2024/04/13

니야야 학파 - 위키백과 Nyaya

니야야 학파 - 위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전

니야야 학파

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

힌두교
기본개념
믿음과 수행
경전과 그 성립
철학
종파
관련 항목

니야야 학파(Nyāya)는 힌두교의 정통 육파철학 중의 하나로, 정리론(正理論) 또는 정리학파(正理學派)라고도 한다.

"니야야"란 법칙 · 규범 등을 뜻한다.[1] 《베다》 연구를 할 때의 여러 가지 변론이나 사고(思考)에 있어서 논증상의 법칙이나 규약이 설정되고 이러한 것에 관한 연구와 교의가 이윽고 한 학파를 이루게 된 것으로 생각된다.[1] 그 성격상 "(윤회의) 원인을 밝히는 논리"라는 의미에서 인명(因明) 혹은 인론(因論)이라고도 부르지만 논리학적 연구는 힌두교의 다른 철학 학파에도 큰 영향을 미쳤다.[1]

창시자는 고타마(가우타마 · 아구바다 · 足目)라고도 하나 분명치 않다.[1] 근본경전으로서는 《니야야 수트라》가 있으며 《정리경(正理經)》이라고 번역된다.[1] 《니야야 수트라》는 250~350년경에 편찬되었다.[2]

니야야 학파의 성립은 약 1세기경으로 추정된다.[1] 니야야 학파의 자연철학과 형이상학은 거의 바이셰시카 학파의 철학을 계승한 것으로 대체로 바이셰시카 학파와 유사하다.[1][2] 해탈론은 불교와 삼키아 학파의 영향을 받았다.[1] 다른 힌두교 철학 학파들과 마찬가지로 해탈을 인생의 궁극적 목표로 삼았으며, 《니야야 수트라》에 정해진 참된 지식(眞知)의 대상인 16제(十六諦)를 바르게 알게 됨으로써 해탈이 달성된다고 주장하였다.[1]

니야야 학파의 사상에는 불교의 영향을 볼 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 또한 논증 중심의 성격을 가진 것으로 인해 《베다》 신학의 주류들로부터는 냉담시되었다.[1] 10세기 이후에는 바이셰시카 학파와 융합되었다.[1] 13세기에 미티라에 강게샤(12세기?)가 나타나서 신니야야 학파를 창설하였다.[2]

어원[편집]

인도에서 논리학 연구는 상당히 오래전부터 이루어지고 있었는데, 불교에서는 논리학을 인명(因明)이라고 부른다.[2] 그러나 그것을 조직적으로 대성한 것은 니야야 학파이다.[2] "니야야"라는 낱말의 문자 그대로의 의미는 이론(理論) 또는 정리(正理)이다.[2] 그것이 후에는 논리학적 연구 전반의 의미가 되었고 다시 학파명으로 되었다.[2]

기본 교의[편집]

니야야 학파는 약 1세기경에 성립된 것으로 추정된다.[1] 니야야 학파의 우주발생론이나 극미론(極微論) 등의 자연철학과 형이상학은 거의 바이셰시카 학파의 철학을 계승하여 대체로 바이셰시카파와 유사하다.[1][2] 해탈론에 있어서는 불교와 삼키아 학파의 영향을 받았다.[1] 다른 철학 학파와 마찬가지로 해탈을 인생의 궁극적 목표로 삼았으며 그것은 《니야야 수트라》에 정해진 참된 지식의 참된 지식(眞知)의 대상인 16제(十六諦)를 올바르게 알게 됨으로써 달성되고, 또한 고(苦) · 생(生) · 동작 · 과실 · 사지(邪知)를 마지막 것으로부터 시작하여 순차적으로 없애 나가면 연쇄적으로 앞의 것이 소멸되어 해탈에 이를 수 있다고도 주장했다.[1]

해탈론[편집]

니야야 학파의 교의에 따르면, 인생은 고(苦)에 번뇌하고 있는데, 그 원인은 인간이 생존(生存)하고 있기 때문이다.[2] 인간이 생존(生存)은 인간이 활동(活動)을 하는 데 근거한다.[2] 그런데 인간의 활동은 여러 가지 결점, 즉 탐욕 · 미워함 등에 근본하여 일어나는 것이며, 이런 결점은 "오류(誤謬)의 지(知)"에서 비롯된 것이다.[2] 그러므로 인간에게서 일어나는 고(苦)의 근원을 추구해 들어가면, 결국 "오류의 지(知)"가 고(苦)가 일어나는 궁극적 근원임을 알 수 있다.[2] 따라서 이 근본적인 오류의 인식(認識)을 제거하여 만유의 진실상을 인식할 것 같으면 자연히 고뇌를 이탈하게 된다.[2] 이것이 모크샤(해탈)이다.[2] 모크샤(해탈)에 이른 사람은 윤회의 굴레에서 벗어나 무엇에도 속박되지 않는다.[2] 이러한 경지에 도달하기 위해서는 계율을 준수하고 요가수행을 해아만 한다.[2]

니야야 학파는 바이셰시카 학파와 같이 한없이 많은 원자가 오랜 옛적부터 존재하여 불변불멸(不變不滅)이며 그것들이 합하여 자연 세계를 성립시키고 있다고 한다.[2] 또 아트만의 존재를 적극적으로 논증하고 있다.[2]

인식론[편집]

니야야 학파에서는 정당한 지식을 얻기 위한 인식방법으로 다음 네 가지를 주장한다.[2]

  1. 직접지각(直接知覺)
  2. 추론(推論)
  3. 유비(類比)
  4. 신뢰할 만한 사람의 언어

이들 중 두 번째의 추론(推論)은 다음의 예와 같은 5분작법(五分作法)이라고 일컬어지는 논증 형식으로 이루어진다.[2]

  1. 주장(主張: 宗 · 종): 저 산(山)은 불을 가지고 있다.
  2. 이유(理由: 因 · 인): 그것은 연기가 있기 때문이다.
  3. 실례(實例: 喩 · 유): 어떤 것이든지 연기가 일어나는 곳에는 불이 있다. 비유컨대 아궁이와 같다.
  4. 적용(適用: 合 · 합): 연기가 일어나는 아궁이와 같이 저 산의 경우에도 마찬가지이다.
  5. 결론(結論: 結 · 결): 따라서 저 산은 불을 가지고 있다.

네 가지 인식방법 중 세 번째의 유비는, 예를 들어, 물소(水牛)는 소와 같은 것이라고 가르쳐지고 후에 실물(實物)인 물소를 보고서 이것이 물소라고 아는 경우이다.[2]

네 가지 인식방법 중 네 번째의 신뢰할 만한 사람의 언어에는 《베다》가 포함된다.[2] 이 네 번째 항목과 관련하여 니야야 학파에서는 미맘사 학파 등의 어상주론(語常住論)에 반대하였는데, 니야야 학파의 이러한 반대 의견은 바이셰시카파와 그 입장이 동일하다.[2]

각주[편집]

  1. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 마 바 사 아 자 차 카 타 파 하 거 종교·철학 > 세계의 종교 > 힌 두 교 > 힌두교 > 힌두교 전사(前史) > 니아야파, 《글로벌 세계 대백과사전》
  2. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 마 바 사 아 자 차 카 타 파 하 거 너 더 러 머 버 서 어 저 동양사상 > 동양의 사상 > 인도의 사상 > 정통바라문 계통의 철학체계 > 니야야 학파와 논리학, 《글로벌 세계 대백과사전》

참고 문헌[편집]

분류: 고대 인도 철학 학파
힌두 철학
논리학
원자주의

니야야 학파

출처 : 무료 백과 사전 "Wikipedia (Wikipedia)"
인도 철학 - 인도 발상 종교
힌두교
기본 교리
신
경전
법전·율법경
학파
종파
인물
수행·예배
관련 용어
목록

니야야 학파 (니야야가쿠는梵: न्यायदर्शनम् , Naiyāyika [1] )는 인도 철학 중 아스티카 [주석 1] 로 분류되는 학파의 하나로 인식론 · 논리학을 전문으로 했다 [2] . 인도 논리학 으로서 대표적인 것으로, 논리 의 추구에 의한 해탈을 목표로 한다. 현대에서는 육파 철학 의 하나로 꼽힌다 [3] .

니야야 [주석 2]는 산스크리트 에서 이론 (또는 논리적 고찰)을 의미한다 [4] .

개조 는 악샤파다 가우타마 ( 힌디어판 , 프랑스어판 ) ( Akṣapāda Gautama ). 굽타 아침 시대 , 즉 4세기와 5세기 사이에는 학파로서 성립했다고 생각되고 있다 [2] . 중관파 의 개조 나가르쥬 나와 격렬한 논의를 펼쳐 치밀한 연역 논리학 체계를 만들었다. 바이셰시카 학파 의 흐름을 꾸려나갔지만, 시대가 내리자 반대로 바이셰시카파를 병렬했다. 13세기 에는 나비야 니야야 학파로 발전했다(후술) [5] .

가우타마가 저술했다고 하는 「니야야 수트라 ( 영어판 )」(「정리경」)를 근본 텍스트로 한다 [6] [5] . 14세기 전반의 철학자, 간게야 ( 영어판 ) 에 의해 저술된 『타트바 틴타마니 ( 영어판 )』로 근본 텍스트가 옮겨진 것은 「나비야 니야야 ( 영어판 )」(신니야야 학파, 신논리 학파)에게 불리고, 구별된다 [5] .

니야야 수트라의 개요 [ 편집 ]

내용 [ 편집 ]

『니야야 수트라』가 제시하는 4종의 지식수단・인식수단(위에서 지각, 비정, 추리, 증언) [7]

『니야야 수트라』는 530 정도의 짧은 수트라(정구)로 이루어져 오편으로 나뉘어져 있다. 각 편은 각각 2과로 나누어져 있다 [6] .

제1편 제1과에서는, 이하의 16의 항목(파다 알타)을 정확하게 알면 해탈이 이루어진다고 한다 [주석 3] [7] .

  1. 인식 수단(직접 지각·추론·유비·신뢰해야 할 말)
  2. 인식 대상(아트맨·신체·감각 기관·감각 기관의 대상·인식·사고 기관·활동[카르마]·과실[번뇌]·윤회·과보·고·해탈)
  3. 의혹
  4. 동기
  5. 실례
  6. 정설
  7. 논증식을 교정하는 5지(주장 제시·이유·근거 사례·해당 문제에의 적용·결론)
  8. 음미
  9. 확정
  10. 토론(정상 토론)
  11. 論諍 (이길 수, 수단 택할 토)
  12. 논결(상대의 논란에 시종한다)
  13. 의사 이유
  14. 궤도
  15. 잘못된 논란
  16. 패배의 입장

제1편은 제1-14항목의, 제5편에서는 제15-16항목의 정의·해설을 한다. 이 두 편은 성립이 가장 오래된 것으로 생각되고 원래는 하나에 정리되어 있던 것이라고 생각된다. 성립시기는 불분명하지만, 나가르쥬나의『바이달야론』(『광파론』)에 언급이 있기 때문에, 성립은 적어도 이것 이전이라고 생각된다.

제2편에서는, 「지각」[7]・「추리 」 [ 8 ]・「비정 」 확립하는 방법을 고려한다 [11] [12] . 이 중 ' 베다 '는 '증언'의 하나로 여겨져 타당성의 근거를 신뢰에 요구한다. 또한 바이셰시카파와 디그나가 (陳那) 이후의 불교 논리학자들은 지식수단으로서 지각과 추리만을 인정하고, 비정과 증언은 추리의 일종으로 간주했다 [13] .

제3편 및 제4편에서는 12종류의 인식대상, 즉,

  1. 아트맨
  2. 신체
  3. 감각 기관
  4. 감각 기관의 대상
  5. 인식
  6. 사고 기관
  7. 활동(카르마)
  8. 과실
  9. 재생
  10. 과보
  11. 고통
  12. 해탈

가 순차적으로 검토된다 [14] [15] . 『니야야 바샤』에 따르면, 이 12종류의 인식 대상은 세계 전체를 망라하는 것이 아니라, 이들을 인식하면 해탈에 이르게 할 수 있는 특별히 선택된 것이다. 유물론적 입장이나 무아의 입장은 부정되고, 아트맨의 존재 증명이라고도 할 만한 것이 이루어지고 있다 [16] .

주요 후속 문헌 [ 편집 ]

4-5세기경의 바츠야야 나 ( 영어판 ) 의 『니야야 바샤』[주석 5] , 6세기 후반의 우도타카라 ( 영어판 ) 의 『니야야 바르티카』버챠스파티 미슐라 ( 영어판 ) 의 『니야야 바르티카 터트 파리야 티커』[주석 7] , 11세기경의 우다야나 ( 영어판 ) 의 『파리 슈디』 의 근본을 이루는 것 외에, 자얀타 메뚜기 ( 영어판 ) 가 저술한 「니야야 만자리」[주석 9] 도 주해서의 일면을 가진다. 독립 작품으로서의 문헌에는 우다야나의 「니야야 쿠스만자리」와 「아트마・타트바・비베카」가 있다. 전자는 하나님의 존재 증명을 시도한 저작이며, 후자는 불교의 무아설에 대한 비판이다. 그 외, 바사르바주냐 ( 러시아어판 ) 의 『니야야 부샤나』가 있어, 이것은 시바신의 직견이 해탈에의 최종계층인 등설한 유신론적 색채의 강한 이색의 작품이다 [18] .

사상 [ 편집 ]

불교 논리학자가 대상은 관념의 구축물이라고 생각하는 것에 대해, 니야야 학파에서는 인식이나 언어는 실재 세계에 즉 대응해, 그것을 그대로 지시하고 있다고 생각한다.

불교 논리학자에게 직접 지각이 사유 가 가해지지 않는 < 무분별지 >인데 반해 니야에서는 직접 지각은 유분별일 수 있다. 「흰소」라고 하는 인식에 있어서, 「흰」도 「소」도 외계의 실재라고 여겨지는 것이다. 추론에 관해서 말하면, 추론의 결과가 가까이나 <신뢰할 수 있는 말>과 모순된다면, 그것은 추론이 틀린 것으로 여겨진다. 즉, 추론은 단지 논리적으로 맞으면 되는 것이 아니라 일상 경험이나 종교의 전통과 가능한 한 모순되지 않는 것이 중요시되는 것이다. 한편, 베다와 같은 <신뢰할 수 있는 말>을 무조건 허용한 것도 아니고, 말의 신빙성은 화자의 신뢰성에 의존한다고 생각했다. 그러나 베다는 하나님의 말씀이라는 견해가 정착됨에 따라 니야 학파에서도 결국 베다의 설명은 옳다고 여겨지게 되었다 [19] .

니야야 학파는, 인간의 생명 활동·생존 그 자체가 「고」라고 나타내고, 그 「고」로부터의 해방・생사 유전의 차단이 「해탈」이라고 파악했다. 일본의 불교학자, 카츠라 사오 타카시 는 「인도인의 논리학 문답법으로부터 귀납법에」중에서, 니야야 학파가 「해탈」을 「고로부터 해방」이라고 규정하고 있는 점에서 불교나 잔 키야 학파 와의 공통성을 볼 수 있는 것 [20] , 16원리의 진리의 인식(니야야 학파)과 12연기설 의 역관(불교), 25원리의 고찰(산키야 학파)이 각각 대응하는 것 [21] ] 를 지적하고 있다.

베다 종교 ​​전통의 위치 지정 [ 편집 ]

베다의 종교 참조

9세기에 카슈미르에서 활약한 자 얀타 메뚜기 ( 영어판 ) [주석 10] 는 그의 저작에서 ' 야쥬냐바르키야 법전 '( 6세기 경 성립 [23] )에 걸려 있는 학처 [주석 11] ] 의 14분류( 히에랄키 )를 염두에 두고 있는 가운데, 희곡 『성전 소동 ( 영어판 )』중의 「성전 권위장」 속에서 다음과 같이 정리했다 [24] . 즉 [23] ,

  1. 리그 베다 (찬가)
  2. 야줄 베다 (제사)
  3. 서마 베다 (선율)
  4. 아탈바 베다 (주사)
  5. 스무리티(마누 등의 법전류)
  6. 이티하사(서사시)·플라나(고담)
  7. 비야카라나 (문법학)
  8. 칼파(전례학)
    1. 슈라우타 수트라
    2. 그리히야 수트라
  9. 조티샤 ( 천문학 )
  10. 식샤 ( 음성학 )
  11. 찬다스 ( 운율학 )
  12. 닐타 ( 어원학 )
  13. 미만서 (베다 해석학)
    1. 풀바 미만서
    2. 우타라 미만서
  14. 니야야(논리·토론, 바이셰시카 포함)

[ 25 ] [주석 12] . 위에서 언급했듯이, 자얀타는 니야 학파가 베다의 정통이며 논리의 담당자로 자리 매김했다 [28] . 하지만, 거슬러 올라가는 기원전 3세기 , 마우리아 아침 의 시대에 쓰여진 「카우티리야 실리론」(1·2·10)에 있어서 「추찰의 학 ( 영어판 )」(형이상학적 사변)의 자리를 차지하고 있었다 은 잔키야파 ·순세파·요가파의 삼파였다 [28] [29] . 덧붙여 자얀타가 활동한 시대, 산키야 학파는 이미 그 최성기를 지나고 있던 것 같다 [30] .

각주 [ 편집 ]

[ 각주 사용법 ]

주석 [ 편집 ]

  1. ↑ 梵: आस्तिक , āstika, 정통파, 유신론자
  2. ^ 梵: न्याय , nyā-yá
  3. ^ 핫토리 마사아키 는 다음과 같이 번역하고 있다: “지식 수단·지식의 대상·의심·동기·실례·정설·지분(시분)·음미·확정·논의·논사 채우기, 의사적 이유, 궤변, 잘못된 논란, 패배의 입장…
  4. ^ 『니야야 수트라』는 다음과 같이 설명한다. 「주지의 것과의 유사에 의해, 증시되어야 할 것을 증시하는 것이 「비정」이다」(계역, 1·1·6)
  5. ^ 『니야야주해』
  6. ↑ Nyāya-vārttika, 「니야야 바샤」의 복주. 불교 논리학자인 바스반투 (세친)나 디그나가(첸나)의 이론을 비판하고 있다 [17] .
  7. ↑ Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyaṭīkā
  8. ↑ Nyaya-vaartika-taatparya-tiikaa-parishuddhi
  9. ↑ Nyaya Manjari
  10. ^ 아탈바 베다를 전하는 바라몬의 가계에서 태어난다. 자얀타의 5대 전에 벵골 에서 카슈미르 지방으로 옮겨 살았던 것으로 알려졌다. 니야야 학파의 주석서『논리의 꽃방』(니야야・만자리―)이나 희곡『성전 소동 ( 영어판 )』(아가마・단바라) 등 복수의 저작을 남겼다 [22] .
  11. ↑ 梵: विद्यास्थान , Vidyā-sthāna, 비디야스타나
  12. ^ 덧붙여 자얀타는 베다의 전통 밖에 있는 것으로 '비베다'( 시바파 , 파슈파타파 ( 영어판 ) (수주파), 카파리카파 ( 영어판 ) , 판차라트라파 ( 영어판 ) ) ), 「반베다」(불교, 자이나교 , 잔키야 학파 [ 요가 학파 포함한다)), 「그 이하」( 순세파 , 흑의파 Nīlāmbara)를 들고 있다 [26] [27] .

출처 [ 편집 ]

  1. ↑ 「니야야 학파」 - 세계대백과사전 제2판
  2. ^ a b 桂 1998 , p. 31.
  3. ↑ “ 육파 철학 ”. 브리타니카 국제대백과사전 소항목사전. 2020년 8월 23일 열람.
  4. ↑ 브리타니카 국제대백과사전
  5. ↑ a b c 야마자키 2007 , p. 255.
  6. ^ a b 桂 1998 , p. 33.
  7. ^ a b c 가쓰라 1998 , p. 34.
  8. ↑ 가쓰라 1998 , pp. 35–36.
  9. ^ a b 桂 1998 , p. 43.
  10. ↑ 가쓰라 1998 , pp. 43–44.
  11. ^ 덧붙여 핫토리는 「유추」(Analogy)라고 번역하고 있는 한편, 카츠라는, 이 행동이 「미지의 대상에 명칭을 적용한다」라는 것을 이유로 「비정」(Identification)의 번역어 채택 [9] .
  12. ↑ 『니야야 수트라』(1・1・3)
  13. ^ 가쓰라 1998 , p. 45.
  14. ↑ 『니야야 수트라』(1・1・9)
  15. ↑ 가쓰라 1998 , pp. 46–48.
  16. ↑ 이와 나미 철학·사상사전. 이와나미 서점. 1222-1223.
  17. ↑ 가쓰라 1998 , pp. 269–270.
  18. ↑ 이와나미 철학·사상사전. 이와나미 서점. 1223.
  19. ↑ 이와나미 철학·사상사전. 이와나미 서점. 1222.
  20. ^ 가쓰라 1998 , p. 48.
  21. ↑ 가쓰라 1998 , pp. 59–62.
  22. ↑ 나라 & 시모다 2019 , pp. 120–121.
  23. ↑ a b 나라 & 시모다 2019 , p. 122.
  24. ^ 카타오카 2007 , p. 39.
  25. ↑ 카타 오카 2007 , p. 42.
  26. ↑ 나라 & 시모다 2019 , pp. 130–139.
  27. ↑ 카타오카 2007 , pp. 42–43.
  28. ↑ a b 나라 & 시모다 2019 , p. 127.
  29. ↑ 가쓰라 1998 , pp. 8–10.
  30. ↑ 나라 & 시모다 2019 , pp. 127–129.

참고 문헌 [ 편집 ]

관련 항목 [ 편집 ]

외부 링크 [ 편집 ]


===

Nyaya

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Nyāya (Sanskrit:न्यायः, 'nyāya), literally meaning "justice", "rules", "method" or "judgment",[1][2] is one of the six orthodox (Āstika) schools of Hindu philosophy that affirm the Vedas.[3] Nyāya's most significant contributions to Indian philosophy were systematic development of the theory of logic, methodology, and its treatises on epistemology.[4][5]

Nyāya school's epistemology accepts four out of six Pramanas as reliable means of gaining knowledge – Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāna (comparison and analogy) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[6][7][8] In its metaphysics, Nyāya school is closer to the Vaisheshika school of Hinduism than others.[2] It holds that human suffering results from mistakes/defects produced by activity under wrong knowledge (notions and ignorance).[9] Moksha (liberation), it states, is gained through right knowledge. This premise led Nyāya to concern itself with epistemology, that is the reliable means to gain correct knowledge and to remove wrong notions. False knowledge is not merely ignorance to Naiyyayikas, it includes delusion. Correct knowledge is discovering and overcoming one's delusions, and understanding true nature of soul, self and reality.[10]

Naiyyayika scholars approached philosophy as a form of direct realism, stating that anything that really exists is in principle humanly knowable. To them, correct knowledge and understanding is different from simple, reflexive cognition; it requires Anuvyavasaya (अनुव्यवसाय, cross-examination of cognition, reflective cognition of what one thinks one knows).[11] An influential collection of texts on logic and reason is the Nyāya Sūtras, attributed to Aksapada Gautama, variously estimated to have been composed between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE.[12][13]

Nyāya school shares some of its methodology and human suffering foundations with Buddhism; however, a key difference between the two is that Buddhism believes that there is neither a soul nor self;[14] Nyāya school like some other schools of Hinduism such as Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita believes that there is a soul and self, with liberation (mokṣa) as a state of removal of ignorance, wrong knowledge, the gain of correct knowledge, and unimpeded continuation of self.[15][16]

Etymology[edit]

Nyaya (न्याय) is a Sanskrit word which means justice, equality for all being, specially a collection of general or universal rules.[1] In some contexts, it means model, axiom, plan, legal proceeding, judicial sentence, or judgment. Nyaya could also mean, "that which shows the way" tracing its Sanskrit etymology. In the theory of logic, and Indian texts discussing it, the term also refers to an argument consisting of an enthymeme or sometimes for any syllogism.[1] In philosophical context, Nyaya encompasses propriety, logic and method.[17]

Panini, revered Sanskrit grammarian, derives the "Nyaya" from the root "i" which conveys the same meaning as "gam" – to go. "Nyaya" signifying logic is there etymologically identical with "nigama" the conclusion of a syllogism.[18]

Nyaya is related to several other concepts and words used in Indian philosophies: Hetu-vidya (science of causes), Anviksiki (science of inquiry, systematic philosophy), Pramana-sastra (epistemology, science of correct knowledge), Tattva-sastra (science of categories), Tarka-vidya (science of reasoning, innovation, synthesis), Vadartha (science of discussion) and Phakkika-sastra (science of uncovering sophism, fraud, error, finding fakes).[19] Some of these subsume or deploy the tools of Nyaya.

Overview[edit]

Nasadiya Sukta

Then was not non-existent nor existent:
there was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.
What covered in, and where? and what gave shelter?
Was water there, unfathomed depth of water?
...
Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it?
Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation?
The gods came after this world's production,
Who knows then whence it first came into being?"

Rig Veda, Creation....10:129–1, 10:129–6 [20][21]

The Nyaya of logic is said to have been founded by a sage named Gautama.[22] He is also known as Gautama, Aksapada and Dirghatapas.[23] The names Gotama and Gautama points to the family to which he belonged while the names Aksapada and Dirghatapas refer respectively to his meditative habit and practice of long penance.[18] The people of Mithila (modern Darbhanga in North Bihar) ascribe the foundation of Nyāya philosophy to Gautama, husband of Ahalya, and point out as the place of his birth a village named Gautamasthana where a fair is held every year on the 9th day of the lunar month of Chaitra (March–April). It is situated 28 miles north-east of Darbhanga.[18]

The historical development of Nyāya school is unclear, although Nasadiya hymns of Book 10 Chapter 129 of Rigveda recite its spiritual questions in logical propositions.[20] In early centuries BCE, states Clooney, the early Nyāya scholars began compiling the science of rational, coherent inquiry and pursuit of knowledge.[24] By the 2nd century CE, Aksapada Gautama had composed Nyāya Sūtras, a foundational text for Nyāya school, that primarily discusses logic, methodology and epistemology.[13] The Nyāya scholars that followed refined it, expanded it, and applied it to spiritual questions. While the early Nyaya scholars published little to no analysis on whether supernatural power or God exists, they did apply their insights into reason and reliable means to knowledge to the questions of nature of existence, spirituality, happiness and moksha. Later Nyāya scholars, such as Udayana, examined various arguments on theism and attempted to prove existence of God.[25] Other Nyāya scholars offered arguments to disprove the existence of God.[24][26][27]

The most important contribution made by the Nyāya school to Hindu thought has been its treatises on epistemology and system of logic that, subsequently, has been adopted by the majority of the other Indian schools.[11]

Sixteen categories (padārthas)[edit]

The Nyāya metaphysics recognizes sixteen padarthas or categories and includes all six (or seven) categories of the Vaisheshika in the second one of them, called prameya.[28]

These sixteen categories are:

  1. pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge or knowledge sources),
  2. prameya (objects of valid knowledge),
  3. saṁśaya (doubt),
  4. prayojana (aim),
  5. dṛṣṭānta (example),
  6. siddhānta (conclusion or accepted position),
  7. avayava (members of syllogism or inferential components),
  8. tarka (hypothetical/suppositional reasoning),
  9. nirṇaya (settlement or certainty),
  10. vāda (discussion or debate for truth),
  11. jalpa (wrangling or disputation),
  12. vitaṇḍā (cavilling or destructive debate),
  13. hetvābhāsa (fallacy or pseudo-proovers),
  14. chala (quibbling or equivocation),
  15. jāti (sophisticated refutation or misleading/futile objections) and
  16. nigrahasthāna (point of defeat or clinchers).[29][30]

According to Matthew Dasti and Stephen Phillips, it may be useful to interpret the word jnana as cognition rather than knowledge when studying the Nyāya system.[31][32]

Epistemology[edit]

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The Nyaya school considers perception, inference, comparison/analogy, and testimony from reliable sources as four means to correct knowledge, holding that perception is the ultimate source of such knowledge.[6][8]

The Nyāya school of Hinduism developed and refined many treatises on epistemology that widely influenced other schools of Hinduism. Nyāya treated it as theory of knowledge, and its scholars developed it as Pramana-sastras. Pramana, a Sanskrit word, literally is "means of knowledge". It encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.[33] The focus of Pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one doesn't, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.[7][34]

The Naiyayikas (the Nyāya scholars) accepted four valid means (pramaṇa) of obtaining valid knowledge (pramana) – perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and word/testimony of reliable sources (śabda). The Nyāya scholars, along with those from other schools of Hinduism, also developed a theory of error, to methodically establish means to identify errors and the process by which errors are made in human pursuit of knowledge. These include Saṁśaya (समस्या, problems, inconsistencies, doubts) and Viparyaya (विपर्यय, contrariness, errors)[35] which can be corrected or resolved by a systematic process of Tarka (तर्क, reasoning, technique).[36][37]

Pratyaksha (perception)[edit]

Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyāya epistemology. Perception can be of two types, laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary).[38] Ordinary perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyāya Sutra (I, i.4) as a 'non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of sense-organs with the objects'.

Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:[39] Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and Vyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).[39]

Ordinary perception to Nyāya scholars was based on direct experience of reality by eyes, ears, nose, touch and taste.[38] Extraordinary perception included yogaja or pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).[38][40]

Determinate and indeterminate perception[edit]

The Naiyyayika maintains two modes or stages in perception. The first is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate), when one just perceives an object without being able to know its features, and the second savikalpa (determinate), when one is able to clearly know an object.[41] All laukika and alaukika pratyakshas are savikalpa, but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Vātsāyana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception but if it is perceived without a name, we have indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct, without any association with any names, whereas determinate perception apprehends them all together with a name. There is yet another stage called Pratyabhijñā, when one is able to re-recognise something on the basis of memory.[42]

Anumāna (inference)[edit]

Anumāna (inference) is one of the most important contributions of the Nyāya. It can be of two types: inference for oneself (Svarthanumana, where one does not need any formal procedure, and at the most the last three of their 5 steps), and inference for others (Parathanumana, which requires a systematic methodology of 5 steps). Inference can also be classified into 3 types: Purvavat (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause), Sheshavat (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) and Samanyatodrishta (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed analysis of error is also given, explaining when anumana could be false.[42]

Theory of inference[edit]

The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:[43][44]

  • There is fire on the hill (called Pratijñā, required to be proved)
  • Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)
  • Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen (called Udāhārana, example of vyāpti)
  • The hill has smoke that is pervaded by fire (called Upanaya, reaffirmation or application)
  • Therefore, there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)

In Nyāya terminology for this example, the hill would be the paksha (minor term),[44]: 31  the fire is the sādhya (major term),[44]: 21  the smoke is hetu,[44]: 31  and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is vyapti(middle term).[44]: 19 

Hetu further has five characteristics[45]

  • It must be present in the Paksha (the case under consideration),
  • It must be present in all positive instances (sapaksha, or homologues),
  • It must be absent in all negative instances
  • It must not be incompatible with an established truth, (abādhitatva)
  • Absence of another evidence for the opposite thesis (asatpratipakshitva)

The fallacies in Anumana (hetvābhasa) may occur due to the following[46]

  1. Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy.
    • Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus.
    • Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible.
    • Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke'. The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel.
  2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu.
    • Sadharana: The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The hill has fire because it is knowable'.
    • Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not present in the Sapaksa and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is audible'.
    • Anupasamhari: Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. 'All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable'.
  3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible', and 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counterbalanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force.
  4. Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'.
  5. Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. 'Sound is eternal because it is produced'.

Upamāna (comparison, analogy)[edit]

Upamāna (उपमान) means comparison and analogy.[7][8] Upamāna, states Lochtefeld,[47] may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.[47] The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamānam, while the attribute(s) are identified as sāmānya.[48] Thus, explains Monier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamānam, and charmingness is sāmānya. The 7th century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not.[48] In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upamāna and their value in epistemology are debated.

Śabda (word, testimony)[edit]

Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts.[7][49] Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means testimony of a reliable and trustworthy person (āptavākya). The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.[50] He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words).[50] The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of reliable sources.[49][50] The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.[51]

Testimony can be of two types, Vaidika (Vedic), which are the words of the four sacred Vedas, and Laukika, or words and writings of trustworthy human beings. Vaidika testimony is preferred over Laukika testimony. Laukika-sourced knowledge must be questioned and revised as more trustworthy knowledge becomes available.[52][53][54]

Comparison with other schools of Hinduism[edit]

Each school of Hinduism has its own treatises on epistemology, with different number of Pramanas. For example, compared to Nyāya school's four pramanas, Carvaka school has just one (perception), while Advaita Vedanta school recognizes six means to reliable knowledge.[6][49]

Theory of causation[edit]

Metaphysics
Nyaya-Vaisheshika offers one of the most vigorous efforts at the construction of a substantialist, realist ontology that the world has ever seen. It provides an extended critique of event-ontologies and idealist metaphysics. (...) This ontology is Platonistic, realistic, but neither exclusively physicalistic nor phenomenalistic.

— Karl Potter, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies[55]

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is not present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect.

The following conditions should be met:

  1. The cause must be antecedent [Purvavrtti]
  2. Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti]
  3. Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha]

Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha]

  1. Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter's cloth.
  2. Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the potter.
  3. The co-effects of a cause are not causally related.
  4. Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents, e.g. space.
  5. Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter.

Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause:

  1. Samavayi, material cause, e.g. thread of a cloth.
  2. Asamavayi, colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth.
  3. Nimitta, efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth.

Anyathakhyativada (theory of error)[edit]

The Nyāya theory of error is similar to that of Kumarila's Viparita-khyati (see Mimamsa). The Naiyyayikas also believe like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions (paratah pramana during both validity and invalidity).

On God and salvation[edit]

Early Naiyyayikas wrote very little about Ishvara (literally, the Supreme Soul). Evidence available so far suggests that early Nyāya scholars were non-theistic or atheists.[56][57] Later, and over time, Nyāya scholars tried to apply some of their epistemological insights and methodology to the question: does God exist? Some offered arguments against and some in favor.[24]

Arguments that God does not exist[edit]

In Nyāya Sūtra's Book 4, Chapter 1, verses 19–21, postulates God exists, states a consequence, then presents contrary evidence, and from contradiction concludes that the postulate must be invalid.[58]

The Lord is the cause, since we see that human action lacks results.
This is not so since, as a matter of fact, no result is accomplished without human action.
Since this is efficacious, the reason lacks force.

— Nyaya Sutra, IV.1.19 – IV.1.21 [58]

A literal interpretation of the three verses suggests that Nyāya school rejected the need for a God for the efficacy of human activity. Since human action and results do not require assumption or need of the existence of God, sutra IV.1.21 is seen as a criticism of the "existence of God and theism postulate".[58] The context of the above verses includes various efficient causes. Nyāya Sūtra verses IV.1.22 to IV.1.24, for example, examine the hypothesis that "random chance" explains the world, after these Indian scholars had rejected God as the efficient cause.[24]

Arguments that God exists[edit]

Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali gave the following nine arguments to prove the existence of creative God and also tried to refute the existing objections and questions by atheistic systems of charvaka, mimamsa, buddhists, jains and samkhya:[25]

  • Kāryāt (lit. "from effect"): The world is an effect, all effects have efficient cause, hence the world must have an efficient cause. That efficient cause is God.[25]
  • Āyojanāt (lit., from combination): Atoms are inactive. To form a substance, they must combine. To combine, they must move. Nothing moves without intelligence and source of motion. Since we perceive substance, some intelligent source must have moved the inactive atoms. That intelligent source is God.[25]
  • Dhŗtyādéḥ (lit., from support): Something sustains this world. Something destroys this world. Unintelligent Adrsta (unseen principles of nature) cannot do this. We must infer that something intelligent is behind. That is God.[25]
  • Padāt (lit., from word): Each word has meaning and represents an object. This representational power of words has a cause. That cause is God.
  • Pratyayataḥ (lit, from faith): Vedas are infallible. Human beings are fallible. Infallible Vedas cannot have been authored by fallible human beings. Someone authored the infallible Vedas. That author is God.[25]
  • Shrutéḥ (lit., from scriptures): The infallible Vedas testify to the existence of God. Thus God exists.[25]
  • Vākyāt (lit., from precepts): Vedas deal with moral laws, the rights and the wrongs. These are divine. Divine injunctions and prohibitions can only come from a divine creator of laws. That divine creator is God.[25]
  • Samkhyāviśeşāt (lit., from the specialty of numbers): By rules of perception, only number "one" can ever be directly perceived. All other numbers other than one, are inferences and concepts created by consciousness. When man is born, his mind is incapable of inferences and concepts. He develops consciousness as he develops. The consciousness development is self-evident and proven because of man's ability with perfect numerical conception. This ability to conceive numerically perfect concepts must depend on something. That something is divine consciousness. So God must exist.[25]
  • Adŗşţāt (lit., from the unforeseen): Everybody reaps the fruits of his own actions. Merits and demerits accrue from his own actions. An Unseen Power keeps a balance sheet of the merit and demerit. But since this Unseen Power is Unintelligent, it needs intelligent guidance to work. That intelligent guide is God.[25]

Liberation[edit]

The Naiyyayikas believe that the bondage of the world is due to false knowledge, which can be removed by constantly thinking of its opposite (pratipakshabhavana), namely, the true knowledge.[59] So the opening aphorism of the Nyāya Sūtra states that only the true knowledge lead to niḥśreyasa (liberation).[30] But the Nyāya school also maintains that the God's grace is essential for obtaining true knowledge.[60] Jayanta, in his Nyayamanjari describes salvation as a passive stage of self in its natural purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge and willingness.[61]

Literature[edit]

In the Yājñavalkya Smṛti, Nyāya is mentioned as one of the fourteen principal branches of learning. The Matsya-Purāṇa states that knowledge of Nyāya came from the mouth of Brahmā. The Mahābhārata also mentions principles of Nyāya. [62]

The earliest text of the Nyāya School is the Nyāya Sūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama. The text is divided into five books, each having two sections. Vātsāyana's Nyāya Bhāṣya is a classic commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra. Udyotakara's Nyāya Vārttika (6th century CE) is written to defend Vātsāyana against the attacks made by Dignāga. Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (9th century CE) is the next major exposition of this school. Two other texts, Nyāyaṣūcinibandha and Nyāyasūtraddhāra are also attributed to him. Udayana's (984 CE) Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi is an important commentary on Vācaspati's treatise. His Nyāyakusumāñjali is the first systematic account of theistic Nyāya. His other works include Ātmatattvaviveka, Kiraṇāvali and Nyāyapariśiṣṭa. Jayanta Bhatta's Nyāyamañjari (10th century CE) is basically an independent work. Bhāsavarajña's Nyāyasāra (10th century CE) is a survey of Nyāya philosophy.[63]

The later works on Nyāya accepted the Vaiśeṣika categories and Varadarāja's Tārkikarakṣā (12th century CE) is a notable treatise of this syncretist school. Keśava Miśra's Tārkabhaṣā (13th century CE) is another important work of this school.[64]

Gangeśa Upādhyāya's Tattvacintāmaṇi (14th century CE) is the first major treatise of the new school of Navya-Nyāya. His son, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya's Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa, though a commentary on Udayana's Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi, incorporated his father's views. Jayadeva wrote a commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi known as Āloka (14th century CE). Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā (16th century CE) is first great work of Navadvipa school of Navya-Nyāya. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti and Padārthakhaṇḍana are the next important works of this school. Viśvanatha's Nyāyasūtravṛtti (17th century CE) is also a notable work.[65] The Commentaries on Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti by Jagadish Tarkalankar (17th century CE) and Gadadhar Bhattacharya (17th century CE) are the last two notable works of this school.

Annaṁbhatta (17th century CE) tried to develop a consistent system by combining the ancient and the new schools, Prācina nyāya and Navya-Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika to develop the nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. His Tarkasaṁgraha and Dīpikā are the popular manuals of this school.[65]

Commentaries on the Nyaya-Sutra[edit]

Numerous commentaries have been written on Nyāya-Sutra since its composition. Some of these commentaries are available on www.archive.org for reference. A few of the commentaries are mentioned below:[66]

  1. Nyaya-Sutra by Gotama or Aksapada
  2. Nyaya-Bhasya by Vatsyayana
  3. Nyaya-Varttika by Udyotakar
  4. Nyaya-Varttika tatparya-tika by Vacaspati Misra
  5. Nyaya-Varttika-tatparayatika-parisuddhi by Udayans
  6. Parisuddhiprakasa by Vardhamana
  7. Vardhamanedu by Padmanabha Misra
  8. Nyayalankara by Srikantha
  9. Nyayalankara Vrtti by Jayanta
  10. Nyaya-manjari by Jayanta
  11. Nyaya-Vrtti by Abhayatilakopadhyaya
  12. Nyaya-Vrtti by Visvanatha
  13. Mitabhasini Vrtti by Mahadeva Vedanti
  14. Nyayaprakasa by Kesava Misra
  15. Nyayabodhini by Govardhana
  16. Nyaya Sutra Vyakhya by Mathuranatha

Differences from Western logic[edit]

It is significant that the name logic is etymologically connected with the Greek word logos, which denotes both 'thought' and 'word' or 'discourse'. The significance of this etymological connection can be adequately appreciated if it is remembered that logic, in its rise and development in the western world, particularly in Greece, was closely connected with rhetoric. Thus the name logic is of a tell-tale character in its application to logic in the West; and it may be taken to indicate how, almost from its very rise, western logic found itself in the firm grip of formalism and how it took more than twenty centuries for the scientific method underlying Aristotle's Organon to be redeemed, brought into prominence and implemented in the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). The term logic should not be taken to carry with it all these implications of European history when it is used in the phrase Indian logic.[67]

The essential features of logic in the Western tradition are well captured in the following statement by a famous logician Alonzo Church:

Logic is the systematic study of the structure of propositions and of the general conditions of valid inference by a method, which abstracts from the content or matter of the propositions and deals only with their logical form. This distinction between form and matter is made whenever we distinguish between the logical soundness or validity of a piece of reasoning and the truth of the premises from which it proceeds and in this sense is familiar from everyday usage. However, a precise statement of the distinction must be made with reference to a particular language or system of notation, a formalised language, which shall avoid the inexactness and systematically misleading irregularities of structure and expression that are found in ordinary (colloquial or literary) English and other natural languages and shall follow or reproduce the logical form.[68]

Thus, the basic features of Western logic are: It deals with a study of ‘propositions’, specially their ‘logical form’ as abstracted from their ‘content’ or ‘matter’. It deals with ‘general conditions of valid inference’, wherein the truth or otherwise of the premises have no bearing on the ‘logical soundness or validity’ of an inference. It achieves this by taking recourse to a symbolic language that has little to do with natural languages. The main concern of Western logic, in its entire course of development, has been one of systematising patterns of mathematical reasoning, with the mathematical objects being thought of as existing either in an independent ideal world or in a formal domain. Indian logic however, does not deal with ideal entities, such as propositions, logical truth as distinguished from material truth, or with purely symbolic languages that apparently have nothing to do with natural languages.

The central concern of Indian logic as founded in nyāya is epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Thus Indian logic is not concerned merely with making arguments in formal mathematics rigorous and precise, but attends to the much larger issue of providing rigour to the arguments encountered in natural sciences (including mathematics, which in Indian tradition has the attributes of a natural science and not that of a collection of context free formal statements), and in philosophical discourse. Inference in Indian logic is ‘deductive and inductive’, ‘formal as well as material’. In essence, it is the method of scientific enquiry. Indian ‘formal logic’ is thus not ‘formal’, in the sense generally understood: in Indian logic ‘form’ cannot be entirely separated from ‘content’. In fact, great care is exercised to exclude from logical discourse terms, which have no referential content. No statement, which is known to be false, is admitted as a premise in a valid argument. Thus, the ‘method of indirect proof’ (reductio ad absurdum) is not accepted as a valid method−neither in Indian philosophy nor in Indian mathematics−for proving the existence of an entity whose existence is not demonstrable (even in principle) by other (direct) means of proof.

Indian logic does not make any attempt to develop a purely symbolic and content independent or ‘formal language’ as the vehicle of logical analysis. Instead, what Indian logic, especially in its later phase of Navya-Nyāya starting with the work of Gāngeśa Upādhyāya of the 14th century, has developed is a technical language, which is based on the natural language Sanskrit, yet avoids ‘inexactness’ and ‘misleading irregularities’ by various technical devices. This technical language, being based on the natural language Sanskrit, inherits a certain natural structure and interpretation, and sensitivity to the context of enquiry. On the other hand, the symbolic formal systems of Western logic, though considerably influenced in their structure (say, in quantification, etc.) by the basic patterns discernible in European languages, are professedly purely symbolic, carrying no interpretation whatsoever−such interpretations are supposed to be supplied separately in the specific context of the particular field of enquiry ‘employing’ the symbolic formal system.[69]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b c nyAya Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany
  2. ^ Jump up to:a b Nyaya: Indian Philosophy Encyclopædia Britannica (2014)
  3. ^ Cite error: The named reference yesnyabri was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ B Gupta (2012), An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge and Freedom, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-80003-7, pages 171–189
  5. ^ PT Raju (1985), Structural Depths of Indian Thought: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Ethics, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-88706-139-4, page 223
  6. ^ Jump up to:a b c John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-3067-5, page 238
  7. ^ Jump up to:a b c d DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, ISBN 978-1-4419-8109-7, page 172
  8. ^ Jump up to:a b c Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-43878-0, page 225
  9. ^ Vassilis Vitsaxis (2009), Thought and Faith, Somerset Hall Press, ISBN 978-1-935244-04-2, page 131
  10. ^ BK Matilal (1997), Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0717-4, pages 353–357
  11. ^ Jump up to:a b Oliver Leaman (2006), Nyaya, in Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-86253-0, pages 405–407
  12. ^ Jeaneane Fowler (2002), Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, Sussex Academic Press, ISBN 978-1-898723-94-3, page 129
  13. ^ Jump up to:a b B. K. Matilal "Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge" (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. xiv.
  14. ^ KN Jayatilleke (2010), Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, ISBN 978-81-208-0619-1, pages 246–249, from note 385 onwards;
    Steven Collins (1994), Religion and Practical Reason (Editors: Frank Reynolds, David Tracy), State Univ of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-2217-5, page 64; Quote: "Central to Buddhist soteriology is the doctrine of not-self (Pali: anattā, Sanskrit: anātman, the opposed doctrine of ātman is central to Brahmanical thought). Put very briefly, this is the [Buddhist] doctrine that human beings have no soul, no self, no unchanging essence.";
    Edward Roer (Translator), Shankara's Introduction, p. 2, at Google Books, pages 2–4
    Katie Javanaud (2013), Is The Buddhist 'No-Self' Doctrine Compatible With Pursuing Nirvana?, Philosophy Now;
    John C. Plott et al (2000), Global History of Philosophy: The Axial Age, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0158-5, page 63, Quote: "The Buddhist schools reject any Ātman concept. As we have already observed, this is the basic and ineradicable distinction between Hinduism and Buddhism".
  15. ^ BK Matilal (1997), Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0717-4, pages 354–355
  16. ^ David Ambeul (1998), Ontology in Indian Philosophy, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Editor: Edward Craig), Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-07310-3, pages 118–127
  17. ^ The Spectator at Google Books, Hindu Philosophy, Volume 32, page 1260
  18. ^ Jump up to:a b c The Nyaya Sutras of Gautama (Original Text, English Translation & Commentary) Translated & English Commentary by M.M. Satisa Candra Vidyabhusana Edited with a Sanskrit Preface by Dr. Sukhram ISBN 978-81-7110-629-5
  19. ^ N Sinha (1990), The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0748-8, see Introduction, pages i–ii
  20. ^ Jump up to:a b David Christian (1 September 2011). Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History. University of California Press. pp. 18–. ISBN 978-0-520-95067-2.
  21. ^ Kenneth Kramer (January 1986). World Scriptures: An Introduction to Comparative Religions. Paulist Press. pp. 34 ff. ISBN 978-0-8091-2781-8.
  22. ^ Naisadacharitam 17–75
  23. ^ Padmapurana Uttarakhanda, Chapter 263
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  34. ^ Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0779-0, pages 25–26
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Further reading[edit]

  • Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti (1995), Definition and induction: a historical and comparative study, University of Hawaii Press, ISBN 978-0-585-30953-8, OCLC 45728618
  • Gangesa (2010), Classical Indian philosophy of induction: the Nyāya viewpoint, (Translator: Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti), ISBN 978-0-7391-4705-4, OCLC 665834163
  • Gangesa (2020), Tattva-cintā-maṇi, (“Jewel”), translated by Stephen Phillips, Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology. 3 volumes, London: Bloomsbury.
  • Gopi Kaviraj (1961), Gleanings from the history and bibliography of the Nyaya-Vaisesika literature, Indian Studies: Past & Present, OCLC 24469380
  • Arthur Keith (1921), Indian logic and atomism: an exposition of the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika systems, Greenwood Press, OCLC 451428
  • Bimal Matilal (1977), A History of Indian Literature – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, ISBN 978-3-447-01807-4, OCLC 489575550
  • Stephen Phillips (2012), Epistemology in classical India: the knowledge sources of the Nyāya school, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-89554-5, OCLC 701015636
  • Karl Potter (1977), Indian metaphysics and epistemology: the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa, Princeton University Press, OCLC 3933891

Navya-Nyaya school[edit]

  • Bimal Matilal, The Navya-nyāya doctrine of negation: the semantics and ontology of negative statements, Harvard University Press, OCLC 606911358
  • Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Materials for the study of Navya-nyāya logic, Harvard University Press, OCLC 1907221

External links[edit]












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