SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Names
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
VII The Divine Names
The philosophical world-view of Ibn 'Arabi is, concisely stated,
a world-view of Divine self-manifestation (tajallï), for, as we have seen,
as long as the Absolute remains in its absoluteness
there can be nothing in existence that may be called the' world',
and the word 'world-view' itself would lose all meaning in the absence of the world.
The principle of tajallï, on the world's side,
is the 'preparedness' (or ontological aptitude), and
the same principle of tajallï from the standpoint of the Absolute
is constituted by the Divine Names.
The present chapter will deal thematically with the problem of tajallï
in so far as it directly bears upon the Divine Names.
Islamic theology discusses as one of the basic themes the question
whether a Name (ism) is or is not
the same as the 'object named' (musammà).
Ibn' Arabi gives his answer to this theological question
by saying that a Name and its 'object named' are
- the same in one sense and
- different from each other in another sense.
The reason why they are one and the same thing is that
all the Divine Names, in so far as they invariably refer to the Absolute, are nothing but the 'object named' (i.e., the Essence [dhat] of the Absolute) itself.
Each name is a special aspect, or special form, of the Absolute in its self-manifestation. And in this sense, each Name is identical with the Essence.
All the Divine Names, in other words, are 'the realities of the relations' (baqa'iq al-nisab ), 1 i.e., the relations which the One Reality bears to the world, and in this respect they are all the Divine Essence itself viewed from the standpoint of
the various special relations which are caused by the phenomenon of Divine self-manifestation.
The relations which the Absolute can possibly bear to the world
are infinite, that is, to use Ibn 'Arabi's peculiar terminology, the
forms of the Divine self-manifestation are infinite in number. Con-
sequently, the Divine Names are infinite.
However, they can be classified and reduced to a certain number of basic Names. For example, it is generally recognized that the Qoran gives ninety-nine
Names of God.
100]
These Names, whether infinite or finite in number, can also be
considered by themselves independently of the Essence to which
they refer.
In other words, they can be regarded as so many independent Attributes.
Considered in this way, each Name has its own 'reality' (l)aqiqah) by which it is distinguished from the rest of the Names.
And in this respect, a Name is different from the 'object named'.
Ibn' Arabi explains this point by making reference to the famous Sufi of the West, Abü al-Qâsim b. Qasi (d. 1151).2
This is what is meant by Abü al-Qasim b. Qasi when he says in his
book Taking Off The Sandals that every Divine Name carries in itself
ail the Divine Names and ail their properties; this because every
Name indicates both the Essence and the particular meaning of
which it is the Name and which is especially required by the latter.
Thus every single Name, in so far as it points to the Essence, con tains
ail the Names, but in so far as it points to its own proper meaning, is
different from ail the rest, like 'Lord', 'Creator' or 'Giver of the
forms' etc. The Name, in short, is the same as the 'object named' in
regard to the Essence, but it is not the same as the 'object named' in
regard to its own particular meaning.
Thus the most conspicuous feature of the Divine Names is their
double structure, that is, their having each two designations. Each
Name designates, and points to, the unique Essence, while pointing
to a meaning or reality which is not shared by any other Name.
In the first aspect, every Name is one and the same as all other
Names, because they all are indicative of the same Essence. In this
respect, even such Names as appear to contradict each other ( e.g.,
'All-Forgiving' and 'Revenger', 'Outward' and 'Inward', 'First' and
'Last') are identical with each other.
In the second aspect, on the contrary, each Name is something
independent, something having its own peculiar reality. It definitely
distinguishes itself from all others. The' Outward' is not the same as
the 'Inward'. And what a distance between the 'First' and the 'Last' !
It will have been made clear to you (by what precedes) in what sense
each Name is the same as another and in what sense it is different
from another. Each Name, in being the same as others, is the Abso-
lute, and in being 'other' than others, is the' Absolute as it appears as
a particular image' (al-IJ,aqq al-mutakhayyal). Glory be to Him who is
not indicated by anything other than Himself and whose existence is
established by nothing other than Himself and whose existence is
established by nothing other than His own self!3
The' Absolute as it appears in particular images', i.e., the world, is
nothing but the whole sum of the Divine Names as concretely actualized.
[101]
And since it is the sole indicator of the absolute Absolute, the latter, after ail, is not indicated by anything other than itself.
The Absolute indicates itself by itself, and its concrete existence is established by itself. Ibn 'Arabi cannot withold his pro- found admiration for the beauty and the grandeur of this structure.
We discussed in Chapter V the relation between the One and the Many.
In terms of the main topic of the present chapter,
the Many are the forms of the Absolute actualized in accordance with the requirements of the Names.
The Many are the 'Absolute as it appears in particular images',
i.e., the Absolute 'imagined' under the particular forms of the Names.
And from this point of view, the One is the Essence (dhat) which is indicated by the Names and to which retum ail the Names.
At this juncture Ibn 'Arabi uses an interesting expression,
'the names of the world' (as ma' al-' alam),
as a counterpart to the Divine Names (al-asma' al-ilahiyah).4
Whatever really exists in the world of Being is solely
what is indicated by (the word) 'unity' (ahadïyah),
whereas whatever exists only in imagination is
what is indicated by 'multiplicity' (kathrah).
Therefore he who sticks to the multiplicity stands on the side of the world,
the Divine Names and the names of the world,
while he who takes the position of the Unity stands on the side of the Absolute.
The Absolute here is the Absolute considered in the Essence
which is completely independent of the whole world,
not in its aspect of Divinity (i.e., being God) and its phenomenal forms.
In this passage Ibn 'Arabi states that
the Absolute in its Essence is completely 'independent', i.e., has absolutely no need of the world.
It is to be remarked that having no need of the world is the same as having no need of the Divine Names.
The Names are, as we have observed above, the relations in which the Absolute stands to the creatures.
They are there because of, and in the interests of, the creatures.
The Essence in itself is not something which cannot subsist apart from such centrifugai relations. What needs the Names is not the Absolute, but the created world. He says: 5
If the Essence is completely independent of the whole world,
this independence must be the same independence by which the Essence transcends the Names to be attributed to it.
For the Names indicate not only the Essence but particular 'objects named' 6 which are different from the Essence.
This is evidenced by the very effect of the Names.7
Thus, the Divine Names,
in their centrifugai side turning toward multiplicity-diversity, are definitely 'other' than the Absolute,
But in their centripetal side turning toward the Essence,
all the Divine Names are ultimately one because they are reducible to the Absolute.
102]
And in this second aspect, the Absolute at the level of the Names is One as it is at the level of its absoluteness.
The Absolute is in this way. One in two different senses.8
The Unity of God on the level of the Divine Names which require
(the existence of) us (i.e., the phenomenal world) is the Unity of
multiplicity (ahadîyah al-kathrah ).
And the Unity of God in the sense of being completely 'independent' of us and even of the Names is the Unity of essence (ahadîyah al-'ayn).
Both aspects are called by the same name: 'One'.
The Unity of multiplicity here spoken of is also called the Unity of 'unification' (ahadïyah al-jam').
It plays an exceedingly important role in the world-view of Ibn' Arabï, as we have already seen in what precedes and as we shall see in more detail in what follows.
In brief, it is a position which recognizes multiplicity existing in potentia in
the Absolute which is essentially One. 9
We have observed above that the Absolute, in so far as it is the
Absolute, does not need the Names, and that it is the creatures that
need them.
The latter half of this statement, namely, that the world needs the Divine Names, may be formulated in more philosophical terms by saying that the Names have the property of causality ('illïyah or sababïyah). From this point of view, the Divine Names are the 'cause' ('illah or sabab) for the existence of the world. The
world needs the Divine Names in the sense that nothing in the world can exist without them.
There can be no doubt that the world stands in essential need of many
causes. And the greatest of ail the causes which it needs is the
Absolute. But the Absolute can act as the cause needed by the world
only through the Divine Names as its cause.
By 'Divine Names' here is meant every Name that is needed by the
world (as its cause), whether it be part of the world itself or the very
Absolute. In either case it is God, nothing else. 10
This passage makes it clear that, in Ibn' Arabï's view, if the world
essentially needs as its cause the Absolute, it does not need the
Absolute in its absoluteness but in its various aspects, such as
'creativity', 'Lordship', etc.
In other words, the Absolute on the level of the Names is the 'cause' of the world's existence. Regarding the latter half of the passage, nothing, I think, could make its meaning more lucid than the following explanation by al-Qàshànï. 11
The Divine Names are the very things which are needed by the world
(as its causes). (Two cases are distinguished).
The first is when the Name needed is something similar to the thing which needs it: e.g., 'son' needs 'father' in his existence, sustenance and maintenance. In
such a case the things needed are nothing but concrete forms taken by
the Names of the Absolute, i.e., their concrete manifestations.
[103]
The second case occurs when the thing needed is ( directly) the Absolute
itself: e.g., the 'son' is in need of the Absolute, the Former, the
Creator, in having his own form, figure and character. This is differ-
ent from (the first case in which) he needs something similar to
himself (e.g., 'father').
In either case, however, the Name needed is no other than the Name
'Allah'. (This may not be clear) in the first case, (but that it is so will
be known from the following consideration).
The causality of 'father' does not lie in the permanent archetype of 'father', for the latter is (actually) non-existent.
The causality of 'father' comes from 'father' in its real existence, his action, and his power. But the existence (of 'father') is essentially nothing but the Absolute as manifested in a locus of self-manifestation; and the action, the form, the ability, the power, the sustenance, and the maintenance - ail these are but what
naturally follows from existence: they are but Attributes of the Absolute and its Actions (in concrete forms). What properly pertains
to 'father' is only being-receptive and being-a-locus-of-Divine-
self-manifestation. As you already know, however, the one who
merely receives has no positive activity; the positive activity belongs
only to the One which manifests itself in (the receiver as) its locus of
self-manifestation. (The causality of the Absolu te) in the second case
is too obvious to need explanation.
The gist of the argument may conveniently be given in the following
way: in the second case in which the world directly needs God, God
is the 'cause' of the world;
but in the first case, too, in which the things in the world need each other in the form of a cause-caused relation, it is again God who is the ultimate 'cause' of everything.
When, for example, 'son' needs 'father', it is the causality of God
that is working through the medium of 'father'.
We see in this way that everything in this world, every event
which occurs in this world, is an actualization of a Divine Name, that
is to say, a self-manifestation of the Absolute through a definite
relative aspect called Divine Name. The conclusion to be drawn
from this is that there are as many Divine Names as there are things
and events in the world. The Divine Names in this sense are infinite
in number.
이 세상의 모든 것, 이 세상에서 일어나는 모든 사건은 신성한 이름의 실현,
즉 신성한 이름이라는 명확한 상대적 측면을 통한 절대자의 자기 현시입니다.
The Names of God are limitless because they become known by what
comes out of them and what comes out of them is limitless. 12
However, they are reducible to a limited number of basic Names
(usul, lit. 'roots') which are the 'Mothers' of Names or, we might say,
the 'Presences' (i.e., basic dimensions) of ail the Names.
The truth of the matter is that there is only one Reality (haqîqah) that
receives ail these relations and relative aspects which are called the
Divine Names. And this same Reality requires that each of these
Names that come into appearance limitlessly should have its own
reality which distinguishes it from ail other Names.
104]
The Name is this reality which distinguishes each individual Name, not that thing (i.e., the Reality) which is common to all. This situation is comparable to
the fact that the Divine gifts are distinguished from each other by
their individual natures, though they are all from one source.
It is evident that this is different from that, and the reason for this
difference lies in the individual distinction of each Name. Thus in the
Divine world, however wide it is, nothing repeats itself. This is a truly
fundamental fact. 13
Here again, as we see, we are brought back to the basic dictum: the
One is the Many and the Many are the One. Only the dictum is here
interpreted topically in terms of the Divine Names.
The Many, i.e. the Divine Names, determine a point of view from which there is not even one thing that is the same as some other thing, because
'nothing repeats itself' in the world. Even 'one and the same thing'
is not in reality the same in two successive moments. 14
In general, any two things that are normally considered the same are not in
reality the 'same'; they are merely 'similar to each other' (shab-
ihan). And of course, 'similar to each other' means 'different from
each other' (ghayran). 15 However, from the point of view of the
Essence, not only similar things but things that are widely different
from each other, are one and the same thing.
The sage who knows the truth sees multiplicity in 'one'; likewise, he
knows that the Divine Names, even though their (individual) realities
are different and many, all point to one single Entity.
This ( difference among the Names) is but a multiplicity of an intelligible nature (i.e., existent only in potentia) in the reality of the One. And this (intelli-
gible multiplicity) turns into sensible multiplicity to be witnessed in
one single Reality, when (the One) manifests itself (in the world).
The situation may be best understood by what happens to Prime
Matter (hayülà) as it enters the inner structure of every 'form'. In
spite of their multiplicity and diversity, all the 'forms' ultimately are
reducible to one single substance which is their 'matter'. And 'he who
knows himself' in this way 'knows his Lord', because (the Lord) has
created him in His own image, nay, He is the very He-ness of the man
and his true reality. 16
All the Divine Names point to one single Reality, and in this sense
they are, as we have just seen, all one. This, however, does not
mean that all the Names stand on an equal level. On the contrary, a
difference of degrees or ranks is observable among them. This
difference of ranks corresponds to the difference of ranks among
the things of the world. And this is natural because, in Ibn' Arabï's
view, the Divine Names owe their very existence to the ontological
requirements of the things. Ibn 'Arabï explains this difference of
ranks among the Names in the following terms: 17
[105]
There is absolutely nothing except it (i.e., the Absolute). 18 However,
there must also be a certain respect in which we are obliged to use
language of discrimination in order to account for the (observable)
existence of 'higher' and 'lower' in the world, so that we might be able
to talk about (for example) this man being 'more' learned than that,
notwithstanding the essential unity (of 'knowledge') itself. 19 This
implies (that there is a similar difference in rank between Attributes;
that, for example,) the Will, in respect to the number of its objects, is
inferior to Knowledge.
Although Will and Knowledge are both Attributes of God and are
one in this aspect, Will is lower than Knowledge. But that same Will
is higher than Power. This because, generally speaking, 'will' begins
to work only after one 'knows' something, and 'will' not only
precedes 'power' but covers a wider field than the latter. Exactly the
same kind of superior-inferior relation obtains among all the Divine
Names. The thing to which they all point, that is, the Essence, stands
on a transcendental height above all comparisons and relations, but
the things other than the Divine Essence are different in ranks,
some being 'higher' and others 'lower'. Concerning the transcen-
dental height of the Essence Ibn 'Arabi says: 20
The Transcendent (al- 'aliy) in itself is that which possesses the ( abso-
lu te) perfection (kamiil) in which are engulfed all existent things as
well as non-existent relations 21 in such a way that there can absolutely
be no property that is not found therein, whether it be something
which is considered 'good' according to convention, Reason, and the
Divine Law, or something to be judged 'bad' by the same standards.
And this is a state of affairs which is observable exclusively in what is
designated by the Name Allah.
This passage is explicated by al-Qàshànï as follows: 22
The Transcendent with a real and essential - not a relative - height,
possesses an absolute perfection which comprises all the perfections
pertaining to all things. The perfections comprised are (exhaustive),
covering as they do both those that are positively existent and those
that are in the nature of non-existence; some of them are 'good' in
every possible aspect, and some of them are 'bad' in a certain respect.
This last point may be understood if one remembers that some of the
perfections are essentially of a relative nature and are 'bad' in rela-
tion to some of the things; e.g., the valor of a lion in relation to his
prey. But the absolute perfection must not lack even one property or
ethical qualification or action. Otherwise, it would be imperfect in
that particular aspect.
Ibn 'Arabi asserts that such an essential height and an absolute
perfection can only belong to the One as determined by the primary
self-determination on the level of the Onesness (wahidiyah) which
gathers together all the Names.
106]
And this is the Greatest Name (al-ism al-a'zam) which is the very thing designated by the Name Allah or the Name Merciful (al-rahman ). 23 In this state, all the Divine Names which have a positive effect (on the things of the world) are
considered together as a unity; they are not considered in their aspect
of multiplicity.
Such is 'God' as the comprehensive whole unifying all the Names.
As to 'what is not the thing designated by the Name Allah', i.e., all
things that are not God, Ibn' Arabï distinguishes two kinds:
(1) that which is a locus of theophany (majlà, i.e. the place of tajallï), and
(2) that which is a form in God, the word 'form' in this context
meaning a particular Name by which the Divine Essence becomes
determined.
'What is not the thing designated by the Name Allah' is
either a locus of the self-manifestation of it
or a form subsisting in it.
In the former case, it is quite natural that there should occur a difference of ranks
between individual loci.
In the second case, the 'form' in question is the very essential perfection (belonging, as we have seen, to the Transcendent) for the form is nothing other than what is manifested in it (i.e., the Transcendent itself), so that what belongs to that which is designated by the Name Allah must also belong to the form. 24
The meaning of this seemingly obscure passage may be made explicit in the following way.
---
In case 'other than God' signifies a locus of theophany, the One Absolute is witnessed in the concrete things of the world as so many loci of theophany.
In this case the Absolute assumes various different aspects in accordance with the
natures of the individual things. And there naturally arise various ranks and degrees according to the more-or-less of the self-manifestation.25
---
But in case 'other than God' signifies a 'form' in God, various forms are witnessed in the Absolute itself. And in this case, each one of the forms will possess the very same essential perfection which is possessed by the whole, i.e., God. If God possesses perfection, the same perfection must necessarily be possessed by each 'form' because the latter appears in nothing other than God.
The existents thus differ ontologically from each other in rank, but
taken as a whole, they constitute among themselves a well-organized order. And this ontological order corresponds to the order formed by the Divine Names.
Two things are worth remarking concerning this theologico-ontological hierarchy. 신학적-존재론적 위계.
(1) A higher Name implicitly contains all the Names that are lower than itself.
And, correspondingly, a higher existent, as a locus of the self-manifestation of a higher Name, contains in itself all the lower existents.
[107]
(2) Every single Name, regardless of its rank in the hierarchy, contains in a certain sense all the other Names.
And, correspondingly, every single part of the world contains all the other parts of the world.
Ibn' Arabï says: 26
When you assign a higher rank to a Divine Name,
you are thereby calling it (implicitly) by all the Names (that stand lower than it) and attributing to it ail the properties (that belong to the Names of lower
ranks).
The same is true of the things of the world;
every higher being possesses the capacity of comprehending all that is lower than itself.
However, every particle of the world is (virtually) the whole of the
world, that is,
every single particle is capable of receiving into itself all the realities of all single particles of the world.
So the observed fact, for instance,
that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not in any way
prevent the same He-ness of the Absolute being the very essence of Zayd and 'Amr;
nor does it prevent the He-ness being more perfect, more conspicuous in 'Amr than in Zayd.
This situation corresponds to the fact that
the Divine Names differ from each other in rank
while being all no other than the Absolute.
Thus, for example,
God as 'Knower' is more comprehensive, regarding the domain covered,
than God as 'Willer' or 'Powerful',
and yet God is God in every case.
Of the numerous Divine Names,
the greatest and most comprehensive, and the most powerful one is the 'Merciful' (rahman).
It is a 'comprehensive' (shamil) Name in that it gathers all the Names together into a unity.
And the Absolute on this level of unity is called Allah.
In the following two chapters these two Names will be discussed in detail.
====
Notes
1. FU!i., p. 193/153.
2. FU!f., p. 70/79-80.
3. Fu-î., p. 119/104.
4. FU!i., p. 120/104-105.
5. ibid.
6. i.e., particular Attributes which are, more concretely, various particular aspects
of the world.
7. i.e., the fact that the Names indicate besides the Essence the special aspects of the world as something different from the Essence is clearly shown by the created world itself which is the very effect of the Names.
8. FU!f., p. 1211105.
[108]
9. Ibn' Arabi here distinguishes between two types of a}Jadïyah or 'Unity'. In his
technical terminology, the first kind of Unity, i.e., the Unity of multiplicity at the
ontological stage of Divine Names and Attributes, is specifically called wâl.zidïyah
'Oneness (of Many)' and is thereby strictly distinguished from the absolute, pure
Unity (al)adiyah), the Unity of Divine Essence. It will be well to remember that there is in his system one more basic type of a}Jadïyah. It is the Unity of'actions and effects' (a}Jadiyah al-af iil wa-al-iithiir) and is symbolized by the name of the prophet Hüd.
Al-Qâshâni (p. 123) refers to these three types of Unity as follows: 'There are three degrees in the Unity. The first is the Unity of the Essence. (God is called at this stage a}Jad "One" or "Unique" in a non-numerical sense). The second is the Unity of the Na mes. This is the stage of Divinity, and God is called at this stage wa}Jid "One" in a numerical sense). The third is the Unity of Lordship (rubübïyah) or the Unity of actions and effects'. This last kind of Unity means that whatever we may do in this world, whatever may happen in this world, everything is 'walking along the straight road'. Everything, every event, occurs in strict accordance with the law of Being (which is nothing other than the Absolute). Ali are 'one' in this sense.
10. Fu$., p. 122/105-106.
11. p. 122.
12. 'The Essence as the Unity is, in relation to each single thing comes out of it, a
particular Name. Thus whenever a determination comes into being there is a Name therein. And the relations (of the Essence with the things of the world) are limitless because the receptacles (i.e., the things that receive the self-manifestation of the Absolute) and their natural dispositions are limitless. Thus it cornes about that the Names of God are limitless' - al-Qâshâni, p. 38.
13. Fu$., pp. 38-39/65.
14. This is the concept of the 'ever new creation' (khalq jadïd), which will be
discussed in detail later.
15. FU$., p. 152/124-125.
16. ibid.
17. FU$.,p.193/153.
18. He means to say: since everything is a self-manifestation of the Absolute
through a particular Name, ail that exist in the world are nothing but the Absolute.
19. This example properly concerns only the existence of degrees in one single
attribute called 'knowledge'. But the real intention of Ibn' Arabi is to maintain that
there is also a difference of degrees between 'knowledge' itself and other attributes.
20. FU$., p. 69/79.
21. As we have observed before, the relations (nisab) are in themselves essentially non-existent.
22. p. 69.
23. On Allah = the Merciful see the next two chapters which will be devoted
specifically to this question.
[109]
24. Fu$., p. 69179.
25. If, for example, ail the Divine Names are actualized in a thing, it will be the
Perfect Man, while if the most of the Names are manifested, it will be an ordinary
(non-perfect) man, and if the number of the Names manifested happens to be far Jess than that, it will be an inanimate thing - al-Qâshâni, p. 69.
26. Fu$., pp. 193-194/153.
====
Fus = Fusus al Hikam
