SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
VI Against Essentialism
Toward the end of the preceding chapter I pointed out the fact that
in the Chuang-tzu, the stages of the 'sitting in oblivion' are traced in
two opposite directions: ascending and descending. The first con-
sists in starting from the lowest stage and going up stage by stage
toward the ultimate and highest one. A typical example of this kind
of description has just been given.
The second, the descending course, is the reverse of the first. It
starts from the highest stage and cornes down to the lowest. As a
proper introduction to the main topic of the present chapter, we
shall begin by giving in translation a passage• from the Chuang-tzu
in which the stages are described in this way. In this passage,
Chuang-tzu, instead of speaking of 'sitting in oblivion', <livides
human knowledge of Reality into four classes which constitute
among themselves a chain of successive degrees. These degrees are
the epistemological stages corresponding to the ontological stages
which Lao-tzu in his Tao Tê Ching distinguishes in the process by
which all things in the world of Being issue forth continuously from
the absolute Unity of the Way.
What is the ultimate limit of Knowledge? It is the stage represented
by the view that nothing has ever existed from the very beginning.
This is the furthest li mit (of Knowledge), to which nothing more can
be added.
As we saw in the previous chapter, this is the ultimate stage to which
man attains at the end of 'sitting in oblivion'. Here the man is so
completely unified with the Way and so perfectly identified with the
absolu te Reality, that the Way or the Reality is not even felt to be
such. This is the stage of Void and Nothing-ness in the sense that has
been explained above.
About this stage Kuo Hsiang says: 2 'The man at this stage has
completely forgotten Heaven and Earth, has put all existent things
out of his mind. In the outside, he does not perceive the existence of
the whole universe; in the inside, he has lost all consciousness of his
own existence. Being limitlessly "void", he is obstructed by nothing.
T
Against Essentialism 355
He goes on changing as the things themselves go on changing, and
there is nothing to which he does not correspond.'
Next is the stage at which there is the consciousness of 'things' being
existent. But (in this consciousness) 'boundaries' between them have
never existed from the very beginning.
At this second stage, the man becomes conscious of the Way which
contains all things in a state of pure potentiality. The Way will
diversify itself at the following stage into 'ten thousand things'. But
here there are no 'boundaries' yet between them. The 'things' are
still an undivided Whole composed of a limitless number of poten-
tially heterogeneous elements. They are still an even plane, a
Chaos, where things have not yet received 'essential' distinctions.
Next (i.e., the third) is the stage at which 'boundaries' are recognized
( among the things). However, there is as yet absolutely no distinction
made between 'right' and 'wrong'.
Here the Chaos begins to disclose the definite forms of the things
which it contains within itself. All things show their own demarca-
tions, and each thing clearly marks its own 'boundary' by which it
distinguishes itself from others. This is the stage of pure 'essences'.
The original Unity <livides itself, and is diversified into Multiplicity,
and the Absolute manifests itself as numberless 'relative' existents.
As a result, the Reality which has previously been beyond the ken of
human cognition cornes for the first time into the limits of its grasp.
And yet, even at this stage, the distinction is not made between
'right' and 'wrong'. This indicates that at this third stage we are still
in touch with the Way in its original integrity, although, to be sure,
the contact with the Way is already indirect, because it is made
through the veil of the 'essences'. We may recall the myth of the
Emperor Chaos (Hun Tun), which we read in Chapter II, who <lied
as soon as his friends bored holes in his 'featureless' visage. In the
light of the present passage, there is in this myth an oversim-
plification. For Chaos does not 'die' simply by 'holes' (i.e., 'essen-
tial' distinctions) being made in it. The true death of the Chaos
occurs at the next stage.
As soon as, however, 'right' and 'wrong' make their clear appear-
ance, the Way becomes damaged. And as soon as the Way is thus
damaged, Love is born.
With the appearance of 'right' and 'wrong', Chaos loses its natural
vitality and becomes fossilized as 'essential forms' stiff and inflex-
ible as corpses. As Wang Hsien Ch'ien says: 'When "right" and
"wrong" are recognized, the "chaotic" integrity of the Way is
immediately injured' .3
356 Sufism and Taoism
And no sooner this happens than Love is born. The birth of Love
symbolizes the activity of such human emotions as love and hate,
like and dislike. This is the last and lowest stage of Knowledge.
Of course there is another aspect to the problem. The Way is here
said to die with the appearance of human emotions like love and ha te.
But this is so only when one considers thè situation in refence to the
original 'chaotic' integrity, i.e., the original 'undifferentiation' of
the Absolute. Otherwise, everything is a particular manifestation
of the Way itself. And as such even a fossilized 'essence' is nothing
other than a 'self-determination' of the Absolute. This aspect of the
matter, however, is irrelevant to our present topic.
As I remarked before several times - and it is particularly important
to recall it once again for the right understanding of the philosophi-
cal position Chuang-tzü takes against 'essentialism' - the descrip-
tion just given of the four stages is not an abstract theory; it is a
description of an experiential fact. It is a phenomenological descrip-
tion of the experience of ekstasis. In the passage which has just been
quoted, the process of ekstasis is described in a descending order.
That is to say, Chuang-tzü describes the 'return' of consciousness.
He starts from the highest stage of contemplation at which the
'oblivion' has been completed, and goes down step by step until he
reaches the stage of normal consciousness.
What is to be kept in mind in connection with this problem is that
the whole process of ekstasis, whether considered in a descending or
ascending order, is composed of two aspects which exactly corres-
pond to each other. One is the subjective aspect, which we might
call 'epistemological', and the other is the objective, or 'metaphysi-
cal' aspect.
Take, for example, the highest stage. On its subjective side, it is,
as I have just said, a stage at which the contemplative in actual
contemplation bas consummated the ekstasis. He is now in com-
plete 'oblivion' of everything, the world and himself included. This
would naturally mean that he is in the state of Nothing-ness,
because he is conscious of nothing, because there is no 'conscious-
ness'. And this subjective Nothing-ness corresponds to the objec-
tive Nothing-ness of the Way. For the Way, too, is in its original
absolute purity Nothing-ness, a -state 'where nothing bas ever
existed from the very beginning', that is, a metaphysical state where
nothing whatsoever is distinguishable as..;in existent.
From such astate of perfect Void, subjective and objective, the
contemplative starts coming back toward the daily state of mind.
There begins to stir something in himself. Consciousness awakes in
him to find 'things' existent. The consciousness, however, is still at
this stage a dim and subdued light. It is not yet the glaring brilliance
Against Essentialism 357
of full daylight. It is the crepuscule of consciousness, a twilight in
which all things are only indistinctly and confusedly observable.
Such a description of the situation might strike one as a negative
evaluation. The state of consciousness at this stage is described as
being a dim light merely because the description is made from the
point of view of the' normal' consciousness of an ordinary mind. For
the latter, the light of the ecstatic consciousness looks dim and
indistinct because it does not distinguish and discriminate things
from each other. In reality, however, su ch indistinctiveness is, for a
Chuang-tzü, Reality as it really is.
And since the real state of Reality is itself 'dim' and 'indistinct',
the consciousness must of necessity be correspondingly 'dim', and
'indistinct'. Only with such a dim light can Reality in its integrity be
illumined. The glaring and dazzling light of normal consciousness
does cast a strong spotlight on this or that particular object. But by
concentrating the light on the particular object, it makes all the rest
of the world sink into darkness. Referring to this point Chuang-tzü
remarks: 4
Therefore, the diffused and indistinct Light is what is aimed at by the
'sacred man'. He does not, however, use this Light (in order to
illumine particular things), but lends it to all things universally. This is
what is called 'illumination'.
The phrase here translated as 'diffused and indistinct Light' 5 means
a kind of light of which one cannot be certain as to whether it exists
or not; a light which, instead of being concentrated upon this or that
particular object, is 'diffused' and pervades all. It is not a glaring,
dazzling light. It is a dim, indistinct light, neither bright nor dark. In
reality, however, it is the Universal Light which illumines every-
thing as it really is.
Chuang-tzü calls this kind of spiritual Light also the 'shaded
Light' (pao kuang). 6 The word pao means 'to cover', 'to conceal
within'. As Ch' êng Hsüan Ying explains: '(The mind of the "sacred
man") forgets (to distinguish between things) and yet illumines all.
And as it illumines them, it forgets them. That is why it shades and
obscures its light, yet becomes ever more brilliant.'
The corresponding 'objective' side of this stage is ontologically the
most important of all stages for Chuang-tzü. For this precisely is the
stage of 'chaotification'. In the subdued and diffused Light of the
consciousness of the contemplative, the 'ten thousand things' loom
up as if through the mist. They appear dim and indistinct because
there are no 'boundaries', i.e., definite 'essences' or 'quiddities', to
differentiate them one from the other.
I say that this is ontologically the most important stage for
358 Sufism and Taoism
Chuang-tzü, because the higher stage, that of the Absolute in its
absoluteness, is properly speaking beyond all thinking and reason-
ing,7 while the lower one is the stage of 'essences' or 'quiddities',
where all things appear to the consciousness distinctly separated
from each other through their 'boundaries'. And Chuang-tzü fights
against the view that this latter stage does represent Reality as it
really is.
Thus we see that the stage of 'chaotification', at which all things
are observed in their original 'undifferentiation', that is, beyond and
apart from their 'essences', constitutes the pivotai point of Chuang-
tzü's metaphysics. We might call this metaphysics 'existentialism',
taking the word 'existence' (existentia) in the same sense as wujüd in
the metaphysical system of Ibn 'Arabi.
From the very outset 1 have been emphasizing implicitly as well as
explicitly the 'existentialist' attitude of Chuang-tzii. 1 think 1 have
made it sufficiently clear by now that its real meaning becomes
understandable only when we relate it to the second stage (from
above) of the 'sitting in oblivion'. It is a philosophical position based
on the vision of Chaos. In this respect it stands opposed to the
position taken by 'essentialism' which is based on a vision of Reality
peculiar to, and typical of the epistemological-ontological stage
where the 'ten thousand things' appear, each with a clearly marked
'boundary' of its own. In terms of the process of 'sitting in oblivion' -
the Return process from the complete ekstasis back toward the
'normal' world of corn mon sense - the' essentialist' position belongs
to the third stage explained above.
Thus in the framework of such an experience, 'existentialism'
represents a vision of Reality which is a stage higher than 'essential-
ism'. It is important to note that the latter is regarded as the third
stage in the Return process of the ecstatic contemplation only as
long as it is considered within this particular framework. In reality,
however, the contemplative, when he cornes down to this stage and
becomes conscious of the things with clear 'boundaries', he is actu-
ally already on a par with any ordinary man who knows nothing
about the experience of ekstasis. His view of Being at this particular
level is nothing unusual from the standpoint of common sense. On
the contrary, it is a view of Being corn mon to, and shared by, all men
who are at all endowed with a 'sound' and 'normal' mind. 'Essential-
ism', in other words, is the typical ontology of common sense.
This statement, however, should not be understood as implying
that, for a Chuang-tzii or a Lao-tzü, 'essentialism' is a wrong and
mistaken view of Being, and that it distorts and disfigures the real
structure of things. For 'essentialism' does represent and corres-
pond to a certain definite stage in the evolving process of the
'/1,
Against Essentialism 359
Absolute itself. Besides, on its subjective side, 'essentialism' consti-
tutes, as we have just seen, the third stage of the 'sitting in oblivion'
in the Return process of the contemplation. And as such, there is
nothing wrong about it.
The serious problem arises only when the common sense refuses
to see any difference in terms of ontological 'levels' between 'exis-
tentialism' and 'essentialism' and begins to assert that the latter is
the right view of Being. It is only then that a Chuang-tzü rises in an
open revoit against 'essentialism'. Since, however, it is of the very
nature of common sense to view the things in an 'essentialist' way,
Chuang-tzii and Lao-tzii constantly find themselves forced to mani-
fest the attitude of revoit against such a view. Their philosophy, in
this respect, may properly be characterized as a revoit against the
'tyranny' of Reason.
Chuang-tzii sees a typical exemplification of the 'essentialist'
position in the moral philosophy of Confucius. Confucian philos-
ophy is, in Chuang-tzu's view, nothing but an ethical elaboration of
ontological 'essentialism'. The so-called cardinal virtues of Con-
fucius like 'humaneness', 'justice', etc., are but so many products of
the normal activity of the Mind which naturally tends to see every-
where things rigidly determined by their own 'essences'. The Real-
ity in its absoluteness has no such 'boundaries'. But a Confucius
establishes distinctions where there are none, and fabricates out of
them rigid, inflexible ethical categories by which he intends to
regulate human behavior.
Stop! Stop approaching men with (your teaching of) virtues!
Dangerous, dangerous, indeed, is (what you are doing), marking off
the ground and running within the boundaries! 8
Ontological 'essentialism' is dangerous because as soon as we take
up such an attitude, we are doomed to lose our natural ftexibility of
mind and consequently lose sight of the absolute 'undifferentiation'
which is the real source and basis of all existent things. 'Essential-
ism' will not remain in the sphere of ontology; it naturally grows into
a categorization of values which, once established, begins to domi-
na te our entire behavioral system.
Chuang-tzu in the following passage 9 gives with keen sarcasm a
symbolic picture of those people who are vainly engaged in ani-
mated discussions over the 'values' of things, considering them as
something absolute, something unalterably determined.
The spring has dried up, and the fish are ail on the g{.Ound. (In the
agonies of death) they are spewing each other with moist breath and
trying to moisten each other with froth and foam. It would be far
better for them if they could forget each other in a wide river or sea.
Likewide, the people praise a 'great man' and condemn a 'bad man'.
360 Sufism and Taoism
But it would be much better if they could forget both ('good' and
'bad') together and be freely 'transmuted' with the Way itself.
'Essentialism' would seem to be a philosophical position which is
most suitable to the human mind. At any rate the Reason and the
common sense which is. but a vulgarized form of Reason naturally
tend to take an 'essentialist' position. And the latter is that upon
which our ordinary thinking depends.
The gist of the 'essentialist' view may be concisely presented as a
thesis that ail things are endowed with 'essences' or 'quiddities',
each thing being clearly marked off by its 'essence' from ail others.
A table is a table, for example, and it can never be a chair. The book
which is upon the table is 'essentially' a book, and it is 'essentially'
different from, or other than the table. There are 'ten thousand',
i.e., innumerable, things in the world. But there is no confusion
among them, for they are separated from one another by clear-cut
lines of demarcation or 'boundaries' which are supplied by their
'essences'.
As 1 have said before, this 'essentialist' ontology in itself is
nothing to be rejected. It gives a true picture of things, if it is put in
the right place, that is to say, as long as one understands it to be the
picture of things at a certain ontological level. Chuang-tzu takes no
exception to this. The point he wants to make is that 'essentialism'
should not be regarded as the one and ultimate view of things. And
he does rise in revoit against it the moment one begins to make such
a daim. For he is convinced that it is not the ultimate view of things.
From the standpoint of a man who bas seen things in a different
light in his ecstatic vision, there is ontologically a stage at which the
'essences' become annihilated. This would simply mean for a
Chuang-tzu that there are 'from the very beginning' -as he says-no
such things as 'essences' in the sense of bard and solid ontological
cores of things. In any event, the so-called 'essences' lose, in this
view, their solidity, and become liquefied. 'Dream' and 'reality'
become confused in the vast, limitless world of 'undifferentiation'.
There is no longer here any marked distinction to be drawn between
a table and a chair, between a table and a book. Everything is itself,
and yet, at the same time, all other things. There being no 'essences',
all things interpenetrate each other and transform themselves into
one another endlessly. Ali things are 'one' -in a dynamic way. We
might properly compare this view with Ibn' Arabï's concept of the
Unity of Existence, wa}Jdah al-wujüd. And we know already that
this is what Chuang-tzu calls Chaos.
Ibn 'Arabi could speak of the Unity of Existence because he
looked at the world of Multiplicity, the illimitable existents, as so
many self-determinations or self-manifestations of the Absolute
Against Essentialism 361
which is itself the absolute Unity. In a similarway, Chuang-tzu came
to the idea of the 'chaotification' of things because he looked at
them from the point of view of the Way, which is also the absolu te
metaphysical Unity.
In contemporary Western philosophy, special emphasis bas often
been laid upon the 'tyrannical' power of language, the great forma-
tive influence exercised by linguistic patterns on the molding of our
thought. The influence of language is particularly visible in the
formation of the 'essentialist' view of things.
From the point of view of an absolute 'existentialism', there are
no watertight compartments in the world of Being. Man, however,
'articulates', that is, cuts up - arbitrarily, in most cases - this origi-
nally undivided whole into a number of segments. Then he gives a
particular name to each of these segments. A segment of Reality,
thus given a name, becomes crystallized into a 'thing'. The name
gives it an 'essential' fixity, and th us ensures it from disintegration.
For better or for worse, such is in fact the power of language.
Language, in other words, positively supports 'essentialism'.
Once a 'thing' is established with a definite name, man is easily led
into thinking that the thing is essentially that and nothing else. If a
thing is namedA, it acquiresA-ness, that is, the 'essence' of beingA.
And since it is A 'by essence', it can never be other than A. One
could hardly imagine un der such conditions the thing' s being B,
Cor D. The thing thus becomes something unalterably fixed and
determined.
This fondamental relation between 'essentialism' and language is
noticed by Chuang-tzu. He notices it because he looks at the matter
from the point of view of the absolute Way in which, as we have
repeatedly pointed out, there is not even a trace of 'essential'
de termina tians.
The Way has absolutely no 'boundaries'. Nor has Ianguage (which
produces and expresses such 'boundaries') absolutely any perma-
nency.10
But (when the correspondence becomes established between the
two) there arise real ( essential) 'boundaries'. 11
Referring to the sophistic logic of the school of Kung Sun Lung,
Chuang-tzu points out that this kind of logic is a product of linguistic
'essentialism' .12
Rather than trying to prove by means of 'finger' that a 'finger' is nota
'finger', why not prove by means of 'non-finger' that a 'finger' is nota
'finger'?
The meaning of this passage will become clear only when we under-
stand it against the background of the sophistic logic which was
362 Sufism and Taoism
prevalent in Chuang-tzu's time. The argument of the Sophists of the
school of Kung Sun Lung may be summarized as follows. The
concept of 'finger' comprises within itself the concepts of the thumb,
the index, the middle, the third, and the little fingers. Actually there
is no 'finger' other than these five. That is to say, the 'finger' must
necessarily be one of these five. And yet, if we take up any one of
them, the 'index finger' for example, we find it negating and exclud-
ing all the rest, because the 'index finger' is not any of the other four
fingers. Thus it cornes about that the 'index finger' which is a real
'finger', is not a 'finger', because its concept applies exclusively to
itself, not to the others.
Against this Chuang-tzii remarks that such an argument is simply
a shallow and superficial piece of sophistry. We do not gain anything
even if we prove in this manner that a 'finger' is not a 'finger'.
However, there is a certain respect in which a 'finger' is properly to
be considered a 'non-finger'. And this latter view - although
superficially it gives the same conclusion; namely, that a 'finger' is
nota 'finger' - is nota piece of sophistry. It is a view standing on the
'chaotification' of things, and it goes to the very heart of the struc-
ture of Reality.
The term 'non-finger' which appears in the second half of the
above-quoted statement is not intended to be the logical contradic-
tory of 'finger'. It means something like a 'super-finger', or an
ontological state in which a 'finger' is no longer a 'finger'. 'Why not
prove by means of "non-finger"?', Chuang-tzu asks. He means to
say: instead of wasting time in trying to prove by logical tricks - as
Kung Sun Lung and his followers are doing - that 'a finger is nota
finger' on the very level of 'a finger is a finger', we had better
transcend at a stroke the ontological level of 'essential' distinctions
and see with the eye of 'illumination' the reality of the situation.
For, in fact, on the level of 'chaotification', a 'finger' is no longer
necessarily a 'finger', it is no longer so solidly fixed that it can never
be anything other than itself. All things are one, and we have no
reason to stick obstina tel y to the idea that sin ce A is A, it cannot be
anything other than A. Thus the statement: 'a "finger" is not a
"finger" ' is found to be true; but, this time, on a higher level than
the one on which the Sophists are trying hard to establish the same
statement.
Chuang-tzu gives one more example, that of a 'horse' not being
a 'horse', which was also a notorious topic of the Sophists of his
time.
Rather than trying to prove by means of' horse' that a' horse' is not a
'horse', why not prove by means of 'non-horse' that a 'horse' is nota
'horse'?
Against Essentialism 363
The structure of the argument is exactly the same as the previous
one. The Sophists daim that a 'horse' is nota 'horse' on the basis of
the following observation. The concept of 'horse', they say, must be
applicable to horses of different colors like 'white horse', 'yellow
horse', 'black horse' etc., and no 'horse' which is actually existent is
colorless. Every actually existent horse is either white, or black, or
yellow, etc. And there can be no exception. Let us take a 'white
horse' as an example. The 'white horse', being white, naturally
excludes all horses of other colors. The concept cannot apply to a
'black horse', for instance, or a 'yellow horse'. And the same is true
of any horse of any color. Since, however, the concept of 'horse'
must be such that it applies to all horses of all colors, we must
conclude that no actually existent horse is a 'horse'.
The Sophists in this way establish, or daim to establish, that a
'horse' is nota 'horse'. Against this, Chuang-tzu takes the position
that, even admitting that they are right in this argument, the conclu-
sion which they reach thereby is devoid of real significance. As in
the case of the preceding argument about 'finger', Chuang-tzu
points out that there is a respect in which exactly the same conclu-
sion can be maintained, but with an entirely new meaning. Here
again the term 'non-horse' refers to the metaphysical level at which
all 'essential' distinctions are eliminated through 'chaotification'.
Once we put ourselves on such a level, we perceive that a 'finger'
is a 'finger' and yet, at the same time, is nota 'finger', that a' horse' is
a 'horse' and yet is not a 'horse'. And the same holds true of
everything else. We can even go to the extreme of asserting that the
whole world is a 'finger', and the whole world is a 'horse'.
Heaven and Earth (i.e., the whole universe) are a 'finger'. Ali things
are a 'horse'.
Heaven and Earth with 'ten thousand things' that exist therein are
but an 'undifferentiated' whole, in which all things ontologically
interpenetrate one another. In such astate, a 'horse' is not unalter-
ably a 'horse'; it can be else. Looking at this particular
situation from the reverse side we could say that all things are
entitled to be regarded as a 'horse' or 'finger', or indeed, anything
else.
From such a standpoint, Chuang-tzu goes on to criticize the
'essentialist' position in the following manner. 13
(Instead of looking at the matter from the viewpoint of 'non-finger'
and 'non-horse', people <livide up the originally undifferentiated
whole of Being into various categories which, again, they classify into
'right' and 'not-right') and insist on the 'right' being unalterably
'right' and the 'not-right' being unalterably 'not-right'. (The distinc-
tion, however, between 'right' and 'not-right', far from being
iJ 364 Sufism and Taoism
something 'essential', i.e., something based on the very nature of
Being, is but a matter of custom and habit, just as) a road is formed
(where there was none before) merely by people walking constantly
upon it. Likewise, the 'things' are formed by their being designated
by this or that particular name (simply by virtue of a social custom or
convention). 14
(And once the 'things' are thus crystallized, they are considered as
either 'right' or 'not-right', 'so' or 'not-so'). On what ground does
man judge a thing to be 'so?' He judges to be 'so' whatever ( other
people or 'society' by custom) judge to be 'so'. On what ground does
man judge a thing to be 'not-so'? He is merely judging it to be 'not-so'
because (other people) judge it (by custom) to be 'not-so'.
(However, from the viewpoint of 'illumination', the reality of things
can only be grasped when one puts oneself on a higher level of
non-discriminating acceptance which transcends all such relative
distinctions. And viewed from such a place) there is a certain respect
in which everything without exception is to be regarded as being 'so'
(i.e., affirmable and acceptable), and everything without exception is
to be regarded as 'right'. There is nothing that is not 'so'. There is
nothing that is not 'right'. Whether a stalk of grain or a great pillar,
whether a Ieper or a (beautiful lady like) Hsi Shih, however strange,
bizarre, ugly and grotesque things may be, the Way makes them all
one.
The Reality perceived on such a level is called by Chuang-tzii
Heavenly-Equalization, 15 or Walking-Two-Ways (at the same
time). 16 The former term means a 'natural' metaphysical state in
which all things, without being disturbed by the distinctions be-
tween 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', etc., repose in their
original harmony or equality. And since, as Ch' êng Hsüan Ying
observes, the 'sacred man' always sees things in such a state of
Equality, his mind too reposes in an etemal peace, being never
disturbed by the distinctions and differences among things. The
second term, literally meaning 'going both ways', refers to the same
metaphysical state in which 'good' and 'bad', or 'right' and 'wrong',
are both equally acceptable; a state, in other words, in which all
opposites and contradictories become acceptable in the ultimate
Unity of coincidentia oppositorum.
It is highly signifi.cant that the second chapter of the Chuang-tzu is
entitled Ch'i Wu Lun, 11 i.e., 'Discourse on Equalizing (All) Things'.
The chapter is so entitled because it is mainly concemed with the
view according to which all things are 'equal', that is, ultimately
One. And since, according to this view, such 'equalization' of things
is justifiable only at the lev el of 'existence', not at that of 'essences', 1
consider this theory rightly comparable with Ibn' Arabï's Unity of
Existence.
Against Essentialism 365
'Essentialism', if it is to be a philosophical view of existents, must be
able to explain the whole of the world of Being. And it does intend -
and does daim, implicitly at least - to be comprehensive enough to
caver all things. But how, in actual fact, could it be so when its very
nature consists in isolating single ontological units, making them
'essentially' independent of one another? If one makes such an
approach to things, and yet wants to comprehend all of them, one is
forced to have recourse to the method of enumeration and addition.
But, however far one may go in this direction, one will never reach
the ultimate end. For no matter how many independent units one
may pile up one upon another, one will be left with an infi.nite
number of things still untouched and uncomprehended.
Thus 'essentialism' is by its very nature utterly incapable of
grasping the reality of the world of Being in its infinite complexity
and in its limitless development and transformation. In order to
comprehend the whole of the world of Being as it really is and as it
really works, we must, Chuang-tzii maintains, abandon the level of
'essential' distinctions, and, by unifying ourselves with 'existence'
itself which pervades all things, look at all things in their original
state of 'chaotification' and 'undifferentiation'. Instead of formulat-
ing this thesis in such a theoretical form, Chuang-tzii explains his
point through the concrete example of Chao Wên, a famous lute player.
That a thing can become 'perfect' and 'defective' (at the same time)
may aptly be exemplified by what happens when Chao Wên plays the
lute. That a thing can remain 'not-perfect' and 'not-defective' may
aptly be exemplified by what happens when Chao Wên does not play
the lute. 18
The meaning of the passage may be explicated as follows. Chao
Wên is a musician of genius. When he plays the lute, the particular
piece of music which he plays becomes actualized in a perfect form.
This is what is referred to by the expression: 'that a thing can
become perf ect'.
However, by the very fact that Chao Wên plays a particular piece
of music and actualizes it in a perfect form, the infinite number of
other pieces which are left behind become darkened and nullified.
This is what is meaJ?.t by the thing being 'defective' at the same time.
Thus a perfect actualization of one single piece of music is at the
same time the negation and nullification of all other possibilities.
Only when Chao Wên does not actually play, are we in a position to
enjoy all the pieces of music which he is capable of actualizing. And
only in such a form is his music 'perfect' in an absolute sense, that is,
in a sense in which it transcends the very distinction between 'per-
fection' and 'imperfection' (or 'defectiveness').
366 Sufism and Taoism
The 'equalization' of all things thus brings us into the very core of
the reality of Being. If, however, one sticks to this idea and discards
completely the phenomenal aspect of things, one falls into an
equally inexcusable error. For, after all, the infi.nitely various and
variegated phenomena are also an aspect of Reality. Certainly, the
music of Chao Wên is 'perfect' in an absolute sense, only when he
does not play his lute. But it is also true that the possibilities that lie
hidden in his ability are destined to be 'perfected' in a relative sense
and will never cease to work up their way from possibility to
actuality even to the detriment of one another. Both forms of
'perfection', absolute and relative, fundamental and phenomenal,
are essential to the reality of his music.
Likewise, in the ontological structure of things, both the original
'undifferentiation' and the phenomenal 'differentiation', or Unity
and Multiplicity, are real. If Chuang-tzu emphasizes so much the
former aspect, it is chietly because at the common sense level of
human experience the phenomenal aspect is so prominent and so
dominant that it is commonly considered the reality.
The root of Being is absolutely one. But it does not repose forever
in its original U nity. On the contrary, it belongs to the very nature of
Being that it never ceases to manifest itself in infinite forms. It goes
on diversifying itself into 'ten thousand things' which, again, go on
endlessly transforming themselves into one another. This is the
phenomenal aspect of Being. But by going through this very process
of ontological 'diversification' and 'differentiation' all things are
returning to their ultimate metaphysical source. The process of
'descent' and the process of 'ascent' are paradoxically one and the
same thing. The relation between Unity and Multiplicity must be
understood in this way. Just as Unity is not a static 'oneness' of
death and rigidity, but is a never-ceasing dynamic process of a
coincidentia oppositorum, Multiplicity is not a static 'differentia-
tion' of things that are rigidly fixed once for all, but is a constant life
process which con tains within itself the ontological tension of Unity
in Multiplicity.
If looked at from the viewpoint of 'differentiation', (nothing is the
sa me as anything else), and even li ver and gall (a typical example of
two things closely resembling each other), are as different and as far
apart as the country of Ch'u and the country of Yüeh.
However, looked at from the viewpoint of 'sameness', ail things are
one and the same. 19
Unfortunately, the eyes of ordinary men are dazzled by the pheno-
menal scintillations of Multiplicity and cannot perceive the pro-
found Unity that underlies the whole. They cannot, as Chuang-tzu
says, 'unify the objects of their knowledge' .20
,,.
Against Essentialism 367
The only right attitude we can take in such a situation is to 'let our
minds be at ease in the harmony of spiritual perfection' .21 The word
'harmony' (ho) here refers, as Ch'êng Hsüan Ying remarks, to the
fact that when we 'unify the objects of our knowledge' and 'chaotify'
all things, our mind enjoys a perfect peace, being no longer dis-
turbed by 'what our ears and eyes approve'; it refers also to the fact
that ail things at this level are peacefully together, there being no
'essential' oppositions between them. We must not be blind to the
phenomenal aspect of Being, Chuang-tzu says; but it is wrong for us
to remain confined in the same phenomenal world and observe the
Multiplicity of things exclusively from the phenomenal point of
view. We must transcend such a stage, go up to a higher level, and
looking down from that height observe the kaleidoscope of the
ever-shifting Multiplicity of things. Only when we do this, are we in
a position to know the reality of Being.
The dynamic relation between the original absolute Unity and the
phenomenal Multiplicity, that is to say, the process by which the
Absolute, stepping out of its metaphysical darkness, diversifies
itself into a myriad of things of the phenomenal world is something
which, as 1 have repeatedly pointed out discloses its reality only to a
mind in the state of ekstasis, or as Chuang-tzu calls it, 'sitting in
oblivion'. Particularly difficult to understand for a non-ecstatic
mind is the ontological status of 'essences'.
As the Absolute <livides itself through a process of ontological
evolvement into 'ten thousand things', each one of the latter does
seem to acquire a particular 'essence'. For, after all, what is the
meaning of talking about 'ten thousand things', if they are not
distinguishable from each other? How could they be distinguishable
from each other if they were devoid of 'essences'? When we recog-
nize A as being different and distinguishable from B, are we not at
the same time recognizing A as being endowed with an 'essence'
which is different from that of B?
From the viewpoint of Chuang-tzu, however, the things being
endowed with 'essences' and their being 'essentially' distinguish-
able from one another is simply a matter of appearance. Each of the
'ten thousand things' appears to have its own 'essence' unalterably
fixed once for ail. In fact, it merely appears or seems to have such an
'essence'.
But our picture inevitably becomes complicated by the fact that
thoseseeming 'essences' are not sheer nothing, either. They are not
mere products of hallucination. They do have an ontological status
peculiar to them. They are not ontologically groundless. The abso-
lute all-pervading 'existence' can take on an infinite variety of forms
because there is a kind of ontological basis for them. We cannot
368 Sujism and Taoism
certainly say that the 'essences' exist in the ordinary sense of the
world. But we cannot say either that they are absolutely non-
existent.
lt is at this point that Ibn' Arabi, as we remember, introduced the
concept of 'permanent archetypes' (a'yiin thiibitah) into his
metaphysical system. And the concept did work admirably well. For
Ibn 'Arabi succeeded thereby in philosophically settling the
difficulty raised by this paradoxical situation. The 'permanent
archetypes' are those metaphysical principles which can 'be said
neither to exist nor not to exist', and through which the all-
pervading divine Existence becomes inftected into a myriad of
'things'. But for him, too, it was not basically a philosophical ques-
tion; it was rather a matter of an ecstatic vision.
Chuang-tzu has no such philosophical device. Instead, he resorts
directly, as he often does, to a symbolic presentation of the content
of his metaphysical vision. As a result, we now have what is unanim-
ously acknowledged to be one of the most masterly descriptions of
Wind in Chinese literature. lt is not, of course, a mere literary piece
of work. lt is a philosophical symbol which Chuang-tzu uses for the
purpose of expressing verbally what is verbally inexpressible.
Furthermore, the whole passage is philosophically of supreme
importance, because, as we shall see immediately, it constitutes
what we might call a Taoist 'proof of the existence of God'.
The beginning part of the passage is purely symbolic. lts real
philosophical meaning may best be understood if, in reading it, one
keeps in mind that the Cosmic Wind symbolizes 'existence', or the
Absolu te in its all-pervading actus, and that the hollow 'openings' of
the trees symbolize 'essences'.
The Great Earth eructates; and the eructation is called Wind.22 As
long as the eructation does not actually occur, nothing is observable.
But once it does occur, ail the hollows of the trees raise ringing
shouts.
Listen! Do you not hear the trailing sound of the wind as it cornes
blowing from afar? The trees in the mountain forests begin to rustle,
stir, and sway, and then ail the hollows and holes of huge trees
measuring a hundred arms' lengths around begin to give forth differ-
ent sounds.
There are holes like noses, like mouths, like ears; some are (square)
like crosspieces upon pillars; some are (round) as cups, some are like
mortars. Sorne are like deep ponds; some are like shallow basins.
(The sounds they emit are accordingly various): some roar like
torrents dashing against the rocks; some hiss like flying arrows; some
growl, some gasp, some shout, some moan. Sorne sounds are deep
and muffled, some sounds are sad and mournful.
As the first wind goes·away with the light trailing sound, there cornes
the following one with a deep rumbling sound. To a gentle wind the
Against Essentialism 369
hollows answer with faint sounds. To a stormy wind they answer with
loud sounds.
However, once the raging gale has passed on, ail these hollows and
holes are empty and soundless. Y ou see only the boughs swaying
silently, and the tender twigs gently moving. 23
As 1 said before, this is not intended to be a mere literary description
of wind. Chuang-tzu's real intention is disclosed by what follows this
passage. The philosophical intention of Chuang-tzu may be formu-
lated in the following way. The 'hollows' and 'holes' of the trees
imagine that they are independently existent, that they emit these
sounds. They fail to notice that they emit these sounds only by the
active working of the Wind upon them. lt is, in reality, the Wind that
makes the 'hollows' resound.
Not that the 'hollows' do not exist at all. They are surely there.
But they are actualized only by the positive activity of the Wind. As
is evident, this is a very apt description of the ontological status of
'essences', which was mentioned earlier.
It is also evident that the Wind here is not an ordinary physical
wind. It is the Cosmic Wind corresponding exactly to Ibn' Arabi's
concept of sarayiin al-wujüd, lit. the 'spreading of Existence'. It is
interesting and, indeed, extremely significant, that both Ibn 'Arabi
and Chuang-tzu conceive of 'existence' as something moving -
'blowing', 'ftowing', or 'spreading'. For both of them, 'existence' is
actus.
(One and the same Wind) blows on ten thousand things in different
ways, and makes each hollow produce its own peculiar sound, so that
each imagines that its own self produces that particular sound. But
who, in reality, is the one who makes (the hollows) produce various
sounds?24
Who is it? In order to give the right answer to this crucial question,
we must remark first of all that the Cosmic Wind has no sound of its
own. The 'sound of Heaven' (t'ien lai) is soundless. What is audible
to our physical ears are only the ten thousand sounds produced by
the hollows of the trees. They are not the sound of Heaven; they are
but the 'sound of Earth' (ti lai). But, Chuang-tzu insists, we must
hear the soundless sound of Heaven behind each of the ten
thousand sounds of Earth. Rather, we must realize that in hearing
the sound of Earth we are really hearing nothing other than the
sound of Heaven. The infinitely various sounds which the hollows
emit are no other than the one, absolute sound of Heaven.
It is to be remarked that exactly the same question: 'Who is it?' can
and must be asked of what actually is observable in the 'interior'
region of our own being. Just as the 'hollows' of the trees emit all
370 Sufism and Taoism
kinds of sounds as the Wind blows upon them, the 'interior' of man
is in a state of constant turmoil. Who causes all this commotion?
That is the central question. Are the minds of men themselves
responsible for it? Or are the stimuli coming from external things its
causes? No, Chuang-tzu answers. But let us first see how he
describes the inner 'hollows' interminably producing noises and
sounds.
Even while asleep, the souls of men are (tormented) by coming into
touch with variousthings (in dreams). When they wake up, the bodily
functions begin to be active; they get entangled with external things,
and all kinds of thoughts and emotions are aroused in the m. And this
induces them to use their mind every day in quarreling with others.
Sorne minds are idle and vacant. Sorne minds are abstruse. Sorne are
scrupulous. Those who have petty fears are nervous; those who are
assailed by great fears are simply stupefied.
The way they argue about the rightness and wrongness of matters
reminds us of those who shoot arrows and missiles (i.e., they are
extremely quick and active). They endeavor to secure a victory (in
disputes) as if they had sworn before the gods. The way they go on
consuming (their mental energy) day by day reminds us of (the leaves
of trees) fading away in autumn and winter.
They have gone so far into delusion and perlexity that it is no longer
possible for them to be brought back. The way they fall deeper and
deeper into infatuation as they grow older reminds us of minds firmly
sealed with seals (of cupidity). Thus, when their minds draw near to
death, there is no means of bringing them back to youthful bright-
ness.
lndeed (the movements of human minds are infinitely various as are
the sounds produced by the hollows of the trees): joy, anger, sadness,
and delight! Sometimes they worry about the future; sometimes they
vainly bewail the irretrievable past. Sometimes fickle, sometimes
obstinate. Sometimes ftattering, sometimes self-conceited. Some-
times candid, sometimes affected.
They remind us of all kinds of sounds emerging from the empty holes
(of a flute), or mushrooms coming up out of warm dampness. Day
and night, these change's never cease to replace one another before
our eyes.
Where do these (incessant changes) sprout from? No one knows their
origin. It is impossible to know, absolutely impossible! It is an unde-
niable fact, however, that morning and evening these things are
actually happening (in ourselves). Yea, precisely the fact that they
are happening (in ourselves) means that we are alive! 25
After describing in this way the endless psychological events which
are actually taking place in our minds day and night, Chuang-tzu
proceeds to an interpretation of this bewildering phenomenon.
What is the real and ultimate cause of all this? He asks himself
whether the ultimate cause of this psychological turmoil is our 'ego'.
l < J
; Against Essentialism 371
To say that the 'ego' is the cause of all this is nothing other than
recognizing - indirectly - that the stimuli coming from the external
world are the causes of our psychological movement. He describes
this relation between the external stimuli and the changing states of
our minds in terms of a relation between 'that' (i.e., the objects) and
'ego'.
Without 'that', there would be no 'ego'. Without 'ego', 'that' would
have nothing to lay hold of. (Thus our 'ego', i.e., the whole of our
psychological phenomena, would seem to owe its existence to exter-
nal stimuli). This view appears to corne close to the truth. And yet it
still leaves the question unanswered as to what really does make ( our
minds) move as they do. 26
Chuang-tzu admits that external stimuli do excite commotions in
our minds. Such a view, however, does notreach the very core of the
matter. Those who imagine that this view is capable offully account-
ing for the psychological changes that are taking place in ourselves
are comparable to the 'holes' and 'hollows' of the trees that naively
imagine that they themselves are producing the sounds they pro-
duce, without paying attention to the activity of the Wind.
Beyond the stimuli coming from the external objects, there is
Something which is the ultimate cause, Something which induces
external objects to act upon our minds and thereby cause the latter
to become agitated. Beyond and behind all these phenomena there
seems to be a real Agent who moves and controls all movements
and all events in our minds, just as there is a Wind behind ail the
sounds produced by the 'holes'. However, just as the Wind is
invisible and impalpable, so is this Agent unknowable and unseen.
But just as we can feel the existence of the Wind - although it is
invisible - through its activity, we can feel the existence of the Agent
through His actus.
It would seem that there is some real Ruler. 21 It is impossible for us to
see Him in a concrete form. He is acting - there can be no doubt
about it; but we cannot see His form. He does show His activity, but
He has no sensible form. 28
It is philosophically very important that Chuang-tzu asserts that the
Absolute in its persona! aspect, i.e., as the absolute Agent, is only
accessible to our understanding as actus. The Absolu te in this aspect
is actus; it is nota 'thing'. Without having any sensible form, that is,
without being a 'thing', it never ceases to manifest its activity. We
can only follow its trace, everywhere, in everything. But we can
never see its form because it bas no form and because it is not a
'thing'. However, the human mind is by its own nature an 'essential-
ist'. It finds it extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible to
represent anything except in the form of a 'thing'. It cannot, except
372 Sufism and Taoism
in very rare cases, conceive of anything as Nothing. The conception
of the Absolute as Something which is Nothing is to an ordinary
mind simply an intolerable paradox, if not sheer nonsense.
In order to render this metaphysical paradox a bit more accept-
able, Chuang-tzu compares the situation with the complicated
functioning of the members and organs of the body, the whole
mechanism of which is governed and controlled by an invisible
'something' : the soul.
One hundred joints, nine openings, six entrails - these constitute a
human body. Now of all these, which one should we respect most
(i.e., which should we regard as the Ruler of the body)? Do you say
that you respect (as the Rulers) all of them equally? (No, that is
impossible). Th en, do you favor one of them as particularly your
own? (No, that again is impossible). But, if not (i.e., if neither all of
them nor any particular one of them is in a position to rule over the
body), is it the case that all of them are mere servants and maids?
(However, if they were ail servants and maids), how could the country
(i.e., the body) be kept in order? Oris it the case that they rule and
are ruled, occupying the positions of the Ruler and the subjects by
turns?
No, there does exist a real Ruler (who governs them all). And
whether or not man knows the concrete form of this Ruler, his reality
is never affected thereby; it neither increases nor decreases
thereby. 29
The true Ruler in this case is the soul whose concrete form is known
to no body. But of course this is here put forward as an image which
would clarify the relation between the Absolute and all events and
all phenomena in the world of Being. Just as the bodily organs and
members are under the domination of the invisible soul, all that
exists and happens in the world is under the dominion of the
unknown-unknowable Ruler.
As I pointed out earlier, it is highly significant that Chuang-tzu
here presents the 'true Ruler' of the world as actus. No one can see
the Absolute itself as 'something' existent, but no one can deny,
either, the presence of its actus. And that actus is philosophically
nothing other than Existence.
We have to notice also that the actus of the Absolute which, in the
earlier passage, was described as the Cosmic Wind, i.e., a cosmic
force, is here presented as something persona!- God. In the world-
view of Chuang-tzu, the Absolute or the Way has two different
aspects, cosmic and persona!. In its cosmic aspect the Absolute is
Nature, a vital energy of Being which pervades all and makes them_
exist, grow, decay, and ultimately brings them back to the original
source, while in its persona! aspect it is God, the Creator of Heaven
and Earth, the Lord of all things and events. As conceptions and
Against Essentialism 373
representations, the two are totally different from one another, but
in reality both point to exactly one and the same thing. The differ-
ence between Nature and God is merely a matter of points of view,
or the ways in which the human mind conceives of the Absolute
which is in itself wholly unknown and unknowable. To this ultimate
metaphysical mystery we shall try to corne doser in the following
chapter.
Notes
1. II, p. 74.
2. ibid., p. 75: f±,
ffiî#ŒrH!t!!.J.
3. ::t:Jt:?J, r
4. II, p. 75.
5.
6. II, p. 83 lî*tiili. OIJMffiîZ, :it3\:WAAJ, Il, p. 89.
7. Lao-tzu, however, does think and talk about this 'ineffable' Something. We shall
corne to this point in the following chapter.
8. Chuang-tzu IV, p. 183.
9. VI, p. 242.
10. i.e., the words which correspond to these 'boundaries' have no unalterable
semantic fixity.
11. Il, p. 83.
12. II, p. 66.
13. Il, pp. 69-70.
14. Note again how Chuang-tzu attributes 'essence'-forming power to language. A
thing which in its original state, is 'nameless', turns into something rigidly fixed and
unchangeable, once it is given a definite name.
15. t'ien chün p. 70. Ch'êng Hsüan Ying: 1 :kit-:J( = ::Ri!itt,
lflA., fi1t1'(HI\, p. 74.
16. liang hang ïifirr, p. 70.
17. This can also be understood as meaning 'Equalization of Various Views
on Being', i.e., the nullification of the opposition among various views on Being on
the level of absolute transcendence.
111'1,,11.1
111 :]
1 111'
11
1
1
374 Sufism and Taoism
18. II, p. 74.
19. V, p. 190.
20. V, p. 193. r lit. 'to unify what is known by the knowledge'.
21. V, p. 191 l:l8H .. Commenting upon this phrase Ch'êng Hsüan Ying
says: § 2.:§:, i\i(fjgiB'fiftîtz•, p. 192.
22. The issuing forth of the phenomenal things from the absolute One is here
compared to the great Earth belching forth the Wind. Note the remarkable similarity
of this mythopoeic image to that used by Ibn' Arabi when the latter tries to describe
the ontological inner tension of the Divine Names within the Absolute, which is so
acute that it cannot but be relieved by the Names 'bursting out'; see Pa'rt 1, pp.
125-126.
23. pp. 45-46.
24. Il, p. 50.
25. Il, p. 51.
26. Il, p. 55.
2 7. chên tsai,
28. Il, p. 55.
29. Il, pp. 55-56.
