SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
VIII Allah and the Lord
One of the cardinal elements of Ibn 'Arabï' s thought on God is
the theologico-ontological difference between Allâh and the Lord (rabb).
In the Chapter of Noah (Qoran, LXXI) to which reference was made before, Noah addressing himself to God
- uses the expression 'O my lord (rabb-i)' ,1
- he does not say 'O my God (ilâh-ï)'.
In this Ibn 'Arabï find a special meaning.
Noah said 'O my Lord', he did not say '0 my God'. This because
- the 'Lord' has a rigid fixity (thubüt),
- while 'God' (ilâh) is variable with the Names in such a way that
'He is every day in a new state' .2
This short passage contains the gist of Ibn' Arabï's thought
on the difference and relation between Allâh and the Lord.
It may be explicated as follows.
The Lord is the Absolute as manifested through a particular concrete Name,
while Allâh is the Absolute who never ceases to change and transform Himself from moment to moment according to the Names.
The Lord has a rigid 'fixity' in the sense that it is the Absolute in one particular aspect being bound and determined by one particular Name or Attribute suitable for the occasion.
Hence a very particular relation between the Lord and man;
namely, that man, whenever he prays to God and makes petition or supplication to Him, he must necessarily address himself to his Lord.
An ailing man prays to God not vaguely and generally but in the 'fixed' form
of the 'Healer' (shâfi).
Likewise, a sinner asking for Divine forgiveness supplicated the 'All-forgiving' (ghafûr). And he who wants something prays to the 'Giver' (mu'tï), 3 etc.
God under each of these and other similar Names is the Lord of the particular man who prays from a particular motive.
Hence al-Qàshàni's definition4 of the Lord:
the Lord is the Essence taken with a particular Attribute through which (the man who prays) obtains what he needs;
thus it is, of all the Divine Names, the most suitable one for the occasion which motivates the man when he addresses himself to God.
This is the reason why Noah, in the Qoranic verse in questions, says 'my Lord'. Lordship (rubübïyah) in this sense means the truly persona! relationship of each individual man with God.
[111]
It is to be remarked that this individual relationship is also of an ontological nature. In the Qoran (XIX, 55) it is related that
Isma'il (Ishmael) 'was approved by his Lord', that is,
his Lord was satisfied with Ishmael.
But if we understand the phrase 'his Lord' in the particular sense in which Ibn 'Arabi understands it, we must admit that not only Ishmael but every being is approved by his Lord.
As Ibn 'Arabï says: 5
Indeed, every being is approved by his Lord.
From the fact, however,
that every being is approved by his Lord it does not follow necessarily
that every being is approved by the Lord of another creature. [말장난?]
This is because every being has chosen a particular form of Lordship from
among all (the possible types of Lordship contained in the absolute
Lordship) and not from one single Lordship ( commonly shared by all).
Every being has been given out of the (infinitely variable) whole
only what particularly fits it, and that precisely is its Lord.
As al-Qàshànï says,6
'the Lord (i.e., its Lord) demands of every being only that which (naturally) appears in it, while the being, in its turn, because of its 'preparedness', does not demand of its Lord except those attributes and actions that its Lord causes to appear in it (naturally)'.
In other words, when the Absolute manifests itself in each individual being,
it is able to do so only through one particular Name because of the natural limitation set by the 'preparedness' of that particular being.
But this is exactly what is willed by the Absolute and what is desired by the recipient, there being no discordance between the two parties.
And this is what is meant by everything being approved by its own Lord.
It must be noticed that Ibn 'Arabï is no longer speaking of the personal relationship between a man and his Lord established by the act of prayer and supplication, but has clearly shifted his interest to the ontological aspect of the problem. And in fact, there is an ontological aspect to the personal relation between each individual being and his Lord.
In the phenomenon of 'prayer', from which Ibn 'Arabï has started,
each single Name has been regarded as representing a particular aspect of the Absolute.
But a Divine Name, in order to actualize, necessarily requires a particular being. A particular being in that capacity is a locus of the self-manifestation of that Name.
And in this context, each individual being, as a locus in which a particular Name is manifested, maintains with the Absolute the same individual relationship as in the 'prayer' context.
Only it maintains the same individual relationship, this time, on the
ontological level.
[112]
lt follows from this that each individual being or thing, at each particular moment, picks up only one out of many Names, and the Name chosen behaves as his or its Lord. Looking at the situation from the reverse side, we can express the same thing by saying that it never happens that the Absolute should manifest itself as it is in its original Oneness, i.e., the comprehensive unity of the Names, in any being.
Ibn' Arabi goes on to say: 7
No being can establish a particular Lord-servant relationship with the Absolute on the Ievel of Unity. This is why the true sages have denied the possibility of Divine self-manifestation (tajalli) on the level of Unity .... 8
The Absolute on the level of Oneness is a synthesis of all Names,
and as such, no one single being is able to contain it. Only the world
as an integral whole can actualize the Oneness of the Names and
offer an ontological counterpart toit. However, Ibn' Arabi seems to
admit one exceptional case. As al-Qâshâni says, the exception
arises in the case of the Perfect Man. Unlike ordinary men, the
Perfect Man actualizes and manifests not one single particular
Name but all the Names in their synthesis. An ordinary man is
approved by his particular Lord. The latter is his Lord; not the Lord
of other people. So that no ordinary man is in direct relation with
the absolute Lord (al-rabb al-mutfaq). The Perfect Man, on the
contrary, actualizes in himself all the attributes and actions of the
One who approves of him not as his Lord alone but as the absolute
Lord.
The expression, 'the absolute Lord', used by al-Qâshâni corres-
ponds to the Qoranic expression, 'the Lord of the worlds' (rabb
al-'alamin, and is equivalent to 'the Lord of all Lords' (rabb al-
arbàb) or Allàh. Thus the statement that, in normal cases, the
Names in their original synthesis can never be actualized in any
single being, amounts to the same thing as saying that Allàh as such
cannot be the Lord of any particular individual.
Know that the object designated by the Name Allah is unitary
(alJ,adiy) in regard to the Essence, and a synthesis (kull) in regard to
the Names. Every being is related to Allah only in the form of his
particular Lord; it is impossible for any being to be related to Allah
directly in the original form of synthesis ....
And blessed indeed is he who is approved by his Lord! But, properly
speaking, there is no one who is not approved by his Lord, because he
(i.e., every individual) is just the thing by which the Lordship of the
Lord subsists. Thus every individual being is approved by his Lord,
and every individual being is happy and blessed. 9
In the latter half of this passage an intimate reciprocal relationship is
affirmed between each individual being and his Lord.
[113]
lt goes without saying that every being depends essentially on his Lord for his existence. But the Lord also depends, in a certain sense, upon the receptive ability (qiibilïyah) 10 of the individual being of whom He is the Lord. The Lord can never be a Lord without there being someone to be 'lorded over' (marbüb). Ibn 'Arabi refers at this point to the following dictum left by Sahl al-Tustari, a famous Sufi-theologian of the ninth century. 11
'The Lordship has a secret, and that (secret) is thyself' - here (by saying thyself) Sahl is addressing himself to every individual being that exists in concrete reality - 'if it were nullified, 12 the Lordship itself would corne to naught'. Remark well that Sahl says if, which implies an impossibility of the actual occurrence of the event in question. In other words, this (secret) will never be nullified, and, consequently, the Lordship will never corne to naught. For there can be no existence for any being except by virtue of its Lord, but as a matter of fact every individual being is forever existent (if not in the physical world, at least in some of the non-physical dimensions of reality). Thus the Lordship will forever be existent.
As has been suggested in the preceding more than once, the 'Lord', in Ibn 'Arabi's thought, is considered on two different levels: (1) 'absolute' (mutlaq) and (2) 'relative' (i<J,àfiy). The Lord on the 'absolute' level is Alliih, while on the second level the Lord is the Lord of one particular being and is an actualized form of one particular Name. From the viewpoint of the concept itself of 'Lord' (rabb), the 'relative' is the proper case, the Lord in the 'absolute' sense being only an extremely exceptional case. This fact is explained by al-Qâshâni in the following way: 13
Rabb is properly a relative term and necessarily requires its object (marbüb, lit. 'the one who is Iorded over'). The wordrabb in Arabicis used in three senses: (1) 'possessor', e.g. rabb al-dar (the possessor of the house), rabb al-ghanam (the possessor of the cattle) etc., (2) 'master', e.g., rabb al-qawm (the master of the people), rabb al-'abid (the master of the slaves) etc., (3) 'one who brings up', e.g., rabb (the one who brings up the boy), rabb al-tifl (one who brings up the infant) etc.
The word rabb is not applicable in the non-relative sense except to the Lord of the whole universe. In this case we say al-rabb with a definite article (without mentioning the 'object' of Lordship). Thereby is meant Allah alone. And to Him belongs in an essential way the Lordship in the three meanings distinguished above, while to anybody other than Allah the Iordship belongs only accidentally. For 'other than Allah' is but a locus in which it (i.e., the Lordship belonging properly to Allah) is manifested.
Thus Lordship is an attribute properly belonging to one single thing (i.e., Allah) but appearing in many forms (as 'relative' Iordships). Everybody in whom it is manifested possesses an accidentai lordship in accordance with the degree to which he is given the power of free disposai which he may exercise over his possessions, slaves or children.
[114]
Since the attribute of Lordship differs from locus to locus in its
self-manifestation, there necessarily arise a number of degrees. Thus
he who has been given a stronger control ( over his possessions) than
others has naturally a higher lordship.
Thus we see that the 'Lord', whether 'absolute' or 'relative', essen-
tially requires an object over which to exercise the Lordship. The
rabb, in short, cannot subsist without marbüb. And this holds true
even when the Lord in question happens to be no other than God.
The only one who does not need anything other than himself is, as
we know, the Absolute in its absoluteness, i.e., the Divine Essence.
The Divine Names are essentially the same as the Named. And the
Named is (ultimately) no other than God. (But a difference cornes
into being because) the Names (unlike the Essence) do not cease to
require the realities which they themselves produce. And the realities
which the Names require are nothing other than the world. Thus
Divinity (ulühïyah, i.e., the Absolute's being God) requires the
object to which it appears as God (ma'lüh, lit. an object which is
'god-ed'), as Lordship requires its own object (marbub 'lord-ed').
Otherwise, i.e., apart from the world, it (i.e., Divinity or Lordship)
has no reality of its own.
What is absolutely free from any need of the world is solely the
Absolute qua Essence. The Lordship has no such property.
Thus Reality is reducible to two aspects: what is required by the
Lordship on the one hand, and, on the other, the complete indepen-
dence from the world which is rightly claimed by the Essence. But
(we may go a step further and reduce these two aspects to one,
because) in reality and in truth the Lordship is nothing other than the
Essence itself .14
We come to know in this way that
the 'Lord' is no other than the Essence (dhiit) considered as carrying various relations (nisab ).
We must not forget, however, that these relations are
no real entities subsisting in the Divine Essence.
They are simply so many
subjective points of view peculiar to the human mind
which cannot by nature approach the Divine Essence except through them.
Incidentally, we have seen, in the above-quoted passage,
Ibn' Arabi
making a distinction between Divinity (ulühiyah) and Lordship (rubübiyah ).
The Divinity represents, as al-Qàshànï says, 15 the 'Presence' or ontological plane of the Names, that is, of those Names that belong to the Absolute considered as God.
In this plane, the Absolute (qua God) is the object of veneration, praise, awe,
fear, prayer, and obedience on the part of the creatures.
[115]
The Lordship is the 'Presence of actions (afal)',
i.e., the plane of those Names that are specifically concerned with Divine actions in administering, sustaining, and controlling the affairs of the creatures.
===
Notes
1. LXXI, 5, 21, 26. 2. Fi14., p. 57/73. 3. Cf. Affifi, Fi14., Corn., p. 42. 4. p. 57. 5. Fu$., p. 95/91. 6. p. 95. 7. Fi14., p. 95/91-92.
8. In this passage Ibn 'Arabi uses the term 'Unity' (a}Jadiyah) in the sense of wa}Jidiyah. It goes without saying that there can be no exterior tajalli on the level of a}Jadiyah, because, as we have seen in the earlier contexts, a}Jadiyah is the absolute state of Essence (dhat) before it begins to split itself into the Names. The real intention of Ibn' Arabi in this passage, however, is to assert that even on the level of the Oneness (wa}Jidiyah) where the Absolute is 'God comprising and unifying all the Names into one' no individual being is able to be a locus of the self-manifestation of the Oneness in its integrity.
9. Fu$., pp. 93-94/90-91. 10. Qâshâni, p. 94. 11. Fi14., p. 94/90-91.
12. As Affifi (Corn., p. 87) says, the word zahara 'appear', 'be disclosed' here has a meaning diametrically opposed to the usual one; namely, that it must be understood in the meaning of zilla 'disappear' or 'cease to exist'. Many examples of this usage of the word can be adduced from ancient poetry.
13. pp. 262-263.
14. Fu$., p. 143/119.
15. pp. 143-144.
