2020/08/22

무아 - 아트만, 아나트만(Anātman), 아나딴(Anattan)

 무아 - 산스크리트로 아트만에 대비되는 말


개설
만물에는 고정 불변하는 실체로서의 나〔實我〕가 없다는 뜻으로 
범어(梵語)로는 아나트만(Anātman), 팔리어(Pali language)로는 아나딴(Anattan)이다. 

무아(無我)는 석가모니가 깨달음을 얻은 뒤 최초로 설파한 가르침이다. 
석가모니 이전의 인도사상에서는 상주(常住)하는 유일의 주재자로서 참된 나인 아트만(ātman)을 주장하였으나, 석가모니는 아트만이 결코 실체적인 나〔我)〕가 아니며, 그러한 나는 없다고 주장하였다.

내용
무아설은 아트만을 불변의 실체로 인정하는 기존의 인도 사상과는 구별되는 불교 고유의 주장이다. 
그러나 고정 불변하는 실체로서의 아(我)는 부정하면서도 아트만의 상주설(常住說)과 함께 인도 사상에서 가장 보편적으로 받아들여지던 윤회설을 수용하고 있다. 
불교의 시각에서 윤회란 실체로서 존재하는 나〔我)〕가 아니라 어디까지나 범부의 그릇된 인식으로서 존재하는 나〔我)〕일 뿐이기 때문이다. 이것을 ‘무아윤회(無我輪廻)’라고 부른다.

불교의 무아윤회는 윤회의 주체로서 중유(中有: 사람이 죽은 후 다시 태어나기 전까지의 시간) 개념을 상정하였으며, 대승불교의 유식학(唯識學)에 이르러 아뢰야식(阿賴耶識: 인간의 가장 근원적인 심층의식)으로 대체되었다.

구사론(俱舍論)에서는 ‘중유의 상속’ 또는 무상(無常)한 ‘오온(五蘊: 色․受․想․行․識)의 상속’으로써 윤회가 성립된다고 주장한다. 즉 중유라는 개념이 윤회의 주체를 연속시키며, 이것이 구체적으로 지시하는 것은 업력(業力: 선악의 행위가 남기는 잠재력) 또는 잠세력(潛勢力: 겉으로 드러나지 않고 숨어있는 세력)의 상태로 있는 오온이다. 결국 중유의 상속에 의한 윤회는 ‘온갖 번뇌와 업에 의해 오염된 온(蘊)에 의한 윤회’를 의미한다.

아뢰야식을 장식이라 하여 인간의 심층의식으로 상정하였던 유식학에서는 아뢰야식을 윤회의 주체로 보았다. 이는 기존의 상속이론보다 진전된 무아설의 일환이다. 아뢰야식은 업의 잠세력을 의미하는 습기(習氣)일 뿐이며 바로 이 점에서 그것은 무아적 존재이다.

불교의 무아설은 ‘나〔我)〕’가 있는가 없는가에 대한 이론이 아니라 실체가 없는 것을 실체로 보아서는 안 된다는 실천적 의미를 담고 있다. ‘나’라고 하는 실체가 존재하는가 하지 않는가？ 하는 형이상학적인 문제는 불교 수행자에게는 무의미한 것이다. 따라서 무아는 제법무아(諸法無我)라는 이름 아래 설명되었고, 무아의 생명은 무아의 실천이나 무아행(無我行)이라고 하는 실천적인 면에서 살아 있다.

즉, 이 세상의 모든 것은 고정성이 없는 무아이고 끊임없이 변화하고 있기 때문에, 무아성을 자각하여 수양하고 노력함에 따라 역경을 극복하여 더욱 향상할 수 있음을 뜻하고 있다. 그러므로 불교의 이상인 열반은 무아성의 자각 아래 철저하게 무아행이 이루어질 때 나타나는 경지이다. 이 무아는 일반적으로 크게 인무아(人無我)와 법무아(法無我)로 나누어 설명되는데, 신라의 원효(元曉)는 그의 여러 저술에서 명쾌한 해석을 가하였다.

원효는 인무아를 외도(外道)나 범부(凡夫)들의 견해를 타파하기 위한 것이라고 하였다. 외도나 범부는 몸과 마음을 한결같이 주재하는 영구불변의 주체가 있다고 보고 이를 ‘나〔我)〕’라고 하나, 우리의 몸과 마음은 오온이 가정적(假定的)으로 화합해 있는 것일 뿐, 특별한 주체라고 인정할 만한 것은 아무것도 없으므로 ‘인무아’라고 한다고 하였다.

법무아는 소승(小乘)의 수행자들이 갖는 그릇된 집착을 타파하기 위한 것이다. 그들은 모든 대상의 법에 대하여 실아(實我)가 있고 실법(實法)이 있다고 그릇 생각하여, 갖가지 현상들에 대하여 상주하고 실재하는 것으로 인정하지만, 실은 모두가 인연의 화합으로 생긴 가법(假法)일 뿐, 따로 그 현상들을 있게끔 하는 법아(法我)가 없는 까닭에 ‘법무아’라고 한다고 하였다.

또 실천적인 면에서 볼 때 무아는 무소득(無所得)과 무가애(無罣碍)라는 두 가지 측면을 갖는다. 무소득이란 집착이 없다는 것이다. 인간은 자기〔我〕와 자기 소유물〔我所〕에 대하여 고정되고 변하지 않는 것으로 생각하거나 고정불변할 것을 원하여 이를 집착하게 된다. 이와 같은 아집(我執)과 아소집(我所執)이 없는 것이 무소득이다. 무가애는 무애(無碍)라고도 하는데, 장애와 정체됨이 없이 자유자재한 것이다. 이것은 무소득의 무집착이 진전하여 완성된 상태를 가리킨다.

의의와 평가

불교사에서 볼 때 무아라는 말은 시대가 흐름에 따라 차차 공(空) 또는 공성(空性)이라는 말로 바뀌어 사용되었고, 선종(禪宗)에서는 무(無)라는 말도 무아의 뜻으로 많이 사용되었다. 원래 아집(我執)에서 벗어날 것을 촉구했던 무아의 가르침은 뒤에 어떠한 것도 실체를 가지고 있지 않다는 가르침으로, 마침내는 주관과 객관 사이에서 일어나는 대립의 소멸과 해탈로 발전되어 갔다.

참고문헌

『대승기신론소(大乘起信論疏)』(원효)
『윤회의 자아와 무아』(정승석, 장격각, 1999)
『불교개설(佛敎槪說)』(무진장, 홍법원, 1980)
『불교학개론(佛敎學槪論)』(김동화, 보련각, 1954)

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제공처 정보
한국민족문화대백과 http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/
[네이버 지식백과] 무아 [無我] (한국민족문화대백과, 한국학중앙연구원)

서울대학교 철학사상연구소

무아 [ anātman , no-self , 無我 ]

구분
철학용어
관련문헌
밀린다팡하

불교철학에서 중요한 개념 중의 하나이다. 
무아를 글자 그대로 해석하면 “나(自我)”라는 것은 없다는 뜻이다. 
무아는 연기(緣起), 공(空), 무상(無常) 등과도 긴밀히 연관되는 개념으로, 연속적이며 불변의 실체로서의 자아를 부정한다. 
따라서 부단히 변화 중에 있으며, 어느 정도 독립적인 기능을 하는 현상으로서의 자아가 부정되는 것이 아니라, 부정되는 것이다.

이름이나 명칭은 그 대상을 변화하는 사물로서가 아니라, ‘고정된’ 사물로, 그리고 일시적이고 우연적인 결합체가 아닌 실체라고 믿게 하는 힘이 있다. 그렇기 때문에 ‘인격적 개체’라는 표현 뒤에 ‘육체 속에 존재하는 영원불변한실체’라는 간과하기 쉽지만 의미심장한 단서가 따라다니게 되는 것이다. 즉 부단히 변화 중에 있으며, 어느 정도 독립적인 기능을 하는 현상으로서의 자아가 부정되는 것이 아니라, 연속적이며 불변의 실체로서의 자아가 부정되는 것이다. 따라서 어떤 대상을 고유명사나 보통명사로 지칭하더라도 그것들의 연기적 성격을 분명히 인식하고 있다면 문제가 없다. 문제는 명사가 아니라, 그러한 명사를 사용하면서 우리가 취하는 심리적 태도인 것이다.

무아가 부정적인 표현인 것은 분명하지만 그 내용이 부정적인 것은 아니다. 다시 말해서 염세적 세계관을 드러내는 것도 아니고, 허무주의를 표방하는 것도 아니다. 없는 것을 없다고 말한 것뿐이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 오온을 근거로 영속적이고 변치 않는 자아가 존재한다는 미망과 집착은 생각보다 오래되고 또 질긴 것이다.

[네이버 지식백과] 무아 [anātman, no-self, 無我] (서울대학교 철학사상연구소, 서울대학교 철학사상연구소)
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철학사전

무아 [ 無我 ]

산스크리트어의 anātman 또는 nirātman의 역어(譯語). '무아'가 일반적이지만, 비아(非我)로 번역되는 경우도 있다. '아트만(ātman, 我)이 존재하지 않는다'라는 주장은 불교를 다른 모든 철학사상으로부터 구별하는 특징이자 불교의 근본사상이다. 아트만은 인도의 정통적 철학의 여러 학파에 의해 실재라고 간주된 영원불멸의 본체이고, 고정적 실체이다. 불교에 의하면 모든 현상은 생멸(生滅) 변화하는 무상(無常)한 것이기 때문에, 그 안에서 영원의 본체와 실체는 인식될 수 없다. 이것을 '제행무상'(諸行無常) '제법무아'(諸法無我)라 한다.

원시경전(原始經典)에는 오온무아설(五縕無我說)이 있는데, 거기에서는 '색(色)은 무상(無常)이다. 모든 무상한 것은 고(苦)이다. 고(苦)인 것은 무아(無我, anātman)이다. 무아인 것은 사(私)가 아니다. 사(私)는 무아가 아니다. 무아는 사(私)의 아(我 : 아트만)가 아니다. 이처럼 있는 그대로 바른 지혜를 가지고 보아야 한다'라고 설명하고, 수(受)ㆍ상(想)ㆍ행(行)ㆍ식(識)에 관해서도 위의 정형구(定型句)에 의해 기술하고 있다. 무아설(無我說)은 우리가 상식적으로 '아(我)라고 생각하는 것 안에는 아무런 실체적인 것도 존재하지 않는다라고 주장하지만, 실천 주체로서 자기의 존재까지 부정하는 것은 아니다.

오히려 무아(無我)라는 부정(否定)에 의해 자아에의 집착을 멸(滅)하고 그것을 초월함으로써 자기의 진실한 모습을 발견하려고 하는 것이 무아설의 취지이다. 소승에서는 인간존재에 대해서 무아를 말하지만(人無我) 그것을 구성하는 법(요소)의 존재는 부정하지 않는다. 대승에서는 인간존재에 관해서는 물론 그것을 구성하는 법에 관해서도 그 실재성이 부정되고 '무아', 또는 '공'(空)으로 표현된다. 소승의 무아설을 '아공법유'(我空法有)라고 말하고 대승의 그것을 '아법이공'(我法二空) 또는 인법이공(人法二空)이라고 말한다.

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철학사전 이미지
철학사전 2009. 책보러가기

본 사전은『세계철학사』독자들을 위한 사전으로 이 땅에서 자연과 사회 및 인간 사유의 일반적 발전 법칙을 탐구하여 올바른 세계관을 수립하고 인식과 실천의 과학적 방법을 연구
[네이버 지식백과] 무아 [無我] (철학사전, 2009., 임석진, 윤용택, 황태연, 이성백, 이정우, 양운덕, 강영계, 우기동, 임재진, 김용정, 박철주, 김호균, 김영태, 강대석, 장병길, 김택현, 최동희, 김승균, 이을호, 김종규, 조일민, 윤두병)

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무아

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.
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불교
Buddhism Symbol.png

무아(無我)는 산스크리트어 아나트만(अनात्मन् anātman, anatman, 팔리어: anattā) 혹은 니르아트만(nir-ātman)의 번역어로 비아(非我)라고도 한다. 불교의 근본 교의 중 하나로 처음에는 자기 소유물을 자기 것으로서 집착함을 금하는 실천적인 입장에서 주장되었다. 즉 고타마 붓다가 말한 무아(無我)는 있는가 없는가에 대한 이론이 아니라 연기에 의해 이루어진 제법(諸法), 즉 유위법(有爲法)을 실체로 보아서는 안 된다는 실천적 의미를 가리킨다.[1]

후에는 영원독립하며 주재적인 자아(아트만)의 실재를 주장하는 브라만교의 교의에 반대하여 사람은 5온(五蘊)의 집합이요, 생명의 주체인 실아(실재로서의 자아)는 없고 또한 모든 존재는 인연으로써 생긴 것이며 고정적인 본성은 없다고 하는 무아설(無我說)을 주장하게 되었다.[2]

무아와 무아설[편집]

무아(無我)란 이론적으로는 고정적 · 불변적인 실체로서의 아("我 · 아트만")가 없다는 것이다. 그러나 고타마 붓다가 말한 무아는 있는가 없는가에 대한 이론이 아니라, 실체가 없는 것, 즉 연기에 의해 이루어진 제법(諸法), 즉 일체의 유위법(有爲法)을 실체로 보아서는 안 된다는 실천적 의미를 가리킨다. 즉, 유위법(有爲法)을 실체로 보지 않을 수 있게 하는 구체적인 수행, 즉 도제(道諦: 팔정도, 37도품, 6바라밀 등의 수행)가 실제로 열반(무위법)에 이르게 하는 길이지, '우주가 시간적으로 또는 공간적으로 영원한가 아닌가? 아(我, 아트만)라고 하는 실체(무위법)가 육체(유위법)와 어떻게 다른가?' 등과 같이 실체(무위법)의 성격은 어떠한지를 논하는 십사무기와 같은 형이상학적인 접근은, 마치 독화살에 맞은 상태에서 독화살과 독을 제거할 생각을 하지 않고 독화살이 어디에서 왔는가를 따지는 태도와 같아서, 고타마 붓다에게 있어서는 무의미한 것이었다.[1][3][4][5]

무아는 일반적으로 제법무아(諸法無我)라는 명제로서 설명되었고 불교의 근본진리라고 하는 연기설(緣起說)은 이 무아설을 기초로 조직되었다. 그러나, 불교로서의 생명은 무아의 실천이라든가 무아행(無我行)이라고 하는 실천면에 있에 있다. 즉 이 세상의 모든 것은 고정성이 없고("無我 · 무아") 끊임없이 변화하고 있는("無常 · 무상") 까닭에 우리들의 수양이나 노력에 의해서 역경을 극복하여 더욱 향상할 수가 있다. 그렇기 때문에 불교의 이상(理想)인 열반(涅槃)은 이 무아행이 철저하게 이루어진 경지를 말한다.[1]

2무아: 인무와와 법무아[편집]

대승불교의 교의에서 무아는 크게 인무아(人無我, 산스크리트어: pudgala-nairātmya)와 법무아(法無我, 산스크리트어: dharma-nairātmya)의 2무아(二無我)로 나뉜다.

인무아(人無我)를 아공(我空)이라고도 하며 법무아(法無我)을 법공(法空)이라고도 한다.[6] 그리고 이 둘을 통칭하여 2공(二空)라고 하는데, 2공(二空)은 2무아(二無我)와 같은 뜻이다.[6][7][8] 2공(二空) 또는 2무아(二無我)를 아법2공(我法二空)이라고도 하며, 아공(我空)은 인공(人空)이라고도 하는데 이 때문에 인법2공(人法二空)이라고도 한다.[9] 2공(二空)의 교의는 초기 대승불교의 근본적인 교의 또는 사상이 되었다.

이치로서의 2무아[편집]

인무아(人無我)
인간 자신 속에는 실체로서의 자아가 있다고 보는 아집(我執)에 대해, 인간 자신 속에는 실체로서의 자아가 없다고 보는 견해 혹은 이치[6], 또는 이러한 깨우침을 증득한 상태 또는 경지[6]이다. 아집(我執)은 번뇌장(煩惱障)이라고도 하는데, 번뇌장은 중생의 몸과 마음을 번거롭게 하여 열반(또는 해탈)을 가로막아 중생으로 하여금 윤회하게 하는 장애라는 의미이다.[10][11]
법무아(法無我)
존재하는 만물 각각에는 실체로서의 자아가 있다고 보는 법집(法執)에 대해, 유위법(有爲法) 즉 존재하는 모든 것은 인연에 의해 생기는 것이므로 실체로서의 자아는 없다는 견해 혹은 이치[6], 또는 이러한 깨우침을 증득한 상태 또는 경지[6]이다. 법집(法執)은 소지장(所知障)이라고도 하는데, 소지장은 참된 지혜, 즉 보리(菩提)가 발현되는 것을 가로막는 장애라는 의미이다.[10][12]

경지로서의 2무아[편집]

불교에서, 수행에 의해 깨달음을 성취해 간다는 입장에서는 2무아(二無我)는 실제로 증득될 수 있고 또한 증득되어야 하는 특정한 경지를 뜻한다.

예를 들어, 유가유식파의 경우, 이 종파의 소의 논서인 《성유식론》에 따르면 이무아(二無我) 중 인무아의 경지에 다다르면 아집인 번뇌장이 소멸되어 열반(해탈)이 성취되고, 법무아의 경지에 다다르면 법집인 소지장이 소멸되어 보리(반야 · 대지혜 · 완전한 깨달음)가 성취된다.[10][13]

《성유식론》에서는 이와 관련된 수행 단계를 더 자세히 설명하는데, 크게 자량위(資糧位) · 가행위(加行位) · 통달위(通達位) · 수습위(修習位) · 구경위(究竟位)의 다섯 단계("오위 · 五位")로 나누고 있다.[14] 이 중에서 네 번째인 수습위는 다시 십지(十地)의 열 단계로 나뉘는데, 십지는 극희지(極喜地) · 이구지(離垢地) · 발광지(發光地) · 염혜지(焰慧地) · 극난승지(極難勝地) · 현전지(現前地) · 원행지(遠行地: 제7지) · 부동지(不動地) · 선혜지(善慧地) · 법운지(法雲地: 제10지)이다.[15] 《성유식론》에 따르면 아집인 번뇌장은 수습위의 십지 중 제7지인 원행지(遠行地)에서 완전히 제거되어 제8지부터는 아무아의 경지에 있게 된다.[15] 그리고 법집인 소지장은 수습위의 십지 중 제10지인 법운지(法雲地)에서 완전히 제거 될 수 있는데, 완전히 제거되면 다섯 단계("오위 · 五位")의 마지막인 구경위(究竟位)에 이르게 되고 해당 보살, 즉 대승불교의 수행자는 비로소 부처가 된다.[15]

유가유식파는 열반과 해탈은 동의어로 사용하는 반면, 열반과 보리는 용어를 구분해서 사용한다. 유가유식파의 문맥에서 열반(또는 해탈)은 아집인 번뇌장이 완전히 제거된 인무아의 상태를 의미한다.[13] 그리고 보리는 법집인 소지장이 완전히 제거된 법무아의 상태를 의미한다.[13] 《성유식론》에서는 열반을 진해탈(眞解脫: 참다운 해탈)이라고도 표현하며 보리를 대보리(大菩提: 큰 깨달음 · 완전한 깨달음)라고도 표현하고 있다.[10][13]

각주[편집]

  1. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 "종교·철학 > 세계의 종교 > 불교 > 불교의 사상 > 근본불교의 사상 > 무아", 《글로벌 세계 대백과사전》
  2. ↑ "세계 사상 > 사상 용어 > 동양사상 관계 > 불교 관계 > 무아", 《글로벌 세계 대백과사전》
  3. ↑ 《잡아함경(雜阿含經) 제16권 408. 사유경(思惟經) ② Archived 2007년 10월 26일 - 웨이백 머신》, 대정신수대장경, T2 No. 99, CBETA. T02n0099_p0109a29(00) - T02n0099_p0109b04(00).
  4. ↑ 《잡아함경(雜阿含經) 제34권 962. 견경(見經) Archived 2007년 10월 26일 - 웨이백 머신》, 대정신수대장경, T2 No. 99, CBETA. T02n0099_p0245c02(04) - T02n0099_p0245c06(04).
  5. ↑ 《중아함경 제60권 전유경(箭喻經) 제10 Archived 2007년 10월 8일 - 웨이백 머신》, 대정신수대장경, T1 No. 26, CBETA, T01n0026_p0804a26(00) - T01n0026_p0804a29(11), T01n0026_p0805b22(02) - T01n0026_p0805b27(03).
  6. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 마 바 호법(護法) 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 현장(玄奘) 한역, 김묘주 번역. 《대정신수대장경》. 제1권, 한글대장경 검색시스템. 동국역경원. 2쪽. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 번역자 김묘주 주석: 두 가지 공[二空]은 아공(我空)과 법공(法空)이다. 아공(我空)은 인무아(人無我)라고도 하며, 유정의 심신(心身)에 상일주재(常一主宰)하는 인격적 실체[我]가 존재하지 않는 이치, 또는 그것을 깨쳐서 아집(我執)이 소멸된 경지를 말한다. 법공(法空)은 법무아(法無我)라고도 하며, 외계 사물은 자기의 마음을 떠나서 독립적으로 실재하지 않는 이치, 또는 그것을 깨쳐서 법집(法執)이 소멸된 경지를 말한다.
  7. ↑ 〈二無我(이무아)〉. 《같은 책》. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  8. ↑ 운허. 〈二空(이공)〉. 《불교 사전》. 동국역경원. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  9. ↑ 星雲, "二無我". 2012년 10월 17일에 확인.
  10. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 호법 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 현장 한역. 《대정신수대장경》. 제1권. T31, No. 1585, CBETA, T31n1585_p0001a09(12) - T31n1585_p0001a12(10). 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 
    원문
    今造此論為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。生解為斷二重障故。由我法執二障具生。若證二空彼障隨斷。斷障為得二勝果故。由斷續生煩惱障故證真解脫。由斷礙解所知障故得大菩提。
    편집자 번역
    지금 이 논서를 저술하는 이유는 이공(二空: 두 가지 공)에 대해서 미혹하고 오류가 있는 사람들이 이공(二空)을 바르게 이해하도록 하기 위해서이다. 이공(二空)을 바르게 이해하는 것이 필요한 이유는 두 가지 무거운 장애(二重障: 번뇌장과 소지장)를 끊기 위한 때문이다. 아집(我執)과 법집(法執)의 (두 가지) 집착으로 인해 이 두 가지 장애가 함께 일어난다. 이공(二空)을 증득하게 되면 그에 따라 이들 (두 가지) 장애도 끊어진다. (이들 두 가지) 장애를 끊는 것이 필요한 이유는 두 가지 뛰어난 과보(二勝果: 열반과 보리, 또는 해탈과 보리)를 얻기 위한 때문이다. (이것을 더 자세히 말하자면) 윤회하는 삶(生)을 계속되게 만드는 원인인 번뇌장(煩惱障)을 끊음으로써 참다운 해탈(眞解脫: 유식학에서 해탈은 열반과 같은 것이다)을 증득하게 되기 때문이며, 지혜(解: 앎 ·이해 · 지식)를 장애하는 소지장(所知障)을 끊음으로써 대보리(大菩提: 큰 깨달음 · 완전한 깨달음 · 출세간의 무분별지혜 · 무상정등보리 · 아뇩다라삼먁삼보리)를 증득할 수 있기 때문이다.
     |인용문=에 라인 피드 문자가 있음(위치 13) (도움말)
  11. ↑ 운허. 〈煩惱障(번뇌장)〉. 《앞의 책》. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  12. ↑ 운허. 장=所池障(소지장) http://buddha.dongguk.edu/bs_detail.aspx?type=detail&from=&to=&srch=%EC%86%8C%EC%A7%80%EC%9E%A5&rowno=1 장=所池障(소지장) |장url= 값 확인 필요 (도움말) |장url=은 제목을 필요로 함 (도움말). 《앞의 책》. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함.
  13. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 라 호법(護法) 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 《앞의 책》. 2쪽. 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 번역자 김묘주 주석: 아공의 도리를 깨쳐서 번뇌장을 끊으면 해탈, 즉 열반을 증득한다. 법공의 도리를 깨쳐서 소지장을 끊으면 곧 큰 깨달음[大菩提]을 성취해서 붓다가 된다.
  14. ↑ 호법(護法) 등. 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 《대정신수대장경》. 제9권. T31, No. 1585, CBETA, T31n1585_p0048b11(07) - T31n1585_p0048b15(06). 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 何謂悟入唯識五位。一資糧位。謂修大乘順解脫分。二加行位。謂修大乘順決擇分。三通達位。謂諸菩薩所住見道。四修習位。謂諸菩薩所住修道。五究竟位。謂住無上正等菩提。
  15. ↑ 이동:가 나 다 〈성유식론(成唯識論)〉. 《같은 책》. T31, No. 1585, CBETA, T31n1585_p0050c17(00) - T31n1585_p0051b07(01). 2011년 4월 3일에 확인함. 

    次修習位其相云何。頌曰。
    　２９無得不思議　　是出世間智
    　捨二麤重故　　便證得轉依
    論曰。菩薩從前見道起已。為斷餘障證得轉依。復數修習無分別智。此智遠離所取能取。故說無得及不思議。或離戲論說為無得。妙用難測名不思議。是出世間無分別智。斷世間故名出世間。二取隨眠是世間本。唯此能斷獨得出名。或出世名依二義立。謂體無漏及證真如。此智具斯二種義故獨名出世。餘智不然。即十地中無分別智。數修此故捨二麤重。二障種子立麤重名。性無堪任違細輕故令彼永滅故說為捨。此能捨彼二麤重故便能證得廣大轉依。依謂所依即依他起與染淨法為所依故。染謂虛妄遍計所執。淨謂真實圓成實性。轉謂二分轉捨轉得。由數修習無分別智斷本識中二障麤重故能轉捨依他起上遍計所執及能轉得依他起中圓成實性。由轉煩惱得大涅槃。轉所知障證無上覺。成立唯識意為有情證得如斯二轉依果。或依即是唯識真如。生死涅槃之所依故。愚夫顛倒迷此真如。故無始來受生死苦。聖者離倒悟此真如。便得涅槃畢究安樂。由數修習無分別智斷本識中二障麤重故能轉滅依如生死及能轉證依如涅槃。此即真如離雜染性。如雖性淨而相雜染。故離染時假說新淨。即此新淨說為轉依。修習位中斷障證得。雖於此位亦得菩提而非此中頌意所顯。頌意但顯轉唯識性。二乘滿位名解脫身。在大牟尼名法身故。

    云何證得二種轉依。謂十地中修十勝行斷十重障證十真如二種轉依由斯證得。言十地者。一極喜地。初獲聖性具證二空能益自他生大喜故。二離垢地。具淨尸羅遠離能起微細毀犯煩惱垢故。三發光地。成就勝定大法總持能發無邊妙慧光故。四焰慧地。安住最勝菩提分法燒煩惱薪慧焰增故。五極難勝地。真俗兩智行相互違合令相應極難勝故。六現前地。住緣起智引無分別最勝般若令現前故。七遠行地。至無相住功用後邊出過世間二乘道故。八不動地。無分別智任運相續相用煩惱不能動故。九善慧地。成就微妙四無閡解能遍十方善說法故。十法雲地。大法智雲含眾德水蔽一切如空麤重充滿法身故。如是十地總攝有為無為功德以為自性。與所修行為勝依持令得生長故名為地。

     |인용문=에 poem stripmarker가 있음(위치 1) (도움말)
---

Anatta

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This article is about the concept in Buddhism. For the concept in Hinduism, see Anatman (Hinduism).
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In Buddhism, the term anattā (Pali) or anātman (Sanskrit) refers to the doctrine of "non-self", that there is no unchanging, permanent self, soul or essence in phenomena.[1][2] It is one of the seven beneficial perceptions in Buddhism,[3] and one of the three marks of existence along with dukkha (suffering) and anicca (impermanence).[1][4]

The Buddhist concept of anatta or anatman is one of the fundamental differences between Buddhism and Hinduism, with the latter asserting that atman (self, soul) exists.[5][6]

Etymology and nomenclature[edit]

Anattā is a composite Pali word consisting of an (not, without) and attā (soul).[7] The term refers to the central Buddhist doctrine that "there is in humans no permanent, underlying substance that can be called the soul."[1] It is one of the three characteristics of all existence, together with dukkha (suffering, dissatisfaction) and anicca (impermanence).[1][7]

Anattā is synonymous with Anātman (an + ātman) in Sanskrit Buddhist texts.[1][8] In some Pali texts, ātman of Vedic texts is also referred to with the term Attan, with the sense of soul.[7] An alternate use of Attan or Atta is "self, oneself, essence of a person", driven by the Vedic era Brahmanical belief that the soul is the permanent, unchangeable essence of a living being, or the true self.[7][8]

In Buddhism-related English literature, Anattā is rendered as "not-Self", but this translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete rendering is "non-Self" because from its earliest days, Anattā doctrine denies that there is anything called a 'Self' in any person or anything else, and that a belief in 'Self' is a source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness).[9][10][note 1] It is also incorrect to translate Anattā simply as "ego-less", according to Peter Harvey, because the Indian concept of ātman and attā is different from the Freudian concept of ego.[14][note 2]

Anatta or Anatma-vada is also referred to as the "no-soul or no-self doctrine" of Buddhism.[16][17][18]

Anattā in early Buddhist texts[edit]

The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutta(Pali)/Sutra(Sanskrit) of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts (Pali canon). It appears, for example, as a noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya, II.37–45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga, III.406 of Dhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya.[7][8]

The ancient Buddhist texts discuss Attā or Attan (soul, self), sometimes with alternate terms such as Atuman, Tuma, Puggala, Jiva, Satta, Pana and Nama-rupa, thereby providing the context for the Buddhist Anattā doctrine. Examples of such Attā contextual discussions are found in Digha Nikaya I.186-187, Samyutta Nikaya III.179 and IV.54, Vinaya I.14, Majjhima Nikaya I.138, III.19, and III.265–271 and Anguttara Nikaya I.284.[7][8][19]

The contextual use of Attā in Nikāyas is two sided. In one, it directly denies that there is anything called a self or soul in a human being that is a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical (Ancient Hindu) traditions.[20] In another, states Peter Harvey, such as at Samyutta Nikaya IV.286, the Sutta considers the materialistic concept in pre-Buddhist Vedic times of "no afterlife, complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a Self".[21] "Self exists" is a false premise, assert the early Buddhist texts.[21] However, adds Peter Harvey, these texts do not admit the premise "Self does not exist" either because the wording presumes the concept of "Self" prior to denying it; instead, the early Buddhist texts use the concept of Anattā as the implicit premise.[21][22] According to Steven Collins, the doctrine of anatta and "denial of self" in the canonical Buddhist texts is "insisted on only in certain theoretical contexts", while they use the terms atta, purisa, puggala quite naturally and freely in various contexts.[19] The elaboration of the anatta doctrine, along with identification of the words such as "puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature.[19]

Anattā is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions.[23] For example, the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (~200 CE), extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity called attā or ātman (self, soul), asserting in chapter 18 of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that there is no such substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self".[24][25][26] The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of the Yogachara school similarly discuss Anatta as a fundamental premise of the Buddha.[27] The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-century Buddhist scholar Candrakirti, who then offered his own theories on its importance.[28][29]

Existence and non-existence[edit]

Anattā (non-self, no enduring soul or essence) is the nature of all things, and this is one of the three marks of existence in Buddhism, along with Anicca (impermanence, nothing lasts) and Dukkha (suffering, unsatisfactoriness is innate in birth, aging, death, rebirth, redeath – the Saṃsāra cycle of existence).[30][31] It is found in many texts of different Buddhist traditions, such as the Dhammapada – a canonical Buddhist text.[32] Buddhism asserts with Four Noble Truths that there is a way out of this Saṃsāra.[note 3][note 4]

Eternalism and annihilationism[edit]

While the concept of soul in Hinduism (as atman) and Jainism (as jiva) is taken for granted, which is different from the Buddhist concept of no-soul, each of the three religions believed in rebirth and emphasized moral responsibility in different ways in contrast to pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian philosophies.[47][48][49] The materialistic schools of Indian philosophies, such as Charvaka, are called annihilationist schools because they posited that death is the end, there is no afterlife, no soul, no rebirth, no karma, and death is that state where a living being is completely annihilated, dissolved.[50]

Buddha criticized the materialistic annihilationism view that denied rebirth and karma, states Damien Keown.[47] Such beliefs are inappropriate and dangerous, stated Buddha, because they encourage moral irresponsibility and material hedonism.[47] Anatta does not mean there is no afterlife, no rebirth or no fruition of karma, and Buddhism contrasts itself to annihilationist schools.[47] Buddhism also contrasts itself to other Indian religions that champion moral responsibility but posit eternalism with their premise that within each human being there is an essence or eternal soul, and this soul is part of the nature of a living being, existence and metaphysical reality.[51][52][53]

Karma, rebirth and anattā[edit]

The Four planes of liberation
(according to the Sutta Piṭaka[54])

stage's
"fruit"[55]

abandoned
fetters

rebirth(s)
until suffering's end

stream-enterer

1. identity view (Anatman)
2. doubt in Buddha
3. ascetic or ritual rules

lower
fetters

up to seven rebirths in
human or heavenly realms

once-returner[56]

once more as
a human

non-returner

4. sensual desire
5. ill will

once more in
a heavenly realm
(Pure Abodes)

arahant

6. material-rebirth desire
7. immaterial-rebirth desire
8. conceit
9. restlessness
10. ignorance

higher
fetters

no rebirth

Source: Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (2001), Middle-Length Discourses, pp. 41-43.

The Buddha emphasized both karma and anatta doctrines.[57]

The Buddha criticized the doctrine that posited an unchanging soul as a subject as the basis of rebirth and karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikavāda". He also criticized the materialistic doctrine that denied the existence of both soul and rebirth, and thereby denied karmic moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".[58] Instead, the Buddha asserted that there is no soul, but there is rebirth for which karmic moral responsibility is a must. In the Buddha's framework of karma, right view and right actions are necessary for liberation.[59][60]

Developing the self[edit]

Main articles: Buddhist Paths to liberation and Personal identity § Theories

According to Peter Harvey, while the Suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly developed.[61] This is paradoxical, states Harvey, in that "the Self-like nibbana state" is a mature self that knows "everything as Selfless".[61] The "empirical self" is the citta (mind/heart, mindset, emotional nature), and the development of self in the Suttas is the development of this citta.[62]

One with "great self", state the early Buddhist Suttas, has a mind which is neither at the mercy of outside stimuli nor its own moods, neither scattered nor diffused, but imbued with self-control, and self-contained towards the single goal of nibbana and a 'Self-like' state.[61] This "great self" is not yet an Arahat, because he still does small evil action which leads to karmic fruition, but he has enough virtue that he does not experience this fruition in hell.[61]

An Arahat, states Harvey, has a fully enlightened state of empirical self, one that lacks the "sense of both 'I am' and 'this I am'", which are illusions that the Arahat has transcended.[63] The Buddhist thought and salvation theory emphasizes a development of self towards a Selfless state not only with respect to oneself, but recognizing the lack of relational essence and Self in others, wherein states Martijn van Zomeren, "self is an illusion".[64]

Anatta in Theravada Buddhism[edit]

Theravada Buddhism scholars, states Oliver Leaman, consider the Anattā doctrine as one of the main theses of Buddhism.[23]

The Buddhist denial of "any Soul or Self" is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts the Theravada tradition.[23] With the doctrine of Anattā, stands or falls the entire Buddhist structure, asserts Nyanatiloka.[65]

According to Collins, "insight into the teaching of anatta is held to have two major loci in the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses along the Path.[66] The first part of this insight is to avoid sakkayaditthi (Personality Belief), that is converting the "sense of I which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical individuality" into a theoretical belief in a self.[66] "A belief in a (really) existing body" is considered a false belief and a part of the Ten Fetters that must be gradually lost. The second loci is the psychological realisation of anatta, or loss of "pride or conceit". This, states Collins, is explained as the conceit of asmimana or "I am"; (...) what this "conceit" refers to is the fact that for the unenlightened man, all experience and action must necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an "I".[66] When a Buddhist gets more enlightened, this happening to or originating in an "I" or sakkdyaditthi is less. The final attainment of enlightenment is the disappearance of this automatic but illusory "I".[66]

The Theravada tradition has long considered the understanding and application of the Anatta doctrine to be a complex teaching, whose "personal, introjected application has always been thought to be possible only for the specialist, the practising monk". The tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely on anatta as a doctrinal position", while in practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists.[67] The Suttas present the doctrine in three forms. First, they apply the "no-self, no-identity" doctrine to all phenomena as well as any and all objects, yielding the idea that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anatta).[67] Second, states Collins, the Suttas apply the doctrine to deny self of any person, treating conceit to be evident in any assertion of "this is mine, this I am, this is myself" (etam mamam eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta ti).[68] Third, the Theravada texts apply the doctrine as a nominal reference, to identify examples of "self" and "not-self", respectively the Wrong view and the Right view; this third case of nominative usage is properly translated as "self" (as an identity) and is unrelated to "soul", states Collins.[68] The first two usages incorporate the idea of soul.[69] The Theravada doctrine of Anatta, or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for monks, states Donald Swearer, but for the lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, the doctrines of kamma, rebirth and punna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual practices and ethical behavior.[70]

The Anatta doctrine is key to the concept of nirvana (nibbana) in the Theravada tradition. The liberated nirvana state, states Collins, is the state of Anatta, a state that is neither universally applicable nor can be explained, but can be realized.[71][note 5]

Current disputes[edit]

See also: Buddhism in Thailand

The dispute about "self" and "not-self" doctrines has continued throughout the history of Buddhism.[74] According to Johannes Bronkhorst, it is possible that "original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul", even though a firm Buddhist tradition has maintained that the Buddha avoided talking about the soul or even denied its existence.[75] French religion writer André Migot also states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholars Jean Przyluski and Caroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in a self, making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs.[76] While there may be ambivalence on the existence or non-existence of self in early Buddhist literature, Bronkhorst suggests that these texts clearly indicate that the Buddhist path of liberation consists not in seeking self-knowledge, but in turning away from what might erroneously be regarded as the self.[77] This is a reverse position to the Vedic traditions which recognized the knowledge of the self as "the principal means to achieving liberation."[77]

In Thai Theravada Buddhism, for example, states Paul Williams, some modern era Buddhist scholars have claimed that "nirvana is indeed the true Self", while other Thai Buddhists disagree.[78] For instance, the Dhammakaya Movement in Thailand teaches that it is erroneous to subsume nirvana under the rubric of anatta (non-self); instead, nirvana is taught to be the "true self" or dhammakaya.[79] The Dhammakaya Movement teaching that nirvana is atta, or true self, was criticized as heretical in Buddhism in 1994 by Ven. Payutto, a well-known scholar monk, who stated that 'Buddha taught nibbana as being non-self".[80][81] The abbot of one major temple in the Dhammakaya Movement, Luang Por Sermchai of Wat Luang Por Sodh Dhammakayaram, argues that it tends to be scholars who hold the view of absolute non-self, rather than Buddhist meditation practitioners. He points to the experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such as Luang Pu Sodh and Ajahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self".[81][82] Similar interpretations on the "true self" were put forth earlier by the 12th Supreme Patriarch of Thailand in 1939. According to Williams, the Supreme Patriarch's interpretation echoes the tathāgatagarbha sutras.[83]

Several notable teachers of the Thai Forest Tradition have also described ideas in contrast to absolute non-self. Ajahn Maha Bua, a well known meditation master, described the citta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall under anattā.[84] He has stated that not-self is merely a perception that is used to pry one away from infatuation with the concept of a self, and that once this infatuation is gone the idea of not-self must be dropped as well.[85] American monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu of the Thai Forest Tradition describes the Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to awakening rather than a universal truth.[57] Thanissaro Bhikkhu states that the Buddha intentionally set the question of whether or not there is a self aside as a useless question, and that clinging to the idea that there is no self at all would actually prevent enlightenment.[86] Bhikkhu Bodhi authored a rejoinder to Thanissaro, claiming that "The reason the teaching of anatta can serve as a strategy of liberation is precisely because it serves to rectify a misconception about the nature of being, hence an ontological error."[87]

Buddhist scholars Richard Gombrich and Alexander Wynne argue that the Buddha's descriptions of non-self in early Buddhist texts do not deny that there is a self. Gethin claims that anatta is often mistranslated as meaning "not having a self", but in reality meant "not the self".[88] Wynne claims early Buddhist texts such as the Anattalakkhana Sutta do not deny that there is a self, stating that the five aggregates that are described as not self are not descriptions of a human being but descriptions of the human experience.[89] Wynne and Gombrich both argue that the Buddha's statements on anattā were originally a "not-self" teaching that developed into a "no-self" teaching in later Buddhist thought.[89][88]

Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10), where the Buddha stays silent when asked whether there is a 'self' or not,[90] as a major cause of the dispute.[91] In Thailand, this dispute on the nature of teachings about 'self' and 'non-self' in Buddhism has led to arrest warrants, attacks and threats.[92]

Anatta in Mahayana Buddhism[edit]

Main article: Madhyamaka
See also: sunyata

There are many different views of Anatta (Chinese: 無我; pinyin: wúwǒ; Japanese: 無我 muga; Korean: 무아 mu-a) within various Mahayana schools.[93]

Nagarjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka (middle way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzed dharma first as factors of experience.[12] He, states David Kalupahana, analyzed how these experiences relate to "bondage and freedom, action and consequence", and thereafter analyzed the notion of personal self (attā, ātman).[12]

Nagarjuna asserted that the notion of a self is associated with the notion of one's own identity and corollary ideas of pride, selfishness and a sense of psychophysical personality.[94] This is all false, and leads to bondage in his Madhyamaka thought. There can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who accepts Anattā and denies "self" which is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states Nagarjuna.[12][13] Further, all obsessions are avoided when a person accepts emptiness (sunyata).[12][95] Nagarjuna denied there is anything called a self-nature as well as other-nature, emphasizing true knowledge to be comprehending emptiness.[94][96][97] Anyone who has not dissociated from his belief in personality in himself or others, through the concept of self, is in a state of Avidya (ignorance) and caught in the cycle of rebirths and redeaths.[94][98]

The early Mahayana Buddhism texts link their discussion of "emptiness" (shunyata) to Anatta and Nirvana. They do so, states Mun-Keat Choong, in three ways: first, in the common sense of a monk's meditative state of emptiness; second, with the main sense of Anatta or 'everything in the world is empty of self'; third, with the ultimate sense of Nirvana or realization of emptiness and thus an end to rebirth cycles of suffering.[99] The Anatta doctrine is another aspect of shunyata, its realization is the nature of the nirvana state and to an end to rebirths.[100][101][102]

Tathagatagarbha Sutras: Buddha is True Self[edit]

Some 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts suggest concepts that have been controversial because they imply a "self-like" concept.[103][104] In particular are the Tathāgatagarbha sūtras, where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing Tathagata (Buddha). These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that 'all sentient beings contain a Tathagata' as their 'essence, core or essential inner nature'.[105] The Tathagatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.[105] Most scholars consider the Tathagatagarbha doctrine of an 'essential nature' in every living being is equivalent to 'Self',[citation needed][note 6] and it contradicts the Anatta doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the Tathagatagarbha Sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.[107][108]

The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra explicitly asserts that the Buddha used the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics.[109][110] The Ratnagotravibhāga (also known as Uttaratantra), another text composed in the first half of 1st millennium CE and translated into Chinese in 511 CE, points out that the teaching of the Tathagatagarbha doctrine is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "self-love" (atma-sneha) – considered to be one of the defects by Buddhism.[111][112] The 6th-century Chinese Tathagatagarbha translation states that "Buddha has shiwo (True Self) which is beyond being and nonbeing".[113] However, the Ratnagotravibhāga asserts that the "Self" implied in Tathagatagarbha doctrine is actually "not-Self".[113][114]

According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self; rather, it is a positive language and expression of śūnyatā "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices.[111] Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references.[115] Michael Zimmermann sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in the Tathagatagarbha Sutra.[116] Zimmermann also avers that 'the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra'.[117] He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata).[118] Williams states that the "Self" in Tathagatagarbha Sutras is actually "non-Self", and neither identical nor comparable to the Hindu concepts of Brahman and Self.[111]

Anatta in Vajrayana Buddhism[edit]

Tibetan and Nepalese Buddhist deities Nairatmya and Hevajra in an embrace. Nairatmya is the goddess of emptiness, and of Anatta (non-self, non-soul, selflessness) realization.[119][120]

The Anatta or Anatman doctrine is extensively discussed in and partly inspires the ritual practices of the Vajrayana tradition. The Tibetan terms such as bdag med refer to "without a self, insubstantial, anatman".[121] These discussions, states Jeffrey Hopkins, assert the "non-existence of a permanent, unitary and independent self", and attribute these ideas to the Buddha.[122]

The ritual practices in Vajrayana Buddhism employs the concept of deities, to end self-grasping, and to manifest as a purified, enlightened deity as part of the Vajrayana path to liberation from rebirths.[123][124][125] One such deity is goddess Nairatmya (literally, non-soul, non-self).[126][127][128] She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and "all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayana Buddhism.[119]

Anatta – a difference between Buddhism and Hinduism[edit]

Anatta is a central doctrine of Buddhism.[129][130][131] It marks one of the major differences between Buddhism and Hinduism. According to the anatta doctrine of Buddhism, at the core of all human beings and living creatures, there is no "eternal, essential and absolute something called a soul, self or atman".[5][6][132] Buddhism, from its earliest days, has denied the existence of the "self, soul" in its core philosophical and ontological texts. In its soteriological themes, Buddhism has defined nirvana as that blissful state when a person, amongst other things, realizes that he or she has "no self, no soul".[5][133]

The traditions within Hinduism believe in Atman. The pre-Buddhist Upanishads of Hinduism assert that there is a permanent Atman, and is an ultimate metaphysical reality.[134][131] This sense of self, is expressed as "I am" in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.1, states Peter Harvey, when nothing existed before the start of the universe.[134] The Upanishadic scriptures hold that this soul or self is underlying the whole world.[134] At the core of all human beings and living creatures, assert the Hindu traditions, there is "eternal, innermost essential and absolute something called a soul, self that is atman."[5] Within the diverse schools of Hinduism, there are differences of perspective on whether souls are distinct, whether Supreme Soul or God exists, whether the nature of Atman is dual or non-dual, and how to reach moksha. However, despite their internal differences, one shared foundational premise of Hinduism is that "soul, self exists", and that there is bliss in seeking this self, knowing self, and self-realization.[5][135]

While the Upanishads recognized many things as being not-Self, they felt that a real, true Self could be found. They held that when it was found, and known to be identical to Brahman, the basis of everything, this would bring liberation. In the Buddhist Suttas, though, literally everything is seen is non-Self, even Nirvana. When this is known, then liberation – Nirvana – is attained by total non-attachment. Thus both the Upanishads and the Buddhist Suttas see many things as not-Self, but the Suttas apply it, indeed non-Self, to everything.

— Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices[136]

Both Buddhism and Hinduism distinguish ego-related "I am, this is mine", from their respective abstract doctrines of "Anatta" and "Atman".[134] This, states Peter Harvey, may have been an influence of Buddhism on Hinduism.[137]

Anatman and Niratman[edit]

The term niratman appears in the Maitrayaniya Upanishad of Hinduism, such as in verses 6.20, 6.21 and 7.4. Niratman literally means "selfless".[138][139] The niratman concept has been interpreted to be analogous to anatman of Buddhism.[140] The ontological teachings, however, are different. In the Upanishad, states Thomas Wood, numerous positive and negative descriptions of various states – such as niratman and sarvasyatman (the self of all) – are used in Maitrayaniya Upanishad to explain the nondual concept of the "highest Self".[139] According to Ramatirtha, states Paul Deussen, the niratman state discussion is referring to stopping the recognition of oneself as an individual soul, and reaching the awareness of universal soul or the metaphysical Brahman.[141]

Correspondence in Pyrrhonism[edit]

Part of a series on
Pyrrhonism
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Main article: Similarities between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism

The Greek philosopher Pyrrho traveled to India as part of Alexander the Great's entourage where he was influenced by the Indian gymnosophists,[142] which inspired him to create the philosophy of Pyrrhonism. Philologist Christopher Beckwith has demonstrated that Pyrrho based his philosophy on his translation of the three marks of existence into Greek, and that adiaphora (not logically differentiable, not clearly definable, negating Aristotle's use of "diaphora") reflects Pyrrho's understanding of the Buddhist concept of anatta.[143]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Buddha did not deny a being or a thing, referring it to be a collection of impermanent interdependent aggregates, but denied that there is a metaphysical self, soul or identity in anything.[11][12][13]
  2. ^ The term ahamkara is 'ego' in Indian philosophies.[15]
  3. ^ On samsara, rebirth and redeath:
    * Paul Williams: "All rebirth is due to karma and is impermanent. Short of attaining enlightenment, in each rebirth one is born and dies, to be reborn elsewhere in accordance with the completely impersonal causal nature of one's own karma. The endless cycle of birth, rebirth, and redeath, is samsara."[33]
    * Buswell and Lopez on "rebirth": "An English term that does not have an exact correlate in Buddhist languages, rendered instead by a range of technical terms, such as the Sanskrit PUNARJANMAN (lit. "birth again") and PUNABHAVAN (lit. "re-becoming"), and, less commonly, the related PUNARMRTYU (lit. "redeath")."[34]

    See also Perry Schmidt-Leukel (2006) pages 32-34,[35] John J. Makransky (1997) p.27.[36] for the use of the term "redeath." The term Agatigati or Agati gati (plus a few other terms) is generally translated as 'rebirth, redeath'; see any Pali-English dictionary; e.g. pages 94-95 of Rhys Davids & William Stede, where they list five Sutta examples with rebirth and re-death sense.[37]
  4. ^ Graham Harvey: "Siddhartha Gautama found an end to rebirth in this world of suffering. His teachings, known as the dharma in Buddhism, can be summarized in the Four Noble truths."[38]Geoffrey Samuel (2008): "The Four Noble Truths [...] describe the knowledge needed to set out on the path to liberation from rebirth."[39] See also [40][41][42][33][43][38][web 1][web 2]

    The Theravada tradition holds that insight into these four truths is liberating in itself.[44] This is reflected in the Pali canon.[45]According to Donald Lopez, "The Buddha stated in his first sermon that when he gained absolute and intuitive knowledge of the four truths, he achieved complete enlightenment and freedom from future rebirth."[web 1]

    The Maha-parinibbana Sutta also refers to this liberation.[web 3]Carol Anderson: "The second passage where the four truths appear in the Vinaya-pitaka is also found in the Mahaparinibbana-sutta (D II 90-91). Here, the Buddha explains that it is by not understanding the four truths that rebirth continues."[46]

    On the meaning of moksha as liberation from rebirth, see Patrick Olivelle in the Encyclopædia Britannica.[web 4]
  5. ^ This is a major difference between the Theravada Buddhists and different Hindu traditions which assert that nirvana is realizing and being in the state of self (soul, atman) and is universally applicable. However, both concur that this state is indescribable, cannot be explained, but can be realized.[72][73]
  6. ^ Wayman and Wayman have disagreed with this view, and they state that the Tathagatagarbha is neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality.[106]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Anatta Buddhism Archived 2015-12-10 at the Wayback Machine, Encyclopædia Britannica (2013)
  2. ^ [a] Christmas Humphreys (2012). Exploring Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 42–43. ISBN 978-1-136-22877-3.
    [b] Brian Morris (2006). Religion and Anthropology: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge University Press. p. 51. ISBN 978-0-521-85241-8., Quote: "...anatta is the doctrine of non-self, and is an extreme empiricist doctrine that holds that the notion of an unchanging permanent self is a fiction and has no reality. According to Buddhist doctrine, the individual person consists of five skandhas or heaps—the body, feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness. The belief in a self or soul, over these five skandhas, is illusory and the cause of suffering."
    [c] Richard Gombrich (2006). Theravada Buddhism. Routledge. p. 47. ISBN 978-1-134-90352-8., Quote: "...Buddha's teaching that beings have no soul, no abiding essence. This 'no-soul doctrine' (anatta-vada) he expounded in his second sermon."
  3. ^ "Sañña Sutta: Perceptions" (AN 7.46) Archived 2014-09-28 at the Wayback Machine Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013
  4. ^ Richard Gombrich (2006). Theravada Buddhism. Routledge. p. 47. ISBN 978-1-134-90352-8., Quote: "All phenomenal existence [in Buddhism] is said to have three interlocking characteristics: impermanence, suffering and lack of soul or essence."
  5. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e [a] Anatta Archived 2015-12-10 at the Wayback Machine, Encyclopædia Britannica (2013), Quote: "Anatta in Buddhism, the doctrine that there is in humans no permanent, underlying soul. The concept of anatta, or anatman, is a departure from the Hindu belief in atman ("the self")."; [b] Steven Collins (1994), "Religion and Practical Reason" (Editors: Frank Reynolds, David Tracy), State Univ of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-2217-5, page 64; "Central to Buddhist soteriology is the doctrine of not-self (Pali: anattā, Sanskrit: anātman, the opposed doctrine of ātman is central to Brahmanical thought). Put very briefly, this is the [Buddhist] doctrine that human beings have no soul, no self, no unchanging essence."; [c] Edward Roer (Translator), Shankara's Introduction, p. 2, at Google Books to Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, pages 2-4; [d] Katie Javanaud (2013), Is The Buddhist 'No-Self' Doctrine Compatible With Pursuing Nirvana? Archived 2015-02-06 at the Wayback Machine, Philosophy Now; [e] David Loy (1982), "Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta: Are Nirvana and Moksha the Same?", International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 1, pages 65-74; [f] KN Jayatilleke (2010), Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, ISBN 978-8120806191, pages 246-249, from note 385 onwards;
  6. ^ Jump up to:a b John C. Plott et al (2000), Global History of Philosophy: The Axial Age, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120801585, page 63, Quote: "The Buddhist schools reject any Ātman concept. As we have already observed, this is the basic and ineradicable distinction between Hinduism and Buddhism".
  7. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f Thomas William Rhys Davids; William Stede (1921). Pali-English Dictionary. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 22. ISBN 978-81-208-1144-7.
  8. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Johannes Bronkhorst (2009). Buddhist Teaching in India. Simon and Schuster. pp. 124–125 with footnotes. ISBN 978-0-86171-566-4.
  9. ^ Peter Harvey (2012). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57–62. ISBN 978-0-521-85942-4.
  10. ^ Peter Harvey (2015). Steven M. Emmanuel (ed.). A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 34–37. ISBN 978-1-119-14466-3.
  11. ^ Peter Harvey (2015). Steven M. Emmanuel (ed.). A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. p. 36. ISBN 978-1-119-14466-3.
  12. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Nāgārjuna; David J. Kalupahana (Translator) (1996). Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 56. ISBN 978-81-208-0774-7.
  13. ^ Jump up to:a b David Loy (2009). Awareness Bound and Unbound: Buddhist Essays. State University of New York Press. pp. 105–106. ISBN 978-1-4384-2680-8., Quote: Nagarjuna, the second century Indian Buddhist philosopher, used shunyata not to characterize the true nature of reality but to deny that anything has any self-existence or reality of its own.
  14. ^ Peter Harvey (2012). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. p. 62. ISBN 978-0-521-85942-4., Quote: "Again, anatta does not mean 'egoless', as it is sometimes rendered. The term 'ego' has a range of meanings in English. The Freudian 'ego' is not the same as the Indian atman/atta or permanent Self."
  15. ^ Surendranath Dasgupta (1992). A History of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass (Republisher; Originally published by Cambridge University Press). p. 250. ISBN 978-81-208-0412-8.
  16. ^ Richard Gombrich; Gananath Obeyesekere (1988). Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 246. ISBN 978-81-208-0702-0.
  17. ^ N. Ross Reat (1994). Buddhism: A History. Jain Publishing. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-87573-002-8.
  18. ^ Richard Francis Gombrich (1988). Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. Routledge. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-415-07585-5.
  19. ^ Jump up to:a b c Steven Collins (1990). Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 71–81. ISBN 978-0-521-39726-1.
  20. ^ Peter Harvey (2013). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 1–2, 34–40, 224–225. ISBN 978-1-136-78336-4.
  21. ^ Jump up to:a b c Peter Harvey (2013). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 39–40. ISBN 978-1-136-78336-4.
  22. ^ Johannes Bronkhorst (2009). Buddhist Teaching in India. Wisdom Publications. pp. 23–25. ISBN 978-0-86171-811-5.
  23. ^ Jump up to:a b c Oliver Leaman (2002). Eastern Philosophy: Key Readings. Routledge. pp. 23–27. ISBN 978-1-134-68919-4.
  24. ^ Nāgārjuna; David J. Kalupahana (Translator) (1996). Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 56–57. ISBN 978-81-208-0774-7.
  25. ^ Brad Warner (Commentary); GW Nishijima (Translator) (2011). Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. Monkfish. pp. 182–191. ISBN 978-0-9833589-0-9.
  26. ^ Nagarjuna; Jay Garfield (Translator) (1995). "Chapters XVIII, XXVII (see Part One and Two)". The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. Oxford University Press. pp. xxxiv, 76. ISBN 978-0-19-976632-1.
  27. ^ Steven M. Emmanuel (2015). A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 419–428. ISBN 978-1-119-14466-3.
  28. ^ James Duerlinger (2013). The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism: Candrakīrti on the Selflessness of Persons. Routledge. pp. 52–54. ISBN 978-0-415-65749-5.
  29. ^ Ronald W. Neufeldt. Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments. State University of New York Press. pp. 216–220. ISBN 978-1-4384-1445-4.
  30. ^ Robert E. Buswell Jr.; Donald S. Lopez Jr. (2013). The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism. Princeton University Press. pp. 42–43, 581. ISBN 978-1-4008-4805-8.
  31. ^ Grant Olson (Translator); Phra Payutto (1995). Buddhadhamma: Natural Laws and Values for Life. State University of New York Press. pp. 62–63. ISBN 978-0-7914-2631-9.
  32. ^ John Carter; Mahinda Palihawadana (2008). Dhammapada. Oxford University Press. pp. 30–31, 74, 80. ISBN 978-0-19-955513-0.
  33. ^ Jump up to:a b Williams 2002, p. 74-75.
  34. ^ Buswell & Lopez 2003, p. 708.
  35. ^ Schmidt-Leukel 2006, p. 32-34.
  36. ^ Makransky 1997, p. 27.
  37. ^ Davids, Thomas William Rhys; Stede, William (1 January 1921). "Pali-English Dictionary". Motilal Banarsidass – via Google Books.
  38. ^ Jump up to:a b Harvey 2016.
  39. ^ Samuel 2008, p. 136.
  40. ^ Spiro 1982, p. 42.
  41. ^ Vetter 1988, p. xxi, xxxi-xxxii.
  42. ^ Makransky 1997, p. 27-28.
  43. ^ Lopez 2009, p. 147.
  44. ^ Carter 1987, p. 3179.
  45. ^ Anderson 2013.
  46. ^ Anderson 2013, p. 162 with note 38, for context see pages 1-3.
  47. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Damien Keown (2004). "Ucchedavāda, śāśvata-vāda, rebirth, in A Dictionary of Buddhism". Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-860560-7. Missing or empty |url= (help)
  48. ^ Robert E. Buswell Jr.; Donald S. Lopez Jr. (2013). The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism. Princeton University Press. pp. 708–709. ISBN 978-1-4008-4805-8.
  49. ^ Peter Harvey (2012). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. pp. 32–33, 38–39, 46–49. ISBN 978-0-521-85942-4.
  50. ^ Ray Billington (2002). Understanding Eastern Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 43–44, 58–60. ISBN 978-1-134-79349-5.
  51. ^ Norman C. McClelland (2010). Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. McFarland. p. 89. ISBN 978-0-7864-5675-8.
  52. ^ Hugh Nicholson (2016). The Spirit of Contradiction in Christianity and Buddhism. Oxford University Press. pp. 23–25. ISBN 978-0-19-045534-7.
  53. ^ Gananath Obeyesekere (2006). Karma and Rebirth: A Cross Cultural Study. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 281–282. ISBN 978-81-208-2609-0.
  54. ^ See, for instance, the "Snake-Simile Discourse" (MN 22), where the Buddha states:

    "Monks, this Teaching so well proclaimed by me, is plain, open, explicit, free of patchwork. In this Teaching that is so well proclaimed by me and is plain, open, explicit and free of patchwork; for those who are arahants, free of taints, who have accomplished and completed their task, have laid down the burden, achieved their aim, severed the fetters binding to existence, who are liberated by full knowledge, there is no (future) round of existence that can be ascribed to them. – Majjhima Nikaya i.130 ¶ 42, Translated by Nyanaponika Thera (Nyanaponika, 2006)

  55. ^ The "fruit" (Pali: phala) is the culmination of the "path" (magga). Thus, for example, the "stream-enterer" is the fruit for one on the "stream-entry" path; more specifically, the stream-enterer has abandoned the first three fetters, while one on the path of stream-entry strives to abandon these fetters.
  56. ^ Both the stream-enterer and the once-returner abandon the first three fetters. What distinguishes these stages is that the once-returner additionally attenuates lust, hate and delusion, and will necessarily be reborn only once more.
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  58. ^ David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.
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  64. ^ Martijn van Zomeren (2016). From Self to Social Relationships: An Essentially Relational Perspective on Social Motivation. Cambridge University Press. p. 156. ISBN 978-1-107-09379-9., Quote: Buddhism is an example of a non-theistic religion, which underlies a cultural matrix in which individuals believe that the self is an illusion. Indeed, its anatta doctrine states that the self is not an essence.
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  98. ^ Ian Harris (1991). The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. BRILL Academic. pp. 146–147. ISBN 90-04-09448-2.
  99. ^ Mun-Keat Choong (1999). The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 1–4, 85–88. ISBN 978-81-208-1649-7.
  100. ^ Ray Billington (2002). Understanding Eastern Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 58–60. ISBN 978-1-134-79348-8.
  101. ^ David Loy (2009). Awareness Bound and Unbound: Buddhist Essays. State University of New York Press. pp. 35–39. ISBN 978-1-4384-2680-8.
  102. ^ Stephan Schuhmacher (1994). The Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion: Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Zen. Shambhala. p. 12. ISBN 978-0-87773-980-7.
  103. ^ Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. pp. 125–127. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  104. ^ S. K. Hookham (1991). The Buddha Within: Tathagatagarbha Doctrine According to the Shentong Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga. State University of New York Press. pp. 100–104. ISBN 978-0-7914-0357-0.
  105. ^ Jump up to:a b Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. p. 104. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  106. ^ Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. p. 107. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  107. ^ Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. pp. 104–105, 108. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  108. ^ Merv Fowler (1999). Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 101–102. ISBN 978-1-898723-66-0., Quote: "Some texts of the tathagatagarbha literature, such as the Mahaparinirvana Sutra actually refer to an atman, though other texts are careful to avoid the term. This would be in direct opposition to the general teachings of Buddhism on anatta. Indeed, the distinctions between the general Indian concept of atman and the popular Buddhist concept of Buddha-nature are often blurred to the point that writers consider them to be synonymous."
  109. ^ Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. p. 109. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.Quote: "... it refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics."
  110. ^ John W. Pettit (1999). Mipham's Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection. Simon and Schuster. pp. 48–49. ISBN 978-0-86171-157-4.
  111. ^ Jump up to:a b c Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. pp. 109–112. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  112. ^ Christopher Bartley (2015). An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Hindu and Buddhist Ideas from Original Sources. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-4725-2437-9.
  113. ^ Jump up to:a b Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. p. 112. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
  114. ^ S. K. Hookham (1991). The Buddha Within: Tathagatagarbha Doctrine According to the Shentong Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga. State University of New York Press. p. 96. ISBN 978-0-7914-0357-0.
  115. ^ Jamie Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 99-100
  116. ^ Zimmermann, Michael (2002), A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Biblotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, p. 64
  117. ^ Michael Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 64
  118. ^ Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 81
  119. ^ Jump up to:a b Miranda Eberle Shaw (2006). Buddhist Goddesses of India. Princeton University Press. pp. 387–390. ISBN 0-691-12758-1.
  120. ^ Kun-Dga'-Bstan; Kunga Tenpay Nyima; Jared Rhoton (2003). The Three Levels of Spiritual Perception: A Commentary on the Three Visions. Simon and Schuster. p. 392. ISBN 978-0-86171-368-4.
  121. ^ Garab Dorje (1996). The Golden Letters: The Three Statements of Garab Dorje, the First Teacher of Dzogchen, Together with a Commentary by. Snow Lion Publications. p. 319. ISBN 978-1-55939-050-7.
  122. ^ Jeffrey Hopkins (2006). Absorption in No External World. Snow Lion Publications. pp. 400–405. ISBN 978-1-55939-946-3.
  123. ^ Khenchen Konchog Gyaltshen (2010). A Complete Guide to the Buddhist Path. Snow Lion Publications. pp. 259–261. ISBN 978-1-55939-790-2.
  124. ^ Karma-Ran-Byun-Kun-Khyab-Phrin-Las; Denis Tondrup (1997). Luminous Mind: The Way of the Buddha. Simon and Schuster. pp. 204–206. ISBN 978-0-86171-118-5.
  125. ^ Geshe Kelsang Gyatso (2000). Essence of Vajrayana: The Highest Yoga Tantra Practice of Heruka Body Mandala. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 140–143. ISBN 978-81-208-1729-6.
  126. ^ John A. Grimes (1996). A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English. State University of New York Press. p. 199. ISBN 978-0-7914-3067-5.
  127. ^ A. K. Warder (2000). Indian Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 473–474. ISBN 978-81-208-1741-8.
  128. ^ Asaṅga; Janice Dean Willis (2002). On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 24. ISBN 978-81-208-1106-5.
  129. ^ Elliot Turiel (2002). The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context, and Conflict. Cambridge University Press. p. 234. ISBN 978-1-139-43266-5., Quote: "A central doctrine of Theravada Buddhism is Anatta, [...]"
  130. ^ Nyanatiloka Thera (2004). Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines. Buddhist Publication Society. p. 15. ISBN 978-955-24-0019-3., Quote: "anatta [...] This is the central doctrine of Buddhism, without understanding which a real knowledge of Buddhism is altogether impossible.";
    For the development of anatta concept to the key doctrine of sunyata in Mahayana: Kenneth Fleming (2002). Asian Christian theologians in dialogue with Buddhism. P. Lang. pp. 26–27. ISBN 978-3-906768-42-7.
  131. ^ Jump up to:a b Trevor Ling (1969). A History of Religion East and West: An Introduction and Interpretation. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 86–87. ISBN 978-1-349-15290-2., Quote: "2.32 The essentials of early Buddhist doctrine [...] third, anatta, or the absence of a permanent enduring private self (atta) within the human individual. This last is the doctrine which most clearly distinguished the teaching of the Buddha from other contemporary schools of thought, and especially from Upanisadic thought, in which the affirmation of the soul or self (Sanskrit: atman; Pali: atta) within the human individual and its identification with the world-soul, or brahman, was the central doctrine. [...]"
  132. ^ Helen J Baroni (2002), The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Zen Buddhism, Rosen Publishing, ISBN 978-0-8239-2240-6, page 14
  133. ^ David Loy (1982), Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta: Are Nirvana and Moksha the Same?, International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 1, pages 65-74
  134. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Peter Harvey (2013). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 34, 38. ISBN 978-1-136-78336-4.
  135. ^ Sengaku Mayeda (2000), Sankara and Buddhism, in New Perspectives on Advaita Vedānta (Editors: Richard V. De Smet, Bradley J. Malkovsky), Brill Academic, ISBN 978-9004116665, pages 18-29
  136. ^ Peter Harvey (2012). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59–60. ISBN 978-0-521-85942-4.
  137. ^ Peter Harvey (2013). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge. p. 34. ISBN 978-1-136-78336-4., Quote: "The post-Buddhist Matri Upanishad holds that only defiled individual self, rather than the universal one, thinks 'this is I' or 'this is mine'. This is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations".
  138. ^ Paul Deussen (1980). Sixty Upanishads of the Veda. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 361. ISBN 978-81-208-1468-4.
  139. ^ Jump up to:a b Thomas E. Wood (1992). The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Āgama Śāstra: An Investigation Into the Meaning of the Vedānta. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 67–68. ISBN 978-81-208-0930-7.
  140. ^ =Shinkan Murakami (1971). "Niratman and anatman". Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū). 19 (2): 61–68.
  141. ^ Paul Deussen (1980). Sixty Upanishads of the Veda. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 358–359 introductory note, 361 with footnote 1, 380. ISBN 978-81-208-1468-4.
  142. ^ Bett, Richard; Zalta, Edward (Winter 2014). "Pyrrho". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved February 19,2018.
  143. ^ Beckwith, Christopher I. (2015). Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia (PDF). Princeton University Press. pp. 22–59. ISBN 9781400866328.

Bibliography[edit]

Web sources
  1. ^ Jump up to:a b Donald Lopez, Four Noble Truths Archived 2016-04-22 at the Wayback Machine, Encyclopædia Britannica.
  2. ^ Thanissaro Bhikkhu, The Truth of Rebirth And Why it Matters for Buddhist Practice Archived 2016-05-22 at the Wayback Machine
  3. ^ "Maha-parinibbana Sutta: Last Days of the Buddha". Archived from the original on 2011-06-06. Retrieved 2016-05-15.
  4. ^ Patrick Olivelle (2012), Encyclopædia Britannica, Moksha (Indian religions) Archived 2015-04-30 at the Wayback Machine

External links[edit]


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