Japan as a Colonizer
by Nitobe, Inazo
Publication date 1912-04-01
Publisher The Journal of Race Development
Collection jstor_jracedeve; jstor_ejc; additional_collections; journals
Contributor JSTOR
Language English
Volume 2
"Japan as a Colonizer" is an article from The Journal of Race Development, Volume
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JAPAN AS A COLONIZER
By Inazo Nitobe, Ph.D.
President of the First National College, and Professor in
the Imperial University, Tokyo, formerly Director of the
Bureau of Industries in the Government of Formosa
With the acquisition of the small island of Formosa in 1895,
Japan joined the ranks of colonial powers. Since then she
has had the island of Saghalien by the treaty of Portsmouth
in 1905 and Korea by annexation last year. Besides these
territories she has also in her possession the small province
of Kwang-tung in the Liao Tung peninsula; and a long,
narrow strip of land along the Manchurian railroad, the
last two being leased from the Chinese.
In recounting what Japan has done as a colonizer I shall
for several reasons devote my time to a review of what Japan
has achieved in Formosa. First, because it was the first colony
and as such served the purpose of colonial education for us.
Second, because it may be called the only colony with which we
have had any experience worth speaking about. The other
colonies and possessions are so new to us that whatever
policy we may have formed for them has not yet borne any
fruit. And thirdly, because the administration of this island
of Formosa forms a precedent for the government of later
acquisitions; and also because you can infer from a descrip-
tion of our policy in Formosa what we shall do with other
possessions and colonies. To these three reasons there is
an appendix to be added — namely, because I can speak of
this colony from a long and personal connection with it,
and to me the last is the strongest and the best reason.
Now Formosa, or more properly, Tai-wan (since Formosa
is not a Chinese nor a Japanese name, being a Portuguese
appellation), was ceded to us at the termination of theChino-
Japanese war. When accession from China was proposed
by Japan, we were not at all sure that the suggestion would
be complied with by the authorities. But the Chinese
plenipotentiary, Li Hung Chang, took up the proposition
as though it were wise on the part of his country to be freed
from an incumbrance, and even commiserated Japan for
acquiring it. He pointed out that the island was not amen-
able to good government, that brigandage could never be
exterminated there, that the presence of head hunting tribes
was always a menace to social order, and that the climate was
not salubrious, and also that the opium habit among the
people was widely spread and extreme. The island, some-
what like Sicily, had, in the course of its history, been sub-
ject to the flags of various nations; Holland, Spain and
China ruled it at different times, and at one time Japanese
pirates had practically usurped supreme power over it.
At another time the French flag floated on its shores. Such
an instability in government is enough to demoralize any
people; but among the people themselves there were ele-
ments which put law and order to naught.
The indigenous population consists of head-hunters of
Malay descent, who live in small communities in a very low
grade of culture. The only art with which they are ac-
quainted is agriculture, and that in a very primitive style
— what the Germans name Spatencultur, not agriculture
proper but rather what Mr. Morgan, if I remember rightly,
in his Primitive Society calls a primitive form of horticulture.
They have no ploughs; they have no draft animals; this hor-
ticulture is all that they know. But these people are very
cleanly in their habits. This may be due to their Malay
instinct of frequent bathing; and they keep their cottages
perfectly clean, unlike other savages of a similar grade of
culture. The main part of the population, however, con-
sists of Chinese who have come from the continent and
settled in Formosa. They came chiefly from the opposite
shores, the province of Fukien and from the city and sur-
roundings of Canton. It seems that the Chinese emigrants
could not perpetuate their families in their new home for
any number of generations, succumbing as they did to the
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 349
direct and indirect effects of malaria, and hence the Chinese
population proper was constantly replenished by new arri-
vals from the main land. The aborigines or savages liv-
ing a primitive life, constantly driven into the forest regions
and high altitudes, did not increase in numbers; so when
Japan assumed authority in this island she found few con-
ditions that bespoke a hopeful outlook. The Chinese, repre-
senting two branches of their race totally different in char-
acter and in their dialects — their dialect being unintelligible
one to the other — occupied the coast and the plains and were
chiefly engaged in agricultural pursuits. They had a few
fortified cities and towns among them; Tainan and Taihoku,
with a population of about 40,000 were the most important.
The peaceful Chinese inhabitants were constantly exposed to
depredations of the brigands. In fact, a great many villages,
besides paying taxes to the government, had to make regular
but secret tribute to the brigand for immunity from spolia-
tion. But this is nothing peculiar to Formosa. When I was in
Manchuria I found just the same thing there. Perhaps my
friend, Professor Iyenaga, described to you in his speech
this morning the brigandage in Manchuria. When I was
there a few years ago I found that the mounted bandits
often threatened the caravans which carried merchandise
and silver ingots. The government could do nothing with
them and so the caravans formed a kind of league, a kind
of guild; and then the brigands also formed a kind of guild,
and both the caravan guild and the brigand guild would
send their representatives to meet somewhere; and the cara-
van representative would offer to pay something and say,
"Now, we will pay you so many thousands of dollars a year,
if you promise to spare our caravans," and the brigands
would say, "All right. If you carry such and such a flag
we will not attack your caravans, but we will attack other
caravans that do not pay us." Thus without any action
on the part of the government there is peace procured
between the brigands and the caravans.
It is the same with the beggars; in Mukden I saw a num-
ber of wretched looking creatures begging from house to
house. These paupers form a very strong body; they have
350 INAZO NITOBE
a delegate of their own. A number of them will stand in
front of a store and of course no one will go into such a store
guarded by beggars, and that store loses trade. So a num-
ber of these stores get together, form a guild and send a dele-
gate to the guild of the beggars and say," Please don't stand
in front of our stores." Between them the two delegates
settle the matter for a certain sum of money. So it was with
these Formosans, in their dealings with the bandits. They
paid tribute, so many dollars or so many head of cattle a
year. Still the agriculturists who had their farms away
from the villages, even though they were free from brigand-
age, were exposed to the attacks of head-hunters who would
steal unawares from their haunts among the mountains to
shoot anybody. I must make a digression and state that
these head-hunters are very partial to Chinese heads; they
say that they are easier to cut, being shaved in the back.
Well, these head-hunters had a custom among them accord-
ing to which young men must secure some head as a trophy
without which they could not obtain recognition for bravery
or celebrate any feast among their tribes. Hence the For-
mosan people had never known the meaning of a quiet,
peaceful society or of a stable government. They had
never known the security of property or of life. Successive
administrations had, none of them, been able to assure them
of these elementary duties of government. With a people
brought up under these circumstances, patriotism was a
thing entirely unknown.
In accordance with the stipulation of the treaty of Shi-
monoseki, one of our generals, Count Kabayama, was dis-
patched as governor-general of Formosa. In that capacity
he was about to land at the island with a large army; when
he was met by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the port of
Kelung, and in an interview which took place on board of
the steamer Yokohama Maru, the 17th of April, 1895, it
was arranged that a landing should be effected without
opposition. This marked the first landing of our troops since
the acquisition of the island of Formosa by the Japanese.
There were at that time some Imperial Chinese soldiers still
remaining on the island, but on hearing of its cession to
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 351
Japan they were required to disarm and leave the country.
Many did so, but a few remained to oppose our army; and
then also there were a few patriots who did not feel ready to
accept our terms, not ready to accept an alien rule — and
these either left the island or took up arms against us.
Since there was now no government, some of the so-called
patriots proclaimed a republic, one of the very few republics,
(I say one of the very few because this is not the only case
a — we had a similar instance in Japan), that were started in
Asia. Mr. Tang was elected president and the republic of
Formosa lasted three or four months, leaving behind nothing
but some post-stamps valuable for collectors. At this time
the professional brigands took this opportunity of general
disturbance to ply their trade. I dare say the peaceful
inhabitants of the island suffered more from the hands of
their own countrymen, that is, largely from Chinese troops
and brigands, than they did from us. Evidence of this lies
in the fact that several towns received our army with open
arms as a deliverer from robbery and slaughter.
Though the island was pacified no one knew what was to
happen next. We did not understand the character of the
people. Very few Japanese could speak Formosan and
fewer Formosans could speak Japanese. There was natur-
ally mutual distrust and suspicion. The bandits abounded
everywhere. Under these conditions military rule was the
only form of government that could be adopted until better
assurance could be obtained of the disposition of the people.
For this purpose it was calculated that some ten million yen,
I may say five million dollars, was yearly needed for the paci-
fication and government of Formosa. Out of this necessary
sum only three million yen could be obtained by taxation,
according to the old regime. The balance had to be defrayed
by the central, that is by the Japanese, government. Now
an annual expenditure of six or seven million yen in those
years, to be spent in an island away from home, with no
immediate prospect of return, was by no means an easy
task for the rather limited finance of Japan. You know how
land values are rising everywhere. Even in Africa, England
had to pay very much more than she had expected in getting
352 INAZO NITOBE
land in the south; and I think Italy has by this time found
Tripoli rather more expensive than she had calulated at
first. A colony that looks at a distance like the goose that
lays the golden egg, on nearer approach and especially
when you have to pay the bills, often proves to be a white
elephant. So with us impatient people who had expected
great things and great benefits to come from Formosa,
began to call for more frugality and some of the very best
publicists went even so far as to propose that the island of
Formosa should be sold back to China or even to some other
power. In the course of some thirty months, two years and
a half, no less than three times were governors changed.
The first governor general was Count Kabayama, known
as a hero of the Chino- Japanese war; the second was no less
a man than Prince Katsura, now of some international fame
as the prime minister of Japan for many years; and the third
was General Nogi. Finding that the country could ill afford
such a luxury as a colony, the parliament of Japan cut down
its subsidy of six or seven million yen from the national
treasury by about one-third, thus reducing the subsidy from
six or seven million to only four million. Now who would
accept a position held by a man as Nogi, but now reduced
financially to two-thirds of its former prestige and power?
Only a man of unbounded resources, of keen perception and
quick decision, not a second or a third-rate man, would
accept such a place; and Japan is forever to be congratulated
on finding the right man at the right time for the right place,
Viscount Kodama, who, as a member of the General Staff, had
made a study of the Formosan problem and was ready to accept
the governorship and to see if he could put to rights the bank-
rupt housekeeping of the colony. I am afraid that the name
so well known among us is perhaps very much less known in
this country. Kodama is a name which is cherished by
our people with love and respect. Perhaps you can best
remember his name if I tell you that he was the real brains
of the Russo-Japanese war. It was he who actually directed
the whole Japanese army in the war with Russia.
In accepting the governorship of Formosa he was particu-
larly fortunate in the selection of his lieutenant, his assist-
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 353
ant, the civil governor; he made the discovery, as he called
it, of a man who proved himself his right hand, and who
actually came far above his most sanguine expectations.
I mean Baron Goto, one of the rising statesmen of modern
Japan. Baron Goto in the last cabinet held the position of
Minister of Communications and was President of the
Bailway Board. Until Baron Goto was made civil governor
of Formosa under Kodama he had been known as an expert
on hygiene, having been a medical doctor. The advent of
these two men in Formosa marked a new era in our colonial
administration. Upon entering their new post of duty early
in 1898, the first thing they did was the practical suspension
of military rule; at least it was made subservient to civil
administration. Military rule is apt to become harsh and
to the Chinese especially, who are not accustomed to respect
the army, it is doubly harsh.
Next, Kodama and Goto, to whom English colonial ser-
vice was an inspiring example, surprised the official world
by a summary discharge of over one thousand public ser-
vants of high and low degrees, and collected about them men
known and tried for their knowledge and integrity. They
used to say often and often, "It is the man who rules and
not red tape." In an old and well settled country "red tape"
may be convenient, but in a new colony great latitude of
power and initiative must be left to responsible men. I
emphasize this point because these men, I mean the gover-
nor general and the civil governor, attributed their success
largely to the selection and use of right men.
Brigandage was still rampant when Kodama went to
Formosa, and with military rule in abeyance there was some
likelihood of its growing worse. To offset this, the constabu-
lary department was organized and made efficient by proper
care in choosing men for the police and by educating them in
the language, and in the rudiments of law and industries, for
their arduous tasks. Exceedingly arduous were their call-
ings, since these policemen were required not only to repre-
sent law and order but they were expected to be teachers.
They kept account, for instance, of every man, and they
watched over every man and woman who smoked opium;
354 INAZO NITOBB
they had to be acquainted with children of school age and
know which children went to school and which did not.
Moreover, they were required to teach the parents the rudi-
ments of entomology. I do not know how policemen in
this country are educated; but I think they are better edu-
cated, though perhaps not in entomology and hygiene. But
our Formosan police were expected to teach the people how
to take care of themselves, and especially about pests, about
disinfection, and about lots of other things that would
scarcely be required of any policeman in any other part of
the world. Moreover these policemen were required to live
in a village where there were no Japanese, just a purely
Formosan village, alone or sometimes with their wives. Of
course the policemen were required to know the language
and to speak it. Now under civil administration armies
were not mobilized against brigands, and if there was any
trouble it was the policemen who had to go and settle bri-
gandage. But the brigands were invited to subject them-
selves to law and if they surrendered their arms they were
assured not only of protection but against hunger. Not
a few leaders took the hint and were given special privileges,
so that they were assured of a future living. Those who
resisted to the end were necessarily treated as disturbers and
as criminals. Twelve years ago brigandage was so rampant
that the capital of Formosa, Taihoku, was assaulted by them ;
but in the last ten years we scarcely hear of it. I went to
Taihoku ten years ago and whenever I went a few miles
out of the city half a dozen policemen armed with rifles used
to accompany me for my protection. But in the last five or
six years a young girl can travel from one end of the island
to the other, of course excluding savage or aboriginal dis-
tricts, of which I shall speak later.
Thus what Li-Hung-Chang in the conference of Shimono-
seki said, turned out to be of no consequence. According
to him brigandage was something inherent in the social
constitution of Formosa. He said it was something that
could not be uprooted in the island; yet here is Formosa
to-day with not a trace of brigandage. That is one of the
first things which was accomplished by Japan as a colonizer.
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 355
Then another great evil in the island to which Li-Hung-
Chang alluded was the opium smoking. When the island
was taken, it was a favorite subject for discussion among
our people. Some said opium smoking must be abolished
at once by law. Others said, "No, no, let it alone; it is
something from which the Chinese cannot free themselves;
let them smoke and smoke to death." What took Baron
Goto for the first time to Formosa was the desire to study
the question of opium-smoking from a medical standpoint ;
and the plan he drew up was the gradual suppression of the
smoking habit, and the modus operandi was the control of
the production — this was to be done by the government,
because, if the government monopolizes the production and
manufacture of opium, it can restrict the quantity and also
it can improve the quality so as to make it less harmful. A
long list of all those who were addicted to this habit was
compiled, and only those who were confirmed smokers were
given permission to buy opium. People who never smoked
opium before, or children, were not allowed to buy, much
less to smoke opium, and strict surveillance was to be insti-
tuted by the policeman, who, as I mentioned before, knows
every man in the village. The annual returns made of
the confirmed smokers and of the quantity consumed in the
island show distinct and gradual decrease of opium. At
one time the number of smokers was, in round numbers,
170,000. In ten years the olders ones died off and
younger ones did not come to take their place; so there is
constant diminution. In ten years the number decreased
from 170,000 to 130,000; and now it is about 110,000. So
there is this constant annual decrease and that, we think,
is the only right way to do away with this habit. It may
interest you, perhaps, to know that American commissioners
from the Philippine Islands came to study our system.
When I met them they expressed much satisfaction and I
dare say they are going to have the same system introduced
in the Philippines, for the Chinese in these islands. Thus
the second evil which Li-Hung-Chang said was inherent to
Formosa also disappeared, or rather is fast disappearing.
There are two more obstacles which we consider are in the
356 INAZO NITOBE
way of the further development of the island of Formosa;
these are, first the mosquito and second, the savages. By
mosquitoes I mean especially the anopheles, the malaria-
bearing mosquito. Malaria is the greatest obstacle in the
way of developing the resources of the island. The Japanese
immigrants who have come suffer, I may say one-third of
them, from malaria. If I want labor and if I take with me
100 Japanese laborers to Formosa, I can count on the effi-
ciency of only 60 or 70, because one-third of the laborers
must be expected to be sick with malaria. Hygienic and
sanitary measures are vigorously enforced but this can be
done only in the larger cities. In the city or rather the
capital of Taihoku, they made a very perfect sewage system;
they tore down the old castle walls and used the stones in
making the sewage ditches, and ever since then the number
of people suffering from malaria has decreased greatly.
In fact, it is said that malaria has disappeared from the city.
Careful observations resulted in substantiating the fact that
among the mosquitoes in this city less than 1 per cent be-
longed to the dangerous species of anopheles. The rest of
the mosquitoes are harmless, that is to say, as far as malaria
is concerned. Then also, speaking of sanitation, I am
reminded of what we have done against the pest; the pest,
or the bubonic plague, was a very common disease there, but in
the last four years we hear nothing or it. By constant care
and by strict enforcement of sanitary laws is the pest now
eradicated or near eradication.
But as to the aborigines, or the savages of Formosa we cannot
say we have nearly eradicated them. They belong to the
Malay race and are fierce and brave. As I have said before,
they live in the mountains; they never live on the plains.
And when they want a head they steal down, hide them-
selves among the underbrush or among the branches of trees,
and shoot the first Chinese or Japanese that passes by. In
fact I knew of a savage who had his rifle so placed on a rock
that he could shoot any person who happened to walk past
in just a certain direction and at a certain height; and there
he waited for days and days for somebody to walk right
within his range; and he succeeded in getting a head! With
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 357
such people it is practically impossible to do anything.
In number they must be over 100,000; we cannot count them,
but we are pretty sure there are 115,000. Repeated at-
tempts we have made but we never have succeeded thus
far in doing much damage to them, though they have suc-
ceeded in doing much damage to us.
All that we can do and all that we are doing, in order to
prevent their descending from among the heights, is to
place a wire fence on the ridge of the hills. Barbed wire
was used at first, but now we use a wire fence which is not
barbed but is of ordinary wire with a strong electric current
running through it. That may sound very savage to you,
but it is the only way that we can keep them off from us.
I have been in this place and seen the fences. The wire is
strung on posts about five feet high; there are four wires with
a foot between them, and a strong electric current running
through. At first they tried their best to get over the fence,
but they have learned not to approach it. This wire fence
stretches a distance of some three hundred miles. It costs
several thousand dollars ; yet every year we build this fence
some miles further in. The next year we go another stretch,
so that their dominion will be more and more confined to the
very tops of the mountains. Of course I do not wish to give
you an impression that we are dealing harshly with them,
because we offer them their choice. We say, "If you come
down and don't indulge in head-hunting we will welcome
you as a brother," — because they are brothers. These
savages look more like Japanese than Chinese and they
themselves say of the Japanese that we Japanese are their
kin and that the Chinese are their enemies. Because the Chi-
nese wear their qeues they think that their heads are espec-
ially made to be hunted. And now every year, as I say, we
are getting a better control over them by this constant mov-
ing of the wire fence and by the salt-famine for they have no
salt since they are cut off from the sea-shore; they raise their
rice, they raise millet, they have their own animals, and so
they do not want food, but what they want badly is salt.
So we say, "We will give you salt if you will come down and
give up your arms;" and tribe after tribe has recognized our
358 INAZO NITOBE
power and has submitted itself to Japanese rule. Then
we build them houses, we give them agricultural tools and
implements, give them land, and let them continue their
own peaceful ways of livelihood.
Thus I have dwelt in a very sketchy, very unsatisfactory
way, on the four points to which Li-Hung-Chang in the con-
ference at Shimonoseki alluded as great obstacles in the way
of developing Formosa. What now is the result? At first
we could not manage a colony with the money that we could
raise in the island; every year we had to get some subsidy
from the national treasury. It was expected that such a
subsidy was necessary until 1910. But by the development
of Formosan industries, especially of rice and of tea, (of
Oolong tea, for which you are the best customer, because
Oolong tea is made chiefly for American export), by develop-
ing the camphor industry (because all the camphor that you
use, if not artificial, is produced in Formosa) ; by developing
sugar, the production of which was increased five-fold in the
last ten years (a tremendous increase for any country in
any industry) — by developing these industries, we can get
money enough in the island to do all the work that is needed
to be done there. By this I mean that irrigation work,
for instance, is now being carried out on a large scale. Then
there is the improvement of the harbors; both in the north,
at Kelung, and in the south, at Takao, commodious and deep
harbors are now being constructed or improved. "We have
built a railroad from one end of the island to the other.
Schools and hospitals are now to be met with in every vil-
lage and town. Then the police attend to the health, to the
industries, and to the education of the people. In all these
things we think that we have succeeded quite well, especially
when we compare our colony of Formosa with the experi-
ments that other nations are making. We often speak of
English colonies as being models; we speak of French colo-
nies as examples not to be followed ; and we are looking to
your experiment in the Philippines to find what it will
amount to. Comparing our Formosa with the colonies of
these different powers, we have good reason to congratulate
ourselves.
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 359
I have made a very rough, sketchy address this afternoon.
I have only tried to show what were the general lines of
policy pursued in the development of Formosa. We have
been successful. A colony was at first thought to be a
luxury, but now Formosa is to us a necessity. The example
that we set there in that island will be followed in other
colonies of ours. I may say that the general lines of the
colonial policy of Formosa were first of all, the defense of
the island. So much is said about our increased navy,
some people in this country think that we are increasing
our navy in order to attack San Francisco or Manila; but
with the acquisition of Formosa, of the island of Saghalien,
and of Korea, our coast line has increased immensely and yet
our increased navy is not sufficient for the proper defence
of all the coast lines that we have, for the first great object
in the colonial policy of Formosa, and I may say of Japan, is
the defence of the new territory.
The second is the protection of property and life, and the
dissemination of legal institutions. People unaccustomed
to the protection of law feel as though it were despotism.
But they will soon find out that, after all, good government
and good laws are the safeguard of life and property, and we
have to teach in Korea as well as in Formosa what govern-
ment and what laws are.
Then the third point is the protection of health. I have
spoken to you of what we have done in Formosa; similar
lines of policy will be pursued in Korea. When I saw Prince
Ito in Seoul and when I told him that the population in
Korea had not increased in the last hundred years and that
perhaps the Korean race was destined to disappear, he said,
"Well, I am not sure. I wish to see whether good laws will
increase the fecundity of the Korean people." In Formosa
it was a very well known fact that without new recruits
coming from the mainland of China the population would
diminish. There were more deaths than births. But since
we assumed sovereignty there annual returns show a gradual
increase of births over deaths; hence, as I said, the third
great point in the colonial policy of Japan is the protection of
health.
360 INAZO NITOBE
The fourth is the encouragement of industries. In For-
mosa the government has done much to improve the quality
as well as the quantity of rice, and to improve irrigation.
The improvements in the sugar industry which have been
made were suggested by the government. When the work
was started ten years ago we got sixty tons of cuttings from
Hawaii; and we have about twenty mills, the machinery
being imported from Germany, England and Hawaii. The
experiments in the manufacture of sugar were also made by
the government and when the experiments resulted in im-
provement, this was told to the people; experts were sent
out to the different villages, preaching the advantages of
better culture. So with other branches of industry. The
government is constantly encouraging the people to make
improvements.
And then the fifth policy is that of education. In For-
mosa we have just reached the stage when we are taking
up education seriously. We could not do it before this,
because our idea was first of all to give to those new people
something which will satisfy their hunger and thirst; their
bodies must be nourished before their minds. And now that
the economic condition has improved in the last year or two,
schools are being started in all the villages.
These broad lines of colonial policy which we have prac-
tised with good results in Formosa, will be transferred in
Korea. We do not trouble ourselves about the question of
assimilation. In the last number of the Journal of Race
Development published by this University, I read an article
by Mr. MacKay, British consul in Formosa. He concludes
his article by expressing two doubts, namely: one in regard
to the commingling of races, that is, Chinese and Formosans;
and second, in regard to the Japanization of the Formosans.
He doubts whether either will take place. Well, as far as the
Japanese are concerned, we do not trouble ourselves about
these questions. I think assimilation will be found easier
in Korea because the Korean race is very much allied to
our own. In Formosa, assimilation will be out of the ques-
tion for long years to come and we shall not try toforceit. The
idea is that we put no pressure upon them, with the object of
JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 361
assimilation or Japanization in view. Our idea is to pro-
vide a Japanese milieu, so to speak, and if people come and
if they assimilate themselves, well and good. We have a
proverb in Japan which says, "He who flees is not pursued,
but he who comes is not repulsed." If the Formosans or the
Koreans come to us, we will not repulse them. We will
take them with open arms and we will hold them as our
brothers, but we will not pursue them. We leave their
customs and manners just as they like to have them. Our
principle is firm government and free society. Firmness in
government is something which they did not have before,
and that is what we offer to them.
And therefore I beg of Americans who are interested in the
development of Japan as a colonial power, not to be misled
by reports which now and then appear in different peri-
odicals and newspapers by critics of all nationalities and
of all countries. I have often read articles written by
foreign critics who speak of our administration in Korea
as a failure. A well educated man, an American, wrote
that in Formosa the people are very much opposed to the
Japanese government, are very much dissatisfied with it.
If I were to go among the farmers in the west of this country
and ask, "Are you satisfied with Mr. Taft's administra-
tion?" they would say "Yes, we are." But if I were to
press the question. "Do you think there is something to
improve?" "Of course," the farmers will say, "I do not
think Mr. Taft's administration is perfect." Well, I may
note down in my book that the American people are dissat-
isfied with Mr. Taft and may rise against him at any mo-
ment. Such a rumor you may hear from time to time in
any newspaper about any country; but as our adage has
it — "Proof is stronger than argument;" and I have given
but a few proofs, though, if time allowed, I could give
more.
