SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
VII The Way
Up to this point we have been following the footprints of Chuang-
tzu as he tries to describe analytically the process by which a vision
of the Absolute is revealed to the Taoist Perfect Man,
opening up in
his mind a new vista of the whole world of Being which is totally
different from, and radically opposed to, that shared by ordinary
men on the level of common sense.
In so doing we have discarded Lao-tzu except in a few places.
Nor have we analyzed in a systematic
manner the philosophical thought expressed in the Tao Tê Ching.
We have adopted this course for several reasons, the most impor-
tant of them being that
---
Chuang-tzu, as 1 have pointed out a number
of times, is vitally interested in describing the epistemological
aspect of the problem of the Tao,
while Lao-tzu is almost exclusively interested in giving the result of the experience of the Absolute, i.e., what comes after, and out of, that experience.
---
We have seen in the preceding chapter how Chuang-tzu submits
to an elaborate theoretical analysis the process of the graduai
development of the human mind toward a Taoist perfection.
He
attempts to give an accurate description of the Taoist variety of
metaphysical or spiritual experience by which man' ascends' toward
the Absolute until he becomes completely unified with it.
Certainly,
Chuang-tzu is equally interested in the 'descending' movement of
the mind, from the state of ekstasis back to the level of daily
consciousness, that is, from the stage of the absolute Unity back to
that of 'essential' Multiplicity.
But even then, his description of the
Descent is epistemological as well as ontological.
That is to say, his
description is made so that to each objective stage of Being there
corresponds a subjective stage of spiritual experience, so that the
ontological system, in the case of Chuang-tzu, is at the same time a
complete epistemological system, and vice versa.
Moreover, it is
typical of Chuang-tzu that these two aspects are so completely fused
together that it is at times difficult for us to decide whether a given
passage is intended to be a description of the subjective side of the
matter or of the objective, ontological structure of things.
The 'sitting in oblivion' is an example in point.
376
Lao-tzu, on the contrary, does not seem to be very much
interested in the experiential stages which precede the ultimate
vision of the Absolute.
He does not take the trouble to explain how
and by what process we can obtain the vision of the Absolute.
He seems to be more interested in the questions:
(1) What is the Absolute, i.e., the Way?; and
(2) How is the 'sacred man' expected to behave in ordinary circumstances of social life on the basis of his vision of the Way?
From the very outset he utters his words in the name of the Absolute, as a representative of those who have already attained to the highest stage of Taoist perfection.
Behind the pages of the Tao Tê Ching we feel the presence of a man who has experienced the most intimate union with the Absolute, who, consequently knows
what the Absolute is.
Quite abruptly Lao-tzu sets out to talk about the Way.
He tries to impart tous his personal knowledge of the Absolute, and his strange
- so it seems to common sense understanding -vision of the world.
If it were not for Chuang-tzu, we would hardly be able to know for sure what kind of experiential background this extraordinary vision of the world has as its unstated 'prehistory'.
This is why we have up till now intentionally refrained from turning systematically toward an analysis of Lao-tzu's thought, and confined ourselves to the task
of clarifying this 'prehistory' in the light of what Chuang-tzu says
about it.
But the particular situation which we have just mentioned con-
cerning Lao-tzu's basic attitude would seem to suggest that the Tao Tê Ching is the best possible thing for us to have recourse to, if we want to obtain a clear understanding of the Taoist conception of the Absolute, its reality and its working.
As we shall realize immediately, the Absolute as conceived by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu is by its very nature beyond all verbal description. Despite that, Lao-tzu does endeavor to describe, at least symbolically, this ineffable Something.
And he succeeds marvellously. In point of fact, the Tao Të Ching is a remarkable work in that it attempts to delineate to the utmost limit of possibility the Absolute which is essentially indescribable.
This is why we shall be greatly dependent in the present chapter upon this book for elucidating the metaphysical structure of the Absolute. .
We must remark, however, that here again, Lao-tzu does not explain how and why it is ineffable, and indescribable.
He simply states that the Way is 'nameless', 'formless', 'imageless', 'invisible',
'inaudible', etc., that it is 'nothing' (wu wu) 1 or Nothing (wu) 2 •
As to the psychological or logical process by which one reaches this
conclusion, he says nothing positive.
377
This process is clarified in an interesting way by Chuang-tzu in a passage which
bears ample witness to his being an excellent dialectician.
Let us begin by reading the passage in question as an illuminating
theoretical introduction to Lao-tzu' s conception of the Absolute.
Chuang-tzu is keenly conscious of the fact that the Way, or the
Absolute in its absoluteness, defies all verbalization and reasoning;
that, if brought down to the level of language, the Way will immediately and inevitably turn into a concept. As a concept, even the Absolute is exactly in the same rank as any other concept. He makes this observation the starting-point of his argument. People, he says, distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong' in all matters and thus take the position of there being a fundamental distinction between 'right' and 'wrong'.
Chuang-tzu, on his part, puts forward the thesis that there is no distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' .3 Ordinary people and Chuang-tzu are in this respect diametrically opposed to each other. And yet, he goes on to say, as a logical proposition, 'there-is-no-distinction-between-right-and-wrong' is no less a logos4 than the opposite proposition: 'there-is-a-distinction-between-right-and-wrong'. In this respect, both belong to one and the same category .5
In reality, the two propositions refer to two completely different
levels of discourse. The difference, as we already know, cornes out
only when one realizes that the positive statement is a statement
typical of the empirical level of discourse, while the negative one is
orginally intended to represent the ontological 'chaotification'
which is experienced by the Perfect Man in the moments of his
ecstatic union with the Absolute. As an expression of this original
experience, the statement is not a logical proposition except in its
outward form. But as long as it does have a logical form, it is a logical
proposition; and as such, it does not properly represent the unique
experience of 'chaotification', being as it is nothing but the con-
tradictory of the proposition: 'there-is-a-distinction-between-
right-and-wrong'. If such is the case, could there be any other
attitude for us to take than maintaining a complete silence? 'Despite
this', he says, 'I would dare to discuss the problem (on the logical or
conceptual lev el).' With these preliminary remarks, he sets out to
develop an extremely interesting argument in the following way.
The argument, in brief, establishes that the Absolute in its original
absoluteness is conceptually the negation-of-negation-of-negation,
that is, the negation of the Absolute's being Nothing which, again, is
the negation of Being. And that is the furthest limit to which our
logical thinking can go in its venturesome attempt at grasping the
Absolute on the level of concepts.378
We have seen in the preceding chapter how Chuang-tzu, in
describing the stages of the spiritual development of 'sitting in
oblivion', mentions as the ultimate limit of ecstatic cognition the
view that 'nothing has ever existed from the very beginning'.
What is the ultimate limit of Knowledge? It is the stage represented
by the view that nothing has ever existed from the very beginning.
This is the furthest limit (of Knowledge), to which nothing more can
be added. 6
'Nothing has ever existed from the very beginning' appearing in this
quotation is the key-phrase for the right understanding of the
passage we are going to read. 7 lt is important to keep in mind,
however, that in this latter passage we are no longer concerned with
the epistemological question of the utmost limit of human cogni-
tion. Our problem here is essentially of a metaphysical nature. For it
concerns the ultimate origin of Being, or of the Universe. The
'beginning' here in question means the beginning point of the world
of Being. Whenever we think logically of the formation of the world
of Being, we have to posit a 'beginning'. Our Reason cannot con-
ceive of the world of Being without imagining a point at which it
'began' to exist.
So we posit Beginning. (But the moment we posit Beginning, our
Reason cannot help going further back and) admit the idea of there
having been no Beginning. (Thus the concept of No-Beginning is
necessarily established. But the moment we posit No-Beginning, our
logical thinking goes further back by negating the very idea which it
has just established, and) admits the idea of there having been no
'there-having-been-no-Beginning'. (The concept of 'No-No-
Beginning' is thus established.)
The concept of Beginning, i.e., the initial point of the whole world of
Being, is but a relative concept. lt can be conceptually pushed
further and further back. But no matter how far we may push it
back, this conceptual process does not reach an end. In order to put
a definite end to this process we have to transcend it atone stroke by
negating the Beginning itself. As a result, the concept of No-
Beginning is obtained.
However, the concept of No-Beginning is, again, a relative one,
being as it is a concept that subsists only by being opposed to that of
Beginning. In order to remove this relativity and attain to the
absolute No-Beginning, we have to transcend the No-Beginning
itself by negating it and establishing No-No-Beginning. The
No-No-Beginning - which must be articulated as No-[No-
Beginning] - is, however, a concept whose real significance is dis
closed only to those who are able to understand it as signifying a
metaphysical state of affairs which is to be grasped by a kind of
metaphysical intuition. 379
And this would seem to indicate that No-No-Beginning, although it is something that has been posited by Reason, lies beyond the grasp of all logical reasoning.
In the same manner, (we begin by taking notice of the fact that) there
is Being. (But the moment we recognize Being, our Reason goes
further back and admits that) there is Non-Being (or Nothing). (But
the moment we posit Non-Being we cannot but go further back and
admit that) there has not been from the very beginning Non-Being.
(The concept of No-[Non-Being] once established in this way, the
Reason goes further back and admits that) there has been no 'there-
having-been-no-Non-Being' (i.e., the negation of the negation of
Non-Being, or No-[No Non-Being]).
This concept of No-[No Non-Being] or No-No-Nothing represents
the ultimate logical stage which is reached by our negating - i.e.,
transcending - the negation itself of the opposition of Being and
Non-Being. This is the logical and conceptual counterpart of the
Way or the metaphysical Nothing which is nota simple 'nothing',
but a transcendent Nothing that lies beyond bath 'being' and 'non-
being' as ordinarily understood.
We have thus seemingly succeeded in conceptualizing the Way as
an absolutely transcendent Nothing. However, does the Absolute
th us conceptualized mirror faithfully the reality of the Absolu te? To
this question, we can say neither Yes nor No. As in the case of the
concept of No-No-Beginning, we must remark that the concept of
No-No-Nothing does justice to the reality of the Absolute only
when we transcend, in understanding it, the sphere of logical think-
ing itself into that of ecstatic or mystic intuition. But when we do so,
the concept of No-No-Nothing will immediately cease to be a
concept. And we shall end up by realizing that all the logical
reasoning that has preceded has in reality been futile and of no use.
If, on the contrary, we refuse to transcend the lev el of reasoning, the
concept of No-No-Nothing will remain for ever an empty concept
devoid of all positive meaning and, therefore, in no position to do
justice to the reality of the Absolu te. Thus, either way, the concep-
tualizing activity of the mind proves powerless in grasping the
Absolute as it really is.
(When Reason begins to be active), ail of a sudden we find ourselves
confronted with 'being' and 'non-being'. (Since, however, these are
relative concepts in the sense that 'being' at this stage turns into
'non-being' at the next stage, and so on and so forth), we can never
know for sure which is really 'being' and which is really 'non-being'.
Now 1 have just established something (that looks) meaningful, (i.e.,
1 have established the Absolute as No-No-Nothing). But 1 do not
know whether 1 have truly established something meaningful or
whether what 1 have established is, after ail, nothing meaningful.
380 S
At this point, Chuang-tzu suddenly changes the direction of his
thinking and tries another approach. This time he turns to the aspect
of Unity which, as we have seen earlier, is one of the most salient
features of the Absolute. But before discussing the problem on the
lev el of logical reasoning, he reminds us by way of caution of what is
to be understood by the statement that the Absolute is 'one'. The
Absolute, he says, is 'one' as a coincidentia oppositorum. We have
already examined in Chapter IV Chuang-tzu's position conceming
this problem. The key-term is 'equalization' of all things in the
Absolute.
The Way or the Absolute, according to Chuang-tzu, is the
metaphysical state of Heavenly Equalization, that is, the absolute
One which 'equalizes' all oppositions and contradictions. At this
stage, the smallest is at the same time the biggest, and a moment is
eternity.
(The state of Heavenly Equalization defies common sense and
reason, for we admit at this stage that) there is in the world nothing
bigger than the tip of a hair of an animal in autumn, while Mount Tai
(which is usually mentioned as an example of a very big thing) is
considered extremely small. No one lives longer than a child who dies
before coming of age, while P'êng Tsu (who is related to have lived
800 years) is considered to have died young. Heaven and Earth
endure for the sa me length of time as 1 do (i.e., the eternal duration of
Heaven and Earth is equivalent to the momentary duration of my
individual existence in this world). And the ten thousand things are
exactly the same as my own self.
Thus, from the viewpoint of Heavenly Equalization, all things
become reduced to a single unity in terms of both time and space.
How does logical reasoning grasp such an absolu te Oneness? That is
the question we are faced with now.
AU things (at this stage) are absolutely 'one'. But if so, how is it
possible for us to say something? (i.e., Since all things are absolutely
'one', there is no longer anything whatsoever opposed to anything
else whatsoever. And since there is no opposition, it is meaningless
even to say: 'one').
(But in order to reason, 1 have to posit something). So 1 have said:
'one'. But how could 1 judge that (it is, or they are) 'one' without
explicitly positing the term (i.e., word or concept: 'one')? However,
(the moment 1 posit the term 'one'), the (original) 'one' (i.e., the
absolu te One which is a coincidentia oppositorum) and the term (or
concept of) 'one' necessarily make 'two'. (This would mean that the
least amount of reasoning makes the original One split itself into Two
and thus produces dualism.)
Then, these 'two' (i.e., the two-term judgment: 'The Way is One')
together with the 'one' (i.e., the absolute One which is prior to any
judgment) make 'three'.
381
And from this point on the process ex tends endlessly, so much so that
even a talented mathematician will not be able to count out the
number, much Jess ordinary people.
If, in this way, moving from Non-Being to Being leads us inevitably to
(at least) 'three', where shall we get if we move from Being to Being
(i.e., if, instead of starting from the absolu te One, we take a relativist
point of view and begin to pursue the individual things which go on
being endlessly diversified)? Better not to make any move (i.e.,
better not to exercise reasoning concerning the Absolute and the
things). Let us content ourselves with abiding by the (great) Yes
(which transcends ail oppositions and contradictions, and leaves
everything as i t is) !
Thus after developing an elaborate reasoning on the nature of the
Absolute, Chuang-tzii, ironically enough, ends by asserting the
futility of reasoning. He advises us to abandon all logical thinking
about the Absolute and to remain immersed ecstatically in the
absolute intuitive Knowledge. For only by doing so can we hope to
be in direct contact with the absolute One.
Thus the highest stage of Knowledge is remaining motionless in what
cannot absolutely be known (by reasoning). Is there anyone who
knows the Word which is no longer a 'word'? Is there anyone who
knows the Way which is not even a 'way'? If there is a man who knows
such a thing, he deserves to be named the 'Treasury of Heaven' (i.e.,
he who is in possession of the key to the limitless treasure house of
Being. Nay, he is the same as the 'treasury' itself). (The Treasury of
Heaven with which such a man is completely identical and unified is
like an unbounded ocean); no matter how much you pour water into
it, it will never become full; and no matter how much you dip up
water therefrom, it will never run dry. And no body knows how and
from where all these (limitless) things corne into being.
It is the Knowledge of such a man that is properly to be called the
'shaded Light'.
Thus by following step by step Chuang-tzu's argument we have
been led to the conclusion that the Way or the Absolute in its
ultimate reality transcends all reasoning and conceptualization.
This conclusion forms the starting-point for the metaphysical think-
ing of Lao-tzii. As 1 remarked at the outset of this chapter, Lao-tzu
does not take the trouble of explaining the logical or epistemologi-
cal process which underlies his metaphysical system. But we are
now in a position to understand the background against which this
metaphysics must be set.
Qui te naturally, the metaphysics of Lao-tzu begins by mentioning
negative attributes of the Way. The Way, to begin with, is
'nameless' .8
382
The Way in its absolute reality (ch'ang) has no name. 9
Interminably continuous like a thread, no name can be given to it. 10
The Way is hidden and nameless. 11
That the Way is 'nameless' implies that the very name 'Way' (tao) is
nothing other than a makeshift. Lao-tzü forcibly calls it 'Way'
because without naming it he cannot even refer to it. This fact is
clearly indicated by the very famous opening sentence of the Tao Tê
Ching.
The 'way' which can be designated by the word 'way' is not the real' 2
Way.
The 'name' which can be designated by the word 'name' is not the
real 12 Name.'3
It is interesting and important to remark that this passage, besides
being a clear statement to the effect that the Absolute is 'nameless',
is designed to be an implicit criticism of Confucian realism. The
'way' which is here said to be not the real Way is the human (or
ethical) 'way' as understood in the Confucian school. And the
'name' which is said to be not the real Name refers to the so-called
'names' of the Confucianists, su ch as' benevolence', 'righ teousness',
'wisdom', etc., which the Confucianists consider cardinal virtues.
Asto the meaning of the word 'way' (tao) as it was originally used
by Confucius himself and his circle, authentic information is fur-
nished by the Lun Yü ('The Analects'). Entering into the fine details
of the problem would lead us too far beyond the scope of the present
study. Here I shall confine myself to giving a few examples just to
clarify the most essential characteristics of the Confucian concept of
tao.
Master Yu (one of the disciples of Confucius) once remarked: Those
who are by nature filial and fraternal (i.e., those who behave with an
inborn goodwill toward their parents and eider brothers) at home are
seldom inclined (in public life) toward comporting themselves
against the will of their superiors. And (of th ose who do not comport
themselves against the will of their superiors) none, indeed, has ever
wanted to stir up confusion (in society).
(The observation of this fact makes us realize that) the 'princely man'
should strive (to establish) the root, for the root once established, the
'way' (tao) will naturally grow up. The right attitude toward parents
and eider brothers may, in this respect, be considered the root of
'benevolence' (or 'human love'). 14
It is contextually clear that the 'way' in this passage means the
proper ethical attitude of man toward his brethren in society. The
argument is typical of Confucianists. 383
It recognizes man's inborn
goodwill toward those closest in blood as the 'root' or 'origin' of
human morals. This inborn goodwill, when expanded into a univer-
sal goodwill toward all fellow-members of society, turns into the
highest principle of ethical conduct, the 'way', as exemplified by the
virtue of 'benevolence'.
Clearly, the conceptual structure of the argument is based on the
terms 'filial piety', 'fraternal respect', and 'benevolence'. The word
'way' is mentioned almost in a casual way. It is not even a key term
in the real sense of the word.
The Master (Confucius) said: 0 Shên, 15 my 'way' is a unity running
through (all forms of my behavior). Master Tsêng respectfully
replied: Yes!
When the Master left the place, the other disciples asked (Master
Tsêng) saying: What did he mean?
Master Tsêng said: Our Master's 'way' consists in 'loyalty' (i.e., being
loyal or faithful to one's own conscience) and, 'kindness' (i.e., being
thoughtful for others, as if their problems were one's own). 16
In this passage, the 'way' means again the leading principle of
ethical conduct. By the statement: 'my way is a unity running
through' Confucius means to say that although his behavior appears
concretely in various forms, there underlies them all a unique
ethical principle. The 'way', in other words, is here the unifying
principle of all forms of moral conduct.
The Master said: In case the 'way' prevails in a state, you may be
daring in both speech and action. But in case the 'way' does not
prevail, you may be daring in action, but you should be reserved in
speech. 17
Confucius often speaks of the 'way' prevailing in astate - or more
literally 'a state's possessing the way' .18 What is meant by the word
in such contexts is too clear to need elucidation.
The Master said: The 'way' of the 'princely man' is (manifested) in
three (forms). But I myself am equal to none of them. He who is
really virtuous does not worry. He who is really wise is never per-
plexed. He who is really bold does not fear.
Master K'ung (one of the disciples of Confucius) said: Master, these
precisely are your own 'way'! 19
The interpretation of the word tao may vary more or less in accor-
dance with contexts, but the fondamental meaning is observable in
all the uses of the word. It means the right or proper 'way' of acting
in social life. The 'way' for Confucius is the highest principle of
ethical conduct.
It would be going too far to assert that this Confucian concept of
the 'way' is exclusively human. For, although it is essentially human
and ethical in its concrete manifestation, the concept would seem to
have in the moral consciousness of Confucius something cosmic as
its metaphysical core. 384
The 'way' in its original metaphysical form is the all-pervading supreme law of Being. The supreme law govern-
ing the working of the universe in general, and governing man as a
part of the whole universe in particular, is called 'way' when it is
comprehended by, or reftected in, the consciousness of man. The
highest principle of ethical conduct is, in this sense, nothing other
than a particular manifestation of the universal law of Being in the
form of the supreme law governing the right forms of human life.
The principle of ethical conduct is, for Confucius, by no means a
man-made rule, or set of rules, regulating from outside the behavior
of man. It is a reftection in the human consciousness of the highest
law of the universe. And as such, it is the 'internalized' cosmic law
regulating human behavior from within.
Thus to know the 'way' does not consist merely in learning the
formai mies of good manners and correct behavior. It consists in
man's coming into contact with the all-pervading metaphysical law
of the Cosmos through becoming conscious of it. The following very
forceful and passionate statement would sound absurd or even
ridiculous if the Confucian 'way' were merely a matter of etiquette
and correct behavior.
The Master said: If a man hears (i.e., understands the profound
meaning of) the 'way' in the morning, he may die contented in the
evening. 20
In this 'cosmic' aspect, the Confucian conception of the 'way' might
be said to have something in common with the Taoist counterpart.
The difference between the two, however, is far more conspicuous
and essential than the point of contact, as we shall see presently.
There is, in any case, a conscious attitude noticeable on the part of
Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu to reject the 'way' as understood by Con-
fucius and his followers. The 'way', Lao-tzu says, which can be
recognized as the 'way' by ordinary people - Confucius and his
followers being their representatives - is not the real Way. The real
Way, or the Absolu te in its absoluteness, is not something which an
ordinary mind can become conscious of. How could one 'know' it?
How could one 'hear' it? It is by nature something unknown,
unknowable and inaudible.
Being essentially unknown and unkowable, the Way is 'name-
less'. Here agin we encounter Lao-tzu consciously taking up a
position against the Confucian attitude toward the 'names'.
Certainly, Lao-tzu too speaks of 'names'. The 'nameless' Way,
he says, goes on assuming various 'names' in its process of
self-determinations.
The Way in its absolute reality has no 'name'. lt is (comparable to)
uncarved wood. 21
Only when it is eut out are there 'names' .22
385
But there is a basic difference between Lao-tzu and Confucius with
regard to 'names' in that Lao-tzü does not regard these 'names' as
absolutely established. As we have learnt from the explanation
given by Chuang-tzu of 'chaotification' as well as from Lao-tzü's
thesis that everything in this world is 'relative', all 'names' - and
ultimately the 'things' designated by the 'names' - are but of a
relative nature. Confucian 'realism' on the contrary, takes the posi-
tion that behind every 'name' there is a corresponding objective and
permanent reality. And to the highest Names there correspond the
highest realities. These Names represent the cardinal virtues:
'benevolence', 'righteousness', 'decorum', 'wisdom', 'truthfulness'.
Against this, Lao-tzu puts forward the view that-these 'names which
may be mentioned as names' are not real 'names'. In his mind, the
Names, or the cardinal virtues, which are so highly valued by the
Confucians are but so many symptoms of degeneration and corrup-
tion, that is, symptoms of men's having alienated themselves from
the Absolute.
Only when the great Way declines, do 'benevolence' and 'righteous-
ness' arise. Only when cleverness and sagacity make their appear-
ance do wiles and intrigues arise. Only when the six basic kinship
relations (i.e., the relationships between father and son, eider and
younger brothers, husband and wife) are out of harmony do filial sons
make their appearance. Only when the state falls into confusion and
disorder, do loyal subjects make their appearance. 23
lt is only after Virtue is lost that 'benevolence' becomes prominent. lt
is only after 'benevolence' is lost that 'righteousness' becomes prom-
inent. And it is only after 'righteousness' is lost that 'decorum'
becomes prominent.
Indeed, 'decorum' emerges in an age in which 'loyalty' and 'faithful-
ness' have become scarce. It marks the beginning of disorder (in
society). 24
Far from being real values as the Confucians assert, all these so-
called Names are but signs of man's alienation from Reality. In the
very establishment of these Names as absolute and permanent
values there is an unmistakable indication that the Absolute bas
been lost sight of. Speaking more generally, no 'name' is absolute.
For, as Lao-tzu says, a 'name which can be designated by the word
"name" 'is not the real Name. The only 'real Name' (ch'ang ming)
which is absolute is the Name assumed by the Absolute. However,
that absolute Name is, paradoxically, 'Nameless', or as we shall see
presently, the 'Mystery of Mysteries', the 'Gate of all Wonders'.
I have just used the phrase: 'the Name assumed by the Absolute'.
And in fact, as Lao-tzu himself explicitly admits, the 'nameless'
Way does assume a more positive 'name' at its very first stage of
386 Sufism and Taoism
self-manifestation or self-determination. That first 'name' assumed
by the Absolute in its creative activity is Existence (yu). 25 Lao-tzii,
making a concession to popular parlance, sometimes calls the latter
Heaven and Earth (t'ien ti). 26 Strictly speaking, the Way at this stage
is not yet actually Heaven and Earth. It is Heaven and Earth only in
potentia. It is that face of the Absolu te by which it turns, so to speak,
toward the world of Being which is to appear therefrom. It refers to
the Absolu te as the principle of eternal and endless creativity.
The Nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. The Named is
the Mother of the ten thousand things. 27
But before we go into the details of the problem of the Named, we
must pursue further the 'nameless' aspect of the Way.
With a view to making a fresh start in the consideration of this
aspect of the Way, we may conveniently begin by recalling the
opening words of the Tao Tê Ching, which has been quoted above28
and which has led us into a sort of long digression on the fondamen-
tal diff erence between Confucianism and Taoism regarding the
understanding of'way' (tao) and 'name' (ming). The passage reads:
The 'way' which can be designated by the word 'way' is not the real
Way. The 'name' which can be designated by the word 'name' is not
the real N ame.
The same conception of the Way is expressed by Chuang-tzii in a
somewhat different way as follows.
If the Way is made clear, it is no longer the Way. 29
He means to say by this that a thing which can be pointed to as the
Way is not the real Way. And again,
Is there anyone who knows the Way which is not a 'way'? 30
This, of course, means that the real Way has no visible form by
which one could designate it by the word 'way'.
To say that the Way or the Absolute in its absoluteness is 'name-
1,ess', that it refuses to be designated by any 'name' whatsoever, is to
say that it transcends all linguistic comprehension. And this is the
same as to say that the Way is beyond the grasp of both thought and
sense perception. The Way is of such a nature that Reason cannot
conceive of it nor the senses perceive it. The Way, in other words, is
an absolute Transcendent.
Even if we try to see it, it cannot be seen. In this respect it is called
'figureless'. 31
Even if we try to hear it, it cannot be heard. In this respect it is called
'inaudibly faint'.
Even if we try to grasp it, it cannot be touched. In this respect it is
called 'extremely minute'.
'9f
The Way 387
In these three aspects, it is totally unfathomable. They merge into
One. 32
(Ordinarily, the upper part of a thing is brightly visible, while the
lower partis dark and obscure. But this is not the case with the Way.)
Upward, it is not bright. Downward, it is not dark.
It continues interminably like a thread, but no name can be given to
it. And (this interminable creative activity) ultimately returns to the
original Nothingness.
Shall we describe it as a shapeless Shape, or imageless Image? Shall
we describe it as something vague and undeterminable? Standing in
front of it, we do not see its head. Following behind it, we do not see
its rear. 33
Thus the 'namelessness' of the Way is the same as its being Non-
Being. For whatever is absolutely imperceptible and inconceivable,
whatever has no 'image' at all, is, for man, the same as 'non-
existent'. It is 'Nothing' (wu). 34
It is important to notice that the Way appears as 'Nothing' only
when looked at fromourpoint of view. It is Nothing for us because it
transcends human cognition. It is, as Islamic philosophers would
say, a matter of i'tibar or (human) 'viewpoint'. Otherwise, the Way
in itself is - far from being 'nothing' - Existence in the fullest sense
of the term. For it is the ultimate origin and source of all Being.
For ordinary human consciousness the Way is Nothing. But it is
not 'nothing' in a purely negative sense. It is nota passive 'nothing'.
It is a positive Nothing in the sense that it is Non-Being pregnant
with Existence.
It goes without saying that this positive aspect of the Way is far
more difficult to explain than its negative side. Properly speaking it
is absolutely impossible to exp Iain it verbally. As we have just seen,
the reality of the Way is indescribable and ineffable. And yet
Lao-tzii does try to describe it, or at least to give some hints as to
how we should 'feel' its presence in the midst of the world of Being.
Qui te naturally, the hints are extremely dim and obscure. They are
of necessity of a symbolic nature.
The Way in its reality is utterly vague, utterly indistinct. 35
Utterly indistinct, utterly vague, yet there is within it an Image.
Utterly vague, utterly indistinct, yet there is within it Something.
Utterly profound, utterly dark, yet there is within it the purest
Essence.
The purest Essence is extremely real.
(Eternally and unchangingly its creativeness is at work, so that) from
of old till now its Name36 has never left it. Through this Name it
governs the principles of ail things.
How do we know that it is so with the principles of ail things? From
what I have just said. 37
388
Thus the Way in its purely negative aspect which is absolutely
beyond human cognition is Nothing and Non-Being. In this aspect
the Way has no 'name' whatsoever. Even the word 'way' (tao) is
properly inapplicable to it. lt is 'nameless'.
This absolutely intangible and impenetrable Mystery steps out of
its own darkness and cornes a stage doser to having a 'name'. lt is, at
this stage of self-manifestation, a faint and shadowy 'Image'. In the
Image we feel vaguely the presence of Something awful and mys-
terious. But we do not yet know what it is. lt is felt as Something but
it has still no 'name'.
In the first part of the present study we saw how, in the metaphys-
ical system of Ibn' Arabi, the Absolu te in its absoluteness is 'name-
less'. We saw how the Absolute in such astate is even beyond the
stage at which it is properly to be designated by the name Allah.
Likewise in Lao-tzii, this Something is made to be antecedent even
to God (lit. the heavenly Emperor).
Unfathomably deep it is like the ancestor of the ten thousand things
Like a deep mass of water it is (and nothing is visible on the surface),
yet Something seems to be there.
1 know not whose son it is. 38
It would seem to be antecedent even to the Emperor (i.e., God. 39
This 'nameless' Something, in its positive aspect, i.e., in its eternal
and everlasting creativeness, may be 'named' provisionally the
'way'. Lao-tzii himself admits that it is a provisional 'name'. But of
all the possible provisional 'names', the 'way' is the representative
one. Actually, Lao-tzii proposes several other 'names' for the Way,
and points out several typical 'attributes', each one of which refers
to this or that particular aspect of the Way .40
There is Something, formless but complete,41 born before Heaven
and Earth.
Silent and void, it stands alone,42 never changing. It goes round
everywhere, never stopping.43 It may be considered the Mother of
the whole world. 44
1 know not its 'name'. Forging a pseudonym, 1 call it the 'Way'.
Being forced to name it (further), 1 call it 'Great'.
Being 'Great' would imply 'Moving-forward' .45 'Moving-forward'
would imply 'Going-far' .46 And 'Going-far' would imply 'Turning-
back' .47
In the passage just quoted Lao-tzii suggests the possibility of the
Absolu te being named in various ways. At the same time, however,
he makes it clear that all these 'Names' or 'attributes' are provi-
sional, relative, and partial. For instance, he proposes to call the
Absolute the 'Great'. He is justified in doing so because the Abso-
The Way 389 lute or the Way is 'great'. But it is, we have to remember, 'great' only in a certain sense, from a particular standpoint. To look upon the Way as something 'great' represents but one particular point of view which we human beings take with regard to the Absolu te. This naturally implies that there is also a certain respect in which the Way should be called 'small'. It can be considered 'great'; it can be considered 'small'. Both 'names' are right, but neither of them can do full justice to its reality. In this respect, the Way is comparable to a water plant adrift, turning this way or that. lt has no fixity. Having no fixity, it accepts any 'name', but no 'name' can represent it perfectly. The great Way is like a thing drifting on the water. It goes every- where, left and right. The ten thousand things owe their existence toit. And yet it does not boast (of its own creative activity). It accomplishes its work, yet makes no daim. It dothes and nourishes the ten thousand things, yet never domineers over them. Being absolutely free of desire, it may be called 'Small'. The ten tho-usand things go back toit, yet it makes no daim to being their Mas ter. In this respect, it may also be called 'Great' .48 This difficulty which we inevitably encounter in attempting to give a proper 'name' to the Absolute is due not only to the fact that it is essentially 'nameless' but also to the fact that the Absolute is nota 'thing' in the sense in which we usually understand the term 'thing'. The descriptive power of human language is tragically limited. The moment we linguistically designate a state of affairs, whether metaphysical or empirical, by a noun, it becomes reified, that is, it turns into a 'substance' in our representation. We have earlier referred to the Absolute as Something; but 'Something' is in our imagination some substance, however mysterious it may be. And exactly the same is true of such 'names' as 'Mother', 'Way', etc., or even 'Nothing'. The Absolute which we designate by these 'names', however, is nota 'substance'. And it should not be understood as a 'substance'. This is the reason - or at least one of the main reasons -why Lao-tzii emphasizes so much that all the 'names' he proposes are nothing but makeshifts. Whatever 'name' he may use in referring to the Absolute, we should try not to 'reify' it in understanding what he says about it. For as a 'thing' in the sense of a 'substance', the Absolute is 'nothing'. How cana thing be a 'substance' when it is absolutely 'formless', 'invisible', 'inaudible', 'intangible', and 'taste- less' ?49 The Absolu te is 'Something' only in the sense of an Act, or the act of Existence itself. Scholastically we may express the concep- tion by saying that the Absolu te is Actus Purus.
390
lt is Actus Purus in
the sense that it is pre-eminently 'actual', and also in the sense that it
exists as the very act of existing and making 'things' exist. The
following words of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu makes this point clear.
Lao-tzu says:
He who goes through the world, holding in hand the great Image,50
wherever he may go will meet with no harm. 51 Safe, tranquil and calm
he will always remain.
Beautiful music and delicious food will make wayfarers stop. The
Way, on the contrary, uttered in words is insipid and ftavorless.
One looks at it, and finds it unworthy to be seen.
One listens to it, and finds it unworthy to be heard.
Yet when one uses it, one finds it inexhaustible. 52
The loudest sound is hardly audible.
The greatest Image has no form.
The Way is hidden and has no name. And yet it is the Way alone that
really excels in bestowing help and bringing things to completion. 53
And Chuang-tzu:
The Way does have a reality and its evidence. 54 But (this does not
imply that it) does something intentionally. Nor does it possess any
(tangible) form. Soit may be transmitted (from heart to heart among
the 'true men'), but cannot be received (as in the case of a thing
having an external form). It may be intuited, but cannot be seen.
It is self-sufficient. It has its own root in itself.
It existed even before Heaven and Earth existed. It has unmistakably
existed from ancient times. 55
It is the thing that confers spirituality upon the Spirits. And it is the
thing that makes the Heavenly Emperor (i.e., God) divine.
It produces Heaven. It produces Earth.
It exists even above the highest point of the sky. And yet it is not
'high' .56 It exists even beneath the six directions. 57 And yet it is not
'deep'.
It was born before Heaven and Earth. And yet it is not 'ancient'. It is
older than the oldest (historical) time. And yet it is not 'old' .58
Thus Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzii agree with each other in asserting
that the Way is actus. lt goes without saying that actus exists. But it
does not existas a 'substance'. lt should not be 'reified'. In order not
to reify it, we have to intuit it. For we cannot possibly imagine,
represent, or conceive the Absolute without turning it into a kind of
'substance'. Metaphysical or ecstatic intuition is the only possible
means by which we can approach it without doing serious harm toits
image. But an intuition of this sortis open only to those who have
experienced to the utmost limit what Chuang-tzu calls 'sitting in
oblivion'.
391
clear that the Way has two opposite aspects, one positive and the
other negative.
The negative side is comparable with the metaphysical Darkness of Ibn 'Arabi.
In the world-view of the latter too, the Absolute (/:taqq) in itself, i.e., in its absoluteness, is absolutely invisible, inaudible and ungraspable as any 'form' whatsoever.
It is an absolute Transcendent, and as such it is 'Nothing' in relation to
human cognition. But, as we remember, the Absolute in the metaphysical intuition of the Arab sage is 'Nothing', not because it is 'nothing' in the purely negative sense, but rather because it is too fully existent - rather, it is Existence itself. Likewise, it is Darkness not because it is deprived of light, but rather because it is too full of light, too luminous - rather, it is the Light itself.
Exactly the same holds true of the Way as Lao-tzu intuits it. The
Way is not dark, but it seems dark because it is too luminous and
bright. He says: A 'way' which is (too) bright seems dark. 59
The Way in itself, that is, from the point of view of the Way itself, is
bright. But since 'it is too profound to be known by man' 60 it is, from
the point of view of man, dark. The Way is 'Nothing' in this sense.
This negative aspect, however, does not exhaust the reality of the
Absolute. If it did, there would be no world, no creatures. In the
thought of Ibn 'Arabi, the Absolute by its own unfathomable Will
cornes down from the stage of abysmal Darkness or 'nothingness' to
that of self-manifestation. The Absolute, although it is in itself a
Mystery having nothing to do with any other thing, and a completely
self-sufficient Reality - has another, positive aspect in which it is
turned toward the world. And in this positive aspect, the Absolute
con tains ail things in the form of Names and Attributes. In the same
way, the Way of Lao-tzii too, although it is in itself Something
'nameless', a Darkness which transcends all things, is the 'Named'
and the 'Mother of the ten thousand things'. Far from being Non-
Being, it is, in this respect, Being in the fullest sense.
The Nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. The Named is
the Mother of ten thousand things. 61
This passage can be translated also as follows:
The term 'Non-Being' could be applied to the beginning of Heaven
and Earth. The term 'Being' could be applied to the Mother of ten
thousand things.392
Whichever translation we may choose, the result cornes to exactly
the same thing. For in the metaphysical system of Lao-tzii, the
'Nameless' is, as we have already seen, synonymous with 'Non-
Being', while the 'Named' is the same as 'Being'.
What is more important to notice is that metaphysically the
Nameless or Non-Being represents a higher - or more fondamental
- stage than the Named or Being within the structure of the Abso-
lute itself. Just as in Ibn 'Arabi even the highest 'self-manifestion'
(tajalli) is a stage lower than the absolute Essence (dhat) of the
Absolute, soin Lao-tzü Being represents a secondary metaphysical
stage with regard to the absoluteness of the Absolute.
The ten thousand things under Heaven are born out of Being (yu),
and Being is born out of Non-Being (wu). 62
If we put these two passages side by side with each other, we
understand that in Lao-tzü's conception the Absolute in its ultimate
metaphysical stage is the Nameless and Non-Being, while at the first
stage of the emergence of the world it becomes the Named and
Being. The expression: 'the beginning of Heaven and Earth', which
Lao-tzü uses in reference to the Nameless, would seem to suggest
that he is here considering the Absolute in terms of a temporal
order. And we must admit that only from such a point of view can
we properly talk about the 'creation' or 'production' of the world.
The temporal expression, however, does not do full justice to the
reality of the matter. For, as in the case of the successive stages of
Divine self-manifestation in Ibn' Arabi's metaphysics, the 'begin-
ning' here in question is not properly speaking a temporal concept.
It simply refers to that aspect of the Absolu te in which it embraces in
itself 'the myriad things under Heaven' in the state of potentia.
Otherwise expressed,. the Absolu te qua the myriad things in the
state of metaphysical concealment is the Beginning. The Beginning
in this sense is the same as Non-Being. We would make the meaning
of the word 'Beginning' more understandable if we translate it as
the 'first principle' or the Urgrund of Being.
The concept of 'production', or 'coming-into-being' of ail exist-
ent things, is also non-temporal. In our temporal representation,
the 'coming-into-being' is a process, the initial stage of which is
Non-Being and the last stage of which is Being. Metaphysically,
however, there can be no temporal development in the Absolute.
The Absolute, for Lao-tzü, is both Non-Being and Being, the
Nameless and the Named at the same time.
Lao-tzü describes the relationship between Non-Being and
Being in the following way.
In its state of eternal (or absolute) Non-Being one would see the
mysterious reality of the Way. In its state of eternal Being one would
see the determinations of the Way.393
These two are ultimately one and the same. But once externalized,
they assume different names (i.e., 'Non-Being' and 'Being'). In (the
original state of) 'sameness', (the Way) is called the Mystery. The
Mystery of Mysteries it really is! And it is the Gateway of myriad
Wonders. 63
The Non-Being (or Nameless) in which the mysterious Reality
(miao )64 is to be observed would correspond to the state of the
Absolute (IJ,aqq), in the conception of Ibn' Arabi, before it actually
begins to work in a creative way. And the Being (or Named) in
which the Way manifests itself in infinite 'determinations' (chiao )65
would find its counterpart, in Ibn' Arabï's thought, in the state of the
Absolute when its creative activity spreads itself, as the Breath of
the Merciful, being 'determined' in an infinite number of things.
It is remarkable that in this passage Lao-tzü goes beyond even the
distinction between Being and Non-Being. Non-Being is surely the
ultimate metaphysical principle, the most fondamental source of
Being. It is the Way, just as Being also is the Way. And yet, sin ce it is
here conceptually opposed to 'Being', it cannot be the last thing.
The basic opposition itself must be transcended. And Lao-tzü sees
beyond the opposition of Being and Non-Being Something abso-
lutely ineffable which he symbolically calls hsüan.66 The word origi-
nally means 'black' with a mixture of redness, a very appropriate
term for something absolutely 'invisible', an unfathomable Mystery
('black'), but revealing itself, at a certain stage, as being pregnant
with the ten thousand things ('red') in their state of potentiality. In
this Mystery of Mysteries Lao-tzü sees the Absolute in a state in
which even Being and Non-Being are not yet distinguished from
each other, an ultimate metaphysical state in which 'these two are
one and the same thing'.
The Absolu te or the Way, in so far as it is the Mystery of
Mysteries, would seem to have nothing to do with the phenomenal
world. But, as we have just observed, in the utter darkness of this
great Mystery ('black'), we already notice a faint foreboding ('red')
of the appearance of phenomenal things. And the Mystery of Mys-
teries is at the same time said to be the 'Gateway of myriad Won-
ders'. In the following chapter we shall be concerned with the
process by which the ten thousand things stream forth out of this
Gateway.
Notes
l. XIV.
2. •,XL.
394 Sufism and Taoism
3. See Chapter IV.
4.
5. lei, m.
6. See above, Chapter VI.
7. II, p. 79.
8.
9. Tao Tê Ching, XXXII. The word ch'ang here is synonymous with !X (chên)
meaning 'true' or' real'. For a similar use of the word, see XVI, XXVIII, Lli, LV. The
original meaning of the wordch'ang is 'constant' or'(eternally) unalterable'. Han Fei
Tzti ( in his chapter on the lnterpretation of Lao-tzu says: 'Those
things that ftourish first but later decay cannot be called ch'ang. Those things only
deserve to be called ch'ang which came into being together with the separation of
Heaven and Earth and which will neither die nor decay even when Heaven and Earth
will be dispersed into nothing. That which is really ch'ang never changes.' Thech'ang
is, in brief, the true reality which remains for ever unalterable.
10. XIV.
11. XLI.
12. Note again the use of the word ch' ang in the sense of' real', 'eternal', 'unalter-
able' or 'absolu te'.
13. 1.
14. Confucian Analects, I, 2.
15, Confucius addresses himself to his disciple Master Tsêng.
16. Analects, IV, 15.
17. ibid., XIV, 4.
18. See VIII, 13; XIV, 1.
19. ibid., XIV, 30.
20. ibid., IV, 8.
21. p'u meaning 'uncarved block'. The uncarved block from which ail kinds of
vessels are made is still 'nameless'. Only when it is carved into vessels does it acquire
various 'names'.
22. Tao Tê Ching, XXXII. 'Being eut out' (chih $1J) is a symbolic expression for the
'nameless' Way becoming 'determined' into myriad things.
23. ibid., XVIII.
24. ibid., XXXVIII.
1
1
The Way
25. -;fi.
26. xil!!.
27. op. cit., 1.
28. See p. 99.
29. Chuang-tzu, II, p. 83.
30. ibid., II, p. 83.
31. ( =•) meaning 'dim and figureless'.
395
32. The three aspects represent sense perception in general. The Way is beyond the
reach of sense perception so that at the ultimate limit of the latter the Way only
appears as an unfathomable and imperceptible One. Everything supposedly percept-
ible is 'merged into' it; that is to say, it has absolutely no articulation.
33. Tao Tê Ching, XIV.
34. ibid., XL.
35. i.e., a metaphysical state in which Being and Non-Being are indistinguishable
from each other.
36. In this passage Lao-tzti is trying to describe the absolute One which is both
Non-Being and Being at the same time. The two aspects are in fact indistinguishable
from one another. But if we concentrate our attention upon the positive side, the
Way appears first as a vague and obscure Image of Something, then as a pure Reality
which is eternally creative. In this aspect and at this stage the Way has an eternal
Name: yu or Existence.
37. op. cit., XXI.
38. 'Nobody knows who is the father of the Absolute.' That is to say, the Way has no
'cause' for its existence; it is its own cause.
39. op. cit., IV.
40. op. cit., XXV.
41. hun ch'êng imfilt.
42. tu li ll.îz:, 'standing alone', that is 'self-sufficient', an expression corresponding to
the Arabie term ghanî.
43. tai W;-( ={tl). See fliUf 1927, ad foc.: l'iJ.{!imûnPHftl&JJJ,
5lttUJllf.,\ FT-IWJJ, tif. r:;r:W;-.1 JitT-ll:. w rmrr.n âmfiltJ.
44. xr, 'all-under-Heaven'. Ma Hsü Lun proposes to read: x:l.1l!,
'Heaven and Earth', which is most probably right. The reading is based on an old
edition (VBll!Jê of the Sung Dynasty. lt accords with the expres-
sion: 'born before Heaven and Earth' which is found in the first sentence of the
present passage.
il1 I
I'
1
396 Sufism and Taoism
45. 'Moving-forward' means that the working of the' Great' permeates Heaven and
Earth without being obstructed.
46. i.e., the working of the 'forward-mover' goes to the extremity of the world of
Being.
47. 'Turning-back' means returning to the original point of departure, so that the
metaphysical movement of the Way forms a big universal circle. And being circular,
it never cornes to an end.
48. op. cit., XXXIV.
49. ibid., XXXV.
50. ta hsiang (if&!J=iftJ). For the expression ta hsiang in the sense of 'great
Image', see the next quotation from the Tao Tê Ching. Compare also XXI which has
been quoted above (p. 106), where Lao-tzu uses the word hsiang '(a faint and
shadowy) Image (of Something beyond)' in reference to the first self-manifestation
of the Absolute.
51. See Chuang-tzu, 1, pp. 30-31: 'Nothing can harm this man. Even ifftood waters
reach the sky, he will never be drowned. Even if in a burning heat metals and stones
begin to ftow and the earth and mountains are burned down, he atone will never feel
hot.'
52. Tao Tê Ching, XXXV.
53. ibid., XLI.
54. l;Km:ftfilffi{âJ, The Way possesses a reality as actus, and it presents unmistak-
able evidence of its existence in the effects it produces.
55. We have already seen above how Chuang-tzu solves the problem of the Begin-
ning of the Way. The statement: 'lt has unmistakably existed from ancient times'
should not tempt us into imagining that Chuang-tzu recognizes a 'beginning-point' in
'ancient times' or 'eternity'. lt is merely a figure of speech. lt is significant in this
connection that Chuang-tzu, a few paragraphs down in the same chapter, calls the
Way i shih {li/1{1) meaning literally 'likening to a beginning'. The Way is so called
because it is something to be 'likened to a thing having a beginning', or more exactly,
something which looks as if it had a beginning, though in reality it has none.
56. 'High' is, as we have seen, a relative concept which cannot be applied to the
Absolute.
57. The 'six directions' means the whole universe.
58. Chuang-tzu, VI, p. 247.
59. Tao Tê Ching, XLI.
60. ibid., XV.
61. ibid., 1.
The Way 397
62. ibid., XL. See also XLI quoted above, which reads: The Way in its absolute
reality has no' name'. lt is (comparable to) uncarved wood. Only when it is eut out are
there 'names'.
63. ibid., 1.
64. !& , meaning something unfathomably profound and mysterious.
65. i5Jli, literally meaning a' fortress in a frontier district'; and by extension a' border'
or'limit'.
66. :z:.
===
崔明淑
·
2부 제 7장 道 The Way
-장자는 “도”문제의 인식론적 측면을,
노자는 절대자를 경험에서 나오는 무언가를 제시하려 했다.
-장자는 사람이 절대자를 향해 상승하고 하나가 된 형이상적 경험을 그려내려 하고
마음의 하강 운동 즉 절대적으로 순수히 하나에서 본질적 다성으로 귀환하는 데에도 관심을 가짐. 존재론 체계가 완전한 인식론 체계로 융합되어 있어 주관적 기술인지 객관적 기술인지 알기 어렵다 (예: 座忘）
-노자는 1 절대자(道）라는 것은 무엇인가 2 성인은 ”도“의 비전에 근거해 어떻게 행동해야 해야 할 것을 기대받고 있는지에 관심을 가짐.
갑자기 당돌하게 “도”를 말하고 있음.
장자가 없었으면 어떤 경험에 기초한 것인지 알 수 없음.
노자는 절대자는 언어화할 수 없는데 왜 그런지 설명이 없음.
도는 名이 없다, 형태가 없다, 생각으로 그려 볼 수 없다, 볼 수 없다, 들을 수 없다, 아무것도 없다.
-그런데 장자는 언어화도 추론도 불가한 도가 언어화 해버리면 많은 개념 중의 하나로 転化 하는 것을 의식했음. 사람들은 正誤의 구별이 있다고 하는데 안티 테제인 정오의 구별이 없다는 것과 로고스(말씀)가 같다고 함. 절대자와 망아 상태에서 존재론적으로 하나가 되어 혼돈화를 표현.
座忘-망아 황홀 상태-처음부터 사물은 존재하지 않았다.(知의 궁극의 한계)
有始他者、有未始有始他者・・・무언가라는 세계의 처음의 시작이라는 개념은 상대적.(처음의 처음, 처음의 처음의 처음)개념상의 과정에 끝은 없다. 결과 처음이 없다는 개념을 얻을 수 있음. 처음이 없다는 개념도 상대적임. 이성이 정립한 것, 논리적 추론의 파악을 넘은 개념.
-장자의 道(절대자)는 등화작용이라는 형이상의 상태에서 모든 대립과 모순을 등화시킨다. 이단계는 최소가 최대이고 순간이 영원임. 절대적 일성을 논리적으로 어떻게 파악하는가하는 것이 우리의 문제.
-절대자의 성질을 추론해도 추론이 성립되지 않는다고 주장. 논리적 사고를 멈추고 직관적 절대지로 망아상태인채 머물라고 충고. 그렇게 함으로서만 절대적 하나와 직접 접촉하는 걸 기대할 수 있기 때문. 지의 최고 차위는 추론에 의해 절대로 알 수 없는 무언가 속에 움직이지 않은 채 머믈러 있는 것.
- 장자가 낸 결론이 노자의 형이상적 출발점.(노자는 자신의 형이상 체계의 기저에 있는 논리적 인식론적 과정을 새삼 설명하지 않는다. )
그는 道은 名이 없다고 말하는데 공자의 인의지라는 이름을 가리키며 암암리에 비판.
-공자의 道는 仁 같은 덕이다. 道는 윤리적으로 행동할 때의 근본원리를 의미.
(아침에 도를 들으면 저녁에 죽어도 좋다가 그 증거.
우주론적인 측면은 없음)
노자는 보통 사람들이 道라고 하는 것은 道가 아니다고 함.
노자는 이름이 없는 “도”가 스스로를 한정시켜가는 과정에서 여러 “이름”을 띤다고 한다.
노자와 공자의 名에 대한 차이는 노자는 세상의 모든 것이 상대적이다는 테제에서 볼 수 있듯이 상대적이라고 하는데 공자는 名 뒤의 배후에 그에 대응하는 객관적 항상적 실재가 있다는 입장을 취함.
중요한 徳(諸名：仁義礼智信）을 노자는 그런 것은 타락의 조짐, 절대자로부터 사람이 떨어져 나간 것이라고….(失徳而後仁 失仁而後義・・・） 절대자가 이름을 띠는 것은 존재가 있음. 有는 창조활동의 원리자로서 절대자이다.
-장자는 道의 개념 파악을 다른 방법으로 함.
“도라는 말로 말하는 것은 진짜 도는 아니다.”(同昭而不道）
사고나 지각으로 파악을 초월한다.
도는 절대적 초월자.
도덕경에도 “보려 해서 볼 수 있는 것도, 들으려 해서 들을 수 있는 것도 …한줄기 실처럼 이어지지만 이름도 없다..
모습 없는 모습이라 형용할까. 상없는 상이라고 할까,,, 어리벙벙하다고 해야 할까, 황홀이라고 해야 할까.. 뒤에 서도 뒤가 안 보인다“
( 視之不見 名曰夷, 聽之不聞 名曰希, 搏之不得 名曰微. 此三者 不可致詰. 故 混而爲一 其上不皦 其下不昧. 繩繩不可名 復歸於無物, 是謂無狀之狀. 無物之象, 是謂惚恍. 迎之不見其首 隨之不見其後.執古之道 以御今之有 能知古始, 是謂道紀.）
이것은 인간의 인식을 넘어 있기 때문이다.
도라고 하기 이전의 알라라고 하기 이전의 ”이름이 없는“것.
이름이 없는 것의 적극적인 측면, 영원히, 창조적으로 움직이는 것에 잠정적으로 “도”라고 붙일 수 있는데 그것이 잠시“이름”에 불과한 것을 노자도 인정.
名의 후보가 되는 것 중에서 道가 대표적 名이다.
도는 수초처럼 이리저리 떠다니는 것에 비유할 수 있다.
도는 어떤 고정성을 띠지 않아 어떤 이름으로도 받아들일 수 있고 어떤 이름으로도 완전히 도를 말할 수 없다. (도덕경 34장)
母、道、無 등의 이름으로 표시되는 절대자는 실체가 아니다.
-커다란 이마주를 꼭 손에 잡고 여기저기 편력하는 어디에 가도 어떠 장해를 만나도 그 자는 편안하고 조용하며 온화한 채이다. …장자
-노자와 장자는 도를 Actus purus (순수 작용-순수 현실태로서의 신)로 보는 데에 일치한다.
형이상의 직관, 망아 상태의 직관이야말로 도의 이마주를 손상시키지 않고 우리가 그것에 어프로치 할 수 있는 유일한 방법. 이런 유의 직관은 장자가 座忘이라고 부르는 무언가를 극한까지 경험한 자만에게 열린다.
-노자의 도도 이름이 없는 무언가, 모든 것을 초월한 “어둠‘(이븐 아라비도 절대자는 빛 자체. 너무 밝게 빛나 어둠으로 보인다)인데 이름이 붙여져 있는 것, 만물의 어머니이다.
이 측면에서 보면 “무언가가 아니다”와 멀리 떨어져 ”무언가이다“(無名天地之始 有名万物之母）
-天下万物生於有 有生於無
무언가가 아닌 이름이 없는 것에서 신비적 실재를 보는데, 이븐 아라비의 창조적으로 움직이기 시작하기 전의 하크(절대자)에 대응하는 것이다.
한편 무언가이다는 道가 무한 확정 작용을 통해 스스로를 드러내는 창조적 활동이 스스로를 자비로운 자의 숨결로 확산되어 무수한 수의 사물로 확정돼 있는 절대자의 상태에 상당할 것이다.
-노자가 무언가이다와 무언가가 아니다는 둘 다 도이지만 둘은 대립적이어서 결정적으로 무언가이지 못한다.
노자는 둘을 초월한 무언가를 본다. 그것은 노자가 상징적으로 玄이라고 한다.
이 말은 원래 붉음이 섞인 검정을 말한다.
절대적 불가시의 신비는 검정이지만 어떤 상태에서 붉음을 가능태로 품고 스스로를 드러낸다.
현은 그런 무언가를 가리키는데 어울리는 단어이다.
이 신비속의 신비에서 노자는 무언가이다와 아니다의 미분화된 상태에서 궁극의 형이상학적 상태의 절대자를 본다.
이 신비의 깊은 어둠(검정) 속에 나타난 사물들 사상들이 모습을 드러낼 조짐(붉음)이 보인다.
신비속의 신비는 동시에 무수의 신기함이 나오는 문이라고 말할 수 있다.
다음 장은 이 문에서 만물이 뿜어져 나오는 과정을 설명하겠다.
