the church all things are interpreted in terms of Iiiiir symbolic power to express the abyss of divinity. They express

II and they guide everything back to it. The ecclesiastical mys­teries penetrate into the interior divinity, into the divine ground ii all things. Thus, a system of symbols in which everything is JIt('IItially included is established. This is the principle of

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Byzantine culture, namely, to transform reality into something which points to the eternal, not to change reality as in the Western world.

Hence, hierarchical thinking in the East is much more in the vertical line, interpreting reality by penetrating into its depths, whereas the kingdom of Cod concept, as in Protestantism, belongs to a horizontal theology. Looking at the situation in terms of East and West, the East lacked the ability to work in the historical line of transforming reality, and therefore became first the victim of the Islamic attack, and then a victim of the Marxist attack. On the other hand, when we look at our culture we can say without much doubt that we have lost the vertical dimension to a great extent. We always go ahead; we never have time to stand somewhere and to look above and below.

To understand what I mean by making everything transparent for the divine ground, we should look for a moment at art. We have the most translucent religious art in the Byzantine mosaics. These mosaics have no tendency at all to deribe anything which happens in the horizontal line. They want to express the presence of the divine through everything which appears on the horizontal level of reality, on the place of time and space, by making every­thing a symbol pointing to its own depths. This is the greatness of the mosaics. There are a few examples of them in the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. There you have the expres­sion of divine transcendence, even when the subjects are com­pletely earthly—animals, trees, men of politics, women of the court. Every expression has its ultimate symbolic meaning. The last great controversy in the Byzantine church had to do with icons, or pictures, because the Byzantine culture believed in the power of pictures to express the divine ground of things. The danger was very great that popular belief would confuse the transparency of the pictures with the power of the divine itself, which is effective through the pictures but is never identical with them. The whole conflict was over the meaning of the transparent power of the pictures. For the East this was essential; therefore, most of the great art came from there, and then conquered the West. The danger then became so great in the West that after Rome had partly capitulated, it finally was attacked again by Protestantism, especially Reformed Protestantism, in a way which removed the pictures from the churches altogether. Thus, in

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Calvinism natural objects lost their transparency. This is the meaning of all iconoclastic (image-destroying) movements. This is understandable as a reaction to the superstitious way in which many Catholics prayed to their pictures, etc. When we realize, however, that by the same act all natural objects lost their trans­parency, one cannot be so sure about it. Things become merely objects of technical activity, nature becomes dedivinized, and its function to represent the divine becomes lost. We can say that what the Byzantine culture effected was the spiritualization of all reality. That is not to be confused with idealization, which is something quite different. Hofmann's picture of Jesus is an ideali­zation. A Byzantine picture of Jesus has transparency, but it is not an idealized picture. The divine majesty is visible throughout, not a nice human being with ideal, manly handsomeness. So I would say that the Eastern church represents something which we have lost. Therefore, I am especially happy that Eastern Orthodox churches could be taken into the World Council of Churches, thus making communication with them possible again. We should not imagine that we have nothing to learn from them. It may happen that with centuries of more intimate contact, the dimension of depth may again enter Western thinking.

The system of Dionysius was received by the West. There were two things which made this possible, which Christianized or baptized this mysticism. First, the emanation was understood not in a natural but in a personal picture. God has given existence to all beings because of his benevolence. This goes beyond pagan thinking. Here the personalistic element comes in and the Neo-Platonic dualism is removed. Secondly, the system of hierarchies was built around Christ and around the church. All things have their power of illuminating and uniting only in relationship to the church and to the Christ. Christ is not one hierarchy alongside others. This was prevented by Nicaea. But Christ is God manifest, Who appears in every hierarchy and works through each one. In this way the system of pagan deities and mysteries, which lived in Neo-Platonism, was overcome, and in this way the Western church could receive the system of hierarchies and mysteries. As a result medieval mysticism was not in opposition to the ecclesi­astical hierarchy. They worked together; only much later did conflicts arise.

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K. TERTULLIAN AND CYPRIAN

The two men in the West with whom we must deal first are Tertullian and Cyprian. We already discussed Tertullian to some extent in connection with the Montanist movement of radical spiritualism and radical eschatology. He was its greatest theo­logical representative. We also spoke of him in terms of his ability to create those trinitarian and christologieal formulae which, under pressure from Rome, finally conquered all the other sug­gestions made by the East. Further, we saw that he was a Stoic philosopher, and as such he used reason to develop his rational system in a radical way. The same Tertullian, however, was also aware of the fact that in Christianity there is also the element of paradox. He who said that the human soul is naturally Christian (anilna naturaliter clzristiana) is the same one who is supposed to have said—though he did not actually say it—"I believe because it is absurd" (credo quia absurdum est). What Tertullian actually said was: "The son of Cod died: it is by all means to he believed, because it is absurd. And he was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible." This paradoxa is a mixture of two factors: first, it expresses the surprising, unexpected reality of the appearance of Cod tinder the conditions of existence; secondly, it is a rhetorical expression of this idea in the way in which Roman orators used the Latin language. It must not be taken as a literal expression, but by means of a paradox a point­ing to the incredible reality of the appearance of Christ. Now, people added to this the formula, credo quia absurdum est, but Tertullian himself never said this. With such a view he never would have been able to present such clear dogmatic formulae and, as a Stoic, believe in the ruling power of the Logos.

In Tertullian there also appeared an emphasis on sill, which was to become important in the West later. He spoke of the vicium originis, the original vice, and identified it with sexuality. In this way he anticipated a long development in Roman Christian­ity, the depreciation of sex and the idea of the universality of sinfulness.

For Tertullian' the Spirit is a kind of fine substance, as it was also in Stoic philosophy. The fine substance is called Spirit, or grace or love. They are actually the same thing in Catholic theology. Thus,

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Roman Catholic theology can speak of gratia infusa, infused grace, infused like a liquid, a very fine substance, into the soul of man and transforming it. This is the non-personalistic element in Roman Catholic sacramental thought. This grace can be infused sacramentally into the oil of extreme unction, into the water of baptism, into the bread of the Lord's Supper, and thus into the soul. This is one of the sources of this kind of "spiritual materialism", so to speak, which played such a great role in the Roman Church.

Finally, Tertullian represented the idea that asceticism, the self-denial of the vital reality of oneself, is the way to receive this substantial grace of God. He used the juristic term "compensa­tion" for sin; asceticism is the compensation for the negative character of sin. And he used the term "satisfaction". By good works we can "satisfy" God. And he spoke of "self-punishment". To the degree that we will punish ourselves, God will not punish us. All of this is legalistic thinking, although Tertullian was not himself a jurist. But every Roman orator and philosopher used the legal categories. This was in general a fundamental char­acteristic of the West and it became decisive for the later develop-rnent of the Roman Church.

Cyprian, bishop of North Africa, had his greatest influence on the doctrine of the church. The problem of the church which Cyprian discussed was a very existential one. There were the Persecutions as a result of which there were those who were ('ailed the lapi, those who fell away either by recanting the faith or by surrendering books to the searching servants of the pagan authorities or by denouncing fellow Christians in a trial. This was II matter of great concern to the church. These people wanted to return to the church and overcome the weakness which had caused them to fall. Who should be readmitted to the church? 'I'he church could not accept those who had fallen out of sheer malignancy. Who should make the decision as to who is eligible to return? The ordinary teaching was that it shall be done by those who were "spirituals", that is, those who had become titartyrs or in some other way had proved that they were fully

Christians. This method, however, was a sort of i t'muant from the past in which the "spirit" was still dominant

ver the "office". But now the office wanted to set aside this

'rnnant of the pest and to take over this decision too. The bishop,

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who is the church, must make the decision on the lapsi. And he should decide in a very liberal way; he should accept those who fell even more than once, in the same way that other mortal sin­ners are received.

On the other hand, the teaching was still powerful that the Spirit must decide whether or not someone can belong to the church. So Cyprian said that the bishops are the spirituals, those who have the Spirit, namely, the Spirit of succession from the early apostles, apostolic succession. In this way the Spirit became the qualification of the office. This was the greatest triumph of the office, that now the Spirit is bound to the office, and the Spirit is called the Spirit of succession. This was a transition to the idea that the clergy are endowed with the graces by virtue of ordina­tion, and that the highest of all clergy, the pope himself, em­bodies the grace of God on earth.

Another existential problem was what to do with people who are baptized by heretics and schismatics. I hope the difference is clear. Heretics are those who have a different faith, those who have deviated from the doctrinal order of the Christian Church. Schismatics are those who follow a special line of church-political development, those who split away from the church, motivated perhaps by a conflict between bishops or by an un­willingness to accept the bishop of Rome. Hence, the separation of the Eastern and Western churches is called a schism. The Eastern church is considered by Rome not as a heretical church but as a schismatic church. Protestantism is considered by Rome as a heretical movement, because the very foundations of faith are at stake and not only the refusal to acknowledge the bishop of Rome.

Now the question arose as to how it was possible to receive into one's own congregation persons who had been baptized by one of these groups. The answer that was given was in terms of the objective character of baptism. The validity of baptism does not depend on the person who performed it We shall see how Augustine carried this through. Cyprian's idea of the church stood behind all this.

(1) "He who does not have the church as Mother cannot have God as Father." "There is no salvation outside the church" (extra ecciesiam nufla salus). The church is the institution in which salvation is attained. This represents a change from the early

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Christian period in which the church was a community of saints and not an institution for salvation. Of course, in this period too salvation was happening in the church; people who were being saved from paganism and from the demons gathered in the church. But the church itself was not considered as an institu­tion of salvation but as a community of the saints. This empha­sis in Cyprian is very consistent with the legal thinking of the West.

(2)The church is built on the episcopate. This is according to divine law and is, therefore, an object of faith. "Therefore you must know that the bishop is in the church and the church is in the bishop, and that if somebody is not with the bishop, he is not in the church." This is the purest form of episcopalianism, al­though somewhat different from what that word means today.

(3)The unity of the church is correspondingly rooted in the unity of the episcopate. All bishops represent this unity. How­ever, in spite of the equality of all of them, there is one repre­sentative of this unity; that is Peter and his See. The See of Peter is the church "from which the priestly unity has arisen, the womb and the root of the Catholic Church." This is said prior to Augus­tine. The consequence of this, although not yet in Cyprian's mind, was unavoidably the principate of Rome in a much more radical way than he expressed it.

(4)The bishop is sacerdos—the Latin word for "priest". The main function of the priest is sacrificial. The priest sacrifices the elements in the Lord's Supper and thus repeats the sacrifice on Golgotha. "He imitates what Christ did; he offers a true and perfect sacrifice to Cod the Father within the church." Here again this is not yet the same thing as the Catholic Mass, but it would titiavoidably lead to it, the more so in the primitive nations, with their realistic thinking and their tendency to take as real what is symbolic. Many of the fundamentals of the Roman Church existed as early as about A.D. 250, when Cyprian lived. Whatever we say against the Roman Church, we should not forget that the early developments in Christianity led this way. And when today one speaks of the agreement of the first five centuries, this is entirely misleading. Of course, Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox agree on the major synodal decisions, but this is only an apparent agreement, because the living meaning of these things was abso-Ii itely different from what the Reformers built up as Protestant

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doctrine. If you look at a man like Cyprian, you can see the dif­ference. No Protestant can accept any of these points.

Let me sum up some of the points of the Occidental tradition.

(1)One could mention first the general practical, activistic tendency in the West, the legal relations between God and man, the much stronger ethical impulses for the average Christian, not with respect to himself but with respect to the world. And we can include in this point the eschatological interest, without mysta-gogal and mystical emphasis. In short, we could say that law more than participation characterizes the West from the very beginning.

(2)The idea of sin, even original sin, is almost exclusively Occidental. The main concerns of the East dealt with death and immortality, error and truth. The main focus of the West was on sin and salvation. In St. Ambrose, for example, the apostle Paul, the main teacher on sin and salvation, is held in high esteem. Ambrose has been called the doctor gentium, the teacher of the nations. Paul has the keys of knowledge; Peter has the keys of power. Throughout the history of the Middle Ages there con­tinued a struggle between Peter and Paul, so to speak, between the keys of knowledge which finally prevailed in the Reformation, and the keys of power which always prevailed in the Roman Church. Therefore, according to St. Ambrose grace is primarily understood as the forgiveness of sins and not as deification, as we have it in the Platonic attitude in the East,

(3)The latter point has the following consequences: Western Christianity emphasizes the historical humanity of Christ, his humility and not his glory. For example, on the door of St. Sabina in Rome, before which I stood with great awe, you find in woodcut relief the first picture or sculpture of the crucifixion. The door is world-famous, coming from the fourth century. Here the West shows that it deviates from the Christ of glory which you find in all mosaics; this is more symptomatic of the difference between East and West than many theological formulae. Of course, the same thing is also expressed in theological formulae. What we said when we dealt with Chalcedon can now be illustra­ted by contrasting a mosaic in, let us say, Ravenna, which was under Byzantine influence at that time, with the door in St. Sabina. There you find the two christologies clearly expressed in picture. In the one you have the tremendously powerful Lord

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of the universe, the Judge of the world in all glory, or as the risen One, in his majesty surrounded by angels, men, animals, and inorganic parts of nature, all of which participate in his glory. In the other you have this wonderful—from another aspect, poor—presentation of the suffering Christ. The former is Alex­andrian christology, which portrays a Christ whose bodily existence is swallowed up by the divine form. The latter is Anti-ochean, Roman christology, which emphasizes the humanity of Christ more than anything else, including his suffering humanity. This gives an example of the difference in feeling. Thus, we have in 'the whole history of painting in the West the most wonderful, the most cruel, and the most destructive representations of the crucifixion. The early Gothic crucifixes, of which there are many, are such that perhaps trustees of a modern church would not permit them to be hung; they are so ugly. As if the crucifixion were a beautiful thing! It was ugly—and that is what the West accepted and could understand.

(4) The idea of the church is emphasized much more in the West than in the East. Somehow the church is built according to the legal structure of the Roman state, with the principle of authority, with the double law—the canonic and the civil law. The hierarchical power is centralized in the pope; and everyone personally participates, even the monks, in the sacrament of pen­ance.

L. THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF AUGUSTINE

Now we come to the man who is more than anyone else the representative of the West; he is the foundation of everything the West had to say. Augustine lived from A.D. 354 to 430. His influ­ence overshadows not only the next thousand years but all periods ever since. In the Middle Ages his influence was such that even those who struggled against him in theological terminology and method—the Dominicans, with the help of Aristotle—quoted him often. Thomas Aquinas, who was the great opponent of Augustinianism in the Middle Ages, quoted him affirmatively most frequently.

In Augustine we also have the man to whom all the Reformers referred in their fight with the Roman Church. He influenced modern philosophy in a profound way insofar as it was Platonic,

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for example, Descartes and his school, including Spinoza. He has influenced modern theology as well. I would say, almost un­ambiguously, that I myself, and my whole theology, stand much more in the line of the Augustinian than in the Thomistic tradi­tion. We can trace a line of thought from Augustine to the Fran­ciscans in the Middle Ages, to the Reformers, to the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the German clas­sical philosophers, including Hegel, to the present-day philosophy of religion, to the extent it is not empirical philosophy of religion, which I think is a contradiction in terms, but a philosophy of religion which is based on the immediacy of the truth in every human being.

1. The Development of Augustine

To understand Augustine we must trace his development in seven different steps, and then an eighth step which is a nega­tive one with respect to content.

(a) The first of these seven steps, which may help us to under­stand the immense influence of this greatest of all church fathers, is Augustine's dependence on the piety of his mother. This means, at the same time, that he is dependent on the Christian tradition. This reminds us of Plato's situation. When Plato wrote, he also wrote out of a tradition, the aristocratic tradition of the Athenian gentry to which he belonged. However, this tradition had come to an end in the self-destructive Peloponnesian War; the masses took over, and then, as always, followed the tyrants. The aristo­cracy was killed, not only as human beings, but as the principle of aristocracy itself. So what Plato saw in his mind was an ideal form of political and philosophical existence; it was a vision which had no reality any more. Therefore, I must warn you about a mistake! The name of Plato overshadows everything else in Greek thought, even Aristotle. However, do not imagine that Plato was the most influential man in the later ancient world. To be sure, he did have some influence and his book, Timaeus, was almost the "bible" of the later ancient world. But he could not exercise real influence because everything he developed was in the realm of pure es­sences, and no longer had historical foundations. Here I am thinking in terms of pure economic materialism. If the social and economic conditions no longer exist, if a civilization has reached

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a certain state, it cannot be influenced, much less transformed, by the ideal form of ideas which come from the past. There is a parallel to this in our day in the longing for the Middle Ages; the increasing power of the Roman Church has something to do with this situation. But it cannot succeed. We cannot go back to the Middle Ages, although this is the hope of every Catholic. Thus, when Plato wrote his Republic and later on his Laws, implying in these writings all elements of his philosophical thought—which included at the same time his social, psychological, and religious thought—he was acting in some sense as a reactionary. By reac­tionary we mean that he was driving toward something which was a matter of the past, and could not be re-established any more in the period of the Roman Empire. This produced again a kind of emptiness in which the Cynics, Skeptics, and Stoics were much more important than Plato, because they were ade­quate to the situation. Stoicism, not Platonism, governed the later ancient world. Plato, however, returned in the Middle Ages.

Augustine was in quite the opposite situation. Whereas in Plato a great aristocratic tradition came to an end, a new tradi­tion started in Augustine. He had a pagan father and a Christian mother. The pagan father made it possible for him to participate in what was greatest in paganism at that time, and his Christian mother made it possible for him to enter into another tradition, a new archaism.

(b) Augustine discovered the problem of truth. This second step is connected with the fact that he read Cicero's book, Hortensius. In it Cicero dealt with the question of truth. For Cicero this meant choosing between existing ways of truth, be­tween the different philosophies. Cicero, a great Roman states­man, answered in terms of a kind of eclectic philosophy, as I believe every American statesman would do if he were to write a book on truth. He would choose those elements in philosophy which are most relevant to the political situation in which he found himself. Likewise, Cicero was interested in truth from a practical point of view. He was not an original philosopher. After the catastrophe of Greek philosophy this was impossible. Hence, from a pragmatic point of view he held that what enhances good citizenship in the Roman Empire is of philosophical value. The ideas which enhance are providence, God, freedom, immortality, rewards, etc. Augustine was in the same situation, only for him it

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was the City of Cod, not the civitas terrena, which he had in mind. So he developed a pragmatic philosophy, with Platonic and other elements, on the basis of the need of the Christian life, not on the basis of Roman citizenship. The basic form was prag­matic and eclectic, as in Cicero. Augustine also was not an opginal philosopher in the sense in which Plato or the Stoics were, He was a philosopher in whom the great synthesis between the Old Testament idea of Yahweh and the Parmenidean idea of being was achieved. More than anyone else in the history of the church Augustine was responsible for the communion of Jerusalem with Athens.

(c) The third point was his Manichaeism. The Persian religion was dualistic and in the Hellenistic period produced a movement called Manichaeism, named after its leader Maui. It was a Hel-lenized Parsism, dualistic in character. We can consider it a mix­ture between the prophecy of Zoroaster, the prophet of the Persian religion, and Platonism in the form of the gnostic think­ing in the late ancient world.

The Manichaeans were for a long time the main competitors of Christianity. They asserted that they represented the truly scien­tific theology of their time. Augustine was attracted to it for this reason, and also because the dualism of the Maniohaeans made it possible to explain sin rationally. This is the reason that the Manichaeans have always had some influence in the history of Christianity. In the Middle Ages there were always-some sects influenced by Manichaean ideas, and there are many Manichaearm ideas around today without our knowing them as such. When­ever sin is explained in terms of two ultimate principles, that is Manichaean; the evil principle is as positive as the good. For ten years Augustine was attracted to Manichaeism. There were reasons for this. First of all, for this group truth was not a merely theoretical issue, a matter of bgical analysis, but it was a religious issue, a matter of practical or existential concern. Secondly, truth was saving truth. Manichaeism was a system of salvation. The elements of the good, which are captivated by the evil principle, are saved from it. Thirdly, truth lies in the struggle between good and bad, which gives one the possibility of interpreting history.

Augustine always remained under the influence of Mani­chaeism. He left the group and fought against it, but his think­ing and even more his feeling were colored by its profound

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pessimism about reality. His doctrine of sin is probably not under­standable apart from his Manichaean period. Augustine left Manichaeism under the influence of astronomy. Astronomy showed him the perfect motion of the stars, that is, the funda­mental elements in the structure of the universe. This made any dualistic principle impossible. If the universe has a structure of regular mathematical forms which can be calculated and which are harmonious, where can you find the effect of the demonic creation in the world? The world as created in its basic structure is good; this is what he derived from astronomy. This means that he used the Greek Pythagorean idea of the cosmos. He used the principles of form and harmony as expressed in mathematics.

This Greek European principle overcame for Augustine the Asiatic dualism and negativity. Thus, the separation of Augustine from the Manichaean philosophy was a symbolic event. It meant the liberation of modern natural science, mathematics, and technology from the Asiatic dualistic pessimism and nega­tion of reality. This was extremely important for the future of Europe. The later medieval Augustinian philosophers and theo­logians were always men who emphasized astronomy and mathe­matics 'more than anything else. Modern natural science is born, as are Platonism and Augustinianism, on the basis of a belief in a harmonious cosmos determined by mathematical rules. This was also the world-view of the Renaissance. If we look deeper into the movements of thought, we can see that this anecdote about Augustine leaving the Manichaeans because of astronomy, after he had joined them because of its explanation of sin and evil, becomes a world-historical symbol for the relationship of the Asiatic East and the European West.

(d) After Augustine left the Manichaean group, he fell into skepticism, as often happens if you are disillusioned about a system of truth. You may fall into doubt about every possibility of truth. At this time the mood of skepticism was widespread. Even in the later Academy, the Platonic school, skepticism about knowledge existed in what was called probabilism. Only prob­able statements are possible; no certainty is possible. All of Augustine's earlier philosophical writings deal with the problem of certainty. He wanted to overcome the skeptical philosophy; he wanted certainty. This is an important element in his thinking because it presupposed the negative end of the Creek

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development. The heroic Greek attempt to build a world on the basis of philosophical reason came to a catastrophic end in skepti­cism. The attempt to create a new world in terms of a doctrine of essences ended in skepticism. It is on this basis that the emphasis on revelation must be understood. Skepticism, the end of Greek philosophy, was the negative presupposition of the way in which Christianity received the idea of revelation. Skepticism is very often the basis for a doctrine of revelation. Those people who emphasize revelation in the most absurd supernaturalistic terms are those who enjoy being skeptical about everything. Skepticism and dogmatism about revelation are correlated. The way that Christianity emphasized revelation up to the Renaissance is re­lated to the tremendous shock Western mankind experienced when all the attempts of the Greek philosophers to bring cer­tainty proved to be in vain.

Skepticism also gave rise to a new doctrine of knowledge, a new epistemology, which Augustine created. It starts with the inner man instead of the experience of the external world. Skepti­cism, which was the end of all attempts to build a world in the objective realm, in the realm of things and objects, had the effect of throwing Augustine upon himself to find therein the place of truth. Thus, we have two consequences of his participation in skepticism: the one is that he accepted revelation, the other that to find certainty as a philosopher he looked into the innermost center of his soul, in the subject himself. Augustine stood between skepticism and the new authority, that of the church, just as Plato stood between the old authority and the beginning of skepticism. Here again we have the end of the archaic period in Plato and the beginning of a new archaic period in Augustine.

(e) Augustine's liberation from skepticism in the philosophical realm was brought about by his Neo-Platonic period. While skepticism was at one end of Greek thinking, Neo-Platonism was at the other. Skepticism was the negative, Neo-Platonism the mystical, way that Greek philosophy came to its finish. Augustine became a Neo-Platonic philosopher and used this philosophy as the basis for a new certainty, the immediate certainty of God. In Neo-Platonism you have the immediacy of truth in the inner soul, and from this he got his new certainty of the divine.

Neo-Platonism also gave Augustine the basis for his interpreta­tion of the relationship of God and the world; God is the creative

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ground of the world in terms of amor (love). Then, from a psycho­logical point of view it gave him an entrance into himself, al­though this had to be supported by his Christian experience. But now Augustine did something which later on all Renaissance philosophers also did—he turned the meaning of Neo-Platonism into its opposite. Neo-Platonism was a negative philosophy, i philosophy of escape from the world. The elevation of the soul out of the material world into the ultimate is the meaning of Neo-Platonism. Augustine changed this emphasis; he dropped the idea of degrees, and instead used Neo-Platonism for the immediate experience of the divine in everything, but especially in his soul.

(f)Augustine overcame skepticism not only philosophically with the help of the Neo-Platonists, but also with the help of the authority of the church. This happened under the influence of St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, in whom the authority of the church was represented. The principle of authority was a form in which the new archaism, or the new archaic period which starts with the church tradition, became conscious of itself. The catastrophe of skepticism drove Augustine more and more to authority, to the authority of revelation, concretely given to him by the authority of the church.

The entire medieval development had an underlying anxiety of skepticism, the anxiety of meaninglessness, as we would call it, over against which the acceptance of revelation and authority stood. Authority for Augustine meant the impressive, imposing, overwhelming power of the church and its great representatives. The phenomenon of authority was not a problem of heteronomy, as it is for us, that is, subjection to what someone else tells us to accept. For Augustine it was the answer to the question implied in ancient skepticism. Therefore, he did not experience it as heter-onomy but as theonomy, and somehow rightly so at that time.

(f)  Another thing which impressed Augustine profoundly was Christian asceticism, as represented by monks and saints. He experienced the tension between the mystical ideal and his own sensual nature. In Augustine's time the sphere of sexuality was profanized in a terrible way. Neither Stoic reason nor Neo-Platonism was able to overcome this profanation on a large scale. The natural forms of love, sanctified by tradition and faith in the archaic periods of Greece and the other countries, had been destroyed. An unrestrained naturalism of sex prevailed.

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None of the preaching of the Stoics, Cynics, or Skeptics was able to help against this, because they preached the law, and the law is powerless against a naturalistically distorted libido. Augus­tine found a new principle of sanctification which proved the solution for himself and for others in this realm. It had the same tension in itself as we met in the Christian Neo-Platonism in Dionysius, that is, both affirmation and negation of the world. Christianity affirms creation and sanctifies existence through the historical appearance of the divine in Christ. Neo-Platonism negates creation; in fact, it has no real creation. And it negates the historical appearance of God, or makes it a universal event which always is happening. Augustine was divided; insofar as he was a Christian, with his roots in the Old Testament, he valued family and sex, to the extent that sex was kept within the family. Being influenced by Neo-Platonism and the ancient negativity toward the world, he denied sex and praised asceticism. This con­flict went on through the whole history of the church. We find it even in the Reformers, although the Reformation was basically on the positive side of Augustine, affirming the body in depen­dence on Old Testament prophetism. On the other hand, the suspi­cion of libido was so deeply rooted in the Christian tradition that in spite of their radicalism, the Reformers were unable to eradi­cate the remnants of Neo-Platonic asceticism, and were suspi­cious of everything sexual. This is still true of Protestants in countries under Calvinist influence.

(h) It is important not only to understand these seven steps in the development of Augustine, but also to notice what is missing among these major influences on him. Aristotle is missing, not entirely, of course, because Plotinus had taken much of Aristotle into his system. Yet, Aristotle was not directly important for Augustine. This means that Augustine did not include in his philo­sophy and theology the concern for Greek science. Not only Greek natural science, but also political science was not really implied in his thinking. This is significant for the further develop­ment in the Middle Ages.

(1) What Aristotle did was to construct a system of mediation, not a system of dualism, as we have in Plato and Plotinus. The system of mediation could not be used by Augustine because for him the dualistic world-view seemed to be the adequate expres­sion of Christianity.

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(2)The emphasis in Aristotle on the importance of the indivi­dual provides a basis for tendencies which are far removed from Augustine,,.who wanted the community of the church.

(3)Aristotle speaks about the middle way between the ex­tremes. He denies anything like the erotic and ascetic ecstasies of Augustine. Again, it is a quasi-bourgeois attitude. The conse­quences of this later on become very explicit in Protestantism.

(4)Aristotle represents the special sciences which deal with things in their rational and horizontal relationship. Augustine denies the importance of such things. What is important is the knowledge of God and the soul, not knowledge of the natural things.

(5)Aristotle was a logician. Augustine had no particular interest in logic. The intuitive and voluntaristic character of his thinking made him disinterested in the abstractions of pure logic.

(6)Aristotle was an inductive thinker, an empiricist. He started from the given reality in time and space and went up from there to the highest abstractions. Augustine, following Plato, was an intuitive thinker; he started from above and went down to the empirical realities.

Now, these two different attitudes were due to clash as soon as Aristotle was rediscovered in the thirteenth century. For this reason this is the greatest century of Christian theology; it is completely determined by the tension between Aristotle and Augustine. This tension continues through all the succeeding cen­turies. If anyone wishes to place a label on me, he can call me an "Augustianian", and in this sense "anti-Aristotelian" and "anti-Thomistic". I am in basic agreement with Augustine with respect to the philosophy of religion, but not necessarily in other things. For example, as a Gestalt theologian or philosopher I am closer to Aristotle than to Augustine or Plato, because the idea of the living structure of an organism is Aristotelian, whereas the atom-istic, mechanical, mathematical science is Augustinian and Platonic.

2. Augustine's Epistemology

The purpose and the way of knowledge are expressed in Augustine's famous words: "I wish to know Cod and the soul." "Nothing else?" "Nothing at all." God and the soul! This means

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that the soul is the place where Cod appears to man. He wants to know the soul because only there can he know Cod, and in no other place. This implies, of course, that Cod is not an object beside other objects. God is seen in the soul. HeAs in the center of man, before the split into subjectivity and objectivity. He is not a strange being whose existence or non-existence one might dis­cuss. Rather, he is our own a priori; he precedes ourselves in dignity, reality, and logical validity. In him the split between the subject and object, and the desire of the subject to know the object, are overcome. There is no such gap. Cod is given to the subject as nearer to itself than it is to itself.

In the Augustianian tradition the source of all philosophy of religion is the immediacy of the presence of God in the soul or, as I prefer to say it, the experience of the unconditional, of the ultimate, iii terms of aiiultimate or unconditional concern. This is the prius of everything. This is not a matter of discussing whether or not somebody exists. Augustine connects this with the problem of certainty. He says that we have immediate evidence of two things, first, the logical form—because even the question of evi­dence presupposes the logical form—and secondly, the immediate sense experience, which should really be called "sense im­pression" because "experience" is too ambiguous. What he means is this: I now say that I see blue. Objectively the color may be not blue but green—sometimes I confuse these two, especially in ladies' dresses, to the horror of Mrs. Tillich. In any case, the sense impression I have is blue. This is absolutely certain, even if the dress is not blue. This is what he means with immediacy. I may see a man, but as I come nearer, it is in reality a tree. This often happens when you are walking in a fog. This means there is no certainty about the objective element in it; but there is absolute certainty about the impression I have as such. There is skepticism about everything real. Logical forms are not real; they are struc­tures which make questions possible. Therefore, they are immedi­ate and necessary. And sense experiences are not real, except insofar as I have them. Whether they are more than this, I do not know. Thus, these two evidences—of the logic and of the percep-tion—do not overcome skepticism.

How then can doubt about reality be overcome? First, we must start with the general doubt; we must doubt about everything. It was not Descartes who first said this. It was said even before

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Augustine. But Augustine also said it. Is there a point of cer­tainty somewhere? He said: "You know that you are thinking." "Do not go outside; go into yourself," namely, where you are thinking. "The truth dwells in the interior of man, for a mind knows nothing except what is present to the mind. But nothing is more present to the mind than the mind itself." That is to say, the immediate self-consciousness of the asking skeptic is the fixed point. The truth which was lost in the exterior world, where everything fell under skepticism, is found again in the interior world. The soul is the inner realm, in contrast to Greek philosophy in which it is the power of life. The discovery of soul in this sense is one of the most important consequences of Christianity. It includes the world as the sum of all appearances. In contrast to the Greeks, where the soul is a part of all things, the world now becomes an object. The world is an appearance for the soul, which is the only real thing.

Now these ideas—go into your inner reality and there you will find truth—sound very much like Descartes' cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). The difference is that in Descartes the self-certainty of the ego is the principle of mathematical evidence —he derives from this his rational system of nature—whereas for Augustine the inner evidence is the immediacy of having God. So Augustine says: After going into your soul, transcend yourself. This means that in your soul there is something which transcends your soul, something immutable, namely, the divine ground. He refers here to the immediate awareness of that which is uncon­ditional. This is certainly not an argument for the existence of God, but a way of showing that God is presupposed in the situa­tion of doubt about him. "While not seeing what we believe, we see the belief in ourselves." That is, we see the situation of being grasped by something unconditional.

There were people whom Augustine met who said: Why truth at all? Truth as such is not necessary. Why not stick to probabili­ties? Why not restrict oneself to pragmatic answers, answers which work? Augustine replied that this is not sufficient, because it leads to a complete emptiness of life. Without something un­conditional or ultimate, the preliminary meanings lose their signi­ficance. This cannot be counteracted by saying that the human situation is not one of having truth but of searching for truth. Augustine replies that searching for truth is no answer to the

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question of truth, because if we are searching for truth, we must at least have some intuition of truth, we must know when we approach truth that we are approaching it. In order to know that we are approaching truth, we must already have some criterion, namely, truth itself. He is saying that in every relativism, how­ever radical it may be, an absolute norm is presupposed, even if it cannot be expressed in propositions. Since truth is something which we can find only in the interior of the human soul, physics is useless for ultimate truth. It does not contribute to the know­ledge of Cod. He says that while angels have knowledge of divine things, the lower demons recognize the world of bodies. A knowledge of the bodily world involves participation in it. Know­ledge is union; union implies love; and he who deals cognitively with the bodies loves them and participates in them. This means that he is distracted from the highest, divine knowledge; it means that he is in untruth. The natural sciences have meaning only insofar as they show the divine causes in nature and show the traces of the trinity in flowers and animals; they have no meaning in themselves. The consequence of this is that for the greater part of the Middle Ages the natural sciences were reduced in significance and were not really furthered at all. The technical relation to nature is of no interest to Augustine, nor the analytic character of controlling knowledge. This makes the attitude of the Middle Ages to the natural sciences understandable. If the people of the Middle Ages loved nature, it was because they could see it as an embodiment of the trinity. This, of course, gave them the possibility of artistic production, which is much higher than most of what we produce under the power of controlling knowledge. Go to the Cloisters (Museum) and look at the carpets on the walls there; what you see there is not a representation of nature in terms of natural science. None of the flowers or animals is naturalistically exact; but they are all painted in order to show the traces of the trinity, that is, the movement of life to separa­tion and reunion in the natural objects. They try to show the divine ground in nature, and that gives them their beauty. To understand these creations, you must see their intentio, that which is really meant.

Augustine said that the Neo-Platonists and Plato himself were nearest to Christianity. He saw trinitarian elements in their thought, especially the Logos doctrine. Then he says—an im‑

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portant statement for revealing the relationship of theology and philosophy—that one thing which philosophy could not affirm is that the Logos has become flesh. Philosophy makes it possible for theologians to speak of the Logos, but when theology says the Logos became flesh, this is a theological statement based on a religious message that distinguished Christianity from classical philosophy. The statement about the Logos becoming flesh is a matter of revelation, not philosophy. The Logos as the universal principle of the cosmos appears in historical form. This is a unique, incomparable historical event.

3. The Idea of God

Augustine's idea of love is the power which unites the mystical and ethical elements in his idea of God. Let us first deal with his idea of love before taking up the problem of God. Anders Nygren, the Swedish theologian who wrote Agape and Eros, criticized Augustine, as he did Christian theology in general, for combining eros and agape in a synthesis. Nygren is right that in Augustine there are both elements. Agape is the element of love in the New Testament sense of the personal, forgiving character of God. ErOs represents the longing of all creatures for God as the highest good, the desire to be united with it, to fulfill itself by intuiting eternally the divine abundance. The agape element is emphasized when we speak of God moving down to man in oaritas—I prefer the Latin word to the much distorted word "charity"—of becoming humble in Christ, exercising grace and mercy, participating in the lowest and elevating it to the highest. ErOs, on the other side, drives from below to above; it is a longing, striving, being moved by the highest, being grasped by it in its fullness and abundance. The Logos becoming flesh, that is agape. But all flesh (all natural and historical reality) is desirous for ()d; this is erOs. In my Systematic Theology I have shown that if you remove erOs, you cannot speak of love toward God any more, because this is love toward that which is the highest power of being in which we are fulfilled.

God is summa essentia, ultimate being, beyond all categories, 1 iv yond all temporal and spatial things. Even the categories of substance cannot be used. Essence and existence, being and (Illality, functions and acts, these cannot be distinguished in this

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side of Cod. The negative theology which we found in Dionysius is present also here; both were dependent on Neo-Platonism. On the other hand, there is the positive way. Cod is the unity of all forms; he is the principle of all beauty. Unity is the form of all beauty and Cod is the unity of all forms. All ideas, all essences, or power, or principles of things, are in the mind of God. Individual things come to pass and return to Cod through the ideas.

Here we have the two elements in the idea of God. Insofar as God is beyond any difference, he is beyond subject and object. Love is not a subjective feeling directed toward an object. It is not that objects are ultimately loved, but through our love to­ward them love itself is loved. Anwr amatur, love is loved; this means that the divine ground of being is love. Love is beyond the separation of subject and object. It is the pure essence, blessed­ness, which is the divine ground in all things. If we love things in the right way, including ourselves, we love the divine substance in them. If we love things for their own sake, in separation from the divine ground in them, we love them in the wrong way; then we are separated from Cod. There is thus for Augustine a right kind of self-love; this is to love yourself as loved by God, or to love God, the divine ground of everything, through yourself.

Augustine is also in the personalistic tradition of the Old and New Testaments and the early church. This is more important for him than for the Eastern theologians, like Origen. He sides com­pletely with the West in the trinitarian discussion. He is more interested in the unity of Cod than in the different hypostaseis, the three personae, in Cod. He expresses this in terms which make it clear he is one of those responsible for our present-day indnation to apply the term persona to Cod, instead of applying it individually to the Father, Son, and Spirit. Of course, Augustine never became heterodox in this respect, although he leaned, as did the West generally, toward a Monarchian view. That he was inclined in this direction is evident by the analogy he sees be­tween the trinity and the personal life of man. He says: "Father, Son, and Spirit are analogous to amans (he who loves), qnod amatur (that which is loved), and amor (the power of love)." Or: "The trinity is analogous to memory, intelligence, and will." This means that he uses the trinity in order to give analogically a description of God as person. Since God is a person, and that

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means a unity, all acts of God toward the outside (ad extra) are always acts of the whole trinity, even the act of the incarnation. None of the three personae or hypostaseis acts for himself. Since the substance of all things is love, in its threefold appearance as anians, quod atnatur, and amor, everything which is created by the divine ground bears the traces of the trinity. This gives a theonomous character to the immediate world. The forms of life are not denied or broken but theonomously filled with divine substance.

On the relation of God to the world, Augustine expressed very clearly the doctrine of creation out of nothing. There is no matter which precedes creation; creation is done without an inde­pendent substance. This means there is a continuous threat of finitude. I believe that when our modem existentialist thinkers, including myself, say that finitude is the mixture of being and non-being, or that non-being is present in everything finite, this has something to do with Augustine's statement that everything is in danger of the fathomless abyss of nothingness. The world is created in every moment by the divine will, which is the will of love. Therefore, Augustine concluded—and the Reformers fol­lowed him—that the creation and preservation are the same thing; the world is at no moment independent of God. The forms, laws, and structures of reality do not make it an independent reality. God is the supporting power of being, which has the character of love. This makes every deistic fixation of the two realities—God and the world—impossible. God is the continuous, carrying ground of the world.

All of this is in agreement with Augustine's famous doctrine of time. Philosophically speaking, this is his greatest achievement, because here he really starts a new era of thinking about the concept of time. (Cf. his prayer, Book II of the Confess—ions.) Time is not an objective reality in the sense in which a thing is. There­fore it is not valid for God. The question how time was before creation is meaningless. Time is created with the world; it is the form of the world. Time is the form of the finitude of things, as is

·1ce also. Both world and space/time have eternity only insofar its they are subjects of the eternal will to creation. That means they are potentially present in the divine life, but they are not eternal as real; as real they are finite; they have a beginning and to end. According to Augustine there is only one world4 process.

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This is the decisive statement by which he denies the Greek con­cept, held by Aristotle and the Stoics, that the world is cyclical, that there are cycles of birth and rebirth which repeat themselves infinitely. For Augustine there is a definite beginning and a defi­nite end; only eternity is before and after this beginning and end. For the Creeks space was finite and time was infinite, or better, endless. For Augustine neither time nor space is infinite. He agrees with the Greeks on the finitude of space. They could not under­stand the infinity of space because they were all potential sculp­tors; their world-view was plastic; they wanted to see bodies in space. The infinity of space would have disrupted the plastic form of reality, expressed in mathematical forms by the Pythagoreans. Augustine, however, said time was finite. This finitude of time is necessary if time is to have an ultimate mean­ing. In Greek thought it does not; instead it is the form of decay and repetition. Time has no meaning of itself in creative terms. The endlessly recurring times of nature are meaningless. Mean­ingful time is historical time, and historical time is not a matter of quantity. The six thousand years of world history about which Augustine speaks are the meaning of time. And if, instead, there were one hundred thousand years or even a few billion years, this could not take away the meaning of time. Meaning is a qualitative, not a quantitative, concept. The measure of time is not clock time. Clock time is physical time; it tends to repeat itself. But the meaning of time is the kairos, the historical moment:, which is the qualitative characteristic of time.

There is one world whose center is the earth, and one history whose center is the Christ. This one process is eternally intended by God, but eternity is not time before time, nor is it timeless­ness. It is something beyond all these categories. However, al­though the world is intended eternally, it is neither eternal nor infinite; it is finite and meaningful. Infinite meaning is actualized in the finite moment. This feeling of finitude makes the Middle Ages understandable to us. People then felt that they lived in one process which has a definitely known beginning with the days of creation a few thousand years before our time and which will have a definite end with the days of judgment a few years or a few thousand years ahead of us. We live within this period, and what we are doing in it is extremely important—it is the meaning of the whole world process. We are in the center of everything

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that happens, and Christ is in the center of everything that we are. This was the medieval world-view. You can imagine how far we are removed from it if you realize what this means not in terms of words but in terms of a feeling toward reality, an aware­ness of one's existence.

4. The Doctrine of Man

Augustine said that the decisive function in man is the will. It is present in memory and in intellect, and has the quality of love, namely, the desire toward reunion. This predominance of will was another of the great ideas by which the West overcame the East, and which produced the great medieval struggle between voluntarism and intellectualism. The two basic activities of the soul—knowledge and love, or will, which is the same—have an ambiguous character. They are directed partly toward themselves and partly beyond themselves. They are directed toward one's self in self-knowledge and self-love. "We are, we know that we are, and we love this our being and knowing." This means we are self-related and self-affirming. We affirm ourselves in know­ledge and in will.

On the other hand, love and knowledge transcend ourselves and go to the other beings. Love participates in the eternal; this is its own eternity. The soul has transtemporal dimensions. This participation is not what is usually called immortality, but it is the participation in the divine life, in the divine loving ground of being. However, this idea is in tension with another in Augustine. One could say that this mystical element is in tension with an educational element. The souls are not only eternal in their essence, but also immortal in the technical sense of continuation in time. As a result those who are excluded from eternity because they are separated from God are still immortal; this immortality means their punishment and damnation. They are excluded from God; this means they are excluded from love—love is the ground of being—and they deserve no pity. There is no unity of love between them and the others. If this is the case, however, one iwist ask how there can then be unity of being, if being is love. I kre we see one of those conflicts between mystical-ontological thinking and ethical-educational thinking. We saw the same con­flict in Origen when he spoke about the apokatastasis ton

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pantOn, the return of everything to God, the final salvation of every­thing that has being, a teaching which the church rejected. In this sort of conflict esoteric theology, philosophy, or mysticism always chooses the one side, specifically the side of the eternal and the union with God in eternity. Ecclesiastical, educational or ethical thinking always chooses the other side, namely, the per­sonal possibility of being eternally condemned and punished. Logically this is impossible to hold, because the very concept of the eternal excludes continuation in time, and the ontological concept of love, which is so strong in Augustine, excludes being which is not in unity with love. The educational view exercises a continual threat over everyone. Therefore, the church has always maintained it, accepting the logical contradiction in order to produce the threat of the eternal (i.e., endless) condemnation. Ontological mysticism and educational moralism contradict each other on such matters.

I am reminded here of another problem which is perhaps much more concrete in our time. Anybody who seriously reflects on it, or at least carries on his reflection within the Christian or exis­tentialist tradition, will no doubt agree that the idea is utopian that at a certain time the kingdom of God, or the classless society, will be established on earth, without power or compul­sion. Utopian means literally (from ou-topos, no place) that there is "no place" for this in time and space. But if this is admitted, then we diminish the fanatical will toward political revolution and the transformation of society. Some will tell you they know this is utopian, but if they tell the people, they will no longer fight for the transformation of society. They can fight only if they believe the final stage is at hand, if the kingdom of God is at hand. Only this conviction releases the power to act. What are we to answer? Here we have the same problem. The ethical, in this case the social-educational, point of view contradicts the insight into the relation of time and eternity. So many say, we know this is utopianism, but we must affirm it, otherwise people will not act. Others say, and I belong to this latter group, the disappointment which follows utopianism always and necessarily makes it impos­sible to speak like this to people, if you know better, because the disappointment is worse than the weakening of fanaticism. This would be my decision, and yet it is a very questionable one.

In Augustine even the unbaptized children are not condemned

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to hell but to the limbus infantium where they are excluded from the eternal blessedness, from the divine love. Such an idea might have had a tremendous educational and ecclesiastical value in certain periods of history, but not for us any more. Very often it produces—this is especially true of the personal fear of con-demnation—neurotic stages, and therefore we cannot say that it is superior.

5. Philosophy of History

Augustine's philosophy of history is based—as philosophy of history usually is—on a dualism, not an ontological dualism, of course, which is impossible, but a dualism in history. On the one hand, there is the city of God, on the other the city of earth or the devil. The city of God is the actualization of love. It is present in the church, but the church is a corpus mix'um, a mixed body, with some people who belong to it essentially and spiritually and others who do not. Then there is a mediation between these two characteristics of the church, the one wherein it represents the kingdom of God and the other wherein it is a mixed body, and this is the hierarchy. The hierarchy, those who have the consecra­tions, mediates between the two. In them Christ rules the church and Christ is present. Thus, the Catholic Church could use Augustine in both ways. It could identify the kingdom of God with the church to such a degree that the church became abso-lutized; this was the one development which actually happened. On the other hand, the difference could be made very clear, and this is what the sectarian movements and the Protestants did. There is a dialectical relationship between the kingdom of God and the church in Augustine. It was ambiguous enough to be use­ful for different points of view. But one thing was clear for him: there is no thousand-year stage in world history, no third age. Chiiasm or millennialism was denied by him. Christ rules the church in this present time; these are the thousand years. There is no stage of history beyond the one in which we are living. The kingdom of God rules through the hierarchy, and the chiliasts are wrong. We should not look beyond the present period in which the kingdom of Cod is presentin terms of history.

The kingdom of the earth has the same ambiguity. On the one hand, it is the state of power, compulsion, arbitrariness, tyranny;

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Augustine edled it the "gangster state". It possesses all the imperialistic characteristics that we see in all states. On the other hand, there is the unity which overcomes the split of reality, and from this point of view it is a work of love. If this is understood by the emperor, he can become a Christian ruler. Here again we have the ambiguous valuation: the state is partly identical with the kingdom of the devil and it is partly different from it because it restricts the devilish powers.

History has three periods: that before the law, that under the law, and that after the law. In this way we have a fully developed interpretation of history. We are in the last period, in the third stage; it is a sectarian heresy to say that another state must still be expected. The medieval sects, of course, expressed this heresy. In this light the struggle becomes visible between the revolution­ary attempts of the sectarian movements and the conservatism of Augustine's philosophy of history.

6. The Pelagian Controversy

We touched on Augustine's doctrine of man when speaking of the voluntaristic character of his thinking, his idea that the center of man is not the intellect but the will. In this he began a development which goes through the whole Western world, represented by theologians and philosophers for whom the will is the center of man. When we come to the medieval philosophers and theologians, and to the modern ones, we will see how this influence was continually maintained in creative tension with the tendencies coming from Aristotle. The tension between Augustine and Aristotle is the decisive power which moves the medieval history of thought; almost everything can be seen in relation to this tension.

So far this has been only a description of man in his essential relationship. If man is seen in his essential relationship to Cod, to himself, and to others, then he is seen by Augustine as a will whose substance is love. This love is the creative ground of every­thing that is. This is an idea of love in which agape and eros are united. However, this essential nature of man is not his existential nature; it is not actual in time and space. On the contrary, this essential nature of man is distorted by what Augustine calls sin, especially original sin, in line with the tradition of the New Testa‑

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ment and the church. His doctrine of sin, the center of his doctrine of man, was developed in his controversy with Pelagius.

Augustine's conflict with Pelagius is one of the great struggles in church history, comparable to the trinitarian and christo-logical controversies. It is one which repeats itself again and again in the history of the church. Already in the New Testa­ment there was the tension between Paul and the writers of the "catholic" Letters; we have it between Augustine and Pelagius, somehow also between Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscans, and finally between Karl Barth and the present-day liberals. One point is always decisive. Usually it is discussed in terms of the concept of freedom, but this is misleading because freedom has so many connotations not relevant for this question. The decisive point is the relationship of religion and ethics. The question is whether the moral imperative is dependent on the divine grace for its actualization, or whether divine grace is dependent on the fulfillment of the moral imperative.

Pelagius was not an isolated heretic. He represented the ordin­ary doctrine of people who were educated in Greek thinking, especially in Stoic traditions, and for whom freedom is the essen­tial nature of man, Man is a rational being, and a rational being has freedom of deliberation and decision. This alone would not have made him a heretic, because most of the Eastern church had exactly the same idea of freedom. But Pelagius developed this concept in a way which brought him into conflict with Augustine. When this conflict was resolved, Augustine was at least partly victorious and Pelagius was an arch-heretic, whose name still stands for one of the classic Christian heresies,

For Pelagius death is a natural event, not a result of the fall. Since death belongs to finitude, it would have happened even if Adam had not fallen into sin. The same idea, we have already seen, was expressed in Ignatius and Irenaeus, namely, that man is naturally finite and destined to die as everything natural. How­ever, according to the story of paradise it is possible for man to overcome his essential finitude through participation in the food of the divine. What Pelagius does is to leave out the second pos­sibility and to affirm only the first as true and in accord with the Christian tradition.

The sin of Adam belongs to him alone and not to the human race as such. In this sense original sin does not exist. Original sin

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would make sin into a natural category, but man is a moral being. Therefore, the contradiction of the moral demand must be an event of freedom and not a natural event. Everybody must sin in order to be a sinner. The simple dependence on Adam does not make anyone a sinner. Here 'again Pelagius is saying something that is universally Christian, that there is no sin without personal

rpicipation in sin. On the other hand, he does not see that fstianity also stresses' the tragic universality of sin, thus mak­ing it a destiny of the human race. The relationship to Adam as the one presupposed as the first man is, of course, mythological, but in this myth the Christian Church—whether it took it literally or not—has preserved the tragic element which we also find in the Greek world-view. Pelagius had a point, but he did not see the profundity of the Christian description of the human situa­tion.

When children are born they are in the state of Adam before the fall; they are innocent. Of course, Pelagius could not close his eyes to the fact that the evil surroundings and customs distort their innocence. This is akin to the modem psychoanalytic theory of the relationship to the parents or their representatives which determines the complexes and other negativities in the depths of the soul. Today there is even another theory, the biological theory that the distortion is inherited and cannot be avoided even if you place the child in the best possible surroundings. There is some ditrtion in its very nature from birth. However, Pelagius wanted to ~id the idea of hereditary sin. Sin is not a universally tragic necessity, but a natter of freedom. America is very much in favor of this Pelagian idea that every individual can always make a new beginning, that he is able by his individual freedom to make decisions for or against the divine. The tragic element, on the other hand, is very much known in Europe, and is not so near to the heart, of Americans. In Europe the negative side of Augustinianism—we could call it exitentia1ism—has emphasized the tragic element and has reduced the ethical zeal and impact that Pelagianism can have.

The function of Christ un4er these circumstances is a double one: to provide the forgiveness of sins in baptism to those who believe, and to give ar'i example of a sinless life not only by avoiding sins but also by avoiding the occasions ,of sins through asceticism. Jesus was an example of asceticism, a kind of first

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monk; Pelagius himself was a monk. Grace is identical with the general remission of sins in baptism. Grace has no meaning after this because then man is able to do everything himself. Only in the situation of baptism does man receive the grace of forgive­ness.

We can say that Pelagianism has a strong ethical emphasis with many ascetic elements, but the tragic aspect of life has been entirely lost. Do not take him lightly; take him seriously. I do not say that we are all born Pelagians—as I say about nominalism—but I would say that Pelagianism is very near to all of us, especi­ally in those countries which are dependent on sectarian move-ments,as America so strongly is. It is always effective in us when we try to force God down to ourselves. This is what we usually call "moralism", a much abused term. Pelagius said that good and evil are performed by us; they are not given. If this is true, then religion is in danger of being transformed into morality.

Against these views of Pelagius we have Augustine's doctrine of sin. Augustine agreed with Pelagius that freedom is the original, essential quality of man, so that Adam was free when he fell. Originally man's freedom was directed toward the good, and the good is the love with which God loves himself. In this sense everybody is free. But this freedom is dangerous, so dangerous that man could change his direction toward God and direct him­self instead toward particular things in time and space. Augustine saw that the danger of freedom was so great that he created the famous doctrine of ad/utorium gratiae, the helping power of grace, which was given to Adam before he fell. He was not in pure nature (in puns naturalibus). The assisting power of grace made it possible for Adam to continue indefinitely in directing his will toward God. It made it possible for him. This, however, was a point on which the Reformers disagreed with Augustine. This ad/utorium gratiae, this assisting power of grace, implied indirectly that nature in itself cannot be good; it must be fulfilled by super-nature. It implied that man in puns naturalibus, in his purely natural state, is so endangered that actually he must fall, unless supernature helps him. The Reformers placed such an emphasis on human nature—very similar to the Renaissance at this point—that they declined this idea of a donum superadditum, a gift of grace that is added to man's nature. This is a very profound dis­tinction, and behind this seemingly Scholastic terminology there

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is hidden the question of the valuation of creation. In the doc­trine of the donum superaddituin there is something of the Greek valuation of matter as the resisting power. An element of the Greek tragic feeling enters here in contrast to the Jewish and Protestant affirmation of nature as good in itself.

Augustine held that the first man, Adam, had the freedom not to fall, not to die, not to turn away from the good. In this state he was at peace with himself—a profound remark in view of our modern depth psychology; he was at peace with all things and all men. There was no cupidity, no desire, not even in sexual life. There was no pain in this state, not even in the event of child­birth. It was easy for Adam not to fall; there was no real reason for it. Yet, astonishingly, he did fall. And since there was no external reason for his fall, it started in his inner life. Sin, accord­ing to Augustine, is in its very inception spiritual sin. Man wanted to be in himself; he had all the good possibilities; there was noth­ing for him to endure from which he would have to turn away; he had everything he needed. However, he wanted to have all this by himself; he wanted to stay in himself. Therefore heturned away from God and fell. This is what Reinhol'd Niehuhr calls "pride" and what I prefer to call hybris, self-elevation. In this way man lost the assistance of grace and was left alone. Man wanted to be autonomous and tostand upon himself. This meant a wrong4ove of himself which cut off the proper love toward God. Augustine said: "The beginning of all sin is pride; the beginning of pride is man's turning away from Goà." If you say hybris instead of pride, it is profounder because pride often has the connotation of a special psychological attitude. But that is not what is meant here. The most humble people in a psychological sense can have the greatest pride.

Now these statements show first of all that Augustine as aware that sin is something which happens in the spiritual realm _turning away from the ground of being to whom one belongs. It is not a naturalistic doctrine of sin. Even more important than this, Augustine shows clearly the religious character of sin. Sin for him is not moral failure; it is not even disobedience. Dis­obedience is a consequence, not the cause of sin. The cause is turning away from God, from God as the highest good, as the love with which God loves himself through us. Since this is the nature of sin, it ought to be kept distinct from "sins", which refer

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to moral acts. Sin is primarily and basically the power of turning away from God. For this reason no moral remedy is possible. Only one remedy is adequate—a return to God. This, of course, is possible only in the power of God, a power which man under the conditions of existence has lost.

The immediate onsequence of man's turning away from his highest good is -the loss of this good. This loss is the essential punishment of man. Punishments in terms of educational or juristic terminology are secondary. For Augustine the basic punish­ment is ontological. If God is everything positive, the ultimate good, or the power of being overcoming non-being, the only real punishment that is possible is the intrinsic one of losing this power of being, of not participating any more in the ultimate good. Augustine described it thus: "The soul died when it was left alone by God, as a body will die when it is left by the soul." The soul which is dead, religiously speaking, has lost its control over the body. When this happened, the other side of sin became actual. The beginning is pride, hybris, turning to oneself, becom­ing separate from God. The consequence is concupiscence, the infinite endless desire. The word concupiscentia, desire or libido (in the ways in which modern psychology uses it) has two mean­ings in Augustine: the universal meaning, the turning toward the movable goods, those goods which change and disappear, and the narrower meaning of natural, sexual desire, which is accom­panied by shame. This ambiguity of the term "concupiscence" is to be found also in Freud's concept of libido. Both terms are meant universally, the desire to fulfill one's own being with the abundance of reality, and both have the meaning of sexual desire. Innumerable consequences followed from this ambiguity. For example, in Freud there followed his puritanism, his depreciation of sex, his bourgeois suppression, and on the other hand, the rpvelation of this situation. But Freud never found a solution to this problem, either by suppressing or getting rid of the desire. And since you cannot get rid of it, you have, according to Freud, the desire unto death, the death instinct, as he calls it, which is the necessary answer to the endlessness of desire. In Protestantism, as in all of Catholicism earlier, the ambiguity of the term "con-tiipiscence had all sorts of ascetic consequences, including the most extreme and disgusting forms. The Reformers tried to re-i,tablish the dignity of the sexual, but they succeeded only in a

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limited way. They never completely followed through on their own principles against the Roman Church. Therefore, anyone who knows anything about the history of moral behavior and the history of ethical theory in Protestantism will see that Chris­tianity has been very uncertain on this point and has produced no satisfactory answer to this question implied in human exis­tence.

Adam's sin is original sin for two reasons. We all existed poten­tially in Adam, in his procreative power, and in this way we participated in his free decision and thus are guilty. This is myth, of course, and a very questionable one. Secondly, Adam intro­duced libido, desire, into the process of sexual generation, and this element was passed on by heredity to all posterity. Everyone is born out of the evil of sexual desire. Original sin is primarily spiritual, sin of the soul, in Adam as in everyone else. But it is also bodily sin. Augustine had great difficulty in uniting the spiritual character of sin in everybody with the hereditary char­acter of sin which derives from Adam.

Because of original, hereditary sin, everybody belongs to a "mass of perdition", to a unity of negativity. The most striking consequence of this is that even infants who die early are lost. Since everyone belo'hgs to the mass of perdition, nobody can be saved except by a special act of God. This is the most powerful emphasis on the solidarity of mankind in the tragedy of sin. Thus, he denies most radically—almost in a Manichaean sense—the freedom in the individual personality. The all-embracing unity of mankind makes us what we are. Now, in the light of our modem research into depth psychology and sociology we are probably able to understand better than our fathers what Augustine meant, namely, the inescapable participation of everyone in human existence, in a social structure, and in an individual psychological structure, whether neurotic or otherwise. The question which arises, however, is: What about the participation of the indivi­dual in guilt? There is no answer to this in the context of Augus­tine.

Man has lost his possibility to turn toward the ultimate good because of his universal sinfulness. We are under the law of servitude, the bondage of the will. Therefore, grace is first of all gratia data, grace given without merit. it is given by God to a certain number of people who cannot be augmented or dirnin‑

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ished; they belong to him eternally. The rest of the people are left to the damnation which they deserve. There is no reason in man for the predestination of the one group or the rejection of the other. The reason is in God alone; it is a mystery. Thus, one can­not speak of prescience, of foreseeing what man would do, as is often done in the doctrine of freedom. This is impossible since God's willing and knowing are identical. Cod can never look at something as though it were not carried by his power of being, that is, his will. God always wills what he knows. "He has elected us not because we would be holy, but in order to have us become holy." There is no reason in man for predestination. God does both the willing and the fulfilling.

Augustine was nevertheless not a determinist in the technical psychological sense. Predestination does not exclude man's will. The psychological will of man is preserved and distinguished from external forces, or from compulsory elements in man. But the direction of the will toward God is dependent on God's pre­destination, and his predestinating will cannot be explored. Grace is given to everybody who becomes a Christian. The forgiveness of sins, which is given first happens in baptism and is received by faith. Here Augustine continues the general tradition. But beyond this, forgiving is a real participation in the ultimate good. This ultimate good has appeared in Jesus as the Christ, without which neither good thinking nor good acting nor loving is possible. He describes this side of grace as the inspiration of the good will, or he speaks of the inspiration of love, primarily the love toward God. "The Spirit helps", he says, "by inspiring in the place of bad concupiscence, good concupiscence, that is, diffusing caritas (agape) within our hearts." Justification, there­fore, is an inspiration of love. Faith is the means to receive it. But faith by that time already had the deteriorated sense—which makes Christian preaching about faith almost impossible today—of an acceptance of doctrines which are unbelievable. So Augustine distinguished between two forms of faith. The one form of faith he called credere deo aut christo, believing directed toward God or Christ, that is, accepting their words and com­mands; the other is credere in deum aut christum, believing into God and into Christ. The first is an intellectual acknowledgment, without hope and love. The second is a personal communion which is created by grace, or by the Holy Spirit, or by love.

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This alone is the faith which justifies, because it makes him who is justified just.

Those who are predestined are not able to fall away again. They receive the gift of perseverance, the gift of not losing the grace which they have received. None of this depends on any merit, not even on the merit of not resisting grace, since grace for Augustine is irresistible when it comes to you.

With these ideas Augustine attacked Pelagius. In all respects it is the opposite of Pelagius' teachings. Augustine's doctrine, how­ever, was never completely accepted by the church, although he was considered the greatest teacher of the church. Pelagianism was rejected, and even semi-Pelagianism, which cropped up later, was condemned a hundred years later. Yet, this rejection did not prevent it from creeping back into the church. Historians sometimes refer to this as crypto-semi-Pelagianism. It cannot be denied that especially in the Augustinian school, in the later Franciscans, semi-Pelagianism was very much alive. It was, of course, out of the question to repeat Pelagius' teachings in the official church. But semi-Pelagianism, which denied the irresisti­bility of grace and stressed the necessity to work to keep grace, crept back into the church to make Augustine's doctrine educa­tionally possible. We spoke about this problem before. You cannot have such a doctrine as Augustine's in an institution of education, and the Christian Church was the only institution of educa­tion for a thousand years. In such a situation you must appeal to the free will of those to be educated. An extreme doctrine cannot be presented in a direct way to most people. Thus, the ultimate tragic element was not lost entirely, but it was to a certain extent restricted for the sake of the educational needs. This was the situation when the Reformers came upon the scene. In their time the tragic element had been reduced almost to nothing by the educational, ethical, and ascetic emphases which were dominant in the church. The churches with only some exceptions are usually very suspicious of any doctrine of predestination—at least the Catholic Church was—because that makes the ultimate relation to God independent of the church, or at least it tends to do so. So here again we have one of those tensions of which I spoke in connection with Origen and other theologians, the tension be­tween the ultimate theological and the penultimate educational points of view. You always have these two elements in tension in

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religious instruction, in counseling, as well as in preaching. The great struggle between Augustine and Pelagius is perhaps the classic example of the problem in the Christian Church.

7. The Doctrine of the Church

Augustine's doctrine of the church has had a great influence on all Christian churches, not only the Roman, and therefore we must deal with it. We have already shown that in Cyprian the church is defined as an institution of salvation, largely replacing the concept of the church as the communion of saints (communio sancto.rum). The consequence of regarding the church as an instifution was ,a change in the idea of the holiness of the church. In this situation Augustine entered into conflict with the Donatist movement. Originally there was an emphasis on the sanctification of the individual members and the group as a whole. This empha­sis gave way to the sacramental reality of the church. Now the holiness of the church is identical with the sacramental gifts, especially with the sacramental power of the clergy. The idea of sanctus (holy, saint) no longer refers to someone who is personally sanctified, but to one who has the sacramental power. This repre­sents a fundamental change in meaning from the subjective to the objective element, from personal holiness to institutional holiness.

There were people in North Africa where Augustine was a bishop who did not go along with this development and who were interested in the actual sanctification of the church and its members, especially of the clergy. The issues which were in­volved were the following:

(1)the discipline in the act of penance;

(2)the question whether baptism is valid if performed by here­tics;

(3)the question whether ordination is valid if performed by traditores, traitors, who either delivered over holy books during the persecutions, or denied they were Christians.

Are the objective graces valid if they are mediated by persons who are not subjectively holy? The Donatists excluded them and did not allow them to become ministers because for them the holiness of the church is the personal holiness of its representa­tives. The consequence of this would be to make individual

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Christians dependent on the moral and religious status of the clergy. They would be dependent on the inner holiness of the ministers. Now, Augustine was clear about the fact that it is impossible to make a judgment of this kind, that any attempt to do so would lead to terrible consequences—to assume the role of Cod who alone can look into the hearts of people. He wanted to save the objectivity of the church in face of the demand for sub­jective holiness of its representatives. Here he followed the lead of Cyprian. To do this he introduced the distinction between faith (including hope) and love. Faith and hope are possible out­side the church because they are determined by their content. You may live among heretics, you may even be one yourself, but if you satisfy the formula of baptism in the right way, then the content is decisive and not your personally heretical or morally unworthy status. The formulae are the same as they are in the Catholic Church. Thus, if the heretical churches use these same formulae, their objective contents make their sacramental actions valid.

Love, on the other hand, is something which cannot be found where there is not the right faith. Love is the principle which unites the church. This is not a simple moral goodness, which can be found everywhere, but it is the agapeic relationship of individuals to each other. This spirit of love, which is embodied in the church as the unity of peace, as the re-establishment of the original divine unity which is disrupted in the state of existence, is something that can be found only in the church. For this reason there is salvation only in the church. Salvation is impossible with­out the inpouring of agape, that grace given like a fluid into the hearts of men. Although there may be valid sacraments outside the church, salvation can only be had within it.

This distinction between faith and love is of extreme importance and makes the church the only place of salvation for Catholics. From this there follows the distinction between the validity and the effectiveness of the sacraments. The sacraments of the here­tics are valid if they are performed in terms of the orthodox tradi­tion. This means nobody has to be rebaptized. On the other hand, the sacraments have no effectiveness within the heretical groups, but only within the church. For example, baptism always gives a character indelebilis, as the technical term stated; it is a quality coming from God, which one has throughout one's life whatever

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one does. This was very important because it enabled the medieval church to treat the pagans and Jews differently from the baptized Christians. The baptized Christians were subjected to the laws of heresy, while pagans and Jews were not. Even though baptized Christians should try to become Jews or pagans or Muslims, they could not because the very act of baptism con­ferred an indelible character upon them, no matter who per­formed the act, whether orthodox or heretical.

In the same way ordination is always valid. Priests who are fallen and excommunicated are forbidden to administer the sacraments, but if they should do it, the sacraments are valid. If in prison a medieval priest who happens to be excommunicated should marry a couple, the marriage is valid in spite of the fact that he was forbidden to do so. And no re-ordination is needed if the priest is absolved and rejoins the clergy, because ordination is and remains valid.

All of this made the people in the church completely inde­pendent of the quality of the priest. Nobody can know this quality for sure anyway. Of course, priests who committed mortal sins that were publicly visible were excommunicated and for­bidden to perform sacramental acts, but this is different. What he does is valid in any case. What we have here is the hierarchical institution of salvation, which as an institution is independent of the character of those who function in its behalf, and within this institution there is the spiritual community of the faithful. Accord­ing to Catholic doctrine the first is the condition of the second; according to sectarian beliefs the second, if anything, is the con­dition of the first. These two concepts of the church have been in conflict throughout the history of the church.