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OCT 2 1 1932
Japan and the Peace Pact
With Special Reference
to Japan^s Reaction
to
Mr. Stimson's Note
Regarding the Pact
BY
INA'ZO NITOBE
This is the unabridged address broadcasted over
the Columbia System, New York, on the evening of
August 20, 1932. The author was kindly given the
privilege of more time than is usually allowed to
a speaker. But in limiting himself to twenty-six
minutes, he was obliged to omit several phrases
which are included in the present brochure, and
which will, he hopes, make his meaning clearer.
Ladies and Gentlemen :
A llow me to state at the outset that I propose to
speak this evening in a -wholly private capacity on a
certain phase of the foreign relations of Japan which
must be of special interest to the American public —
namely, on Secretary Stimson’s Note regarding the Treaty
for the Renunciation of War, or the so-called Briand-Kellogg
Pact, otherwise known as the Non-War or Peace Pact. I shall
confine myself to Mr. Stimson’s Note, with no reference to
the so-called Hoover Doctrine which the President himself
enunciated and which strikes me as somewhat different from
Mr. Stimson’s.
When the Peace Pact came up for discussion in the
Japanese Diet during its session of 1929, there was a heated
debate as to the incongruity of Monarchical Japan’s subscrib-
ing to a Treaty which began with the words, “In the name of
the people.’’ This phrase bears more than one interpretation,
and, in whatever way it is interpreted, does not affect the
contents and substance of the Treaty. It finally passed the
Diet with a proviso that the said phrase was not to be under-
stood, as far as Japan was concerned, in a literal sense.
When, a few weeks later, the same Treaty was presented
in the Privy Council, which is our highest consultative body
on matters of international relations, only one member, a
jurist of high standing, raised the question whether a reserva-
tion had been made regarding Manchuria. It was answered
that there could be no fear on that score, since some govern-
ments had already made reservations implying the non-appli-
cation of the Pact in certain spheres of interest, not even
specified. The Japanese Government, therefore, took it for
granted, that in those regions where she had paramount and
vital interests, she, too, would naturally be exempt from the
obligation of the Non-War Pact.
It was not, however, solely implicit faith in the fairness of
other Powers that led the Japanese Government to accept the
Treaty in good faith. Tokyo had previously corresponded with
Washington as to the legitimacy and right of self-detense.
Mr. Kellogg himself said that “there is nothing in the
American draft of an Anti-War Treaty which restricts or im-
pairs the right of self-defense. The right is inherent in every
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty.” He added
that “each state alone is competent to decide whether circum-
stances require recourse to war in defense.” As to what con-
stituted self-defense, the answer was given by Mr. Eiihu
Root, who, in speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, defined it as
“the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by pre-
venting a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to
protect.” Another high American authority on international
law. Professor Bassett Moore, a former justice of the World
Court, compares self-defense to what is known in private
law as “the abatement of nuisance.”
Mr. Stimson disposes of the subject of self-defense, which
he calls “the only limitation to the broad covenant against
war,” rather summarily by stating “its limits have been
clearly defined by countless precedents,” suggesting no new
doctrine on this point and approving of “countless precedents,”
many of which are of notoriously ambiguous nature and
open to dubious interpretation. Still he seems to rely for facts
substantiating self-defense on the “journalistic condition of
today.” Yet how misleading journalistic reports are is a mat-
ter of common knowledge. The information obtained through
the “Black Chamber,” where were decoded the secret tele-
grams of friendly foreign powers to their representatives in
Washington, served the State Department, until a few years
ago, more than the press. With all my respect for the journal-
ism of today, may I not say that whoever builds his policy
on newspapers builds only a house of paper? It scarcely
seems fair that Japan’s reasons for self-defense are miscon-
strued, doubted and ignored. Is self-defense legitimate only
in cases of attack by force? Is there to be no defense against
personal insults, against wholesale violations of treaty rights,
against an uncontrolled menace to life and property? Is na-
tional honor incapable of defense? Is there no defense against
the boycott, which, when America suffered in 1905 at the
hands of the Chinese, the State Department stigmatized as
“a form of coercion designed to blackmail concessions out of
our (American) country, a conspiracy in restraint of our
trade, a treaty violation and an hostile act, carried on under
official guidance”? If, as Leibnitz said, “absence of war is
not peace,” neither does the absence of warlike measures al-
ways spell peace. A sword wrapt in brocade is still a sword.
Boycott, when it assumes the form, or attains the proportion
that it does in China, is practically, and not rhetorically, war-
fare. It even resorts at times to the free use of physical
violence. Mr. Castle has rightly compared an official boycott
to “gas attack from the air on undefended cities and towns.”
If boycott is not immediately as bad as open warfare,
there is little doubt that it is a sure step toward war. “If
there is anything more likely to lead to war than a blockade,”
says an eminent statesman of this country, “I have yet to
hear of it.” Boycott is war in its incipient stage.
A voluminous report has recently come from the press of
the Kiel University, which shows how interdependent and
mutually supporting nations are — that trade is the life-blood
of nations. This is most emphatically true of a nation like
Japan, which has a large population and a small extent of
arable land. Industries and trade keep alive more than half
of our 65,000,000, in a country smaller than California. If a
Chinese army should invade our territory they might slaughter
thousands; but if the Chinese people resort to a boycott, they
can starve millions. Is the man with a sword always an ag-
gressor and the man with a plow the aggrieved? A child
reading Shakespeare can tell which is the greater offender :
Othello with his dagger or lago with a dainty handkerchief
and an evil tongue.
If we would outlaw war, wc must outlaw war in all its
forms, with or without weapons. We must indeed define war
itself. And if we would resort exclusively to pacific means for
settlement of disputes, we must exclude from them means that
are to all intents and purposes warlike. If we would punish
an aggressor, we must take into account other criteria than
the mere use of arms. War is a serious, not infrequently a
fatal, disease of the body politique and it cannot be cured by
plaster of Paris. Indeed, tinkering with paper remedies may
aggravate it.
Moreover, is it fair to bind a signatory to a treaty by
interpreting it in a way of which it was not warned and to
which it may not have consented? The Peace Pact was signed
August 27, 1928. Three years and a half later, namely on
January 8, 1932, Secretary Stimson comes out with a sudden
declaration of the Non-recognition Doctrine and claims for it
canonical authority. Seven weeks later (February 23rd) he
amplifies the explanation, and then in a recent speech in New
York (August 8th) he expands the interpretation of the Pact,
drawing from its text consequences which were not explicitly
contained therein — namely, that no country should “recognize
any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought
about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of
the Pact of Paris.”
From the context in his speech and from the circumstances
closely connected with his repeated declarations, it is pretty
clear that Secretary Stimson intends to apply this new doctrine
to Japan with reference to Manchuria. Can it exercise a retro-
active power and be applied to the Manchurian situation,
which took place nearly half a year before his declaration?
Suppose it can be argued that it can be legitimately applied to
Manchuria, the true lovers of peace, those who would realize
lasting peace on earth, would think twice and thrice before
putting it to that test. In the early days of the League of
Nations, the Council was exceedingly chary of taking up large
questions for settlement, for they had to proceed most cauti-
ously with the infant institution. The success of the League
may be largely attributed to the gradual accretion of con-
fidence and power — even to its hesitation to confront the
major problems of world politics. Remember, for instance,
how the Assembly declined to discuss the Tacna-Arica dispute
in 1921. I, for one, shall be most sorry to see the Kellogg
Pact fail utterly or function lamely in its first contact with a
live problem. I have faith in its ultimate triumph, but triumph
cannot be forced by hair-splitting legal interpretations. Tri-
umph can come only as a moral suasion befitting a real situ-
ation.
Mr. Stimson shows his noble idealism in looking to the
sanction of public opinion for the success of the Non-War
Pact. He wisely addresses himself to the League and to the
public, and waxes eloquent on this theme, the force of public
opinion; and he will have, and should have, the support of
all right-thinking and right-feeling men and women through-
out the world. But the world as a whole is not yet advanced
enough to accept and abide by his interpretation. Rome was
not built in a day, though the warlike materials out of which
it was reared were near at hand. To build a city of peace,
one must begin with quarrying stones and baking bricks.
The Non-War Pact is certainly a gigantic stride toward
the realization of world peace. The ideals of the Pact must be
developed and the Pact itself should be clarified and imple-
mented. The signatories are committed to “put teeth” into it.
But I fear that it will 'be some time before the dental oper-
ation is completed, and if we hurry the process we shall get
only artificial teeth, ill-fitting and easily broken, needing to be
mended over and over again. Am I too cynical in thinking
that the nations are paying only lip-service to the Peace Pact,
that they are still thinking of it in terms of war? Their con-
ception of peace is martial. They do not as yet free them-
selves from war mentality. That I am not cynical is testified
by disarmament conferences, and even by pacifists whose
psychology is militant. Call it economic sanction, call it coer-
cion by the “severance of all trade and financial relation,”
“prohibition of intercourse among nationals” — all these are
war measures, punitive to the “aggressor” and provocative of
further aggression on the part of the so-called “covenant
breaking state” in the name of self-preservation. For, before
the urge of self-preservation, all peace functions will stagger.
An energetic nation asserting its right to live, when its claims
are contested or resisted, will assert itself the more vehem-
enly if for no reason than dire need or desperation. No
people will commit suicide in order to uphold a clause in a
treaty. Individuals may, but nations will not offer themselves
for martyrdom for an interpretation of a pact. Any engage-
ment that overlooks the realities of life cannot be final,
though it may be imposed for a while. Germany, crushed to
earth by the Versailles Treaty, will, in a generation, tear that
document to pieces, like a “mere scrap of paper.” The Jewish
race, persecuted, exiled and slaughtered, still thrives like a
chosen child of God, while their persecutors have vanished
from history. Unless the world takes cognizance of a nation’s
will and right and power to live, and opens the way for her
to live, I fear that all treaties and agreements will prove
futile as a means of insuring lasting peace. All theories are
powerless when confronted by facts. Japan’s advance — not
necessarily by military methods, I should say- — in search of a
life-line, is as irresistible an economic force as the westward
march of the Anglo-Saxon empires. We, therefore, admire
Mr. Roosevelt’s far-seeing statesmanship, when he favored
Japanese expansion in Manchuria and cautioned his official
successor against meddling in that part of the world.
A few months ago, when a faint rumor reached Japan
that the League may enforce Article XVI of the Covenant
and that America may join hands with her in so doing, the
more thoughtful of our people could not believe this possible ;
but those who did think this might be, instead of fearing the
consequences, showed resentment in a way which indicated
that an actual decree of sanctions would have brought about
real war with China, in which case the Japanese fleet might
even now be bombarding Chinese ports. Professor John
Dewey was right when he said : “Japan is probably the only
country in the world on whom such fear (i.e. fear of economic
loss) would have the least deterrent effect” — and this, in
spite of the fact that trade with China is so essential to her.
Here again, I am not passing moral judgment; I am only re-
lating a fact. Certainly within the country itself there exist
all shades of opinions from a mediaevalistic right to an ex-
treme left; but when there is a threat or show of threat from
outside, all differences merge into one compact nationalism.
Thus, in the present imbroglio with China, liberal ideas in
Japan would have exercised far more influence if the matter
had been left to be settled between the two countries. The in-
terference of a third party made confusion worse confounded,
especially when there was a shadow of threat in the inter-
ference. The Liberals were not in favor of military operations
in Manchuria; but when menace came from abroad, they
turned against it in defence of their country’s honor, giving
up the pettier conflict with their militaristic fellow country-
men.
Japan is grieved to be called a violator of the Peace
Pact. She maintains that she has acted within its provisions.
She resorted to unpacific means not “as an instrument of na-
tional policy,” but as an instrument of self-defense. The
Japanese nation would be grieved to see the Pact rendered
null and void. Even though it was not signed or ratified “in
the name of the people,” it had the endorsement of the people ;
and they will welcome the practical application of its prin-
ciples as understood and accepted by them, but not as inter-
preted afterward, and that is no friendly attitude toward
Manchukuo. They will even welcome its further elucidation
and implementation in the future. In order to make it ef-
fective it must be interpreted in consonance not with its let-
ter and legal notions but with facts and actual conditions,
cultural and economic, as well as political and diplomatic.
We cannot introduce a new order in diplomacy in utter dis-
regard of other factors of national life. The strict observance
of the Peace Pact will be possible only when China reaches
a certain degree of political unity and renounces anti-foreign
diplomacy as a means of national policy, or when Japan is
allowed access to vital resources of her food and industrial
supply, or when Russia shall be checked from further enroach-
ment on Chinese soil.
That Manchukuo was established with the help of Japan,
no one denies. It is a common experience of new countries
to be founded with the help of others. The example of Panama
is too recent to be forgotten. The Republic of Outer Mongolia
is not yet ten years old. If one studies the events which led
up to the establishment of the Nanking Government, one sees
the help, material and immaterial, of Soviet Russia. It is
argued that all these instances belong to the period prior to
the new dispensation announced to the world by the Peace Pact.
Does the new dispensation provide that if a new state is born, it
must receive no help from a midwife? Certainly the assistance
which the Japanese Army gave to Manchukuo was conspicu-
ous, because it was not given clandestinely, as has often been
the case under similar circumstances. The chaotic conditions
under which the new state came into existence — namely, the
sudden suspension of all authority, civil and military, in
Manchuria, due to the flight of Chinese officials after the in-
cident of September 18th — lend to it an appearance of being
a mere puppet of the Japanese Army. I can very well under-
stand how such things can be, because I have heard of similar
instances in other places. Where similar conditions prevail,
similar methods are adopted and similar results follow. Rarely
is man original. East and West, under similar circumstances,
he thinks and acts much the same, and will so continue to do.
There are wide regions not yet politically delimited.
Central and South America and Africa will henceforth furnish
many problems. Will Mr. Stimson’s doctrine be applied to
these peacefully and justly? If I am correctly informed, Mr.
Stimson has renounced the application of the theory of non-
recognition to Latin America. Is the theory right in one place
and wrong in another? Trade considerations alone are suf-
ficient to dictate and justify the policy of recognition. Man-
chukuo proclaims a policy of open door and equal oppor-
tunity. Its virgin resources invite the investment of American
capital. Its increasing population opens a market for Amer-
ican produce. Trade should link more and more closely the
nations of the earth.
If Mr. Stimson’s idea should be carried out — and I hope
it will not be, for the sake of his own country — will not the
future historian regard his policy as another instance of the
infamous interference which robbed Japan of her legitimate
rights after her war with China? I know America well enough
to believe that she will not follow the steps taken by Russia,
France and Germany in 1895 ; but the logical application of
Mr. Stimson’s theory to Manchuria might well give rise to
such criticism.
Japan must of course be prepared for the worst. She
stands alone — a small country, face to face with China, Russia
and America, three of the giant nations of the earth. Japan
stands alone for her right to live — not for conquest, as is so
often alleged, but for the preservation of that life with which
God has endowed her. One may at least give her credit for
her courage.
But what I fear most for China and ultimately for the
world, in case Manchukuo fails of recognition, is this : Man-
churia will then become a province of China, and between the
provinces of China any sort of war is tolerated, be it the most
bloody and devastating, by the League and by the United
States. Manchuria will fall into the hands of a war-lord and
he can indulge in warfare with impunity. When General
Chiang dealt a blow upon the communists in Kiangsi, ten
million people fled from that province, and 100,000 homes were
destroyed. When General Feng quartered his armies in Shansi
and Shensi, in 1931, five million people were starved to death.
As an old saying is: “One warrior wins a name and ten thou-
sand skulls whiten the field.” In the last civil war, according
to Lin Yu-tang, the casualties were twenty million in killed
and wounded. Now, what has this to do with the recognition
of Manchukuo?
Let there be a few zones in China where people can en-
joy peace and security. Such zones are afforded by Shanghai,
Tientsin and other treaty ports under foreign protection and —
by Manchuria. Thanks to the presence of the Japanese Army,
this province has for many years been the only province
where civil war did not penetrate. Banditry and maladminis-
tration there always were, but it was preserved from an at-
tack by neighboring war-lords.
Let us not look at Manchuria as merely a law case. The
present issue is too big for that. Look at it from the view
point of a statesman, and from that of world politics. Law-
yers may find satisfaction for their logic and idealists foi
their conscience, by adhering to the new interpretation of the
Pact; but such intellectual satisfaction means the loss of mil-
lions of lives and hastens the disintegration of that mighty
and venerable civilization which we call China, and the loss of
China is a loss to the whole world. The salvation of China
lies in her cooperation with Japan. Japan’s future is bound
up with that of China. It is Manchuria that links the two
peoples together. Weak and disordered, Manchuria will fall
an easy prey to Bolshevist Russia. I very much fear that
Mr. Stimson’s policy will end in making a present of Man-
churia to Russia and creating in the Far East a perpetual
storm center. In the name of humanity, then, let us exercise
a litle patience, study the Pact, implement it, make it practical
and applicable to realities — so that the new dispensation may
bring lasting peace to the Far East and to the world.
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