Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P3Part III - A Comparative Reflection

SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

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Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reflection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

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Part 111

CONCLUSION

A Comparative Reflection

Methodological Preliminaries

As stated in the Introduction to Part One of this work, I started this

study prompted by the conviction that what Professor Henry Cor-

bin calls 'un dialogue dans la métahistoire' is something urgently

needed in the present world situation. For at no time in the history

of humanity has the need for mutual understanding among the

nations of the world been more keenly felt than in our days. 'Mutual

understanding' may be realizable - or at least conceivable - at a

number of different levels of life. The philosophical level is one of

the most important of them. And it is characteristic of the

philosophical level that, unlike other levels of human interest which

are more or less closely connected with the current situations and

actual conditions of the world, it provides or prepares a suitable

locus in which the 'mutual understanding' here in question could be

actualized in the form of a meta-historical dialogue. And meta-

historical dialogues, conducted methodically, will, I believe, event-

ually be crystallised into a philosophia perennis in the fullest sense

of the term. For the philosophical drive of the human Mind is,

regardless of ages, places and nations, ultimately and fundamentally

one.

I readily admit that the present work is far from even coming

close to this ideal. But at least such was the motive from which I

undertook this study. In the first Part, an attempt was made to lay

bare the fondamental philosophical structure of the world-view of

Ibn 'Arabi, one of the greatest mystic-philosophers. The analytic

work was done quite independently of any comparative considera-

tions. I simply tried to isolate and analyze as rigorously as possible

the major concepts that constitute the basis of Ibn 'Arabï' s

philosophical world-view in such a way that it might forma com-

pletely independent study.

The second Part dealing with Lao-tzii and Chaung-tzii is of a

slightly different nature. Of course it is in itself an equally indepen-

dent study of Taoist philosophy, which could very well be read as

such. But it is slightly different from the first Part in one point,

namely, that in isolating key-concepts and presenting them in a

470 Sufism and Taoism

systematic way, 1 already began preparations for the work of co-

ordination and comparison. By this 1 am not simply referring to the

fact that in the course of this work mention was made from time to

time of this or that part of Ibn' Arabi's thought. 1 am referring to

something more fondamental and of a more methodological nature.

1 have just spoken of the 'preparatory work for co-ordination and

comparison'. Concretely, this refers to the fact that 1 consciously

arranged and presented the whole matter in such a way that the very

analysis of the key-concepts of Taoism might bring to light the

common philosophical ground upon which the meta-historical

dialogue could become possible. Let this not be taken to mean that 1

modified the given material with a view to facilitating comparison,

let alone distorted the given facts, or forced something upon Lao-

tzu and Chuang-tzu for such a purpose. The fact is rather that an

objective analysis of Taoist key-terms naturally led me to the dis-

covery of a central idea which might work as the most basic connect-

ing link between the two systems of thought. The only arbitrary

thing 1 did - if 'arbitrary' it was - consisted in my having given a

philosophical 'name' to the central idea. The name is 'existence'.

And the name once established, 1 could characterize the guiding

spirit of the philosophical world-view of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu as

'existentialist' as opposed to the 'essentialist' tendency of the Con-

focian school.

1think1 have made it abundantly clear in the course of the second

Part that by understanding the philosophy of Lao-tzu and Chuang-

tzu in terms of 'existence', 1 have not arbitrarily forced upon them

anything alien to their thought. The only point is that the Taoist

sages themselves do not propose any definite 'name' for this particu-

lar idea, whereas Ibn 'Arabi has the word wujüd which is, histori-

cally as well as structurally, the exact Arabie expression for the same

idea. Certainly, Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu do use the wordyu mean-

ing'being' or'existence' in contradistinction from wu 'non-beil)g' or

'non-existence'. But, as we have seen,yu in their system plays a very

special rôle which is different from that of 'existence' here in ques-

tion. The yu refers to a particular aspect or stage of the creative

activity of the Absolute, the stage at which the absolutely 'nameless'

Absolute definitely turns into the 'named' and begins to be

diversified into myriads of things.

Far better than yu in this respect is the word tao, the Way, which is

primarily an exact Taoist counterpart of the Islamic IJ,aqq, the Tru th

or Reality. But tao, to. begin with, is a word having an extremely

complex connotative structure. It covers an extensive semantic

field, ranging from the Mystery of Mysteries to the 'being-so-of-

itself' of all existents. Its meaning is, so to speak, tinged with

variegated nuances and charged with many associations. Certainly

Methodological Preliminaries 471

it does cover to a great extent the meaning of'existence'. But if used

as an equivalent of 'existence' it would inevitably add many ele-

ments to the basic meaning of 'existence'. The use of the term

'taoism', for example, instead of 'existentialism' in those contexts

where we want to bring out the radical contrast between the fonda-

mental position of Taoism and 'essentialism' - which by the way, is

an English equivalent chosen for the Confocian conception of

'names' (ming)-would make the whole situation more obscure and

confosing. In order to refer to the particular aspect of the tao in

which it is conceived as the actus purus, it is absolutely necessary

that we should have a far less 'colorfol' word than tao. And 'exist-

ence' is just the word for its purpose.

These considerations would seem to lead us to a very important

methodological problem regarding the possibility of meta-historical

dialogues. The problem concerns the need of a common linguistic

system. This is only natural because the very concept of 'dialogue'

presupposes the existence of a common language between two

interlocutors.

When our intention happens to be to establish a philosophical

dialogue between two thinkers belonging to one and the same

cultural and historical background, Plato and Aristotle, for

instance, or Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, Kant and Hegel,

etc., the problem of the necessity of a common language does not of

course arise. The problem begins to make itself felt when we pickup

within a cultural tradition two thinkers separated one from the

other by a number of factors, like Aristotle and Kant, for example.

Each of them philosophized in a language which is different from

that of the other. There is, in this sense, no common language

between them. But in a broad sense, we can still say that there is a

common philosophical language between the two, because of the

strong tie of a common philosophical tradition that bind them

together inseparably. lt is, in fact, hardly imaginable that any key-

term of primary importance in Greek should not find its equivalent

in German.

The linguistic distance naturally becomes more conspicuous

when we want to establish a dialogue between two thinkers belong-

ing to two different cultural traditions, Avicenna and Thomas

Aquinas, for example. But even here we are still justified in recog-

nizing the existence of a common philosophical language in view of

the fact that in the last analysis they represent but two varieties of

scholastic philosophy, both of which ultimately go back to one and

the same Greek source. The concept of 'existence', for instance -in

the linguistic form of wujüd in Arabie and in that of existentia in

Latin - appears with the same basic connotation in both the Eastern

472 Sufism and Taoism

and Western scholastic traditions. Thus the problem of a common

language does not arise in a very acute form.

The problem does arise with real acuity where there is no histori-

cal connection in any sense whatsoever between the two thinkers.

And this is precisely the case with Ibn 'Arabï and Lao-tzii or

Chuang-tzu. In such a case, if there happens to be a central concept

active in both systems, but having its linguistic counterpart only in

one of the systems, we have to pinpoint the concept in the system in

which it is in astate of non-linguistic ftuidity or amorphousness, and

then stabilize it with a definite 'name'. The 'name' may be borrowed

from the other system, if the term actually in use in it happens to be a

really appropriate one. Or some other word may be chosen for the

purpose. In our particular case, Ibn' Arabï off ers the word wujüd,

which, in its translated form, 'existence' serves exactly our purpose,

because it does express the concept to be expressed in as simple a

manner as possible, that is, without 'coloring' it with special conno-

tations. The word remains connotatively colorless mainly due to the

fact that Ibn 'Arabi uses by preference a variety of other terms, like

tajallï, fay<J,, ral)mah, nafas, etc., in order to describe the same

concept with special connotations.

That we are not doing any injustice to the reality of the world-

view of the Taoist sages by applying the word 'existence' to the

central idea of their thought will be clear if one takes the trouble of

re-examining Chuang-tzii's description of the Cosmic Wind

together with the analytic interpretation of it which has been given

in Chapter VI.

However this may be, with the establishment of 'existence' as the

central concept of both systems, we are now in possession of a

common philosophical ground on which to establish a meta-

historical dialogue between Ibn' Arabï on the one hand and Lao-tzii

and Chuang-tzu on the other. With this in mind, let us review the

main points of the two philosophical systems which we have already

analyzed in detail in the preceding pages.

1 would like to point out at the outset that the philosophical

structure of both systems as a whole is dominated by the concept of

the Unity of Existence. This concept is expressed in Arabie by

wal)dah al-wujüd, literally the 'one-ness of existence'. For expres-

sing the same basic concept, Chuang-tzii, uses words like t'ien ni

'Heavenly Levelling' and t'ien chün 'Heavenly Equalization'.

The very words 'levelling' and equalization' clearly suggest that

the 'unity' in question is nota simple 'unity', but a 'unity' formed by

many different things. The idea, in brief, is this. There are actually

different things, but they are 'equalized' with each other, or 'level-

led down' to the state of 'unity', losing all their ontological distinc-

l' ' ' M ethodological Preliminaries 473 tions in the midst of the original metaphysical Chaos. More briefly stated, the 'unity' in question is a 'unity' of 'multiplicity'. The same is true of the 'wa}:tdah' of Ibn 'Arabï. In both these systems, the whole world of Being is represented as a kind of ontological tension between Unity and Multiplicity. Unity in the world-view of Ibn' Arabï is represented by }:taqq, 'Tru th' or 'Reality' while in that of Taoism it is represented by the tao, 'Way'. And Multiplicity is for Ibn' Arabi the mumkiniit 'possible beings', and for Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu the wan wu, 'ten thousand things'. tajallï }:taqq mumkiniit shêng' tao wan wu And the relation between the two terms of the ontological tension is that of Unity. lt is a Unity because all the things that constitute Multiplicity are, after all, so many different phenomenal forms assumed by the Absolute (the Truth and the Way respectively). The phenomenal process by which the original One diversifies itself into Many is considered by Ibn' Arabi as the tajallï, 'self-manifestation' of the One, and by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu as shëng 'producing'. And Chuang-tzu, in particular, further elaborates this idea into that of the universal Transmutation, wu hua, lit. 'things-transforming'. Such is the broad conceptual framework which is shared by the world-views of Ibn' Arabi and the Taoist sages. The framework is in its entirety constructed on the most basic concept of 'existence'. In what follows we shall examine in terms of this framework and in tenns of this basic concept the major points of emphasis which characterize the two philosophical systems. Note 1. 1:., shêng: 'produces' or 'brings into existence'.

11 The lnner Transformation of Man

The philosophical world-view of the 'Unity of Multiplicity',

whether in the form of the 'Unity of Existence' or in the form of

'Heavenly Equalization', is an unusual - to say the least - world-

view. lt is an extraordinary world-view because it is a product of an

extraordinary vision of Existence as experienced by an extraordi-

nary man. The most characteristic point about this type of philos-

ophy is that philosophizing act starts from an immediate intuitive

grasp of Existence at its metaphysical depth, at the level of its being

the 'absolu te' Absolu te.

Existence - which has always and everywhere been the central

theme for innumerable philosophers - can be approached and

grasped at a number of different levels. The Aristotelian attitude

represents in this respect the exact opposite of the position taken by

the philosophers of Taoism and Sufism. For an Aristotle, Existence

means primarily the existence of individual 'things' on the concrete

lev el of phenomenal 'reality'. And his philosophizing starts from the

ordinary experience of Existence shared by all men on the level of

common sense. For an Ibn' Arabi or Chuang-tzu, however, these

'things' as experienced by an ordinary mind on the physical level are

nothing but a dream, or of a dreamlike nature. From their point of

view, the 'things' grasped on that level - although ultimately they

are but so many phenomenal forms of the Absolute, and are, as

such, no other than Existence - do not reveal the real metaphysical

depth of Existence. And an ontology based on such an experience

touches only shallowly the surface of the 'things'; it is not in a

position to account for the structure of the 'things' in terms of the

very ground of their Existence. A philosopher of this type is a man

standing on the level of the 'worldly mode of being' (nash'ah

dunyawïyah), in the terminology of Ibn Arabi. Such a man lacks the

'spiritual eyesight' ('ayn al-ba$ïrah) - or 'illuminating light' (ming)

as Chuang-tzu calls it - which is absolutely necessary for a deeper

penetration into the mystery of Existence. In order to obtain such

an eyesight, man must experience a spiritual rebirth and be trans-

ferred from the 'worldly mode of being' to the 'otherworldly mode

of being' (nash'ah ukhrawiyah ).

1 . . 1 .· The Inner Transformation of Man 475

Since the former is the way the majority of men naturally are,

men of the 'otherwordly mode of being' must necessarily appear as

'abnormal' men. The world-view of Taoism and Sufism represents

in this sense a vision of Existence peculiar to 'abnormal' men.

It is significant that the process by which this spiritual transforma-

tion occurs in man is described by Ibn' Arabi and Chuang-tzu, in

such a way that it discloses in both cases exactly the same basic

structure. Ibn 'Arabi describes it in terms of 'self-annihilation'

(fana'), and Chuang-tzu in terms of 'sitting in oblivion' (tso wang).

The very words used: 'annihilation' and 'forgeüing', clearly point to

one and the same conception. And the same underlying conception

is the 'purification of the Mind', or as Chuang-tzu calls it, the

spiritual 'fasting'.

As to what actually occurs in the process of 'purification', details

have been given in the first and second Parts of this book. And it

would be pointless to repeat the description here. The 'purification'

in both Taoism and Sufism consists, in brief, the man's purifying

himself of all desires as well as of the activity of Reason. lt consists,

in other words, in a complete nullification of the 'ego' as the empiri-

cal subject of all activities of Reason and desires. The nullification of

the empirical ego results in the actualization of a new Ego, the

Cosmic Ego, which, in the case of Taoism, is considered to be

completely at one with the Absolu te in its creative activity, and, in

the case of Ibn 'Arabi, is said to be unified with the Absolu te to the

utmost limit of possibility.

Perhaps the most interesting point concerning this topic from the

viewpoint of comparison is the problem of the 'stages' of the 'puri-

A comparative consideration is here the more interesting

because both Ibn' Arabi and Chuang-tzu distinguish in the process

three basic stages. The two systems differ from each other in details,

but agree with each other in the main.

Let us begin by recapitulating the thesis put forward by Chuang-

tzu. The first stage, according to him, consists in 'putting the world

outside the Mind', that is to say, forgetting the existence of the

objective world. The world as something 'objective' being by nature

relatively far from the Mind from the very beginning, it is relatively

easy for man to erase it from his consciousness through

contemplation.

The second stage consists in 'putting the things outside the Mind',

that is, erasing from consciousness the familiar things that surround

man in his daily life. At this stage, the external world completely

disappears from his consciousness.

The third stage is said to consist in man's forgetting Life, that is,

his own life or his persona! existence. The 'ego' is thereby corn-

476 Sufism and Taoism

pletely destroyed, and the world, both external and internai, disap-

pears from the consciousness. And as the 'ego' is nullified, the inner

eye of the man is opened and the light of 'illumination' suddenly

breaks through the darkness of spiritual night. This marks the birth

of a new Ego in man. He now finds himself in the Eternal Now,

beyond all limitation of time and space. He is also 'beyond Life and

Death', that is, he is 'one' with all things, and all things are unified

into 'one' in his 'no-consciousness'. In this spiritual state, an unusual

Tranquillity or Calmness reigns over everything. And in this cosmic

Tranquillity, away from the turmoil and agitation of the sensible

world, man enjoys being unified and identified with the very process

of the universal Transmutation of the ten thousand things.

Ibn 'Arabi who, as 1 have just said, also <livides the process into

three stages, provides a markedly Islamic version of spiritual 'puri-

fication'. The first stage is the' annihilation of the attributes'. At this

stage man has all his 'human' attributes nullified, and in their place

he assumes as his own the Divine Attributes.

The second stage consists in that man has his own persona!

'essence' nullified and realizes in himself his being one with the

Divine Essence. This is the completion of the phenomenon of

'self-annihilation' in the proper sense of the word. This stage cor-

responds to the first half of the third stage of Chuang-tzü, in which

the man is said to abandon his old 'ego'.

The third stage, according to Ibn' Arabi, is the stage at which man

regains his 'self' which he has 'annihilated' at the previous stage.

Only he does not regain his 'self' under the same conditions as

before, but rather in the very midst of the Divine Essence. This is

evidently but another way of saying that having abandoned his old

'ego' he has obtained a new Ego. Having lost his life, he has found a

new Life in being unified with the Divine Reality. In the technical

terminology of the Sufism, this is known as 'self-subsistence' (baqà').

This third stage corresponds to the latter half of the third stage

according to Chuang-tzü' s division of the process. Now man witnes-

ses all phenomenal things mingling with each other and merging

into the boundless ocean of Divine Life. His consciousness - or, to

be more exact, supra-consciousness -is in the utmost propinquity to

the Divine Consciousness in an ontological stage previous to its

actual splitting into an infinity of determinations and particular

forms. Naturally he falls into profound Silence, and an extraordi-

nary Tranquillity reigns over his concentrated Mind.

There is another important point to be mentioned in connection

with the problem of the 'purification' of the Mind. It concerns the

centripetal direction of the 'purification'. The process of 'self-

annihilation' or 'self-purification', if it is to succeed, must definitely

l ' ' '

,,

The Inner Transformation of Man 477

be turned and directed toward the innermost core of human exist-

ence. This direction clearly goes against the ordinary movements of

the Mind. The activity of the mind is usually characterized by its

centrifugai tendency. The Mind has a very marked natural tendency

to 'go out' toward the external world, attracted by, and in pursuit of,

external abjects. For the sake of 'purification', this natural tendency

must be curbed and turned to the opposite direction. The 'puri-

fication' is realizable only by man's 'turning into himself. This is

expressed by Ibn 'Arabi through the famous Tradition: 'He who

knows himself knows his Lord.' To this corresponds on the side of

Taoism the dictum of Lao-tzü: 'He who knows others (i.e., external

abjects) is a "clever" man, but he who knows himself is an

"illumined" man.' In reference to the same situation, Lao-tzü also

speaks of' closing up all the openings and doors'. 'Closing up all the

openings and doors' means obstructing all the possible outlets for

the centrifugai activity of the mind. What is aimed at thereby is

man's going down deep into his own mind until he cornes into direct

touch with the existential core of himself.

The reason why this point must be mentioned as being of special

importance is that such a thesis would appear at first sight to

contradict the more fondamental thesis of the Unity of Existence.

For in the world-view of both Ibn 'Arabi and the Taoist sages, not

only ourselves but all things in the world, without a single exception,

are phenomenal forms of the Absolute. And as such, there can be

no basic difference between them. All existents equally manifest,

each in its particular way and particular form, the Absolute. Why,

then, are the external things to be considered detrimental to the

subjective actualization of the Unity of Existence?

The answer is not far to seek. Although external things are so

many forms of the Absolute, and although we know this intellec-

tually, we cannot penetrate into them and experience from the

inside the palpitating Life of the Absolute as it is actively working

within them. Ali we are able to dois look at them from the outside.

Only in the case of our own selves, can each of us go into his 'inside'

and in-tuit the Absolute as something constantly at work within

himself. Only in this way can we subjectively participate in the

Mystery of Existence.

Besides, the centrifugai tendency of the mind is directly con-

nected with the discriminating activity of Reason. And Reason

cannot subsist without taking an 'essentialist' position. For where

there are no conceptual boundaries neatly established Reason is

utterly powerless. In the view of Reason, 'reality' consists of various

'things' and' qualities', each having what is called 'essence' by which

it is distinguished from the rest. These 'things' and 'qualities' are in

truth nothing but so many forms in which the Absolute manifests

478 Sufism and Taoism

itself. But in so far as they are self-subsistent entities, they conceal

the Absolute behind their solid 'essential' veils. They intervene

between our sight and the Absolute, and make our direct view of

Reality impossible. The majority of men are those whose eyesight is

obstructed in this way by the thick curtain of 'things'. They have

their counterpart in Taoism in those people who, unable to

'chaotify' the 'things', cannot interpret reality except in terms of

'this'-or-'that', 'good'-or-'bad', 'right'-or-'wrong', etc.

When the 'purification' of the Mind is completed, and when man has

tumed into a metaphysical Void, forgetting both the inside and the

outside of himself, he is allowed to experience what the Taoist sages

call 'illumination' (ming) and what Ibn 'Arabi calls 'unveiling'

(kashfl or 'immediate tasting' (dhawq). It is characteristic of both

'illumination' and 'unveiling' (or 'tasting') that this ultimate stage

once fully actualized, the 'things' that have been eliminated in the

process of 'purification' from the consciousness all corne back once

again, totally transformed, to his Mind which is now a well-polished

spotless mirror - the Mysterious Mirror, 1 as Lao-tzu calls it. Thus it

cornes about that the highest stage of metaphysical intuition is not

that of those who witness only the Absolute, wholly oblivious of

its phenomenal aspect. The highest 'unveiling', according to

Ibn 'Arabi, is of th ose who witness both the creatures and the

Absolu te as two aspects of one Reality, or rather, who witness the

whole as one Reality diversifying itself constantly and incessantly

according to various aspects and relations, being 'one' in Essence,

and 'all' with regard to the Names.

Likewise, the Perfect Man of Taoism does perceive infinitely

variegated things on the phenomenal level of Existence, and the

spotless surface of his Mysterious Mirror reflects all of them as they

appear and disappear. But this kaleidoscope of ever shifting forms

does not perturb the cosmic Tranquillity of the Mind, because

behind these variegated veils of the phenomenal world, he intuits

the metaphysical 'One'. He himself is one with the constant flux of

Transmutation, and being one therewith, he is one with the 'One'.

The philosophical world-view of an Ibn' Arabi, a Lao-tzu and a

Chuang-tzu is a product of such an 'abnormal' spiritual state. Itis an

ontology, because it is a philosophized vision of Existence. But it is

an extraordinary ontology, because the underlying vision of Exist-

ence is far from being an ordinary one.

Note

1. :tl'., Hsüan fan, X.

r

,

111 The Multistratified Structure of

Reality

In terms of historical origin there is obviously no connection at all

between Sufism and Taoism. Historically speaking, the former goes

back to a particular form of Semi tic monotheism, while the latter -if

the hypothesis which I have put forward at the outset of this study is

correct - is a philosophical elaboration of the Far Eastern type of

shamanism.

It is highly significant that, in spite of this wide historico-cultural

distance that separates the two, they share, on the philosophical

level, the same ground. They agree with each other, to begin with, in

that both base their philosophical thinking on a very peculiar con-

ception of Existence which is fundamentally identical, though dif-

fering from one another in details and on secondary matters.

They further agree with one another in that philosophizing in

both cases has its ultimate origin not in reasoning about Existence

but in experiencing Existence. Furthermore, 'experiencing' Exist-

ence in this particular case consists in experiencing it not on the

ordinary level of sense perception, but on the level (or levels) of

supra-sensible intuition.

Existence or Reality as 'experienced' on supra-sensible levels

reveals itself as of a multistratified structure. The Reality which one

observes in this kind of metaphysical intuition is not of a uni-

stratum structure. And the vision of Reality thus obtained is totally

different from the ordinary view of 'reality' which is shared by the

common people.

It is extremely interesting that both Ibn' Arabi and Chuang-tzu

begin by giving a rude shock to common sense by flatly refusing to

admit any reality to so-called 'reality', saying that the latter is

nothing but a dream. Quoting the famous Tradition: 'All men are

asleep; only when they die, do they wake up', Ibn' Arabi says: 'The

world is an illusion; it has no real existence .... Know that you

yourself are an imagination. And everything that you perceive and

say to yourself, "this is not me", is also an imagination.' In an

exactly similar way Chuang-tzu remarks: 'Suppose you dream that

you are a bird. (In that state) you soar up into the sky. Suppose you

480 Sufism and Taoism

dream that you are a fish; you go down deep into the pool. (While

you are experiencing all this in your dream, what you experience is

your "reality" .) Judging by this, nobody can be sure whether we -

you and I, who are actually engaged in conversation in this way- are

awake of just dreaming.' Thus we see so-called 'reality' being all of

a sudden transformed and reduced to something dreamlike and

unreal.

Far more remarkable, however, is the fact that for both Ibn

'Arabi and Chuang-tzii the dictum: 'All is a dream' has a very

positive metaphysical meaning. It is not in any way an emotive

statement to the effect, for instance, that the world we live in is like a

dream, that everything in this world is tragically ephemeral and

transient. It is, on the contrary, a definite ontological statement

recognizing the existence of a higher ontological level where all

things are deprived of their seemingly solid essential boundaries

and disclose their natural amorphousness. And paradoxically

enough, this 'dreamlike' lev el of Existence is, in the view of both Ibn

'Arabi and Chuang-tzii, far more 'real' than so-called 'reality'.

This dreamlike level of Existence is in the ontological system of

Ibn' Arabi what he calls the 'world of similitudes and Imagination',

while in that of Chuang-tzii it is the Chaos.

Thus the basic proposition that all is a dream does not mean that

so-called 'reality' is a vain and groundless thing. Instead of meaning

simply that the physical world is a sheer illusion, the proposition

indicates that the world which we experience on the sensible level is

nota self-subsistent reality, but is a Symbol - an ayah (pl. ayat), or

'indicator' as Ibn 'Arabi calls it, using the Quranic term - vaguely

and indistinctively painting to 'Something beyond'. The sensible

things, thus interpreted, are phenomenal forms of the Absolute

itself, and as such, they are 'real' in a particular way.

However, this again is a matter of immediate intuitive experi-

ence. The metaphysical fact that behind and beyond so-called 'real-

ity', which is apparently a colorful fa bric of fantasy and imagination,

there lies hidden the 'real' Reality, does not become clear except to

those who have learnt how to 'interpret' rightly- as Ibn' Arabi says

- the infinitely variegated forms and properties as so many manifes-

tations of Reality. This is what is meant by Ibn 'Arabi when he says

that one has to 'die and wake up'. 'The only "reality" (in the true

sense of the term) is the Absolu te revealing itself as it really is in the

sensible forms which are nothing but the loci of its self-

manifestation. This point becomes understandable only when one

wakes up from the present life - which is a sleep of forgetfulness -

after one dies to this world through self-annihilation in God.'

Chuang-tzii, likewise, speaks of the need of experiencing a Great

I_

The Multistratified structure of Reality 481

Awakening. 'Only when one experiences a Great Awakening does

one realize that "reality" is but a Big Dream. But the stupid imagine

that they are actually awake .... How deep-rooted and irremedi-

able their stupidity is!'

In the eye of those who have experienced this spiritual Awaken-

ing, all things, each in its own form and on its own level, manifest the

presence of 'Something beyond'. And that 'Something beyond' is

ultimately the haqq of Ibn 'Arabi and the tao of Lao-tzii and

Chuang-tzii - the Absolute. Both Ibn 'Arabi and the Taoist sages

distinguish in the process of the self-revealing evolvement of the

Absolute several degrees or stages. Ontologically speaking this

would mean that Existence is of a multistratified structure.

The strata, according to Ibn' Arabi, are:

(1) The stage of the Essence (the absolute Mystery, abysmal

Darkness);

(2) The stage of the Divine Attributes and Names (the stage

of Divinity);

(3) The stage of the Divine Actions (the stage of Lordship);

( 4) The stage of Images and Similitudes;

( 5) The sensible world.

And according to Lao-tzii:

(1) Mystery of Mysteries;

(2) Non-Being (Nothing, or Nameless);

(3) One;

( 4) Being (Heaven and Earth);

( 5) The ten thousand things.

The two systems agree with each other in that (I) they regard the

first stage as an absolute Mystery, that is, something _absolutely

unknown-unknowable, transcending all distinctions and all limita-

tions, even the limitation of 'not being limited'; and that (2) they

regard the four remaining stages as so many various forms assumed by

this absolute Mystery in the process of its ontological evolvement,

so that all are, in this sense, 'one'. This latter point, namely, the

problem of U nity, will be further discussed in the following chapter.

IV Essence and Existence

As we have seen above, both Chuang-tzu's 'Heavenly Levelling'

and Ibn' Arabi's 'Unity of Existence' are based on the idea that all

things are ultimately reducible to the original Unity of the Absolu te

in its absoluteness, that is, the 'Essence at the level of Unity

(al}adïyah )'.

It is to be remarked that the Essence in the Unity of its uncondi-

tional simplicity is, in Ibn 'Arabi' s view, nothing other than pure

Existence, there being here not even the slightest discrepancy be-

tween 'essence' (i.e., 'quiddity') and 'existence'. In other words, the

Absolu te is actus purus, the act itself of 'existing'. The Absolute is

not a 'thing' in the sense of a 'substance'.

As Qâshâni says: 'The Reality called the" Essence at the lev el of

Unity" in its true nature is nothing other than Existence pure and

simple in so far as it is Existence. It is conditioned neither by

non-determination nor by determination, for in itself it is too sacred

to be qualified by any property and any name. It bas no quality, no

delimitation; there is not even a shadow of Multiplicity in it. It is not

a substance ... , for a substance must have an 'essence' other than

"existence", a "quiddity" by which it is a substance as differentiated

from all others.'

The conception of the Absolute being conditioned neither by

determination nor by non-determination is more tersely expressed

by Lao-tzu through single words like 'Nothing' and 'Nameless', and

by Chuang-tzu through the expression No-[No Non-Being]. The

last expression, No-[No Non-Being], indicates analytically the

stages in the logical process by which one arrives at the realization of

the Absolute transcending all determinations. First, the idea that

the Absolute is Being, i.e., 'existence' as ordinarily understood, is

negated. The concept of Non-Being is thus posited. Then, this

concept of Non-Being is eliminated, because, being a simple nega-

tion of Being, it is but a relative Non-Being. Thus the concept of.

No-Non-Being is obtained. This concept stands on the negation of

both Being and Non-Being, and as such it still keeps in itself a trace

or reftection of the opposition which exists between the contradic-

Essence and Existence 483 tories. In order to eliminate· even this faint trace of relativity, one bas to negate the No-Non-Being itself. Thus finally the concept of No-[No Non-Being] is established, as 'Nothing' in its absolutely unconditional transcendence. And Chuang-tzu clarifies through the admirable symbol of the Cosmic Wind that this transcendent Nothing is nota purely negative 'nothing' in the usual sense of the word; that, on the contrary, it is a supra-plenitude of Existence as the ultimate ontological ground of everything, as Something that lies at the very source of all existents and makes them exist. 'lt would seem', Chuang-tzu says, 'that there is some real Ruler. It is impossible for us to see Him in a concrete form. He is acting - there can be no doubt aboutit; but we cannot see His form. He does show His activity, but He has no sensible form.' This simply means that the No-[No Non-Being] - or theo- logically, the real Ruler of the world- is actus, creative energy, nota substance. The Cosmic Wind in itself is invisible and impalpable - because it is nota substance - but we know its presence through its ontological activity, through the ten thousand 'hales' and 'hollows' producing each its peculiar sound as the Wind blows upon them. The basic idea underlying the use of the symbol of the Wind is comparable with Ibn 'Arabi's favorite image of the 'ftowing' of Existence (sarayim al-wujüd). 'The secret of Life (i.e., Existence) lies in the act of ftowing peculiar to water.' The 'water' of Existence is eternally flowing through all things. It 'spreads" throughout the universe, permeating and pervading everything. It is significant that both Chuang-tzu and Ibn 'Abrabi represent Existence as something moving: 'blowing', 'ftowing', 'spreading', 'permeating', etc. This is a definite proof that Existence as they have corne to know it through 'immediate tasting' is in reality actus, nothing else. Existence which is actus, th us spreading itself out far and wide, goes on producing the ten thousand things. The latter, as 1 have repeatedly pointed out, are various forms in which Existence (or the Absolu te) manifests itself. And in this sense, all are Existence, nothing but Existence. And there is nothing but Existence. Viewed from this angle, the whole world of Being is one. On the other band, however, it is also an undeniable fact that we actually see with our own eyes an infinity of infinitely variegated 'things' which are different from one another. 'lt is evident', Ibn 'Arabi says, 'that this is different from that . .. And in the Divine world, however wide it is, nothing repeats itself. This is a truly fondamental fact.' From this po:nt: of view, there is nota single thing that is the same as any other thing. Even 'one and the same thing' is in reality not exactly the same in two successive moments.

484 Sufism and Taoism

These individually different things, on a more universal level of

Existence, still retain their mutual differences and distinctions, not

'individually' this time, but in terms of 'essences'. And these

ontological differences and distinctions which the 'things' manifest

on this level are far more solid and unalterable because they are

based on, and fixed by, their 'essences'. The latter provide the

'things' with an 'essential' fixity which ensures them from disinte-

gration. A 'horse' is a 'horse' by its 'essence'; it can never be a '<log'.

A '<log' is 'essentially' a '<log', nothing else. It goes without saying

that this is the very basis on which stands the 'essentialist' type of

ontology.

How could we account for the apparent contradiction between

the above-mentioned absolute Unity of Existence, Unity of all

things, and the undeniable Multiplicity of the ten thousand things

which are not reducible to each other, let alone to a unique and

single thing? Surely, if one puts these two points of view si de by side

with each other, one's mind cannot help being thrown into bewilder-

ing confusion. To see the One in the Many and the Many in the One,

or rather to see the Many as One and the One as Many - this

naturally causes what Ibn 'Arabï calls (metaphysical) 'perplexity'

(IJ,ayrah).

Faced with this problem, Chuang-tzu takes a thoroughgoing

anti-essentialist position. The view of things, each being distin-

guished from the rest by a solid 'boundary' of 'essence', he main tains,

does not give a true picture of these things themselves. The 'essen-

tial' distinctions which common sense and Reason recognize be-

tween things are, according to him, devoid of reality. The 'things'

ordinarily look as if they were distinct from each other in terms of

'essences', simply because ordinary men are not 'awake'. If they

were, they would 'chaotify' the things and see them in their original

'undifferentiation'.

The things being 'chaotified', however, is not the same as their

being sheer nothing. The very concept of 'chaotification' would be

meaningless if there were no plurality at all in the world of Being. It

is, as Ibn 'Arabï main tains, a truly fondamental fact that many

'different' things do exist, no matter how 'unreal' they may be in

themselves and from the viewpoint of the higher metaphysical level

of Existence. The differences and distinctions that are observable in

the world may reveal themselves as 'unreal' when observed with the

'spiritual eyesight' of an ecstatic philosopher, but in so far as things

are factually different and distinct from each other, there must be

some ontological ground for that, too. And the ontological ground

cannot be anything other than 'essences'.

The 'essences' are symbolically designated by Chuang-tzu

through the image of the 'hollows' in the trees, which emit all kinds

Essence and Existence 485

of sounds as the Wind blows upon them. Chuang-tzu does not assert

that the 'hollows' do not exist in any sense whatsoever. They are

surely there. The only point is that they do not produce any sound

by themselves. It is the Wind, not the 'hollows', that really produces

the sounds. '(One and the same Wind) blows on the ten thousand

things in different ways, and makes each "hollow" produce its own

peculiar sound, so that each imagines that its own self produces that

particular sound. But who, in reality, is the one who makes (the

"hollows") produce various sounds?'

All this would seem to be tantamount to saying - although

Chuang-tzu himself does not talk in terms of these concepts - that

the 'essences' are not sheer nothing, that they are potentially exist-

ent. The 'essences' do exist, but only in potentia, not in actu; they

are not actual or real in the fullest sense of the word. What is really

'real' is Existence, nothing else. And the 'essences' look as if they

were 'real' only by dint of the actualizing activity of Existence.

The position of the 'hollows' in the ontology of Chuang-tzu

corresponds to that of the 'permanent archetypes' in the ontology of

Ibn' Arabï. The main difference between the two lies in the fact that

in the former the relation between Essence and Existence is merely

symbolically suggested, whereas Ibn 'Arabï consciously takes up

the problem as an ontological theme and elaborates it far more

theoretically.

Details have been given in Chapter XII of the first Part regarding

the conceptual structure of the 'permanent archetypes'. Suffice it

here to note that the 'permanent archetypes' are the 'essences' of

the things, and that they are described as 'neither existent nor

non-existent' - which would exactly apply to the 'hollows' of

Chuang-tzu. It is remarkable, however, that the 'permanent

archetypes' are also described by Ibn' Arabï as 'realities (IJ,aqa'iq)

eternally subsistent in the world of the Unseen'. That is to say, the

'permanent archetypes', although they are 'non-existent' in terms

of'external existence', do existin actu within the Divine Conscious-

ness. The ontology of Ibn 'Arabï is, in this respect, Platonic; it is

more 'essentialist' than that of Chuang-tzu who does not concede

anything more than sheer potentiality to the 'essences'.

V The Self-Evolvement of Existence

The absolu te and ultimate ground of Existence is in both Sufism and

Taoism the Mystery of Mysteries. The latter is, as Ibn 'Arabï says,

the ankar al-nakirat 'the most indeterminate of all indeterminates';

that is to say, it is Something that transcends all qualifications and

relations that are humanly conceivable. And since it is transcendent

to such a degree, it remains for ever unknown and unknowable.

Existence per se is thus absolutely inconceivable and inapproach-

able. Ibn 'Arabï refers to this aspect of Existence by the word

'ghayb, 'concealment' or 'invisibility'. In the Taoist system, it is

hsüan or Mystery that is the most proper word for referring to this

absolutely transcendent stage of Existence.

The Taoist sages have also a set of negative words like wu,

Non-Being, wu-wu, No-thing or 'Nothing', wu-ming, Nameless,

etc. These terms are properly to be considered as functioning still

within the domain of the original transcendence. Conceptually,

however, there is already observable a distinction between these

negative terms and the 'Mystery', because their very 'negative-ness'

indicates their opposition to something 'positive', i.e., the following

stage of yu or Being, at which the 'boundaries' of the things-to-be

are adumbrated. This is the reason why Chuang-tzii proposes to use

the complex expression, No-[No Non-Being] or No-No-Nothing in

order to refer to the ultimate stage of Existence (i.e., the Mystery of

Mysteries) without leaving the level of negativity. However, this

distinction between the Mystery and these negative terms is ex-

clusively conceptual. Otherwise, 'Non-Being', 'Nothing', and

'Nameless' denote exactly the same thing as the 'Mystery'. They all

denote the Absolute in its absoluteness, or Existence at its ultimate

stage, qua Something unknown-unknowable, transcending all

qualifications, determinations, and relations.

It is important to note that Ibn' Arabi calls this ontological level the

'level of Unity (alJ,adiyah )'.The Absolu te at this stage is 'One' in the

sense that it refuses to accept any qualification whatsoever. Thus,

being one here means nothing other than absolute transcendence.

The self-evolvement of Existence 487

The Taoist sages, too, speak of the Way as' One'. As I have tried

to show earlier, the 'One' in the Taoist system is conceptually to be

placed between the stage of Non-Being and that of Being. It is not

exactly the same as the Way qua Mystery, because it is considered as

something which the ten thousand things 'acquire', i.e., partake of.

The One, in other words, is the principle of immanence. The Way is

'immanent' in everything existent as its existential core, or as its

Virtue, as Lao-tzii calls it. But whether regarded as 'immanent' or

'transcendent', the Way is the Way. What is immanent in everything

is exactly the same thing as that which transcends everything. And

this situation corresponds to the conceptual distinction between

tanzih and tashbih and the factual identity of the two in the system of

Ibn 'Arabi.

Thus the Taoist concept of One, in so far as it refers to the

Absolute itself, is an exact counterpart of Ibn 'Arabï's alJ,ad, the

'absolu te One', but in so far as it is 'One' comprising within itself the

possibility of Multiplicity, it is a counterpart of walJ,id, i.e., the 'One

at the level of the Names and Attributes', or the Unity of the Many.

In short, the Taoist One comprises both the alJ,ad and the walJ,id of

Sufism.

These considerations make us realize that the first and ultimate

stage of Existence itself can naturally be considered from two

diff erent angles: ( 1) as the Absolu te perse, and ( 2) as the Absolu te

as the very origin and starting-point of the process of self-

evolvement. In the first of these two aspects, the Absolute is Mys-

tery and Darkness. In the second aspect, on the contrary, a faint

foreboding of light is already perceivable in the very midst of utter

darkness. As Ibn' Arabï says: 'Everything is contained in the bosom

of the Breath, just as the bright light of day in the very darkness of

dawn'.

It is quite significant in this respect that the word used by the

Taoist sages to denote the Mystery, hsüan, originally means 'black'

with a mixture of redness. Lao-tzii, as we have noticed, likes us to

use in this sense also the word p'u meaning originally 'uncarved

wood'. Existence, at this stage of absolu te simplicity, is like

'uncarved wood'. In so far as it still remains 'uncarved', there is

nothing observable but 'wood'. But in so far as it contains the

possibility of producing all kinds of vessels and utensils, it is more

than sheer 'wood'. Actually it is still 'Nothing', but potentially it is

all things. There is at least a vague and indistinct feeling that

something is about to happen. And that is the 'positive' aspect of the

Mystery, the face of the Absolu te turned toward the world of

creation. Ibn 'Arabi conveys the same idea by the expression:

'hidden Treasure', which he has taken from a Tradition. And it is of

488 Sufism and Taoism

the very nature of the 'hidden Treasure' that it 'loves to be known'.

It is, however, at the stage of the Divine Names and Attributes -

in terms of Ibn' Arabi's world-view-that this 'love of being known',

i.e., the inner ontological drive of Existence, becomes actualized.

At the stage of the absolu te Unity, the Absolu te qua Absolu te is

characterized by a perfect 'independence', and does not require by

itself and for itself any creative activity. If' creation' is at all conceiv-

able at this stage, it is simply in the form of a faint foreboding. In the

System of Taoism the concept of Non-Being or Nothing refers

precisely to this delicate situation. 'Deep and Bottomless', Lao-tzii

says, 'it is like the origin and principle of the ten thousand

things .... There is nothing, and yet there seems to be something. 1

know not whose son it is. It would seem to be antecedent even to the

Heavenly Emperor.' 'The Way in its reality is utterly vague, utterly

indistinct. Utterly indistinct, utterly vague, and yet there is in the

midst of it an Image. Utterly vague, utterly indistinct, and yet there

is in the midst of it Something.'

The 'hidden Treasure loves to be known'. The Treasure lies 'hid-

den', and yet it is, so to speak, pressed from inside by the' desire to

be known'. Speaking less symbolically, the infini te things that are

contained in the Absolute in the state of pure potentia forcefully

seek for an outlet. This naturally causes an ontological tension

within the Absolute. And the internai ontological compression,

growing ever stronger finally relieves itself by bursting forth. It is

highly interesting to notice that both Ibn 'Arabi and Chuang-tzii

resort to the same kind of imagery in trying to describe this situa-

tion. Chuang-tzii talks about 'eructation'. He says: 'The Great

Earth eructates; and the eructation is called Wind. As long as the

eructation does not actually occur, nothing is observable. But once

it does occur, all the hollows of the trees raise ringing shouts.' The

issuing forth of the ten thousand things from the Absolute is here

compared to the Great Earth belching forth the Wind.

No less bold and picturesque is the mythopoeic image of 'brea-

thing out' by which Ibn 'Arabi tries to depict the matter. The

ontological state of extreme tension which precedes the 'bursting

out' and which has been caused by an excessive amount of things

accumulated inside is compared to the state in which a man finds

himself when he holds his breath compressed within himself. The

tension reaches the last limit, and the air compressed in the breast

exp Iodes and gushes forth with a violent outburst. In a similar way,

the creative drive of Existence gushes forth out of the depth of

Absolute. This is the phenomenon which Ibn 'Arabi calls the

'breath of the Merciful'. In the theological language peculiar to Ibn

'Arabi, the same phenomenon can also be described as the Divine

The self-evolvement of Existence 489

Names, at the extreme limitof inner compression, suddenly burst-

ing out from the bosom of the Absolute. 'The Names, previous to

their existence in the outer world (in the form of phenomenal

things) exist hidden in the Essence of the Absolu te (i.e., the Mystery

of Mysteries), all of them seeking an outlet toward the world of

external existence. The situation is comparable to the case in which

a man holds his breath within himself. The breath, held within,

seeks an outlet toward the outside, and this causes in the man a

painful sensation of extreme compression. Only when he breathes

out does this compression cease to make itself felt. Just as the man is

tormented by the compression if he does not breathe out, so the

Absolu te would feel the pain of ( ontological) compression if it did

not bring into existence the world in response to the demand of the

Names.' This may also be compared with the image of a great

Cosmic Bellows by which Lao-tzii symbolically-describes the inex-

haustible creative activity of the Way. 'The space between Heaven

and Earth is comparable to a bellows. It is empty (i.e., the Absolute

qua the Mystery of Mysteries is "Nothing"), but its activity is

inexhaustible. The more it works the more it produces.'

Thus Existence, in compliance with its own necessary and natural

internai demand, goes on inexhaustibly determining itself into an

infinity of concrete things. And the 'breath of the Merciful' or the

ontological Mercy pervades all of them, constituting the very exis-

tential core of each one of them. And the existential core thus

acquired by each phenomenal thing is what The Taoist sages call tê

or Virtue.

It is worth remarking that the ral)mah or Mercy as understood by

Ibn 'Arabi is primarily an ontological fact. It refers to the actus of

Existence, namely, the act of making things exist. lt does not

primarily denote the emotive attitude of compassion and benevol-

ence. But Mercy as bestowal of existence of course carries an

emotive and subjective overtone. And this squares well with the

ethical understanding of God in Islam. The creative activity of

Existence is represented in Taoism in a form which is diametrically

opposed to such a conception. For in Taoism the Way is said to be

'non-humane' (pu jen). 'Heaven and Earth', Lao-tzii says, 'lack

"benevolence" (i.e., lack mercy).' They treat the ten thousand

things as if the latter were straw dogs.' The difference between the

two systems, however, is only superficial. For whether described in

terms of Mercy (in Sufism) or non-Mercy (in Taoism), the basic fact

described remains exactly the same. This because the ontological

Mercy, in the conception of Ibn 'Arabi, is absolu tel y gratuitous.

What is meant by both Mercy and non-Mercy is nothing other than

the all-pervading creative activity of Existence. Ibn' Arabi himself

490 Sufism and Taoism

warns us against understanding the word ralJ,mah with its usual

associations. 'There does not corne into its activity any considera-

tion of attaining an aim, or of a thing's being or not being suitable for

a purpose. Whether suitable or unsuitable the Divine Mercy covers

everything and anything with existence.'

This explanation of Mercy by Ibn 'Arabï is so congenial to the

spirit of Taoism that it will pass verbatim for an explanation by a

Lao-tzu of the Taoist concept of non-Mercy which is as equally

impartial and indiscriminating as Ibn' Arabï's Mercy in bestowing

the gift of 'existence' upon everything and everybody. In the view of

Lao-tzu, the creative activity of the Absolute is extended over the

ten thousand things without a single exception precisely because it

stands on the principle of non-Mercy. If even a trifting amount of

human emotion were involved therein, the Absolute would not be

acting with such an absolu te impartiality. In the view of Ibn' Arabï,

on the contrary, the Absolute bestows 'existence' to all things

without excluding anything precisely because it is the actus of

Mercy. The Divine Mercy being by nature limitlessly wide, it covers

the whole world. As is obvious, the underlying idea is in both cases

one and the same.

The structure itself of this concept of Mercy or non-Mercy is directly

connected with another important idea: that of the Absolute being

'beyond good and evil'. The creative activity of the Absolute, which

consists in the bestowal of 'existence' qua 'existence' upon every-

thing involves no moral judgment. From the point of view of the

Absolu te, it does not matter at all whether a given object be good or

bad. Rather, there is absolutely no such distinction among the

objects. The latter assume these and other evaluational properties

only after having been given 'existence' by the indiscriminating act

of the Absolute; and that from the particular points of view of the

creatures. Otherwise, all existents are on the 'straight way' - as Ibn

'Arabï says - or all existents are 'so-of-themselves' - as the Taoist

sages say. There is no distinction at this stage between good and evil.

This idea is formulated by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu in terms of a

'relativist' view of all values. Ordinary men distinguish between

'good' and 'bad', 'beautiful' and 'ugly', 'noble' and 'ignoble', etc.,

and construct their life social as well as persona!, on these distinc-

tions as if they were objective categories that have been fixed in an

unalterable way by the very nature of the things. In truth, however,

these and other seemingly solid objective categories, far from being

'objective', are but products of 'subjective' and 'relative' points of

view. A 'beautiful' lady from the human point of view, Chuang-tzu

argues, is 'ugly' and 'terrifying' enough, from the point of view of

other animais, to make them run away as fast as their legs or wings

The self-evolvement of Existence 491

can carry them. The distinctions are a sheer matter of relative

viewpoints, a matter of likes and dislikes. As Ibn 'Arabï says: 'The

bad is nothing other than what one dislikes, while the good is

nothing other than what one likes.'

Thus in both Sufism and Taoism the basic proposition holds true

that everything is primarily, that is, qua 'existence', neither good

nor evil. However there is a certain respect - again both in Sufism

and Taoism - in which everything is to be considered fundamentally

'good'. This because everything qua 'existence' is a particular self-

manifestation of the Absolute itself. And looked at from such a

viewpoint, all things in the world are 'one'. As Chuang-tzu says:

'(However different they may look from each other) they are, in

reality no other than so man y things that are "affirmable" piled up

one upon the other.' They are at one with each other in being

fundamentally 'affirmable', i.e., good. The Perfect Man 'is "one",

whether he (seemingly) likes something or dislikes something'. And

Lao-tzii: 'Those who are good 1 treat as good. But those who are not

good also 1 treat as good. For the original nature of man is goodness.

Those who are faithful 1 treat as faithful. But even those who are not

faithful 1 treat as faithful. For the original nature of man is faithful-

ness.' Such an attitude would immediately be approved by Ibn

'Arabï, who says: 'What is bad is bad simply because of (the subjec-

tive impression caused by) the taste; but the same thing will be

found to be essentially good, if considered apart from the (subjec-

tive attitude on the part of man) of liking or disliking.'

These considerations make it clear that for both Ibn' Arabi and the

Taoist sages there is the closest and most intimate relationship

between the Absolute and the things of the phenomenal world.

Although the latter are apparently far removed from the Absolute,

they are after all so many different forms which the Absolute

assumes in making itself manifest at various stages and in various

places. This intimate ontological relationship between the two

terms of the creative process is in Taoism symbolically expressed by

the image of the Mother-Child relationship. The Way at the stage of

the 'Being' or 'Named' is considered by Lao-tzu the 'Mother of the

ten thousand things'. The symbolic implication of this statement is

that all things in the phenomenal world are the very ftesh and blood

of the Absolute. And the Taoist ideal consists in man's 'knowing the

Children by knowing the Mother, and in his knowing the Children

and yet holding fast to the Mother' .

On the side of Ibn 'Arabi, the same ontological relationship

between the Absolute and phenomenal things is compared to the

inseparable relationship between 'shadow' and its source, i.e., the

man or object that projects it upon the earth. 'Do you not see', Ibn

492 Sufism and Taoism

'Arabï asks, 'how in your ordinary sensible experience shadow is so

closely tied up with the person who projects it that it is absolutely

impossible for it to liberate itself from this tie? This is impossible

because it is impossible for anything to be separated from itself.' The

world is the 'shadow' of the Absolute, and, as such, it is connected

with the latter with the closest relationship which is never to be eut

off. Every single part of the world is a particular aspect of the

Absolute, and is the Absolute in a delimited form.

Ibn 'Arabï describes the same rélationship by referring to the

Divine Name: 'Subtle' (latïf). The 'subtleness' in this context means

the quality of an immaterial thing which, because of its immaterial-

ity, permeates and pervades the substances of all other things,

diffusing itself in the latter and freely mixing with them. 'lt is the

effect of God's "subtleness" that He exists in every particular thing,

designated by a particular name, as the very essence of that particu-

lar thing. He is immanent in every particular thing in such a way that

He is, in each case, referred to by the conventional and customary

meaning of the particular name of that thing. Thus we say: "This is

Heaven", "This is the earth", "This is a tree", etc. But the essence

itself that exists in every one of these things is just one.'

We shall do well to recall that in a passage of his commentary

upon the Qashanï also uses the Mother image. 'The ultimate

ground of everything is called the Mother (umm) because the

mother is the (stem) from which all branches go out.'

lt is worth noticing, further, that both Ibn 'Arabi and the Taoist

sages pictute the process of creation as a perpetual and constant

flow. Their world-view in this respect is of a markedly dynamic

nature. Nothing remains static. The world in its entirety is in fervent

movement. 'As water running in a river, which forever goes on

being renewed continuously' (Ibn 'Arabi), the world transforms

itself kaleidoscopically from moment to moment. The Cosmic Bel-

lows of Lao-tzii is an appropriate symbol for this incessant process

of creation. 'The space between Heaven and Earth is comparable to

a bellows. lt is empty, but its activity is inexhaustible. The more it

works, the more it produces.'

The thesis of the universal Transmutation of things which

Chuang-tzii puts forward also refers to this aspect of Reality. All

things in the phenomenal world are constantly changing from one

form to another. Everything is ontologically involved in the cosmic

process of Transmutation. 'Dying and being alive, being subsistent

and perishing, getting into a predicament and being in the ascend-

ant, being poor and being rich, being clever and being incom-

petent, being disgraced and being honored ... all these are but the

constant changes of things, and the results of the incessant working

The selfevolvement of Existence 493

of Fate. All these thing go on replacing one another before our own

eyes, but no one by his Intellect can trace them back to their real

origin.' These changes 'remind us of all kinds of sounds emerging

from the empty holes (of a flute), or mushrooms coming out of

warm dampness. Day and night, these changes never cease to

replace one another before our eyes.'

Ibn 'Arabi pursues this perpetual flux of things down to a single

moment. The result is his theory of 'new creation', that is, the thesis

that the world goes on being created anew at every single moment.

At every moment, countless things and properties are produced,

and at the very next moment they are annihilated to be replaced by

another infinity of things and properties. And this ontological pro-

cess goes on repeating itself indefinitely and endlessly.

It is remarkable that neither in Sufism nor in Taoism is the

ontological Descent - from the Mystery of Mysteries down to the

stage of phenomenal things - made to represent the final comple-

tion of the activity of Existence. The Descent is followed by its

reversai, that is, Ascent. The ten thousand things flourish exuber-

antly at the last stage of the descending course, and then take an

ascending course toward their ultimate source until they disappear

in the original Darkness and find their resting place in the cosmic

pre-phenomenal Stillness. Thus the whole process of creation forms

a huge ontological circle in which there is in reality neither an initial

point nor a final point. The movement from one stage to another,

considered in itself, is surely a temporal phenomenon. But the

whole circle, having neither an initial point nor a final point, is a

trans-temporal or a-temporal phenomenon. lt is, in other words, a

metaphysical process. Everything is an occurrence in an Eternal

Now.