SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
Sufism Chapter 5 Metaphysical Perplexity
---
Key words:
- perplexity
- mystical
- spiritual
- God
- Divine
- Absolute
- self-manifestation
- diversify
- Multiplicity
- ego
- self-annihilation
---
As the preceding chapter will have made clear, in Ibn 'Arabi' s
conception, the only right attitude of man toward God is a harmoni-
ous unity composed of tanzih and tashbih, which is realizable solely
on the basis of the mystical intuition of 'unveiling'.
If man follows the direction of Imagination which is not yet
illumined by the experience of 'unveiling', he is sure to fall into the
wrong type of idolatry in which each individual idol is worshipped as
a really independent and self-sufficient god. Such a god is nothing
but a groundless image produced in the mind of man. And the result
is a crude type of tashbih which can never rise to the lev el of tanzih.
If, on the other hand, man tries to approach God by following the
direction of Reason unaided by Imagination, man will inevitably
rush toward an exclusive tanzih, and lose sight of the Divine life
pulsating in ail the phenomena of the world including himself.
The right attitude which combines in itself tanzih and tashbih is, in
short, to see the One in the Many and the Many in the One, or rather
to see the Many as One and the One as Many.
The realization of this kind of coincidentia oppositorum is called by Ibn' Arabi 'perplexity' (hayrah).
As such, this is a metaphysical perplexity because here
man is impeded by the very nature of what he sees in the world from
definitely deciding as to whether Being is One or Many.
Ibn' Arabi explains the conception of 'perplexity' by an original
interpretation of a Qoranic verse.
The verse in question is:
'And they (i.e., the idols) have caused many people to go astray' (LXXI,24).
This is interpreted by Ibn 'Arabi to mean that
the existence of many idols has put men into perplexity
at the strange sight of
the absolute One being actually diversified into Many through its own activity. 1.
The idols in this context represent the multiplicity of forms that
are observable in the world. And, as al-Qâshâni remarks, anybody
who looks at them 'with the eye of unification (tawhid)', i.e., with
the preconception of tanzih, is sure to become embarrassed and
perplexed at the sight of the One being diversified according to the
relations it bears to its loci of self-manifestation.
[69]
The Qoranic verse just quoted ends with another sentence:
'and ( o God) increase Thou not the people of injustice (zàlimin) except
in going astray',
and the whole verse is put in the mouth of Noah.
This second sentence, too, is interpreted by Ibn' Arabi in quite an
original way. The interpretation is, in fact, more than original, for it
squeezes out of the verse a conception of zàlim which is exactly the
opposite of what is meant by the Qoran. He begins by saying that
the word zàlim or 'a man of injustice' here is equivalent to a phrase
which occurs repeatedly in the Qoran,
zàlim li-nafsi-hi, meaning
'he who does injustice or wrong to himself'.
Now according to the actual usage of the Qoran,
'he who wrongs himself' designates a stubborn unbeliever who disobeys God' s commands and by sticking obstinately to polytheism,
drives himself on to perdition.
But, as interpreted by Ibn' Arabi zàlim li-nafsi-hi refers to
- a man who 'does wrong to himself'
- by refusing himself all the pleasures of the present world and
- devotes himself to seeking 'self-annihilation' (fanà') in God. 2
This interpretation is based on another Qoranic verse, namely XXXV, 32,
which reads:
'Some of them are doing injustice to themselves and some of them are moderate,
while some others vie one with another in doing good works with the permission of God'.
And quite opposite to the usual ranking, Ibn' Arabi
considers 'those who do injustice to themselves' the highest and best of ail the three classes of men. [?]
They are, he says, 'the best of all people, the specially chosen of God' .3
Al-Qâshâni quotes, in this connection, a Tradition from al-Tirmidhï's SalJ,ilJ,
which reads:
'These men are ail in one and the same grade; ail of them will be in the Garden'.
He says that this Tradition refers to the three classes of men mentioned in the verse just quoted.
These three classes are, as the Tradition explicitly states, in the same grade in the sense that they ail are destined to go to the Garden, but al-Qâshâni thinks that this does not prevent them from forming a hierarchy,
- the highest being 'those who do injustice to themselves',
- the middle the 'moderate', and
- the lowest 'those who vie with one another in the performance of good works'.
The theoretical explanation he gives of this hierarchy, however,
does not seem to be convincing at ail. lt would seem to be better for
us to take, as Affifi does,
- 'the man who does injustice to himself' as meaning a mystic who has had the experience of 'unveiling' in self-annihilation, and
- 'the moderate man' as meaning 'a man who keeps to the middle course'.
- Then most naturally, 'those who vie one another' would mean those who are still in the earlier stage of the mystical training.
However this may be, what is important for Ibn 'Arabi is the
conception that the 'man who does injustice to himself' occupies the
highest rank precisely by being in metaphysical perplexity. [70]
As is easy to see, this has a weighty bearing on the interpretation of the
latter half of the Qoranic verse, in which Noah implores God to
increase more and more the 'going astray' of the 'people of injustice'.
Noah, according to this understanding, implores God to increase
even more the metaphysical 'perplexity' of the highest class of men,
while the standard, i.e., common-sense, interpretation of the verse
sees Noah calling down Divine curses upon the worst class of men,
the stubbom idol-worshippers.
In exactly the same spirit, Ibn 'Arabï finds a very picturesque
description of this 'perplexity' in a Qoranic verse (II, 20) which
depicts how God trifles with wicked people who are trying in vain to
beguile and delude Him and those who sincerely believe in Him.
하나님은 헛되이 하나님을 미혹하고 미혹하는 악인과 진심으로 하나님을 믿는 자들을 업신여김
A dead darkness settles down upon these people. From time to time
roars frightful thunder, and a flash of lightning 'almost snatches
away their sight'. And 'as often as they are illuminated they walk in
the light, but when it darkens again they stand still'.
This verse in Ibn' Arabï's interpretation, yields a new meaning
which is totally different from what we ordinarily understand.
Although he merely quotes the verse without any comment, what
he wants to convey thereby is evident from the very fact that he
adduces it in support of his theory of 'perplexity'. On behalf of his
Master, al-Qashanï makes it explicit in the following way: 4
This verse describes the 'perplexity' of these people. Thus, when the
light of the Unity (alJ,adïyah) is manifested they 'walk', that is, they
move ahead with the very movement of God, while when it darkens
against them as God becomes hidden behind the veil and the Multi-
plicity appears instead (of Unity) obstructing their view, they just
stand still in 'perplexity'.
This 'perplexity' necessarily assumes the form of a circular move-
ment. 'The man in "perplexity" draws a circle', as Ibn' Arabï says.5
This is necessarily so, because the 'walking' of such a man reflects
the very circle of the Divine self-manifestation.
The Absolute itself
- draws a circle in the sense that it starts from the primordial state of Unity, 'descends' to the plane of concrete beings
- and diversifies itself in myriads of things and events, and
- finally 'ascends' back into the original non-differentiation.
The man in 'perplexity' draws the same circle,
for he 'walks with God, from God, to God,
his onward movement being identical with the movement of God Himself' .6
This circular movement, Ibn' Arabi observes, tums round a pivot
(qutb) or center (markaz), which is God. And since the man is
merely going round and round the center, his distance from God
remains exactly the same whether he happens to be in the state of
Unity or in that of Multiplicity.
Whether, in other words, he is looking at the Absolute
- in its primordial Unity or
- as it is diversified in an infinite number of concrete things,
he stands at the same distance from the Absolute per se.[71]
On the contrary, a man who, his vision being veiled, is unable to
see the truth, is a 'man who walks along a straight road'.
He imagines God to be far away from him, and looks for God afar off.
He is deceived by his own imagination and strives in vain to reach
his imagined God.
In the case of such a man, there is a definite distinction between the 'from' (min, i.e., the starting-point) and the 'to' (ilà, i.e., the ultimate goal), and there is naturally an infinite distance between the two points.
The starting-point is himself imagined to be far away from himself, and the distance between is an imaginary distance which he thinks separates him from God.
Such a man, in spite of his desire to approach Him, goes even farther
from God as he walks along the straight road stretching infinitely ahead.
The thought itself, thus formulated and expressed with the image
of a man walking in a circle and another going ahead along a straight
line, is indeed of remarkable profundity.
As an interpretation of the above-cited Qoranic verse, however, it certainly does not do justice to the meaning given directly by the actual context.
The extraordinary freedom in the interpretation of the Qoran comes out even
more conspicuously when Ibn 'Arabï applies his exegesis to other
verses which he quotes as a conclusive evidence for his thesis. 7
The first is LXXI, 25, which immediately follows the one relating to the
'people who do injustice to themselves'.
lt reads: 'Because of their mistakes (kha(i'àt) they (i.e., the people of injustice), were drowned, and then put into fire. And they found nobody to help them in place of God' .
The word khati'àt meaning 'mistakes' or 'sins' comes from the
root KH-T' which means 'to err' 'to commit a mistake'. lt is a commonly used word with a definite meaning. Ibn 'Arabi, however, completely disregards this etymology, and derives it from the root KH-TT meaning 'to draw lines' 'to mark out'. The phrase min khatï.' àti-him 'from their mistakes' is thus made to mean something like: 'because of that which has been marked out for them as their
personal possessions'.
And this, for Ibn 'Arabï, means nothing other than 'their own individual determinations (ta'ayyunàt)', that is, 'the ego of each person'.
'Because of their egos', i.e., since they had their own egos already
established, they had to be 'drowned' once in the ocean before they
could be raised into the spiritual state of 'self-annihilation' (fanà').
[72]
This ocean in which they were drowned, he says, symbolizes 'knowledge of God', and that is no other than the 'perplexity'. And al-Qashanï: 8
(This 'ocean'-'perplexity') is the Unity pervading all and manifesting
itself in multiple forms.
It is 'perplexing' because of the Unity appearing in a determined form in every single thing and yet remaining non-determined in the whole. (It is 'perplexing') because of its (simultaneous) non-limitation and limitation.
As regards the sentence in the verse: 'then (they) were put into tire',
Ibn' Arabi remarks simply that this holocaust occurred in the very
water, that is, while they were in the ocean. The meaning is again
explicated by al-Qàshàni: 9
This 'fire' is the tire of love ('ishq) for the light of the splendor of His
Face, which consumes ail the determined forms and individual
essences in thé very midst of the ocean of 'knowledge of God' and
true Life. And this true Life is of such a nature that everything comes
to life with it and yet is destroyed by it at the same time. There can be
no perplexity greater than the 'perplexity' caused by the sight of
'drowning' and 'burning' with Life and Knowledge, that is, simul-
taneous self-annihilation and self-subsistence.
Thus 'they found nobody to help them in place of God', because
when God manifested Himself to these sages in His Essence, they
were all burned down, and there remained for them nothing else
than God who was the sole 'helper' for them, i.e., the sole vivifier of
them. God alone was there to 'help' them, and 'they were destroyed
(i.e., annihilated) in Him for ever'. Their annihilation in God was
the very vivification of them in Him. And this is the meaning of
'self-subsistence' (baqa'), of which fana', 'self-annihilation', is but
the reverse side.
If God, instead of destroying them in the ocean, had rescued them
from drowning and brought them back to the shore of Nature (i.e.,
brought them back to the world of limitations and determinations)
they would not have attained to such a high grade (i.e., they would
have lived in the natural world of 'reality' and would have remained
veiled from God by their very individualities).
Ibn' Arabi adds that all this is true from a certain point of view, 10
'although, to be more strict (there is no 'drowning', no 'burning',
and no 'helping' because) everything belongs (from beginning to
end) to God, and is with God; or rather, everything is God.
In a Qoranic verse following the one which bas just been discussed,
Noah goes on to say to God: 'Verily, if Thou shouldst leave them as
they are, they would surely lead Thy slaves astray and would beget
none but sinful disbelievers'.
The words: 'they would surely lead Thy slaves astray' mean,
according to Ibn' Arabi, 11 'they would put Thy slaves into perplexity
and lead them out of the state of being slaves and bring them to their
inner reality which is now hidden from their eyes, namely, the state
of being the Lord.
[73]
(If this happens,) then those who think themselves to be slaves will regard themselves as Lords'. The 'perplexity' here spoken of is considered by al-Qàshàni not the true metaphysical perplexity but a 'Satanic perplexity' (l:tayrah shaytanïyah).
But this is evidently an overstatement. Ibn' Arabi is still speaking of the
same kind of metaphysical 'perplexity' as before. The point he
makes here is that, if one permits those who know the Mystery of
Being to lead and teach the people, the latter will in the end realize
the paradoxical fact that they are not only slaves, as they have
thought themselves to be, but at the same time Lords.
The interpretation which Ibn 'Arabi puts on the ending part of
the verse: 'and would beget none but sinful disbelievers', is even
more shocking to common sense than the preceding one. We must
remember, however, that this interpretation is something quite
natural and obvious to Ibn' Arabi's mind.
The Arabie word which I have translated as 'sinful' is fajir, a
well-established Qoranic term which is derived from the root FJR
meaning 'to commit unlawful, i.e., sinful, acts'. Ibn' Arabi derives it
from another FJR meaning 'to open and give an outlet for water'.
And in this paticular context it is taken in the sense of 'making
manifest' (izhar). Thus the word fajir, instead of meaning 'a man
who commits sinful acts', means 'a man who manifests or unveils
what is veiled'. In a terminology which is more typical of Ibn' Arabi,
a fajir is a man who manifests the Absolu te in the sense that he is a
locus of the Absolute's self-manifestation.
As for the second term translated here as' disbeliever', the Arabie
is kaffar, an emphatic form of kaftr meaning 'one who is ungrateful
to, i.e., disbelieves in, God'. But, as we have observed before, Ibn
'Arabi takes this word in its etymological sense; namely, that of
'covering up'. So kaffar in this context is not an 'ingrate' or 'disbe-
liever', but a man who 'covers up' or bides the Absolute behind the
veil of his own concrete, determined form.
Moreover, it is important to remember, the fajir and kaftr are not
two different persans but one and the same persan. So that the
meaning of this part of the verse amounts to: 'these people would do
nothing but unveil what is veiled and veil what is manifest at the
same time'. As a result, those who see this extraordinary view
naturally fall into 'perplexity'.
But precisely the act of falling into this kind of 'perplexity' is the
very first step to attaining ultimately the real 'knowledge'. And the
'perplexity' here in question has a metaphysical basis. We shall
consider in what follows this point in more theoretical terms,
remaining faithful to Ibn' Arabi's own description.
* * *
[74]
What we must emphasize before everything else is that, in Ibn
'Arabï's world-view, the whole world is the locus of theophany or
the self-manifestation of the Absolute, and that, consequently, all
the things and events of the world are self-determinations of the
Absolute. Therefore, the world of Being cannot be grasped in its
true form except as a synthesis of contraditions. Only by a simul-
taneous affirmation of contradictories can we understand the real
nature of the world. And the 'perplexity' is nothing other than the
impression produced on our minds by the observation of the simul-
taneous existence of contradictories.
Ibn 'Arabï describes in detail some of the basic forms of the
ontological contradiction. And the explanation he gives of the
coincidentia oppositorum is of great value and importance in that it
clarifies several cardinal points of his world-view. Here we shall
consider two most fundamental forms of contradiction.
The first 12 is the contradictory nature of the things of the world as
manifested in the relation between the 'inward' (bii(in) and the
'outward' (ziihir). When one wants to define 'man', for example,
one must combine the 'inward' and the 'outward' of man in his
definition. The commonly accepted definition - 'man is a rational
animal - is the result of the combination, for' animal' represents the
'outward' of man, while 'rational' represents his 'inward', the
former being body and the latter the spirit governing the body. Take
away from a man his spirit, and he will no longer be a 'man'; he will
merely be a figure resembling a man, something like a stone or a
piece of wood. Such a figure does not deserve the name 'man' except
in a metaphorical sense.
Just as man is man only in so far as there is spirit within the body,
so also the 'world' is 'world' only in so far as there is the Reality or
Absolute within the exterior form of the world.
It is utterly impossible that the various forms of the world (i.e., the
things in the empirical world) should subsist apart from the Absolute.
Thus the basic attribute of divinity (ulühïyah) must necessarily per-
tain to the world in the real sense of the word, not metaphorically,
just as it (i.e., the complex of spirit, the 'inward', and body, the
'outward') constitutes the definition of man, so long as we understand
by 'man' a real, living man.
Furthermore, not only is the 'inward' of the world the Reality itself
but its 'outward' also is the Reality, because the 'outward' of the
world is, as we have seen, essentially the forms of theophany. In this
sense, both the 'inward' and 'outward' of the world must be defined
in terms of divinity.[?]
Having established this point, Ibn' Arabï goes on to describe the
strange nature of the praising (thanii') of the 'inward' by the 'outward'.
[75]
'Just as', he says, 'the outward form of man constantly praises with its own tangue the spirit within, so the various forms of the world praise, by a special disposai of God, the inward spirit of the world'.
How does the bodily form of man 'praise with its own tangue' the spirit within? This is explained by al-Qashanï in the following way: 13 The bodily form of man praises the spirit, i.e., the soul, by means of its movements and by manifestation of its peculiar properties and per- fections. (The reason why this is 'praise' is as follows.)
The bodily members of man are in themselves but (lifeless) objects which, were it not for the spirit, would neither move nor perceive anything; besides, the bodily members as such have no virtue at ail such as generosity, liberal giving, magnanimity, the sense of shame, courage, truthfulness, honesty, etc. And since 'to praise' means nothing other than mentioning the good points (of somebody or something), the bodily members (praise the spirit) by expressing (through actions) the virtues of the spirit. Exactly in the same way, the various forms of the world 'praise' the inner spirit of the universe (i.e., the Reality residing within the universe) through their own properties, perfections, indeed, through everything that comes out of them. Thus the world is praising its own 'inward' by its 'outward'.
We, however, usually do not notice this fact, because we do not have a comprehensive knowledge of all the forms of the world. The language of this universal 'praise' remains incomprehensible to us 'just as a Turk cannot understand the language of a Hindu'. 14 The contradictory nature of this phenomenon lies in the fact that if the 'outward' of the world praises its 'inward', properly speaking both the 'outward' and 'inward' are absolutely nothing other than the Absolute itself. Hence we reach the conclusion that the one who praises and the one who is praised are in this case ultimately the same.
The phenomenon just described, of the Absolute praising itself in two forms opposed to each other, is me rel y a concrete case illustrat- ing the more profound and more general fact that the Absolute, from the point of view of man, cannot be grasped except in the form of coincidentia oppositorum. Ibn 'Arabï quotes in support of his view a famous saying of Abü Sa'id al-Kharraz, a great mystic of Bagdad of the ninth century: 'God cannot be known except as a synthesis of opposites'. 15
coincidence of opposites.
[76]
Al-Kharraz, who was himself one of the many faces of the Absolute and one of its many tongues, said that God cannot be known except by attributing opposites to Him simultaneously.
Thus the Absolute is the First and the Last,
the Outward and the lnward.
It is nothing other than what comes out outwardly (in concealing itself inwardly),
whereas in the very moment of coming out outwardly it is what conceals itself inwardly.
There is no one who sees the Absolute except the Absolute itself, and
yet there is no one to whom the Absolute remains hidden. lt is the
Outward (i.e., self-manifesting) to itself, and yet it is the Inward (i.e.,
self-concealing) to itself. The absolute is the one who is called by the
name of Abü Sa'ïd al-Kharraz and by other names of other contingent beings.
The Inward belies the Outward when the latter says 'I', and the
Outward belies the Inward when the latter says 'I'. And this applies
to every other pair of opposites. (In every case) the one who says
something is one, and yet he is the very same one who hears. This is
based on the phrase said by the prophet (Mul)ammad): 'and what
their own souls tell them', indicating clearly that the soul is the
speaker and the hearer of what it says at the sa me time, the knower of
what itself has said. In ail this (phenomenon), the essence itself is one
though it takes on different aspects. Nobody can ignore this, because
everybody is aware of this in himself in so far as he is a form of the
Absolute.
Al-Qàshàni reminds us concerning this fondamental thesis of his
Master that everything, in regard to its ontological source and
ground, is the Absolute, and that all the things of the world are but
different forms assumed by the same essence. The fact that the
phenomenal world is so variegated is simply due to the diversity of
the Divine Names, i.e., the basic or archetypal forms of the Divine
self-manifestation.
Nothing exists except the Absolute. Only it takes on divergent forms
and different aspects according to whether the Names appear out-
wardly or lie hidden inwardly as well as in accordance with the
relative preponderance of the properties of Necessity (wujüb) over
th ose of Possibility (imkân) or conversely: the preponderance of
spirituality, for instance, in some and the preponderance of material-
ity in others. 16
As regards Ibn 'Arabi's words: 'The lnward belies the Outward
when the latter says "I", etc.', al-Qâshâni gives the following
explication:
Each one of the Divine Names affirms its own meaning, but what it
affirms is immediately negated by an opposite Name which affirms its
own. Thus each single part of the world affirms its own I-ness by the
very act of manifesting its property, but the opposite of that part
immediately denies what the former has affirmed and brings to
naught its self-assertion by manifesting in its turn a property which is
the opposite of the one manifested by the first.
[77]
Each of the two, in this way, declares what it has in its own nature,
and the other responds (negatively) to it. But (in essence) the one
which declares and the one which responds are one and the same
thing. As an illustration of this, Ibn' Arabï refers to a (famous) saying
of the prophet (Mul)ammad) describing how God pardons the sins
committed by the people of this community, namely, 'both what their
bodily members have done and what their souls have told them (to
do) even if they do not actually do it.' This is right because it often
happens that the soul tells a man to do something ( evil) and he
intends to do it, but is detained from it by another motive. In such a
case, the man himself is the hearer of what his own soul tells him, and
he becomes conscious of the conflicting properties at work in himself
when he hesitates to do the act.
The man at such a moment is the speaker and the hearer at the same
time, the commander and the forbidder at the same time. Morover,
he is the knower of ail this. And (he manifests and gathers in himself
ail these contradictory properties), notwithstanding his inner essence
being one and the same, by dint of the diversity of his faculties and
governing principles of his actions such as reason, imagination, repul-
sion, desire etc. Such a man is an image of the Absolute (which is
essentially one) in its divergent aspects and the properties coming
from the Names.
Close to the relation between the 'inward' and 'outward' is the
contradictory relation between the One and the Many. The two
kinds of contradictory relations are, at bottom, one and the same
thing. For the dictum that the Absolute (or the world) is One and
yet Many, Many and yet One, arises precisely from the fact that the
infinitely various and divergent things of the world are but so many
phenomenal forms of one unique Being which is the Absolute.
The (apparent) difference is due to our taking a slightly different view-
point in each case.
Regarding the second relation which we will now consider, Ibn
'Arabi offers two explanations, one mathematical and the other
ontological. We begin with the 'mathematical' aspect of the
problem.
The structure of the metaphysical fact that the One appears in the
multiplicity of things, and the things that are many are ultimately
reducible to the One or the Absolute, is identical with the structure
of the reciprocal relation between the mathematical 'one', which is
the very source of all numbers, and the numbers.
The numbers are produced in a serial form by the (repetition of)
'one'. Thus the 'one' brings into existence the numbers, white the
numbers <livide the 'one', (the oqly essential difference between
them being that) a 'number' subsists as a number by virtue of some-
thing which is counted. 17
[78]
Ontologically, as we have seen, the diversification of the unique
Essence by concrete delimitations and various degrees is the cause
of things and events being observable related to one another in an
infinitely complicated manner. The basic structure of this
phenomenon, however, is quite simple. lt is, Ibn 'Arabi says, the
same as the proceeding of the infinite series of numbers out of' one'.
In his view, the mathematical 'one' is the ultimate source of all
numbers, and the numbers are nothing but various forms in which
'one' manifests itself.
'One' itself is not a number; it is the source or ground of all
numbers. Every number is a phenomenal form of'one' brought into
being by the repetition of the latter (just as all the things in the world
are products of the one Essence 'repeating itself', mutakarrir, in
various forms of self-determination). 18 The important point is that a
number thus constituted by repetition of 'one', is not a mere con-
glomeration of the units, but an independent reality (}Jaqiqah ). For
example, the number 'two' is explained by al-Qâshânï in the follow-
ing way: 19
When 'one' manifests itself (tajallà )20 in a different form it is called
'two'. But 'two' is nothing other than 'one' and 'one' put together,
while 'one' itself is not a number. It is to be remarked that the
structure of this putting together (of two 'one's) is one, and the
product of this putting together, which is called 'two', is also one
number. So that the essential form here is one, the matter is one, and
the two 'one's put together is also one, i.e., 'one' manifesting itself in
a form of the Many. Thus 'one' produces the number ('two') by
manifesting itself in two different forms. The same is true of 'three',
for example, which is 'one' and 'one' and 'one', and the nature and
structure of its one-ness is exactly the same as in the case of 'two'.
Thus, all the numbers are each a particular form in which 'one'
manifests itself according toits peculiar determination and the rank
it occupies in the numerical series.
It is very important to note that the numbers brought into being in
this way are all intelligibles (haqà'iq ma'qûlah, lit. 'realities grasped
by Reason'), and have no existence in the external world; they exist
only in our mind. They exist in the external world merely in so far as
they are recognizable in the objects that are countable. This must be
what is meant by Ibn 'Arabï when he says (in the above-quote
passage) that a 'number' is actualized only by something which is
counted. And tkis situation corresponds exactly to the ontological
structure of the world of Being.
'Something which is counted' (ma'dûd), in al-Qâshânï's interpre-
tation, refers to the One Reality which manifests itself and
diversifies itself in the Many. But this is clearly a misinterpretation.
The ma'dûd in this context must denote a concrete object which
exists in the external world and which manifests the transcendental
'one' in a concrete form.
[79]
In terms of the correspondence between the mathematical and the ontological order of being, 'one' corresponds to the One Reality, i.e., the Absolute, and the numbers that are intelligibles correspond to permanent archetypes, and finally
the 'countable things' correspond to the things of the empirical
world. Balï Efendi brings out this system of correspondences with
an admirable lucidity: 21
You must notice that 'one' corresponds symbolically to the one inner
essence ('ayn) which is the reality itself of the Absolute, while the
numbers correspond to the multiplicity of the Names arising from the
self-manifestation of that reality (i.e., of the Absolute) in various
forms in accordance with the requirement of its own aspects and
relations. (The multiplicity of the Names here spoken of) is the
multiplicity of the permanent archetypes in the Knowledge (i.e.,
within the Divine Consciousness). Finally, the 'things counted' cor-
respond to the concrete things of this world, that is, creaturely forms
of theophany, without which neither the properties of the Na mes nor
the states of the permanent archetypes can become manifest (in the
external world in a concrete way).
Only when we understand the word 'things counted' in this sense,
are we in a position to see correctly what is meant by the following
words of Ibn 'Arabï: 22
The 'thing counted' partakes of both non-existence and existence, for
one and the sa me thing can be non-existent on the lev el of the senses
while being existent on the level of the intellect. 23 So there must be
both the 'number' and the 'thing counted'.
But there must be, in addition, also 'one' which causes all this and is
caused by it.24 (And the relation between 'one' and the numbers is to
be conceived as follows.) Every degree in the numerical series (i.e.,
every number) is in itself one reality. (Thus each number is a self-
subsistent unity and) not a mere conglomeration, and yet, on the
other hand, there certainly is a respect in which it must be regarded as
'one's put together. Thus 'two' isone reality (though it is a 'gathering'
of'one' and 'one'), 'three' is alsoone reality (though it is a 'gathering'
of 'one' and 'one' and 'one'), and so on, however far we go up the
numerical series. Since each number is in this way one (i.e., an
independent reality), the essence of each number cannot be the same
as the essences of other numbers. And yet, the fact of 'gathering' (of
'one's) is common to all of them (i.e., as a genus, as it were, which
comprises all the species). Thus we admit the (existence of) various
degrees (i.e., different numbers, each being unique as an indepen-
dent number) in terms of the very essence of each one of them,
recognizing at the same time that they are all one. 25 Thus we inevi-
tably affirm the very thing which we think is to be negated in itself. 26
[80]
He who has understood what 1 have established regarding the nature
of the numbers, namely, that the negation of them is at the sa me time
the affirmation of them, must have thereby understood how the
Absolute in tanzïh is at the same time the creatures in tashbïh,
although there is a distinction between the Creator and the creatures.
The truth of the matter is that we see here the Creator who is the
creatures and the creatures who are the Creator. Moreover, all this
'arises from one unique Essence; nay, there is nothing but one unique
Essence, and it is at the same time many essences.
In the eye of a man who has understood by experience the ontologi-
cal depth of this paradox the world appears in an extraordinary form
which an ordinary mind can never believe to be true. Such an
experience consists in penetrating into the 'real situation' (amr)
beyond the veils of normal perception and thought. In illustration,
Ibn' Arabï gives two concrete examples from the Qoran.27 The first
is the event of Abraham going to sacrifice his own son Isaac, and the
second is the marriage of Adam with Eve.
(Isaac said to his father Abraham): 'My father, do what you have
been commanded to do!' (XXXVII, 102). The child (Isaac) is essen-
tially the same as his father. So the father saw ( when he saw himself in
his vision sacrificing his son) nothing other than himself sacrificing
himself. 'And We ransomed him (i.e., Isaac) with a big sacrifice'
(XXXVII, 107). At that moment, the very thing which (earlier) had
appeared in the form of a human being (i.e., Isaac) appeared in the
form of a ram. And the very thing which was 'father' appeared in the
form of 'son', or more exactly in the capacity of 'son'.
(As for Adam and Eve, it is said in the Qoran): 'And (your Lord)
created from it (i.e., the first soul which is Adam) its mate' (IV, 1).
This shows that Adam married no other than himself. Thus from him
issued both his wife and his child. The reality is one but assumes many
forms.
Of this passage, al-Qâshânï gives an important philosophical expla-
nation.28 It is to be remarked in particular that, regarding the
self-determination of the Absolute, he distinguishes between the
'universal self-determination' (al-ta'ayyun al-kulliy ), i.e., self-
determination on the level of species, and the particular or
'individual self-determination' (al-ta'ayyun al-juz'iy). These two
self-determinations correspond to the ontological plane of the
archetypes and that of the concrete things.
'The reality is one but assumes many forms' means that what is in
reality the one unique Essence multiplies itself into many essences
through the multiplicity of self-determinations.
These self-determinations are of two kinds: one is 'universal' by
which the Reality in the state of Unity becomes 'man', for example,
and the other is 'individual' by which 'man' becomes Abraham. Thus,
in this case, (the one unique Essence) becomes 'man' through the
universal self-determination: and then, through an individual self-
determination, it becomes Abraham, and through another (indi-
vidual self-determination) becomes lshmael. 29
[81]
In the light of this, (Abraham, notas an individual named Abraham,
but on the level of) 'man' before individuation, did not sacrifice
anything other than himself by executing the 'big sacrifice' (i.e., by
sacrificing the ram in place of his son). For (the ram he saerificed) was
in reality (i.e., if we consider it on the level of the Absolute
before any self-determination). (It appeared in the form of the ram
because) the Absolu te determined itself by a different universal
self-determination30 (into 'ram') and then by an individual self-
determination (into the particular ram which Abraham sacrificed.)
Thus the same one Reality which had appeared in the form of a man
appeared in the form of a ram by going through two different self-
determinations, once on the level of species, then on the level of
individuals.
Since 'man' remains preserved both in father and child on the level of
the specific unity, (Ibn 'Arabi) avoids aftirming the difference of
essence in father and child and affirms only the difference of 'capa-
city' (l:iukm) saying 'or more exactly, in the capacity of son'. This he
does because there is no difference at all between the two in essence,
that is, in so far as they are' man'; the difference arises only in regard
to their 'being father' and 'being son' respectively.
The same is true of Adam and Eve. Both of them and their children
are one with respect to their 'being man'.
Thus the Absolu te is one in itself, but it is multiple because of its
various self-determinations, specific and individual. These self-
determinations do not contradict the real Unity. In conclusion we
say: (The Absolute) is One in the form of Many.
It is remarkable that here al-Qâshânï presents the contradictory
relation between the One and the Many in terms of the Aristotelian
conception of genus-species-individual. There is no denying that
the world-view of Ibn' Arabï has in fact a conspicuously philosophi-
cal aspect which admits of this kind of interpretation. However, the
problem of the One and the Many is for Ibn 'Arabï primarily a
matter of experience. No philosophical explanation can do justice
to his thought unless it is backed by a persona! experience of the
Unity of Being (walJdah al-:wujüd). The proposition: 'Adam mar-
ried himself', for example, will never cease to be perplexing and
perturbing to our Reason until it is transformed into a matter of
experience.
Philosophical interpretation is after ail an afterthought applied to
the naked content of mystical intuition. The naked content itself
cannot be conveyed by philosophical language. Nor is there any
linguistic means by which to convey immediately the content of
mystical intuition. If, in spite of this basic fact, one forces oneself to
express and describe it, one has to have recourse to a metaphorical
or analogical language. And in fact, Ibn' Arabï introduces for this
purpose a number of comparisons. Here I give two comparisons
which particularly illumine the relation of the One and the Many.
[82]
---
The first is the organic unity of the body and the diversity of the
bodily members.31
These forms (i.e., the infinite forms of the phenomenal world) are
comparable to the bodily members of Zayd. A man, Zayd, is admit-
tedly one personal reality, but his hand is neither his foot nor his head
nor his eye nor his eyebrow. So he is Many which are One. He is
Many in the forms and One in his person.
In the same way, 'man' is essentially One no doubt, and yet it is also
clear that 'Umar is not the same as Zayd, nor Khâlid, nor Ja'far. In
spite of the essential one-ness of 'man', the individual exemplars of it
are infinitely man y. Thus man is One in essence, while he is Many
both in regard to the forms (i.e., the bodily members of a particular
man) and in regard to the individual exemplars.
---
The second is a comparison of the luxuriant growth of grass after a
rainfall. It is based on the Qoran, XXII, 5, which reads: 'Thou seest
the earth devoid of life. But when We send down upon it water, it
thrills, swells up, and puts forth all magnificent pairs of vegetation'.
He says: 32
Water13 , is the source of life and movement for the earth, as is indicated
by the expression: 'it thrills'. 'It swells up' refers to the fact that the
earth becomes pregnant through the activity of water. And 'it puts
forth all magnificent pairs of vegetation', that is, the earth gives birth
only to things that resemble it, namely, 'natural' things like the
earth.34 And the earth obtains in this way the property of 'double-
ness' by what is born out of it.35
Likewise, the Absolute in its Being obtains the property of multiplic-
ity and a variety of particular names by the world which appears from
it. The world, because of its ontological nature, requires that the
Divine Names be actualized. And as a result, the Divine Names
become duplicated by the world (which has arisen in this way), and
the unity of the Many (i.e., the essential unity of the Divine Names)
cornes to stand opposed to the world.36 Thus (in the comparison of
the earth and vegetation, the earth) is a unique substance which is
one essence like (the Aristotelian) 'matter' (hayülà). And this unique
substance which is one in essence is man y in its forms which appear in
it and which it contains within itself.
The same is true of the Absolute with all the forms of its self-
manifestation that appear from it. So the Absolute plays the role of
the locus in which the forms of the world are manifested, but even
then it main tains intact the intelligible unity. See how wonderful is
this Divine teaching, the secret of which God discloses to some only
of His servants as He likes.
[83]
The general ontological thesis that the Many of the phenomenal
world are all particular forms of the absolute One in its self-
manifestation
is of extreme importance in Ibn' Arabï's world-view
not only because of the central and basic position it occupies in his
thought but also because of the far-reaching influence it exercises
on a number of problems in more particular fields.
As an interesting example of the application of this idea to a special problem,
I shall here discuss the view entertained by Ibn 'Arabï concerning the
historical religions and beliefs that have arisen among mankind.
The starting-point is furnished by the factual observation that
- various peoples in the world have always worshipped and are wor-shipping various gods.
- If, however, all the things and events in the world are but so many self-manifestations of the Absolute,
- the different gods also must necessarily be considered various special forms in which the Absolute manifests itself.
- All gods are ultimately one and the same God,
- but each nation or each community believes in, and worships, Him in a special form.
Ibn 'Arabï names it 'God as created in various religious beliefs'.
And pushing this argument to its extreme, he holds that each man
has his own god, and worships his own god, and naturally denies the
gods of other people. God whom each man thus worships as his god
is the Lord (rabb) of that particular man.
In truth, everybody worships the same one God through different
forms.
Whatever a man worships, he is worshipping indirectly God
Himself.
This is the true meaning of polytheism or idolatry.
And in this sense, idol-worship is, as we have seen above, nothing blam-
able.
---
In order to bring home this point, Ibn' Arabï refers to an article of
belief which every Muslim is supposed to acknowledge; namely,
that God on the day of Resurrection will appear in the presence of
the believers in diverse forms. 37
You must know for sure, if you are a real believer, that God will
appear on the day of Resurrection (in various forms successively):
first in a certain form in which He will be recognized, next in a
different form in which He will be denied, then He will transform
Himself into another form in which He will be again recognized.
Throughout this whole process, He will remain He; in whatever form
He appears it is He and no one else. Yet, on the other hand, it is also
certain that this particular form is not the same as that particular
form.
Thus, the situation may be described as the one unique Essence
playing the role of a mirror. A man looks into it, and if he sees there
the particular image of God peculiar to his religion he recognizes it
and accepts it without question. If, however, he happens to see an
image of God peculiar to some other religion than his, he denies it.
This is comparable to the case in which a man sees in a mirror his own
image, then the image of some one else. In either case, the mirror is
one substance while the images reftected upon it are many in the eye
of the man who looks at it. He cannot see in the mirror one unique
image comprising the whole.38
[84]
Thus the truth itself is quite simple: in whatever form God appears
in the mirror, it is always a particular phenomenal form of God, and
in this sense every image (i.e., every object worshipped as a god) is
ultimately no other than God Himself. This simple fact, however, is
beyond the reach of Reason. Reason is utterly powerless in a matter
of this nature, and the reasoning which is the activity of Reason is
unable to grasp the real meaning of this phenomenon.39 The only
one who is able to do sois the real 'knower' ('ârin. Ibn' Arabï calls
such a true 'knower' who, in this particular case, penetrates into the
mystery of the paradoxical relation between the One and the Many,
a 'worshipper of the Instant' ('âbid al-waqt),40 meaning thereby a
man who worships every self-manifestation of God at every
moment as a particular form of the One.
Those who know the truth of the matter show a seemingly negative
attitude toward the various forms which ordinary people worship as
gods. (But this attitude of denial is merely a make-believe. In reality
they do not deny such a form of worship for themselves) for the high
degree of spiritual knowledge makes them behave according to the
dictates of the Instant. In this sense they are 'worshippers of the
Instant.' 41
In the consciousness of such men of high spirituality, each Instant is
a glorious 'time' of theophany.
신현 (Theophany) 신현이란 신의 현현
The Absolute manifests itself at
every moment with this or that of its Attributes. The Absolute,
viewed from this angle, never ceases to make a new self-
manifestation, and goes on changing its form from moment to
moment.42
And the true 'knowers', on their part, go on responding with flexibility to this ever changing process of Divine self-manifestation.
Of course, in so doing they are not worshipping the changing forms themselves that come out outwardly on the surface;
they are worshipping through the ever changing forms the One that
remains etemally unchanging and unchangeable.
These men know, further, that not only themselves but even the
idol-worshippers are also (unconsciously) worshipping God beyond
the idols. This they know because they discem in the idol-worshippers the majestic power of Divine self-manifestation (sultân al-tajalli) working actively quite independently of the conscious minds of the worshippers.43
If, in spite of this knowledge, the 'knowers' hold outwardly an
attitude of denial toward idolatry, it is because they want to follow
the footsteps of the prophet Muhammad. The prophet forbad
idol-worship because he knew that the understanding of the mass of
people being shallow and superficial, they would surely begin to
worship the 'forms' without going beyond them. He urged them,
instead, to worship One God alone whom the people could know
only in a broad general way but never witness (in any concrete
form). The attitude of the 'knowers' toward idol-worship is pious
imitation of this attitude of Muhammad.
[85]
Let us go back to the point from which we started. We opened this chapter with a discussion of the problem of 'perplexity' (IJ,ayrah).
We are now in a better position to understand the true nature of the
'perplexity' and to see to what extent the ontological structure of
Being is really 'perplexing'.
A brief consideration of the problem at this stage will make a suitable conclusion to the present chapter.
An infinity of things which are clearly different from each other
and some of which stand in marked opposition to one another are,
with all the divergencies, one and the same thing.
The moment man becomes aware of this fact, it cannot but throw his mind into
bewildering confusion. This 'perplexity' is quite a natural state for
those who have opened their eyes to the metaphysical depth of Being.
But on reftection it will be realized that the human mind falls into
this 'perplexity' because it has not yet penetrated deeply below the
level of superficial understanding.
In the mind of a sage who has experienced the Unity of Being in its real depth there can no longer be any place for any 'perplexity'.
Here follows what Ibn' Arabï says on this point.44
The 'perplexity' arises because the mind of man becomes polarized
(i.e., toward two contradictory directions, one toward the One and
the other toward the Many). But he who knows (by the experience of
'unveiling') what I have just explained is no longer in 'perplexity', no
matter how many divergent things he may come to know. For (he
knows that) the divergence is simply due to the nature of the locus,
and that the locus in each case is the eternal archetype itself of the
thing. The Absolute goes on assuming different forms in accordance
with different eternal archetypes, i.e., different loci of self-
manifestation, and the determinate aspects which man perceives of it
go on changing correspondingly. In fact, the Absolute accepts every
one of these aspects that are attributed to it. Nothing, however, is
attributed to it except that in which it manifests itself (i.e., the
particular forms of its self-manifestation). And there is nothing at all
(in the whole world of Being) except this.45
On the basis of this observation al-Qashanï gives a final judgment
concerning the metaphysical 'perplexity'. It is, he says, merely a
phenomenon observable in the earliest stage of spiritual development.46
The 'perplexity' is a state which occurs only in the beginning when
there still lingers the activity of Reason and the veil of thinking still
remains. But when the 'unveiling' is completed and the immediate
intuitive cognition becomes purified, the 'perplexity' is removed with
a sudden increase of knowledge coming from the direct witnessing of
the One manifesting itself in diverse forms of the archetypes in
accordance with the essential requirement of the Name 'All-knowing' ('alïm). 41
[86]
=====
Notes
1. FU$., p. 55/72.
2. Cf. Affifi, Fu$., Corn., p. 40; FU$., p. 56/72-73.
3. Reference to Qoran, XXXVIII, 47.
4. p. 56.
5. FU$., p. 56/73.
6. Qâshânï, p. 56.
7. FU$., p. 57173.
8. p. 57.
9. ibid.
10. i.e., from the point of view of the Names, in whose plane alone there corne into
existence all these diff erences in degrees.
11. FU$., p. 58/7 4.
12. FU$., p. 48/69.
13. p. 48.
14. Qâshânï, ibid.
15. FU$., p. 64/77.
16. p. 64.
17. FU$., p. 64/77.
18. The words in parentheses belong to al-Qâshânï, p. 65.
19. ibid.
20. It is to be remarked that the multiplication of the mathematical 'one' is described
in terms of 'self-manifestation' (tajallî) just in the same way as the Absolute is
described as 'manifesting itself' in the Many.
T Metaphysical Perplexity 87
21. p. 65, footnote.
22. FU$., p. 65/77-78.
23. i.e., one and the same thing qua 'number' is non-existent on the level of the
senses, existing only on the level of intellect, but it is, qua 'a thing counted', existent
on the level of the senses. In other words, it is the 'thing counted' that makes a
'number' exist in a concrete, sensible form. The same applies to the relation between
an archetype and a thing which actualizes it in a sensible form.
24. i.e., besides the 'number' and the 'thing counted', there must necessarily be also
'one' which is the ultimate source of ail numbers and things counted. But 'one' which
th us causes and establishes the numbers is also caused and established by the latter in
concrete forms.
25. That is to say: we admit the one-ness (i.e., uniqueness) of each number, while
recognizing at the same time the one-ness (i.e., sameness) of ail numbers.
26. You affirm of every number that which you negate of it when you consider it in
itself. This may be explained in more concrete terms in the following way. You admit
the inherence of 'one' in every number; 'one' is the common element of al! the
numbers and is, in this respect, a sort of genus. But, on the other hand, you know that
'one' is not inherent in every number in its original form but only in a particularized
form in each case; 'one' may be considered a sort of species as distinguished from
genus. Thus 'one', although it does exist in every number, is no longer the 'one' perse
in its absoluteness. And this precisely corresponds to the ontological situation in
which the Absolute is manifested in everything, but not as the absolute Absolute.
27. FU$., p. 67/78.
28. p. 67.
29. the Absolute
. /\ .. (umversal self-determmat1on)
I \
'ram' 'man'
/\ Î".
( individual ) ( individual ) self-determination self-determination
this ram / that ram Abraham f "' lshmael
30. i.e., by a specific self-determination different from the self-determination by
which the Absolu te became 'man'.
31. Fu$., pp. 231-232/183--184.
32. FU$., p. 253/200.
33. 'Water' for Ibn' Arabi is a symbol of cosmic Life.
34. The idea is that the earth produces only 'earth-like' things, i.e., its own 'dupli-
cates', the symbolic meaning of which is that the things of the world are ultimately of
the same nature as the Absolute which is their ontological ground.
88 Sufism and Taoism
35. i.e., the luxuriant vegetation which grows forth from the earth, being of the same
nature as the latter, 'doubles' so to speak the earth.
36. This is a difficult passage, and there is a remarkable divergence between the
Cairo edition and that of Affifi. The Affifi text reads: fa-thahata hi-hi wa-khâliqi-hi
al)adiyah al-kathrah 'thus the unity of the Many becomes established by the world
and its Creator'. The Cairo edition, which 1 follow here, reads: fa-thunniyat hi-hi
wa-yukhâlifu-hu al)adïyah al-kathrah.
37. .• p. 232/184.
38. i.e., what he actually sees in the mirror is always the particular image of a
particular object which happens to be there in front of the mirror; he can never see a
universal image comprising al! the particular images in unity.
39. p. 233/185.
40. The word waqt 'Time' in this context means, as al-Qashanï remarks, the present
moment, or each successive moment as it is actualized (p. 247).
41. p. 247/196.
42. a view comparable with the atomistic metaphysics of Islamic theology.
43. p. 247/196.
44. ., p. 68178.
45. Ali the divergent aspects (al)kâm) that are recognizable in the world of Being are
so many actualizations of the eternal archetypes. And the eternal archetypes, in their
turn, are nothing but so many self-manifestations of the Absolute. In this sense
everything is ultimately the Absolu te. And there is no place for 'perplexity'.
46. p. 68.
47. The archetypes are, as we shall see later in more detail, the eternal essential
forms of the things of the world as they exist in the Divine Consciousness. They are
born in accordance with the requirement of the Attribute of Omniscience.
