SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
IX Ontological Mercy
The two preceding chapters will have made it clear that there is a
difference of ranks among the Divine Names, and that a higher
Name virtually contains in itself all the Names of lower ranks. If
such is the case, then it is natural for us to suppose that there must be
in this hierarchy the highest, i.e., the most comprehensive, Name
that contains all the rest of the Names. And in fact, according to Ibn
'Arabï, there actually is such a Name: 'Merciful' (Rahman). The
present chapter will be devoted to a detailed consideration of Ibn
'Arabi's thought conceming this highest Name, its nature and its
activity.
From the very beginning, the concept of Divine Mercy was a
dominant theme in Islamic thought. The Qoran emphasizes con-
stantly and everywhere the boundless Mercy of God shown toward
the creatures. The Mercy of God is indeed 'wide'; it covers every-
thing. Ibn 'Arabi, too, greatly emphasizes the boundless width of
Divine Mercy. 'Know that the Mercy of God extends to everything,
both in actual reality and possibility' .1
However, there is one important point at which bis understanding
of 'mercy' (ra}Jmah) differs totally from the ordinary common-
sense understanding of the term. In the ordinary understanding,
ra}Jmah denotes an essentially emotive attitude, the attitude of
compassion, kindly forbearance, pity, benevolence, etc. But, for Ibn
'Arabi, ra}Jmah is rather an ontological fact. For him, ra}Jmah is
primarily the act of making things exist, giving existence to them. It
is bestowal of existence, with, of course, an overtone of a subjective,
emotive attitude on the part of the one who does so.
God is by essence 'overftowing with bounteousness' (Jayya4
bi-al-jüd), that is, God is giving out existence limitlessly and end-
lessly to everything. As al-Qashani says, 'existence (wujüd) is the
first overflowing of the Mercy which is said to extend to every-
thing' .2
Such an understanding of ra}Jmah gives a very particular coloring
to the interpretation of the ethical nature of God which plays an
,
Ontological Mercy 117
important role in the Qoran and in Islam in general. This is best
illustrated by Ibn' Arabi's interpretation of the concept of Divine
'wrath'.
As is well known, the Qoran, while emphasizing that God is the
Merciful, stresses at the same time that He is also a God of Wrath, a
God of Vengeance. The God of the Qoran is God of justice. He
shows unlimited love and compassion toward the good and pious,
but that does not prevent Him from inflicting relentless punishment
and chastisement upon those who do wrong, those who refuse to
believe in Him and obey Him.
Ibn 'Arabï, too, admits God's wrath' (ghalf,ab). For him, how-
ever, ghalf,ab is not an ordinary emotion of anger. It is, like its
counterpart, ra}Jmah, something of an ontological nature.
Moreover, it is put in a subordinate position in relation to ra}Jmah,
for ghalf,ab itself is but an object of the boundless ra}Jmah of God.
The very existence of Wrath originates from the Mercy of God for the
Wrath. Thus His Mercy precedes His Wrath. 3
This statement would seem to need an explication. Here is what
al-Qashani says about it: 4
Mercy pertains essentially to the Absolute because the latter is by
essence 'Bounteous' (jawad) ... Wrath, however, is not of the
essence of the Absolu te. On the contrary, it is simply a negative
property that arises from the absence of receptivity on the part of
some of the things for a perfect manifestation of the eff ects of
existence and the various properties of existence.
The absence of receptivity in some of the things for Mercy entails the
non-appearance of Mercy (in those things), whether in this world or
the Hereafter. And the fact that Divine Mercy is prevented from
overftowing into a thing of this kind because of its non-receptivity is
called Wrath in relation to that particular thing ....
Thus it is patent that Mercy has precedence over Wrath with regard
to the Absolute, for Wrath is nothing but the actual non-receptivity
of the locus which is ( supposed to receive) Mercy in a perfect form.
We ordinarily imagine that what we call 'evil' (sharr) is something
positive, something positively existent. But 'evil' is in itself a pure
non-existence ('adam). It exists only in the purely negative sense
that a certain thing, when Divine Mercy works upon it, cannot by
nature receive and accept it as it should. In other words, 'evil' is the
negative situation of those things which cannot receive Mercy
( = existence) in its full and perfect form, and which, therefore,
cannot fully realize existence.
Apart from these things which constitute the objects of Divine
Wrath, or, more philosophically speaking, the things that properly
cannot have existence, all the remaining things which naturally have
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the proper receptivity for existence, demand of God existence. And
the Divine activity which arises in response to this demand is Mercy.
lt is natural, then, that Mercy should caver all things that can
possibly exist.
Every essence ('ayn, i.e., everything in its archetypal state) asks for
existence from God. Accordingly God's Mercy extends to, and cov-
ers, every essence. For God, by the very Mercy which He exercises
upon it, accepts (i.e., recognizes approvingly) the thing's (latent)
desire to exist ( even before the desire actually arises) and brings it
(i.e., the desire) out to existence. This is why we assert that the Mercy
of God extends to everything both in actual reality and possibility .5
Everything, already in its archetypal state, cherishes latently a
desire (raghbah) for actual existence. God's Mercy extends even to
this ontological desire while it is still in the state of mere possibility,
and brings it out into existence. The desire thus actualized consti-
tutes the 'preparedness' (isti'dàd) of the thing. The explication of
the above passage by al-Qâshâni is philosophically of great
importance.6
The permanent archetypes in their state of latency have only an
intelligible existence (as objects of God's Knowledge); by themselves
they have no actual existence. They are desirous of actual existence,
and are asking for it from God. When the archetypes are in such a
state, God's essential Mercy extends to every archetype by giving it a
capacity to receive an ontological Divine self-manifestation. This
receptivity, or the essential 'preparedness' for receiving existence, is
exactly the archetype's desire for actual existence.
Thus the very first effect of the essential Mercy upon an archetype
appears in the form of its natural aptitude for receiving existence.
This aptitude is called 'preparedness'. God exercises Mercy upon an
archetype, even before it has the 'preparedness' for existence, by
existentiating the 'preparedness' itself through the' most holy emana-
tion' (al-fay4 al-aqdas), i.e., the essential self-manifestation occur-
ring in the Unseen. Thus the 'preparedness' of an archetype is itself (a
result of) Divine Mercy upon it (i.e., the archetype), for previous to
that, the archetype properly speaking has no existence if only to ask
for its own 'preparedness'.
These words make it clear that the exercise of Divine Mercy is
nothing other than the process of the self-manifestation of the
Absolute, which has often been referred to in the preceding pages.
For Mercy is bestowal of existence, and, in Ibn' Arabï's conception,
the Absolute's bestowing existence upon the things of the world is
exactly the sa me as the Absolu te' s manifesting itself in these things.
In the passage just quoted, al-Qâshâni states that the first stage in
the appearance of Mercy is the giving of 'preparedness' for exist-
ence to things not yet actually existent. And he says this stage
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Ontological Mercy 119
corresponds to the 'most holy emanation' in the theory of Divine
self-manifestation. But this is somewhat misleading because it pre-
sents the whole matter in an extremely simplified form. We shall
have to reconsider in detail the process by which Divine Mercy is
manifested, following closely what Ibn' Arabï himself says aboutit.
Unfortunately, though, this is one of the most obscure parts of the
Fu$il.î. Let us first quote the whole passage, and then split it into
three parts representing, as I think, the three major stages in the
graduai appearance of Mercy. 7
The Divine Names are 'things', and they ail are ultimately reducible
to one single Essence (1).
The first object to which the Mercy is extended is the very thing-ness
(i.e., the primary ontological reality by dint of which anything
becomes cognizable as 'something') of that Essence ('ayn) which
produces the Mercy itself out of Mercy. Thus the first thing to which
the Mercy is extended is the Mercy itself (2). Then (in the second
stage, the object of the Mercy is) the thing-ness of (the Names) that
has just been mentioned (3). Then (in the third stage, it is) the
thing-ness of ail existents that corne into being without end, both of
this world and of the Hereafter, whether substances or accidents,
composite or simple ( 4).
The first stage in the appearance of Divine Mercy is referred to in
the second sentence (2) in this passage. The situation will be more
understandable if we describe it analytically in the following terms.
In the bosom of the absolu te Absolu te, or the abysmal Darkness,
there appears first a faint foreboding, a presentment, so to speak, of
the Mercy. Since, however, the Mercy, before it begins positively to
manifest itself, is a non-existent ('adam ), it needs something which
would bestow upon it 'existence', that is, another Mercy preceding
it. But there can be no Mercy preceding the Divine Mercy. The only
possibility then, is that the Divine Mercy is exercised upon itself.
The self-Mercy of the Mercy constitutes the very first stage in the
appearance of Mercy.
Looking at the same situation from the point of view of the
ontological Divine self-manifestation (tajallï) we might describe it
as the first appearance of a foreboding of 'existence'. And the
appearance of a foreboding (or possibility) of 'existence' in the
absolute Absolute means nothing else than the Absolute becoming
conscious of itself as 'existence'. lt is the self-manifestation of the
Absolute to itself. And in terms of 'emanation' to which reference
has been made, this stage represents the beginning of the 'most holy
emanation' of the Absolute.
The sentence (2) in the above passage is intended to be a theoreti-
cal formulation of this phenomenon. lt means that 'the first abject
of the Mercy is the thing-ness (shay'ïyah) of that Essence (i.e., the
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absolu te Divine Essence) which, with its own Mercy, brings Mercy
into existence'. lt implies that by the very first manifestation of its
own Mercy, the absolutely Unknown-Unknowable turns into a
'thing' (shay'). And to say that the Absolute obtains 'thing-ness',
i.e., an ontological status by which it presents itself as a 'thing' -
which is the most general, the most undetermined of all determina-
tions - is to say that a process of 'self-objectification' has already
begun to take place within the Absolute itself. This is the appear-
ance of self-consciousness on the part of the Absolute, and is, for
the world, the appearance of a faint light just preceding the advent
of the dawn of existence. In this state there exists as yet nothing at all
except the Absolute, but the bestowal of existence which is, theo-
logically, the 'cieation', is already steadily operating.
The second stage in the appearance of Mercy is the establishment of
the thing-ness of the Names or the permanent archetypes, referred
to by sentences (1) and (3) in the above-quoted passage. At this
stage, the Mercy, which has turned the absolutely Unknown-
Unknowable into a 'thing', now extends to all the Names and
bestows upon them existence. The Names are thereby given
'thing-ness', and become 'things'.
On the side of tajallï, the second stage represents the completion
of the 'most holy emanation'. Unlike the first stage, the second stage
brings us doser to the external world of sensible experience, but
even at this stage the tajallï is not an external tajallï; it is still an event
occurring inside the Unseen. Only the Unseen (ghayb) here is no
longer a primordial state of total indiscrimination, for the essential
forms of the things are already clearly discernible. These forms of
the things (-îuwar al-mawjüddàt) in the darkness of the Unseen are
the Divine Names. And the Absolute, as we have seen earlier,
reveals itself to itself by being manifested in these essences. This is
the final form in which Divine Consciousness makes its appearance,
and thus is completed the 'most holy emanation'.
These essential forms constituting the content of Divine Con-
sciousness are the first 'determinations' (ta'ayyunàt) that appear in
the Essence in its relation with the creaturely world. And the
'thing-ness' that arises at this stage is nothing other than the being of
the permanent archetypes, and is, therefore, different from the
thing-ness of the first stage. For all the existents at this stage,
although they still maintain the essential unity peculiar to the first
stage, have, at the same time, the meaning of being the totality of
the essences which are in potentia divisible. And the Mercy which is
at work at this stage is the Mercy of the Divine Names (ral)mah
asmà'ïyah), and is to be distinguished from the Mercy operating at
the first stage, which is the Mercy of the Essence (ral)mah dhatïyah).
' Ontological Mercy 121 The third stage in the appearance of the Mercy is described in
sentence ( 4) of the above passage. After having brought into exist-
ence the Divine Names (the second stage), the Mercy causes the
individual things to arise as concrete actualizations of the Names.
The ontological activity of the Mercy becomes thereby completed,
and the tajallï, on its part, reaches its final stage. This is what Ibn
'Arabi calls the 'holy emanation' (al-fayd al-muqaddas) to be tech-
nically distinguished from the above-mentioned 'most holy emana-
tion' (al-fayd al-aqdas). Thus, the Mercy, starting from the Divine
Essence itself, ends by being extended over all the possible beings of
phenomenal reality, and cornes to cover the whole world.
lt is to be remarked that the activity of the Mercy covering the whole
world of Being is absolutely impartial and indiscriminating. It
extends literally over everything. In understanding the nature of its
activity, we should not associa te with it anything human with which
the word 'mercy' (ral)mah) is usually associated.
There does not corne into its activity any consideration of attaining an
aim, or of a thing's being or not being suitable for a purpose. Whether
suitable or unsuitable, the Divine Mercy covers everything and any-
thing with existence.8
Such an indiscriminating and gratuitous Mercy is called by Ibn
'Arabi the 'Mercy of gratuitous gift' (ral)mah al-imtinàn ). 9 lt is
totally gratuitous; freely bestowed without any particular
justification. The gift is given not in reward for something good
done. As al-Qashani defines it, 10 the 'Mercy of gratuitous gift' is an
essential Mercy which extends to all things without exception. lt is
extended to anything whatsoever because it is nota reward for some
act. Thus anything that acquires thing-ness obtains this Mercy.
The Mercy in this sense is synonymous with 'existence'. And to
exercise 'mercy' means to bestow 'existence' by way of a gratuitous
gift. This is, for Ibn' Arabi, the meaning of the Qoranic verse: 'My
Mercy covers everything' (VII, 156). lt means that the Absolute
bestows existence upon everything without any discrimination.
In contrast, there is a kind of 'mercy' which is more human in
nature, that is, the kind of 'mercy' which is exercised in reward for
some act done. Ibn 'Arabi calls this second type the 'Mercy of
obligation' (ral)mah al-wujüb ). The conception is based on another
Qoranic verse: 'Your Lord has written upon Himself Mercy' (VI,
12). This is the kind of Mercy exercised with discrimination, i.e., in
accordance with what each person actually has done. Ontologically
speaking, it is Mercy exercised in accordance with the 'prepared-
ness' of each individual being.
There are, therefore, two different kinds of Mercy (ral)matan);
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122 Sufism and Taoism
and the 'Merciful' is, accordingly, given two meanings. These two
senses are differentiated in Arabie by two different Names: the first
is al-RafJman and the second is al-RafJïm. The Rahman is the
Merciful in the sense of the One who exercises the 'Mercy of
gratuitous gift', while the Ra}Jïm is the Merciful in the sense of the
One who exercises the 'Mercy of obligation'. 11
Sin ce, however, the act of Mercy of the second category is but a
special case of the first ( which consists in bestowing existence on all
beings), the Name Ra}Jïm is included in the Name Rahman. This
point is explained by Ibn 'Arabi in the following way: 12
(The Mercy is of two kinds:) the 'Mercy of gratuitous gift' and the
'Mercy of obligation' corresponding to (the Names) the Rahmim and
Rahîm respectively. ( God) exercises Mercy as a gratuitous act un der
the Name of the Rahman, while He obligates Himselfto (requite with
Mercy) under the Name of Rahîm.
This kind of 'obligation', however, is part of 'gratuitous gift', and so
the Rahîm is contained within the Rahman. God 'has written upon
Himself Mercy' in such a way that Mercy of this kind may be
extended to His servants in reward for the good acts done by them
individually - those good works which are mentioned in the Qoran.
This kind of Mercy is an obligation upon God with which He has
bound Himself toward those servants, and the latter rightfully merit
this kind of Mercy by their good works.
Thus the 'Mercy of obligation' would seem to indicate that each
person merits this kind of Mercy by whatever good work he has
done. For Ibn' Arabi, this is merely a superficial understanding of
the matter. In the eyes of those who know the truth, he who really
does a good work is not man; the real agent is God Himself.
He who is in this state (i.e., whoever isfully entitled to the 'Mercy of
obligation') knows within himself who is the real agent (of the good
works which he does). Good works are distributed among the eight
bodily members of man. And God has definitely declared that He is
the He-ness (i.e., the inmost reality) of each of these bodily members.
From this point of view, the real agent cannot be other than God;
what belongs to man is only the outward form. (When we say that)
the Divine He-ness itself is inherent in man, (what is meant thereby is
that) it inheres in nothing other than one of His Names (i.e., man as a
concrete form of one of the Divine Names, not in man as a physical
being.) 13
As regards the 'Mercy of gratuitous gift', the most important point
to remember is that it covers all without exception. Quite naturally,
then, the Divine Naines themselves are objects of this kind 9f
Mercy.
God has put the 'Mercy of gratuitous gift' above ail restrictions when
He has declared: 'My Mercy covers everything' (VII, 156). So it
1'1' 1
Ontological Mercy 123
covers even the Divine Names, i.e., the realities of ail relative deter-
minations (of the Divine Essence). God has shown 'Mercy of gratu-
itous gift' to the Na mes by (the very act of bestowing existence to) us
(i.e., the world). Thus we (the world) are the result of the 'Mercy of
gratuitous gift' exercised upon the Divine Names, i.e., the relations
pertaining to the Lordship (i.e., the various relations which arise
because of the Absolute being the 'Lord'). 14
This universal, unconditional, and indiscriminating nature of the
'Mercy of gratuitous gift' cannot but affect gravely that part of Ibn
'Arabi's ontology which concerns the value of things. His position
on this problem may succinctly be described by the phrase' Beyond
Good and Evil'.
As we have seen, the Mercy in this sense is nothing but bestowing
upon everything existence qua existence. And this is done by the
Absolute's manifesting itself in the creaturely forms. This ontologi-
cal act has in itself nothing to do with moral judgments. In other
words, it does not matter essentially whether a thing as an object of
the Mercy be good (khayr) or bad (sharr). Things assume these and
other evaluational properties only after having been given existence
by the act of the universal Mercy. The actual appearance of good-
ness, badness, etc., is the result of the activity of the 'Mercy of
obligation', for a thing's assuming properties of this kind is due to
the nature of the thing itself.
The' Mercy of gratuitous gift' is bestowal of existence. It concerns
existence qua existence; it does not concern existence being good or
bad. This is one of the major theses of Ibn 'Arabi. Briefly stated,
everything is a self-manifestation of the Absolute; the Mercy
extends in this sense to ail, and ail are on the 'straight way' (sirat
mustaqïm); and there is no distinction at this stage between good
and evil.
Verily God's is the straight Way; the Way is there, exposed to sight
everywhere. Its reality is inherent in great things and small, in those
who are ignorant of the truth as well as in th ose who know it well. This
is why it is said that His Mercy covers everything, whether it be vile
and contemptible or grand and stately.
Thus (it is said in the Qoran:) 'There is not even one single animal on
earth but that He seizes its forelock. Verily my Lord is on the straight
Way'. (XI, 56). It is clear, then, that everybody walking on the earth
is on the straight Way of the Lord. From this point of view nobody is
of 'those upon whom is God's wrath' (1, 7) nor of 'those who go
astray' (ibid.). Both 'wrath' and 'going astray' corne into being only
secondarily. Everything goes ultimately back to the Mercy which is
universal and which precedes (the appearance of ail secondary
distinctions). 15
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God himself seizes the forelock of every animal and leads it along
the straight Way. This means that everything qua being is good as it
is, and is, as we have seen earlier, actually approved by God.
As all things go in this manner along the straight Way of God
under His own guidance, each shows its own characteristic feature,
i.e., each goes on doing individually various acts which are peculiar
to it. These acts are each a concrete manifestation of the particular
Name which acts as the persona! Lord of each being. In other words,
everything, after having been put on the straight Way by the
ontological activity of the Mercy, begins to show secondarily its own
characteristic traits in accordance with the individual peculiarity
(khu$Ü$Ïyah) of the Name of which it happens to be an embodiment.
Everything except the Absolute is (what is described by the Qoran
as) an animal walking on the earth. lt is called 'animal' because it is
possessed of a spirit (rulJ,). 16
But there is nothing that 'walks around' by itself. Everything that
'walks around' does so only secondarily, following the movement of
(its own Lord) who is the one who really walks along the straight
Way. But the Way, on its part, cannot be a way unless there be people
who walk upon it. 17
Thus the statement is fundamentally right that everything is primar-
ily, i.e., qua being, neither good nor bad. However, since existence
is a direct manifestation of the essential Mercy of the Absolute,
everything in that sense must be said to be essentially 'good'
(tayyib ). Anything whatsoever is good in its existence. Only when
man, from his subjective and relative point of view, begins to like
and dislike things, does the distinction between good and bad corne
into being. For Ibn' Arabï, 'good' and 'bad' are a sheer matter of
relative viewpoints. He explains this in the following way: 18
Concerning the' badness' of garlic, the Prophet once observed: '1t is a
plant whose scent I dislike'. He did not say, 'I dislike garlic', because
the thing itself is not to be disliked; what is liable to be disliked is only
what appears from the thing.
Thus displeasure arises either because of a habit, namely, because a
thing does not suit one's nature or purpose, or because of some
regulation in the Law, or because of the thing falling short of the
desired perfection. There can be no other cause than those which I
have just enumerated.
And as the things of the world are divided into categories: good (i.e.,
agreeable) and bad (i.e., disagreeable), the Prophet (Mul:rnmmad)
was made to be of sùch a nature that he liked the good and disliked
the bad.
The Prophet also says in describing the angels that they are annoyed
by the offensive odors, (which the human beings exhale) because of
the natural putrefaction peculiar to the elemental constitution of
Ontological Mercy 125
man. Man has been 'created of clay of black mud wrought into shape'
(XV, 26), so he emits a repulsive odor. The angels dislike it by nature.
The dung-beetle finds repulsive the scent of rose, which, in reality, is
a sweet fragrance. For the dung-beetle, rose does not emit a sweet
smell. Likewise, a man who is like a dung-beetle in his nature and
inner constitution, finds truth repulsive and is pleased with falsehood.
To this refer God's words: 'And those who believe in falsehood and
disbelieve in God' (XXIX, 52). And God describes them as people at
a loss when He says: 'they it is who are the losers' (ibid.), meaning
thereby that these are the people who lose themselves. For they do
not discern good from bad, and, therefore, totally lack discernment.
Asto the Apostle of God (Mul;rnmmad), love was inspired into his
heart for the good concerning everything. And, properly speaking,
everything without exception is (essentially) good.
However, is it at ail imaginable that there be in the world (a man of)
such an inner constitution that he would find in everything only the
good and nothing bad? I should say, 'No, that is impossible.' Because
we find the (opposition between good and bad) even in the very
Ground from which the world arises, I mean, the Absolute. We know
that the Absolute (as God) likes and dislikes. And the bad is nothing
other than what one dislikes, while the good is nothing other than
what one likes. And the world has been created in the image of the
Absolu te (i.e., having likes and dislikes), and man has been created in
the image of these two (i.e., the Absolute and the world).
Thus it is natural that no man should be (of such a) constitution that
he would perceive exclusively one aspect (i.e., either the good or bad
aspect) of everything. But there does not exist a (man of such a)
constitution that he discerns a good element in anything bad, being
well aware that what is bad is bad simply because of (the subjective
impression caused by) the taste, and that it is ( essentially) good if
considered a part from the (subjective impression caused by the)
taste. In the case of such a man, the perception of the good may be so
overwhelming as to make him forget completely the perception of
the bad. This is quite possible. But it is impossible to make the bad
disappear completely from the world, i.e., from the realm of Being.
The Mercy of God covers both good and bad. Anything bad consid-
ers itself good, and what is good (for others) looks bad toit. There is
nothing good in the world but that it turns into something bad from a
certain point of view and for a certain constitution, and likewise,
conversely.
Viewed from such a height, even the good and bad in the religious
sense, i.e., 'obedience' (tà'ah) and 'disobedience' (ma'$iyah), tum
out ultimately to be two aspects of one and the same thing. Ibn
'Arabï explains this by the symbolic meaning contained in the story
of Moses throwing down his staff in the presence of Pharaoh. 19
'Then he threw down his staff' (XXVI, 32). The staff symbol-
izes something (i.e., the spirit or nature of Pharaoh) with which
/
11
1
126 Sufism and Taoism
Pharaoh disobeyed ('a.sà) Moses in his haughtiness and refused to
respond to the call of Moses. 'And, Io, it turned into a serpent
man if est' (ibid.), that is, the staff was changed into an apparent snake
(hayyah). Thus (the Qoranic verse here quoted means that) the
disobedience, which was a bad thing, transformed itself into obedi-
ence, which was a good thing.
In competing with the magicians of the Egyptian court in the pres-
ence of Pharaoh, Moses throws down on the floor the staff in his
hand. The staff - in Arabie, 'a$à - is immediately associated in the
mind of Ibn 'Arabï with the verb 'a$à (meaning 'to rebel' 'to dis-
obey') by phonetic association, and the staff becomes a symbol of
'disobedience'. The staff becomes the symbol of the fact that
Pharaoh disobeyed Moses, and did not respond to the latter's call.
The staff, thrown down, changes at once into a serpent. The
Arabie word for' serpent' or' snake', IJ,ayyah, amuses in Ibn' Arabï' s
mind, again by phonetic association, the word IJ,ayàh, i.e., 'life'.
'Life' in this particular context, is the spiritual life resulting from
man's getting into immediate touch with the depth structure of
Reality. And, for Ibn' Arabï, it means 'obedience' to God.
Thus the feat enacted by Moses depicts symbolically the naturally
disobedient soul of Pharaoh being transformed into an obedient,
docile soul. Not that there are two different souls: one obedient,
another disobedient. As al-Qàshànï remarks,20 soul itself is 'one and
single reality', except that it becomes good or bad according to
contexts. One and the same reality shows two different aspects, and
appears in two different modes.
The staff of Moses perse remains the same, but it appears some-
times as a staff, sometimes as a serpent according to particular
situations, i.e., according to the point of view from which one looks
at it. Likewise, whatever Pharaoh may do, the act itself is neither
good nor bad. The only thing that changes are its properties. The
same act of Pharaoh becomes sometimes obedience, sometimes
disobedience.
Ali this happens in accordance with God's words: 'God will change
their evil deeds into good deeds' (XXV, 70), that is to say, in so far as
concerns their qualifications (and not the essences themselves of
their deeds). Thus, in this case, different qualifications appeared as
distinctive realities within one single substance. That is to say, one
single substance appeared as a staff and as a snake or, (as the Qoran
says) 'a serpent manifest.' As a snake, it swallowed up ail the other
snakes, while as a staff, it swallowed up ail the staffs. 21
Ibn 'Arabi develops the same thought from a properly theological
point of view, as the problem of Divine Will (mashi'ah).
Ali events that occur in this world, all actions that are done, are,
Ontological Mercy 127
without even a single exception, due to Divine Will. In this sense,
there can be no distinction between good and bad, or right and
wrong. Every phenomenon, as it actually is, is a direct effect of the
Will of God. Every event occurs as it actually does because it is so
willed by God.
This standpoint is totally different from that of the Sacred Law
which approves of this and disapproves of that. When a 'bad' man
does something 'evil', his act obviously goes against the Sacred Law,
but, according to Ibn' Arabï it never goes against Divine Will. For it
is absolutely impossible that something should occur against the
Will of God. Here is what Ibn 'Arabï, says about this problem: 22
Every decree which is carried out now in the world (i.e., anything that
actually occurs in the world as a concrete phenomenon) is a decree of
God, even if it violates the particular kind of decree which has been
established un der the na me of a Sacred Law. For in reality only when
a decree is truly God's decree, is it actually carried out. Everything
that occurs in the world occurs solely in accordance with what is
decreed by the Will of God, not in accordance with the decree of an
established Sacred Law, although, to be sure, the very establishment
of a Sacred Law is itself due to Divine Will. Besides, precisely
because it is willed by God, establishment of the Sacred Law is
actualized. However, Divine Will in this case concerns only the
establishment of the Law; it does not concern the practice of what is
enjoined by the Law.
Thus the Will has a supreme authority. And this is why Abü Tâlib
(al-Makkï) regarded it as the 'Throne of the Divine Essence',
because the Will demands for itself that the decrees should be carried
out.
Such being the case, nothing occurs in this world apart from the Will,
nor is anything removed from the sphere of Being except by the Will.
And whenever the Divine Command23 is violated in this world by
what is called 'disobedience' (or 'sin'), it is the matter of the' media te'
Command, not the 'creational' Command. Nobody, whatever he
may do, can ever act against Godin so far as the Command of the Will
(i.e., the creational Command) is concerned. Disobedience occurs
only in regard to the 'media te' Command.
The Will of God concems only takwin, i.e., 'bringing into existence',
or 'creation'. Within the sphere of human acts, for instance, the Will
concems the coming into existence of a certain act. The Will is not
directly concemed with the question as to who happens to be the
individual person through whom the act occurs. Ali acts occur
necessarily through individual persans. Every individual, in this
sense, is a 'responsible' (mukallaf) person, that is, a person who
bears a number of moral responsibilities within the boundaries of
the system of a Sacred Law. And every human act becomes 'good'
or 'bad' through this very process of personal 'mediation'.
128 Sufism and Taoism
In reality the Command of the Will is directed exclusively toward the
bringing into existence of an act itself; it is nota matter of concern to
the Will 'who' actually manifests the act. Soit is absolutely impossible
that the act should not occur. But in regard to the particular locus (in
which it actualfy occurs), the (sa me) act is called sometimes 'dis-
obedience' to the Divine Command ( namely, when the particular
person who does it happens to be prohibited to do it by the Sacred
Law of his community), and sometimes 'obedience' (namely, when
the person happens to belong to a community whose Sacred Law
enjoins the act). And (the same act) is followed by blame or praise
accordingly.
The situation being just as we have shown, ail creatures are destined
ultimately to reach happiness in spite of the difference in kind that
exists among them. God Himself expresses this fact when He states
that His Mercy covers everything and that the Mercy forestalls
Divine Wrath. 'Forestall' means to get ahead of something. Thus, as
soon as a particular person who has already been given a (negative)
judgment by that which ( essentially) cornes afterward (i.e., Wrath)
overtakes that which goes ahead of it (i.e., Mercy), the latter pro-
nounces a (new) judgment upon him, so that Mercy gets hold of him.
Such a (miraculous) thing can actually occur because there is abso-
lutely nothing that can ever forestall it (i.e., Mercy).
This is what is meant by the dictum: 'God's Mercy forestalls His
Wrath', because of the decisive influence Mercy exercises upon
whatever reaches it, for it stands at the ultimate goal ( awaiting
everything), and everything is running toward the goal. Everything
necessarily attains to the ultimate goal. So everything necessarily
obtains Mercy and leaves Wrath. 24
The preceding description of the Mercy clearly suggests that Ibn
'Arabi is considering the phenomenon of the universal Mercy from
two different points of view at one time. The basic dictum: 'the
Mercy of God runs through all beings' ,25 means ontologically that
everything existent is existent by the Divine act of the bestowal of
existence. The dictum also means that everything is under Divine
Mercy, and that everything, therefore, is essentially blessed and is in
felicity.
Everything which is remembered by Mercy is happy and blessed. But
there is nothing that has not been remembered by Mercy. And
Mercy's remembering things is exactly the same as its bringing them
into existence. Thus everything existent is affected by Mercy.
Do not, o my friend, lose sight of what 1 have told you under the
influence of your vision of the people of misery and your belief in the
torments of the Hereafter which are never to be slackened once men
are put into them. Know before everything else that Mercy is primar-
ily exercised in bringing everything into existence, so that even the
torments of Hell themselves have been brought into existence by
Mercy that has been directed toward them. 26
1 .....
Ontological Mercy 129
Then, in the passage which immediately follows what we have just
quoted, Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes two different kinds of effect pro-
duced by the Mercy: (1) an ontological effect produced directly by
its Essence, and (2) an effect produced in accordance with man's
asking. This distinction corresponds to what we have already discus-
sed in terms of the distinction between the' Mercy of gratuitous gift'
and the' Mercy of obligation'. Only he considers it this time from a
somewhat different perspective.
Mercy in its effect has two different aspects. The first concerns an
effect it produces in accordance with essential requirement of itself.
It consists in that Mercy brings into existence every individual
essence ('ayn, i.e., archetype). In doing this, it does not pay any
attention to purpose or non-purpose, suitability or non-suitability,
for the object of Mercy is the essence of every existent thing before
the latter actually exists, that is, while it is still in the state of a
permanent archetype.
So (for instance,) Mercy discerns the Absolute as 'created' in the
various religions, ( even before its actual existence) as one of the
permanent archetypes (i.e., as a potential existent), and spontane-
ously shows Mercy upon it by bringing it into actual existence. This is
the reason why 1 assert that the Absolute as 'created' in the various
religions constitutes the first object of Mercy immediately after the
Mercy has exercised Mercy upon itself by concerning itself with the
existentiation of ail existents.
The second kind of effect is that induced by 'asking' (on the part of
creatures). But (there are two kinds of 'asking'). Those who are
veiled (from the truth) ask the Absolute to show Mercy upon them,
each representing the Absolute in (the particular form provided by)
his own religion. The people of 'unveiling', on the contrary, ask the
Mercy of God to reside in them. They ask for Mercy in the Name
Allàh, saying, 'O Allàh, show Mercy upon us!' And (the Absolute, in
response) shows Mercy upon them only by making Mercy reside in
them. And Mercy (thus residing in these sages) produces its positive
effect in them (i.e., they themselves become the possessors of the
Mercy and begin to act as 'merciful' ones). 27
We must try to grasp exactly what is meant by Ibn 'Arabi in this
important but obscure passage. The first of the two aspects of the
effect of Mercy here described is not difficult to understand,
because it concerns the ontological activity of Mercy which we have
already discussed earlier in terms of the Mercy of the ralJ,màn type.
It refers to one of the most fondamental theses of Ibn' Arabi, that
beings obtain their existence by the Essence of the Absolute mani-
festing itself in the particular form of each one of them in accord-
ance with the capacity determined in eternity for each thing.
Ibn' Arabi here leaves the plane of general theoretical considera-
tions and narrows down his observation to a very particular case;
130 Sufism and Taoism
namely, the problem of the relation between the believer and the
abject of his belief within the boundaries of the traditional religion
of his community. The effect of Mercy, he argues, appears first in
Mercy exercising an ontological (i.e., existentiating) Mercy upon its
own self. Following this, Mercy bestows existence upon the Abso-
lute as 'created' in various religions.
It goes without saying that the believers themselves, in so far as
they are 'beings', are originally permanent archetypes, and as such
must necessarily be abjects of the ontological Mercy. But the
abjects of belief of these believers, i.e., their gods, are also originally
permanent archetypes which are included within the archetypes of
the believers. Soit is natural that they, too, should be affected by the
ontological Mercy. In other words, the very same activity of the
Mercy, which brings into existence the believers as so many abjects
of Mercy, brings into existence also the 'created' Absolute within
the believers themselves.
In contrast to this activity of the ontological Mercy, the second
aspect concerns the effect of the Mercy which is produced in accor-
dance with what an individual persan asks from his Lord, each being
motivated by a persona} purpose. This aspect of Mercy varies in
accordance with the nature of what is asked by individual 'seekers'.
Ibn 'Arabi <livides the 'seekers' (talibün) of Mercy into two
classes: (1) the 'veiled' people, and (2) the people of 'unveiling'.
Each one of the first class implores his Lord saying, 'Have mercy
upon me!' 'Give me this, or give me that!' This, in Ibn' Arabi' s view,
is nothing but a silly act which arises from the ignorance of the truth.
The Mercy of God does not produce any effect except on the basis
of what has been eternally determined in the form of permanent
archetypes. However much they may implore God, the permanent
archetypes of himself and of others can never be altered.
The people of the second class, on the contrary, ask for something
extraordinary. First of ail, they do not direct their supplication to
any individual Lord. They address themselves to Allah as the point
of comprehensive unification of ail the Names. They cry out, 'O
Allah, have mercy upon us!' This should not be taken literally as if
they implored God to show mercy to them in the manner in which a
'merciful' man shows mercy to other human beings. What they are
asking for is that God should make them subjectively conscious of
the uni versai Mercy which is implied in the Name Allah. Their wish
is to go beyond the passive state of being abjects of the Mercy
(marlJ,üm) and to putthemselves in the position of the ralJ,im, i.e.,
one who shows mercy, and thereby have the consciousness of ail the
Names being, so to speak, their own attributes.
When this wish is really fulfilled, Mercy begins to show its positive
effect within these people as their own persona! attributes. And
y ",l!;
Ontological Mercy 131
each one of them turns from the state of marlJ,üm to that of ralJ,im.
Mercy works in this way according to Ibn 'Arabi because the real
effect of a property begins to appear positively only when the
non-material content (ma'nà) of it cornes to reside in a particular
locus.
Thus it (i.e., the non-material essence of Mercy residing in a particu-
lar locus) fonctions as the râlJ,im in the real sense of the word. God
shows Mercy to His servants about whom He is concerned only
through Mercy, and when this Mercy becomes established in them
(as their subjective state), they experience by 'immediate tasting' the
positive effect of Mercy as their own property. For he whom Mercy
remembers (in this sense) is himself a subject of Mercy. His state then
(will be more properly expressed by) a name descriptive of an agent
(rather than a na me descriptive of the passive state, marlJ,üm ), that is,
the 'merciful' or râhim. 28
Such a man, Ibn 'Arabi says, is conscious within himself of Mercy
being active as his own subjective state. He is no longer an 'abject'
of Mercy, one to whom Mercy is shown; he is rather a 'subject' of
Mercy, one who exercises it toward other beings. He is now a man
worthy to be called 'merciful'. The grave consequence of this per-
sona} transformation through the appropriation of Mercy will be
studied later when we deal with the problem of the Perfect Man.
In what precedes, we have been following Ibn' Arabi as he develops
his thought on the Divine Name 'Merciful' (ralJ,man), and we have
tried to clarify the structure of Mercy (ralJ,mah) which is the concep-
tual core of this Name.
The next problem to consider is: How does Mercy issue forth
from the Absolu te? Ibn 'Arabi explains his view on this problem
using a very bold and colorful image of 'breathing out'.
It is a matter of common experience that, when we hold our
breath for some time, the air compressed in the chest makes us feel
unbearable pain. And when the utmost limit is reached, and we
cannot hold it any longer, the air that has been held inside bursts out
ail at once. It is a natural phenomenon that the breath compressed
in the breast seeks forcibly for an outlet, and finally explodes and
gushes forth with a violent outburst. Just as air bursts forth from the
chest of man, the compressed existence within the depths of
the Absolute, taking the form of Mercy, gushes forth from the
Absolute. This he calls the 'breath of the Merciful' (al-najas
al-ralJ,mlmiy). 29
The state preceding the bursting forth of the breath of Mercy is
described by Ibn 'Arabi by an equally expressive word karb. The
word is derived from a root meaning 'to overload' or 'to fill up' , and
is used to designate the state in which the stomach, for instance, is
132 Sufism and Taoism
surfeited. It is a state of extreme tension, just short of explosion,
caused by an excessive amount of things accumulated inside.
Because of this surfeit (i.e., in order to relieve itself from the excess of
inner tension) the Absolute breathes out. The breath is attributed to
the Merciful (and called the 'breath of the Merciful') because the
(Absolute under the Name of) Merciful shows Mercy by means of
this breath toward the Divine Relations (i.e., the Names) and
responds to their demand that the forms of the world be brought into
existence.30
The Mercy, as we have seen above, means bestowal of existence. So
the 'breathing out' of the breath of the Merciful is a symbolic
expression for the manifestation of Being, or the Divine act of
bringing into existence the things of the world. In the imagery
peculiar to Ibn 'Arabi, this phenomenon may also be described as
the Divine Names bursting out into the real world of existence. The
Divine Names, in this imagery, are originally in the state of intense
compression within the Absolute. And at the extreme limit of
interior compression, the Names 'burst out' from the bosom of the
Absolu te. Ibn 'Arabi depicts in this vividly pictorial way the
ontological process by which the Divine Names become actualized
in the forms of the world. This is the birth of the world as the whole
of outwardly existent beings. The process itself is explained in more
plain terms by Bali Efendi in the following manner. 31
The Names, previous to their existence in the outer world, exist
hidden in the Essence of the Absolute, all of them seeking an outlet
toward the world of external existence. The state is comparable to the
case in which a man holds his breath within himself. The breath, held
within, seeks an outlet toward the outside, and this causes in the man
a painful sensation of extreme compression. Only when he breathes
out does this compression cease ... Just as the man is tormented by
the compression if he does not breathe out, so the Absolute would
feel the pain of compression if it did not bring into existence the world
in response to the demand of the Names.
To this Bali Efendi adds the remark that this phenomenon of Divine
'breathing' (tanaffus) is the same as God's uttering the word 'Be!'
(kun) to the world. 'He breathed out' means 'He sent out what was
in His Interior to the Exterior by means of the word Be. Thus He
Himself, after having been in the Interior, has corne to exist in the
Exterior'.
What is important to observe is that, in Ibn 'Arabï's world-view,
this 'breathing out' of Mercy is not something that took place, once
for all, sometime in the past. On the contrary, the process of the
'compressed breath', i.e., the Names contained in the Absolute,
bursting out in virtue of its own pressure toward the outside, is going
y-: -,Jl:l
Ontological Mercy 133
on continuously without intermission. And it is this continuous
process that maintains the present world in subsistence. To use the
Aristotelian terminology, things are constantly turning from the
state of potentiality to that of actuality. It is a constant and everlast-
ing process of a universal overftow of the Being of the Absolu te into
Being of the creatures. Thus the real and absolute Being (al-wujüd
al-/Jaqiqiy) goes on transforming itself without a moment's rest into
the relative Being (al-wujüd al-üjiifiy). And this ontological trans-
formation, which Ibn 'Arabi sometimes calls 'emanation' (fay4), is,
in his view, a natural and necessary movement of Being caused by
the inner pressure of the ontological potentiality kept within the
Absolute. Without this constant transformation, i.e., 'breathing
out', the Being would be compressed within beyond its extreme
limit, and the Essence of the Absolute would be in structurally the
same situation as when we suffer an unbearable pain by holding our
breath.
The phenomenon of the 'breath of the Merciful' has been inter-
preted in the preceding pages in terms of the Divine Names. It may
also be understood in terms of the Lordship (rubübiyah), for, as we
have seen, 'Lord' is a particularized form of the Absolute on the
level of the Divine Names. The Absolute in its absoluteness is
completely 'independent'; it does not need anything, it does not
seek anything outside itself. But the Absolute qua Lord needs
objects of its Lordship; it does not subsist without marbüb.
But marbüb ('one who is lorded over') is nothing other than the
world in existence. Thus the Lord must bring into existence the
things of the world. The same thing can be expressed in religious
terms by saying that to the Absolute qua Lord essentially belongs
solicitude for his servants.
In the plane of Being where it is split into various relations opposed to
each other,32 God describes Himself in a (famous) Tradition as
having 'solicitude (shafaqah) for His servants'.
The very first thing which (the Absolute) breathed out by its 'breath
of Mercy' was Lordship. And this was actualized by the bringing into
existence of the world, because the world was what was essentially
required by Lordship and all (the other) Divine Names. From this
point of view it is evident that Mercy covers everything.33
Thus the 'breath of the Merciful' is the principle of Being or the
ground of Being extending over both the world of material things
and the world of spiritual beings. In this ontological capacity, the
'breath of the Merciful' is regarded by Ibn 'Arabi as Nature
(tabi'ah).
Viewed from this perspective, the 'breath' is a Substance (jawhar,
in the Aristotelian sense of Prime Matter) in which all the forms of
134 Sufism and Taoism
Being, both material and spiritual, are manifested. In this sense,
Nature necessarily precedes any form which becomes manifest in it.
Nature precedes all that are born out of it with definite forms. But in
reality, Nature is no other than the 'breath of the Merciful'. Ali the
forms of the world become manifest in the latter, ranging from the
highest forms to the lowest, in virtue of the spreading of the 'breath'
through the material substance in the world of physical bodies in
particular. The 'breath' spreads also through the Being of the spirits
of a luminous nature and the attributes. But that is another kind of
the spreading of the 'breath' .34
According to this passage, the Divine 'breath' pervades the material
substance, i.e., the Prime Matter (hayülà), which is receptive of the
physical forms, and it brings into existence the physical bodies in
the material world. The 'breath' pervades, at the same time, the
spiritual substances bringing into existence the spirits of the Light-
nature, i.e., immaterial things by spreading through the spiritual
Nature which is another kind of Prime Matter. lt also spreads
through the accidentai Nature and thereby brings into being various
accidents which exist as inherent attributes of substances.
To consider bestowal of existence by the Absolute as the 'breath'
of the Merciful is, for Ibn 'Arabï, by no means a mere metaphor
which has corne to his mind haphazardly. 1 t is an essential metaphor.
The ontological phenomenon, in his view, coïncides in every im-
portant respect with the physiological phenomenon of breathing.
Ali the basic attributes which characterize the human act of breath-
ing apply analogically to the 'breath' of God. We shall in what
follows consider this point, basing ourselves on Ibn 'Arabi' s own
description. 35
The Absolute attributes to itself the 'breath of the Merciful'. Now
whenever anything is qualified by an attribute, all the qualities that
naturally follow that attribute must necessarily be attributed to that
thing. (In our particular case), you know well what qualities naturally
follow the· attribute of breathing in an animal that breathes.36 This is
why the Divine breath receives the forms of the world. Thus the
Divine breath acts as the Prime Matter in relation to the forms of the
world. And (the Divine breath in this capacity) is precisely what we
call Nature.
Accordingly, the four elements, everything that has been generated
from the elements, the higher spiritual beings, and the spirits of
seven Heavens, all these are found to be 'forms' of Nature.37
Thus the four elements are forms (i.e., specific determinations) of
Nature. And those beings above the elements, namely, the 'higher
spirits' that are (ranged in a hierarchical order down to a level just)
above the seven Heavens - they are forms of Nature. And those
Ontological Mercy 135
being born of the elements are also forms of Nature. (By 'those that
are born of the elements') 1 mean the spheres of the seven Heavens
and the spirits (governing their movements); they are of an elemental
nature, because they are made of, and born of, the vapor38 of the
elements.
Each one of the angels born in any of the seven Heavens is likewise of
the elements. Thus ail the heavenly angels are elemental. Those
(angels) above the heavenly spheres (are not elemental, but they
nonetheless) belong to Nature. And this is the reason why God
described the angels as mutually rivaling. This may be explained by
the fact that Nature itself tends by essence to be split into opposed
potes. And the essential opposition among the Divine Names, i.e.,
the Divine Relations, has been caused only by the 'breath of the
Merciful'. Do you not see how even in the Divine Essence which is in
itself completely free from such a property (i.e., polarization) there
appears ( at the lev el of the Divine Na mes) the definite property of
essential independence? 39 Thus the world has been produced in the
image of its creator which is (not the Essence but) the 'breath of the
Merciful' 40 •.. He41 who wants to know (the nature of) the Divine
breath must try to know the world, for (as the Prophet said) 'he who
knows himself knows his Lord' who manifests Himself in him. That is
to say, the world makes its appearance in the 'breath of the Merciful'
by which God breathes out from the Divine Names the inner com-
pression that has been caused by the non-manifestation of their
effects. (God relieves the Names of the pain of their inner compres-
sion by letting them manifest their effects.) At the same time, God
thereby shows Mercy toward Himself, that is, by what He brings into
existence in the 'breath' .42 Thus the first effect shown by the Divine
'breath' appears in God Himself (by the manifestation of His
Names). Theo, following that stage, the process goes on stage by
stage by the 'breathing out' of ail the Divine Names until it reaches
the last stage of Being (i.e., the world).
Ibn 'Arabï concludes with a short poem, the first verse of which
runs: 'Thus everything is contained in the bosom of the Breath, just
as the bright light of day is in the very darkness before dawn'. The
whole world is still completely shrouded in darkness. But it is not
the darkness of midnight, for the light of dawn is already potentially
there, ready to appear at any moment. Commenting on this verse,
Affifi writes: 43 The 'breath' symbolizes the material substance (al-
jawhar al-hayülani) in which the forms of all beings become mani-
fested. In itself, it is utter darkness, i.e., utterly unknowable, but
seen from the viewpoint of manifestation, all the forms of the
universe are faintly observable in the midst of the darkness.
Mercy (ra}Jmah) is unquestionably one of the key-concepts which
characterize in a definite way the structure of Ibn' Arabï's thought.
Probably a little less important than Mercy, but very close to it in
136 Sufem and Taoism
content is another key-concept, Love (mafJabbah). The Divine
Love is, after all, the sa me thing as Mercy, but looked at from a
somewhat different angle. It is, theologically speaking, the funda-
mental motive of the creation of the world by God, and in terms of
the ontology peculiar to Ibn 'Arabi, it is the driving force of the
self-manifestation of the Absolute. Before we close the present
chapter, we shall analyze this concept and discuss the place it
occupies in the philosophical system of Ibn 'Arabi.
There is a particular reason why the concept of Love plays such an
important role in Ibn' Arabi's thought. Its importance is due to the
existence of an explicit statement put in the mouth of God Himself
in a famous Tradition which may be considered the starting-point,
the basis, and the very gist of his philosophy: '1 was a hidden
treasure, and 1 desired (afJbabtu, 'loved') to be known. Accordingly
1 created the creatures and thereby made Myself known to them.
Any they did corne to know Me'.
As this Tradition tells us with utmost clarity, Love (IJubb) is the
principle which moved the Absolute toward the creation of the
world. It is, in this sense, the 'secret of creation' (sirr al-khalq) or
'cause of creation' ('illah al-khalq). If we are to express the thought
in terms more characteristic of Ibn' Arabi, we might say that Love is
something because of which the Absolute steps out of the state of
abysmal Darkness and begins to manifest itself in the forms of ail
beings.
For Ibn' Arabi, speaking more generally, 'love' is the principle of
all movement (IJarakah). Ail movements that actually occur in the
world ( e.g., when a man does something) are due to the driving
force of 'love'. In explaining events that take place in and around
ourselves, our attention tends to be drawn toward various causes44
other than 'love'. We usually say, for example, that the 'cause' of
such-and-such an action we dois such-and-such a thing (e.g., fear,
anger, joy, etc.). In doing so, we are overlooking the real cause, i.e.,
the most basic cause of all causes. In the eyes of those who know the
truth, all phenomena of movement, on all levels of Being, are
caused by 'love'. If it were not for the activity of 'love', everything
would remain in the state of eternal rest, i.e., non-movement. And
non-movement (sukün) means nothing other than non-existence
('adam).45
From this point of view, the fact that the world has corne out of
the state of non-existence into the state of existence is a grand-scale
ontological 'movement', and this movement has been caused by the
Divine Love. Ibn 'Arabi expresses this conception in the following
way:46
The most basic and primary movement was the movement of the
world from the state of non-existence (i.e., the archetypal state), in
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Ontological Mercy 137
which it had been reposing, into the state of existence. This is the
reason why it is said that the reality of existence is a movement from
the state of repose. And the movement which is coming into exist-
ence of the world is a movement of Love. This is clearly indicated by
the Apostle when he says (conveying God's own words): 'I was a
hidden treasure, and I loved to be known'. If it were not for this love,
the world would never have appeared in this concrete existence. In
this sense, the movement of the world toward existence was a move-
ment of Love which brought it into existence ....
And the world, on its part, loves to witness itself in the existence as it
used to witness itself in the state of archetypal repose. Thus, from
whichever side one considers it, the movement of the world from the
state of the archetypal non-existence toward concrete existence was a
movement of Love, both from the side of the Absolu te and from the
side of the world itself.
And ail this is ultimately due to the Love of the Absolute for being
'perfect' in both its Knowledge and Existence. If the Absolute
remained in isolation in its own original absoluteness, neither its
Knowledge nor its Existence would have attained perfection. Ibn
'Arabi goes on to say:47
Perfection (kamal) is loved for its own sake. But as for God's Know-
ledge of Himself, in so far as He was completely independent of the
whole world (i.e., in so far as He remained in isolation before the
creation of the world), it was there (from the beginning in absolute
perfection). The degree of the Knowledge was to be made perfect
only by a temporal Knowledge ('ilm IJ,adith) 48 which would concern
the concrete individual objects of the world once these would be
brought into existence. Thus the form of Perfection is realized (in
God) by the two kinds of Knowledge, temporal and eternal, and the
degree of His Knowledge is brought to perfection through these two
aspects. Correspondingly, the degrees of Being are also perfected (by
the creation of the world). For Being is of two kinds: eternal (a parte
ante) and non-eternal, that is temporal. The 'eternal' (azaliy) Exis-
tence is the Existence of the Absolute for itself, while the 'non-
eternal' is the Existence of the Absolute in the forms of the
archetypal world. This latter kind of Being is called 'becoming'
(IJ,udûth) because the Abs.olute in it (splits itself into multiplicity and)
appears to one another. The Absolu te in this way appears to itself in
the forms of the world. And this brings Being to perfection.
And so Ibn 'Arabi cornes to a conclusion in which he connects the
concept of Love with that of the breath of Mercy.
Thus you should understand that the movement of the world is born
of Love for perfection.
Do you not see how the Absolute breathed out and relieved the
Divine Names of (the pain of compression) which they had been
feeling because of the non-appearance of their effects, in an entity
138 Sufism and Taoism
called the world? This happened because the Absolute loves relaxa-
tion (riil]ah). And relaxation was only to be obtained through the
existence of the forms high and low. Thus it is patent that movement
is caused by Love, and that there can be no movement in the world
but that it is motivated by Love.
Notes
1. Fu$., p. 222/177.
2. p. 222.
3. FU$., p. 222/177.
4. p. 222.
5. FU$., pp. 222-223/177.
6. p. 223.
7. Fu$., p. 223/177.
8. FU$., p. 224/177
9. FU$., p. 227/180.
10. p. 227
11. Accordingly, ra}Jmah al-imtinim is sornetirnes called al-ra}Jmah al-ra}Jmânïyah,
and ra}Jmah al-wujüb is called al-ra}Jmah al-ra}Jïmïyah.
12. FuL p. 191/151.
13. FU$., p. 192/152.
14. FU$., p. 193/153.
15. FU$., pp. 123-124/106.
16. Why does Ibn 'Arabi specifically ernphasize that everything other than the
Absolute is 'possessed of a spirit' (dhû rû}J)? Bâli Efendi thinks (p. 124) that it is
because, according to the Qoran, everything is 'praising God', and the act of 'prais-
ing' cornes only frorn a spirit. We rnay, I think, also understand the phrase 'possessed
of a spirit' in the sense of 'possessed of life'. As we shall see in the next chapter,
everything, in Ibn 'Arabî's world-view, is 'alive'.
17. FuL p. 124/106.
18. FU$., pp. 276-278/221.
19. Fu$., pp. 261-262/210.
11"'
Ontological Mercy 139
20. p. 261.
21. Fu$., p. 262/210.
22. FU$., pp. 206-207/165.
23. 'Cornrnand' (amr) is different frorn the Will (mashï'ah). The latter, as we have
seen, is absolute, and its decree irrevocable. Disobedience is out of question here.
The Cornrnand is of two kinds: (1) rnediate (bi-al-wâsi(ah) and (2) creational
(takwïniy). The second concerns the corning into existence of anything, and is
identical with the Will. The first, however, is identical with the Sacred Law (shar'),
and rnay be disobeyed.
24. FU$., pp. 207-208/165-166.
25. Ra}Jmah Allah fi al-akwiin siiriyah, Fu$., p. 225/177.
26. Fu$., p. 225/178.
27. ibid.
28. FU$., p. 226/178.
29. Fu$., p. 273/219.
30. FU$., p. 133/112.
31. p. 133.
32. The Divine Narnes, as we already know, are the relations which the Absolute
bears toward the things of the world. And on this level, there occur in the Absolute
oppositions in accordance with the Narnes, su ch as 'Inward' - 'Outward', 'First' -
' Last', etc.
33. FU$., p. 144/119.
34. Fu-î-, p. 273/219. In the case of 'spirits' or non-rnaterial beings, the 'breath'
spreads through 'spiritual rnatter' (hayûlà rû}Jiinïyah ), and in the case of' accidents'
through 'accidentai rnatter'.
35. FU$., p. 182/143-144.
36. Man breathes, for exarnple, and his breath 'receives' sounds and words, which
are linguistic 'forrns' - al-Qâshânï, p. 182.
37. FU$., pp. 182-183/rnrrnf
38. 'Vapor' (dukhân), or 'stearn', to be cornpared with the ch'i of the ancient
Chinese. Of the 'vapor' of the elernents, that which is 'subtle' becornes the governing
spirits of the seven Heavens, whereas that which is 'coarse' becornes the seven
Heavens thernselves.
39. The Essence itself has nothing to do with the appearance of the world. But as
soon as it cornes down to the level of Narnes it becornes 'independent'. And as soon as
it becornes 'independent' it becornes opposed to 'dependent', thus causing a prirnary
polarization within the Absolute itself.
140 Sufism and Taoism
40. The world, thus produced, necessarily reflects the nature of its immediate
creator, the 'breath of the Merciful'. And since the 'breath of the Merciful' requires
polarizations because of the self-polarizing nature of the Divine Names, the world
also is split into oppositions.
41. Fu$., p. 185/145.
42. 'Gad shows Mercy toward Himself' because the Divine Names are ultimately no
other than Gad Himself.
43. Corn., pp. 197-198.
44. i.e., the so-called 'proximate causes' (asbab qarïbah).
45. Fu$., pp. 255-256/203.
46. Fu$., p. 256/203.
47. p. 256/204.
48. Note that Ibn' Arabï recognizes in Gad the temporally produced Knowledge in
addition to the 'eternal' (qadim) Knowledge. He thereby stands definitely against the
majority of the theologians.
