Rhetorical Complexity of Advocating Intercultural Peace: Post-World War II Peace Discourse
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ABSTRACT
Alberto González, Advisor
This dissertation focuses on the rhetorical discourse advocating for peace in the postwar intercultural community centering Japan in the succeeding 70 years since the end of WWII in Asia in 1945. It interrogates the rhetorical complexity of current engagements with intercultural peacebuilding through the analysis of three sets of speeches between 2015 to 2017. In doing so, this dissertation aims to contribute itself to the process of restoring and enhancing the relationship among the relevant intercultural communities. By employing generative criticism, the rhetorical investigation explores the hidden role of culture and social practices, and challenges the Western-dominant rhetorical approach and then broadens the rhetorical approach.
The overarching research questions are: (1) How is peace discourse symbolically constructed and negotiated in the postwar intercultural community among Japan and its wartime enemies and victims, and (2) How does the peace discourse advocate for negative peace and positive peace in the postwar intercultural community? There are three case studies and three sub-questions. The first case study is Abe danwa by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia. This chapter unpacks the three primary rhetorical efforts around the expression of apologies, negative peace, and positive peace. The second case study is the statements in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor by President Barack Obama of the U.S. and Prime Minister Abe. While applying ideograph, it elucidates how <wa> and <harmony> persuasively warrant the use of rhetorical powers. The end of this chapter proposes the concept of intercultural ideograph. The third case study is the annual Hiroshima Peace Declarations. The chapter reveals that, through the process of guilt-redemption, Hiroshima Peace Declarations invite the audience to adapt the new perspective of living in the world where all human lives would co-exist without the fear of atomic weapons.
While centering the value of peace, the end of the dissertation calls for future scholarship at the intersections of studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric. It closes by offering practical implications for intercultural peace advocators working toward harmonious relationships among the involved communities in the post-conflict situation.
To the memory of my beloved mother, Sakiko Kanemoto, who still represents unconditional love to me
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
When I think of my journey of engaging with this dissertation, I get emotional because I am overwhelmed with the appreciation for the guidance, mentorship, friendship, support, trust, and love I have received from many people. In no particular order, I would like to express my gratitude for those who have pushed me to keep walking this tough, meaningful journey.
My journey in the Ph.D. program would not have started or been completed without my advisor, Dr. Alberto González. In the Japanese language, we address the respected teacher as onshi [恩師], meaning the teacher who truly teaches something important for a particular individual. Dr. González, you are my onshi. Your continuous support and guidance were irreplaceable. Once I was second-guessing my choice of the dissertation topic as it has not necessarily focused on a brighter side of the world. I clearly remember that you said, “There is an important thing needed to be studied. If you do not write about the topic, who will do it?” Through your encouragement, I did not turn away from the vital topic of peace advocacy in the post-conflict intercultural situation. I truly appreciate you for valuing my research, for respecting my thoughts, for seeing a potential in me, and for guiding me.
I would especially like to thank my dissertation committee members. Dr. Ellen Gorsevski and Dr. John Dowd are also my onshi, who have taught me not only academic lessons but also life lessons. Dr. Ellen Gorsevski, you are the one who inspired me to explore the values and meanings of peace. I was always excited to talk with you about my dissertation as you were always there to support me intellectually and emotionally. I express my deep gratitude for your encouragement and guidance through the research process. Dr. John Dowd, I cannot thank you enough for your generosity and patience. I had countless “a-ha” moments during various conversations with you. I am very fortunate to be mentored and to be much influenced by you.
Dr. Sheila Roberts, thank you for bringing your unique social science perspective to broaden my humanistic horizon along this process.
There are the groups of people who took vital roles in my Ph.D. journey. To my cohort members and friends in the School of Media and Communication, thank you for letting me feel comfortable to be who I am. I cherish these memories with you forever: studying together, researching together, going to conferences together, laughing together, and crying together. To my academic family and siblings, I have truly felt supported and loved by you. I have always enjoyed the conversations and dialogues with you at the graduate lab, coffee shops, gatherings, and any other spaces and locations. You have always allowed me to learn from you. I can honestly say that when you are happy, I am happy.
To my mentors at Bowling Green State University, thank you very much Dr. Clayton Rosati and Dr. Lisa Hanasono who always gave me kind and cheering words. The interactions with you made me realize how I want to interact with my own students. You are my role models. To my professors at Texas State University, Dr. Ann Burnette, Dr. Rebekah Fox, Dr. Felipe Gómez, and Dr. Robert Tally who is in the Department of English, you impacted my academic journey during the master’s program and the post-master’s program. I felt that I did not clearly express my gratitude to you upon my graduation. Thank you very much for your guidance. I will always carry what I learned from you.
I also want to express my truthful appreciation to Dr. Roseann Mandziuk, at Texas State University, as well. You are the one who first taught me the joy of exploring the field of communication as an undergraduate student. If I had not taken your class about protest movements as an undergraduate student, I would not be here now, nor would I have chosen to pursue the master’s degree and Ph.D. degree. I always looked up to you as a scholar, professor, and human being and will continue to do so.
I wish to extend a thank you to my family in my home country, Japan: my dad Shinjiro
Kanemoto, brother Tadashi, sister-in-law Yuka, nieces Kito and Kika, and nephew Uki. Thank you for encouraging me to pursue my goals abroad [お父さん、 お兄ちゃん、 裕香ちゃん、 希都ちゃん、 羽希君、 希花ちゃん、 本当にありがとう]. When I doubted my ability in this journey, you believed in me. My mother, Sakiko Kanemoto, should receive the credits for my accomplishments in the U.S., if there are any. Some people in the U.S. have described me as adventurous and hardworking. If that is true, then I learned it from my mother, who peacefully passed away in December 2018. Yet, my heart feels her with me, looking at me, and cheering me from the heavens. I also want to remember my grandmother, who passed away in February 2019.
She taught me to be curious.
Finally, to my partner, Sasha Allgayer: Thank you very much for literarily pushing me to keep walking in this tough, meaningful Ph.D. journey. We started our own “story” during the academic journey. Let’s keep smiling and laughing together. Hvala and volim te.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEBUILDING IN THE POSTWAR
INTERCULTURAL CONTEXT OF JAPAN ..…………………………………………….. 1
Peace as Social Value ….…………………………………………………………… 4
Selective Concepts of Peace ..………………………………………………. 5
Negative peace ……………………………………………………... 6
Positive peace.…….………………………………………………... 7
Heiwa….……………………………………………………………. 8
Diplomacy and Peace …….………………………………………………… 9
Peace agreements .…...……………………………………………… 9
Peacebuilding ....……………………………………………………. 11
Conflict ...…………………………………………………………….……. . 13
Method ……………………………………………………………………………… 14
Generative Criticism .....…………………………………………………….. 17
Summary and Rationale of Case Studies …………………………………………… 18 Selected Speeches ...………………………………………………………… 18
Significance of Studying the Selected Series of Speeches …………………. 20
Interrogation toward the Western dominant approach ......…………. 21
Interrogation toward the consequences of past and present ..………. 22
Critical Frame .……………………………………………………………………… 26
Primary Questions and Overview of Chapters ……………………………………... 30
CHAPTER II. PUBLIC APOLOGY AND INTERCULTURAL PEACEBUILDING: 70 YEARS LATER ……………………………………………………………………………………... 34
Untranslated Cultural Meanings ...……………….…………………………………. 36
Cultural Meaning of Danwa ……………….……………………………….. 36
Cultural Meaning of Shazai Apology and Owabi Apology .……………….. 38
Background of Abe Danwa...……………………………………………………….. 39
The Previous Expression of Apology and Its Failure, Success, and
Challenge ....………………………………………………………...………. 39
Expression of apology in Murayama danwa in 1995 .……………... 42
Speaker: Prime Minister of Japan…………………………………………... 43
Overview of Abe Danwa.…………………………………………………… 44
Apologetic Rhetoric and Expression of Regret .........………………………………. 46
Apology Speech as a Means of Image Repair…….………………………... 46
Apology to Restore the Relationship……………………………………….. 47
Apology as a Co-Produced Process ………………………………………… 49
Analysis of Abe Danwa: Expression of Apologies and Peace …… 50
Owabi Apology and Creation of Old and New Past Identities……………... 51
Profound grief for the wartime actions……………………………... 51
Owabi apology to be enacted by postwar commitment to peace ....... 53
New Past Identities of Wartime Enemies and Victims……………………... 56 Wartime victims’ new past identities as paradox reflection of Japan… 56
Expression of heartfelt gratitude to the wartime enemies
and victims…58
The Future Vision of Apology and Peace…………………………………... 59
(No) more shazai apology in the future? ..………………………...... 59
Alternative ways to face the past …………………………………… 61
Conclusion: Peace as a Co-Produced Process ...….………………………………… 64
Condensed Summary About the Rhetorical Efforts ..….………………….... 64
Transforming to Be a Peace-Loving Nation as a Co-Produced Process ........ 65
CHAPTER III. INTERCULTURAL IDEOGRAPHS FOR POSITIVE PEACE: “WA” AND “HARMONY” 70 YEARS AFTER………………………………….. 71
Background of Speech ……………………………………………………………… 72
Sites of Speeches: Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor .…………………………… 74
Speakers: President Obama and Prime Minister Abe………………………. 75
Overview of Selected Speeches…………………………………………….. 79
Speeches delivered in Hiroshima, Japan ...….…………………….... 80
Speeches delivered at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the U.S......................... 82
Ideographs ...………………………………………………………………………... 85
<Wa> and <Harmony> as Peace Ideology …………………………………………. 88 “Wa[和]” in Japanese Context ……………………………………………… 88
Historical background of the ideological term “wa” ……………...... 89
Operation of “wa” in the current Japanese context .…….….………. 91
“Harmony” in the U.S. Context…………………………………………….. 92
Historical background of the ideological term “harmony” ................ 93
Operation of “harmony” in the modern U.S. context ………………. 93
Power Lines Regarding “Wa,” “Harmony,” and Heiwa/Peace ....….. 94
Analysis of Remarks: <Wa> and <Harmony> .…..………………………………… 96
Transformation Enacting <Harmony>……………………………………… 96
The U.S. and Japan as wartime enemies ..…………….……………. 97
The U.S. and Japan in a postwar alliance and friendship …………... 99
The Phrase “Otagai no tame ni: With and for Each Other” Enacting <Wa> 100
Diachronic use of the cluster phrase in 2015.………………………. 101
The cluster phrase at Pearl Harbor in 2016 ………………….……... 103
Remembrance in the Future Enacting <Harmony> and <Wa> ..…………... 104
Remembering stories about a common humanity ………………….. 104
Remembering Hiroshima as the start of moral awakening.....…….... 107 Remembering the lesson of “Otagai o tame ni—With and for each other”
Remembering Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation………..... 109
“Symbol of reconciliation” enacting <harmony> ...……….. 109
“Symbol of reconciliation” enacting <wa>……….…...…... 111
Conclusion: <Wa> and <Harmony> in an Intercultural Context ... 113
Condensed Summary About the Themes Enacting <Harmony> and <Wa> .. 114
<Wa> and <Harmony> as Ideographs in the Remarks……………………... 114
Reactions toward the first set of the remarks in Hiroshima ............... 115
Reactions toward the second set of the remarks in Pearl Harbor ....... 118
<Wa> and <Harmony> as an Intercultural Ideograph ..….………….……… 120
CHAPTER IV. PEACE DECLARATION AS RITUAL SPEECH: PROCESS OF
GUILT-REDEMPTION FOR INTERCULTURAL PEACEBUILDING . 122
Postwar Hiroshima Peace Discourse and the 1945 Hiroshima Bombing… 124
Different Collective Memories of the Hiroshima Bombing …………….….. 125 Uniqueness of Hiroshima in Katakana (ヒロシマ)………………………...... 128
Hiroshima’s Efforts for Peacebuilding ……...……………………………… 131
Background of the Speeches ………………………………………………….……. 132
Peace Memorial Ceremony ...………………………………………………. 132
Speaker of the Peace Declaration: The Mayor of Hiroshima ………………. 134
Overview of the Selected Hiroshima Peace Declarations ...….……...……... 134
August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m. and the continued suffering………….. 135
Remaining nuclear weapons ………………………………………... 136
Testimonies by hibakusha ...………………………………………... 136
The “absolute evil” and Mayors for Peace ..………………………... 137
Appeal to policymakers …………………………………………….. 137
Appeal to the Japanese government ....…………………………...… 138
The conclusion of the Peace Declaration…………………………… 138
Consubstantiality and Process of Guilt-Redemption…………………………….…. 139 Consubstantiality & Division and War & Peace …………………………… 140
Process of Guilt-Redemption……………………………………………….. 142
Guilt ………………………………………………………………… 143
Purification …………………………………………………………. 144 Redemption…………………………………………………………. 147
Process of guilt-redemption, war, and peace ……………...………... 148
Guilt-Redemption in the Peace Declaration ………………………………………... 149
Guilt in Past, Present, and Future ...………………………………………… 150
Guilt in past ...………………………………………………………. 150
Guilt in present ...…………………………………………………… 151
Guilt in the future …………………………………………………... 152
Dual Modes of Purification .…………………………………………..……. 153
Purification through victimage ……………………………………... 154
Purification through transcendence ...….…………………………… 155
Redemption Through Policymakers .……………………………………….. 156
Conclusion: Rhetorical Negotiation for Intercultural Peacebuilding .……………… 158
Condensed Summary About Guilt, Purification, and Redemption ...………. 159
Policymakers as the Paradoxical Sacrificial Redeemers …………………… 160
Root of Guilt Becoming the Challenges for Intercultural Peacebuilding…... 162
Peace Declaration as a Re-Humanizing Ritual……………………………... 164
Non-human scapegoat, all human lives, and rehumanizing
ritual ……………………………………………………………….. 164
Positive peace and rehumanizing ritual …………………………….. 166
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD INTERVENTIONS FOR PEACE. 169
Chapter Review and Research Questions …………………………………………... 170
Apologetic Speech and Peace Efforts………………………………………. 171
Postwar Peacebuilding Effort Among Wartime Enemies ………………….. 174
Peace Declarations and Re-Humanization ...…………………………….…. 177
Going Beyond: Implications………………………………………………………... 181
Rhetorical Peacebuilding as a Co-Produced Process ………………………. 181
Intercultural Ideograph as a Rhetorical Tool ……………………………….. 183
Re-Humanization as Creation of a Peace Culture ………………………….. 184
Peace culture and war culture ………………………………………. 185
Re-humanizing all and peace culture..……………………………... 185
Future Scholarship ………………………………………………………….. 187
Going Beyond: For Peace Advocators ……………………………………………... 188
Concluding Remarks ..……………………………………………………………… 190
REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………... 192
CHAPTER I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEBUILDING IN THE POSTWAR
INTERCULTURAL CONTEXT OF JAPAN
In January 2016, I visited my home country of Japan, which has been ranked as 9th among the most peaceful countries in the world (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). During that visit, I found out that my 90-year-old grandmother is a hibakusha (被曝者), which is translated in English as a victim of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The term literally means explosion-affected people as hi means passively covered/affected, baku means explosion, and sha means people. My grandmother was a surviving victim of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. She had the document that authenticated her as an atomic bomb survivor, and the insurance health check certificates specifically issued to the surviving victims. Until this visit, I had never heard about this from my grandparents, parents, uncles, or aunts. While growing up in Japan, the topic was never brought up at family gatherings or during any conversations; at least I do not remember hearing such conversations. Yet one of my uncles at a family get-together first brought it up when I was sharing information that my partner is a refugee to the U.S. and experienced a war and witnessed bombings. I was surprised to hear that my grandmother is a surviving victim of the atomic bombing on Hiroshima. Ironically, if my partner was not a refugee from a European war, then I would never know that my grandmother is a surviving hibakusha.
With renewed curiosity, I revisited Japan and my grandmother later in 2016. There I saw a news article with a picture on her wall. The article was about President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima in May 2016, as the first President of the U.S. to do so. The picture captured the moment President Obama was giving a hug to a surviving victim of the Hiroshima bombing. My grandmother said that her heart was filled by his visit to Hiroshima and his caring gesture. She added that she had never expected that a U.S. president would ever visit the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial. In fact, shortly after the announcement of President Obama’s visits to Hiroshima, the Kyodo news agency took a survey of surviving hibakusha (“Hibakusha 78 % did,” 2016). The poll reported that 78.3% of the surviving victims said they saw no need for an apology from President Obama or the U.S. as a nation, yet they hoped his visit would come true. One of the main opinions among them was that they did not attribute responsibility for the bombing only to the U.S. but included consideration of Japan’s aggressive actions.
In my grandmother’s case, she expressed appreciation for President Obama’s visit, and she hoped that his speech would play a role for a long-lasting peace. I do not know why exactly I never heard directly from her about her experience in Hiroshima in 1945. I can only assume that she must have had multiple stigmas that inhibited sharing the experience. In fact, as a member of a relatively younger generation that grew up in an era of peace, I do not know what to say and what to think when I imagine her feeling of looking at the picture of President Obama with a survivor of the bombing. In the summer of 2017, I revisited her, and asked about her experience around the wartime. It became my first and last time to hear directly from her about her personal war experience and wishes for a peaceful world as she passed away in the beginning of 2019.
In the succeeding 70 years since the end of World War II in Asia on August 15, 1945, the term “peace,” or heiwa in Japanese, has been a significant presence in Japanese society in various ways. Discourses of peace often surround Japan’s long reflection on and repentance for World War II. Such discourses have been embedded within the education systems, constitutions, traditional and new media, and speeches at annual rituals and milestone occasions. For example, soon after the war, the postwar education system in Japan was critical of the prewar super nationalism and militaristic education, and has since upheld the educational philosophy for a peaceful and democratic society, which developed based on the Pacifism of Japanese
Constitution and Basic Law on Education (Murakami, 2017). Political public figures also deliver speeches that call for peace and express regret of Japan’s war engagement. Important examples of such speech occasions are the annual Peace ceremonies at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and milestone occasions such as the 50th, 60th, and 70th anniversaries of the end of World War II in
Asia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995, 2005; The Public Relations Office of the
Government of Japan, 2015).
Along with these examples, the social value of peace has been embedded within various cultural forms. Here, peace [heiwa] has been an ideology. Ideologies can be described as socially shared beliefs of groups and dominant beliefs in a specific society, rather than an individual’s set of beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). However, intricate tensions pervade Japanese discourse regarding war and peace within the current political, cultural, and historical scenes that reveal the rhetorical complexity among Japan and its wartime victims and neighboring countries, such as China and Korea, as well as its former wartime enemies, such as the United States of America.
This dissertation places a research focus on the postwar peace efforts in Japan and on the implications for the intercultural community surrounding Japan. My overarching goal is to interrogate and investigate the rhetorical complexity of current and postwar engagements with intercultural peacebuilding. Peacebuilding can be described as a form of fighting for peace positively by promoting better relationships (Gultung, 1985). Communication is a necessary entity for any level of peacebuilding efforts (Gorsevski, 2014b). Although peacebuilding has been understudied in the field of communication, communication critics, particularly intercultural communication critics, can play a vital, meaningful role in progressing the practice of peacebuilding (Broome & Collier, 2012). As an intercultural communication scholar, I focus on three case studies from the perspective of rhetorical criticism and communication studies. In doing so, my analysis provides insights into the peace ideology in the postwar intercultural community as well as insight into the rhetorical challenges and achievements for long-term, intercultural peace-building. I seek to expand the understanding of the value of peace within the communication discipline at the intersection of studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric.
This chapter first offers a discussion of peace by drawing from peace studies and highlighting the core and significant concepts. Peace is the overarching ideology, which is at the center of this dissertation. Second, I introduce the method, which is rhetorical criticism, particularly generative criticism. Third, I present a brief summary of selected speeches to be analyzed and the rationale of studying them. Fourth, I offer the critical frame where the dissertation is located. The chapter concludes with a statement of the primary research questions and overview of the dissertation chapters.
Peace as Social Value
“Peace [heiwa]” is an ideological term. At the same time, it is an ambiguous term and has a variety of connotations. Communication for peace is described as the “field of human activity that deserves more systematic attention from scholars of many disciplines that would benefit greatly from more crosspollination between hitherto rather insulated disciplines including international law, communication science, and peace and conflict studies” (Hoffman, 2013, p. 33). In fact, there are many efforts to make a global order more favorable to peace, to cherish human dignity, and to build an environment to stay away from relapse into war (Hoffmann,
2013). For example, the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) clearly includes a statement that emphasizes the importance of a lasting peace (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2018). Multiple local governments and non-governmental organizations are engaged with a broad range of activities to support peaceful communities.
However, Hoffmann (2013) points out that there is “no equivalent body of knowledge and inquiry of… ‘Communication for Peace’” (p. 11). The examination of the role of communication on the process of building a more peaceful society has been largely invisible, compared to the study of communication for development and study of the role of communication in conflicts including wars. Additionally, Gorsevski (2014b) states that the concept of nonviolence in the communication field has been used interchangeably with the term peacebuilding in the 21st century. Then, “[at] the international level, diplomacy is a strategy of nonviolent communication” (p. 451). This means that diplomacy can be considered as a strategy of peacebuilding in the international community from the perspective of communication studies. Below, I first provide selective concepts from peace studies so that the following chapters can advance the understanding of each case study. Second, I discuss the diplomatic aspects of peace discourse. At the end of this section, I conceptualize conflict, as this dissertation focuses on peace advocacy in the post-conflict intercultural situation.
Selective Concepts of Peace
Peace is a never-ending process and a revolutionary proposition (Galtung, 1996). Johan Galtung (1996), the pioneer of peace studies, defined peace as “what [people] have when creative conflict transformation takes place nonviolently” (p. 265). The goal of peace studies is comprehending “violence and its negation by conflict transformation…and peacebuilding by cooperation and harmony” and further encouraging peaceful conditions among the groups of human beings (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 139). Peace studies is highly “value-oriented” to protect and endorse life for all human beings as well as their basic needs for security, freedom, identity, a livable atmosphere, and more (p. 12). It encourages peace researchers to be “futureoriented” and applies a more “holistic and global approach” (Galtung, 1985, p. 147). Galtung further discussed peace in two manners: negative peace and positive peace.
Negative peace. Negative peace is illustrated as an “absence of war” and “absence of violence” (Galtung, 1964, p. 2). An absence of war could mean the absence of “organized collective violence…between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes, racial, and ethnic groups” (Galtung, 1967, p. 14). The absence of violence refers to the absence of the three forms of violence: direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence (Galtung & Fischer, 2013. p. 173). Direct violence is “an act of commission” (p. 12). An example is the actions of killing or physically attacking another individual. Structural violence is built on frequent “acts of omission,” which is built into the nature of social, cultural, and economic institutions (p. 12). An example is college admission that favors children of alumni to the disadvantage of other applicants. Cultural violence is legitimation for direct and structural violence. For example, racism as a cultural violence allows apartheid regimes to be justified and preserved, not only by the victimizers but also by the victimized. Similarly, the ideologies of nationalism and sexism as well as other forms of discrimination and prejudice in education, media, literature, and other areas make “the direct and structural violence feel right or at least not wrong” (p. 39). Thus, negative peace is a process of first recognizing and then thereby delegitimating these three forms of violence.
Furthermore, negative peace efforts include various activities and forms to contrive ending or softening existing antagonistic relationships, including the termination of wars (Diehl,
2016). Examples of negative peace efforts are disarmament and negotiating agreements to end or moderate war and hostile relationships. For a specific instance, the activities by the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winner, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), would be considered as a negative peace effort. The activities of ICAN resulted in the organization being awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their role in achieving the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 2017). The millions of campaigners in 103 nations, including the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings in 1945, have loudly protested against nuclear weapons and advocated to secure this landmark agreement. Other negative peace efforts could be often found in the policing, security policy, and military strategy (Diehl, 2016).
Positive peace. On the other hand, the definition of peace also contains elements of equality and an absence of exploitation. In communities at war, the first phase of peace initiates as the end of violence and absence of war, which connotes a negative peace (Shields & Soeters, 2017). The next phase allows communities to assist social equity, social justice, cooperation, and more. This is the condition of positive peace. Positive peace is defined as “the integration of human society” (Galtung, 1964, p. 2) and conditions that assist the “presence of positive relations” among human groups (Galtung, 1967, p. 14). It can be described as the attitudes, institutions, and structures that develop and strengthen peaceful societies (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). This means that positive peace is more than the mere absence of violence in a post-conflict situation. It embraces jointly valuable collaboration on each end and mutual learning to “heal past violence and prevent future violence” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 12). Here, the studies about positive peace consider peace-building through the usage of harmony and its legitimation (p. 138). It can include creation of a social system for the need of the whole population in the post-conflict situation so that the involved parties, like enemies during the conflicts, can restore a better relationship.
This vision of peace integrates values such as justice, democracy, sympathy, cooperation, engagement, harmony, and collaboration (Shields, 2017). Eventually, positive peace can be a process that nurtures human life and promotes social justice (Fischer, 2009). In this case, positive peace efforts deal with usage of non-traditional security concerns that may not directly deal with war and violence (Diehl, 2016). The efforts can strive to overcome social injustice. Examples are the activities that promote the development, human rights, and status of women. They can be activities for peace-building in the post-war context. Here, peace-building is the idea of fighting for peace positively by establishing a harmonious relationship. When assembling negative peace and positive peace, the end of the war does not necessarily mean that groups of human beings won the peaceful conditions or harmonious relationships among the involved parties. This speaks to the topic of my dissertation, which is the long-term process of peace-building in the postwar intercultural communities centering Japan.
Heiwa. Different civilizations comprehend the word peace differently (Galtung, 1985).
For instance, Ishida (1969) points out vital concepts of peace across cultures, including Santi in Hindi, which connotes the idea of maintaining a tranquil mindset including during conflict and suffering; eirene in Greek, which connotes prosperity and order; and shalom in Hebrew, which connotes prosperity and a sense of wholeness arising from righteousness and justice. Thereby, in addition to negative peace and positive peace, I introduce the value of heiwa, which is a Japanese term for peace. The Japanese term heiwa is composed with two Japanese ideological characters:
hei (平和) and wa (和). The literal meaning of hei is flat, broader, and ordinary, and wa is a motion of getting along and having a good relationship (Shinmura, 2018). Assembling these ideological characters together, the concept of heiwa holds the connotations of “social harmony, peacefulness, [and] adjustment” (Galtung, 1985, p. 155).
Further, heiwa can be comprehended as a tranquil state of mind as well as an adaptation to social order interconnecting with harmony. The connotation includes an emphasis on emotion. It means that the meaning of heiwa involves the value of harmony, which supports the ties between social order and an individual’s emotional feeling. In addition, the well-respected
Japanese dictionary, 広辞苑 [kōjien], lists the several connotations of heiwa (Shinmura, 2018, p. 2630). The first is the condition of calm, relaxing, and unchanging. The second is the calm world without war. I must point out that peace [heiwa] is an ideological term in Japanese society, as it is easily found in the various cultural forms, such as laws, poems, speeches, lyrics in music, and more. Ideologies can be described as socially shared beliefs of groups rather than an individual’s set of beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). It is the cluster of related values, ideas, and beliefs, which carry rhetorical force. Van Dijk (1998) further explains that ideology exerts a rhetorical force on group members to shape social beliefs about what is “good or bad, right or wrong, for them, and to act accordingly” (p. 8). The ideology of peace is a vital element in my dissertation. This section has reviewed significant concepts of peace. The next section reviews a process for peace-building, diplomacy.
Diplomacy and Peace
Some diplomatic activities can aim to achieve negative and positive peace. I offer two key selective diplomatic terms that are associated with three sets of artifacts in the following chapters: peace agreement and peacebuilding.
Peace agreements. First, peace agreements are the formal treaties that are intended to end or limit violent conflict (Yawanarajah & Ouellet, 2003). Diplomacy that aims to deal with peace agreements can be considered negative peace efforts. It is because the efforts of negotiating agreements that ends or diminishes war and rivalries are negative peace efforts (Diehl, 2016). Peace agreements aim to constructively address the conflict. The contents of various kinds of peace agreements might overlap, such as ceasefire agreements, interim agreements, and preliminary agreements. Each peace agreement contributes positive momentum for the final settlement whereas step-by-step agreements could be necessary for a comprehensive settlement to happen (Yawanarajah & Ouellet, 2003). For example, a ceasefire agreement is a provisional stoppage, which is designed to suspend aggressive military actions at least for a certain timeline and/or within the specific area (Smith, 2003). Although the ceasefire agreement tends to be short-lived and fragile, the purpose of this agreement is to provide the opportunities and time to conduct the political negotiations in order to seek a more durable solution. For another example of peace agreements, comprehensive agreement is the agreement to end a longstanding conflict. This agreement is designed to discover the common ground between interests and needs of both parties of the conflicts, so that they could resolve the substantive issue of dispute (Yawanarajah & Ouellet, 2003).
In the case of postwar Japan and WWII, the major peace agreements and formal treaties, such as the Treaty of San Francisco, were made between Japan and the Allied countries soon after the end of World War II. These peace agreements can be categorized as the comprehensive agreement. In fact, these peace treaties with Japan were largely drafted by the U.S., who actively negotiated their contents with other Allied nations (Togo, 2011). They ended up shaping what would become postwar memory in Japan. In the case of peace agreements between Japan and South Korea, these two nations in 1965 normalized diplomatic relations and resumed economic channels (United Nations, 1966). Japan and China did so in 1972 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972). Japan further made normalization agreements with Burma in 1955, the Philippines in 1956, Indonesia in 1958, Malaysia in 1967, and Singapore in 1967 (Miller, 2002).
Together, peace agreements as the formal treaties aim to end or limit violent conflicts (Yawanarajah & Ouellet, 2003). Therefore, the peace agreements between Japan and other nations were ending the war and aiming to dismiss the rivalry relationships so that they could create a path toward establishment of a positive and comprehensive settlement among these nations. These peace agreements stimulated these nations to approach the condition of negative peace, or the condition of absence of war and violence.
Peacebuilding. The second process is peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is a process that promotes the establishment of long-lasting peace after a violent conflict comes to an end
(Maiese, 2003). It is the process for a transformation toward more peaceful bonds (Morris, 2000). The central task of peacebuilding is to form the aforementioned positive peace, which maintains the presence of positive relations and prevent future conflicts, wars, and violence (Maiese, 2003). The intercultural communication scholars Broome and Collier (2012) described peacebuilding as a dynamic and adaptive, yet purposeful process, which is rooted within communicative practice, which is culturally produced. The peacebuilding process should aim to prevent the reoccurrence of violence through a various range of activities, including reconciliation, political and economic transformation, and fair and effective governance, as well as a dispute resolution process (Maiese, 2003; Morris, 2000). The peacebuilding must further function as the protection and enrichment of daily lives among human beings as well as each individual’s dignity. Thus, any diplomatic activities which assist the positive harmonious relationship can be positive peace efforts.
In fact, peacebuilding is the long-term process of fulfilling commitments in peace agreements. Peacebuilders not only consider the immediate post-conflict needs, but also consider the long-term needs (Gorsevski, 2014a). These long-ranging needs can stem from postcolonial, post-conflict, and/or postwar aftermaths wherein societies must potentially deal with “cultural and institutional forms of violence decades, even centuries, following wars or conflicts” (p. xix). While diplomacy can be considered as a strategy of peacebuilding in the international community, Japan has been engaging with this long-term process of fulfilling the commitments to peacebuilding over 70 years after the end of World War II. For example, there is the ritual of delivering a speech of apology by the Japanese prime minister every 10 years, which I analyze in
Chapter Two. There were historic visits to Hiroshima and Hawaii by U.S. President Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Abe respectively. Chapter Three focuses on their visits and speeches. There are the annual commemorations at Hiroshima to console the spirits of all the deceased in war. Chapter Four focuses on the commemorations at Hiroshima in 2015, 2016, and 2017.
These activities highlight Japan’s continuing engagement with the process of dealing with the consequences of its actions during World War II and committing itself to the peace agreements. Hence, the sets of artifacts in the upcoming chapters can be understood as elements of diplomatic strategies to engage with peacebuilding, so that the intercultural community can reach out to positive peace. To end this section, the peace agreement and peacebuilding are important diplomatic terms, especially because diplomacy can be utilized to design a dialogue over contentious issues so that Japan and the international community can work on delegitimation of violence—in other words negative peace—and have a long-lasting social stability through cooperation and harmony—in other words positive peace.
Conflict
Conflict also needed to be conceptualized. The “opposite of peace” is seen as violence, which is “the outcome of untransformed conflict” (Galtung, 2007, p. 14). While conflict has been described in the communication field as the struggles among interdependent parties who anticipate or have actual incompatibility of goals, ethics, beliefs, expectations, outcomes, scarce resources, and more (e.g., Wilmot & Hocker, 2007), Galtung (1996) pointed out that “conflict is about life, pointing straight to contradictions as life-creative and life-destructive” (p. 71). Conflict is a triadic paradigm with contradiction, the attitude of those concerned, and their behavior. First, contradiction can emerge from incompatible goals of involved groups. It can be seen as a frustration in which something disturbs a goal or results in “aggressiveness as an attitude” and “aggression as behavior” (p. 72). Second, hostile attitudes among the involved parties can produce or reproduce behavior that crafts an incompatibility of goals. Third, aggressive behavior could be irreconcilable with the other involved actors’ idea of happiness. Such behavior further could cause a new contradiction in addition to the original one. There are multiple possibilities to lead to more “aggressiveness and aggression” among the involved groups (p. 72).
In this case, conflict transformation must be peaceful so as not to exacerbate the situation by assisting future violence (Galtung, 2007). It is significant to have a transcendence approach, which means concerned groups not only go beyond just achieving their goals but also seek out and create “a new reality” in order to harmoniously co-exist together (p. 14). In addition, peacebuilding becomes important because it can assist people not only to take a “new action” but also engage with “new thoughts” (p. 29). Together, my dissertation specifically examines the rhetorical performance of three case studies and their peacebuilding efforts in the postwar intercultural situations while applying these selective concepts from peace studies, diplomatic aspects of peace discourse, and concept of conflict.
Method
Communication peace scholar Ellen Gorsevski (2004) suggests that rhetorical critics “need to be more well versed with…. the rhetoric of advocates of peace” (p. 4). Cavin (1994) also suggests that studying peace rhetoric and peace speakers could lead to the development of a meaningful model to gain better insights of “an alternative to the bloody sacrifice of war” (p. 292). By employing rhetorical criticism, I aim to advance the understanding of the rhetoric of advocates of peace. Rhetorical criticism is a method for a “systematic investigation and exploration” of the particular symbolic actions and artifacts among human beings, on the basis of criteria that are specified through critical frameworks (Foss, 2009. p. 6). The purpose of rhetorical criticism is gaining a better understanding of the rhetorical processes. While rhetorical criticism has a history of over 2,000 years, rhetoric has been defined differently (Black, 1978; Brock, Scott, & Chesebro, 1990; Foss, 2009). Aristotle (2008) defines it as “the faculty of observing in any given case that available means of persuasion” (p. 4). In this case, the critic’s concern is about rhetorical effects and persuasiveness.
More recently, Edwin Black (1978) stated that rhetorical discourses are “those discourses…which aim to influence [people]” (p. 15). Here, persuasion is attributed to the intent, and does not necessarily refer to accomplishment. Listeners also take a role in producing rhetoric. They can choose to be persuaded, which means that they seek to modify the grounds for their beliefs and redefine their beliefs (Scott, 1973, p. 90). In addition to the immediate audience, there is “a larger audience of ‘rhetorical players’” who take symbolic actions of their own as their responses to the speech (Scott, 2003). Thus, it is a transactional process between rhetors and their audience members though which meanings are co-created. Further, Kenneth Burke (1966) notes that rhetoric is a structured way of applying symbols to generate acceptance and authority (p. 20). It is the uses of symbols by a speaker to manipulate the listeners’ attitudes to promote cooperation and participation in the commonly shared attitudes and beliefs (p. 4). Burke sees that rhetoric, within a dramatic frame, is concerned with identification, or consubstantiality (Burke, 1969). Dramatism is the theory that language suggests what reality means and that the central goal of rhetoric is to overcome those things that divide people from one another. For Burke, critics can discover the motives of speakers by examining language use and language choices in their speech.
Some scholarship further considers rhetoric as a product of the larger context of society, which historically and politically influences the human use of symbols. In this case, the rhetorical analysis may aim to reveal the meanings hidden within these persuasive, rhetorical efforts. For instance, Wander (1983) argues rhetorical critics must seek to understand “the existence of powerful vested interests” which could be in the artifacts (p. 18). Klumpp and Hollihan (1979) suggest that rhetorical critics need to study how “rhetoric converts experiences into culture and history” (p. 89). Assembling them together, the critics would use rhetorical criticism to understand the complex matters of human communication. In doing so, they can examine power and hold a responsibility that “accompanies full critical participation in [their] society” (p. 94). For my dissertation, I use rhetorical criticism to analyze the selected artifacts with the purpose of identifying and interrogating their rhetorical power and efforts to advocate for peace.
Engaging in rhetorical criticism consists of three elements: description, interpretation, and evaluation (Brock, Scott, & Chesebro, 1990, p. 16). As the first step of description, critics must draw an attention to a certain phenomenon, meaning a type of symbolic action or inducement. Description clearly reveals what the object of exploration is. This means that critics need to describe the artifacts or texts and the occasion that surrounds them. The second step is interpretation. Here, the rhetorical critics must reveal the social significance of the selected artifact. They are engaging with the process of shaping the meaning and importance of “the symbolic inducement” while they are selecting the meanings based on their own positionalities and the purposes of the critical engagement (p. 16). The interpretation process could include finding the questions or issues at the center of the text under study, developing a “propositional argument that highlights the significance of the rhetorical action” upon experiencing “a-ha” moments (Medhurst, 2014, p. 132).
This guides the critic to the third step, which is evaluation. This is a judgmental dimension—like some critics state, “rhetoric… is well done or ill” (Brock, Scott, & Chesebro, 1990, p. 16). By following the criteria in the framework, some critics evaluate a speech based on the effectiveness by unpacking its persuasiveness and/or identification while others evaluate a speech based on the ethical and moral judgments, and often about the appeals. This ethical judgment can even lead the critics to unpack the construction or destruction of human values. Here, Edwin Black (1978), one of the pioneers of contemporary rhetorical study, states that a rhetorical critic’s own style would be essential in formulating the critique. The critics frequently have motives to go beyond understanding of the artifact; such motives are to improve the quality of human life (p. 9). At this point, critics are cognizant of their responsibility to make a critical contribution for their own society (Klumpp & Hollihan, 1979). In this sense, the goal of the rhetorical criticism could be seeking the change of the human condition by encouraging or discouraging certain actions (Brock, Scott, & Chesebro, 1990).
My dissertation interrogates, interprets, and evaluates the long-term peacebuilding efforts within the peace discourse in the postwar intercultural context surrounding current postwar Japan. In doing so, I aim to go beyond understanding of the artifacts, and contribute my dissertation to the process of restoring and enhancing the relationship among the relevant intercultural communities. The critical frames will be introduced later, so that I can evaluate the selected artifacts in the analysis chapters through the systematic exploration on the basis of evaluative criteria. The next section presents the specific procedures for rhetorical analysis so that each case study in the following chapters can engage with the investigation of the particular symbolic actions.
Generative Criticism
For my dissertation, I apply the procedures of generative criticism. Generative criticism is a method of rhetorical analysis through which critics dive into the artifacts and generate a unit of an explanation from artifacts themselves (Foss, 2009). It means that critics are involved in the process to develop the theoretical and conceptual lens through which they can explain primary elements in each artifact by identifying and codifying new acumens and accounts of rhetorical performance. I apply the basic steps for employing generative criticism in order to analyze the case studies in the later chapters.
First, critics identify and gather the vital artifacts to be analyzed. Second, critics engage with the initial coding of artifacts, which means they observe major features of each artifact, according to intensity and frequency, several times. The intensity entails the elements which are noteworthy and noticeable in the artifacts. The frequency entails the repetition of elements. Upon identifying the major features in the initial coding, critics interpret these surface, obvious elements. Here, critics can begin to form an explanatory scheme. This is an explanation of the major features, which are not organized yet. In order to do so, critics can apply a conventional explanation by employing an existing theory that they believe is most suitable. If any conventional explanations are not found, then the critics need to develop their own explanatory schema. In the latter case, they must generate an explanatory scheme that organizes their insights about the artifact “in an insightful and coherent way” (p. 394). It could function as a structure of the analysis section in the essay. At this point, critics can formulate research questions, and dive into the artifacts multiple times to code the artifacts again in details with the tentative explanatory scheme. The coding process includes labeling the rhetorical elements. The detailed coding guides critics to analyze rhetorical elements in artifacts. Accordingly, it conceptualizes, redefines, or extends them, which the critics were unable to do so prior. Together, by employing the general procedures of generative criticism, this dissertation aims to interpret, critique, and further evaluate the current, postwar peace discourse in the intercultural context surrounding Japan.
Summary and Rationale of Case Studies
The procedure of generative criticism described above points out that the critic first encounters and gathers the artifacts. Thus, this section provides fundamental aspects of primary artifacts and then provides a rationale for their study. All artifacts are related to the approach to peace and war. They were delivered between 2015 to 2017 in the public settings. The later chapter re-introduces each artifact with more detail.
Selected Speeches
The first artifact is Abe danwa. This speech was delivered by the current Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe on August 14, 2015, at the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in
Asia (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a). Prior to Abe danwa, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama delivered Murayama danwa in 1995 at the 50th anniversary and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered Koizumi danwa in 2005 at the 60th anniversary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995; 2005). All danwas were publicly and ritualistically performed by prime ministers of Japan every 10 years. As a note, Japanese diplomacy toward Korea and China is often described as the “apology diplomacy (shazai gaikou)” mainly because Japan had negatively affected these nations and other Asian-Pacific nations during the war. These speeches are considered parts of such diplomacy. In fact, Abe danwa elaborated on two Japanese terms of apologies referring to Japan’s aggressive actions during war. This superficially connotates that Abe danwa was delivered as a former, wartime aggressor. Still, it was advocating the value of peace.
The second artifact is composed with two pairs of milestone statements in 2016 by President Barack Obama of the U.S. and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan. They delivered the first pair of speeches in May at Hiroshima, Japan, when President Obama visited there
(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016a; The White House of the United States of
America, 2016a). President Obama became the first president of the U.S. to do so (Harris, Davis, & Soble, 2016). They delivered the second pair in December at Pearl Harbor (The White House of the United States of America, 2016b; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016c). These two countries were enemies during World War II and both caused and triggered huge damages and loss of human lives. Yet, over 70 years after losing about 140,000 lives in Hiroshima (The
City of Hiroshima, 2015) and 2,458 lives in Pearl Harbor in 1941, (United States. Department of Defense, 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee, 1991), recent political leaders as the representatives of these countries delivered speeches together at these two significant places for the first time. Their statements were also focused on the value of peace and reconciliation.
The third set of artifacts consists of Hiroshima Peace Declarations in 2015, 2016, and
2017 at the annual commemorations hosted by the city of Hiroshima (Matsui, 2015; 2016; 2017).
The commemorations are held annually on August 6, the day an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The purpose of the ceremony is to comfort the victims of the Hiroshima bombing as well as to pray for long-lasting world peace. In fact, representatives from 80 to 100 nations, including the ones with recognized atomic/nuclear weapons, such as the U.S., Great Britain, France, and Russia, attended the memorial ceremonies in these three aforementioned years (Kawate, 2015; Takeshita, 2017; Wada, 2016). These audience members in international communities remember the Hiroshima bombing differently. The incident of Hiroshima bombing is remembered as a symbol of a triumph to end the war, as a scientific miracle, as a U.S. diplomatic move against the Soviet Union by demonstrating its militaristic power, and more (e.g., Fields, 2015; Masumoto, 2015; Williams, 2007; Lindaman & Ward, 2004). While Hiroshima itself occupies a unique role not only in Japan but also in the global communities, the Hiroshima Peace Declarations advocate for lasting world peace.
Above, I described three sets of artifacts: Abe danwa in 2015, the speeches in 2016 at Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor by the U.S. President Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Abe, and the Hiroshima Peace Declarations at commemorations in 2015, 2016, and 2017. The analysis chapters provide more details for each artifact.
Significance of Studying the Selected Series of Speeches
The end of World War II did not necessarily lead the intercultural community to peaceful conditions. Rather, the needs of peace post-conflict have expressed the current political discourse in multiple (inter)cultural layers. Thereby, a rhetorical analysis of the series of artifacts can unravel the complex ties between the discourse about war and the long-term process of building a peaceful condition. Following the crucial points made by Gorsevski (2004), there are needs to be among communication critics a study of the rhetoric of peace. Thus, the rhetorical investigation of these case studies can potentially make a vital contribution to the study of the rhetorical discourse advocating for peace. In addition to this overarching rationale for examining the case studies about peace discourse from the rhetorical perspective, there are two vital reasons to investigate the selected artifacts.
Interrogation toward the Western dominant approach. First, the analysis of case studies interrogates the Western dominant rhetorical approach. A rhetorical investigation of the selected speeches allows the exploration of the hidden role of culture and social practices in the intercultural communities to be studied. In fact, when a speech is delivered to international audiences, speakers may have difficulty achieving their intended goals because each society has a different interpretive system regarding how to evaluate languages and behavioral and nonverbal patterns (Scott, 2003). For example, when an individual expresses apologies or appreciations, a speaker in the U.S. tends to emphasize personal comments much more than the formality of expression, while a speaker in Japan tends to emphasize the formality such as nonverbal rules for bowing (Goldstein & Tamura, 1975). Another example is that the preferred pattern is different in English and Japanese argumentation, because characteristics of English argumentation often favor linear, direct, deductive, and logical claims and assertions while
Japanese argumentations often favor circular, inductive, and indirect claims (Kamimura & Oi, 1998; Kaplan, 1972; Hinds, 1983). The rhetorical investigation of each case study could explore the hidden role of culture and social practices, which, in Scott’s (2003) words, is the different interpretive system in each society to evaluate language and behavioral and nonverbal patterns.
In doing so, analysis of three sets of artifacts together could challenge and interrogate the
Western dominant rhetorical approach and then broaden the notions of rhetorical approach.
Interrogation toward the consequences of past and present. Second, the examination of the speeches unpacks the tangled connections between the current, postwar peace discourse and the intercultural knot of unresolved consequences that stems from the rich and often violent histories among the countries. Here, I briefly present some historical elements regarding Japan’s engagement in WWII. In doing so, these elements provide a certain understanding of the current rhetorical, intercultural complex of concerns regarding the peace rhetoric surrounding postwar Japan. It is significant to note that different communities have different collective memories about the historical events. Collective memory is a taken-for-granted memory among the community members and a shared remembering of the past that is presented by public historical narratives (Prosise, 1998). These narratives exclude many substantive historical considerations of wartime events. Accordingly, the beginning and ending of such narratives about one war event could vary depending on the community (see Masumoto, 2015, Prosise, 1998). This means that the collective memory of a specific incident is composed of selective elements. In a similar manner, the historical elements about war surrounding Japan, which are introduced here, are also selective elements.
Countless books and journal articles discuss the historical elements about the complex engagements of World War II in the Far East by Japan, its neighboring nations, and other Asian and Western international communities (e.g., Baker, 2005; Hasting, 2011; Holland, 2016). While I dove into these books and became familiar with the substantive components, I drew the following information about Japan’s engagements in WWII primarily from a popular historical magazine, Atlas of World War II: Exploring the History of the Greatest Conflict, published by National Geographic (2019). It was largely accessible in 2019 in the U.S. Popular historical magazines can find a “middle ground between popular and academic history” (Thorp, 2015. p. 102). This means that they can convey complicated past events and historically accurate elements of these events for a wider number of readers, including non-historians. This dissertation is not a project of studying historiography; it is a project of studying communicative, rhetorical performance, but it still requires a historical understanding of particular events. Thus, the popular historical magazine published by National Geographic is an appropriate and helpful source.
The National Geographic (2019) demonstrates multiple substantial aspects about Japan’s involvement in WWII. It traces back to the late 1800s when European trading companies acquired portions of the Asian-Pacific region. Then Japan solemnly promised to unify this region under Asian rule against the Western colonizers. In the early 1900s, the Great Depression added more pressure on Japan to expand its military power, increase its empire, and access material markets abroad. It expanded its territory overseas, including Taiwan and Korea. Following Japan’s invasions of China in the 1930s, including the region of Nanking (Nanjing), the Japanese foreign minister joined the Tripartite Pact with the Axis Powers of Germany and Italy in 1940.
Around this time, Japan attacked the European colonies, including French Indonesia, Dutch East
Indies, and British Malaya and Burma. In fact, these attacks were much anticipated by the
European colonizers, but the war in Europe left the Far East stations short of military resources.
While the National Geographic (2019) highlights the war in the Pacific, it notes that British troops were in Singapore, which was far exceeded by the Japanese army. However, many of them were “demoralized solders from India who, when captured, agreed to serve in the Indian National Army, which backed Japan in the hope of freeing India from British rule” (p. 33). Also, it notes that Japan made one last diplomatic effort to avoid war after it became subject to the U.S. oil embargo. Yet U.S. President Roosevelt refused to compromise after decoding cables from
Tokyo, which indicated that Japan would attack if they could not reach a deal. Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, commander of Japan’s Combined Fleet, then wanted to destroy the U.S. Pacific
Fleet with military aircraft before the American war effort could become more organized.
Commanders at Pearl Harbor had been warned about a possible hostile action, but they suspected Japan would first attack a different island in Pacific. Subsequently, the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese military happened in December 1941. The U.S. collective memory about the U.S. entry to WWII tends to start from the Pearl Harbor attack.
After that, battles kept happening in Asian-Pacific regions. Yet Japan clearly began to experience defeats in1943 from Allied victories on the Pacific islands such Guadalcanal and
Papua New Guinea. The fights between the U.S. and Japan included the Philippines, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and more. National Geographic also included the China-Burma-India theater, which was designed by the U.S. military to actively assist these nations by providing war materials and manpower in their fights with Japan. Then, following heavy firebombing of several Japanese cities, in August 1945 the U.S. dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In
September of the same year, Japan formally surrendered. The U.S. collective memory about WWII tends to finish its narrative by presenting the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as the events that ended the war (Fields, 2015; Masumoto, 2015; Prosise, 1998). Yet, this simplistic portrayal of the use of atomic weapons against Japan has been often misrecognized as objective history in the U.S. (Prosise, 1998). In fact, “a number of high profile military leaders,” including Dwight Eisenhower, who was the general during wartime and later a U.S. president, and Paul Nitze, who was vice-chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, “were against dropping” atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Crawford, 2003, p. 112). For instance, Crawford (2003) introduced the statement by Nitze in 1945, in which he indicated that “‘even without the atomic bomb… Japan would capitulate by November 1945’” when he was given the duty to strategize the air attack against Japan (p. 112).
Then, soon after Japan was defeated, the major international treaties and agreements were made, and they shaped the postwar evaluation of ancient memory in Japan (Togo, 2011). Allied countries negotiated and imposed the official judgments, and Japan accepted them. Here, although the Tokyo Treaty highlighted the Nanjing Massacre, these written documents included little information about the Japanese colonialism in Korea and Taiwan; this surprised the postwar Japanese government (Togo, 2011). Togo (2011) notes that some of the prosecutors and judges creating these treaties were from the countries, such as the United States, Great Britain,
Australia, the Netherlands, and France, that had colonial rule at the very time as the war began. This background of these prosecutors and judges could have influenced the treaties, which did not necessarily fully emphasize the wrongdoings committed by WWII Japan. At the time, the Japanese collective memory of WWII was influenced by these treaties and accordingly by the international communities, rather than being solely developed within Japanese cultural community. It was developed within the intricate intercultural negotiation in the postwar international structures. It is important to note that Japan was occupied by the Allied forces, mostly entirely by U.S. forces, from 1945 to 1952 (Togo, 2011; Dower, 1999). Thus, unequal power relations imbued this collective memory.
Above, selective elements are introduced regarding Japan’s actions and positions around the time of WWII. These elements are intertwined to construct the current, postwar intercultural context surrounding Japan. The rhetorical analysis of the series of artifacts not only unpacks the long-term peacebuilding process, but also elucidates the historical force on peace discourse. It clarifies the untangled connection among the current discourse of peace and the complex intercultural tensions emerging from historical incidents. The examination of each case study unpacks the rhetorical successes and challenges within such intertwined, intercultural connections that are tied with the past events. The close rhetorical analysis of the three sets of artifacts can potentially untie the complicated intercultural tensions around the postwar peace efforts while simultaneously untangling the role of cultural forces on rhetorical discourse. It further contributes to the whole project of advocating for rhetorical efforts to construct a peaceful and harmonious relationship among the involved intercultural communities, 70 years after the war officially ended.
Critical Frame
The critical frame helps critics to evaluate each case study on the basis of specific criteria during the process of performing criticism. The overarching critical frame for this dissertation intersects the studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric, in addition to the aforementioned definitions of peace, including positive peace and negative peace. First, intercultural rhetoric is a project within rhetorical studies that analyzes and observes various cultural norms and understandings discovered when people act rhetorically (Shuter, 1999). The intercultural rhetoric takes a stand and questions the application of traditional Western rhetorical approaches only, and instead integrates the notion of culture in rhetorical criticism. It exemplifies how culture-based rhetoric is created during intercultural interactions and how the symbolic performance makes sense within and across particular cultural worldviews.
The project of intercultural rhetoric can recognize one or more of the following occasions: (1) “Rhetoric crosses two or more cultures”; (2) “Rhetorical activity from two distinct rhetorical traditions collides over common topics”; (3) “A rhetor is of one culture, and the primary audience is of another culture”; and (4) “The critic selects concepts and evaluative tools from one rhetorical tradition and applies these concepts to a rhetorical activity that originates from another tradition” (González & Cheng, 2003, p. 477). The analysis of rhetoric in such projects is highly related to the analysis of the beliefs and values of peculiar cultural communities. Rhetorical analysis of intercultural contexts aims to embody the cultural sensibility and rhetorical forms that are adjured by a specific interaction, negotiation, tensions, or struggle in the cultural communities. Then, the meaning of culture needs to be conceptualized in order to engage with intercultural rhetoric. This leads to the next element, critical intercultural communication.
This dissertation locates itself in critical intercultural communication. The critics explore topics of power, context, ideology, and historical and structural forces within the intercultural communication context (Halualani, Mendoza, & Drzewiecka, 2009). This approach applies the notion of culture from the critical cultural perspective, although its notion has been theorized differently in communication studies (Hall, 1992; Halualani, Mendoza, & Drzewiecka, 2009; González & Peterson, 1993). The critical cultural perspective conceptualizes culture as a site of ongoing struggles over meanings and values within the social world (González & Peterson, 1993). Culture is not a fixed category that represents a certain life experience. It is “discursively constituted, a contested location,” where social order of equality and inequality are maintained, challenged, and (re)produced and where various group identities and ideologies intersect
(Collier, 2014, p. 9). Therefore, culture is connected to multiple ways of constituting and exercising power and resistance between dominant and oppressed groups and ideologies. Contending groups and ideologies emerge in culture as they express a political and situational stance through discourse.
For my dissertation, it is necessary to consider the political and situational stance that is publicly expressed or performed by a group in the process of examining the peace discourse in the postwar intercultural communities centering around Japan. The critical perspective on culture endorses the definition of culture as the ongoing process over ideologies of peace. In this sense, critical intercultural communication would guide the examination about the rhetorical engagement of pushing and pulling the dominant ideologies of negative peace and positive peace, which are historically, politically, and socially constructed, embedded, and embraced in the intercultural community to be studied. Thereby, my dissertation, which aims to engage with the deep examination of the roles of the ideologies of peace, intersects with critical intercultural communication.
To complement intercultural rhetorical and critical intercultural communication, this dissertation locates itself within the study of critical rhetoric. Critical rhetoric holds that the critical task is “one of re-creation—constructing an argument that identifies the integration of power and knowledge and delineates the role of power/knowledge in structuring social practices” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 102). It offers critics the means to unmask discourses of power that are sustained through social practice (McKerrow, 2009). Here, McKerrow (1989) suggests that critics commit themselves to a “critique of domination” and a “critique of freedom” (p. 91). The critique of domination is generally a “critique of ideologies” (p. 92). Ideologies can be a discourse and involvement of belief. In this case, discourse is the tactical use of power in its wider relations at various levels of society. Power is an active force that produces and maintains social relations. Such power can naturalize social relations through discourse, and then become a norm in a specific society. Then, each society has a notion of truth that can be described as a social norm or community knowledge being historically produced in discourses within social relations. The critique of domination allows critics to interrogate how a discourse, or an ideology, is mobilized and maintained by particular groups to sustain social relations. The critique of freedom is described as a “one of never-ending skepticism” (p. 96). It is an ongoing area of self-reflexive critique that provides critics the opportunities to reshape the next criticism to continually challenge and question repression and domination, and accordingly turn back the critique as “it promotes a realignment” (p. 91).
Projects within the critical rhetoric demystify and untangle the discourses of power. In doing so, in the intercultural context, these studies aim to identify the possibilities for empowering people in the specific intercultural communities being studied. For my dissertation, I interrogate the discourse of power, or an ideology, of peace in the postwar intercultural community centering on Japan. I hope that the critique of peace as a critical rhetoric works as a strategy that can activate future changes, thereby contributing to peace activism initiatives in the intercultural community, particularly among Japan, its neighboring nations, its wartime victims such as China and Korea, and its wartime enemies, such as the U.S.
Together, this study locates itself within the intersection of intercultural rhetoric, critical approach to culture, and critical rhetoric, in addition to the value of peace. By integrating this intersectional approach as the critical framework to evaluate the case studies, this dissertation provides a more holistic and complex understanding of the long-term process of rhetorical efforts for peacebuilding within the postwar intercultural communities centering on Japan. Furthermore, in doing so, I aim to make a further contribution for the study of peace rhetoric. As Wilz (2010) points out, although the previous analyses mainly locate how the language of violence dehumanizes others and justifies wars, “few offer strategies for dissent or models of civic behavior that may make it more difficult to dehumanize, or enter into war in the first place” (p. 591). This means that critics have been examining how languages justify war, but little analysis has done to describe, interpret, and evaluate the civic behaviors that re-humanize enemies or refuse to initiate war in the first place. Thus, I hope that this dissertation can take a role in advancing the study of rhetorical discourse that advocates for peace and for the process of rehumanizing others.
Primary Questions and Overview of Chapters
The rhetorical discourse advocating for peace cuts across multiple institutions within the postwar intercultural community centering on Japan. Therefore, understanding this concept is key to understanding its domination within the specific intercultural community and its role in tangled global peace activities over the 70 years since the end of World War II. Hence, the overarching research questions that guide this dissertation are: (1) How is peace discourse symbolically constructed and negotiated in the postwar intercultural community among Japan and its wartime enemies and victims? and (2) How does the peace discourse advocate for negative peace and positive peace in the postwar intercultural community? To answer these overarching questions, this dissertation addresses the following sub-questions:
1. How does Japanese apologetic speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII rhetorically negotiate Japan’s role as a wartime aggressor and/or peace-loving nation in the international community?
2. How does the set of milestone speeches by the president of the U.S. and the prime minister of Japan rhetorically negotiate the long-term peacebuilding process in the intercultural context?
3. How does the recent annual Peace Declaration rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding?
Each sub-question will be answered in Chapters Two to Four.
Chapter One lays the foundations of my dissertation. It presents the peace discourse as the central discourse to be interrogated. The overarching key concepts related to peace are negative peace and positive peace. It further introduces rhetorical criticism, particularly generative criticism, as the method to describe, interpret, and evaluate the selected artifacts, which are Abe danwa in 2015, two pairs of milestone speeches in 2016 by the U.S. president and Japanese prime minister in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor, and the annual Hiroshima Peace Declarations in 2015, 2016, and 2017. This chapter positions this project at the intersections of studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric. As a critical project, this dissertation not only seeks to examine the peace discourse and its rhetorical efforts within the intertwined intercultural communities in the current postwar era, which are tied to the past incidents, but it also aims to advocate for peaceful and harmonious relationships among the involved community members. The structure of the dissertation is as follows.
In Chapter Two, I present the first case study, which examines Abe danwa. The general focus of the analysis is rhetorical efforts around the expressions of owabi apology and shazai apology as well as negative peace efforts and positive peace efforts. This chapter introduces the background of Japan’s engagement in WWII. I present the literature review about expression of apologies as image-repair or expression of apologies as relationship-repair (see Edwards, 2005; Hatch, 2014; Koesten & Rowland, 2004; Towner, 2009). This chapter interrogates how Japanese apologetic speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII negotiates the Japanese role as a wartime aggressor and peace-loving nation in the international community.
In Chapter Three, I present the second case study, which explores two pairs of speeches in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor by U.S. President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The literature review of this chapter includes the discussion about the collective memories of the Pearl Harbor attack and Hiroshima bombing that are embedded in each society. This chapter applies the rhetorical concept of ideograph, which is described as the “ideology in practice” in the rhetorical documents (McGee, 1980, p. 5). The overarching goal of analysis is unpacking how these speeches rhetorically encouraged their American and Japanese audiences to accept the engagement with positive peace. I pay particular attention to <wa[和]> and <harmony> in these artifacts. In doing so, this chapter aims to answer how these sets of milestone speeches rhetorically function in the long-term peacebuilding process in an intercultural context.
In Chapter Four, I present the third case study, which focuses on the Hiroshima Peace Declarations. This chapter focuses on the city of Hiroshima’s rhetorical efforts to advocate peace on its own behalf, rather than on behalf of Japan. The chapter introduces and applies Burke’s concepts of guilt, purification, and redemption in order to have a deeper understanding of the selected speeches. This chapter aims to reveal how the recent annual Hiroshima Peace
Declarations rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding. Special attention is given to the rhetorical efforts on the peacebuilding process through re-humanization instead of enemy making through dehumanization.
Chapter Five is the conclusion, in which I summarize answers to the key questions posed by this dissertation. In addition, by reviewing previous chapters, I illuminate the interlocking natures of the findings of each case study. The process of reiterating the inter-connectedness is ultimately to elucidate and conceptualize the rhetorical performance intersecting the studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric. This chapter further presents the insights into the meaning of peace in the postwar intercultural community as well as the insight into the rhetorical challenges and achievements for the long-term, intercultural peacebuilding upon the end of the war. Ultimately, I attempt to indicate the theoretical contributions to the study of peace rhetoric in the post-conflict intercultural context. I also attempt to offer some suggestions for peace advocators. By doing so, I hope to offer this dissertation to the process of activating (more) harmonious human conditions and contributing to peace activism initiatives in the intercultural community.
CHAPTER II. PUBLIC APOLOGY AND INTERCULTURAL PEACEBUILDING: 70 YEARS
LATER
Over 70 years after the end of World War II in the Asian-Pacific region, my Japanese cousin has lived in China since she got married there. I now have a family member whose nationality is Chinese. One of my best friends from graduate school is South Korean. Although we “clicked” soon after we met, it took a few years for us to openly talk about WWII and the postwar era as these contain intricate historical elements. Yet, the more I have heard about the war-related stories from my family in China and my best friend from South Korea, the clearer the gap became about the comprehensive views of peacebuilding efforts in the postwar condition among these neighboring nations. At the interpersonal level, I had an open-hearted dialogue, or danwa (談話) by the Japanese word, with my close individuals, which allowed me to have a certain level of access to see peacebuilding in the postwar intercultural situation from Chinese and Korean perspectives.
This chapter describes and interprets Abe danwa (安倍談話), a speech by the current prime minister of Japan, Abe Shinzo, on August 14, 2015 (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a). While referring to peace and war, this speech was delivered in order to remember and commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia. The next day, August 15, 2015, was exactly 70 years after Japan surrendered to end World War II. While the speech was broadcast live in Japan, other East Asian nations were also paying close attention to his speech as Japan aggressively acted toward these nations during WWII.
In fact, Abe danwa is the third official statement delivered on August 15 or 14 after the end of WWII in Asia in 1945 Specifically, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama delivered a statement on the 50th anniversary, on August 15, 1995 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995). The statement is known as Murayama danwa. Then, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered a statement on the 60th anniversary in 2005 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005). Similarly, the statement is known as Koizumi danwa. Both speeches are known as parts of the “apology diplomacy (謝罪外交 [shazai gaikou]),” which often has been used to describe recent Japanese diplomacy, precisely toward South Korea and the People’s Republic of China. The anticipated Abe danwa followed these previous danwa.
The set of danwa delivered by prime ministers of Japan could be considered as apologetic statements; however, there is a space of disagreement as to whether these are sincere apologies or not. The Japanese language has multiple terms for “apology.” In Abe danwa, Prime Minister Abe used two words of apology: 謝罪 [shazai] and お詫び [owabi]. Although both shazai and owabi are translated as “apology” in English, they actually have more nuanced meanings. In addition, although 談話 [danwa] in Japanese has been translated as a statement in English (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015b), danwa has a metaphoric nuance for this occasion. These untranslated nuances will be discussed later, as they are important for intercultural communication peacebuilding.
This chapter focuses on the most recent danwa, known as Abe danwa. It examines rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa, particularly around the expression of apologies and rhetorical construction of negative peace and positive peace. In doing so, it addresses the sub-question posed by this dissertation: How does Japanese apologetic speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII rhetorically negotiate the Japanese role as wartime aggressor and/or peace-loving nation in the international community? Below, I first introduce the untranslated nuanced meanings of key words, including danwa, shazai apology, and owabi apology. Second, I provide a condensed background of Abe danwa, including the previous expression of apologies from Japan to the international community and its failure. Third, I review the concepts of apology. Fourth, I examine Abe danwa’s rhetorical efforts around the expression of apologies and rhetorical construction of peace. Lastly, based on the findings, I propose that negative peace efforts upon the past incidents are the co-produced process of the involved parties.
Untranslated Cultural Meanings
First, it is important to review the untranslated nuanced meaning, specifically of the following Japanese words, 談話[danwa], which is translated as a speech, and 謝罪 [shazai] and お詫び [owabi], both of which are translated as apologies. They are key rhetorical components of my analysis.
Cultural Meaning of Danwa
To begin, 談話[danwa] in Japanese has been translated as “a statement” in English (Prime
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015b). In Japanese, the word danwa is composed from two kanji characters, “談 [dan]” and “話[wa].” Dan implies the act of talking about something or telling a story (Shinmura, 2018, p. 1840). Wa (or hanashi, which is another way to read wa [話]) implies exchanging words, conversation, discourse, stories, and the contents of the conversations and stories (p. 2371). By putting these ideographic characters together, danwa connotes dialogue and open-hearted conversations. In fact, the well-respected Japanese dictionary 広辞苑 [kōjien] listed the several connotations of danwa (Shinmura, 2018). The first connotation is “the act of talking, conversation, dialogue, and story, as well as its contents” (p. 1856). The listed examples of the usage of danwa includes 談話室 [danwa room/conversation lounge]. Here, danwa is most commonly used for the act of openhearted dialogue in interpersonal or small-group contexts.
Still, the second connotation is “To express an opinion informally or in a form of a matter, as well as its contents” (p. 1856). The listed example is 首相談話 [the prime minister’s speech]. In this case, political danwa cannot be a simple speech by the prime minister of Japan. Rather, I would argue that political danwa is used metaphorically to imply dialogue and conversation with the international community. In the cases of Murayama danwa, Koizumi danwa, and Abe danwa, these were the political, yet open-hearted dialogues with the international community, including the nations that Japan colonized and invaded, such as China and Korea, and the WWII enemy, the U.S. In fact, according to Kimura (2015), political danwa does not have any binding force or influence on society outside of the Cabinet. Nevertheless, danwa related to historical recognition has been delivered. Kimura points out that the danwa relating to WWII could be troublesome because they unnecessarily raise internal and external arguments over the nature of historical awareness centering on Japan.
In addition, Edwards (2005), analyzes Murayama danwa in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia, although this study uses the word “apology” or “speech” instead of the word danwa. The study observes that Murayama danwa was a starting point to create, rebuild, and deepen “relationships between Japan and the national communities of the Asia-Pacific region” (Edwards, 2005, p. 330). In this study, Edwards introduces communityfocused apologia, whose goal is different from the traditional apologia. Community-focused apology is defined as the speech act “that begins the process of repairing and resolving historical [i]njustice, strengthening communal bonds, and even deepening relationship among populations” (p. 321). Edwards (2005) states that Prime Minister Murayama elaborated on four elements of a community-focused apologia: remembrance, reconciliation, mortification, and atonement. Thus, Prime Minister Murayama delivered apologies and expressed regrets on behalf of the Japanese community as the actor of the community-focused apologia is a community rather than an individual.
All in all, danwa is not a simple speech, due to a nuanced meaning particularly on the milestone occasions of the anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia. Rather, political and rhetorical danwa is a metaphor for the open-hearted dialogue and interpersonal conversation that invites international communities to participate in the process of mending past injustices and strengthening ties. In this case, holistically speaking, I would argue that political danwa is a form of negative peace effort and positive peace effort. It is a negative peace effort because such effort includes the negotiation to end or moderate the existing antagonistic relationship (Diehl, 2016). For political danwa, the existing hostile relationship could exist between Japan and some in the international community due to the past injustices done by wartime Japan. It is also positive peace efforts because such effort includes a jointly valuable collaboration on each side to restore harmonious relations and prevent future violence (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Political danwa invites the involved communities for collaboration. Thereby, danwa is not a simple remark in this intercultural context surrounding Japan, its wartime enemies, and victims.
Cultural Meaning of Shazai Apology and Owabi Apology
Next, Abe danwa elaborated on two Japanese words, 謝罪 [shazai] and お詫び [owabi], which have different nuances even though they are translated as apologies in English. Shazai is an apology for one’s sin (or crime) and fault, according to aforementioned Japanese dictionary, kōjien (Shinmura, 2018, p. 1356). Further, the expression of shazai apology is the act performed for the purpose of restoration when social norms are broken (e.g., through incident or injury), and then the apologizing party acknowledges its responsibility for the victim’s damage (Takenoya, 2004). Thus, shazai can be described as a public or official apology with a feeling of being indebted.
On the other hand, wabi is the apology that emerged from a profound feeling (Shinmura, 2018, p. 3172). Hence, owabi’s “o” in this context functions as the language of lowering the status of the apologizing party. The expression of owabi apology can be the act of asking for forgiveness with profound grief and knowledge of wrong-doing, which negatively impacted the other party. Together, Abe danwa utilized shazai apology and owabi apology, while the aforementioned cultural meanings were lost in translation into English. Still, as the analysis section below shows, the rhetorical efforts of Abe danwa are surrounded by the shazai apology and owabi apology.
Background of Abe Danwa
This section reviews the background of Abe danwa, delivered by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2015. It presents a review of the intercultural tensions and the layered expression of the Japanese apology to its neighboring countries, particularly to Korea and China. I acknowledge that there are various arguments about the Japanese expression of apologies. Yet, the selected literatures would help in examining rhetorical efforts around the expression of apology, positive peace, and negative peace in Abe danwa. Below, I review the continuous expression of apologies from Japan to its neighboring countries and its failures. Then, I introduce the speaker and provide an overview of Abe’s remarks.
The Previous Expression of Apology and Its Failure, Success, and Challenge
Simply speaking, wartime Japan invaded and colonized the Southeast Asian and East Asian regions. Japan was defeated in 1945. Various perspectives bring intricate debates about the official apologies or the statements to express regret and its sincerity. Yet, the previous research generally recognizes the intercultural tensions and rhetorical difficulties when previous danwa or Japanese public statements expressed apologies to Japan’s neighboring countries, particularly
China and Korea (e.g., Edwards, 2005; Miller, 2002; Mok & Tokunaga, 2009; Okuda, 2005; Togo, 2011; Yamazaki, 2004a, 2004b). While acknowledging the existence of debatable elements about the expression of apology, some data states that postwar Japan first expressed a certain degree of “public apology” to Korea in 1964 when Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina expressed regret and deep remorse to Korea (Cha, 1966, p. 138). Some also discuss Japan’s first expression of regret to China in 1972 upon agreeing to the postwar settlement treaties because their joint statement at that time stated Japan’s deep remorse (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972).
Since then, Japanese political figures have articulated apologies on different occasions.
For example, multiple apologies were made to South Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s by
Prime Minister Kaifu and Emperors Hirohito and Akihito. As a summarized timeline, Emperor Hirohito in 1984 expressed apology about the “unfortunate past” referring to Japan’s colonial rule over South Korea when Korean President Chun visited Japan (Herberman, 1984, para. 2). At that time, Korean President Chun favorably responded to the apology by stating he experienced the “beginning of a new era of partnership [between South Korea and Japan]” (para. 7). At the same time, the apology regrettably lacked the specificity of Japanese wrongdoing, meaning it was unclear who caused the “unfortunate past” (Yamazaki, 2004a, p. 159). This apology ended up not satisfying the Korean public.
Then, the apology by successor Emperor Akihito acknowledged the “‘suffering’ of the Korean people caused by” Japan during South Korean President Roh’s trip to Japan in 1990, although there can be a debate over the vagueness of details about its wrongdoing (Yamazaki, 2004a, p. 163). The remark by Emperor Akihito accepted and recognized Japanese responsibility for the unfortunate past and wrongdoing, which was unclear and criticized in 1984. At that time, most Korean intellectual observers documented that the apology by Emperor Akihito in 1990 was clearer than the one by Emperor Hirohito in 1984. However, the sincerity of Emperor Akihito was questioned by the Korean public, who saw the apology as simply words, and wanted evidence of apology, such as more monetary contributions from Japan to Korea. Prime Minister Kaifu further expressed apology and remorse during South Korean President Roh’s visit.
Although the apology by Prime Minister Kaif was clearer than the one by the Emperor Akihito,
Korean media and accordingly the Korean public paid little attention to the apology by Prime
Minister (Yamazaki, 2004a, p. 169).
Similarly, Japanese political leaders made apology statements toward China. For example, an official apology was issued by Prime Minister Koizumi in 2005. Mok and Tokunaga (2009) draw from previous scholarship and point out that this official apology achieves crucial elements of apologetic strategies and attempts to sound sincere and substantial. Yet, the apology could be interpreted wrongly due to certain moves by the Japanese Cabinet that could be considered as inconsistent with the expression apology, such as the visit to the Yasukuni shrine that honors the war deceased, including war criminals. Therefore, for different reasons, Japan’s apologetic statements had difficulties in satisfying the involved parties. Along with these examples, there have been continuous rhetorical actions sending apologies and receiving apologies within the postwar East Asian region. Murayama danwa in 1995, Koizumi danwa in 2005, and Abe danwa in 2015 happened within this continuity of expression of regrets and apologies.
Expression of apology in Murayama danwa in 1995. Previous scholars examine how Murayama danwa in 1995 faced rhetorical tensions and difficulties in expressing apologies and regrets (e.g., Dodds, 2003; Edwards; 2005; Okuda 2005; Togo, 2011). When President Murayama gave an official apology on behalf of the nation in 1995, the apology was directed to the affected Asian-Pacific nations (Dodds, 2003). While expressing his deep self-reflection and heartfelt apology, Murayama dawna identified Japan as the imperialistic aggressor (Okuda, 2005). He further expressed deep remorse, regret, and sorrow. Within Western rhetorical studies, the expression of emotions such as deep remorse, regret, and sorrow are considered as a necessary basis for apologies (Brown, 2015). Here, the apology was supported by a majority of the Japanese population, which indicated they felt deep remorse for Japan’s actions during WWII. However, some scholars point out that the apology rhetoric was challenged by neighboring countries, primarily China and South Korea, while others surmised that it was viewed favorably by many Asian leaders (Edwards, 2005; Miller, 2002; Okuda, 2005).
In addition, Miller (2002) explains that Murayama danwa described Japan not only as the aggressor but also as the victim of the bombings. This became a reason for China and South Korea to state that Japan was not taking full responsibility for its actions. Furthermore, the historical quarrel and dissatisfaction with the speech were used to create “anti-Japanese struggle” as “the touchstone of…national identity on China and [South and North] Koreas” (p. 2). Thus, these nations largely did not accept the Murayama danwa. As a side note, in addition to the rhetorical challenge with international community, Prime Minister Murayama also experienced domestic constraint due to his affiliation with the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (Okuda, 2005; Ogawa, 2000). It was because some individuals in the party perceived the certain loss of life as a commitment to peace and democracy, while other individuals perceived that Japanese actions during war time were not intended to be aggressive but rather intended to free Asia from Western colonization. Prime Minister Murayama expressed the apology under such domestic and international constraints.
Together, as these previous studies demonstrate, there are multiple layers and tensions around the Japanese expression of regret and apology to the international community. Prior apologies were criticized by some affected Asian nations due to these various reasons, including the lack of specificity of Japanese wrongdoing and doubt toward its sincerity. Abe danwa was delivered within this intricate mix of concerns by following the apology statement of the former prime ministers of Japan in 1995 and 2005.
Speaker: Prime Minister of Japan
In this section, I review the speaker of the selected speech, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. When Prime Minister Abe delivered the 70th anniversary speech, he was 60 years old. In fact, he became the first Prime Minister of Japan who was born after the end of WWII when he was first elected as prime minister in 2006 (The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan,
n.d.). As a side note, when he was first elected, one of his slogans was “Getting Out From PostWar Regime [sengo rejimu kara no dakkyaku / 戦後レジームからの脱却]” (para. 11). This slogan meant that there was a need to revisit the basic framework, including the administrative system at the top of the Constitution, education, the economy, employment, the relationship between the State and the rural area, diplomacy, security and beyond. For Prime Minister Abe, re-evaluation was needed because this framework was developed soon after WWII and it was becoming harder to adapt to the challenges of the early 21st century (The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, n.d.). Some intelligent observers have pointed out that the creation of such a framework was largely influenced by the U.S. since the end of war, meaning that the U.S. has had a huge impact on various aspects of the Japanese economy, politics, military, and culture (e.g., Toga, 2015). The slogan may represent important components for the language choices in Abe danwa.
In fact, the apologetic ritual on the anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia started when
Japanese Prime Minister Murayama delivered Murayama danwa in 1995 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995). It was the year of the 50th anniversary. He was 22 years old when the war ended and 72 years old when he delivered Murayama danwa. Then, Koizumi danwa was delivered by Prime Minister Koizumi on the 60th anniversary in 2005 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005). He was two years old at the end of the war and 64 years old when he delivered the 60th anniversary speech. Beside these milestone anniversaries, former Japanese prime ministers have expressed apologies and remorse, especially toward Asian nations, in multiple statements during different occasions. Under such circumstances, Abe danwa was somewhat anticipated by its domestic and international community. Next, I provide an overview of the speech.
Overview of Abe Danwa
Abe danwa was originally delivered in the Japanese language. Later, Japanese governmental agencies provided written transcripts and translations into English, Chinese, and Korean, in addition to the Japanese transcript (Embassy of Japan in China, 2015; Embassy of
Japan in Korea, 2015; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, 2015b). For my analysis, I examined the artifacts in English and Japanese. For the written artifacts, I compared speeches in English and Japanese side by side for each paragraph. Below, I provide the summary of Abe danwa. The very first paragraph of Abe danwa stated that there was a need to “calmly reflect upon the road to war, the path we have taken since it ended, and the era of the 20th century” and “to learn from the lesson of history the wisdom for our future” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 1). The speech was organized by the following topics.
In the first portion, Abe danwa focused on “the road of war,” which is the depiction of the pre-WWII Japan (para. 1). The road was illustrated within the framework of the “vast colonies…by the Western powers” (para. 2). The illustration included a short background on how Japan was economically damaged and became isolated when the Great Depression occurred, and how accordingly Western nations promoted economic blocs. Upon withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan gradually “took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war” (para. 5). Then, the second portion illustrated the path since the end of the war as well as the path in the 20th century. Specifically, Abe expressed his “profound grief and…eternal, sincere condolences” for “the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad” (para. 7). There was a brief depiction of the lost lives in Japan and countries that fought against Japan. The description includes the Japanese pledge never again to use “any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes” (para. 13) and the immense suffering by the destruction of war, as well as the tolerance of the Chinese people and former prisoners of war. Abe danwa expressed Japan’s sincere appreciation to all countries and all people who have endeavored for reconciliation in the postwar era.
The third potion focused on the future. Here, Prime Minister Abe points out that over 80 per cent of the Japanese population was born after the end of the war, and he expresses Japan’s desire to not let further generations “be predestined” to make [shazai] apologies (para. 23). Still, the speech expressed that Japan would inherit the past and pass it on to the future. Hence, the last portion elucidated what needs to be passed down into the future. Abe danwa uttered that Japan would engrave the past in the heart “when Japan attempted to break its deadlock with force” (para. 26), “when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century” (para. 27), “when forming economic blocs made the seeds of conflict thrive” (para. 28), and “when Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order” (para. 29). Then, upon these reflections, Japan would commit itself for several things, including the act of hoisting “the flag of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace,’ and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before” (para. 29).
Apologetic Rhetoric and Expression of Regret
Above, I introduced the background and overview of Abe danwa. Next, I review the selected literature of apology rhetoric and expression of regret in order to examine the rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa. As Towner (2009) points out, the apologetic statement can be a means of image repair or a part of reconciliation and healing. Therefore, I first review an apology as a means of image repair. Second, I review an apology as a part of reconciliation. Lastly, I introduce that the second notion of apology could be described as co-constructed processes (Yamazaki, 2004a) and dialogues (Hatch, 2014).
Apology Speech as a Means of Image Repair
Apology is treated within the larger category of rhetoric known as apologia. It is a rhetorical genre in which the speakers defend their character and/or repairs one’s self-image (Koesten & Rowland, 2004; Ryan, 1982; Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Hatch (2014) calls it a “selfcelebratory commemoration” (p. 172). The speech is typically given in a situation when selfidentity can be hurt by some private or public actions, but the problems are manageable. The apologia speech can make it possible to reduce the potential damage from the “repercussion of ‘accusation’” (Downey, 1993, p. 56). The speakers who utilize speeches of apologia tend to use motivational appeals, by either accepting the full responsibility for a certain action or shifting the blame to circumstances instead of describing their action. The rhetorical strategies can be denial (of action or intention), bolstering (of something favorable about them), differentiation (from suspicious/sinful action within larger contacts), and/or transcendence (establishment of a larger context which audience members do not currently view) (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Here, denial and bolstering can be reformative in the sense to revise or modify the audience’s perceptions. Differentiation and transcendence can be transformative in the sense of composing new realities for the audience. Subcategories for each were further advanced (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Downey, 1993; Koesten & Rowland; 2004). Together, apologetic statements are a self-serving approach to address the real or suspected wrongdoing, and accordingly to restore the self-image.
Apology to Restore the Relationship
Some apologetic speech can be a part of reconciliation and healing, instead of a means for image repair (see Edwards, 2005; Hatch, 2014; Koesten & Rowland, 2004; Towner, 2009). The aforementioned Murayama danwa is an example of such a speech, as it functioned as community-focused apology and became an initial point to rebuild the relationships between Japan as the apologizing party and the international communities in the Asia-Pacific region as the aggrieved party (Edwards, 2005). Similar to Murayama danwa, some apologetic speeches aim to restore the relationship between the party making the apologies and the party receiving the apologies. For instance, the atonement speech by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1997 for the
Tuskegee study would fit in the speech category as a part of reconciliation (Koesten & Rowland,
2004; Towner, 2009). The Tuskegee study was initiated in 1932 by the U.S. Public Health
Service in order to study the natural history of syphilis. It was conducted without the benefit of patients’ informed consent. The Black American patients who had syphilis in this project did not receive the proper treatment needed to cure their illness.
The purpose of the speech was rebuilding a relationship by seeking forgiveness for the past sin committed by the U.S. Public Health Service, as the Tuskegee study was initially conducted in 1930s (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). President Clinton successfully achieved five elements of the rhetoric of atonement: “acknowledgement of wrongdoing and ask[ing] for forgiveness; based upon reflection offer a thorough change of attitude and relationship; take steps to develop a different kind of present and future; through public action or private mortification demonstrate the authenticity of the apology; and seek atonement in a public forum” (p. 75). Then, the speech became not only a powerful force to start healing the human relations damaged 40 years ago, but also an influential force in changing attitudes among the American people regarding the Tuskegee study.
Along with these examples, some apologetic statements express regret and apologies toward the injustice made by their nations in the past. Although the apologies may not immediately heal wounds between communities, they play an important role in beginning to heal the wounds (Edwards, 2005). It is possible to start an attitude change toward historical incidents among both victims and victimizers (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). Thus, the central motive of these apologetic speeches is different from traditional apologia; their motives are restoring the relationship while the ones for the traditional apologia are restoring the self-image.
Then, similar to previous literatures about the apologetic statements as a means of image repair, scholars have introduced characteristics of successful apologetic statements as a means of reconciliation and healing (e.g., Edwards, 2005; Lazare, 2004; Marrus, 2007). For example, the aforementioned Edwards (2005) states that community-focused apologies should be composed of remembrance (a reckoning or explanation of the wrongs), reconciliation (identifying the victims and pledging to make amends), mortification (accepting responsibility of wrongdoing, expressing remorse, and asking for forgiveness), and atonement or some form of corrective action (telling the steps the community would take for the healing process between involved parties). Based on the reviews above, it is clear that apologetic speeches as a part of healing have different rhetorical goals, key elements, and strategies than speeches of self-restoration.
Apology as a Co-Produced Process
Furthermore, the apology as a means of healing can be described as a process that is negotiated and co-created by the apologizer and victims (Yamazaki, 2004a) and/or as a dialectic form that is “relationship-oriented” (Hatch, 2014, p. 155–156). It means that the outcomes of apologetic speeches are not simply the results of the monologic approach from apologizers to the victims. Rather, the outcomes of such speech are negotiated by both sides. For example, while focusing on the state apology in 2007 for slavery of Africans and exploitation of Native Americans, Hatch (2014) observes that both wrongdoers and victims must “attend to the Other” and even “see through the Other’s eyes [sic]”” in order for reconciliation to happen through apology. The moral apology must acknowledge the reality of the violence, while victims have the prerogative to emphasize if the apologizing party is capable of being receptive to a different future. Although the victims must observe the respective efforts of recognition and restoration, reconciliation though apologies is dependent on the current willingness to engage with others in dialogues. Similarly, Yamazaki (2004a) argues that the role of the victim is not simply being audience members or criticizers of an apology. Rather it is the “co-producer” of it (p. 168).
Apology is a “process” which is co-created by both apologizers and victims (p. 169).
In this regard, Hatch (2014) and Yamazaki (2004a) not only focus on the perpetrators, who are expressing apologies, but also the victims, who are co-producing the apology with the perpetrators. As these literatures explain that some apologetic speeches seek to restore the damaged relationship due to injustices done in past, such injustice could be causing the current strained relations between the party expressing apologies and the party receiving the apologies (see Edwards, 2005; Hatch, 2014; Koesten & Rowland, 2004; Yamazaki, 2004a). The outcome of such apologies emerges through a dialectical process by both apologizers and victims.
Above, I reviewed the apology as a rhetorical tool to repair the self-image and apology as a rhetorical tool to restore the relationship. I also reviewed the apology as a co-produced process, which can be the extension of the apology to restore the relationship. In the case of Abe danwa, its goal may not be a simple attempt to repair self-image, although Japan’s national image was damaged by its own actions during the war. Rather, its goal may fit more with the one in which the apologetic statement heals and reconciles, because political and rhetorical danwa is a metaphor for the open-hearted dialogue that invites international communities to be in the process of mending past injustice and solidifying ties, as discussed above. Then, an apology as a co-produced process would become important with respect to intercultural peacebuilding, particularly because of the holistic idea of political danwa as a form of negative peace efforts. Next, I analyze the rhetorical efforts around the expression of apologies and negative peace and positive peace. By doing so, I unpack how Abe danwa rhetorically negotiated Japan’s role as a wartime aggressor and/or peace-loving nation in the international community.
Analysis of Abe Danwa: Expression of Apologies and Peace
Abe danwa differentiated owabi apology and shazai apology, as pointed out above. More specifically, Abe danwa stated that Japan had continually “expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology [owabi]” for its wartime actions (Prime Minister of Japan and His
Cabinet, 2015a, para. 15). Such expression would remain “unshakable into the future” (para. 16). It later stated that over 80% of the Japanese population was born in the postwar era. Then, it expressed the desire to free the future generation, “who have nothing to do with that war,” from the predestination to apologize [shazai] (para. 23). While the different cultural meanings of apologies get lost in translation, the sections below illuminate the three main rhetorical efforts around the expression of apologies as well as negative peace and positive peace. These rhetorical efforts were engaging with the rhetorical negotiation of Japanese roles in the international community.
Owabi Apology and Creation of Old and New Past Identities
The first main rhetorical effort in Abe danwa was found around the expression of owabi apology. The expression of owabi apology rhetorically constructed two past identities of Japan. The first identity relates to the owabi apology for the wartime actions. This is the old past image of Japan. The second one relates to the postwar commitment to peace that has manifested owabi apology. This is the new image of Japan. This rhetorical effort is foundational for the negotiation of Japanese roles throughout Abe danwa.
Profound grief for the wartime actions. First, there was a rhetorical effort to construct the “old past” identity of Japan as a wartime aggressor while engaging with rhetorical strategies and elements of both types of apology to repair the rhetor’s image and repair the relationship. Initially, Prime Minister Abe engaged with denial strategy for the apologies as a means of imagerepair. He underlined the wrong road Japan took to the war and illustrated the circumstance when Japan’s economy suffered from the Great Depression and the Western countries launching economic blocs by involving colonial economies. At this point, Abe danwa situated Japan within the international context and shifted the blame about its wartime action on the international circumstance around that time. The rhetorical action of shifting the blame, known as scapegoating, is a form of denial strategy for the apology as a tool to repair the self-image
(Benoit, 1995, p.33).
Then, he offered to bow his “head deeply before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad,” and expressed his feelings of “profound grief and my eternal, sincere condolences” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 7). He further found himself “speechless and [his] heart is rent with the utmost grief [danchou no nen]” (para. 10) after acknowledging that Japan’s action during the war caused immeasurable harm and suffering upon the guiltless people. At this time, Prime Minister Abe engaged with remembrance as he expressed condolences to acknowledge the victims of Japan’s actions as well as victims in Japan during wartime. However, although he mentioned that China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands, and elsewhere became battlefields, the remembrance does not necessarily recall the injustice committed by wartime Japan or who suffered that injustice. Thus, similar to Murayama danwa in 1995 (Edwards, 2005), the prime minister engaged with incomplete remembrance due to the unclear reckoning, which is the explanation of the wrongs. Although remembrance can “enable…group[s] who have suffered to recover their dignity…and mend broken human relations” (Negash, 2002, p. 122), this partial remembrance would not necessarily recover the dignity of the victims of wartime Japan.
Together, while expressing eternal condolences and utmost grief for Japan’s wartime actions, the opening potion of Abe danwa shifted the blame of such actions to the international circumstances and remembered the vague injustice and suffering due to action by wartime Japan. In other words, through denial strategy and partial remembrance, Abe danwa constructed the old past image of Japan as a wartime ambiguous aggressor. Then, expression of owabi apology glued the old and new past images of Japan and separated them at the same time. While the old past image is constructed with Japan’s actions during WWII, the new past image is associated with its actions during the postwar era.
Owabi apology to be enacted by postwar commitment to peace. The new past identity depicts Japan as a “peace-loving nation” for “70 years” since the end of the war (para. 14). In order to reinforce the new past identity, Abe danwa engaged with an atonement and both positive and negative peace. An atonement is one element of apology as a tool to heal past injustice. It is a rhetorical choice of uttering “what steps the community will take to start the healing process between groups” (Edwards, 2005, p. 323) as well as a rhetorical tool of “accepting guilt in order to create a new image as a redeemed…nation’’ (Koersten & Rowland, 2004, p. 70). In the case of Abe danwa, Prime Minister Abe, for example, addressed that postwar Japan upheld the “pledge never to wage a war again” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 14) and further stated:
Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology [emphasis added] for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours: those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and China, among others; and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region
[emphasis added] since the end of the war. (para.15)
In the original text in Japanese, heartfelt apology is expressed as owabi. The above paragraph showed that the devotion to peace allowed postwar Japan to enact the owabi apologies for the wartime actions. At the same time, this devotion separated postwar Japan from the image of violence during the war.
Here, Abe danwa strategically engaged with the rhetorical choice of atonement. For atonement, the rhetorical pledge should emphasize the notion in which past actions committed by the apologizing party would not happen again (Edwards, 2005). For Abe danwa, the commitment to peace by postwar Japan was the rhetorical pledge with deep repentance to never again repeat the destruction of war. It symbolized the new identity of the current/postwar Japan, and further separated current/postwar Japan from the wartime Japan that engaged with colonial rule, aggression, and war. As the articulation of the deep remorse and owabi apology by previous
Cabinets would remain unwavering into the future (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 16), this specific atonement highlighted Japan’s contribution to peace as the steps which postwar Japan took, current Japan was taking, and future Japan will keep taking. Here, I argue that Abe danwa constructed the past atonement instead of simply using the atonement, because postwar Japan in the past already engaged with constant devotion to peace. Thus, through the past atonement, Abe danwa constructed the “new past” identity of Japan.
Regarding negative peace and positive peace, there were rhetorical efforts of negative peace, through the positive peace activities done during the postwar period. As discussed in
Chapter One, one element of negative peace is the absence of war, meaning the absence of the
“organized collective violence…between major human groups; particularly nations” (Galtung,
1967, p. 14.). Positive peace is the “integration of human society” (Galtung, 1964, p. 2) and “presence of positive relations” among human groups (Galtung, 1967, p. 14). Positive peace efforts deal with non-traditional security concerns, such as promoting development and human rights, instead of dealing with war and violence (Diehl, 2016).
Drawing from the postwar atonement, the depictions in the speech highlighted the commitment to peace as Japan’s pledge not to repeat the aggressive actions ever again. In this regard, Abe danwa rhetorically engaged with the negative peace effort: the absence of wars. At the same time, this negative peace effort was formed through the positive peace effort, which is done by postwar Japan; in other words, when Prime Minister Abe elaborated on postwar Japan’s devotion to the peace and prosperity of the Asian nations, including China and South Korea. This devotion was most likely the form of positive peace efforts. It is first because, technically speaking, postwar Japan has not had a military system to engage with the absence of war. Second, Abe danwa toward the end stated that Japan would “strengthen assistance for developing countries” and “make even greater efforts to fight against poverty…and to provide opportunities for medical services, education, and self-reliance” to everyone in the world (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 28). This means that Japan has been working on the promotion of development and human needs for survival in these nations to a certain extent, but it would do more.
In fact, Japan and its citizens have been engaged with various activities for promotions of positive peace, although Abe danwa avoided vigorously discussing specific activities. For example, since 1954, Japan has engaged with Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is an international cooperation by the Japanese government and its partnered organizations for the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018). As of 2018, through ODA, it has provided multiple hundreds of billions of dollars in funds and technologies to developing countries or international organizations for development in these countries, including peacebuilding, promotion of basic human rights, and humanitarian assistance. Thus, it would be appropriate to say that postwar Japan’s devotion to peace and prosperity in Abe danwa was a form of a positive peace effort. Together, the commitment to positive peace by postwar Japan was a way to elucidate a farewell to war and manifest “the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for its wartime action (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 15). The postwar atonement emerged from this commitment to the form of positive peace efforts and it turned into a form of negative peace efforts of never to repeat any destruction of war. Hence, Abe danwa constructed the new past identity of Japan as a postwar peace-loving nation, which deals with both positive peace and
negative peace.
Putting the above two elements together, this rhetorical effort around owabi apology and devotion to peace did not necessarily resuscitate the image of wartime Japan or fully heal the relationship with victim nations. Rather, the first definitive rhetorical effort constructed two separate past identities of Japan: an old past identity as a wartime ambiguous aggressor and new past identity as a postwar peace-loving nation.
New Past Identities of Wartime Enemies and Victims
On the rhetorical process of constructing the new past identity of Japan, Abe danwa also constructed the new past identities of the wartime enemies and victims through two ways. The first one paradoxically reflects Japan’s past identity. The second and more significant one is through the expression of heartfelt gratitude to the wartime enemies and victims.
Wartime victims’ new past identities as paradox reflection of Japan. Abe danwa constructed a new past identity within the relationship to the wartime victim nations and affected nations, specifically Asian-Pacific nations. Paradoxically speaking, this rhetorical effort unobtrusively created new past identities of these nations. Their new past identities were the nations who have received deep remorse and owabi apology and positive peace activities from postwar Japan. More specifically, Abe danwa clearly gave names of certain Asian-Pacific countries, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and China, among others, for whom postwar Japanese devoted themselves to peace and prosperity in order to manifest the deep remorse and owabi apology for the country’s wartime actions. Here, Abe danwa indirectly inferred these nations as the wartime victims and affected nations by the wartime Japan. In this way, while there was a rhetorical effort to construct both old and new past identities of Japan, Abe danwa further had a concealed rhetorical effort to construct old and new past identities of Asian-Pacific nations. The old past identities of these nations could be wartime victims and affected nations by the wartime Japan. The new past identities could be the nations who have received the deep remorse and owabi apology as well as positive peace activities from postwar Japan.
In fact, to a certain extent this rhetorical effort was unique compared to the previous danwa. Murayama danwa expressed that Japan should “ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future [the emphasis added]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995, para. 4). Murayama danwa rhetorically advocated a future vision of peace. Koizumi danwa expressed that postwar Japan has “proactively extended material and personnel assistance for the sake of the peace and prosperity of the world [emphasis added]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005, para. 4). Although Koizumi danwa mentioned postwar Japan’s contribution to peace in a similar manner with Abe danwa, it highlighted postwar Japan’s activities around the world, instead of with the Asian-Pacific nations. This means that Koizumi danwa did not necessarily shift Japan’s past identity within the relationship with wartime victims or affected nations. Therefore, it was a unique rhetorical effort in Abe danwa to paradoxically construct the new past identities of Asian-Pacific nations.
Expression of heartfelt gratitude to the wartime enemies and victims. The expression of heartfelt gratitude is the second, yet clearer, rhetorical effort to construct the new past images of wartime enemies and victims of wartime Japan. Particularly, after recognizing that nothing can heal the sorrow and painful memories, Prime Minister Abe remembered the tolerance of the wartime enemies and victims, although he did not used the words enemies or victims. At this point, in order to depict the tolerance of wartime victims, Abe danwa stated that, after the war, over six million Japanese repatriates in different areas of the Asian-Pacific region and 3,000 Japanese children who were left behind in China and grew up there were able to return to their homeland. In order to depict the tolerance of wartime enemies, Abe danwa stated that former prisoners of war of other nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia, among others, have visited Japan for many years and prayed for the deceased of war on both sides. While remembering “manifestation of tolerance” of the nations and their people who helped Japan to return to the international community, “Japan express[es] its heartfelt gratitude to all the nations and all the people who made every effort for reconciliation” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 22).
Here, the expression of heartfelt gratitude constructed the new past images among the wartime enemies and victims. Such expression was a rhetorical effort to transform the wartime enemies and victims to postwar heroes who were tolerant enough to let postwar Japan join the international community again and to make efforts for reconciliation. As a side note, there is a rhetorical choice of remembrance. However, Abe danwa had a different intention to engage with the form of remembrance from one of apology as a part of healing. While remembrance of apology to restore needs to elaborate on a reckoning or explanation of the past wrongs (Edwards, 2005), Abe danwa did not necessarily reckon the past wrongs by wartime Japan. Rather, Prime Minister Abe chose to remember the postwar tolerance of other nations and their people. Thus, this rhetorical choice was not parallel with the one for the apology to heal the antagonistic relationship due to the past injustice. Instead, through the remembrance of postwar actions, Abe danwa highlighted the new past images of these non-Japanese nations as postwar heroes.
Assembling the above two elements about the paradoxical way and expression of heartfelt gratitude, Abe danwa was constructing two separate past identities of other nations. The first one was the old past identities as wartime enemies or victims. The second one was the new past identities as postwar heroes. Together, the second primary rhetorical effort was negotiating and even shifting the role of certain nations from wartime victims and enemies to postwar heroes.
The Future Vision of Apology and Peace
The final main rhetorical effort elaborated on the future-oriented values and aspirations, including the future expression of shazai apology and engagement of international peace. The future-oriented components were found at the end of the remarks, from paragraphs 23 to 30. Furthermore, there were rhetorical choices of atonement and remembrance while engaging with negative and positive peace. Below, I unpack the rhetorical effort around the (non)expression of shazai apology in the future. Then, I explore the rhetorical effort around the alternative ways in the future, other than making shazai apology. Ultimately, I would argue that Abe danwa had a hidden yet primary rhetorical effort to shift the “past” image of Japan from the old past identity to the new past identity.
(No) more shazai apology in the future? To begin, as discussed, Abe danwa elaborated on owabi apology and shazai apology. The remark stated that the expression of “heartfelt apology [owabi]” for its wartime actions and devotion to peace and prosperity (para. 15) would remain “unshakable into the future” (para. 16). On the other hand, further generations, “who have nothing to do with that war,” need to be free from the predestination to make apologies [shazai], while pointing out that over 80% of the current Japanese population was born in the postwar era (para. 23). At this point, Abe danwa clearly wished to stop making public and official apologies for wartime Japan’s actions, while it strategically emphasized that Japan in the future would keep expressing the feelings of owibi apology. However, because the cultural meanings of owabi apology and shazai apologies are lost in the translation to English, the rhetorical forces of apologies would be different to the domestic audience and international audience. Those who have access only to the English version may find inconsistencies among the future visions of the expression of apologies.
Besides, as previous danwa did not express desire to stop shazai apology in the future, I would argue that a unique rhetorical effort in Abe danwa aims to devalue the old past images of Japan internationally. More specifically, by wishing to free postwar and later generations from predestination of public apologies in the future, Abe dawna paradoxically framed them as powerless people, who currently have a destiny to keep making public apologies for wartime Japan’s actions, respectively. As a comparison, Koizumi danwa in 2005 stated that over 70 percent of the Japanese population was from postwar generations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005). This danwa framed these Japanese citizens as peace-lovers as Prime Minister Koizumi introduced how they have been engaged with peace-oriented education as well as how they have been “receiving much trust and high appreciation from the local people” around the world for their activities for peace and humanitarian assistance (para. 6).
Hence, it was a rhetorical choice for Abe danwa to frame the postwar generation as powerless people and somewhat as victims with the destiny to keep making public apologies, instead of framing them as peace-lovers. Thus, such wishes to free the postwar and future generations from predestination of shazai apology could be the rhetorical effort to internationally deemphasize the old past image of Japan as a wartime aggressor. In fact, Abe danwa provided alternative ways to face that history in the future, instead of making shazai apologies. I would argue that the proposed alternative ways were another form of rhetorical efforts to push this agenda of internationally lessening the old past identity. In order to clearly unpack my argument, I will further explore alternative ways to face the history.
Alternative ways to face the past. The alternative ways to face the past in the future are connected with the several elements of apology as a part of healing: remembrance and atonement. The combination of remembrance and atonement rhetorically engaged with the efforts to develop negative peace and positive peace. More precisely, instead of making shazai apology, Abe danwa elucidated the Japanese, across generations, have the responsibility to “inherit the past” and “pass it on to the future” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015a, para. 23). Here, remembrance came from the responsibility to inherit the past. Atonement came from the responsibility to pass it on to the future along with the efforts to construct both negative peace and positive peace. For example, the fifth paragraph from the end stated that:
We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan attempted to break its deadlock with force. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue [emphasis added] to firmly uphold the principle that any disputes must be settled peacefully and diplomatically based on the respect for the rule of law and not through the use of force, and to reach out to other countries in the world [emphasis added] to do the same. As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war, Japan will fulfil its responsibility in the international community, aiming at the non-proliferation and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. (para. 26)
To start off with the remembrance, in this paragraph the past to be remembered is the wrong road Japan took to war. Other elements of remembrance in this portion were the goodwill and assistance by the wartime enemies such as the U.S., Australia, and European nations, and the dignity of women that was infringed during wars. Yet, again, the remembrance here did not necessarily recall the injustice committed by wartime Japan and who suffered that injustice. Therefore, regarding the responsibility to inherit the past, the rhetorical effort was remembering the ambiguous injustice and suffering.
Moving to the atonement, in the above paragraph atonement came from the future goals and rhetorical pledges which emphasize that the past actions by wartime Japan would not happen again in the future. The atonement further derived from the promotion of negative peace through nuclear disarmament and abolition. Thus, the future promotion of negative peace is the symbolic element for the atonement. In addition to the promotion of negative peace, the atonement came from the activity to internationally promote positive peace. For instance, the third paragraph from the end stated:
We will engrave in our hearts the past… We will strengthen assistance for developing countries, and lead the world [emphasis added] toward further prosperity. Prosperity is the very foundation for peace. Japan will make even greater efforts to fight against poverty, which also serves as a hotbed of violence, and to provide opportunities for medical services, education, and self-reliance to all the people in the world [emphasis added]. (para. 28)
This paragraph demonstrated Japan’s rhetorical pledges to further engagements for international positive peace. The promotion of international positive peace was the manifest form to demonstrate how the future Japanese will engrave the past and not repeat the wartime actions. Hence, Japan’s atonement was interconnected with the future commitment to the promotion of both international negative peace and positive peace. Together, Abe danwa proposed the ways to inherit the past and pass the past on to the future; the way is vaguely remembering Japan’s injustice in wartime and enacting the atonement though its efforts to promote international negative peace and positive peace.
Ultimately, the rhetorical effort around the future-oriented components is shifting the past image of Japan from the old past identity to the new past identity. Abe danwa proposed the future, in which the future generations of Japanese would be freed from the predestination of shazai apology; accordingly, future Japan would stop public apologies for its wartime actions. Rather, future Japanese citizens would internationally promote negative peace and positive peace because such promotions would enact Japan’s responsibility to pass the past for the future.
Therefore, Abe dawna was negotiating the future actions to face the history; it aimed to replace the future actions from the expression of shazai apology to the efforts to promote international peace. By doing so, the old past image of Japan as the wartime aggressor would be internationally played down.
Conclusion: Peace as a Co-Produced Process
This chapter has examined the rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa around the expression of apologies and rhetorical construction of negative peace and positive peace. In order to answer the first sub-question of the dissertation, it aimed to unpack how Abe danwa rhetorically negotiates the Japanese role as wartime aggressor and/or peace-loving nation in the international community. To conclude, I first provide a brief summary of the analysis and clarify the overarching rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa regarding the proposed research question. Second, I propose that peace efforts and transformation to be a peace-loving nation is a co-produced process among the involved communities.
Condensed Summary About the Rhetorical Efforts
The above analysis unpacked the three primary rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa. I would argue that ultimately the rhetorical effort is internationally negotiating the Japanese image as a peace-loving nation and lessening the image of violence associated with wartime, while Abe danwa strategically arranged the owabi apology and shazai apology as well as the negative peace and positive peace efforts. More specifically, the first primary rhetorical effort was constructing two distinguished past images of Japan: an old past identity as a wartime ambiguous aggressor and a new past identity as a postwar peace-loving nation. The old past image was constructed through the denial strategy for the apologia as image repair and a partial remembrance of apology as a part of healing. The new past identity was constructed through postwar Japan’s commitment to promote the positive peace and postwar atonement of apology for healing, which was transformed into the negative peace effort.
The second primary rhetorical effort was constructing the new past images of certain nations, which were the wartime enemies and victims of Japan. The new past images were the nations who have received owabi apology and positive peace activities from postwar Japan. It was also the hero nations who pursued reconciliation and allowed Japan to rejoin the international community again. The third primary rhetorical effort aimed to internationally lessen the old past image of Japan in the future. It expressed the desire to stop shazai apology in the future by implying the wish to save future Japanese generations from being predestined for shazai apology. Then, Abe danwa elaborated on atonement, which would be derived from the promotion of international negative peace and positive peace, and accordingly aimed to replace shazai apology with the promotion of international peace in future.
Here, Abe danwa strategically elaborated on both elements of an apology: to repair the image and to repair the relationship. By arranging the heartfelt owabi apology and public, formal shazai apology, it aimed to lessen the old past image as a wartime aggressor and even more so in the future, as well as to carry on the new past image as a peace-loving nation which would keep seeking both international negative peace and positive peace efforts. Thus, its ultimate rhetorical effort is constructing Japan as a peace-loving nation in the (new) past, present, and future.
Transforming to Be a Peace-Loving Nation as a Co-Produced Process
To conclude this chapter, I first propose that the peace effort is a co-produced process among the involved parties. I further propose that the successful transformation to be a peaceloving nation is another co-produced process, particularly in the post-war intercultural context.
This is similar to an apology-making process, particularly when Yamazaki (2004a) referred that the role of the offended parties would be the co-producer of the apology, and their responses would affirm the relationship among the involved parties. In fact, Abe danwa had a useful case study to demonstrate the clear overlap between my two proposals and Yamazaki’s view about apology-making processes among the involved parties.
More specifically, as mentioned already, a political danwa is a metaphor for open-hearted dialogue that invites the involved communities to be in the process of mending past injustices and strengthening ties. Holistically speaking, a political danwa is a form of negative peace effort to moderate the hostile relationship and a form of positive peace to promote harmonious relationship in the post-conflict situation. At the same time, its goal should be aligned with the expression of apologies to heal the relationship. In fact, atonement for the relationship repair was the emphasized key rhetorical component throughout Abe danwa, although the remark included both elements of an apology as image repair and apology as relationship repair. Therefore, the political danwa have a connection with the expression of apology and accordingly its extended view of apology-making process as a co-produced process among the involved parties.
Then, based on observations on the findings and connections between political danwa and the co-produced process of apology, I propose that peacebuilding in the post-conflict situation is a co-produced process among the involved communities. In the case of Abe danwa, the negative peace and positive peace efforts, as well as Japan’s transformation to be a peaceloving nation, were a co-produced process among Japan and its wartime enemies and victims. Furthermore, the role of non-Japanese involved nations was as the co-producer of negative peace and positive peacebuilding. Their responses to Abe danwa became the co-constructed form of the negative peace effort to moderate the hostile relationship, the co-constructed from of the positive peace effort to assist the harmonious ties, and co-constructed form of transformation of Japan to be a peace-loving nation. The political leaders of various nations responded to the remarks differently. Although there was no extensive data on how the public reacted, I will introduce news reactions below.
Roughly speaking, there were three types of responses with respect to the primary rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa. Then, I observed that the key on the co-produced process of peace was interconnected with its ultimate rhetorical effort to construct Japan as a peace-loving nation in the (new) past, present, and future. Specifically, first, there were some unfavorable responses from the wartime victims and affected nations, particularly China and South Korea. The responses were derived from the old past images of Japan as a wartime aggressor and themselves as wartime victims. Specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China responded that Japan should have clearly explained its wartime responsibility, should have made the profound apology to people in other nations, and should separate itself from militaristic invasion (Kawagoe, 2015). During a Liberation Day speech, South Korean President Park expressed that she was unimpressed due to unclarity of the history in Abe danwa (Yoshino, 2015). At the same time, she pledged to pay attention in the future if Prime Minister Abe really had inherited the position of successive Cabinets, who have stated apologies and remorse over the issue of comfort women. South Korean media further criticized Abe danwa due to the indirect apology, lack of a sincere apology, and ambiguity of who invaded and colonized (Yoshino, 2015). North Korea’s Foreign Ministry also criticized Abe danwa as it did not make an honest recognition and apology for the history of aggression (Katou, 2015).
Here, responses were primarily derived from past images of the wartime victims and wartime Japan. This group did not recognize postwar images in the international community, and rarely connected with the primary rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa. Based on the reactions by the first co-producers, Abe danwa did not de-legitimate the rivalry relationship nor assist the presence of positive relations among human groups. Thus, it was an ineffective rhetorical form of both negative peace and positive peace efforts, primarily among Japan, China, and South Korea. In other words, Abe danwa was an unsuccessful form to invite China and South Korea to co-produce negative peace and positive peace with Japan. In addition, it was an ineffective form to invite China and South Korea to co-transform Japan to be a peace-loving nation.
On the other hand, the second and third types of responses were primarily derived from the new past image of Japan as a peace-loving nation. The second type was the favorable responses from other wartime victims and affected nations. For instance, while the Philippines was a fierce war zone, its foreign secretary, Albert del Rosario, reacted positively to Abe danwa (Calleja & Dizon, 2015). He said postwar Japan “has ‘acted with compassion’” so that these two nations could have a relationship characterized by trust and solid support in various areas (para. 3). Similarly, the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its response and stated that, while Japan is responsible for the war, it positively viewed Japan’s unshakable standpoint of successive Cabinets, which have expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apologies (“Singapore issues response,” 2015). It further pointed out the significance for all nations to reconcile and made progress with Japan because it would benefit Asia and the world.
The third type was positive responses from some wartime enemies of Japan. Their responses were derived from the new past images of Japan and themselves. For example, the U.S. welcomed the deep remorse and commitment to uphold apologies for wartime Japan’s behavior (Brunnstrom & Hay, 2015). The White House’s National Security Council stated that “Japan’s record since the war had been ‘a model to everyone’” and it valued the “assurances of
Japan’s intent to expand its contribution to international peace and prosperity” (para. 2).
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott also welcomed Abe danwa and said the remark “should make it easier for other countries to accept Japan’s commitment to a better future” (“Tony
Abbott welcomes,” 2015, para. 1). He stated that Abe danwa acknowledged the suffering of Australia and other countries, and that postwar Australia and Japan were unified in a commitment to democracy, human rights, rule of law, and in particular the work on peace.
Here, the wartime enemies and victims, which provided the second and third kinds of responses, recognized the postwar and current Japan’s engagement with positive and negative peace efforts while still remembering the wartime Japan. Their responses showed that these involved parties are willing to assist and strengthen the harmonious relations. In this sense, Abe danwa was an effective rhetorical form of positive efforts among Japan and its wartime enemies and other wartime victims and affected nations, including the U.S., Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore, among others. In fact, the focus by these co-producers was not necessarily highlighting the existing hostilities due to the wartime incident. Hence, it would be appropriate to say that these co-producers and Japan had already achieved the de-legitimation of the hostile relationship caused by wartime Japan’ actions. Additionally, Abe danwa was an effective rhetorical form to invite these particular nations to co-produce Japan’s image as a peace-loving nation.
In conclusion, this chapter observed that Abe danwa negotiated the international role of Japan as a peace-loving nation in the (new) past, present, and future. At the same time, I proposed that the negative peace efforts are the co-produced process among the multiple involved parties to heal the antagonistic relationship due to the past injustice. Also, positive peace efforts are a co-produced process that assist to strengthen harmonious ties. Then, it became clearer that the challenge was to form the negative peace in the international community, even over 70 years after the injustices were made. Here, I observe and emphasize the significance to rhetorically engage with the dialogic approach, instead of the monologic approach, to form intercultural negative peace in the post-conflict situation. It would be important to co-produce the negative peace with the nations which Abe danwa has failed to do so, particularly China and South Korea. It might be essential for future danwa, if there are any, to revisit its rhetorical efforts of moderating the antagonistic relationship.
In assembling the various pieces of this chapter, in a similar manner with the perspective in which an apology to heal the relationship needs to be a dialectic and “relationship-oriented” form (Hatch, 2014, p. 155–156), the efforts to construct negative peace also need to be a dialectic form. It would be essential for each community to see through the other’s eyes in order to reconcile and mend the relationships, if the involved parties seek for the negative peace and want to overcome the past injustice together. Finally, it is worthy for all involved parties to recognize that they are producing the negative peace and positive peace together and engaging with the process of the international peacebuilding.
CHAPTER III. INTERCULTURAL IDEOGRAPHS FOR POSITIVE PEACE: “WA” AND
“HARMONY” 70 YEARS AFTER
During Fall 2017, I had an international exchange student from Japan in my Global Communication class. Though still a graduate student, I served as the instructor of record. In the course of the semester, we discussed communication and conflict in global contexts, and one of the examples was World War II. After the semester was over, we had an opportunity to have a conversation. Then, I asked the student what the one thing is she would choose for U.S. students to know. She said, “One thing I want American students to know is that Japanese people, including those from Hiroshima, do not hate Americans. I, as an exchange student from Hiroshima, do not hate Americans. Rather, I love Americans and their culture.” It was said on December 15, 2017.
Chapter Three describes and interprets the symbolic actions and statements by President
Barack Obama of the U.S. and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan during their historic visits to Hiroshima, Japan, in May, 2016 and to Pearl Harbor in December of the same year. The two leaders delivered speeches referring to peace [heiwa/平和] (The White House, 2016a, 2016b; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016a, 2016b; 2016c; 2016d). Both Japanese and U.S. media widely reported their speeches and their visits (e.g., Harris, Davis, & Soble, 2016; Lyte &
Nakamura, 2016; Rich, 2016; Tadokoro, 2016a; Tadokoro, 2016b; Satou & Okamoto, 2016). The goal of this chapter is to understand how the speeches function toward the creation and development of positive peace.
As discussed in Chapter One, positive peace is the condition of the “presence of positive relations” among human groups (Galtung, 1967, p. 14). These human groups need to have a jointly valuable collaboration and mutual learning to “heal past violence and prevent future violence” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 12). As the scholarship about positive peace considers peacebuilding by the usage of harmony and its legitimation, it includes restoration of damaged relationships among enemies during wars and establishment of a social system that meets the needs of the whole population. I apply the critical concept of the ideograph to unpack how ideological values in the Japanese and U.S. societies are used rhetorically to engage the longterm peacebuilding process over the roughly 70 years since the end of WWII. In doing so, it would answer the sub-question posted by this dissertation: How does the set of milestone speeches by the President of the U.S. and Prime Minister of Japan rhetorically negotiate the long-term peacebuilding process in the intercultural context?
This chapter simultaneously focuses on four speeches. The first pair are speeches by
President Obama and Prime Minister Abe in Hiroshima on May 27, 2016 (The White House,
2016a). The second pair are speeches by President Obama and President Abe in Pearl Harbor on December 27, 2016 (The White House, 2016b). I first discuss the background of the speeches by the U.S. and Japanese political leaders. Second, I review the rhetorical concept of the ideograph, which I use to analyze the speeches. Third, I introduce the values of “wa[和]” in the Japanese community and “harmony” in the U.S. community. Fourth, I examine the sets of speeches while applying the concept of the ideograph. Lastly, I coin the concept of intercultural ideograph, and propose that an intercultural ideograph is a persuasive rhetorical tool for the peacebuilding process in an intercultural context.
Background of Speech
President Obama and Prime Minister Abe delivered their speeches in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor in 2016. The locations are known as spaces for reflection on wars and peace due to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 and the Hiroshima bombing in 1945. Generally speaking, the
U.S. narrative labels the Pearl Harbor attack as its entrance to WWII and the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima as the ending of WWII. The Japanese narrative, on the other hand, normally treats the
Pearl Harbor attack as a historical footnote (Slavin & Sumida, 2016), while it situates the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as the historical events which led Japan to surrender and end WWII (Crawford, 2003). The Japanese narrative frames the end of WWII upon the Japanese surrender within the context of the Potsdam Treaty, rather than as a defeat (p. 115).
I acknowledge that there are various perspectives for discussing the multiple, intricate aspects of the various narratives of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 and the Hiroshima bombing in 1945. For example, the international community could have different narratives from
American or Japanese ones about the Hiroshima bombing (e.g., the narrative that labels the Hiroshima bombing [and Nagasaki bombing] as the beginning of the Cold War, instead of the end of WWII (Wong, 2016)). The general narrative among European communities frankly discusses the economic and political interests of the U.S. while illustrating that the purpose in dropping the atomic bombs was to frighten the Soviets and to keep them away from entering the war against Japan (Lindaman & Ward, 2004). Alex Willerstein, a nuclear historian, points out that Europeans “generally take a dim view” of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, and they tend to find it “completely shocking” that the majority of Americans still think these bombings were morally correct and justified (Wong, 2016, para. 8). Depending on the positionality, there are diverse ways to discuss multiple narratives about the Pearl Harbor attack and the Hiroshima bombing in the 1940s. However, I put these discussions aside in order to focus on analyzing the sets of the selected speeches in 2016 at Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor. Below I provide the vital yet fundamental background to the speeches: the sites of speeches, speakers, and a brief summary of each speech.
Sites of Speeches: Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor
The sites of the speeches add symbolic and historical meaning to the selected speeches.
In this section, I first provide a brief description of the enormous loss of life at Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima during WWII. Then, I provide a brief description of how these locations are currently treated. When the Japanese military attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, a total of 2,403 Americans died (United States Department of Defense, 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee, 1991, p. 1). This number is composed of 2,335 military personnel and 68 civilians. In addition, 55 Japanese personnel lost their lives during this attack. Three years and six months after the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. military dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. This bombing took about 140,000 lives through the end of 1946, which includes those who died from the effects of the bombing (The City of Hiroshima, 2015).
The majority of losses were Japanese civilians, but the losses included Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, and other Southeast Asians as well as American prisoners of war.
An enormous number of lives were lost at Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima in the 1940s during WWII, and these locations are still remembered with sadness and remorse in both the current U.S. and Japanese societies. The political leaders in 2016 made their remarks in these emotive locations. More specifically, the leaders delivered their speeches on Kilo Pier where the speakers could see the USS Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor as well as at the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Park. The USS Arizona Memorial is one of the sites composing the World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument and is one of the U.S. National Parks (The U.S.
Department of the Interior, 2018b). It has an average of 4,000–5,000 visitors per day (The U.S. Department of the Interior, 2018a). On the other hand, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park has the Hiroshima Peace Memorial known as Genbaku Dome, which is a World Heritage site, as well as the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (UNESCO World Heritage Centre 1992–2018,
n.d). In the fiscal year 2016, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum had a total of 1,739,986 visitors, including 366,779 international visitors (Noda, 2017). This means it has an average of 4,767 visitors per day, not considering the holidays. Thus, a huge number of visitors have been currently engaging with the memories of WWII at these sites, even over 70 years after the Pearl Harbor attack and the Hiroshima bombing. This chapter focuses on the speeches delivered at these sites.
Speakers: President Obama and Prime Minister Abe
Over 70 years since losing large numbers of human lives in Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima, the recent political leaders as the representatives of the U.S. and Japanese nations delivered speeches together at these two significant sites. President Obama was identified as the first U.S. president who visited Hiroshima (Harris, Davis, & Soble, 2016). Prime Minister Abe was recognized as the first prime minister of Japan who visited Pearl Harbor with the U.S. president (“Japan PM Shinzo,” 2016). In this section I provide brief descriptions of both political leaders and describe the historical confusion that provides more context to the speeches.
Some foundational information about President Obama includes basic facts about his administration. He served as the 44th president of the United States, being elected in November 2008 and sworn in on January 20th, 2009 (The White House, n.d.). He is originally from Hawaii and was born on August 4, 1961, as the child of a father from Kenya and a mother from Kansas. He was 54 years old at the time of his visit to Hiroshima and 55 years old at Pearl Harbor. He was also the first African American president of the U.S. (Barack Obama, n.d.). He was reelected in 2012 and visited Hiroshima six months before his farewell address and Pearl Harbor only 14 days before the address (Rodrigues, 2017; The White House, 2016a; The White House,
2016b). Hence, these visits to Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor happened at the end of his presidency.
The foundational information of Prime Minister Abe includes that he was first appointed as the 90th prime minister of Japan in 2006 and resigned in 2007 (Prime Minister of Japan and
His Cabinet, n.d.a). He was later appointed as the 96th prime minister in 2012, reappointed as the 97th prime minister in 2014, and as the 98th prime minister in 2017. He continued to serve as the prime minister in 2018. Originally from Tokyo, Japan, he was born on September 21, 1954, the son of Shintarou Abe, who served as the foreign minister, and a grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, who served as the 56th and 57th prime minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960 (Shougakukan Inc.,
n.d.; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, n.d.b). As of August 2019, Abe still holds his position as the prime minister of Japan, and so these visits to Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima occurred in the middle of his term.
Here, I describe the historical confusion regarding the timing of the historical visit to Pearl Harbor by Prime Minister Abe, as this incident reveals a layer of the intricate intercultural components between the U.S. and Japan with respect to this specific location. Specifically, immediately after the announcement of Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor, Japan’s Foreign Ministry mistakenly indicated that Prime Minister Abe was the first Japanese prime minister to visit Pearl Harbor, and accordingly Japanese and U.S. media mistakenly reported this (e.g., “Nihon no shushō ga,” 2016; Soble & Sanger, 2016). However, a few days later, it appeared that he was actually the fourth prime minister of Japan, following after Prime Ministers
Yoshida in 1951, Hatoyama in 1956, and Kishi in 1957, based on the suggestion by the Hawaii
Hochi, which is a dual-language (Japanese and English) newspaper based in Hawaii (e.g.,
Miyachi, 2016; Rich, 2016; Schwartz, 2016; Taylor, 2016). Soon after the appearance of the information, the Japanese government re-announced that Prime Minister Abe was the first prime minister of Japan who visited Pearl Harbor with a U.S. president (Schwartz, 2016). Interestingly enough, while Prime Minister Kishi happed to be Abe’s grandfather, Prime Minister Abe himself apparently did not know about his grandfather’s visit (Rich, 2016).
The significance of this error and correction is this: the narrative about such visits in the 1950s had been largely invisible until 2016, both in the continental U.S. society and in Japanese societies. Such narratives were silenced because they were unprofitable and risky for both U.S. and Japan at that time; the wounds of the attack were still fresh and yet the two nations were aiming to build a postwar alliance (Rich, 2016). Then, there are questions about why no sitting Japanese leaders visited again after the 1950s, and why Prime Minister Abe was able to visit with the U.S president in 2016. To help answer the first question, Taylor (2016), a journalist of the Washington Post, introduced a suggestion by Sheila Smith, who is a senior fellow for Japan
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. According to this suggestion, the leaders’ visits to Pearl Harbor could imply “looking backwards instead of looking ahead” (Taylor, 2016, para. 10). In the 1960s Japan was entering a new era of economic growth and gaining a newborn sense of progress. Japan and the U.S. were also revising their security treaty. Thereby, Japan’s leader stopped going to Pearl Harbor when Japan began to establish its new sense of national identity.
Regarding the second question of why Prime Minister Abe could visit Pearl Harbor in
2016: this visit was more than Japan’s diplomatic reciprocity since President Obama had visited Hiroshima (Inoue, 2016). The U.S. and Japanese governments actually had considered his potential visit as an opportunity to regard it as a settlement of historical issues (Ando, 2016).
According to Inoue, a professor in the Department of International Studies at Hiroshima City
University and a visiting researcher from 2013 to 2014 at Matsunaga Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution at the University of Hawaii–Manoa, a majority of people in Hawaii now consider that Pearl Harbor has undergone a major shift from a formerly humiliated place to a place of “harmony and peace [yuuwa to heiwa]” (para. 3). In fact, Robert Lee, a 95-year-old witness to the attack, commented that “‘[the U.S. and Japan] already gone through quite a bit of healing’” and called Prime Minister Abe’s visit as “‘the culmination of the healing’” prior to his visit (Jones, 2016, para. 20). Hence, Prime Minister Abe’s visit would become the symbol of the “settlement of history [rekishi no kugiri]” as well as the symbol of “harmony and peace [yuuwa to heiwa]” (para. 2).
In addition, Ando (2016), a political and economic journalist, introduced three more possibilities. The first possibility is that this visit functioned as part of his attempts to have steadily accumulated an end to the “postwar period [sengo]” (para. 8). Second, while deepening the U.S.-Japan relationship, this visit could have been an opportunity to end some repeated patterns to bring back the discussions about “historical issues [rekishi mondai]” related to WWII.
More specifically, by demonstrating the future-oriented relationship between the U.S. and Japan,
Prime Minister Abe also anticipated encouraging other countries, such as China and South Korea, which occasionally used the “history card [rekishi kado],” to have a similar futureoriented relationship like the U.S. and Japan (para. 15). Third, while aiming to appeal to the world with the strong U.S.-Japan relationship, this visit also aimed to send a message to the upcoming Trump administration about the importance of the stable U.S.-Japan relationship, especially because Mr. Trump (the current U.S. president), during his presidential election in 2016, repeatedly criticized the Japan-U.S. security treaty and advocated its revision. These speculations potentially led to Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor with President Obama.
Overview of Selected Speeches
This chapter focuses on four speeches. The first pair are speeches by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe in Hiroshima on May 27, 2016 (The White House, 2016a). The second pair are the speeches by President Obama and President Abe in Pearl Harbor on December 27, 2016 (The White House, 2016b). In these speeches, President Obama spoke in English and Prime Minister Abe spoke in Japanese. Multiple U.S. and Japanese governmental agencies provided the written transcripts and translations of these speeches both in English and Japanese
(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d; U.S. Embassy and
Consulates in Japan, 2016). They were accessible online.
In addition to the written speeches, both governmental agencies made videos available to view and to listen to these speeches in both languages. For example, a YouTube account, which is maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and served as an archive of the Obama administration’s content, provided the videos of all speeches (The Obama White House, 2016a; The Obama White House, 2016b). In these videos, President Obama spoke in English and Prime Minister Abe’s speeches was simultaneously interpreted into English. The audience could not hear Prime Minister Abe’s voice. There were English subtitles for all speeches. Similarly, the prime minister of Japan and his cabinet provided the videos to watch and listen to the speeches (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016a; 2016c). In these videos, Prime Minister Abe delivered his speech in Japanese and President Obama delivered his speech in English. While there was no simultaneous interpretation from Japanese to English, President Obama’s speech was simultaneously interpreted into Japanese. There were neither Japanese nor English subtitles.
Along with these accessible statements on the U.S. and Japanese governmental websites, multiple newspapers in both countries published full texts of these statements in their articles. For example, the New York Times published the full text of written transcripts of President
Obama’s speech in Hiroshima (“Text of President Obama’s Speech in Hiroshima,” 2016) and an
English translation of Prime Minister Abe’s speech in Pearl Harbor (“Shinzo Abe at Pearl Harbor,” 2016). Nihonkeizai shimbun and Asashi shimbun, two Japanese newspapers, published full texts of both the English written transcripts and Japanese translations of President Obama’s speech in Hiroshima (“Obama bei daitouryou,” 2016; “Obama shi Hiroshima,” 2016 ;“8 gatu muika,” 2016) and in Pearl Harbor (“Obama daitouryou enzetsu,” 2016; “Obama daitouryou no,” 2016a; “Obama daitouryou no,” 2016b).
For my analysis, I examined the artifacts both in English and Japanese. For the written artifacts, I compared speeches in English and Japanese side by side and paragraph by paragraph. I listened and watched speeches in the videos in English, the English interpretation, Japanese, and the Japanese interpretation. Below, I provide a summary of the four speeches in chronological order, primarily utilizing the written transcripts and translations in English provided by the U.S. White House (The White House, 2016a; the White House, 2016b).
Speeches delivered in Hiroshima, Japan. President Obama first delivered his 17-minute statement and then Prime Minister Abe delivered his eight-minute statement (Prime Minister of
Japan and His Cabinet, 2016a). President Obama began by stating the reasons why “we” came to Hiroshima through a statement (The White House, 2016a, para. 2; para. 9; para. 19). As a side note, it was ambiguous to whom President Obama referred as “we.” “We” could be President Obama and Prime Minister Abe, or “we” could be Americans as President Obama represented his country. As the first reason, President Obama stated that “we” came to Hiroshima to grieve the dead (para. 2) immediately after describing a “flash of light and a wall of fire” that destroyed Hiroshima 71 years ago (para. 1). He then continued to briefly state that the souls of the dead included “over 100,000 in Japanese men, women, and children, thousands of Koreans, and a dozen Americans held prisoner,” and asked the audience to “look inward” and think of “who they are and what they may become” (para. 2).
As the second reason, “we” came to Hiroshima to “imagine the moment the bomb fell… [and to] remember all the innocents killed across the arc of the terrible war” along with the wars that happened before and wars that would come next (para. 9). He illustrated that war has existed throughout “the history of civilization” (para. 3), and the names of innocents who have suffered in wars are forgotten by time. He illustrated some contradictions that humans have experienced. For example, science makes it possible both to cure disease and to become “ever-more efficient killing machines” (para. 7), which “Hiroshima teaches” (para. 8). He further stated that the “scientific revolution” must need “moral revolution” (para. 8).
As the third reason, “we” came to Hiroshima to think of loved ones (para. 19). While stating “we” were “part of the single human family” (para. 18), he illustrated the precious moments people can have with their children, spouses, and partners; those who died in Hiroshima 71 years ago had these precious moments as well. Then he stated that they would not want more war. Instead, they would prefer the miracle of science to engage with advancing life. While describing children in Hiroshima today who live in peace, the speech concluded by stating that “we can choose the future,” in which “Hiroshima and Nagasaki are known not as the dawn of atomic warfare, but as the start of our own moral awakening” (para. 21).
Prime Minister Abe’s speech began by sharing his experience of delivering an address at a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress in 2015 where he offered his “eternal condolences to the souls of all American people” who were killed during WWII and expressed the gratitude for all individuals who “have committed themselves to reconciliation” since the end of the war (para. 22). Prime Minister Abe verbally welcomed President Obama’s historic visit and expressed sincere respect toward his decision and courage to create the “new chapter reconciliation of Japan and the U.S.” (para. 25). He continued to describe that, a few moments before, both President Obama and Prime Minister Abe offered their earnest condolences for all individuals who lost their lives during WWII as well as by the atomic bombings.
Then, while acknowledging various potential feelings, Prime Minister Abe emphasized one mutual feeling above all—the tragedy: what happened in Hiroshima must not happen again at any place in the world. He continued to express the determination of “[realizing] a world free of nuclear weapons” even though it would take a long time and be challenging (para. 21). In the end, he focused on the “effort for the peace and prosperity of the world” (para. 29) while describing Japan and the U.S., together, as the “‘light for hope” for the world (para. 29). He labeled this effort as the collective responsibility among those who live in the present and as “the ‘only way’ to respond” to the spirits of the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings (para. 28).
Speeches delivered at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the U.S. At Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Abe first delivered his 17-minute speech and subsequently President Obama delivered his 15minute statement (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016c). Prime Minister Abe started his speech by depicting the scene that the two leaders had visited, the USS Arizona Memorial where many souls were resting (The White House, 2016b). Prime Minister Abe initially described calmness surrounding the USS Arizona Memorial in 2016 and moved to describe how he felt he could “almost discern[ed] the voice of” resting sailors and Marines (para. 4). Then, he provided brief portrayals of the ordinary voice and life these resting crewmen had before the aerial bombing on the USS Arizona; for example, many of them had wives and/or partners and children. It was the “solemn reality” in which these voices were taken (para. 4). Subsequently, Prime Minister Abe stated he had cast flowers “on behalf of Japanese people” (para. 5). He expressed his “sincere and everlasting condolences” to the souls of those who lost their lives in that place, along with those who lost their lives by the war started there and all innocent victims of war.
Second, he focused on the vow the people of Japan have taken since the war: the vow to never repeat the war again. This vow would continue to be upheld by Japan, which has taken a path as a peace-loving nation over the 70 years since the war ended. Third, he expressed the “heartfelt gratitude” (para. 14) to the “spirit of tolerance embraced by” the American people and the U.S. (para. 10). In order to demonstrate such tolerance, he shared several narratives, which are later discussed in the analysis section. Fourth, the speech focused on the “alliance of hope”
(para. 15), which would lead Japan and the U.S. to the future, and the “power of reconciliation” (para. 16) that Prime Minister Abe wanted to express to the world. He portrayed that the “spirit of tolerance” and the “power of reconciliation” would be needed for the world, which still experiences the fear of wars. In the end, he shared his wish, in which people would “continue to remember Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” (para. 18).
President Obama started his statement by thanking Prime Minister Abe for speaking to “the power of reconciliation and the alliance” and for reminding the U.S. of the “friendship and lasting peace” even after the deepest wounds of war (para. 20). He first focused on “[saluting] the defenders of Oahu” and “[reflecting] on the heroism” that happened there 75 years ago (para.
23). President Obama illustrated how “Americans defended themselves” while using brief, specific narratives of defenders such as Jim Dowing, who was a gunner’s mate first class; Harry Pang, who was a fireman from Honolulu; and John Finn, who was the Chief Petty Officer. He added Daniel Inouye, who was a member of the U.S. 442nd Infantry Regiment, assembled with “the Japanese-American Nisei [second generation]” (para. 29). Second, the focus was “friendship and peace” as the choice made by the U.S. and Japan after World War II (para. 31). In order to demonstrate the friendship and alliance, he utilized the concise narrative of how U.S. solders helped “Japanese friends” when a tsunami hit Fukushima, Japan, in 2011. He also mentioned Admiral Harry Harris, who was born in Yokohama, Japan, as the son of an American naval officer and a Japanese mother. President Obama thanked Harris for his leadership at the maritime military exercise near Pearl Harbor, which was held earlier in the year and included Japan among 24 nations. While centering the “fruits of peace” (para. 35), he pointed out that the presence of Prime Minister Abe and himself at Pearl Harbor was a reminder of the possibilities between their nations and peoples.
The speech moved on to focus on the “lesson” (para. 37; para 38): “otagai no tame ni— ‘with and for each other’” (para. 36, emphasis added). To demonstrate this, President Obama first talked about a past act by a specific American individual, Captain William Callaghan of the
USS Missouri, along with an act by a Japanese pilot. Then, he described how people in the U.S. and Japan have currently learned this lesson in ordinary ways, for example, though studying abroad in each other’s countries and working together in scientific fields. He mentioned Ichiro, a Japanese baseball player who has been lately playing for Miami’s professional team. Furthermore, by focusing on the future, the lessons could be used to map our own future. The speech concluded by welcoming Prime Minister Abe, emphasizing peace and reconciliation over war and retribution, and honoring the lost people as well as giving thanks for everything that the
U.S. and Japan have gained as friends. Above, I reviewed the background of two sets of speeches at Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor in 2016 by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe. Next, I review the rhetorical concept of ideographs.
Ideographs
In this chapter, I utilize ideographs as the guiding concept in order to reveal how the sets of selected speeches rhetorically function in the long-term peacebuilding process in the intercultural context specifically between Japan and the U.S. Ideographs are the “basic structural elements, the building blocks of ideology” (McGee, 1980, p. 7). They are the “ideology in practice,” which is often found in a rhetorical document (p. 5).
First of all, ideologies are constituted with the dominant beliefs in a specific society (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978). It is shared beliefs of groups in a society, instead of an individual’s set of beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). Because each society holds a set of beliefs, as Steward Hall, a British cultural studies scholar states, ideologies “tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted ‘naturalized’ world of common sense” (2003, p. 90). The ideology in practice is capable of governing public beliefs and behaviors. Cloud (2004) contends that an ideograph is a vehicle “through which ideologies or unconsciously shared idea systems that organize consent to a particular social system becomes rhetorically effective” (p. 288). McGee (1980) invites critics to engage with the examination of ideographs, or the ideology in practice in political rhetoric. By doing so, critics can discover the diachronic and synchronic patterns of political consciousness, which can “control ‘power’ and to influence…the shape and texture of each individual’s ‘reality’” (p. 5).
In fact, an ideograph is described as a commonly used term found in political discourse, as well as an abstract term signifying “collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defended goal” (p. 15). For example, <rule of law>, <liberty>, <property>, and <freedom> are the ordinary, abstract terms often found in American public discourse. These terms function as ideographs in the U.S. context (e.g., McGee, 1980; Kelly, 2014). In addition, an ideograph could justify the practice of power as well as justify certain behaviors and beliefs, which, if not made sensible by the ideograph, may appear as bizarre or disruptive. Accordingly, these behaviors and beliefs are easily seen as acceptable and credible by the people in a community. At the same time, certain ideographs, such as <terrorism>, represent an improper action. Connelly (2012) calls the ideographs discouraging certain behaviors as negative ideographs, while the ideographs representing an ideal as positive ideographs.
As stated above, as much as ideographs often enforce acceptable public beliefs, they are also abstract in nature. Disagreement over the ideographs potentially emerges due to this abstract aspect; the dominant and marginalized groups might share a commitment to a term but differ on what it implies for their communities. For instance, regarding the federal Native American policy in the 1960s, both dominant Euro-American policy makers and marginalized American Indian activists were progressive within the same sets of symbols and engagement with <freedom> (Kelly, 2014). As much as <freedom> unifies policy makers and activists, it also alienates them because of the different understandings of the meaning in the term and political application. This leads us to another defining characteristic of ideographs: they are “culture-bound” (McGee, 1980, p. 15).
Ideographs are understood within the cultural contexts of a particular community. The members of the community are situated to understand the ideographs in distinctive, acceptable ways. Connelly (2012) points out that an ideograph is influential in that it shapes the socialization of community members. In fact, “each ideograph has… an etymology,” connoting that the current meaning of every ordinary, abstract term has its own history and development and its diachronic meaning (McGee, 1980, p. 16). This means that ideological terms could have different significance across cultures and time. Thus, an ideological term must be understood while tracing how each term has been diachronically utilized in the past in a specific cultural community.
As McGee (1980) argues, if critics elucidate how communities infuse with deep meaning abstract concepts like liberty and freedom, then we can discover the ideological commitments that the community holds. Kelly (2014) did so with respect to the <freedom> employed by the Euro-American policy makers and marginalized American Indian activists who belong to different cultural communities. In his study, Kelly (2014) argues that although both groups placed a claim on the lead value of <freedom> with “strikingly different and mutually exclusive notions of its meaning,” they shaped a notion of <freedom> to require “liberation from poverty” throughout the oppositional usage of <freedom> (p. 16). Similar to Kelly’s study, I focus on “wa” and “harmony” employed by Japanese Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama. This chapter performs the critical journey of revealing the key ideographs found in the selected rhetorical pieces so that I can unpack how these terms unite and alienate the American community and the Japanese community. All in all, the defining characteristics of ideographs are: (1) They are commonly used terms in political discourse; (2) they are abstract terms signifying collective commitment; (3) they justify the practice of power and certain behaviors and beliefs as acceptable; and (4) they are culture-bound (McGee, 1980, p. 15). Next, I discuss two ideological terms: “wa [和]” and “harmony.” “Wa” is an ideological term in Japanese society, while “harmony” is an ideological term in U.S. society.
<Wa> and <Harmony> as Peace Ideology
<Wa(和)> and <harmony> are the overarching, implied ideographs in the selected speeches. The literal meanings of the Japanese term “wa(和)” are a motion of getting along and having a good relationship, a Japanese style such as wa-food, wa-clothes, and wa-room, and the sum of numbers (Konishi, Yahiro, Nakajima, & Ono, 2009; Shinmura, 2018), while it is often interpreted as “harmony” in academic literatures (e.g., Kelley, 2008; Konishi & David, 2006).
Prior to examining these ideological terms in practice in the selected artifacts, I first focus on the Japanese ideological term “wa” in the Japanese context. Second, I explore the English ideological term “harmony” in the U.S. context. By doing so, I aim to unpack each characteristic of being culture-bound for “wa” and “harmony” as well as introduce each nuanced definition of
“wa” and “harmony.” Third, I demonstrate the important overlapping aspect of “wa” and “harmony.”
“Wa[和]” in Japanese Context
Japanese “wa [和]” is “the ethic of harmony, unity, peace, and wholeness” in a social community (Genzberger, 1994, p. 155). In addition, “wa” is an ancient name for Japan itself
(Rice, 2009, p. 57). Yet, as stated, it is often interpreted as “harmony” in English. The ethic of “wa” is a cardinal value in Japanese society (Genzberger, 1994; Rice, 2009). It connotes a social gestalt wherein a group is greater than the sum of each member. Individuals are considered incomplete if they are standing alone, but they can find completion by contributing their personal will to the needs of their own community. Hence, the desire for independence could be seen as strange and immature (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). In addition, “wa” implies more emotional interpersonal closeness, which allows individuals to situate themselves with others in order to develop a good interaction even while the definition of the good is ambiguous (Sakisaka, 1979).
This idea connotes that interdependence within a group is associated with positive emotions for individuals in the group (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000).
In fact, the Japanese individuals’ identities are attached to the group identity (Bauman, 1994). This means that individuals and groups cannot exist without one another. Thus, “wa” is the Japanese “ethical concept whose ideal is to integrate individuals for the harmony and balance of the group: often this is at the expense of individual achievement” (Bauman, 1994, p. 13). It is common that the group receives rewards as a whole instead of the individual who shows high achievement. Yet, if “the group is given priority over the individuals” in Western society, then people in the West are conditioned to think of themselves as being “‘oppressed’” (Bauman, 1994, p. 13). All in all, the Japanese value “wa” as the essence of Japanese life, and it is understood as the ethic of wholeness and conformity within a social group and peaceful unity (Genzberger, 1994; Rice, 2009). In order to further demonstrate the culture-bound quality of “wa,” I describe below the historical background of “wa” and the operation of “wa” in the current Japanese context.
Historical background of the ideological term “wa.” First, I provide the condensed historical background of “wa” in the Japanese context in order to articulate the deep infusion of “wa” in Japanese culture. In fact, the value of “wa” is originally derived from Shinto, which is the Japanese indigenous religion, as well as Confucianism, which was introduced from China to Japan (Konishi & Davis, 2006). Regarding Shinto, some scholars historically trace and interpret the Yayoe period (300 B.C.–300 A.D.) as the origin of Shinto’s prototype (see Anzu, 1971;
Asoya, 1994), while others point out they can observe the human behaviors and faith related to
Shinto during the Jomon period (13,000 B.C.–300 B.C.) (see Kamata, 2000). As to
Confucianism, it is a philosophy that aims to have a way of “the harmonious society” while
being concerned with issues related to social and political aspects, suitable rule and government, and the value of family and community (Solomon & Higgins, 1996, p. 3). The founder is Confucius (Kong Fuzi) (551–479 B.C.)—one of the greatest educators in China who provided great understanding for how people should live together. Confucianism sees society as an extended family as the basis of Chinese culture is family. Confucianism was presented to Japan in the 5th century (Konishi & Davis, 2006). Thus, the ethic of “wa” has been in Japanese society since 300 B.C. with regard to Shinto and the 5th century with regard to Confucianism.
Returning to Shinto for a moment, Hara (2003), along with what other religious scholars have observed, notes that in Shinto, there can be peace of mind when humans value their lives with nature, when they treasure their ancestors’ spirits, and appreciate their lives within a harmony with others. Here nature itself is understood to have a spirit and life. Also, Japanese people tend to be engaged with worship of ancestors. Japanese people feel that ancestors’ souls would not go too far away, and would come back to their houses on some occasions such as New Year’s festivals, look after us on a daily basis, and continue to do so for generations of future descendants. Yet, while Shinto can be identified as an indigenous religion of Japan, it can be a part of social life for most individuals in modern Japanese society because such religious practices and consciousness are reinforced in their everyday lives (Hara, 2003). In addition, the 17 Article Constituent of Prince Shôtoku, which is known as the first written Japanese constitution in 604, contained the thoughts of Shinto. The Constitution initiated its first article by stating “wa” is to be most valued (The Tsurugaoka Hachimangu, n.d.).
In addition to Shinto, Confucianism manifests the concept of “wa” in contemporary Japan. In Confucianism, “wa” is the key for the ideal state of both society and individuals. Yet it largely focuses on the “ethical and social conduct” that would be encouraging to “a harmonious community” (Solomon & Higgins, 1996, p. 91). Its philosophy is primarily on the advocacy of virtue because the harmony of society relies on individual virtue. Together, “wa” is clearly a primary, respected value in Confucianism. In addition, Confucianism stresses self-realization for individuals, which must be understood through its value for harmonious social relationships. The individual achievement is unimportant to comprehend self-realization. Here, I argue that the description of self-realization demonstrates that individual achievement is inferior to social harmony in Confucianism. All in all, both Shinto and Confucianism admirably value “wa,” which became an ideological term in Japanese culture. The ethic of “wa” has been embedded in Japanese culture for centuries.
Operation of “wa” in the current Japanese context. Through various forms, “wa” is diachronically used and maintained as the crucial key value in Japanese modern society. This section describes how “wa” is maintained in the current Japanese context as an essential value for current Japanese society. It has been operated through various cultural forms, and sustained by elites (Kidder & Hostetler, 1990) as well as ordinary people during family interactions, business meetings, leisure activities, at workplaces, and through children’s literatures (e.g.,
Kelley, 2008; Konishi, Yahiro, Nakajima, & Ono, 2009; Genzberger, 1994).
As a brief guiding example, I provide a review of a study by Kelley (2008) with the goal of “identify[ing] children’s books that portray Japanese ideology” (p. 61). This study demonstrates the expression of “wa” in children’s literature while focusing on four children’s books. These books properly and authentically represent the commonly held values, beliefs, and attitudes of modern Japanese culture, according to the researcher’s Japanese friends. For instance, the book, The Way We Do It in Japan, by Geneva Cobb Iijima (2002), features
Gregory, a young boy from San Francisco. He changed to a school in Japan because his father’s company transferred him to Tokyo for work. While centered on Gregory’s experience, the story shows how disequilibrium might emerge due to an individual choice among group members, and how one-ness is encouraged. For example, Gregory feels like he is almost a real Japanese schoolboy when he wears his gym uniform, which other students also wear while walking to school. The book points out that the group works as one when everyone wears the same gym uniform, uses the same shoe storage for inside and outside shoes, and shares one lunch menu. Kelley (2008) ultimately explains the value of “wa” through demonstrating how individuals can experience harmony by eating, wearing, and doing the same things with others in the group.
This connotes “wa” as wholeness and conformity within a social group, and peaceful unity (Genzberger, 1994; Rice, 2009). As the ethic of “wa” is promoted in children’s literature (Kelley, 2008), I add that, through children’s books, individuals learn the value of “wa” at an early age in Japanese society. Along with this specific research done by Kelley (2008), “wa” operates in various forms in Japanese society. It is a well-respected, admired belief in modern Japanese society.
“Harmony” in the U.S. Context
Next, I explore the value of “harmony” in the U.S. context. I review the historical background and the operation of the ideological term “harmony” in the current U.S. context. In doing so, I clarify the different nuances of the Japanese value of “wa” and the U.S. value of “harmony.” This discussion will later help us not only to compare “wa” and “harmony,” but also discover the overlapping aspects of these ideological terms. In fact, from the scholarly perspective, the examination of harmony ideology as practice has been ignored (Beyer & Girke, 2015). Hence, while introducing different nuances of these values, I aim to narrow down the connotation of the U.S. “harmony” for the purpose of this study.
Historical background of the ideological term “harmony.” First, I discuss the origin of the contemporary understanding of the ideological term “harmony” in the Western context.
The contemporary understanding of the term “harmony” in the Western context emerged from French and Greek words in the 12th century denoting “joint, agreement, concord of sounds, music… to fit together, [and] arrange” (Oxford University Press, 2018a, para. 1). Based on the several meanings provided by the Oxford University Press (2018a), the term “harmony” indicates the pleased result of the agreed or combined unity composed with differences. In fact,
President-Elect George H. W. Bush in 1988 utilized the term of “harmony” and his expression of “harmony” parallels this specific connotation of “harmony.” He stated that a “campaign is a disagreement, and disagreements divide. But an election is a decision, and decisions clear the way for harmony and peace” (Smith, 2004, p. 128). As President-Elect Bush stated, “harmony” is the agreed decision through the election, which ended up uniting the disagreements based on different ideas.
Along the same lines, Sakisaka (1979) points out that the foundation of the etymological
Greek word of “harmony” is associated with the ideas of logos, logical reasoning, and rules. While “harmony” in the Western context refers to relating people, being symmetrical, harmonizing, and agreeing, it has more logical elements in its meanings as it emerged from
French and Greek words. This foundational aspect of “harmony” differentiates “harmony” from “wa” because “wa” implies more emotional closeness than logic (Sakisaka, 1979). In order to demonstrate the culture-bound quality of “harmony,” I next describe the operation of “harmony” in the current U.S. context.
Operation of “harmony” in the modern U.S. context. Although academic examination of harmony ideology as practice has been largely missing (Beyer & Girke, 2015), this ordinary, abstract term “harmony” can be commonly found in U.S. political discourse. For example, in addition to the aforementioned speech by President-Elect Bush in 1988, U.S. President Ronald Reagan in his farewell address in 1989 utilized the terms “harmony and peace” as a part of the description of the “shining city” where people of all kinds live together (“Ronald Reagan:
Farewell,” 1989, para. 34). Prior to the election in 2016, the current U.S. president Donald Trump spoke the terms “happiness and harmony” in his foreign policy speech (“Transcript:
Donald Trump’s,” 2016, para. 73).
Further, some scholars touched on the concept of harmony. For instance, RadcliffeBrown (1935) defines “functional unity” as “a condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony” (p. 397). Based on this description, harmony could be described as an element that smoothly holds together the parts of the social system. In a relatively recent work, Nader (2002), an anthropologist, proposes the ideal of social harmony is often used to justify coercion. Regarding the U.S., the critic further argues that harmony ideology actually took an important role in expanding Protestant fundamentalism (Nader, 2002). At this point, it is clear that the ideological term “harmony” in the U.S. context does not exactly parallel the ideological term “wa” in the Japanese context, as the origin of “wa” was from Shintoism and Confucianism. Together, for the purpose of the dissertation, I would argue that the nuance of the U.S. value “harmony” contains the result of logical agreement. This logical argument is driven due to the need of balancing many differences, including different ideas and people with different cultural and historical backgrounds.
Power Lines Regarding “Wa,” “Harmony,” and Heiwa/Peace
All in all, the ideological term “harmony” in the Western context is not exactly equivalent with the ideological term “wa” in the Japanese context. However, Japanese “wa” and Western “harmony” have an overlapping reference. It is an ethic of heiwa/peace. According to the Oxford University Press (2018), the meaning of “harmony” contains a reference to “peace” or “peaceableness” (para. 4). On the other hand, the Japanese term heiwa (平和), interpreted as “peace,” is composed with hei (平) and wa (和). As noted in Chapter One, the literal meaning of hei is flat, broader, and ordinary, and wa is a motion of getting along and having a good relationship (Shinmura, 2018). Thus, the meaning of “harmony” includes the allusion to peace in the Western context while “wa” is a part of the heiwa in the Japanese context. This indicates that “harmony” and “wa” are glued within the overlapping reference to peace/heiwa.
This idea of overlapping reference is similar to the concept of power lines. Power lines are the “webs of heavy cable which crisscross the globe” (Rowe, 2008, p. 176). They allow scholars to invest in “connectivity” (p. 176). Rowe (2008; 2012) focuses on power lines with respect to transracial alliances and examines the “‘inter’ within intercultural communication,” which can be seen as the “fluid spaces” across categories of difference (Rowe, 2012, p. 216). In a similar manner, this research focuses on peace discourse that holds the connectivity and fluid space across the different nuances between “wa” and “harmony.” The above depictions of “wa” and “harmony” make it clear that they have differences, yet there is a fluid space between them. The heiwa/peace serves in the fluid space. As Rowe states (2008), power lines can allow humans to shape community within and against power relations. In addition to the ideological terms “wa” and “harmony,” the examination of such fluid spaces between these ideologies in peace discourse illuminates how speech functions toward the goal of peace. After the analysis section of ideographs in the two pairs of remarks, I argue how two ideographs are entering the intercultural context by borrowing the concepts of the power line discussed by Rowe (2008; 2012). I would further introduce the term, intercultural ideograph, as a rhetorical tool for an intercultural context.
Analysis of Remarks: <Wa> and <Harmony>
Above, I explored how “wa” can be considered as an ideology in the Japanese context as well as “harmony” can be in the U.S. context. Next, while centering on these ideological terms, I analyze how <wa> and <harmony> rhetorically and persuasively warrant the use of power to encourage audiences to construct a peaceful condition between the U.S. and Japan. The construction of a peaceful condition is related to positive peace, which is the embracement of joint collaboration on each end and mutual learning to “heal past violence and prevent future violence” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 12). Although neither Prime Minister Abe nor President Obama clearly used the term “wa” or the term “harmony,” these ideologies were invoked in the set of the speeches by hidden, symbolic ways. Because these ideologies were in practice in the political discourse, they were functioning as ideographs. The analysis section of two sets of remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe in 2016 is composed of three themes: the transformation to friends, the cluster phrase “otagai no tame ni,” and remembrance in the future.
Each of these themes enacts <harmony> and/or <wa>.
Transformation Enacting <Harmony>
The first theme is the transformation to a relationship as friends. Under this theme, the U.S. and Japan chose to transform from enemies in WWII to an alliance in the post-WWII period. This transformation enacts <harmony> in the selected speeches. More specifically, the ideological value of “harmony” is the result of logical agreement, which can unite differences. During WWII, the U.S. and Japan were “enemies who fought each other so fiercely,” as stated by Prime Minister Abe in Hiroshima (The White House, 2016a, para. 23). This means that they used to belong to different groups with different end goals. However, they became “friends bounded with spirit…[and] alliance of hope for the world” (para. 23). This indicates that they overcame the difference and then agreed to be united together, in the same manner with the U.S.
value of “harmony.” Therefore, the depiction of choosing alliance and friendship enacts the <harmony>.
In fact, although both sets of remarks repeatedly illustrated the choice to transform from enemies to friends, they actually de-emphasized the antagonistic U.S.-Japan relationship during WWII, and emphasized their friendly relationship in the post-WWII era. Putting this differently, it de-stressed the different end goals during WWII, and stressed unity after WWII. Below, I draw from both sets of speeches and explore how the political leaders de-stressed transformation from the enemy and stressed transformation to alliance. By doing so, I elucidate that, under <harmony>, the audience members were rhetorically directed to visualize the unity among two nations in the post-WWII period over the difference during wartime.
The U.S. and Japan as wartime enemies. First, I demonstrate how the political leaders de-emphasized the antagonistic U.S.-Japan relationship and de-stressed the different end goals during WWII. The first set of speeches in Hiroshima strategically elaborated the bigger picture of the history of wars and avoided solely featuring the Hiroshima bombing. As a specific example, President Obama, as the visiting political leader, rhetorically situated the Hiroshima bombing in the “history of civilization,” which is “filled with war” (para. 3). The Hiroshima bombing was framed as part of a broader world history. He further discussed how WWII happened among the wealthiest nations without clearly specifying the engagement by the U.S. and Japan. Additionally, in the earlier section of the speech he expressed that the reason for their visit was to mourn the dead, “including 100,000 Japanese, thousands of Koreans, and a dozen American war prisoners” at Hiroshima (para. 2). However, he later described the dead among some 60 million people during WWII and stated that the reason of their visit was to remember “all the innocents killed across the arc of that terrible war, and the wars that came before, and the wars that would follow” (para. 9). Thus, the dead due to the Hiroshima bombing were eventually situated within the overall dead not only from WWII but also among wars in the past, present, and future.
As the hosting political leader in Hiroshima, Prime Minister Abe followed this pattern of situating the loss from the Hiroshima bombing as a part of the larger loss from wars. For instance, he initiated his remarks by talking about his speech at the joint U.S. Congress in 2015 when he offered his eternal condolences to all of the American lives lost during WWII. He continued that he also expressed gratitude and respect for both Japanese and American people who have made a commitment to reconciliation after WWII. Here, the remark in 2016 was held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, where people most likely remember the deaths due to the Hiroshima bombing. However, Prime Minister Abe strategically articulated the death of the American side during WWII. By doing so regarding the deaths, his remarks avoided solely focusing on the ones from the Hiroshima bombing.
The second set of remarks in Pearl Harbor followed this pattern of de-emphasizing the antagonistic U.S.-Japan relationship during WWII. For instance, Prime Minister Abe as the visiting political leader offered his “sincere and everlasting condolences” not only to the souls of those who lost their lives at the harbor and in the war that was initiated by the attack, but also “the souls of the countless innocent people who became the victims of the war” (The White House, 2016b, para. 6). Prime Minister Abe avoided offering condolences solely to those who died in the Pearl Harbor attack. Thereby, the Pearl Harbor attack casualties were rhetorically positioned within the overall dead from WWII; this was very similar to how President Obama at Hiroshima, as the visiting political leader, situated the dead from the Hiroshima bombing in a larger picture of wars.
Together, both President Obama and Prime Minister Abe avoided solely focusing on the dead in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor in the 1940s. By doing so, they situated the WWII U.S.Japan relationship within the broader context of WWII, instead of specifying their relationship as enemies. It is worth noting that most of these atomic bomb victims were Japanese civilians, whereas in the reverse Japanese context of Pearl Harbor, most of those killed were U.S. soldiers
(The City of Hiroshima, 2015; United States Department of Defense, 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee, 1991). Yet these political leaders purposefully evaded these
facts.
The U.S. and Japan in a postwar alliance and friendship. While the antagonistic U.S.Japan relationship during WWII was described vaguely in the sets of speeches, both sets repeatedly and clearly defined the post-WWII U.S.-Japan relationship as an alliance and friendship (The White House, 2016a; The White House, 2016b). Therefore, audience members could visualize the allied relationship post-WWII beyond the antagonistic relationship during WWII. Furthermore, their allied relationship post-WWII was situated as being superior to their antagonistic relationship in WWII. For instance, in the first set of speeches in Hiroshima, President Obama labeled the post-WWII U.S.-Japan relationship as the alliance and friendship winning “far more for our people than we could ever claim through war” (The White House,
2016a, para. 11). Prime Minister Abe depicted it as “the alliance of hope for the world” (para.
23). Japan and the U.S. were framed as the guiding example for how former enemies can become friends, as these nations were former “enemies” and now became “friends, bonded in spirit, and have become allies, bound in trust and friendship” (para. 23).
In a similar manner as the first set of the statements in Hiroshima, Prime Minister Abe in Pearl Harbor stated that Japan and the U.S., which fought a brutal war in human history, have become “allies with deep and strong ties rarely found anywhere in history” (The White House, 2016b, para. 15). President Obama also stated that “[a]fter one of the most horrible chapters in human history…the United States and Japan chose friendship and peace” in the post-WWII era (para. 31). He added that their alliance has made both countries more successful, while the definition of the success was ambiguous. Therefore, as their relationship transformed to an alliance post-WWII, they transformed to be more successful when compared to the time period of WWII.
All in all, in the sets of speeches both President Obama and Prime Minister Abe destressed transformation from the enemy by avoiding clearly demonstrating their antagonistic relations during WWII. Rather, they stressed transformation to alliance not only by continually defining the WWII U.S.-Japan relationship as the alliance and friendship in the post-WWII period but also by describing such a relationship as stronger and more successful. By situating their allied relationship post-WWII as more visible and superior to the one during wartime, the political leaders constructed more visible “harmony,” which was the fruitful outcome of the postwar logical agreement to bond the U.S. and Japan. Accordingly, they were situating
“harmony” as superior and enacting <harmony>.
The Phrase “Otagai no tame ni: With and for Each Other” Enacting <Wa>
The second theme is the cluster phrase “otagai no tame ni: with and for one another.”
President Obama used the phrase “Otagai no tame ni: with and for each other” in the speech at Pearl Harbor in 2016 (The White House. 2016b, para. 36). This is the cluster phrase of <wa>. In order to untangle this symbolic phrase, I first trace back how President Obama diachronically used this phrase prior to the speech in 2016, and how he introduced its meaning to the international community. The introduction of the meaning is pertinent for a deeper understanding of <wa> and its cluster phrase in the selected speeches in 2016. Second, I interpret how the phrase embodies <wa> in the selected speeches.
Diachronic use of the cluster phrase in 2015. Prior to his speech at Pearl Harbor in 2016, President Obama employed the phrase of “[o]tagai no tame ni: ‘with and for each other’” at a joint press conference in the Rose Garden in April 2015 during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the U.S. (The White House, 2015, para. 1). The primary focus of their remarks in 2015 was not about the post-WWII reconciliation between the U.S. and Japan, as both political leaders mainly emphasized their joint efforts on multiple elements such as security, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, climate change, women’s dignity, and basic human rights. However, the leaders explicitly pointed out that 2015 was the year that marked 70 years since the end of WWII. For example, President Obama initiated his speech by talking about their visit together to the memorial to President Lincoln at Arlington National Cemetery. This visit was significant since President Lincoln was the person who believed that “great conflict had to be followed with reconciliation,” and their visit to his memorial was the reminder “that the past can be overcome, former adversaries can become the closest of allies, and that nations can build a future together” (para. 2). Prime Minister Abe in his remarks first thanked President Obama for allowing him to make an official visit, which was happening 70 years after the end of WWII. Thus, both political leaders at the beginning of their 2015 remarks acknowledged that 70 years had passed since the end of WWII.
Then, at the very beginning of those remarks, President Obama overtly explained the meaning of the Japanese phrase “otagai no tame ni” (para. 1). After the initial greeting, he started describing “otagai no tame ni” as:
a phrase in Japanese culture that speaks to the spirit that brings us together today. It’s an idea rooted in loyalty. It’s an expression of mutuality, respect, and shared obligation. It transcends any specific moment or challenge. It’s the foundation of a relationship that endures. It’s what allows us to say that the United States and Japan stand together. Otagai no tame ni—“with and for each other.”
This is the essence of the alliance between the United States and Japan—an alliance that holds lessons for the world [italics added]. (The White House, 2015, paras.
1–2)
The phrase was employed to describe the foundation and essence of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, which was later depicted as the “closest of allies” (para. 2) and “true partners and friends” (para. 3). As stated, the emphasis of the remarks in 2015 was the joint efforts between the U.S. and Japan on multiple components. The joint efforts emerged from their relationship as true partners and friends. Therefore, the joint efforts happened through the idea of “otagai no tame ni— ‘with and for each other’” (para. 1).
This phrase connotes the emotional closeness that allows the U.S. and Japan to situate themselves in order to develop a good interaction—in a similar manner to how the Japanese “wa” is explained (Sakisaka, 1979). The phrase further framed the joint efforts as a social gestalt in which the U.S. and Japan together can be greater than the sum of each member of the group— again in a similar manner how “wa” is explained (Genzberger, 1994). Hence, the phrase “otagai no tame ni—‘with and for each other’” can be considered as a cluster phrase of the Japanese value “wa.”
The cluster phrase at Pearl Harbor in 2016. Among the set of selected speeches from 2016, President Obama employed the cluster phrase of the Japanese value “wa” during his speech at Pearl Harbor. The phrase enacted the overarching ideograph <wa> in the speech as
President Obama stated that “we strive to be what our Japanese friends call otagai no tame ni— ‘with and for each other’ [italics added]” (The White House, 2016b, para. 36). In his speech, this concept of “otagai no tame ni—‘with and for each other’” was framed as the lessons that were indicated in the past, have been learned in the present, and would be chosen in the future.
Specifically, in the past this concept of “otagai no tame ni—‘with and for each other’ [italics added]” (para. 36) was depicted as the lesson of both American and Japanese military personnel after the attack. More specifically, the American Captain William Callaghan of Missouri ordered American sailors to wrap Japanese pilots with Japanese flags so that the pilots could be laid to rest with military honors. Also, a Japanese pilot returned to Pearl Harbor years later and became friends with a Marine bugler. He asked his friend to play “Taps” every month at the memorial as well as to throw in one rose for American deaths and one rose for Japanese deaths. President Obama utilized their specific actions to clarify the lesson of both American and
Japanese military personnel; this lesson embodies the symbolic phrase of “otagai no tame ni— ‘with and for each other’ [italics added]” (para. 36).
In the present, the lesson of “otagai no tame ni” could be sustained in ordinary ways among both American and Japanese peoples. For example, the lesson can be learned through studying abroad in each country and working together in a scientific field. Furthermore, a wellknown Japanese baseball player, Ichiro, who now plays in the U.S., symbolizes this lesson as well as the shared pride and unity in peace and friendship. In the future, the U.S. and Japan can choose this lesson of “otagai no tame ni” in order for them to illustrate their own futures.
Thus, this concept of “otagai no tame ni” is the lesson that both American and Japanese military personnel indicated in the past, both American and Japanese ordinary people have learned in the present, and both Americans and Japanese as a nation and people would choose in the future. The lesson of “otagai no tame ni” connotes their closeness, which helps the U.S. and Japan develop a good interaction in the present and future. As stated, the phrase of “otagai no tame ni—‘with and for each other’ [italics added” (para. 35) is a cluster phrase of the Japanese value “wa.” Therefore, the phrase enacted the implied, overarching ideograph <wa> in the selected speech.
Remembrance in the Future Enacting <Harmony> and <Wa>
The third theme is the remembrance for the future. This theme enacts both <harmony> and <wa> in the selected speeches. More specifically, the sets of remarks in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor invited the audience to remember four components in the future: (1) the “story…that describes a common humanity” (The White House, 2016a, para. 17); (2) “Hiroshima as the start of our moral awakening” (para. 21); (3) the lesson (The White House, 2016b, para.39); and (4) “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” (para. 18). All components enact <wa> while the fourth component, “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation,” enforces both <harmony> and <wa> (para. 18). Below, I unpack how each component enacts <harmony> and/or <wa> in the sets of speeches.
Remembering stories about a common humanity. The first set of the speeches in
Hiroshima encouraged the audience to remember the stories that talk about “a common humanity” (The White House, 2016a, para. 15). Such remembrance enacts <wa> in the set of speeches in Hiroshima. More specifically, President Obama as the visiting political leader stated:
we must reimagine our connection to one another as members of one human race. For this, too, is what makes our species unique. We’re not bound by genetic code to repeat the mistakes of the past. We can learn. We can choose. We can tell our children a different story—one that describes a common humanity; one that makes war less likely and cruelty less easily accepted. (para. 15)
As a side note about this paragraph, the story that makes war less acceptable is prompting both negative peace, which is “absence of war” and “absence of violence” (Galtung, 1964, p. 20), and positive peace, which is the condition of assisting the “presence of positive relations” among human groups (Galtung, 1967, p. 14). Here, the story described by President Obama already symbolizes the Japanese value of “wa” because one meaning of “wa” is the “ethic of…peace” in a social community (Genzberger, 1994, p. 155).
Yet the idea of a common humanity symbolizes the value of “wa.” In order to crystalize what he meant by “a common humanity” (para. 15), President Obama explored the stories in hibakusha as well as the story connected with the Declaration of Independence in the U.S.
Hibakusha is the Japanese word meaning the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.
(As a side note, President Obama utilized the Japanese word, hibakusha [被爆者], instead of its English translation.) The story in hibakusha included the action by two specific surviving hibakusha. One action by a hibakusha was forgiving the pilot who dropped the atomic bombs, because what she hated was war itself. Another hibakusha sought out the families of the Americans who were prisoners and ended up dying in Hiroshima, as their loss was equivalent to his own.
Although President Obama did not specify the names of these hibakusha in the speech, Koko Kondo was the first and Shigeru Mori is the second. Mr. Mori was invited to participate in this remark, and the picture of hugs between Mr. Mori and President Obama following his speech was reported across the globe (McCurry, 2016; Takeuchi, Yamada, & Tanabe, 2017; Satou & Okamoto, 2016). At this point, the survivors of the atomic bombings situated themselves within the larger group by choosing forgiveness instead of hatred and seeing the equality of both American and Japanese lives. They integrated themselves for the harmony of the group, in this case among the U.S. and Japan. Thereby, the story of their actions symbolized the value of “wa.”
In addition to the story in hibakusha, President Obama illustrated another story by stating that “My own nation’s story began with simple words: All men are created equal, and endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (para. 17). Although it was not specified, the phrase came from the United States Declaration of Independence (The National Archives, 2017). The story connected with the
Declaration of Independence could be appealing to the American audience as it helped President Obama to establish a common ground by acknowledging shared values among Americans. This is a classical rhetorical strategy to establish ethos (Aristotle, 2008). Additionally, this story highlights a common humanity because this story is the “notion that we are part of a single human family” (para. 18). The notion connotes that “we” as individuals or nations are integrated for harmony within one human family. Thus, the story connected with the Declaration of
Independence also symbolizes the value of “wa.”
All in all, the story in hibakusha and the one connected with the United States’
Declaration of Independence describes a common humanity, which needs to be told to the children (para. 15). Because children are the ones who will carry the stories to the future, the story of common humanity is encouraged to be remembered in the future. The remembrance of such stories symbolizing “wa” enacts <wa> in the selected set of speeches.
Remembering Hiroshima as the start of moral awakening. Second, the first set of the speeches in Hiroshima further encouraged the audience to remember Hiroshima as “the start of our own moral awakening” (The White House, 2016a, para. 21). Along with the aforementioned remembrance of the stories about a common humanity, the remembrance of Hiroshima in this specific way enacts <wa>. More specifically, President Obama ended his remarks in Hiroshima by stating that:
The world was forever changed here [in Hiroshima]. But today, the children of this city will go through their day in peace. What a precious thing that is. It is worth protecting, and then extending to every child. That is the future we can choose—a future in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki are known not as the dawn of atomic warfare, but as the start of our own moral awakening. (The White House, 2016a, para. 21)
The choice to remember Hiroshima as the start of moral awakening is situated opposite of the choice to remember Hiroshima as the dawn of atomic warfare. This comparison of moral awakening and atomic warfare is related to the comparison of “scientific revolution” with “moral revolution” and science revolution without it (para. 8). Here, the science with moral revolution situates itself on the opposite side of the science without moral revolution. The science with moral revolution can value a common humanity, while the science without moral revolution could cause the loss of innocent lives. President Obama used the either-or fallacy, which rhetorically offers only two choices when in reality there are more than two, or there can be middle-ground positions rather than one or the other (Lucas, 2015). I argue that, through this strategical ploy, this moral revolution is enacting <wa>.
More clearly, in the comparison of science revolutions, President Obama described that science without moral revolution could become an “ever-more efficient killing machine” (para. 7) and lead humans to doom themselves (para. 8). The outcome of such science was described as the moment when the bomb dropped in Hiroshima and all innocents died, not only in Hiroshima but also across the wars. This description of science without moral revolution does not symbolize the value of “wa.” However, as President Obama said, “Hiroshima teach[es] [the] truth,” which is both the tragic outcome of science without moral revolution and the necessity of moral revolution for the science to progress (para. 8).
Hence, Hiroshima on one hand can be “the dawn of the atomic warfare” (para. 21), where the atomic bomb killed innocent people due to science without moral revolution. On the other hand, it can be the start of our own moral awakening (para. 21) wherein the memory of the moment in Hiroshima stimulates “moral imagination” and allows people to change (para. 10). This means that moral imagination along with a moral revolution for progress in science can lead people to the aforementioned “story…that describes a common humanity” (para. 15). Therefore, the remembrance of Hiroshima as the start of moral awakening is treating humans as a common humanity, which is symbolizing “wa,” as discussed. Hence, the remembrance of Hiroshima as the start of moral awakening enacts <wa>.
Remembering the lesson of “Otagai o tame ni—With and for each other.” Third, the second set of speeches in Pearl Harbor invited the audience to remember the lesson of “[o]tagai no tame ni” (The White House, 2016b, para. 36). As explored in the above section, the phrase of “[o]tagai no tame ni—‘with and for each other’” (para. 36) is a cluster phrase of the Japanese value “wa.” The lesson of “otagai no tame ni” is embodied in this cluster phrase. Thus, the lesson enacts <wa> in the set of speeches. In the speech, while recommending this lesson,
President Obama stated that the U.S. and Japan as nations and Americans and Japanese as people
“can choose what lessons to draw from it” and “use those lessons to chart our own futures” (The
White House, 2016b, para. 39). As the lesson enacting <wa> is encouraged to be chosen for the U.S.-Japanese future, the remembrance of this lesson in the future enacts <wa> as well.
Remembering Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation. The second set of speeches further encouraged the audience to remember “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation,” which enacts both <harmony> and <wa> (The White House, 2016b, para. 18). Prime Minister Abe ended his remarks at Pearl Harbor by stating that:
Pearl Harbor. It is precisely this inlet, flowing like shimmering pearls, that is a symbol of tolerance and reconciliation. It is my wish that our Japanese children and—President Obama, your American children, and, indeed, their children and grandchildren—and people all around the world will continue to remember Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation.
We will spare no efforts to continue our endeavors to make that wish a reality. Together with President Obama, I hereby make my steadfast pledge. Thank you very much [italics added]. (The White House, 2016b, paras. 18–19)
Below, I first explore how the remembrance of “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” (para. 18) enacts <harmony>. Second, I explore how it enacts <wa> while also elucidating the term “tolerance.”
“Symbol of reconciliation” enacting <harmony>. To begin, it is important to discuss one of the meanings of reconciliation, which is an “action or an act of bringing a thing or things to agreement, concord, or harmony; the fact of being made consistent or compatible” (Oxford University Press, 2018b, para. 16). By following the clear connection between the meanings of reconciliation and harmony, the reconciliation by the U.S. and Japan is the action that led them to harmony. This connection is paralleled with a statement delivered by Prime Minister Abe: “what has binded [sic] us together is the hope of the reconciliation made through the spirit, the tolerance” (The White House, 2016a, para. 16). This indicates that the hope of reconciliation united two different countries in a similar manner with the value of harmony, which described the result of logical agreement that can resolve differences. Hence, the reconciliation can be seen as the cluster word of the ideological value of “harmony.” In fact, the word “reconciliation” was spread throughout the speeches. For instance, Prime Minister Abe utilized the phrase “power of reconciliation” three times (para. 16; para. 17), the phrase “symbol of reconciliation” twice (para. 18), and the phrase “hope of reconciliation” once (para. 16). The term “reconciliation” enacts <harmony> in the selected speeches. In addition, President Obama utilized the phrase “the power of reconciliation” (para. 20).
Furthermore, President Obama described “reconciliation” in parallel ways with peace: “a message to the world that there is more to be won in peace than in war; that reconciliation carries more rewards than retribution” (para. 40). Here, what the world can gain in peace is parallel with the reward through reconciliation. Peace and reconciliation were situated as superior than what the world can win in war, which is paralleled with reward by retribution. As the reward by “reconciliation” was positioned as greater than other rewards, “reconciliation” is more easily recognized among the audiences as more acceptable and laudable. While “reconciliation” of the U.S. and Japan symbolizes the “harmony” of these countries, the value of “harmony” is also acknowledged among the audience as more acceptable and laudable. Therefore, as the reconciliation can enforce <harmony> as an implied ideograph in the selected speeches, the remembrance of “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” can further enact <harmony>
(para. 18).
“Symbol of reconciliation” enacting <wa>. Next, I focus on how a “symbol of reconciliation” enacted <wa> (para. 18). I first briefly discuss the Japanese word “wakai,” which means reconciliation in English. Then, I explain the term tolerance, which allows
“reconciliation” to enact <wa> in the second set of speeches. To begin, I focus on the Japanese term “wakai[和解].” Prime Minister Abe at Pearl Harbor often utilized this Japanese word “wakai [和解],” which was translated as “reconciliation” in English. The character of “wa[和]” in the word “wakai [和解]” is the same Japanese character as the Japanese value of “wa[和],” while “kai[解]” literally means “understanding.” Remembrance of “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” (para. 18) already contains the Japanese value “wa” as “wa” is one of two characters used to create the word “wakai [和解]” in Japanese or “reconciliation” in English.
In addition to the significant connection between “wa[和]” and “wakai [和解],” the term
“tolerance” is the key component to explain how a “symbol of reconciliation” can enforce <wa>. For example, tolerance was framed as the foundational component of reconciliation, because the spirit of tolerance made the hope of reconciliation possible, as said by Prime Minister Abe (para.
16). Also, the term “tolerance” was often paralleled with the term “reconciliation”: for example, Pearl Harbor was described as “a symbol of tolerance and reconciliation” only one sentence before the phrase “a symbol of reconciliation” (para. 18). Below, I untangle the term “tolerance” so that it becomes clear how “reconciliation” and “tolerance” enact <wa> in the set of speeches.
By doing so, I argue that “tolerance” is a cluster word of “wa” and it further allows
“reconciliation” to enact <wa>.
More precisely, Prime Minister Abe in his remarks portrayed “the spirit of tolerance” as the spirit of the American people post-WWII, while illustrating several past actions by the U.S. and the American people that symbolized their tolerance (para. 10). For example, the U.S.
government and private citizens sent Japanese people food and clothes when Japan was a ruined and burned country, even after the U.S. and Japan had fought fiercely. Abe further stated that “it was the United States that opened up the path for Japan to return to the international community once more after the war” (para. 11).
Here, the spirit of tolerance is embedded in the American response to the war. The actions that emerged from such a spirit of tolerance could be seemingly portrayed as the actions in which Americans contributed their personal efforts to the needs of the Japanese community, instead of walking away from the community. These actions perform the ethic of “wa,” which integrates “individuals for the harmony and balance of the group” (Bauman, 1994, p. 13).
Specifically, these actions derived from the spirit of tolerance in America first allowed the Japanese people to survive in the burned-out community and afterward allowed Japan to return to the international community. As the spirit of tolerance is the foundation for reconciliation between the U.S. and Japan, these actions eventually allowed both nations to reconcile differences. Thus, as the spirit of tolerance made reconciliation happen, as a result of this reconciliation the U.S. and Japan achieved harmony in order to develop good interactions as allies and friends, similar in manner to the value of “wa.” Hence, through the expression of tolerance, reconciliation functions as a cluster word of “wa” and enacts <wa> in the set of speeches. All in all, remembrance of “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” includes remembrance of tolerance embedded in Americans who first contributed their personal will to the needs of the Japanese community, and second allowed both the U.S. and Japan to have a post-WWII reconciliation. This followed the description of Pearl Harbor as “a symbol of tolerance and reconciliation” as also said by Prime Minister Abe (para. 18). Hence, the remembrance of “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” enacts <wa> in the second set of speeches (para. 18). Assembling the two points together, the remembrance of “Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation” indicated both values of “harmony” and “wa” and further enacted
<harmony> and <wa>.
Above, I revealed the third theme, which was remembrance in the future. There were four elements to remember in the future: the story of a common humanity, Hiroshima as the start of our moral awakening, the lesson, and Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation. The first three elements symbolized “wa” and further enacted <wa>. The fourth one symbolized “harmony” and “wa” and enacted <harmony> and <wa>.
Conclusion: <Wa> and <Harmony> in an Intercultural Context
Chapter Three has focused on the sets of speeches by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe in 2016 at Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima. While applying the rhetorical concept of ideographs, it elucidated how <wa> and <harmony> rhetorically and persuasively warranted the use of rhetorical powers by these political leaders. In doing so, this chapter answered the second sub-question of the dissertation: how does the set of milestone speeches by the President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of Japan rhetorically function in the long-term peacebuilding process in the intercultural context? To conclude, I first provide a condensed summary of the analysis. Second, I reinforce the argument that <wa> and <harmony> were ideographs in the remarks. Then, I propose that <wa> and <harmony> together functioned as one intercultural ideograph in the specific intercultural context between the U.S. and Japan.
Condensed Summary About the Themes Enacting <Harmony> and <Wa>
The analysis of the two sets of remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe in 2016 revealed three themes. The first theme was the postwar transformation to alliance. This theme enacted <harmony>. Through the continuous description of the superior allied relationship between the postwar U.S. and Japan, the remarks justified the concept of harmony, in this case the positive outcome of their logical agreement to bond these nations in the postwar time. The second theme was the value of “Otagai no tame ni: With and for each other” enacting <wa>. It was the valued lesson for both Americans and Japanese in the past, present, and future. The third theme was remembrance in the future. The four sub-elements to remember in the future enacted <wa> and <harmony>. Altogether, through <wa> and <harmony>, the sets of their speeches rhetorically encouraged their audience to accept the engagement with positive peace: the embracement of joint collaboration on both ends, and mutual learning to “heal past violence and prevent future violence” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 12).
<Wa> and <Harmony> as Ideographs in the Remarks
Second, I strengthen the argument that <wa> and <harmony> were ideographs in the sets of speeches by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe. More specifically, as discussed, the characteristics of an ideograph are: (1) an ordinary term in political discourse; (2) an abstract term signifying collective commitment; (3) a term justifying the practice of power and certain behaviors and beliefs as acceptable; and (4) a culture-bound term (McGee, 1980, p. 15). Regarding the first, second, and fourth characters, I actively reviewed how “wa” and “harmony” are ordinary, abstract terms, each of which is embedded in the Japanese or U.S. cultural context. In addition, in this analysis section I profoundly elucidated how “wa” and “harmony” were implied overarching values in the sets of the political remarks. Here, with close attention on the third characteristic, I demonstrate that both <wa> and <harmony> avoided backlash, and rather justified certain behaviors and beliefs among the U.S. and Japanese audiences to accept the engagement with positive peace.
Reactions toward the first set of the remarks in Hiroshima. The first set of remarks in Hiroshima was largely appreciated by the Japanese audience, including surviving hibakusha, the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. For example, a nationwide telephone opinion poll conducted by Kyodo News showed that 98 percent answered that President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was “good” (“Naikaku shiji ritsu,” 2016). In addition, surviving hibakusha expressed positive opinions and thoughts toward his visits while some expressed “prudent viewpoints” (“Mr. Obama shi Hiroshima,” 2016). For instance, The Mainichi, one of Japan’s national dailies, reported how survivors recalled President Obama’s visit one year after. They particularly appreciated the impact of the historic visit, although they expressed concerns over the lack of progress in nuclear weapon abolition (Takeuchi, Yamada, & Tanabe, 2017). This article included positive comments about the visit from some survivors such as Shigeaki Mori and Koko Kondo. Mori is the hibakusha “who sought out families of Americans killed here, because he believed their loss was equal to his own,” as President Obama mentioned in his speech in 2016 (The
White House, 2016a, para. 16). He additionally built a memorial to the American soldiers in Hiroshima (Ryall, 2016). Kondo was the hibakusha “who forgave a pilot who flew the plane that dropped the atomic bomb,” as President Obama said (The White House, 2016a, para. 16). She met the co-pilot of the Enola Gay 10 years after the bombings and learned that the parties that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima were also deeply hurt (Takeuchi, Yamada, & Tanabe, 2017). In addition to these two, other hibakusha have frequently offered positive expressions to the 2016 remarks in Hiroshima.
Of course, some people voiced dissatisfaction on certain points. For instance, the opinion poll showed that 18 percent answered “there was a need for apologies,” while 75 percent answered “there was no need for the apologies” (“Naikaku shiji ritsu,” 2016, para. 1). This 75percent rate reflected various feelings; for example, some people felt that “[hibakusha or
Hiroshima residents] could not live only with hatred” (“Obama Hiroshima hōmon,” 2016, para. 26) and others felt “only the prayer for the soul of the dead is even a huge step,” as the U.S. had not paid any attention to the lost ones in Hiroshima (para. 28). Thus, apologies were desired by minorities. Regardless of some voices of frustration, the remarks in Hiroshima received overwhelming support from the Japanese audience, as the public polls and surviving hibakusha have expressed (“Naikaku shiji ritsu,” 2016; “Obama Hiroshima hōmon,” 2016; Takeuchi, Yamada, & Tanabe, 2017). Therefore, as following the third character of ideographs, the remarks justified the Japanese audience in accepting the engagement with positive peace.
Regarding the U.S. audience, the vital audience members were veterans and former prisoners of war. The reactions from key individuals from U.S. organizations representing veterans were framed as “lukewarm” in The Guardian (Smith, 2016, para. 14) and “bittersweet” in USA Today (Zoroya, 2016, para. 10). For example, Garry Augustine, an executive director for
Disabled American Veterans with 1.3 million members, thought the remarks by President Obama “went well” (para. 5). Joe Davis, a spokesman for Veterans of Foreign Wars with 1.2 million members, offered one statement that “‘a world without conflict is a vision we should all share’” (para. 4). This statement by Davis was introduced in Japanese media as well (“Obama’s Hiroshima visit,” 2016).
Such lukewarm responses could potentially emerge due to the lack of expression of apologies by President Obama. For instance, according to an article in USA Today, Rhonda Powell, the national security director of the American Legion, which is the largest veterans’ group with 2.2 million members, told Japanese media that they “definitely support [President
Obama’s] decision to not apologize because…it would dishonor those who sacrificed’” (Zoroya, 2016, para. 9). Along with this example, the comments by multiple veterans and prisoners of war together demonstrated that an apology would not have been well-received in the U.S. Hence, the remarks in Hiroshima without an apology successfully avoided huge criticism from the key U.S audiences, such as veterans and former prisoners of war. In addition, as revealed above, an apology was not desired by the majority of Japanese either; thus, the remarks without an apology functioned nicely for both the U.S. and Japanese audiences.
Certainly, the remarks received some criticisms from certain U.S. audiences. For example, the moral revolution proposed by President Obama will not end the spread of nuclear weapons (“Obama’s Hiroshima Genie,” 2016). Yet, as the responses by the veterans showed, the symbolic visit to Hiroshima and remarks were seen as bittersweet and lukewarm, and did not receive huge criticism from veterans. This reaction was actually important because it was different from the fierce opposition expressed in the 1990s by veterans against the Smithsonian’s proposal of an Enola Gay exhibit. Veterans in the 1990s actively expressed opposition when the Smithsonian vainly aimed to display the Enola Gay using a critical pedagogical approach, which potentially would have built sympathy for the Japanese (Horowitz, 1994). Compared to the ferocious opposition in the 1990s, the veterans reacted much more favorably to the remarks in
2016 in Hiroshima, which have built a certain level of sympathy for the Japanese, respectively. The third character of ideograph can explain this lukewarm, favorable response, which showed that the U.S. audience allowed themselves to build sympathy and accordingly accepted the engagement with positive peace with Japan by having a mutual learning experience and healing the past violence.
Reactions toward the second set of the remarks in Pearl Harbor. The second set of the remarks in Pearl Harbor was also largely welcomed by Japanese audiences. According to the nation-wide telephone opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri News, 85 percent answered that they “appreciate” Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor (“Naikaku shiji ritsu,” 2016, para. 4). Also, 83 percent answered that they “appreciate” his speech, which expressed his determination to not repeat the war again and emphasized the “‘power of reconciliation’” (para. 5). In addition to the poll, former Japanese soldiers expressed their positive responses. For example, Masaru
Kusama, a 100-year-old former engineering officer, watched the remarks by both Prime Minister Abe and President Obama on TV, and then thanked Prime Minister Abe, who carried the “‘true feelings of Japanese citizens and those… who took part in the war’” (“Abe’s Pearl Harbor Visit,” 2016, para. 3). Unquestionably, there were some criticisms; for example, “‘there was no apology, and it wasn’t stimulating for the people of Japan” (para. 5) was said by Kuniyoshi Takimoto, a 95-year-old former mechanic for Japanese fighters “that roared off…to launch their assault on
Pearl Harbor in 1941” (para. 4). Yet, as the poll showed, the general reaction was positive from Japanese audiences toward the remarks in Pearl Harbor. Thus, by following the third characteristic of ideographs, through the <wa>, the Japanese audience lauded the remarks in Pearl Harbor and their engagement with positive peace.
Meanwhile, the U.S. audience, especially the locals in Hawaii and the Pearl Harbor witnesses, mostly welcomed the remarks by Prime Minister Abe. Joe Rise, an 85-year-old resident of Honolulu, commented that “war was a thing of the past” for many individuals and he
“welcomed” his [Abe’s] visit, as well as saying that “[he] didn’t feel uncomfortable about … the term ‘reconciliation,’” which used by Prime Minister Abe (“Abe’s Pearl Harbor Visit,” 2016, para. 9). Furthermore, the U.S. media, such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal, consistently reported that Prime Minister Abe did not apologize while he offered repentance and condolence, in a similar manner with the response toward the remarks in Hiroshima (e.g., Lee, 2016; Nakamura & Lyte, 2016; Schmidt, 2016). Yet Allan Seiden, a 72year-old Honolulu journalist who interviewed surviving U.S. soldiers of the attack on Pearl Harbor, offered following comments: although an apology was not offered, Prime Minister Abe’s “tribute to those who died was actually a positive news” and his visit would even have a positive effect on those U.S. soldiers who still have something against Japan (“Abe’s Pearl Harbor Visit,” 2016, para. 10). Therefore, through <harmony> in the speech, certain U.S.
audiences accepted the remarks in Pearl Harbor and healed a scar made by the past violence in the 1940s.
All in all, the remarks in 2016 in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor received relatively positive and favorable reactions by both Japanese and U.S. audiences. By following the third characteristic of an ideograph, these remarks enacting <wa> and <harmony> avoided backlash. Instead, they justified the engagement with positive peace for both audiences. Thereby, <wa> in these remarks functioned as a Japanese ideograph, as it engaged with all four characteristics of an ideograph: (1) it was an implied ordinary term found in political discourse; (2) it was an abstract term signifying collective commitment among Japanese; (3) it justified the engagement with positive peace as acceptable and laudable; and (4) it was a term bounded in Japanese culture. Similarly, <harmony> in the remarks in 2016 functioned as an U.S. ideograph: (1) it was an implied ordinary term found in political discourse; (2) it was an abstract term signifying collective commitment among Americans; (3) it justified the engagement with positive peace as acceptable and laudable, and; (4) it was a term bounded in U.S. culture. Through the use of each <wa> and <harmony>, the remarks rhetorically and persuasively encouraged their audience to accept the engagement with positive peace.
<Wa> and <Harmony> as an Intercultural Ideograph
While <wa> was a Japanese ideograph, <harmony> was a U.S. ideograph in these two pairs of speeches in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor. In this section I propose that <wa> and <harmony> together functioned as one intercultural ideograph. More precisely, I argue that the specific Japanese ideograph and U.S. ideograph had the “‘inter’ within intercultural communication,” which can be seen as the “fluid spaces” across the categories of difference as I borrow the words from Rowe (2012, p. 216). As discussed in the earlier section of the “Power Lines Regarding to ‘Wa,’ ‘Harmony,’ and Heiwa[平和]/Peace,” the Japanese value of “wa” and the Western value of “harmony” have a fluid space across their different nuances. The value of peace/heiwa [平和] serves in the fluid space.
Thus, peace/heiwa in the fluid space glued <wa> and <harmony> in the remarks in 2016 in the intercultural context between the U.S and Japan. Here, while <harmony> fully navigated the U.S. audience to be conditioned to accept the engagement with positive peace with Japan, the fluid space with <wa> was taking a role to justify the commitment to positive peace. Similarly, while <wa> fully navigated Japanese audience to be situated to accept the engagement with positive peace with the U.S., the fluid space with <harmony> was justifying the commitment to positive peace. This means that, through the shared reference of peace/heiwa in the fluid space,
<wa> and <harmony> together warranted the commitment to positive peace for both the
Japanese audience and the U.S. audience.
All in all, I propose anew that <wa> and <harmony> together performed as one intercultural ideograph in the postwar intercultural context between Japan and the U.S. This intercultural ideograph, which is composed with <wa> and <harmony>, allowed the intercultural audiences to laud together for the idea of engaging with a positive peace: the embracement of joint collaboration on each end and mutual learning to “heal past violence” during WWII and to “prevent future violence” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 12). Therefore, U.S. President Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Abe together rhetorically utilized this intercultural ideograph in the sets of remarks in 2016 in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor. The intercultural ideograph contributed rhetorical power to the peacebuilding process over the roughly 70-year span of peacebuilding initiatives in the intercultural context between these two societies.
CHAPTER IV. PEACE DECLARATION AS RITUAL SPEECH: PROCESS OF GUILT-
REDEMPTION FOR INTERCULTURAL PEACEBUILDING
As mentioned in Chapter One, in 2016 I learned that my 91-year-old grandmother was a surviving hibakusha, a victim of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. In the summer of 2017, I visited Japan and took some time to talk with my grandmother about her experience of the Hiroshima bombing, which I had never heard from her before. Over 70 years later, she still vividly remembered that day of the bombing: what she was doing and where she was prior to the bombing as well as what she did, experienced, and witnessed after the atomic bomb was dropped. Yet, she said that she has almost never talked about her experience to people, even to her children. In the end, she added that “the war is really disgusting [sensou tte hontou ni iya ne].
There is nothing good [Nanni mo ii koto nai].”
This chapter describes and interprets the symbolic, ritual statements in what is commonly known as the Peace Declaration [heiwa sengen/平和宣言], delivered by the Mayor of
Hiroshima. It is also called the Hiroshima Peace Declaration to differentiate it from the speech delivered by the Mayor of Nagasaki and the Governor of Okinawa. This Peace Declaration has been delivered on August 6th every year since 1947, two years after the atomic bomb was dropped, except in 1950 (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.a). August 6, 1945, is the day the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. It is important to note that the Hiroshima Peace Declaration is not delivered by the Japanese government. Rather, it is delivered by the City of Hiroshima. While the City of Hiroshima annually holds a Peace Memorial Ceremony [heiwa kinen shikiten / 平和記念式典] during which the Peace Declaration is delivered, the hope is that the ceremony will become a global event to carry “Hiroshima’s desire for lasting peace to the people of the world” (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.b). The Peace Declaration by the City of Hiroshima implores listeners to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the “establishment of lasting world peace” so that “no other people in the world would have to suffer tragedies” as did those who experienced the suffering in Hiroshima (para. 10).
Specifically, this chapter focuses on the Peace Declarations delivered in 2015, 2016, and 2017 by Mayor Matsui of Hiroshima (Matsui, 2015, 2016, 2017). 2015 was the 75th year anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. On August 14, 2015, the Japanese Prime Minister Abe delivered Abe’s danwa, which I examined in Chapter Two. 2016 was the same year that U.S. President Obama visited Hiroshima and Japan’s Prime Minister Abe visited Pearl Harbor. The remarks by President Obama in Hiroshima are examined in Chapter Three. The most recent remarks among the selected speeches were delivered in 2017 following these significant commemorations. The attendees at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in 2015, 2016, and 2017 included representatives from 100 countries, representatives from the European Union, a representative from the United Nations, and Japanese political officials (Kawate, 2015;
Takeshita, 2017; United Nations Information Center, 2015, 2016, 2017; Wada, 2016).
The Hiroshima Peace Declaration is a ritual speech for the initiation of the peacebuilding process in the international community. Thus, this chapter focuses on the rhetorical efforts in the Peace Declaration to transform the international community into a force for living in a peaceful environment. Applying Burkean concepts, the sub-question to be answered in this chapter is: how does the recent annual Peace Declaration rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding? Addressing this question elucidates how the Peace Declaration engages a re-humanizing ritual as opposed to an enemy-making de-humanizing ritual. Re-humanization is “a process that re-identifies a previously devalued individual as uniquely human again” while both victim and offender need to be in the process together (Aoki & Jonab, 2016, p. 248). On the other hand, de-humanization is the process that deprives individuals from their humanness and denies human qualities. In the U.S. context during WWII, the enemy nations, including Italy, Germany, and Japan, were dehumanized through the U.S. administration’s propaganda, which invited soldiers and civilians to perceive their war enemies as inferior and deserving of defeat (Fussell, 1989).
Below, I first introduce the connections between the postwar peace discourse in
Hiroshima and the 1945 Hiroshima bombing. Second, I provide the background to the Peace Declarations in 2015, 2016, and 2017. Third, I review the guiding Burkean concepts of this chapter: consubstantiality, guilt-redemption known as the rhetoric of rebirth, and their associated concepts. Fourth, I provide an analysis of the Hiroshima Peace Declaration. I conclude the chapter by discussing the policymakers as a paradox sacrificial redeemer, rhetorical challenges due to the root of the guilt within the intercultural tension, and the Hiroshima Peace Declarations as a re-humanizing ritual.
Postwar Hiroshima Peace Discourse and the 1945 Hiroshima Bombing
In this section, I present the interconnectivity between peace discourse in postwar Hiroshima and the Hiroshima bombing on August 6, 1945. I first introduce the different emphasis to collectively remember the 1945 Hiroshima bombing in the current U.S., Japan, and the international community. Then, I show the uniqueness of Hiroshima, not only in the international community, but even within Japanese society. Last, I recognize the previous critiques for the postwar Hiroshima peace discourse and disclose my position regarding these critiques. These reviews locate Hiroshima at an intercultural junction while explaining how the peace discourse spreads out from Hiroshima to the international communities and to other parts of Japan.
Different Collective Memories of the Hiroshima Bombing
First, it is vital to review the collective memories of the Hiroshima bombing in the U.S.
and in Hiroshima. Previous scholars in communication studies, American studies, and historical studies revealed that the U.S. and Hiroshima have different collective memories or cultural memories about the Hiroshima bombing (e.g., Fields, 2015; Giamo, 2003; Hubbard & Hasian, 1998a, 1998b; Masumoto, 2015; Mishler, 2008; Prosise, 1998; Williams, 2007). Broadly speaking, the U.S. remembrance has underlined the atomic bombing as the “victory in war and scientific achievement” while Hiroshima (and Japanese) memories has emphasized the “loss of lives and environment” due to the bombing (Field, 2015, p. 54). For example, the Bradbury Science Museum (BSM) in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum in Hiroshima, Japan, have evoked different messages and meanings regarding the Hiroshima bombing (Fields, 2015; Masumoto, 2015; Williams, 2007). Below, the condensed review of the unique emphasis in each museum reveals different collective memories. Attendance at each museum varies; for instance, the BSM had about 100,000 visitors per year, and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum had a total of 1,739,986 visitors, including 366,779 international visitors in fiscal year 2016 (Field, 2015; Noda, 2017).
The BSM’s mission has been “to interpret Laboratory research, activities, and history…; to promote greater public understanding of the Laboratory’s role in national security programs; to assist the taxpaying public in making informed judgments in these matters; and to contribute to visitors’ knowledge of science and technology,” according to Fields (2015, p. 61). The display of the items related to the Hiroshima bombing emphasizes the scientific inventiveness of producing the first atomic bomb, the advancement of engaging in nuclear research, and the importance of defending the nation. The BSM reaffirms the narrative of the U.S. collective memory, in which the atomic bomb is remembered as a political decision to win and end the war and save lives (Fields, 2015; Masumoto, 2015). Here, the U.S. collective narrative has belonged to the celebratory genre, which asks the American audiences to remember veterans, including the one who dropped the nuclear bomb, as heroes and heroines of war (Hubbard & Hasian, 1998b). The BSM’s narrative has situated the Hiroshima bombing as the end of WWII while additionally framing it as “the dawn of ‘the Atomic age’” (Masumoto, 2015, p. 155). Together, the dominant narrative in the U.S. community has remembered Hiroshima as the site where the U.S. as the hero engaged with the scientific innovation of the first atomic bombing, the progress of nuclear research, and the significance of securing and defending the nation. In this sense, Hiroshima itself and the Hiroshima bombing signifies the end of WWII.
On the other hand, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has highlighted the human loss instead of focusing on the scientific inventiveness of the atomic bomb. The museum has displayed the belongings left by victims, artifacts affected by the bombing, testimonies by the surviving victims, and photos of dead and suffering victims, and the burned town (Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Museum, 2016). Its brochure, which was available in 10 languages, including English, Korean, and Chinese, stated that these exhibited items represented “the grief, anger, or pain of real people” (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, n.d., para. 2). It continued by stating that, having now been rebuilt from the atomic bomb damage, “Hiroshima’s deepest wish is the realization of a genuinely peaceful international community” without nuclear weapons (para. 2). I collected the brochure during my visit to the museum in 2017 and retrieved it from its official website in July 2018. Here, its central narrative has evoked empathy by highlighting the human loss (Field, 2015).
Furthermore, the museum has guided the visitors to understand that war itself was responsible for nuclear destruction and victimization (Masumoto, 2015; Giamo, 2003). The museum seldom mentioned the U.S., which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. It actively expressed prayer, instead of explicit blame. For example, Masumoto (2015), who examined the collective memories both in the BSM and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, introduces the inscription on the cenotaph in the stone. The inscription states that: “All the souls here rest in peace, for we shall not repeat the evil” (p. 144). It articulates the wish of the people of Hiroshima for endless peace in the world and the strength of mind that “the human race will never again ‘repeat the evil’” (Masumoto, 2015). While “the evil” signifies the atomic bomb, the central message becomes a universal message of world peace and abolishment of nuclear weapons. By sending such a message, the narrative turns the Hiroshima bombing into a beginning, in which Hiroshima becomes the “messenger of peace” due to the obligation to the victims (p. 154).
Hence, through the display of multiple items affected by the Hiroshima bombing, the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Museum has allowed visitors to remember the sufferings among the people in Hiroshima, has evoked empathy, and has transformed various aspects into a message of peace.
In assembling the U.S. narrative and Japanese narrative, the U.S. narrative has connoted the Hiroshima bombing and the end of war together, while the Japanese narrative has stimulated the obligated feeling to the victims and turned Hiroshima itself into a peace messenger. In addition to the U.S. and Hiroshima, it is worth noting that various international communities have their own narratives about the Hiroshima bombing. For example, the book How Textbooks From Around the World Portray U.S. History pointed out that the general European narratives
(at least those that are cited in the book) have identified the purpose of the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a way of frightening the Soviet Union and preventing them from entering the war against Japan (Lindaman & Ward, 2004). They have illustrated the U.S.’s political power and economic interests far more frankly than the U.S. narrative. Thus, the Hiroshima bombing has been somewhat differently remembered in the U.S., Japan, and international community.
However, the purpose of this chapter is neither interpreting nor criticizing these different narratives about the bombing. Rather, the acknowledgment of these different narratives articulates that the U.S., Japanese, and international communities have their own dominant meanings associated with the 1945 Hiroshima bombing. This acknowledgement is vital, because, as the Peace Declaration has a clear connotation with the Hiroshima bombing, the audiences of each community could uniquely interpret the Peace Declaration due to the different kinds of understanding of the Hiroshima bombing. Next, the following section reviews the uniqueness of Hiroshima in the international community as well as in Japanese society.
Uniqueness of Hiroshima in Katakana (ヒロシマ)
Hiroshima, as the first city to experience the tragedy of an atomic bombing, occupies a unique role not only in the global communities but also in Japan. Hiroshima “explicitly presents itself as distinct, separate from the rest of Japan” as a messenger of peace (Masumoto, 2015, p. 154). I provide two main elements that make Hiroshima unique. The first element consists of the multiple public artifacts in the city of Hiroshima, which are linked with the peace discourse and the 1945 Hiroshima bombing. The artifacts include monuments, cenotaphs, museums, gates, and bridges. The City of Hiroshima formally acknowledged over 200 memorial monuments in Hiroshima to remember the victims of atomic bombings and to pray for peace while there are more unacknowledged artifacts (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.c). I argue that these monuments and artifacts evoke the empathy and message of peace, like the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum does.
These monuments include the Children’s Peace Monument, Hiroshima Peace Memorial as known as Genbaku domu or Atomic Bomb Dome, and cenotaphs for the victims of elementary, junior high, and high school students. The City of Hiroshima has memorials specifically to remember and honor non-Japanese victims as well. For example, there is a cenotaph for South Korean victims who were living and working there. Although 70 percent of non-Japanese victims of Hiroshima bombing were Koreans, such elements were not taught in the Korean education system (Chung, 2017). Another monument is for the U.S. aircrews and prisoners of war who became victims and lost their lives in Hiroshima (Ryall, 2016). In fact, “Clifton Truman Daniel, the grandson of the U.S. President Harry Truman, who ordered the attack,” visited the monument on the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing in 2012 to “pay his respects” there (para. 25). This loss of these U.S. aircrews has not been well-known among the U.S. population. Another example of artifacts is the Gates of Peace, which were created in 2005 by French artist Clara Halter and architect Jean-Michel Wilmotte, and are located near the area of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.d). The word “peace,” which was translated into 49 languages, is engraved on the gates. Together, these artifacts in Hiroshima, along with the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, induces empathy and a message of peace. Such artifacts are rarely found in other parts of Japan. Hence, Hiroshima conditions itself not only uniquely in the international community, but distinctly from the rest of Japan due to the countless artifacts in Hiroshima, representing the prayer for world peace and for the victims of the 1945 atomic bombing.
As the second element of Hiroshima’s uniqueness, Hiroshima rhetorically situates itself not only as a city of Japan but also as the city that is important for the world. More specifically, as Masumoto (2015) introduced, while kanji characters are used for the written official name of the City of Hiroshima [広島], katakana is also often used for its written name [ヒロシマ]. As a side note, Japanese written style applies three different characters: kanji, hiragana, and katakana. Generally speaking, each kanji represents an abstract concept, and a single kanji or combination of them is used for normal Japanese words. Hiragana is primarily used for grammatical particles and simple Japanese words. Katakana signifies the sounds of foreign words, meaning that the word written in katakana is generally an imported one from foreign countries, or signifies the intention of an effect by a notation different from general.
By following the different written styles, Hiroshima [広島] in kanji simply refers a city of Japan, and Hiroshima [ヒロシマ] in katakana refers to the city, which is the first city in the world to experience an attack by nuclear bomb (Masumoto, 2015). Hiroshima in katakana turns itself into a messenger of world peace due to the memory of victims and obligation to victims. Here, I argue that Hiroshima in katakana indicates the intention to distinguish itself from the rest of Japan because it is positioning itself as a post-WWII messenger of peace to the international community and the rest of Japan. In fact, political and cultural forms and articles in traditional and new media often utilize Hiroshima in katakana. For example, since 1989 the Hiroshima [ヒロシマ] Art Prize has been awarded for art performances that contribute to human peace, so that “Hiroshima’s heart [Hiroshima no kokoro/ヒロシマの心]” can spread to the world (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.g, para. 1). Hiroshima’s heart signifies the desire to eliminate nuclear weapons and promote the prayer of lasting peace for the world. In addition, as the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation (n.d.) publicly listed 160 groups as peace-related-organizations in Hiroshima, 20 groups use Hiroshima in katakana as part of their names. Thus, Hiroshima in katakana actively situates itself as the postwar messenger of peace, and somewhat separates itself from the rest of Japan. Altogether, through the peace and prayer-related cultural artifacts and the usage of katakana for its name, Hiroshima presents itself as the postwar messenger of peace, and carries the hope that no one in the world will have to experience a tragedy like those in Hiroshima in 1945. Therefore, Hiroshima occupies a unique role not only in the global communities but also in the Japanese community. The annual Peace Declaration is delivered from this vital site.
Hiroshima’s Efforts for Peacebuilding
To complete this section about the post-WWII Hiroshima Peace Discourse and the 1945 Hiroshima bombing, I acknowledge the previous critiques of the Hiroshima peace discourse, and then reveal my position with respect to these critiques. As other scholars pointed out, the general formation of Hiroshima’s discourse of peace and WWII has not been politically neutral in the post-WWII period. For example, the narrative of Hiroshima’s destruction has sustained Japan’s “national victimology and phantasm of innocence” in postwar Japan (Yoneyama, 1999, p. 13). Such a narrative, particularly the one presented in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, has emphasized the atomic victim consciousness, and marginalizes Japan’s wartime aggression and colonial practices. Further, it has ignored the non-nuclear American atrocities to Japanese citizens in other cities, including the fire bombings on Tokyo that killed nearly 100,000 residents and forced another million to become homeless (Giamo, 2003). Conversely, it ignored the victims who were affected in non-Hiroshima areas of Japan. The postwar Japanese and American nationalists’ interests have been clearly involved in the memory of Hiroshima in postwar Japan
(Yoneyama, 1999).
I recognize and highly respect these criticisms about Hiroshima’s peace discourse. At the same time, while they treat Hiroshima synonymously with the Japanese nation, this chapter avoids framing Hiroshima as the representation of the country. As revealed above, Hiroshima strategically separates itself from the rest of Japan regarding peace discourse and also holds a unique role in the Japanese community. Hence, this chapter examines the Hiroshima Peace Declaration with special attention paid to its rhetorical appeals for peacebuilding, which are uniquely embedded in the Hiroshima culture. While this chapter aims to answer how the Peace Declaration rhetorically invited audiences in the postwar international community to the new perspective of peacebuilding, Japanese audiences who are from non-Hiroshima prefectures is a part of such audience. Next, I provide the background of the selected speeches for this chapter, the Peace Declarations in 2015, 2016, and 2017.
Background of the Speeches
The Hiroshima Peace Declaration is delivered annually on August 6th and is sent to various countries around the world, according to the City of Hiroshima (n.d.e). This chapter specifically focuses on the declarations in 2015, 2016, and 2017, which were delivered by the Mayor of Hiroshima in order to comfort the spirits and to pray for world peace. This section provides the vital background of the sets of speeches. First, I briefly review the Peace Memorial Ceremony during which the selected Hiroshima Peace Declarations were delivered. Second, I review the speaker of the declaration. Third, I provide the overview of the selected speeches.
Peace Memorial Ceremony
As briefly discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration is annually delivered during the Peace Memorial Ceremony on the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. The Hiroshima bombing took about 140,000 lives, which were largely composed of Japanese civilians but also included Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, and other Southeast Asians as well as American prisoners of war (The City of Hiroshima, 2015). As a reflection of the horror of war, the City of Hiroshima hosts this ceremony with the hope that the ceremony becomes a global event to carry “Hiroshima’s desire for lasting peace to the people of the world” (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.b). This ceremony is held inside of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, specifically in front of the Cenotaph for the A-Bomb Victims, officially known as the Memorial Monument for Hiroshima, City of Peace (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.e). During the ceremony, the peace bell and sirens ring for one minute from 8:15 a.m., the time when the atomic bomb was dropped in 1945. At that moment, attendees have silent prayer and express their condolences to the deceased. In addition to the Peace Declaration by the mayor of Hiroshima, there is the Oath of Peace by two children who are representatives of the elementary school students in Hiroshima, and addresses by the prime minister of Japan and other visitors. The program includes a dedication of flowers, the Hiroshima peace song (chorus), and a release of doves (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.h).
The ceremony is open to the public and is typically conducted with 50,000 attendees, including Hiroshima citizens and the bereaved families of the victims of the atomic bomb (The
City of Hiroshima, n.d.h). Foreigners may reserve seats with simultaneous translation in English (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.i). Furthermore, the attendees include Japanese government officials, such as the prime minister, chairman of the House of Representatives, House of Councilors chairman, minister of Foreign Affairs, minister of Health, Labor and Welfare, and the governor of Hiroshima (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.h). The attendees also include representatives from multiple countries. Particularly, the 2015 ceremony had representatives from 100 countries, which was the largest number in the ceremony’s history (Kawate, 2015). The 2016 ceremony
had representatives from 91 countries, while in 2017 there were representatives from 80 countries (Takeshita, 2017; Wada, 2016). Among the five countries with officially recognized atomic/nuclear weapons, the representatives from the U.S., Great Britain, France, and Russia have presented at the Peace Memorial Ceremony in all three years, while China has not. Representatives from the European Union have also attended. In addition, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs from the United Nations has delivered a message in each year (United Nations Information Center, 2015, 2016, 2017). Thus, the Mayor of Hiroshima annually delivers the Peace Declaration during an intercultural, elaborate ceremony.
Speaker of the Peace Declaration: The Mayor of Hiroshima
The Peace Declaration has been delivered by successive mayors of Hiroshima since 1947 (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.b). The Peace Declarations in 2015, 2016, and 2017 were delivered by Mayor Kazumi Matsui (Matsui, 2015, 2016, 2017). Matsui was born in 1953 in Hiroshima
Prefecture, and was elected mayor of Hiroshima in 2011 and reelected in 2015 (The City of
Hiroshima, n.d.f). He is a member of the second generation of hibakusha, a victim of the Hiroshima bombing in 1945, as his father is a hibakusha (Nishiyama, 2015). Also, Mayor Matsui is the first mayor who directly included testimonies from surviving hibakusha in the Peace Declaration in 2011(The City of Hiroshima, n.d.b). He chose to do so because he has believed in the importance of sharing their experiences and their wish for peace.
Overview of the Selected Hiroshima Peace Declarations
The Hiroshima Peace Declarations of 2015, 2016, and 2017 had similar structures and themes with different wordings. Hence, this section utilizes the overview of the 2015 Peace Declaration while elaborating on the similarities and differences in the 2016 Peace Declaration as well as the 2017 Peace Declaration.
August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m. and the continued suffering. The 2015 Peace Declaration began with the statement that described how a single atomic bomb destroyed ordinary life at
“8:15 a.m., August 6, 1945” and burned countless people in the flames (Matsui, 2015, para. 1).
Then, by the end of the year, 140,000 lives were taken, which included “Koreans, Chinese, Southeast Asians, and American prisoners of war” (para. 1). The suffering continued even among these who managed to survive, as victims had serious health aftereffects and experienced discrimination and prejudice. As a side note, while the remarks did not provide any clear explanation about the discrimination, the hibakusha and their children (have) experienced discrimination and prejudice during the prospects of marriage or work (Matsubara, 2001). This was because the disastrous condition of Hiroshima and its people after the bombing engraved a profound fear in the minds of Japanese. Also, there was a rumor that hibakusha had contaminated blood, which would be not only inheritable by children but also transmittable to others. In fact, the investigation about the effects of radiation among the second and third generations of atomic bomb survivors still continues, while a recent study notices no clear associations between parental radiation exposure and mortality among children (Grant et al., 2015). The other continuing investigations focus on prejudice and health anxiety about radiation exposure from the second and third generations of atomic bomb survivors (Kamite, Abe, & Ikeda, 2018; Kamite, 2017; Tomoike, 2007).
After the depiction of the continued suffering among the surviving victims, Mayor Matsui in 2015 stated that he wanted “us all” to face the reality of the atomic bomb damage, and to embrace the spirit of the hibakusha, in front of the Atomic Bomb Dome that has been “watch[ing] over Hiroshima” (para. 4). “Us all” could be a reference to Japanese audiences; the attendees at the ceremony, including those representing the various nations; or anyone in the world, as the Peace Declaration has been sent to various countries around the world (The City of
Hiroshima, n.d.e). The remarks in 2016 and 2017 also included the specific date and time of the Hiroshima bombing as well as the description of continual suffering among surviving victims. However, the remarks in 2016 included the number and nationalities of the deaths, while the remarks in 2017 did not. In addition, the atomic bomb was labeled as “absolute evil” in 2016 and
2017 at the beginning of the speech (Matsui, 2016, para. 2; 2017, para. 1).
Remaining nuclear weapons. In 2015, Matsui pointed out that over 15,000 nuclear weapons still existed, and numerous accidents and incidents could potentially have brought us to the “brinks of nuclear explosions or war” (Matsui, 2015, para. 5). He stated that anyone could become a hibakusha as long as nuclear weapons remained. The 2016 remarks included a similar description of nuclear weapons. The 2017 remarks did not include the number of remaining nuclear weapons. Instead, it argued that the current nuclear weapons could have much more destructive power compared to the Hiroshima atomic bomb of 72 years ago (Matsui, 2017). He pointed out that humans should not engage in building any such weapons, which would lead the entire world to hell.
Testimonies by hibakusha. Matsui in 2015 introduced testimonies by hibakusha. The testimonies illustrated that generosity and love for humanity could transcend hatred and rejection; for example, a hibakusha “emphasize[d], ‘War means tragedy for adults and children alike. Empathy, caring, loving others and oneself—this is where peace comes from’” (Matsui,
2015, para. 7). The Peace Declarations in 2016 and 2017 also had testimonies by hibakusha. While the testimonies in 2016 and 2017 had similar expressions as the ones in 2015, they provided additional descriptions. The testimonies in 2016 recalled how Hiroshima was a “living hell” on the day of the bombing (Matsui, 2016, para. 3), while they still emphasized the necessity of helping “‘each other live in peace and happiness with reverence for all life’” (para. 5). The testimonies in 2017 added hibakushas’ descriptions of enduring pain by recalling their friends and acquaintances who they saw dying as well as adding their suggestion for “‘the leaders of nuclear-armed states…to preserve the irreplaceable Earth for future generations’” (Matsui, 2017, para. 4).
The “absolute evil” and Mayors for Peace. The speech in 2015 continued by saying that the “absolute evil” and “ultimate inhumanity” must be eliminated (para. 9), while the term “absolute evil” signified the atomic bomb and repeatedly came up in all three remarks.
Furthermore, the City of Hiroshima is the lead city of Mayors for Peace [heiwa shichō kaigi/平和市長会議], which is an international organization of cities devoted to the promotion of peace. In 2015, Mayor Matsui (2015) counted over 6,700 city members around the world, and Hiroshima would determine to work on accelerating the international trend of negotiations for a nuclear weapons agreement and elimination of nuclear weapons. The Peace Declarations in 2016 and 2017 included similar depictions as the lead city of Mayors for Peace, while the one in 2016 counted 7,000 city members and the one in 2017 counted 7,400 city members.
Appeal to policymakers. Going further, Mayor Matsui in 2015 talked to policymakers. He suggested “generosity” and “love of humanity” in order for them to pursue happiness for their own people (para. 11). He asked policymakers to visit the “A-bombed cities,” which implied Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and then to hear the hibakusha to encounter the reality of the atomic bombings (para. 12). The suggestions toward the policymakers were also found in 2016 and 2017. Additionally, the 2016 remarks elaborated the quote from U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech during his visit to Hiroshima in May 2016, which expressed his passion to abolish nuclear weapons. It also elaborated the declaration, related to the negotiation of nuclear disarmament and more, at the gathering by the Group of Seven (G7) foreign ministers in 2016 in
Hiroshima.
Appeal to the Japanese government. The 2015 speech requested that the Japanese government be a “bridge between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states” in order to lead all states toward the initiation of dialogues (Matsui, 2015, para. 13). It also asked the Japanese government to improve the assistance for hibakusha and others who have been suffering from mental and physical effects of radiation, and called on the “expansion of the ‘black rain areas’” (para. 13). The remarks in 2016 and 2017 contained the same requests to the Japanese government. As a side note, none of the remarks specified what the black rain areas meant. Although I put the complicated details aside about the black rain, basically the certain areas of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had black rain [kuroi ame/黒い雨] after the atomic bombings. Immediately after the black rain, the researchers have been investigating the radioactive fallout on the exposure of people and black rain due to the atomic bombs (see Hoshi, 2010). Simply speaking, the expansion of the black rain areas could potentially lead to the expansion of medical examination areas.
The conclusion of the Peace Declaration. The Hiroshima Peace Declaration in 2015 concluded by expressing a prayer for the “peaceful repose” of the atomic bomb victims, offering gratitude to the predecessors and hibakusha for their hard work to rebuild Hiroshima and to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as asking the people in the world to work together for “the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of lasting world peace” (Matsui, 2015, para. 14).
The Peace Declarations in 2016 and 2017 were concluded in a similar manner. The speech in
2016 additionally expressed the pledge to work with Nagasaki, another atomic bombed city (Matsui, 2016). The speech in 2017 labeled nuclear weapons as the “absolute evil” once again in the conclusion (Matsui, 2017, para. 12).
Consubstantiality and Process of Guilt-Redemption
Above, I introduced the background of the Hiroshima Peace Declarations, while presenting the Peace Memorial Ceremony, the speaker, and overview of the selected remarks. Next, I review the Burkean concepts that are applied to examine the rhetorical efforts in the selected Hiroshima Peace Declarations. More particularly, I apply the concepts of consubstantiality and rhetoric of rebirth. These concepts are appropriate for examining the Peace Declarations, because they help to interpret and evaluate the rhetorical effort to induce the transformation of the international and Japanese communities to the new viewpoint toward peacebuilding. Prior to reviewing these concepts, I briefly discuss the contribution to rhetorical theories and criticisms by Kenneth Burke.
Kenneth Burke is generally regarded as “the father of contemporary rhetoric” (Hawhee, 1999, p. 130), who unified a wide range of topics with the concepts of symbolic action. To start off, he is academically unique, not only because he was a “college dropout” but because he “resisted being ‘disciplined’” (Simons, 1989, p. 4). He can be considered as one of the original thinkers who developed and applied an interdisciplinary critical approach. Yet, core notions in his work pertain to language and human symbol systems. For Burke, “rhetorical language is inducement to action (or to attitude, attitude being an incipient act)” (Burke, 1969, p. 42).
Motives for human action are inherent in the use of language. Here, human is the “symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal” in the symbolic systems (Burke, 1966, p. 16). His major contributions include A Grammar of Motives, originally published in 1945, and A Rhetoric of Motives, originally published in 1950.
This Burkean approach played a large role in expanding rhetorical criticism after the neo-
Aristotelian approach dominated the field of rhetorical criticism prior to the 1960s. The neoAristotelian perspective concerns the persuasiveness of speech through the contents of the rhetorical discourse itself (see Wander, 1983; Black, 1978). On the other hand, the Burkean approach, particularly dramatism, concerns how language suggests what reality means. For Burke, rhetorical criticism put the weight on the identification, which is also called consubstantiality in Burkean dramatism (Burke, 1969, p. 21). The examination of consubstantiality/identification is significant in order for critics to discover the motive of speakers by the examination of the language used in their speech. Therefore, below I first review the concept of consubstantiality and its associated concepts. Then, I review the concept of guiltredemption.
Consubstantiality & Division and War & Peace
Consubstantiality, which is used synonymously with identification, is the key rhetorical concept in the Burkean approach (Burke, 1969, p. 55). Consubstantiality/identification happens when one entity is identified with another entity in an attempt to find commonalities. For instance, if a person identifies themself with someone else or something, then they have the potential to become consubstantial with the person or it; “to identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’ with B” (Burke, 1969, p. 21). For “symbol-using animals,” as Burke defined human beings (Burke, 1966, p. 3–9), consubstantiality could be essential to any way of life, as “a way of life is an acting-together,” in which “men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, [and] attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969, p. 21). As a way of achieving identification, rhetoric can create social communities because it can enable symbolicusing-animals to “identify” with and thus become “consubstantial” with one another (p. 20–21).
Therefore, consubstantiality/identification is a means of inducing unity and seeking to build a community.
It is significant to note that identification/consubstantiality is labeled as “compensatory to division” (p. 22). As much as division is the natural state of separate human beings, as widely recognized “[e]very ‘us’ requires a ‘them’ in order to define ourselves” (Crusius, 1986, p. 29).
An example can be found in one of Burke’s most well-known articles, The Rhetoric of Hitler’s
“Battle” in The Philosophy of Literary Form (1973), which offered a rhetorical analysis of Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. In this article, Burke indicates how Hitler’s rhetoric utilized the belief of inborn dignity, which categorizes the Aryan as an inborn superiority and other races, particularly Jews and people of color, as inborn inferiors. In order for Hitler’s followers to identify themselves as an inborn superiority, they must have separated themselves from inborn inferiors. Therefore, seeking identification simultaneously confronts the implications of divisions. In fact, the ambiguity of identification and division together is the characteristic invitation of rhetoric, according to Burke (1969, p. 25). It is because there would be no need for identification if there were no kinds of divisions in the first place. Likewise, in the circumstance with pure identification, there would be no divisions nor need for rhetoric to create social communities through the means of persuading for unity.
In fact, with respect to the focus of this chapter, Burke (1969) described wars as the “most tragically ironic of all divisions, or conflicts” (p. 22). He noted that one nation could potentially pursue an enormous economic and armed alliance against other nations while “‘directing the intention’ towards peace” (pp. 157–158). As a related example of this dissertation, Ishida (1965) in The Journal of Peace Research mentioned that Japanese government leaders during WWII actually stated that they were “fighting for ‘peace in the East’” (p. 132). Besides, in order to clearly elucidate wars and the rival aspects of identification and division together, it should be stated that identification embraces the workings of opposites, “as when allies who would otherwise dispute among themselves join forces against a common enemy” (Burke, 1972, p. 28). An example can be found in the aforementioned article (1973) on
Hitler’s rhetoric. Burke points out that, in Hitler’s rhetoric, the selection of the Jew as an “international devil” and common enemy was the first step of unification among Hitler’s followers, who could have disputed with each other without the essential enemy (p. 167). While the common enemy or the Others are frequently de-humanized in war rhetoric, (e.g., Ivie, 1980, 2007; Wilz, 2010), Jews were de-humanized in Hitler’s rhetoric because the description of Jews was associated with negative terms such a plot, destruction, and inferior (Burke, 1973). Thus, as much as a “war is cultural” (Burke, 1973, p. 319), it reflects a symbolic expression of identification. Ivie (2006) further described war as “a perversion of rhetorical expression” (p. 9).
At the same time, peace could be rhetorically privileged “through the principle of identification” (Ivie, 2006, p. 9). The peacebuilding process engages with discovering of a rehumanizing discourse and “challenge[s] dominant dehumanizing attitudes that have contributed to a culture of war” (Wilz, 2010). If the rhetorical process lets competing sides identify with one another through the process of re-humanizing the Others, then it could become the cure from the rhetoric of war, which dehumanizes the Others (Wilz, 2010). In this chapter, I do closely interpret the Peace Declaration’s efforts of re-humanization, instead of de-humanization, during the rhetorical process of identification.
Process of Guilt-Redemption
The primary key concept for the chapter is guilt-redemption, which is the rhetorical process of purging individual and/or collective guilt and achieving redemption through symbolic expression. This process is also introduced as a rhetoric of rebirth, which involves the three primary elements: guilt, purgation, and redemption (Bobbitt, 2004; Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 2014). Below, in order to closely review the process of guilt-redemption, I first introduce guilt, including individual and collective guilt. Second, I introduce purification and its strategies: mortification, victimage, and transcendence. Third, I introduce redemption. In the end of this section, I discuss guilt-redemption with respect to peace discourse.
Guilt. First, I review the concept of guilt, which creates an urgent desire to rhetorically find redemption. Guilt, in Burke’s approach, is the term to cover the human sense of noxious feeling, such as anxiety, a feeling of being divided from others, and failure to enable to be adhered to the self or social standard (Bobbitt, 2004, p. 89–90). For example, “Battle” points out the sense of frustration after the defeat of Germany in the First World War. While Burke in this article does not utilize the word “guilt,” the sense of frustration functions as guilt in the rhetoric of rebirth. Here, Germany’s frustration and plight related to the factors of blood and race, instead of the consequences of WWI. Specifically, military collapse, causing frustration, was framed as the consequence of the “moral decay” emanated “from…‘the degradation of the race’” along with the consequence of a “decrease in the instinct of self-preservation” (Burke, 1973, pp. 204– 205).
In addition, the burden of guilt could be not only derived from the consciousness that belongs to a particular individual or the group of individuals. It could be derived collectively as human as guilt could be the human’s “sin of disobedience” to the social order (Duncan, 1962, p. 121). Social order creates transgressors who feel guilt, as the social order constructs symbolic hierarchies, which are “any kind of graded, value-charged structure” of the ranked “things, words, people, acts, and ideas” (Rueckert, 1982, p. 131). In the social order, those individuals “Up” in the hierarchy are “guilty of not being ‘Down,’” and those “Down” are also “guilty of not being ‘Up’” (Burke, 1966, p. 15). Therefore, collective guilt inevitably arises. This inevitability of escape from the collective guilt creates a guilt-ridden society (Mackey-Kallis & Hahn, 1994). In such a guilt-ridden society, the guilt creates a desire to find relief; consequently, there is a rhetorical need to purify the guilt and achieve redemption.
Purification. Second, I review two rhetorical modes of purification. The largely recognized modes to purify guilt are mortification and victimage (see, for example, Burke, 1952, 1966, 1984a). In addition, another mode is transcendence. In fact, transcendence is a significant mode in the Peace Declaration, although it has been largely overshadowed by the two primary modes (Bobbitt, 2004). Below I review each of the three modes of purification. The first mode of purification is mortification. It is the purification through the process in which individuals suffer for their guilt or failures. Typically speaking, mortification involves “open confession of one’s ‘sins’ and actual or symbolic punishment of them” (Brummett, 1981, p. 256). Thus, it is labeled as a form of self-blaming or self-scarifying in order to atone for sinful imperfection resulting from symbolic hierarchy (Burke, 1969, pp. 206–207). In addition to the mortification of the individual-self, there is the mortification of the collective-self, which is labeled as the mutual mortification resulting in mutual shame or confession (Cavin, 1994). Furthermore, it is intertwined into the fabric of human social relations because the mortification principally follows the “basic to the pattern of governance” (Burke, 1970, p. 200). In this sense, mortification is a vital feature of social order as well as the “scrupulous and deliberate clamping of limitation upon the self” (Burke, 1984b, p. 289).
The second mode of purification is victimage. Victimage is the “purification by sacrifice”
(Burke, 1966, p. 478) through which individuals shift the guilt from oneself to a “sacrificial offering” (Burke, 1984b, p. 284). It is a transference of guilt to the sacrificial offering, which is largely known as a scapegoat. The scapegoat acts as a “sacrificial redeemer” for the guilt (Burke, 1970, p. 200). In “Battle,” Hitler’s rhetoric utilized the Jew as a scapegoat. The cause of the guilt, or the sense of frustration after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, was shifted to Jews, who are described not only as inborn inferiors, but also as deconstruction.
There are two specific forms of scapegoats: factional and universal (Burke, 1984a, pp. 188–190). The factional scapegoat targets other groups to blame because “the evil” is attributed to other factions (Burke, 1984a, p. 189). The Jew as a scapegoat in Hitler’s rhetoric must fit in this form. It only produces dissociation, not association (Moore, 2006). The factional scapegoat may be found in the “lowest form,” which is “the psychology of war” (Burke, 1984a, p. 188). In addition, the act of factional scapegoating was discussed in the article by Moore (2006). This article focuses on the rhetorical discourse by Governor George Ryan of Illinois, who used to be a firm believer in the social justice system to enact the death penalty, but later placed the death penalty on a moratorium statewide and called for reform of the commutation of death sentences. The analysis revealed that Governor Ryan engaged with a dual strategy of mortification and factional scapegoat, as Ryan shifted the blame to the criminal justice system in relation to the death penalty, which combined with the form of mortification. Because the criminal justice system was the factional scapegoat, the scapegoat does not have to be a group of human beings.
On the other hand, as a universal scapegoat, individuals identify themselves with victims and accordingly feel pity for the victims as everyone is a part of the whole humanity. A universal scapegoat represents all human beings and “takes upon” “the guilt of all” and the “punishment is mankind’s chastening” (Burke, 1984a, p. 188). However, the audience members would likely dissociate themselves from the punishment, because it produces fear. Here, the essence of the universal scapegoat is association, although it contains dissociation (Moore, 2006). Together, victimage could transfer the guilt to the sacrificial offering, which can be factional or universal scapegoats.
The third mode of purification is transcendence, which is defined as the construction of a
“bridge whereby one realm is transcended by being viewed in terms of a realm ‘beyond’ it” (Burke, 1966, p. 187). Transcendence is further described as the arising mode as individuals find a “motive that can serve as ground for both...choices, a motive that, while not exactly either one or the other, can ambiguously contain them both” (Burke, 1969, p. 10). A motive, which aids as the ground for different choices, can transcend them. In other words, transcendence can remove “division (guilt) by appealing to a higher principle” under which different elements can be integrated together (Bobbitt, 2004, p. 48). Thus, the interpretation and evaluation of transcendence requires examination of the terms, which creates a bridge to the new or higher dominion. Brummett (1981) further described transcendence as a symbolic mode of avoiding guilt, instead of redeeming guilt.
While the modes of mortification and victimage have been well-recognized as means of purification, transcendence has been often ignored by Burkean scholars (Bobbitt, 2004). Yet, some research can guide transcendence as a mode of purification. For example, Towner (2010) examined the transcendence in the apologia by the Dixie Chicks, an American country music band, to defend the comment by Natalie Maines, the lead vocalist of the band. She made a comment during a concert in London, which expressed the shameful feeling toward the U.S. president around the time of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The analysis unpacked how transcendence as a strategy redefined the abstract values, particularly patriotism, among the audience, instead of reaccepting the societal value. As explained in the article, the rhetorical force of transcendence is connected with the higher-order abstract value.
Furthermore, Bobbitt (2004) in his book examined transcendence in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s, “I Have a Dream” speech. He illustrated King’s stimulation of the latent sense of guilt among his listeners, both black and white citizens. Then, he unpacked the reinforced images of American secular/religious mythology, which united social and racial divisions under transcendent principles. In addition, Rasmussen (1994) elucidated the value of “wholeness” as the ground of the transcendence in the Kaddish, Leonard Bernstein’s Third Symphony. The Kaddish addresses not only the musical tension but also the ideational tension related to a pursuit for faith along with mourning the dead, praising God, and pleading peace. Together, as these previous works of scholarship demonstrate, the rhetorical force of transcendence can be operated in the notion, which creates a bridge as the ground for different choices so that it can transcend them. It can unite the different portions and remove division by appealing to a higher principle. As a side note, this mode of transcendence corresponds with the conceptualization of conflict transcendence by Galtung (2007). Galtung’s conflict transcendence means that the concerned groups go beyond just achieving their goals, and further pursue the generation of a new perspective so that these groups can harmoniously co-exist (Galtung, 2007, p. 14). To summarize the concept of purification, the rhetorical strategies are mortification, victimage, and transcendence. Through these strategies, guilt can be purified and accordingly redeemed.
Redemption. Third, I review redemption. Redemption can bring in either the suppression of the source of guilt or the transcendence in which discordant elements may become a “passing note” of the history (Burke, 1969, p. 230). In doing so, the guilt is rhetorically displaced from individuals’ lives. Therefore, redemption is a symbolic transformation to a new way of being, a new order of life, and/or a new perspective on moving toward a goal. For instance, as discussed, the idea of the Jew as a scapegoat in Hitler’s rhetoric is coupled with inborn racial dignity. This rhetoric provides a “‘positive’ view of life” to his audience members, and gives the feeling of “moving forward, toward a goal,” which is “a promissory feature” made by Hitler (Burke, 1973,
p. 174). The new way, order, and/or perspective is a “temporary condition” before a purification of guilt repeats, because guilt is an intrinsic portion of human nature (Bobbitt, 2004, p. 41). All in all, as described above, guilt-redemption is the process of purging guilt and achieving redemption through rhetorical, symbolic expressions.
Process of guilt-redemption, war, and peace. With respect to peace discourse, however, war rhetoric has been more successful in the notion of guilt-redemption (Cavin, 1994). War in general seeks out an appropriate sacrificial offering known as a scapegoat. A scapegoat is typically shaped through the propaganda of the different factions in war while each of them depicted the other as the enemy. Then, once the sacrifice is done, guilt is purified and the global structure is redeemed. Furthermore, at least in the U.S. context, the languages of dehumanizing the enemy or scapegoat has dominated pro-war rhetoric (Wilz, 2010).
In addition, there are challenges that face the advocacy of peace to purify guilt and to redeem it. For example, Ivie (1987) examines anti-nuke and anti-cold war rhetoric delivered by cold war “idealists”: Henry Wallace (the third-party peace candidate in the 1948 presidential race), J. William Fulbright (United States Senator), and Helen Caldicott (Australian anti-nuke activist). He indicates that their rhetoric toward American audiences de-civilizes American images by framing the U.S. as irrational, coercive, and aggressive, instead of de-civilizing their enemies. In this case, the strategy of self-mortification was used for the redeeming act. However, for the U.S., which is habituated to condemning scapegoats, this strategy of turning savagery inward intensifies its guilt and eventually increases its need to sacrifice an external enemy (Ivie, 1987). Thus, the failure of peace rhetoric is often due to the absence of the scapegoats to purify the guilt, at least in the U.S. contexts.
However, human beings, as symbol-using animals, can escape from the scenario of wars through the process of a peaceful cycle of rebirth (Cavin, 1994). For instance, while pointing out that challenge for the symbolic expression of peace, Cavin (1994) examined the guilt-redemption found in peace discourse by William Sloane Coffin, a long-time American peace activist. He concluded that the process of rebirth could happen though “a language of identification that acknowledges mutual guilt, a language of shame and confession that activates mutual purgation” (p. 276) and “a language of empowerment that creates redemption” (p. 292). Particularly, the mutual mortification can replace the modes of the scapegoat (Cavin, 1994), which is often missing in peace advocacy in order to purify the guilt (Ivie, 1987). In addition, Ivie (2007), in his examination of the Bush administration’s rhetoric of evil in the War on Terror after 9/11, proposes that the modes of purification can be transformed into peacebuilding through rehumanizing rituals, instead of enemy-making through de-humanizing rituals. Assembling the pieces above, for my analysis I interpret the process of guilt-redemption in the Peace Declaration and evaluate the rhetorical effort of inducing the transformation toward the new stand of the peacebuilding.
Guilt-Redemption in the Peace Declaration
Below, I examine the process of guilt-redemption in the Peace Declarations. I first discuss guilt in the declarations. Then, I discuss the dual modes of purification. Lastly, I discuss the redemption through policymakers. In doing so, I aim to reveal how the recent annual
Hiroshima Peace Declarations rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding. Upon this examination, I will explore how re-humanizing rituals (did not) transform the modes of purification into an international peacebuilding effort.
Guilt in Past, Present, and Future
I first unpack the concept of guilt in the Peace Declaration, which created an urgent desire to rhetorically find redemption. Each remark, primarily at the beginning, underlined the noxious feelings that were stimulated by the descriptive power of atomic bombings in the past, present, and future. In doing so, the Peace Declarations projected collective guilt. Below, I explain the sense of the guilt related to the past, present, and future in chronological order.
Guilt in past. First, the sense of guilt regarding the past was found when Mayor Matsui focused on “what the A-bomb did” (Matsui, 2015, para. 4). The aftermath of the atomic bombing was portrayed in two manners. In the first manner, each remark of the Peace Declaration started by briefly descripting how one atomic bomb destroyed ordinary life on August 6, 1945, at 8:15
a.m. (Matsui, 2015, 2016, 2017). For example, Mayor Matsui in 2017 included the intense illustrations of the scene when an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima (Matsui, 2017). It described “countless scattered corpses charred beyond recognition even as man or woman” and that there were “badly burned, nearly naked figures with blackened faces, singed hair, and tattered, dangling skin wandering through spreading flames, looking for water” (para. 1). In addition, the 2016 Peace Declaration introduced the testimonies by two surviving hibakusha as: He was a boy of 17. Today he recalls, “Charred corpses blocked the road. An eerie stench filled my nose. A sea of fire spread as far as I could see. Hiroshima was a living hell.”
She was a girl of 18. “I was covered in blood. Around me were people with skin flayed
from their backs hanging all the way to their feet—crying, screaming, begging for water.”
(Matsui, 2016, para. 3)
These descriptions together induced terrifying feelings about what the atomic bomb did in the past. As the lives of 140,000 people were taken by the end of the year, the slaughtered people included Koreans, Chinese, Southeast Asians, and American prisoners of war. The frightening feelings were directed toward all of the victims who unfortunately happened to be in Hiroshima, instead of only the Japanese victims.
In the second manner of discussing guilt related to the past, each remark of the Peace Declaration included a statement about the continuous suffering among those who managed to survive as they encountered serious health aftereffects as well as discrimination during the prospects of marriage or work (Matsui, 2015, para. 2; 2016, para. 2; 2017, para. 1). For instance, the Peace Declaration in 2015 mentioned a “young boy rendered an A-bomb orphan still lives alone” and “a wife was divorced when her exposure was discovered” (Matsui, 2015, para. 2).
Yet, as mentioned earlier, the remarks did not have detailed accounts about the discrimination. These surviving hibakusha and their descendants (have) experienced discrimination and prejudice, partially because of a rumor that hibakusha have polluted blood, which is inheritable to descendants and transmittable to others around them. All three remarks recognized the continued sufferings among the surviving hibakusha. By putting the two pieces above together, guilt in the past was derived when the audience members shared the sense of guilt by remembering what the atomic bomb did on the day it was dropped as well what hibakusha had to go through.
Guilt in present. The sense of guilt in the past interlocked with the sense of guilt in the present. More specifically, as the Peace Memorial Ceremony is annually held on the anniversary of the 1945 Hiroshima bombing, August 6 has ritualistically functioned as the symbolic day to remember the sense of guilt. This means that the audience was rhetorically invited to feel sorrow and guilt at the current ceremony. For instance, the 2017 Peace Declaration started with the following sentences: “Friends, 72 years ago today, on August 6, at 8:15 a.m., absolute evil,” implying the atomic bomb, “was unleashed in the sky over Hiroshima. Let’s imagine for a moment what happened under that roiling mushroom cloud” (Matsui, 2017, para. 1). Here, Mastui was aiming to invite “friends” in the present context to remember the day the atomic bomb was dropped. In another example, Mayor Matsui in 2015 asked, “us all, once again, to face squarely what the A-bomb did and embrace fully the spirit of the hibakusha” (Matsui, 2015, para. 4).
It was unclear to whom he referred to as “friends” or “us.” It could be the audiences who were watching and/or listening to the Peace Declaration on live TV or radio. It could be the attendees at the ceremony, or anyone in the nations to which the Peace Declaration has been sent. The Peace Declaration did not define the boundaries to clarify its intended audience. Rather, anyone could be one of the “friends” or “us” in this situation. As remembering the spirit of hibakusha every year in August 6th, Peace Declarations invited the audience not only to remember the sense of guilt in the past but also to feel grief and sorrow in the present context at the annual Peace Memorial Ceremonies. Thus, the Peace Declarations projected the guilt in the present among the “friends” collectively.
Guilt in the future. Third, the sense of guilt related to the past and present connected with the anxiety related to the potential future. This anxious feeling emerged from the depiction of the remaining nuclear weapons. Specifically, over 15,000 nuclear weapons, which can have more destructive power than the one dropped on Hiroshima, still exist in the world. These remaining nuclear weapons “would plunge the entire world into hell, the user as well as the enemy” (Matsui, 2017, para. 7) and could make anyone “become a hibakusha any time” (Matsui, 2015, para. 6). The terrifying feeling can be carried from the past to the future through the depiction of the potential future, in which anyone in the future could experience what the Hiroshima atomic bomb survivors did in the past. The Peace Declarations did not expand the depiction of the potential future with the remaining nuclear weapons, relatively speaking with the past and present. Yet, this anxious feeling related to the potential future is a key component in purifying the guilt, which I discuss in the next section.
Together, the guilt is the disturbing feeling under the depiction of the descriptive power of atomic bombings, which is tied with the reflection of the past (what happened in Hiroshima), present (what and how to remember about the Hiroshima bombing), and potential future (what could potentially happen to the world). Although the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in the past, anyone in the present time could have an alarming feeling when they listened about the destruction by the bomb. Then, any humans in the future could become the victims of the destructive power of the nuclear bombs. Any harsh images of the atomic bombs’ aftermath enacted the fear among the audience members. Therefore, the Peace Declaration symbolically manifested the sense of the guilt, which could be shared by the entire human community. As Peace Declarations rhetorically enacted the guilt collectively among the humans, the next rhetorical need is to purify the guilt.
Dual Modes of Purification
Such guilt needed to be purified in order to achieve redemption. As aforementioned, the potential strategies of purification are mortification, victimage, and transcendence. Among these rhetorical forces, the Peace Declarations utilized a dual application of victimage and transcendence. Below, I first examine the purification mode of victimage, and second the mode of transcendence.
Purification through victimage. The first mode of purification in the Peace Declaration is victimage, through which the sense of guilt is shifted to a “sacrificial offering” known as a scapegoat (Burke, 1984b, p. 284). The Peace Declarations particularly employed a factional scapegoat, which targets other groups to blame and attributes the notion of evil to other factions.
The Peace Declarations attributed the notion of the “absolute evil” to the atomic bombs (Matsui, 2015, para. 9; 2016, para. 1, 2, 6, 7; 2017, para. 1, 12). They caused the audience members to have a sense of guilt related to the destructive power of nuclear weapons in the past, present, and potential future. In the past, the atomic bomb was the absolute evil, which took human lives away and caused continuous sufferings among the surviving victims. At that point, the audience members in the present would experience noxious feelings by remembering the atomic bomb as the absolute evil. Any human beings in the future would become hibakusha at any moment, if the atomic bombs were used. Therefore, it is clear that the Peace Declaration shifted the blame to nuclear weapons in relation to the sense of guilt, the terrifying feelings associated with the destructive power of such weapons.
In addition, it is important to note that, while the act of factional scapegoating blamed atomic bombs, the Peace Declaration did not shift the sense of guilt to the U.S., which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. As Burke (1972) points out, the groups of humans, who would otherwise have a quarrel, could become a joint ally against a common enemy. In the case of the Peace Declaration, human beings could unite against the nuclear weapons that caused the fearsome feeling among them all. Therefore, it was rhetorically significant to transfer the guilt to the non-human sacrificial offering instead of a particular group of human beings, so that the Peace Declarations could situate all humans, including people in the U.S., to not only share the sense of guilt, but also to motivate them to join against nuclear weapons. In fact, this rhetorical act of not blaming the U.S. followed the pattern of the narrative that is provided by the
Hiroshima Peace Museum. The narrative by the Hiroshima Peace Museum seldom mentions the
U.S., and rather it highlights how war itself is guilty for the victimization in Hiroshima
(Masumoto, 2015; Giamo, 2003). In a similar manner, the Peace Declarations utilized victimage, through which the sense of guilt was shifted to atomic bombs. Then, the elimination of the atomic bombs turned as the rhetorical goal so that the guilt would be displaced from the life among the audience members.
Purification through transcendence. The second mode of purification in the Peace Declaration is transcendence. As discussed, the rhetorical force of transcendence appeals to a higher principle, under which various elements can be united together, and accordingly eliminates the sense of guilt or divisions. The higher principle could be abstract values regarding transcendence (Towner, 2010). Each remark of the Peace Declarations elaborated on the values of humanity and living-togetherness, which became the higher principles to unify the various elements in relation to the sense of guilt. The rhetorical effort aimed to remove the sense of guilt by moving beyond the national borders for the survival of humanity.
Specifically, the 2017 Peace Declaration appealed to policymakers to “build a world where all thrive together,” immediately after which Mayor Matsui was asking them to overcome their differences and encouraging them to gain a deeper awareness of the inhumanity of atomic weapons (Matsui, 2017, para. 6). In making a comparison of a world where all would live together, Mayor Matsui pointed out that the current atomic weapons could terminate the whole world, including both users of the weapons and their enemies, along with the other nations.
Putting this differently, there is a rhetorical force to lead the audience members to choose “living together” by overcoming differences without atomic arms, instead of “dying together” due to the use of atomic arms.
The 2016 Peace Declaration also expressed the need of the persistent endeavor toward “a world where all people are truly ‘living together’” by following the testimonies by two hibakusha (Matsui, 2016, para. 5). The first testimony expressed the need of helping one another to live “in peace and happiness with reverence for all life,” and the other one expressed no need to hold nuclear weapons in order to live the given life. Similarly, the 2015 Peace Declaration articulated the co-existence on the planet that human beings share by exceeding the difference due to nationality, race, religion, and so on. It also introduced testimonies by two hibakusha, who voiced that peace would come from the “circle of harmony,” and “empathy, caring, [and] loving” one another (Matsui, 2015, para. 7). The messages by hibakusha in 2016 and 2015 elaborated on the value of “living together.” While these testimonies were used to rhetorically transcend the feelings of hatefulness, sadness, and anger, the value of “living-together” was clearly tied with “the future of humankind” without the fear of encountering nuclear weapons, which are known as the ultimate inhumanity (Matsui, 2015, para. 8). All in all, for the second mode of purification, the value of “living together” became the higher principle to exceed various needs among the nations, including the users of nuclear arms and the targets of nuclear arms. Its rhetorical effort was transcending the survival of all human beings together over the national borders.
Redemption Through Policymakers
Above, I elucidated that the dual purification modes are victimage and transcendence. Through victimage, the rhetorical appeal was for eliminating nuclear weapons, which functions as the factional scapegoat. Through transcendence, the survival of all humans became the higher principle, which takes precedence over national borders. While their rhetorical effort symbolically displaced guilt from individuals’ lives, they could rhetorically lead the redemption, which is a symbolic transformation to a new way of being or new way of life. Thus, the ultimate redemption could be reached in the world when both the elimination of atomic bombs and survival of all human beings would have happened together.
Here, I argue that each Peace Declaration situated the policymakers in all nations to become the key agents who could actually enact this symbolic transformation. It is because Mayor Matsui (2015, 2016, 2017) repeatedly appealed to them to pursue a world without nuclear weapons so that all humans could survive together. For instance, Matsui (2017) asked policymakers to admire the differences among humans and stated that, “it is vital that you [as policymakers] deepen your awareness of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons…and recognize your duty to build a world where all thrive together” (para. 6). In another example, the 2016 Peace Declaration specifically cited the remark by U.S. President Obama during his visit to
Hiroshima in May 2016, in order to request other policymakers. Mayor Matsui (2016) said that
President Obama was
Declaring, “…among those nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear, and pursue a world without them,” he expressed acceptance of the hibakusha’s heartfelt plea that “no one else should ever suffer as we have.” Demonstrating to the people of the U.S. and the world a passion to fight to eliminate all remaining nuclear weapons, the president’s words showed that he was touched by the spirit of Hiroshima, which refuses to accept the “absolute evil.” (para. 6)
This paragraph illustrated that President Obama as a policymaker desired to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Here, President Obama’s wish was depicted within the process of guilt-redemption because the new way of living would happen in a world without any nuclear stockpiles. This is the vision of redemption, a symbolic transformation to a new way of being. Then, in the remarks, other policymakers were rhetorically encouraged to follow President Obama and act accordingly to engage with the process of guilt-redemption. Along with these examples, any policymakers were rhetorically situated as the key agents holding the capability to remove the remaining atomic bombs, which were scapegoats associated with the noxious feeling among audience members. Also, they were the ones holding the capability to transcend all human survival over the idea of national borders. Therefore, in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations, the policymakers could enact redemption by displacing the guilt from individuals’ lives, particularly in the future.
Conclusion: Rhetorical Negotiation for Intercultural Peacebuilding
Chapter Four has examined the recent Hiroshima Peace Declarations. Through the analysis of the process of guilt-redemption, it aimed to address the sub-question posed by this dissertation: how do the recent annual Peace Declarations rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding? To conclude, I first provide a summary of the analysis and illuminate the answer with respect to the sub-question. Second, I argue that policymakers were not only the key agents for the redemption, but also the paradox sacrificial redeemer. Third, I discuss the rhetorical challenges within the intercultural tension in order to navigate the notion of the Hiroshima bombing and to disconnect the city of Hiroshima from Japan as a nation. Lastly and most importantly, I propose that the Peace Declaration is a re-humanizing ritualistic speech, instead of de-humanizing ritualistic speech.
Condensed Summary About Guilt, Purification, and Redemption
The analysis about the process of guilt-redemption revealed that the rhetorical goal in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations was to invite the audience to symbolically transform and to adapt their perspective to a new way of living in the world, where atomic arms would be abolished and all human lives would hold the higher principle of living together instead of dying together. To summarize the guilt-redemption in the Hiroshima Peace Declaration, the guilt was associated with the destructive power of the atomic bombings. The anxious feeling is related to what happened in the past in Hiroshima, how the audience in the present remembers the Hiroshima bombing, and how they in the future may encounter even more cataclysmic atomic power than that found in Hiroshima around 70 years ago.
Then, through victimage and transcendence as dual modes of purifying the guilt, the rhetorical effort was directed toward eliminating nuclear weapons and situating the survival of all humans higher than any national borders. In this guilt-redemption process, the redemption would happen when policymakers, as the key agents in this guilt-redemption process, abolish nuclear weapons and treat all human lives as being more transcendent than national borders. All in all, the rhetorical goal in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations was symbolic transformation of the ways of living: from living in a world where atomic weapons remain and the national borders are held in higher principle over all human lives, to living in a world where atomic weapons are abolished and all human lives are held in higher principle over national borders.
Policymakers as the Paradox Sacrificial Redeemers
Second, I argue that the policymakers were the paradox sacrificial redeemer, who were paradoxically depicted as the cause of the sense of guilt. As described, policymakers were the key agents for the ultimate redemption in the guilt-redemption process. It was because the Hiroshima Peace Declaration continually appealed to any policymakers to pursue a world without nuclear weapons for all human survival. However, this demand conversely means that some policymakers were the ones who interrupted the ultimate redemption as they have not pursued such a world. At the same time, a guilt within the audience was related through the possibility of becoming future hibakusha. This means that the current way of living with the remaining nuclear weapons in the world could cause the sense of distress and fear. Then, the cause of the guilt was shifted to the policymakers who were not only the interrupter for the elimination of nuclear weapons and thus ensuring all humans survived, but also the reason why people still lived with the existing nuclear weapons.
For example, while the Hiroshima Peace Declarations in all three years requested certain actions from policymakers, the requested actions included ones particularly for the Japanese government. One of the calls was to take a role as a bridge between the nuclear- and nonnuclear-weapon nations to initiate dialogues (Matsui, 2015, 2017). This requested action insinuated that the present-day Japanese government has been failing to take such a role to unite various nations for the benefit of all human lives. In fact, the 2017 Hiroshima Peace Declaration includes a sentence stating that, “As long as nuclear weapons exist and policymakers threaten their use,” the “horror [to experience the hell created by the nuclear weapons] could leap into our present at any moment” (Matsui, 2017, para. 2). Here, the policymakers were the ones who have threatened the use of nuclear weapons and could potentially make any audience members hibakusha. Thus, the cause of the guilt was shifted to the policymakers. I call them paradox sacrificial offers because they were first the key agents for redemption, then the interrupters for the abolishment of nuclear weapons to ensure the survival of all humans, and finally the causes of guilt, or the sense of fear of living with the remaining nuclear weapons and with the possibility of becoming future hibakusha.
As an additional note, North Korea was testing missiles and shooting them over Japan during the summer of 2017 before and after the Hiroshima Peace Declaration (Phillips, 2017; Wang, 2017). Therefore, there was a certain level of fear among Japanese citizens and tensions in the East Asian region. Around the time of the 2017 Hiroshima Peace Declaration, the audience members were more conscious of the idea of potentially becoming victims of missiles. However, Mayor Matsui in his remarks never mentioned North Korea nor the names of the specific countries which currently hold nuclear weapons. The audience members could potentially see the indirect link between North Korean policymakers and “policymakers who threaten their use” in Mayor Matsui’s words (2017, para. 2). In this case, North Korean policymakers were the indirect paradox sacrificial offers, who could take a role of being the key agents both for redemption by abolishing nuclear weapons and for the cause of guilt by presenting the fear of becoming the hibakusha.
Considering such rhetorical choices around the policymakers, I must point out the Japanese preferred argument style. As discussed in the first chapter, the previous research uncovered that English arguments tend to prefer more linear, direct, deductive, and logical claims and assertions, while Japanese argumentations tend to prefer more circular, inductive, and indirect claims and assertions (e.g., Kamimura & Oi, 1998; Kaplan, 1972; Hinds, 1983).
Following the above examples and the ones from the earlier section of Redemption Through Policymakers, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration paradoxically utilized the policymakers as a scapegoat. Further, it indirectly used specific policymakers as paradox sacrificial offerings. This indirect, paradox style fits the Japanese preference for a more circular claim over a direct claim.
Root of Guilt Becoming the Challenges for Intercultural Peacebuilding
The Hiroshima Peace Declarations negotiated peacebuilding within the intercultural tensions. I argue that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations encountered rhetorical challenges due to the root of guilt that is particularly associated with the past. Specifically, the whole process of guilt-redemption initiated itself with the Hiroshima bombing. This means that the root of guilt was only traced back to the day of the Hiroshima bombing in 1945. Therefore, the Hiroshima bombing was the first event to be highlighted, in chronological order, in the postwar Hiroshima peace discourse. Now I offer two insights. They are related with the previous studies, which were introduced in the earlier sections about the rhetorical challenge for intercultural peacebuilding.
The first insight is about the different collective memories regarding the Hiroshima bombing. More specifically, the process of guilt-redemption marginalized Japan’s wartime aggression and colonial practices, the non-nuclear U.S. American atrocities to Japanese citizens, and the death of civilians in non-Hiroshima areas in Japan. This rhetorical form follows the postWWII Hiroshima peace discourse, which previous critiques focused on, as explored in the earlier section of Hiroshima’s Peacebuilding (e.g., Giamo, 2003; Yoneyama, 1999). Then, the root of guilt, which is the Hiroshima bombing, could be an issue for some international community members, particularly those nations which were the victims of Japan’s wartime aggressions and colonial acts.
For instance, Chinese and South Korean mainstream media often criticize the victimhood associated with the Hiroshima bombing, as their collective narratives situate the Hiroshima bombing as the event which was the result of Japan’s wartime aggression and colonial practices. For instance, an article in the Washington Post introduced a comment from an editorial in Xinhua, the Chinese state news agency, which claimed that the fear of bombing should be a reminder of Japan’s wartime militaristic aggression, according to (Tharoor, 2016). Similarly, an article in the Telegraph cited an opinion piece in JoongAng Ilbo, a South Korean daily newspaper, which stated that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, along with other bombs on other Japanese cities, were “‘divine punishment’ on Japan” (Demetriou, 2013, para. 1, subheading). Korean society has an ethnic liberation discourse to justify the nuclear bombings and describes Japan’s resulting decision to surrender as being similar to “‘A-bomb myths’ in the U.S.” (Chung, 2017, p. 26). As these examples demonstrate, the depiction of the Hiroshima bombing in their collective memories is incompatible with its depiction in the Hiroshima Peace Declaration. Therefore, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration had a challenge to rhetorically negotiate intercultural peacebuilding through its guilt-rebirth process.
The second insight pertains to how the Hiroshima Peace Declaration navigated the city of Hiroshima apart from the nation of Japan. It aims to identify the city of Hiroshima, not the nation of Japan, as the messenger to symbolically re-birth the world as the place where all human lives exist without fear of nuclear weapons. For instance, Mayor Matsui repeatedly requests certain actions from the Japanese government. Through the continuous pressure on the Japanese government, the Peace Declaration demonstrated the disconnections between the government of Japan as a nation and the government of Hiroshima as a city. In addition, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration was announced specifically from the mayor of Hiroshima, not necessarily from a political figure on behalf of the Japanese nation. These rhetorical efforts were a part of a bigger rhetorical effort by the city of Hiroshima, which was explored in the earlier section Post-WWII Hiroshima Peace Discourse and the 1945 Hiroshima Bombing in this chapter.
Here, the Hiroshima bombing as the root of guilt could be more acceptable for those dominant and international community members who were consciously or unconsciously distinguishing Hiroshima from Japan, and those whose collective memories have included the U.S. political and economic interests, respectively. Yet again, it would be challenging to navigate the rhetorical tension for intercultural peacebuilding, if the audience members had considered that the Hiroshima Peace Declaration was announced by Hiroshima on behalf of Japan, or Hiroshima was simply representing the entirety of Japan. Those audience members may have found the language choices unfavorable in downplaying Japanese wartime aggression and colonial acts and silencing the other American atrocities in non-Hiroshima areas in Japan. This leads me to the suggestion that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations need to more clearly divide their peacebuilding efforts from any work done by postwar Japan as a nation. By doing so, they can display that their ultimate rhetorical goal is the achievement of a world in which all human lives matter, no matter where the individuals are.
Peace Declaration as a Re-Humanizing Ritual
As the last and most significant final thoughts, I argue that this process of guiltredemption makes the Hiroshima Peace Declarations a re-humanizing ritual instead of a dehumanizing ritual. I would like to make two proposals.
Non-human scapegoat, all human lives, and rehumanizing ritual. First, I propose that the dual modes of purification were transformed into a peacebuilding rhetoric. This proposal is following Ivie’s (2007) proposal in which the modes of purification can be transformed into peacebuilding through re-humanizing rituals, instead of enemy-making through de-humanizing rituals. Regarding victimage as the first mode of purification, the destructive power of the atomic bombs was the scapegoat in the Peace Declaration. Now, frankly yet hypothetically speaking, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration could have chosen the U.S. as a factional scapegoat because it was the U.S. that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. It could have transferred the guilt associated with the Hiroshima bombing to the U.S. If the Peace Declaration had selected such language choices, then it would have become enemy-making by de-humanizing the U.S.
However, the languages in the guilt-redemption process in the declaration actively avoid using the term “the U.S.,” except when mentioning U.S. President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima in 2016 and including the American prisoners of war as victims of the Hiroshima bombing. The Hiroshima Peace Declaration actively used the strategy of shifting the guilt to the destructive power of atomic bombs, which were non-human objects. Thus, the groups of humans who would otherwise have a disagreement could become joint allies against a common enemy (Burke, 1972), with the common enemy, or scapegoat in the Hiroshima Peace Declaration, being nonparticular groups of humans. This means that all groups of human beings could form an alliance against a non-human object instead of against each other.
Similarly, regarding the transcendence as the second mode of purification, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration continuously used the language of transcending the survival of all human lives over the different national interests. This language usage assists human beings in escaping from the scenario of wars, because the mode of transcendence can unite different portions and remove divisions—in this case national borders—by appealing to a higher principle, in this case the survival of all human lives. Here, I argue that the transcendence in the Hiroshima Peace Declaration had a similar rhetorical force, which was previously discussed by Cavin (1994). The research piece explored the guilt-redemption in peace discourse by William Sloane Coffin, a long-time American peace activist. The author discussed that the process of rebirth could happen through mutual mortification, which activates mutual purgation through the language of conceding mutual guilt and leading mutual confession. In the case of the Hiroshima Peace Declaration, while attempting to downplay national borders, the rhetorical effort aimed to unite all humans through the language which concedes mutual guilt (as the audience remembers the Hiroshima bombing in the present context and how they could potentially become future hibakusha) and the language to value all human life. Thus, the transcendence activated the value of mutuality, inclusivity, and wholeness. This rhetorical action was re-humanizing various groups of human beings. Together, I propose that, through the dual modes of purification, the process of guilt-redemption in the Hiroshima Peace Declaration was transformed into peacebuilding through the re-humanizing rituals, instead of enemy-making through the dehumanizing rituals.
Positive peace and rehumanizing ritual. Second, I propose that the Hiroshima Peace Declaration is advocating for human rights for everyone to deserve to live in positive peace, which is the condition of promoting harmonious relations among human groups. In fact, on the one hand, the City of Hiroshima aims to implore the audience to work for abolition of nuclear weapons (The City of Hiroshima, n.d.b, para. 10). The activity to abolish nuclear weapons is a negative peace effort. However, on another hand, I would argue that, through its rhetorical efforts to activate the value of wholeness, the Hiroshima Peace Declaration is a form of a positive peace effort. While it aims to bridge humans into co-existing together in a harmonious condition, there is an effort to include the WWII victims, aggressors, and heroes/heroines as well as the post-WWII apologizers and receivers, and anyone and nations who were engaged with wars in any way.
In fact, as the previous chapter revealed, the Japanese nation and other nations have been negotiating their identities in intercultural rhetorical tension because of their engagements in WWII. Chapter Two demonstrated rhetorical efforts in Abe dawna and pointed out that Japan experiences challenges, particularly with China and South Korea, in negotiating its role in the international community. In that context, Abe dawna aimed to negotiate Japan’s past images as a postwar peace-loving nation while China and South Korea positioned themselves as the wartime victims. Chapter Three focused how the post-WWII Japanese and American political leaders delivered remarks together at Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima. In this case, Japan and the U.S. rhetorically pushed and pulled their identities as nations who ended up taking people’s lives away during the war, but also their identities as nations who transformed into allies in the postwar era. However, the Hiroshima Peace Declarations have a rhetorical effort that goes beyond identifying particular countries as victims, aggressors, heroes/heroines, apologizers, and apology-receivers during wartime and post-wartime. Thereby, in doing so, its hidden rhetorical effort is unifying all humans and advocating human rights for all to live in positive peace.
To end this chapter, as Ivie (2006) stated, the current world entails us to search “strategic ways of symbolically bridging the human divide enough to coexist without eradicating differences or rhetorically sacrificing convenient scapegoats” (p. 9). The Hiroshima Peace Declarations could be one of the models of such strategic ways; through the process of guiltredemption, the Hiroshima Peace Declarations encouraged the international audience to adapt their perspective of the world and visualize a world in which all human lives would co-exist and live together instead of dying together due to atomic weapons. At this point, I ultimately proposed that the motive of the Hiroshima Peace Declarations is rhetorically, symbolically, and strategically bridging humans’ need to coexist while ritualistically making the notion of wars as a sacrificial offering. In doing so it advocates human rights by re-humanizing any parties which have engaged with wars in any manner, as well as emphasizing wholeness among human beings, who all deserve to live in positive peace without experiencing the fear of wars or becoming war victims or aggressors.
Then, the future question would be: how do the Hiroshima Peace Declarations rhetorically invite those international communities, who may not necessarily want to be a part of wholeness offered by the Hiroshima Peace Declarations? They may position the Hiroshima bombing as the result of Japan’s wartime militaristic aggression and/or those who consider the city of Hiroshima as representation of the entire Japanese nation. As long as the city of
Hiroshima annually announces the Hiroshima Peace Declaration at the Peace Memorial Ceremony, the Declaration would most likely aim to contribute to peacebuilding in a similar manner as the ones in 2015, 2016, and 2017. It would be a continuing rhetorical challenge for intercultural peacebuilding for the Hiroshima Peace Declaration.
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD INTERVENTIONS FOR PEACE
My partner is a war survivor from a European war, which officially ended about 20 years ago. While he rarely talks about his war experience as a child, once he told me about witnessing that the people around him were suddenly killed. I became speechless when my thoughts went to the ones who lost their lives and to the ones who lost their loved ones in the specific war and past wars in general, as well as to the ones who were losing their lives and losing their loved ones at that very moment in wars and conflicts. The conversation made it clear that the individuals in various communities were tangled in the unclear process of war, which individuals may not have any control over. I was reminded that the end of war did not necessarily bring a peaceful condition. Healing did not happen magically. In my partner’s words, survivors may move on, but only some can heal when they lost their loved ones. The various involved parties would go through the aftermath of war for a long time for different reasons.
In this dissertation, I have focused on rhetorical discourses advocating for peace in the postwar intercultural contexts centering on Japan. This context included Japan’s wartime enemies and victims. Through the three steps of rhetorical criticism, which were the description, interpretation, and evaluation, Chapters Two through Four identified the rhetorical efforts and challenges in the selected speeches that marked 70 years after the end of war. In this final chapter, I offer an encouragement to have a (more) peaceful condition among the greater community of nations. In order to do so, I first answer my research questions raised in Chapter One while providing a review of each chapter. Second, I offer implications based on the interlocking nature of the findings of each case study. I have conceptualized my critical approach at the intersections of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric. This section serves to enhance the body of knowledge on peace and rhetoric. Third, I offer some suggestions for peace advocators in postwar, intercultural settings. Then, I conclude the dissertation by sharing my optimistic hope.
Chapter Review and Research Questions
In this section, I review each chapter to present their interconnectivity and summarize my critique with respect to the postwar peace discourse among Japan and its wartime enemies and victims. Chapter One presented the significant concepts guiding this study, including positive peace and negative peace, in order to interrogate peace discourses. Negative peace is an absence of war and organized collective violence among groups of human beings (Galtung, 1964, 1967). Positive peace is the integrated condition that assists the harmonious relationships among the group of human beings. The critical framework of the dissertation focused on this distinction, which was intersected with studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric, as well as peace studies. This intersectional framework ultimately allowed me to seek out the rhetorical efforts in the selected speeches and further comprehend their approach to the long-term process of peacebuilding in the postwar intercultural situation.
By applying the concepts of positive peace and negative peace within the critical frame, the overarching questions I posed in Chapter One were: (1) “How is peace discourse symbolically constructed and negotiated in the postwar intercultural community among Japan and its wartime enemies and victims?” and (2) “How does the peace discourse advocate for negative peace and positive peace in the postwar intercultural community?” These central questions were divided into three sub-questions: “How does Japanese apologetic speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII rhetorically negotiate the Japanese role as a wartime aggressor and/or a peace-loving nation in the international community?”; “How does the set of milestone speeches by the president of the U.S. and the prime minister of Japan rhetorically negotiate the long-term peacebuilding process in the intercultural context?”; and “How do the recent annual Peace Declarations rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding?”
Chapters Two, Three, and Four offered case studies in order to answer each sub-question. Each case study was designed to broaden the understanding of the role of communication in the process of building a more peaceful society because communication studies for peace have little in the way of an “equivalent body of knowledge” of communication for peace (Hoffmann, 2013,
p. 11). Below, the sub-questions are answered respectively.
Apologetic Speech and Peace Efforts
Chapter Two focused on the case study about Abe danwa, the speech delivered by Japanese Prime Minister Abe in 2015 on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia. This chapter revealed Abe danwa’s rhetorical efforts around the expressions of owabi apology and shazai apology, as well as negative peace and positive peace efforts. In doing so, I answered the first sub-question and exposed the way Japanese apologetic speech rhetorically negotiated the Japanese role as a wartime aggressor and postwar peace-loving nation in the international community. In examining rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa, this chapter elaborated on the concepts of an apology as a rhetorical tool to repair self-image and an apology as a rhetorical tool to repair a relationship. More specifically, Abe danwa applied several elements of both types of apologies, including denial, atonement, and remembrance. Yet, while elaborating these elements, I revealed three primary rhetorical efforts in Abe danwa.
The first effort was constructing two separate past images of Japan: an old past identity as a wartime ambiguous aggressor and a new past identity as a postwar peace-loving nation. Here, the old past image was constructed through the denial strategy for the apologia as an image-
repair and a partial remembrance of the apology as a relationship-repair. For instance, Abe danwa used a denial strategy by shifting the blame about its wartime actions on the international economic and political circumstances around that time. The new past image was built through postwar Japan’s commitment to endorse positive peace and postwar atonement as a relationship repair. Here, the devotion to positive peace allowed postwar Japan to enact the owabi apologies for its wartime actions. This devotion is the postwar atonement to make a pledge to never engage with wartime actions again. Then, this atonement was holistically transformed into a negative peace effort. Together, the first primary effort was constructing old past and new past images of Japan.
The second primary rhetorical effort was constructing the new past images of certain nations, whose old past images were as the wartime enemies and victims of the wartime Japan. The new past image of Asian Pacific nations included the nations that have received owabi apology and positive peace activities by postwar Japan. In addition, another yet primary new past image of wartime victims and enemies were the postwar hero-nations who sought out reconciliation and allowed postwar Japan to be a part of the international community again. For instance, Abe danwa expressed Japan’s gratitude to various nations and their people, including those tolerant Chinese people who allowed the thousands of Japanese children left behind in China to grow up and then to return to homeland. Here, Abe danwa negotiated their past images from the old past images as wartime victims and enemies to the new past images as postwar heroes.
The third primary rhetorical effort was de-highlighting the old past image of Japan to envision a future of international cooperation. The Abe danwa proposed the continuous future promotion of international negative peace and positive peace as the replacement of shazai apology. For example, Abe danwa stated that Japan would keep promoting the opportunities for medical services, education, and self-reliance to everyone in the world. Such promotion is a form of an atonement, which is an element of the apology as a relationship repair, in order to embody a pledge to never repeat the destruction of war again.
In assembling these three primary efforts, the ultimate rhetorical effort in Abe danwa on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII was negotiating Japan’s image as a peace-loving nation and decreasing its image as a wartime aggressor. At the end of the chapter, I proposed that the negative peace and positive peace efforts as well as transformation to a peace-loving nation are a co-produced process among the involved parties, particularly in the post-war intercultural situation. Then, I further considered the reactions from non-Japanese nations as they were coproducers of peace efforts. Here, I observed that some wartime victims, particularly China and South Korea, responded to Abe danwa unfavorably while their responses emerged primarily from the old past images of wartime victims and wartime Japan. The responses largely ignored their postwar images in the international community. This means that Abe danwa was an ineffective rhetorical form by which to invite China and South Korea to co-produce negative peace because it did not de-legitimate the rivalry relationship. It was also an ineffective form by which to invite them to co-produce positive peace as it did not necessarily promote or assist harmonious relations among involved nations. Finally, it was an ineffective form by which to invite these nations to co-transform Japan to be a peace-loving nation.
Also, I observed that other wartime victims, including the Philippines and Singapore, and wartime enemies, including the U.S. and Australia, welcomed Abe danwa. Their responses were derived highly from the new past images of Japan. They recognized peace efforts by the postwar and current Japan. Thus, Abe danwa was an effective rhetorical form to successfully invite these particular nations to co-transform Japan into a peace-loving nation. It was a successful rhetorical form of positive peace efforts because it successfully invited them to strengthen their ties and a harmonious relationship. In addition, the responses showed that these co-producers and Japan had already achieved the termination of the hostile relationship caused by wartime Japan’s actions.
All in all, Chapter Two demonstrated that, as the answer toward the first sub-question,
Abe danwa on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia rhetorically aimed to shift Japan’s image as a peace-loving nation in the international community. However, it failed to successfully and completely encourage Japan’s neighboring nations, particularly China and South Korea, to co-transform Japan to be a peace-loving nation, although it effectively encouraged other wartime victims and enemies.
Postwar Peacebuilding Effort Among Wartime Enemies
Chapter Three focused on two pairs of speeches by U.S. President Obama and Japanese
Prime Minister Abe. The first pair are speeches by these political figures in Hiroshima on May
27, 2016 (The White House, 2016a). The second pair are the speeches in Pearl Harbor on December 27, 2016 (The White House, 2016b). While applying the rhetorical concept of ideograph, this chapter revealed that, through <wa[和]> and <harmony>, these speeches rhetorically encouraged their American and Japanese audiences to accept the engagement with positive peace so that the audience could embrace the joint collaboration to heal the past violence and prevent any future violence. In doing so, I answered the second sub-question and exposed the ways this set of milestone speeches rhetorically function in the long-term peacebuilding process in the intercultural context.
More specifically, prior to the analysis, I pointed out the different nuances of “wa” and “harmony,” although Japanese “wa” is often translated as harmony in English. Here, “wa,” which connotes as the peaceful unity, wholeness, and conformity within a social group, is a significant ideology in Japanese society. On one hand, harmony, which contains the result of logical agreement to potentially unite differences, is an ideology in the U.S. society. Then, the analysis section revealed three themes to enact <wa> and <harmony>.
The first theme was the transformation enacting <harmony>. Here, both political leaders avoided a clear demonstration of their wartime hostile relationship. Rather, they highlighted the transformation to alliance as they repeatedly described how strong and successful an alliance and friendship the U.S. and Japan have had since the end of the war. It rhetorically positioned their postwar allied relationship as more visible and superior to the wartime relationship. This means that the remarks were repeatedly describing the successful outcome of their logical agreement to unite these nations in postwar time. Such an outcome was the cluster values of harmony. Thus, political figures situated “harmony” as more visible and superior. In doing so, the rhetorical transformation to be friends ended up enacting <harmony>.
The second theme was the value of “otagai no tame ni: With and for each other” enacting <wa>. President Obama used the phrase “Otagai no tame ni: with and for each other” in the speech at Pearl Harbor in 2016 (The White House, 2016b, para. 36). In this remark, the concept of “otagai no tame ni: with and for each other” was labeled as the lesson that both the U.S. and Japan as nations and their people had chosen to follow in the past, were choosing to follow in the present, and would choose in the future. Because the phrase of “otagai no tame ni” is a cluster phrase of Japanese value “wa,” the phrase in his remarks enacted the overarching ideograph
<wa> in the selected speech.
The third theme was the remembrance in the future, which enacted both <wa> and <harmony>. There were four elements to remember in the future. The first three elements symbolized “wa” and further enacted <wa>. The first element was the story about a common humanity. Examples were the stories in hibakusha as well as the stories connected with the U.S. Declaration of Independence. The second element was Hiroshima as the start of a moral awakening. The moral awakening would value a common humanity and would not choose atomic warfare to slay innocent people. The third element was the lesson of “otagai no tame ni: with and for each other.” Then, the fourth element symbolized “harmony” and “wa” and enacted
<harmony> and <wa>. This fourth element used Pearl Harbor as a symbol of reconciliation. Here, while reconciliation is a cluster word of harmony, the remark situated reconciliation as superior than the reward by retribution. In doing so, this element enacted <harmony>. At the same time, “tolerance” is a cluster word of “wa” and it further allows “reconciliation” to enact <wa>. Here, the spirit of tolerance in Americans allowed Japanese people survive in the burned community and then let Japan rejoin the international community. Such tolerance is the foundation of reconciliation, which was integrated for both communities to become allies and friends, in a similar manner as the value of “wa.”
The above analysis demonstrated that the set of milestone speeches by the president of the U.S. and prime minister of Japan enacted <harmony> and <wa>. Upon these speeches, the American and Japanese audiences favorably or neutrally responded, rather than responding negatively. Through the use of each <harmony> and <wa>, the remarks rhetorically and persuasively justified the engagements with positive peace and further encouraged their audiences to work on more engagements with positive peace. Thus, these speeches were a part of the long-term rhetorical effort to construct positive peace in the postwar intercultural context.
At the end of Chapter Three, I proposed that <wa> and <harmony> together functioned as one intercultural ideograph in the specific intercultural context between the U.S. and Japan. Here, I argued that, while <wa> was a Japanese ideograph and <harmony> was a U.S. ideograph, the value of peace/heiwa [平和] serves in the fluid space across the categories of difference. More clearly, <harmony> fully encouraged the condition for the U.S. audience to accept their engagement of positive peace with Japan, and its fluid space with <wa> was also playing a role in advocating the commitment to positive peace. In the same manner, <wa> fully encouraged the condition for Japanese audiences to accept their engagement of positive peace with the U.S., where its fluid space with <harmony> was advocating the commitment to positive peace. This means that <wa> and <harmony>, which were connected by the shared reference of peace/heiwa in the fluid space, together justified the commitment to positive peace for both the Japanese and U.S. audiences. Thus, <wa> and <harmony> functioned as one intercultural ideograph in the postwar intercultural community between Japan and the U.S. In sum, Chapter Three demonstrated that, as the answer of the second sub-question, the sets of milestone speeches by the president of the U.S. and prime minister of Japan enacted <harmony> and <wa>. They further enacted one intercultural ideograph composed with these <harmony> and <wa>, and accordingly laud together for both the U.S. and Japanese audiences to engage with and commit to more positive peacebuilding efforts.
Peace Declarations and Re-Humanization
Chapter Four focused on the recent annual Hiroshima Peace Declarations delivered by Mayor Matsui of Hiroshima. The chapter revealed that, through the process of guilt-redemption, the Hiroshima Peace Declarations aimed to invite the audience in the international community and Japanese community to symbolically transform and to adapt the new perspective of living in a world in which all human lives would co-exist without the fear of dying together due to atomic weapons. In doing so, I answered the third sub-question: How do the recent annual Hiroshima Peace Declarations rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adopt the new perspective of peacebuilding?
More specifically, the guilt in Hiroshima Peace Declarations was derived from the destructive power of atomic bombings. The anxious, sad feeling was related to what happened in Hiroshima in 1945, how the audience in the present has remembered it, and how human beings in the future may encounter atomic powers, which would be more cataclysmic than the one in Hiroshima around 70 years ago. Next, the guilt was purified through dual modes: victimage and transcendence. Through the mode of victimage, the Peace Declarations shifted the blame to nuclear weapons, in relation to the sense of guilt linked with the destructive power of such weapons. Through the mode of transcendence, the notion of co-existence became the higher principle to exceed various needs among the countries. Here, the rhetorical effort was transcending the survival of all human beings together over the national borders or interests of each country. This mode of transcendence was paralleled with Galtung’s conceptualization of conflict transcendence, through which involved groups go beyond just achieving their goals and seek out to create “a new reality” so that they can harmoniously co-exist (Galtung, 2007, p. 14).
Then, redemption would happen in a world which would abolish nuclear weapons and treat all human lives as transcending over various national interests. Here, the policymakers were the key agents in making redemption possible. Together, through the analysis of the guiltredemption process, it became clear that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations aimed to rhetorically transform the audience in the postwar international community to adapt the perspective of the way of living in the proposed world where all human lives co-exist without the fear of atomic weapons.
At the end of the chapter, I offered three insights. First, I pointed out that the policymakers were not only the key agents of redemption, but also the paradox sacrificial redeemers, or scapegoats. They were paradoxically depicted as the cause of the guilt because they were not seeking hard enough for a world without nuclear weapons. Thus, they were the reason why nuclear weapons still exist. This indirect rhetorical style fits the Japanese rhetorical preference. Second, I pointed out the rhetorical challenges due to the root of guilt. The initial guilt in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations can only be traced back to the day of the Hiroshima bombing. It could cause a rhetorical challenge in this intercultural context, particularly with the audience who considered that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations were delivered on behalf of Japan and accordingly considered that the process of guilt-redemption silenced Japan’s wartime aggressions and colonial practices as well as the non-nuclear American atrocities to Japanese citizens in non-Hiroshima regions. Here, I suggested that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations may need to more plainly differentiate their postwar peace efforts as done by the city of Hiroshima from the works done by postwar Japan as a nation.
Third and most importantly, I argued that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations became a rehumanizing ritual instead of a de-humanizing ritual. Here, I made two specific proposals. The first proposal was that dual modes of purification, victimage and transcendence, transformed the process of guilt-redemption into a re-humanizing process. Regarding victimage, the scarified redeemer was the destructive power of atomic bombs so that various human groups could form an alliance against non-human objects. Regarding transcendence, it downplayed the national borders. In doing so, transcendence activated the value of wholeness and inclusivity. The dual modes of purification were re-humanizing various groups of human beings, instead of dehumanizing enemies or others. Thus, the process of guilt-redemption transformed itself into a rehumanizing ritual.
The second proposal was that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations advocated the human rights for everyone to live in positive peace, because there was a rhetorical effort to go beyond identifying particular countries as the victims, aggressors, saviors, and more during wartime and postwar time. Therefore, in this sense, the hidden rhetorical role in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations was a form of positive peace efforts, although the obvious rhetorical effort of abolishing nuclear weapons can be considered as a form of negative peace efforts. In assembling these two specific proposals, I reaffirm that the Hiroshima Peace Declarations activate the process of a re-humanizing ritual, and rhetorically invite the audience to join the effort to create peacebuilding, instead of activating a de-humanizing ritual and inviting their audience to an enemy-making.
All in all, in the efforts of answering the third sub-question, Chapter Four revealed that, through the guilt-redemption process, the Hiroshima Peace Declarations were rhetorically, symbolically, and strategically bridging the gaps between humans and allowing them to co-exist while ritualistically making the idea of wars and atomic bombs as sacrificial offerings. In doing so, they re-humanized all parties which have dealt with wars in any manner, so that they transformed the audience members in the international communities to adapt the view of a world in which all humans deserve to live in positive peace without experiencing the fear of wars or potentially becoming war victims or aggressors.
Going Beyond: Implications
Having answered the questions above, I now turn to a discussion of implications for rhetorical, intercultural, critical praxis about peace discourse. This project was intended to enhance the body of knowledge of peace through a rhetorical approach, as current scholarship suggested that such knowledge has been largely invisible in the communication field (e.g., Hoffmann, 2013; Gorsevski, 2004, 2014a; Wilz, 2010). Here, generative criticism was a useful rhetorical method, particularly on the stage, where there is an academic need to conceptualize symbolic, rhetorical performance in the speeches advocating for peace. This method allowed me to identify, codify, and develop the theoretical lens by explaining primary elements in each speech from a communication perspective, while I was borrowing the concepts from peace studies and centering ideologies of peace. Below, I conceptualize the rhetorical elements and locate three implications in the intersection of the studies of intercultural rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and critical rhetoric. I also make a suggestion about the area, which future scholarship can study.
Rhetorical Peacebuilding as a Co-Produced Process
First, my rhetorical analysis points out that rhetorical peacebuilding is a co-produced process among the involved parties, including the rhetors in one cultural community and audience in another cultural community. It is a co-produced rhetorical effort to heal the injuries due to past conflicts and promote harmonious conditions. I borrow the concept of apology as a co-produced process (Yamazaki, 2004a) and as a dialectical form (Hatch, 2014). More specifically, as Chapter Two presented, Abe danwa did not necessarily de-legitimate the rivalry relationship nor assist the presence of positive relations among human groups, particularly among Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. Abe danwa aimed to negotiate the international role of
Japan as a peace-loving nation in the (new) past, present, and future. However, China and South Korea viewed Japan’s past image as an aggressor during the (old) past in the wartime era. Thus, there was a gap about the past images of Japan and according the past image of China and South Korea. This gap interrupted the terminal point for the hostile relationships between Japan as a wartime aggressor and postwar apologizer and China and South Korea as wartime victims and postwar receivers of apologies.
Here, rhetorical efforts to construct the meaning of peace need to be a dialectical, coproduced form, particularly in intercultural occasions when the rhetor and audience are from different cultural communities. This is in a similar manner with the view in which an apology to heal the relationship needs to be a “dialectical” and “relationship-oriented” form (Hatch, 2014, pp. 155–156). As Hatch (2014) suggests, both sides need to attend to the others’ perspective in order to promote healing. Following this concept of apologies for a relationship-repair, it would be significant for peace rhetoric to attend to the other’s perspective to promote peace in the intercultural community in the pos- conflict setting. In Abe danwa’s case, the Japanese rhetor failed to attend the perspective of China and South Korea, which still hold Japan’s past image as a wartime aggressor. This means the rhetor ignored the political and historical forces in China and South Korea which would take a role to shape their collective memories about the “past” incident. At the same time, the Chinese and South Korean audiences failed to attend to the perspective of Japan which already has held its past image as a peace-loving nation. Thus, they failed together to assist and promote negative peace and positive peace.
I argue that one of the main tasks for postwar peace discourse should be the active articulation of the co-producing process of peacebuilding in the intercultural community. The peace discourse needs to eloquently express that all involved parties are co-producers of negative peace and positive peace. In doing so, the various parties could consciously co-engage with the process of international peacebuilding. In fact, one role for peace researchers is to serve as a third party and to “[point] out possibilities that the parties may not have been able to see for themselves” (Galtung, 1985, p. 150). Here I further argue that peace speakers should take a role to intervene among conflicted parties. In order to do so, peace speakers or advocators must understand the political, historical forces in each cultural community that cause different understandings of past incidents. Such forces bring rhetorical challenges to encourage the involved parties to co-produce the meaning of peace together. Thus, if peace advocators unpack these forces and invite the involved parties to attend to others’ perspectives to see the past events, then the peace discourse could be promoting peacebuilding as the co-produced, dialogic process in the intercultural settings.
Intercultural Ideograph as a Rhetorical Tool
Another main task for the postwar peace discourse should be connecting the various cultural communities together, which may have diverse collective memories about one past incident. If communities are connected in intercultural settings, then these communities are on the path to engage with the aforementioned value of peacebuilding as a co-produced process. Below, I introduce the rhetorical force of an intercultural ideograph, and then demonstrate that it is a powerful rhetorical tool to glue the communities to advocating peace in an intercultural community. First, an ideograph is ideology in practice in the rhetorical documents, which signifies collective commitment among the members in the cultural community (McGee, 1980).
They can warrant certain behaviors and beliefs as acceptable.
Here, I introduce an intercultural ideograph, and describe it as a rhetorical force in practice, in a similar manner as an ideograph; yet it is composed with two or more ideologies, each of which is embedded in a specific culture but all of which are glued with a fluid value and belief. Drawing a specific case from Chapter Three, the U.S. and Japan each have their unique collective narratives about the Pearl Harbor attack and Hiroshima bombing (e.g., Fields, 2015; Masumoto, 2015; Williams, 2007; Lindaman & Ward, 2004). Yet the U.S. president and
Japanese prime minister enacted Japanese <wa> and English <harmony> in their speeches in Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor during their visits together. <Wa> was an ideograph for the audience in the Japanese community, while <harmony> was an ideograph for the audience in the U.S. community. At the end of that chapter, I pointed out that these two ideographs had fluid spaces across their different nuances. The ideology of peace serves as the fluid space to glue the Japanese value of “wa” and the Western value of “harmony.” Thus, <wa> and <harmony> together functioned as one intercultural ideograph, which justified the engagement of positive peace efforts for both the Japanese and U.S. audiences.
In this sense, an intercultural ideograph could be a powerful rhetorical tool in an intercultural setting in which peace advocators have audience members from various cultural groups. An intercultural ideograph can justify the actions of promoting a harmonious relationship and encouraging the audience members to support the value of peace. Thus, I argue that the concept of an intercultural ideograph is a rhetorical means to advocate peace in an intercultural community, as it can provide justification for the audience members to engage with a coproduced process of peacebuilding.
Re-Humanization as Creation of a Peace Culture
Ivie (2007) discussed a ritual’s untapped peacebuilding potential and its “capacity for inducing and reorienting political motives” (p. 240). Wilz (2010) also provided the argument of how the peacebuilding process engages with discovery of a re-humanizing discourse and challenges a dehumanizing discourse that has contributed to “a culture of war” (p. 583). The third implication follows their approach to the peacebuilding process and re-humanizing discourse. Below, I argue that, if the rhetorical discourse in an intercultural community works to re-humanize all involved parties, then it could activate, assist, and sustain the creation of a peace culture. I also argue that victimage and transcendence, as modes of purifications on the guiltredemption process, are effective rhetorical tools if they are used in a particular way. Yet, prior to presenting the implication, I depict a peace culture and war culture.
Peace culture and war culture. A peace culture sees peace as good, right, and beautiful, and violence as bad, wrong, and horrible (Gultung, 2004). It promotes various aspects of cultural peace (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Cultural peace completes positive peace in various cultural forms in language, art and science, schools, the media, and more. Specifically, it justifies and validates the structural peace, which generates a symbiotic, equitable relation among diverse groups. It further validates the direct peace, which generates a verbal and physical act of cooperation, friendliness, and love.
Here, a peace culture is the opposite of a war culture, which promotes cultural violence, structural violence, and direct violence (see Chapter One for the definitions of these three types of violence). A war culture glorifies the idea of violence and connects heroism to the violent acts, including wars. In fact, in a war culture, not only enemies are dehumanized by depicting them as devils; the allied soldiers are also dehumanized by promoting them to be the depersonalized heroes/heroines, whose lives both lived and lost would be secreted under the shadows of grand monuments (Ivie, 2007, p. 241).
Re-humanizing all and peace culture. Having described a peace culture and war culture, I conceptualize the re-humanizing rhetorical efforts and peace culture. There is no doubt a war culture prevails in the international community. Yet, if the rhetorical process lets competing sides identify with one another through the process of re-humanizing the Others, then it could become the cure from the rhetoric of war, which de-humanizes the Others (Wilz, 2010). Such a rhetorical approach was found in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations. Yet, their rhetorical forces were not only re-humanizing the Others and enemies, but rehumanizing all human groups. They applied the dual modes of purification. Victimage encouraged various groups to become united against a non-human object, which was the power of nuclear weapons. Transcendence activated the values of wholeness and inclusivity. The dual modes were re-humanizing all human beings, including wartime enemies, victims, and saviors. In this sense, the Hiroshima Peace Declarations were a re-humanizing ritual, which advocated human rights for everyone to live in positive peace. Based on the rhetorical analysis of the Hiroshima Peace Declarations, I submit the argument that the re-humanization of whole human beings not only engages with peacebuilding in the intercultural community, but also creates, reinforces, and celebrates a peace culture and becomes a remedy for a war culture.
Furthermore, victimage as a mode of purification is an effective rhetorical tool for peace speakers in an intercultural community, if any non-human objects are sacrificial redeemers. In doing so, a rhetor does not necessarily dehumanize human groups in the intercultural community. This means that if any human groups are sacrificial redeemers to purify the guilt, then victimage is dehumanizing the particular groups and not celebrating a peace culture. Transcendence is another effective tool to create a bridge among the various human groups, especially when it appeals to the principle of co-existing and co-living as the higher dominion. Thus, I say that these dual modes could activate, assist, and sustain the creation of a peace culture if they are applied in appropriate ways. At the end, another vital task of the intercultural peace discourse should be re-humanizing all involved groups in the post-conflict community, providing a cure from an intercultural war culture, and engaging with the co-creation of an intercultural peace culture.
Future Scholarship
I offer one potential area, which needs to be considered for future critics when they also aim to crystalize the peace discourse in the postwar setting for the intercultural community. The critics may want to deeply contemplate the role of collective memories in each community about past injustices while analyzing the intercultural peace discourse in the post-conflict situation. While collective memories are a shared remembering of the past and taken-for-granted memory among the community members (Prosise, 1998), they are the vital elements that affect the rhetorical effectiveness of a speech advocating for reconciliation and peace. Furthermore, they could impact on the rhetorical choices for peace advocators.
For example, as explained in Chapter Two, regarding the past images, Abe danwa highlighted the postwar images of Japan and its neighboring nations, such as China and South Korea. Yet, these nations remembered the wartime images of Japan and themselves. These different “pasts” could be linked with the collective memories, which are also uniquely sustained by the political, historical, and social forces in each cultural community. Similarly, Chapter Four demonstrated that the initial root of guilt in the Hiroshima Peace Declarations was traced back to the destructive power of the Hiroshima bombing. Yet, the depiction of the outcome of the bombing did not align with the Chinese and Korean collective memories about the Hiroshima bombing. In this regard, Abe dawna and the Hiroshima Peace Declarations were not necessarily engaged with effective advocation for peace due to the gap among the different collective memories in this specific intercultural community. At the same time, Chapter Three presented that the intercultural ideograph justified peace engagements for both the U.S. and Japanese community members, even though these nations have different collective memories about the Pearl Harbor attack and Hiroshima bombing.
Hence, future critics, including myself, should continue to work for a deeper examination of how the different collective memories in each community impact on the effectiveness of the peace speeches and influence the rhetorical choices for peace advocators in intercultural rhetorical settings. Such an examination might be able to identify the meaningful rhetorical strategies, which do not dismiss or silence the experiences during past injustices but at the same time allow advocators to be future-oriented to end the hostile relationship and to endorse peaceful relationship. Above, I provided three implications: rhetorical peacebuilding as a coproduced process, an intercultural ideograph as a rhetorical tool, and re-humanization as creation of a peace culture. I also provided one potential academic direction that future scholars can seek out. These implications and direction aim to broaden and deepen the understanding of peace discourse in the communication field, particularly at the intersection of rhetorical, intercultural, critical praxis about peace discourse.
Going Beyond: For Peace Advocators
Critics who engage a rhetorical approach can contribute to the insights of “what ‘works’ in communication and is effective,” and should provide some implications (Cavin, 2006, p. 392). Their implications about rhetorical strategies for potential conflicted situations like wars should guide a better understanding of how human beings can learn to exist peacefully together. Here, I would say that such an idea of implications should be offered in the post-conflict, intercultural community as well. Therefore, I offer several suggestions for intercultural peace advocators. These suggestions are drawn from the above academic implications. Here, intercultural peace advocators at any levels may consider the following elements when they engage with peace activism in an intercultural community which is composed of the conflicted groups due to past injustices.
Peace advocators in the postwar intercultural community need to actively express that all parties are involved together in the intercultural peacebuilding, as it is a co-producing process.
Peace advocators need to identify the social, political, and historical forces in each involved group, which shape a different understanding and collective memory of a past event. Rhetorical articulation of such forces would help the conflicted groups to see the past event from others’ perspectives.
The coined concept of an intercultural ideograph is an effective rhetorical tool to invite the conflicted sides to join the co-produced process of intercultural peacebuilding.
Through an intercultural ideograph, the various cultural groups should be glued together to achieve the value of peace together.
Peacebuilding through the rhetorical re-humanization of all humans can celebrate and shape a peace culture and de-celebrate a war culture.
Victimage, in the process of guilt-redemption, is an effective rhetorical tool to rehumanize the whole human being and celebrate a peace culture, if any non-human objects are their sacrificial redeemers.
Transcendence, in the process of guilt-redemption, is an effective rhetorical tool to rehumanize the whole human being and celebrate a peace culture, if the appealing principle is co-existing and co-living.
I would add that intercultural peace advocators, including the ones working for governments, NGO groups, educational institutions, and more, may want to team up with peace researchers and critics. By utilizing the framework of the critical rhetoric, critical intercultural communication, and intercultural rhetoric, researchers need to help unpack the social, political, and historical forces in each community that has constructed dominant ideologies of peace (or violence) as well as shaped the collective memories about past injustices. In the post-conflict intercultural setting, different dominant ideologies and collective memories would become rhetorical challenges to promote a peaceful condition among the conflicted groups.
Understanding these dominant ideologies and collective memories could be essential steps for an effective postwar peace discourse. Thus, I recommend any intercultural peace advocators to work with peace researchers who, according to Galtung (1985), hold a role to serve as “a go between” the conflicted groups so that they can demonstrate the options that these groups may be unable to recognize for themselves (pp. 149–150).
Also, peace advocators and researchers may want to keep in mind that “the narratives of past conflict and injustice, when presented in public space may rekindle the conflict” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 25). Particularly for intercultural settings, it is essential not to confuse what is good for one cultural group with what is good for the intercultural community, which hopes to terminate the hated interactions and to assist a harmonious, positive relationship in postwar settings. With an effective peacebuilding process, as Galtung and Fischer (2013) point out, the negative emotions could recede into the background, which, I would say, allows the intercultural community to promote positive peace and shape a peace culture.
Concluding Remarks
It is not any secret that the current international community has quite prolifically conducted wars and violent actions. This dissertation identified, described, interpreted, and evaluated the rhetorical efforts to reconcile the antagonistic relations 70 years after the end of WWII in the intercultural community involving Japan and its neighboring countries. Also, it critiqued the rhetorical efforts to justify the engagement of positive peace activities among the U.S. and Japanese audiences. It is far from crystal-clear to me that an end of war does not automatically bring a peaceful condition to the postwar intercultural community. Once the wars and violent acts start, it takes time to end. Once it ends, it takes a long time to heal relationships and reach both negative peace and positive peace.
Therefore, it is significant, in my opinion, to actively re-humanize human beings and advocate for the creation of a peace culture in the intercultural community. Peace culture can promote the dominant ideologies of positive peace and go beyond characterizing various human groups as aggressors, victims, saviors, enemies, postwar apologizers, apology-receivers, and more. It can create the structural peace and direct peace that allows humans to consciously choose and justify non-violent means, if any conflicted interests emerge. I would add that peace speakers may consider wars (or violent acts) as scapegoats, common enemies, or sacrificial redeemers, so that they can advocate against the creation and reinforcement of war culture.
At this point, as a critic, I view this dissertation as a first step toward my participation in the long-term effort of peacebuilding. I contribute it to the process of activating more harmonious conditions among the human groups, even in the post-conflict context. In this way, my optimistic wish is that this academic product serves as my initial activism of advocating peace in intercultural settings.
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