반출생주의
위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.
둘러보기로 가기검색하러 가기
아르투어 쇼펜하우어(1788 - 1860), 유명한 반출생주의자
반출생주의(反出生主義, Antinatalism, 또는 anti-natalism)는 인간의 출생을 부정적으로 보는 철학적 입장이다. 반출생주의자는 인간의 삶에 불가피한 악과 부조리로 인한 고통의 위험이 만연해 있으며, 출생은 태어나는 사람에게 있어 나쁜 것이라고 주장한다. 따라서 이들은 출산을 타자에게 고통의 가능성을 강제하는 부도덕한 행위로 보고 반대한다. 현대 반출생주의 옹호자로서 데이비드 베네이타가 가장 잘 알려져 있다. 비동일성 문제의 해결책 중 하나로 제시된다. 반출생주의라는 명칭은 먼저 있던 일본의 번역을 따른 것이다.
목차
1반출생주의의 논의
1.1인구과잉
1.2도의적 책임
1.3행복
2페테르 베셀 삽페의 견해
3반출생주의자
4각주
5관련 항목
반출생주의의 논의[편집]
인구과잉[편집]
반출생주의가 인구과잉이나 기아의 문제를 해결할 수 있다고 지지자의 대부분이 생각하고 있다. 또, 고갈성 자원의 감소도 회피할 수 있다. 인도나 중국 등의 몇 개의 나라는 가정 내의 아이의 수를 줄이는 정책을 채용하고 있다. 이러한 정책은 모든 출산을 부정적으로 파악하고 있는 것은 아니지만, 심각한 인구과잉의 염려나 나라의 자원에의 무거운 부담을 억제하는데 도움이 되고 있다.
도의적 책임[편집]
쇼펜하우어는 최종적으로 인생은 싫은 일이 많다고 주장해, 가장 합리적인 입장은 아이를 이 세계에 만들어 내지 않는 것이라고 주장한다. 노르웨이의 철학자 Peter Wessel Zapffe는 아이가 동의 없이 세계에 만들어지는 것에도 유의하고 있다. David Benatar는 존재를 만드는 행위에 대해 결코 이타적인 근거를 찾을 수 없으며, 그 행위 자체로는 항상 해악일 수밖에 없음을 지적한다.
행복[편집]
부모가 되고 아이를 기르는 일이 꼭 행복을 가져온다고는 할 수 없다. 아이의 입장에서 봐도 아이는 부모를 선택할 수 없기에 육아에게 부적격인 부모, 아동 심리를 모르는 부모(이른바 '독친') 아래에서 태어나면 필연적으로 아이는 불행하게 된다.
아이를 가지는 부모는 아이가 없는 가정과 비교해 통계적으로 유의미하게 행복 수준이 낮고 생활 만족도, 결혼 만족도, 정신적 건강 상태 등이 나쁘다는 증거를 유럽과 미국에서 연구 보고하고 있다.[1]
페테르 베셀 삽페의 견해[편집]
페테르 베셀 삽페는 인간 존재를 생물학적인 모순으로 보았다. 그에 따르면, 의식은 지나치게 진화한 나머지 다른 동물처럼 자연스럽게 기능하지 않는다. 인식되는 정보는 우리가 소화할 수 있는 능력을 벗어났다. 우주 공간에서의 인간의 허약함과 하찮음은 우리의 인식능력에 의해 우리 자신에게 명백하게 드러난다. 우리는 영생을 꿈꾸지만 동시에 죽음을 숙명적인 것으로 인식할 수 있는 유일한 생물종이다. 우리는 자신과 타인의 과거와 미래를 분석할 수 있으며 수십억 명의 사람들의 고통을 상상하고, 그 고통에 동정심을 느낀다. 우리는 정의와 의미를 이 세상에 기대하지만, 사실 그러한 것들은 존재하지 않는다. 이러한 사실은 의식을 가지고 있는 인류 개개인이 비극적 존재라는 것을 확연히 보여준다. 우리는 현실적으로 만족될 수 없는 영성에 관한 욕구를 가지고 있으며, 그럼에도 현실을 왜곡하고 제한적으로 인식하는 방법으로 이러한 비극을 모면한다. 이를 위해 인간 존재는 결과적으로 개인적으로나 사회적으로나 복잡한 방어기제 네트워크를 개발했다. 그에 따르면, 인류는 이러한 자기기만을 중지해야 하며 가장 자연스러운 방법은 출산을 회피함으로써 자발적으로 멸종하는 것이다.[2][3][4]
반출생주의자[편집]
에밀 시오란
아르투어 쇼펜하우어
에두 알토 폰 할트만
유리우스 반센
매치 하이리
우르릿히 홀스트맨
필립 마인렌다
페테르 베셀 삽페
에드거 사르타스
자코모 레오파르디
토마스 리곳티
페르난도 바레이호
리처드 스톨먼
테오필 드 지로
데이비드 베네이타
훌리오 카브레라
각주[편집]
↑ CNN "아이가 없는 것이 부부는 행복? 미영으로 조사 ". 2014.01.15
↑ P.W. Zapffe, The Last Messiah, Philosophy Now, 2004, number 45, pp. 35–39.
↑ P. W. Zapffe, Om det tragiske, Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1996.
↑ P. W. Zapffe, H. Tønnessen, Jeg velger sannheten: En dialog mellom Peter Wessel Zapffe og Herman Tønnessen, Oslo: Universitets forlaget, 1983.
관련 항목[편집]
아동 복지
아동심리학
피투성
출생주의
이 글은 철학에 관한 토막글입니다. 여러분의 지식으로 알차게 문서를 완성해 갑시다.분류:
어린이
윤리학
반출생주의
======
反出生主義
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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アルトゥル・ショーペンハウアー (1788–1860), 有名な反出生主義者
反出生主義（はんしゅっしょうしゅぎ、英: Antinatalism）とは、生まれてきたことおよび人間を生み出すことに対して否定的な意見を持つ[1]哲学的な立場である。アルトゥル・ショーペンハウアー、エミール・シオラン、デイヴィッド・ベネターらが反出生主義の擁護者として知られている。一方、生まれてきたことおよび人間を生み出すことに対して肯定的な意見を持つ立場は出生主義と呼ばれている。
目次
1環境問題
2道義的責任
3幸福
4ブッダ
5ベネターの主張
6負の功利主義
7悪事としての魂の牢獄
8ショーペンハウアーの倫理
9死の克服
10反出生主義の政党
11生物学的逆理としての人間
12同意なしに苦痛や死をもたらす
13他の動物を傷つける
14出産の代わりに養子
15反出生主義者の一覧
16脚注
17関連項目
18文献
環境問題[編集]
反出生主義の思想は古代よりあるが、21世紀に入って環境問題との絡みで新たな展開を見せている[2]。
人口過剰
反出生主義が人口過剰や飢餓の問題の解決に繋がると支持者の多くが考えている。また、枯渇性資源の減少も回避できる。 インドや中国などのいくつかの国は家庭内の子供の数を減らす政策を採用している。これらの政策はすべての出産を否定的に捉えているわけではないが、深刻な人口過剰の懸念や国の資源への重い負担を抑制するのに役立っている。
環境汚染
環境汚染や温暖化などが現在より深刻化するであろう将来の地球に子供を存在させたくないという理由で、反出生主義が語られることがある。
自主的な人類絶滅運動の支持者達は人間の活動が環境悪化の主な原因であるため、生殖を控えるのが「人災への人道的代替」であると論じている[3][4][5]。
道義的責任[編集]
ショーペンハウアーは、人生は苦しみの方が多いと主張し、最も合理的な立場は子供を地球に生みださないことだと主張する。子供は、親・出生地・時代を選ぶ術がない点から、ノルウェーの哲学者 ピーター・ウェッセル・ザプフェは、子供が同意なしに世界に生み出されることにも留意している。
私が己を自負する唯一の理由は、20歳を迎える非常に早い段階で、人は子供を産むべきではないと悟ったからだ。結婚、家族、そしてすべての社会慣習に対する私の嫌悪感は、これに依る。自分の欠点を誰かに継承させること、自分が経験した同じ経験を誰かにさせること、自分よりも辛いかもしれない十字架の道に誰かを強制することは、犯罪だ。不幸と苦痛を継承する子に人生を与えることには同意できない。すべての親は無責任であり、殺人犯である。生殖は獣にのみ在るべきだ。— エミール・シオラン 『Cahiers』1957-1972, 1997
幸福[編集]
親になって子供を育てることは、幸福をもたらすとは限らない。子供の立場から見ても、子供は親を選べない点から、児童心理を知らなかったり、子供を奴隷扱いするなど育児に不適格な親のもとに生まれたら、必然的に子供は不幸になる。
子供を持つ親は、子供のいない家庭と比較して統計的に有意に幸福のレベルが低く、生活満足度、結婚満足度、および精神的健康状態が悪いことをヨーロッパやアメリカの多くの学者が報告し、いくつかの証拠を発見している[6]。
ブッダ[編集]
仏教の開祖ブッダ(ゴータマ・シッダールタ)は出家前に子供（ラーフラ）をもっていたが、原始仏典のスッタニパータでは「子を持つなかれ」等と説いている[7]。
パーピマント悪魔が〔言った〕「子をもつ者は、子たちについて喜ぶ。まさしく、そのように、牛をもつ者は、牛たちについて喜ぶ。まさに、諸々の依存〔の対象〕は、人の喜びである。依存〔の対象〕なき者――彼は、まさに、喜ぶことがない」と。
世尊は〔答えた〕「子をもつ者は、子たちについて憂う。まさしく、そのように、牛をもつ者は、牛たちについて憂う。まさに、諸々の依存〔の対象〕は、人の憂いである。依存〔の対象〕なき者――彼は、まさに、憂うことがない」と。— スッタニパータ（正田大観訳）
Hari Singh Gourは彼の本The Spirit of Buddhismの中で、とりわけ四諦とパーリ律の始まりを考慮し、以下のようにブッダの教えを解釈している。
ブッダ曰く、人生が苦しみである事は忘れられがちである。人が子供を作る。従ってそれが老いと死の原因である。彼らが苦しみの原因がその行いにあると気付いたならば、彼らは子供を作るのを止めるだろう。そうして老いと死のプロセスを止めるべし。— Hari Singh Gour[8]
ベネターの主張[編集]
デイヴィッド・ベネターは、生まれてくることはその本人にとって常に災難であり、それゆえに子供を生むことは反道徳的な行為であり、子供は生むべきではない、と主張する。子供を生むことは、多くの動物がそうしているように単に何も考えずに性的欲求を満たすための行動である性行為の結果として引き起こされている現象であるか、または生む側の欲求を満たすために引き起こされている現象であるか（例えば子育てしてみたいといった欲求を満たすため、自分の老後の世話をしてもらおうという計算のため）、または判断するさいに生の質（QOL）を不当に高く誤評価していること（ポリアンナ効果）から起きている現象である、とする。
ベネターはチャイルド・フリーのような立場と自身の立場をはっきりと区別する。チャイルド・フリーのような考え方は、自分のライフスタイルを維持することを考えて子供を持たないという立場を取るが、ベネターは親の都合ではなく、生まれてくる人間の観点に立って、その上で生むべきではない、と主張する。つまり生まないことは、多くの人に取ってはある種の我慢が必要なことではあるが、生まれてくる人間のことを少しでも真剣に考えるのならば、子供は生まずに我慢すべきだ、とする。
ベネターは人口爆発の問題について言及している。ベネターは地球上の理想の人口はゼロであるとしている。つまり人間は絶滅した方がよい、と主張している。とはいえ即座に人類絶滅を目指すのは生まれてきてしまった人たちにとって大きい苦痛を伴うものとなるであろうから、少しずつ段階的に人口を減らしていき、最終的に絶滅する、つまりゆるやかに絶滅していくのが良いだろう、としている。ちなみにヒトに限らず、他の感覚を持った生物も、まったく生まれてこない方が良かった、つまり絶滅してしまった方が良い、としている。
ちなみにこの生の苦の問題に関し、こうした文章を読んでいる人間は「すでに手遅れである」とベネターは言う。それはすでに生まれてきてしまっているからである。
彼の著書『Better Never to Have Been』は両親と兄弟に捧げられている。両親に（私を生んでしまったけれども）、兄弟に（生まれてきてしまったけれども）、という形で献辞されている[9]。
負の功利主義[編集]
負の功利主義（英語版） では、幸福を最大限までに高めるよりも苦痛を最小限に抑えることの方がより倫理的に重要であるとされる。
ヘルマン・ヴェター（英語版） (1933-)が賛同したヤン・ナーベソン（英語版）(1936-)の非対称仮説（英語版）はこう主張する:[10]
仮に子が生涯にわたって著しく幸福であることが保証されていても、その子供を出生させるべき倫理的責任は存在しない
もし子が不幸になりうることを予想できるのであればその子供を出生させるべきではない倫理的責任が存在する
しかし、ヴェターはナーベソンのこの結論に賛同しなかった:
一般的には、子が不幸を経験すること、また、他者に不利益をもたらすことが予想されないのであれば、子供を出生させる、もしくはさせない義務は生じない
代わりに、彼はこの決定理論的テーブルを提示した:
子が幸福になる子が不幸になる
子を出生させる 倫理的責任は生じない 倫理的責任は不履行
子を出生させない 倫理的責任は生じない 倫理的責任は履行される
そして、子供は生むべきではないと結論付けた:[11][12]
”子を出生させない”ことが、同程度、もしくはより良い結果をもたらすため、”子を出生させる”ことよりも優位にあると考えられる。そのため子が不幸になる可能性を排除できない限り―これは不可能であるが―、前者はより好まれる。そのため、我々は(3)の代わりに、より踏み込んだ(3')―どのような場合でも、子供を産まないことが倫理的に好まれる―を結論とする。
カリム・アケルマは、人生の中で起きうる最良のことは最悪なこと―激痛、怪我、病気、死による苦しみ―を相殺せず、出生を控えるべきであると主張している。[13][14]
ブルノ・コンテスタビリー はアーシュラ・K・ル＝グウィン の "オメラスから歩み去る人々" を例として挙げている。この短編では、隔離され、虐げられ、救うことができない一人の子供の苦しみにより、住民の繁栄と都市の存続がもたらされるユートピア都市オメラスが描かれている。大半の住民はこの状態を認めて暮らしているが、この状態を良しとしない者もおり、彼らはこの都市に住むことを嫌って"オメラスから歩み去る"。コンテスタビリーはこの短編と現実世界を対比する: オメラスの存続のためには、その子供は虐げられなければいけない。同様に、社会の存続にも、虐げられる者は常に存在するという事実が付随する。コンテスタビリーは、反出生主義者は、そのような社会を受け入れず、関与することを拒む "オメラスから歩み去る人々"と同一視できると述べた。また、「万人の幸福はただ一人の甚大な苦しみを相殺できうるのか」という疑問を投げかけた。[15]
悪事としての魂の牢獄[編集]
マニ教[16]、ボゴミル派[17]とカタリ派[18]は出産は魂を牢獄に入れる悪事であると信じていた。彼らは出産は邪神デミウルゴスまたはサタンの仕業と見なしていた。
ショーペンハウアーの倫理[編集]
アルトゥル・ショーペンハウアーの哲学では、世界は生きる意志によって支配されている。盲目的で不合理な力、常に現れる本能的欲望が、それ自身によって懸命に生み出される。しかし、その性質ゆえに決して満たされない事が苦しみの原因である。存在は苦しみで満たされている。世界には喜びより苦しみの方が多い。数千人の幸福と喜びは、一人の人間の苦痛を補う事はできない。そして全体的に考えると生命は生まれない方がより良いだろう。 倫理的な行動の本質は、同情と禁欲によって自分の欲望を克服することからなる生きる意志の否定である。 一度我々が生きる意志を否定したなら、この世界に人間を生み出すのは、余計で、無意味で、道徳的に非常に疑問のある行為である[19]。
死の克服[編集]
Julius CassianusとEncratitesは誕生が死につながる事に気づいた。 死を克服するため、我々は出産をやめるべきであると言う[20][21][22]。
反出生主義の政党[編集]
イギリスの反出生主義を公約に掲げた政党ANP(The Anti Natalist Party)は法学者ウィリアム・ブラックストンの「10人の罪人を逃しても1人の無辜を罰することなかれ」の言葉を引用し、正義の原則的に（不必要な）喜びが存在するより（不必要な）苦しみを経験しない方が良いと主張している[23]。 また、公約として「子供を作る意欲を減らす為」に子供の税控除の廃止や裕福な家族への課税などを掲げている[24]。
生物学的逆理としての人間[編集]
Peter Wessel Zapffeの哲学によると、人間は生物学的な逆理である。意識が過剰に発達してしまったため他の動物の様に正常に機能しなくなっている。 知覚は我々が抱えられる以上に与えられている。我々はもっと生きたいと望む様に進化したが、人間は死が運命づけられている事を認識できる唯一の種である。我々は幅広く過去から未来を予測する事が可能だ。我々は正義と、世界の出来事に意味がある事を期待する。これが意識を持った個体の人生が悲劇である事を保証している。 我々は満足させる事ができない欲望と精神的な要求を持っている。人類がまだ存続しているのはこの現実の前に思考停止しているからに他ならない。 Zapffeによると人間はこの自己欺瞞をやめ、その帰結として出産を止めることによって存続を終わらせる必要がある[25][26][27][28]。
同意なしに苦痛や死をもたらす[編集]
Julio Cabrera は出産は人間を危険で痛みに満ちた場所に送り込む行為だと述べている。生まれた瞬間から死に至るプロセスが開始される。Cabreraは出産において我々は生まれてくる子供の同意を得ておらず、子供は痛みと死を避けるために生まれてくる事を望んでいないかも知れないと主張している[29][30]。同意の欠如については哲学者のGerald HarrisonとJulia Tannerも同様の事を書いている。彼らは生まれてくる本人の同意なしに出産をつうじて他人の人生に影響を与える道徳的な権利を我々は持っていないと主張している[31]。
他の動物を傷つける[編集]
デイヴィッド・ベネター、[32] Gerald HarrisonとJulia Tanner[31] らは 人間が動物に危害を加えている事を懸念している。我々の種によって毎年数十億の動物が動物製品の生産や動物実験、環境破壊の結果や残酷で嗜虐的な喜びの為に虐殺されている。彼らは我々が動物を苦しめるのは非倫理的であるとする動物の権利の思想家に賛同する傾向がある。 彼らは地球上で最も破壊的な種は人類だと考える。そして新たに人間が生まれなければ人間によって新たに動物が苦しめられる事はなくなると主張する。
出産の代わりに養子[編集]
現在、世界中に何百万人もの孤児がいる。Théophile de Giraud[33]は道徳的な問題を抱えた出産を行うよりも、愛情と保護を必要としている子供らを養子にする方が良いだろうと述べている。
反出生主義者の一覧[編集]
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デイヴィッド・ベネター
エミール・シオラン
アルトゥル・ショーペンハウアー
ジョン・スチュアート・ミル
フランシス・クリック
タレス
アル＝マアッリー
ハワード・フィリップス・ラヴクラフト
マルキ・ド・サド
脚注[編集]
[脚注の使い方]
^ 森岡正博は『生まれてこないほうが良かったのか？』（筑摩選書 ２０２０年、１４頁）で反出生主義を「自分が生まれてきたことを否定する思想」と「人間を新たに生み出すことを否定する思想」に分けている
^ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/anti-natalists-childfree-population-climate-change
^ V. Baird, "The No-nonsense Guide to World Population", New Internationalist, Oxford 2011, p. 119.
^ [1] An NBC interview with Les U. Knight.
^ [2] The official Voluntary Human Extinction Movement website.
^ ＣＮＮ "子どものいない方が夫婦は幸せ？ 米英で調査". 2014.01.15
^ 中村元訳『ブッダのことば―スッタニパータ』 p.17
^ H.S. Gour, The Spirit of Buddhism, Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish, Montana 2005, pp. 286-288.
^ Benatar, David (2006). Better Never to Have Been. Oxford University Press, USA. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-929642-2
^ J. Narveson, Utilitarianism and New Generations, Mind 1967, LXXVI (301), pp. 62-67.
^ H. Vetter, The production of children as a problem for utilitarian ethics, Inquiry 12, 1969, pp. 445–447.
^ H. Vetter, Utilitarianism and New Generations, Mind, 1971, LXXX (318), pp. 301–302.
^ K. Akerma, Soll eine Menschheit sein? Eine fundamentalethische Frage, Cuxhaven-Dartford: Traude Junghans, 1995.
^ K. Akerma, Verebben der Menschheit?: Neganthropie und Anthropodizee, Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Karl Alber, 2000.
^ B. Contestabile, The Denial of the World from an Impartial View, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, volume 17, issue 1, Taylor and Francis, 2016.
^ H. Jonas, The gnostic..., op. cit., pp. 228 and 231.
^ D. Obolensky, The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 114.
^ M.J. Fromer, Ethical issues in sexuality and reproduction, The C. V. Mosby Company, St. Louis 1983, p. 110.
^ A. Schopenhauer, Selected Essays of Schopenhauer, Contributions to the Doctrine of the Affirmation and Nega-tion of the Will-to-live, G. Bell and Sons, London 1926, p. 269.
^ P. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, Columbia University Press, Columbia 1988, p. 96.
^ Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, op. cit., pp. 295-296.
^ G. Quispel, Gnostica, Judaica, Catholica: Collected Essays of Gilles Quispel, Brill, Danvers 2008, p. 228.
^ [3]What is ‘Antinatalism’? – The Anti-Natalist Party
^ [4]Manifesto – The Anti-Natalist Party
^ P.W. Zapffe, The Last Messiah,The Philosophy Now 2004, Number 45, pp. 35-39.
^ P.W. Zapffe, Om det tragiske, Pax Forlag, Oslo 1996.
^ P.W. Zapffe, H. Tønnessen, Jeg velger sannheten: En dialog mellom Peter Wessel Zapffe og Herman Tønnessen, Universitets forlaget, Oslo 1983.
^ T. Brede Andersen, Hva det betyr at være menneske, 1990.
^ [5] J. Cabrera, T. L. di Santis, Porque te amo, Não nascerás! Nascituri te salutant, LGE Editora, Brasilia 2009.
^ [6] J. Cabrera, A critique of affirmative morality - a reflection on death, birth and the value of life, Julio Cabrera Editions, Brasília 2014.
^ a b G. Harrison, J. Tanner, Better Not To Have Children, Think 2011, Volume 10, Issue 27, pp. 113-121.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 109.
^ T. de Giraud, L'art... op. cit., p. 51.
関連項目[編集]
自主的な人類絶滅運動
チャイルド・フリー
子どもの権利
マルサス主義
優生学
カタリ派
スコプツィ
人類の絶滅
ニヒリズム
産児制限
『河童』
『生誕と災厄』
文献[編集]
加藤秀一『＜個＞からはじめる生命論』（日本放送出版協会、2007年）
デイヴィッド・ベネター『生まれてこないほうが良かった―存在してしまうことの害悪』（すずさわ書店、2017年）
大谷崇『生まれてきたことが苦しいあなたに―最強のペシミスト・シオランの思想』（星海社新書、2019年）
『現代思想2019年11月号 特集＜反出生主義を考える＞』（2019年）
森岡正博『生まれてこないほうが良かったのか？―生命の哲学へ！』（筑摩選書、2020年）
カテゴリ:
反出生主義
子供
倫理学の理論
生命倫理学
生物学の哲学
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Antinatalism
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Antinatalism, or anti-natalism, is a philosophical position that assigns a negative value to birth. Antinatalists argue that humans should abstain from procreation because it is morally wrong (some also recognize the procreation of other sentient beings as morally wrong). In scholarly and in literary writings, various ethical foundations have been presented for antinatalism.[1][2][3] Some of the earliest surviving formulations of the idea that it would be better not to have been born come from ancient Greece.[4] The term antinatalism is in opposition to the term natalism or pro-natalism, and was used probably for the first time as the name of the position by Théophile de Giraud in his book L'art de guillotiner les procréateurs: Manifeste anti-nataliste.[5]
Contents
1Arguments
1.1In religion
1.2Theodicy and anthropodicy
1.3Peter Wessel Zapffe
1.4Negative ethics
1.5Kantian imperative
1.6Impossibility of consent
1.7Death as a harm
1.8Negative utilitarianism
1.9David Benatar
1.9.1Asymmetry between pleasure and pain
1.9.2Suffering experienced by descendents
1.9.3Consequences of procreation
1.9.4Misanthropy
1.10Harm to non-human animals
1.11Environmental impact
2Realism
3Practical implications
3.1Abortion
3.2Adoption
3.3Famine relief
4Non-human animals
5Criticism
6See also
7Notes
8External links
Arguments[edit]
In religion[edit]
The teaching of the Buddha, among other Four Noble Truths and the beginning of Mahāvagga, is interpreted by Hari Singh Gour as follows:
Buddha states his propositions in the pedantic style of his age. He throws them into a form of sorites; but, as such, it is logically faulty and all he wishes to convey is this: Oblivious of the suffering to which life is subject, man begets children, and is thus the cause of old age and death. If he would only realize what suffering he would add to by his act, he would desist from the procreation of children; and so stop the operation of old age and death.[6]
The Marcionites believed that the visible world is an evil creation of a crude, cruel, jealous, angry demiurge, Yahweh. According to this teaching, people should oppose him, abandon his world, not create people, and trust in the good God of mercy, foreign and distant.[7][8][9]
The Encratites observed that birth leads to death. In order to conquer death, people should desist from procreation: "not produce fresh fodder for death".[10][11][12]
The Manichaeans,[13][14][15] the Bogomils[16][17][18] and the Cathars[19][20][21] believed that procreation sentences the soul to imprisonment in evil matter. They saw procreation as an instrument of an evil god, demiurge, or of Satan that imprisons the divine element in the matter and thus causes the divine element to suffer.
Theodicy and anthropodicy[edit]
Julio Cabrera considers the issue of being a creator in relation to theodicy and argues that just as it is impossible to defend the idea of a good God as creator, it is also impossible to defend the idea of a good man as a creator. In parenthood, the human parent imitates the divine parent, in the sense that education could be understood as a form of pursuit of "salvation", the "right path" for a child. However, a human being could decide that it is better not to suffer at all than to suffer and be offered the later possibility of salvation from suffering. In Cabrera's opinion, evil is associated not with the lack of being, but with the suffering and dying of those that are alive. So, on the contrary, evil is only and obviously associated with being.[22]
Karim Akerma, due to the moral problem of man as creator, introduces anthropodicy, a twin concept for theodicy. He is of the opinion that the less faith in the Almighty Creator-God there is, the more urgent the question of anthropodicy becomes. Akerma thinks that for those who want to lead ethical lives, the causation of suffering requires a justification. Man can no longer shed responsibility for the suffering that occurs by appealing to an imaginary entity that sets moral principles. For Akerma, antinatalism is a consequence of the collapse of theodicy endeavors and the failure of attempts to establish an anthropodicy. According to him, there is no metaphysics nor moral theory that can justify the production of new people, and therefore anthropodicy is indefensible as well as theodicy.[23]
Peter Wessel Zapffe[edit]
Peter Wessel Zapffe viewed humans as a biological paradox. According to him, consciousness has become over-evolved in humans, thereby making us incapable of functioning normally like other animals: cognition gives us more than we can carry. Our frailness and insignificance in the cosmos are visible to us. We want to live, and yet because of how we have evolved, we are the only species whose members are conscious that they are destined to die. We are able to analyze the past and the future, both our situation and that of others, as well as to imagine the suffering of billions of people (as well as of other living beings) and feel compassion for their suffering. We yearn for justice and meaning in a world that lacks both. This ensures that the lives of conscious individuals are tragic. We have desires: spiritual needs that reality is unable to satisfy, and our species still exists only because we limit our awareness of what that reality actually entails. Human existence amounts to a tangled network of defense mechanisms, which can be observed both individually and socially, in our everyday behavior patterns. According to Zapffe, humanity should cease this self-deception, and the natural consequence would be its extinction by abstaining from procreation.[24][25][26]
Negative ethics[edit]
Julio Cabrera proposes a concept of "negative ethics" in opposition to "affirmative" ethics, meaning ethics that affirm being.[22][27][28][29] He describes procreation as manipulation and harm, a unilateral and non-consensual sending of a human being into a painful, dangerous and morally impeding situation.
Cabrera regards procreation as an ontological issue of total manipulation: one's very being is manufactured and used; in contrast to intra-worldly cases where someone is placed in a harmful situation. In the case of procreation, no chance of defense against that act is even available. According to Cabrera: manipulation in procreation is visible primarily in the unilateral and non-consensual nature of the act, which makes procreation per se inevitably asymmetrical; be it a product of forethought, or a product of neglect. It is always connected with the interests (or disinterests) of other humans, not the created human. In addition, Cabrera points out that in his view the manipulation of procreation is not limited to the act of creation itself, but it is continued in the process of raising the child, during which parents gain great power over the child's life, who is shaped according to their preferences and for their satisfaction. He emphasizes that although it is not possible to avoid manipulation in procreation, it is perfectly possible to avoid procreation itself and that then no moral rule is violated.
Cabrera believes that the situation in which one is placed through procreation, human life, is structurally negative in that its constitutive features are inherently adverse. The most prominent of them are, according to Cabrera, the following:
The being acquired by a human at birth is decreasing (or "decaying"), in the sense of a being that begins to end since its very emergence, following a single and irreversible direction of deterioration and decline, of which complete consummation can occur at any moment between some minutes and around one hundred years.
From the moment they come into being, humans are affected by three kinds of frictions: physical pain (in the form of illnesses, accidents, and natural catastrophes to which they are always exposed); discouragement (in the form of "lacking the will", or the "mood" or the "spirit", to continue to act, from mild taedium vitae to serious forms of depression), and finally, exposure to the aggressions of other humans (from gossip and slander to various forms of discrimination, persecution, and injustice), aggressions that we too can inflict on others, also submitted, like us, to the three kinds of friction.
To defend themselves against (a) and (b), human beings are equipped with mechanisms of creation of positive values (ethical, aesthetic, religious, entertaining, recreational, as well as values contained in human realizations of all kinds), which humans must keep constantly active. All positive values that appear within human life are reactive and palliative; they are introduced by the permanent, anxious, and uncertain struggle against the decaying life and its three kinds of friction.
Cabrera calls the set of these characteristics A–C the "terminality of being". He is of the opinion that a huge number of humans around the world cannot withstand this steep struggle against the terminal structure of their being, which leads to destructive consequences for them and others: suicides, major or minor mental illnesses, or aggressive behavior. He accepts that life may be – thanks to human's own merits and efforts – bearable and even very pleasant (though not for all, due to the phenomenon of moral impediment), but also considers it problematic to bring someone into existence so that they may attempt to make their life pleasant by struggling against the difficult and oppressive situation we place them in by procreating. It seems more reasonable, according to Cabrera, simply not to put them in that situation, since the results of their struggle are always uncertain.
Cabrera believes that in ethics, including affirmative ethics, there is one overarching concept which he calls the "Minimal Ethical Articulation", "MEA" (previously translated into English as "Fundamental Ethical Articulation" and "FEA"): the consideration of other people's interests, not manipulating them and not harming them. Procreation for him is an obvious violation of MEA – someone is manipulated and placed in a harmful situation as a result of that action. In his view, values included in the MEA are widely accepted by affirmative ethics, they are even their basics, and if approached radically, they should lead to the refusal of procreation.
For Cabrera, the worst thing in human life and by extension in procreation is what he calls "moral impediment": the structural impossibility of acting in the world without harming or manipulating someone at some given moment. This impediment does not occur because of an intrinsic "evil" of human nature, but because of the structural situation in which the human being has always been. In this situation, we are cornered by various kinds of pain, space for action is limited, and different interests often conflict with each other. We do not have to have bad intentions to treat others with disregard; we are compelled to do so in order to survive, pursue our projects, and escape from suffering. Cabrera also draws attention to the fact that life is associated with the constant risk of one experiencing strong physical pain, which is common in human life, for example as a result of a serious illness, and maintains that the mere existence of such possibility impedes us morally, as well as that because of it, we can at any time lose, as a result of its occurrence, the possibility of a dignified, moral functioning even to a minimal extent.
Kantian imperative[edit]
Julio Cabrera,[30] David Benatar[31] and Karim Akerma[32] all argue that procreation is contrary to Immanuel Kant's practical imperative (according to Kant, a man should never be used as merely a means to an end, but always be treated as an end in himself). They argue that a person can be created for the sake of his parents or other people, but that it is impossible to create someone for his own good; and that therefore, following Kant's recommendation, we should not create new people. Heiko Puls argues that Kant's considerations regarding parental duties and human procreation, in general, imply arguments for an ethically justified antinatalism. Kant, however, according to Puls, rejects this position in his teleology for meta-ethical reasons.[33]
Impossibility of consent[edit]
Seana Shiffrin, Gerald Harrison, Julia Tanner and Asheel Singh argue that procreation is morally problematic because of the impossibility of obtaining consent from the human who will be brought into existence.
Shiffrin lists four factors that in her opinion make the justification for having hypothetical consent to procreation a problem:
great harm is not at stake if the action is not taken;
if the action is taken, the harms suffered by the created person can be very severe;
a person cannot escape the imposed condition without very high cost (suicide is often a physically, emotionally, and morally excruciating option);
the hypothetical consent procedure is not based on the values of the person who will bear the imposed condition.[34]
Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner argue that when we want to significantly affect someone by our action and it is not possible to get their consent, then the default should be to not take such action. The exception is, according to them, actions by which we want to prevent greater harm of a person (for example, pushing someone out of the way of a falling piano). However, in their opinion, such actions certainly do not include procreation, because before taking this action a person does not exist.[35][36][37][38]
Asheel Singh emphasizes that one does not have to think that coming into existence is always an overall harm in order to recognize antinatalism as a correct view. In his opinion, it is enough to think that there is no moral right to inflict serious, preventable harms upon others without their consent.[39]
Death as a harm[edit]
Marc Larock presents a view which he calls "deprivationalism".[40] According to this view:
Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference.
Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and thus causes harm.
Larock argues that if a person is deprived of an infinite number of new satisfied preferences, they suffer an infinite number of harms and that such deprivation is death to which procreation leads.
All of us are brought into existence, without our consent, and over the course of our lives, we are acquainted with a multitude of goods. Unfortunately, there is a limit to the amount of good each of us will have in our lives. Eventually, each of us will die and we will be permanently cut off from the prospect of any further good. Existence, viewed in this way, seems to be a cruel joke.
Larock believes that it is not correct to neutralize his view by stating that death is also an infinitely great benefit for us, because it protects us from the infinite number of new frustrated preferences. He proposes a thought experiment in which we have two people, Mary and Tom. The first person, Mary, dies at the age of forty years as a result of complications caused by a degenerative disease. Mary would live for some more time, if not for the complications, but she would only experience bad things in her life, not good ones. The second person, Tom, dies at the same age from the same illness, but in his case, the disease is at such a stage of development that his body would no longer be able to function. According to Larock, it is bad when someone, like in the case of Tom, encounters the impossibility of continuing to derive good things from his life; everybody's life leads to such a point if someone lives long enough and our intuitions do not tell us that this is generally good or even neutral. Therefore, we should reject the view that death is also an infinitely great benefit: because we think that Tom has been unlucky. In the case of Mary, our intuitions tell us that her misfortune is not as great as Tom's misfortune. Her misfortune is reduced by the fact that death saved her from the real prospect of experiencing bad things. We do not have the same intuition in Tom's case. No evil or good future was physically possible for him. Larock thinks that while the impossibility of experiencing future good things seems to us to be a harm, the mere lack of a logical possibility of experiencing future bad things does not seem to be a compensatory benefit to us. If so, there would be nothing strange in recognizing that Tom had not suffered any misfortune. But he is a victim of misfortune, just like Mary. However, Mary's misfortune does not seem to be so great because her death prevents great suffering. Larock is of the opinion that most people will see both cases in this way. This conclusion is supposed to lead to the fact that we recognize that there is an asymmetry between the harms and benefits that death brings.
Larock summarizes his view as follows:
The existence of every moral patient in our world rests on a crude moral miscalculation. As I see it, non-procreation is the best means of rectifying this mistake.
Negative utilitarianism[edit]
Negative utilitarianism argues that minimizing suffering has greater moral importance than maximizing happiness.
Hermann Vetter agrees with the assumptions of Jan Narveson:[41]
There is no moral obligation to produce a child even if we could be sure that it will be very happy throughout its life.
There is a moral obligation not to produce a child if it can be foreseen that it will be unhappy.
However, he disagrees with the conclusion that Narveson draws:
In general – if it can be foreseen neither that the child will be unhappy nor that it will bring disutility upon others – there is no duty to have or not to have a child.
Instead, he presents the following decision-theoretic matrix:
Child will be more or less happyChild will be more or less unhappy
Produce the child No duty fulfilled or violated Duty violated
Do not produce the child No duty fulfilled or violated Duty fulfilled
Based on this, he concludes that we should not create people:[42][43]
It is seen immediately that the act "do not produce the child" dominates the act "produce the child" because it has equally good consequences as the other act in one case and better consequences in the other. So it is to be preferred to the other act as long as we cannot exclude with certainty the possibility that the child will be more or less unhappy; and we never can. So we have, instead of (3), the far-reaching consequence: (3') In any case, it is morally preferable not to produce a child.
Karim Akerma argues that utilitarianism requires the least metaphysical assumptions and is, therefore, the most convincing ethical theory. He believes that negative utilitarianism is the right one because the good things in life do not compensate for the bad things; first and foremost, the best things do not compensate for the worst things such as, for example, the experiences of terrible pain, the agonies of the wounded, sick or dying. In his opinion, we also rarely know what to do to make people happy, but we know what to do so that people do not suffer: it is enough that they are not created. What is important for Akerma in ethics is the striving for the fewest suffering people (ultimately no one), not striving for the happiest people, which, according to him, takes place at the expense of immeasurable suffering.[44][23]
Bruno Contestabile cites the story "The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas" by Ursula K. Le Guin. In this story, the existence of the utopian city of Omelas and the good fortune of its inhabitants depend on the suffering of one child who is tortured in an isolated place and who cannot be helped. The majority accepts this state of affairs and stays in the city, but there are those who do not agree with it, who do not want to participate in it and thus they "walk away from Omelas". Contestabile draws a parallel here: for Omelas to exist, the child must be tortured, and in the same way, the existence of our world is related to the fact that someone is constantly harmed. According to Contestabile, antinatalists can be seen just as "the ones who walk away from Omelas", who do not accept such a world, and who do not approve of its perpetuation. He poses the question: is all happiness able to compensate for the extreme suffering of even one person?[45]
David Benatar[edit]
Asymmetry between pleasure and pain[edit]
David Benatar argues that there is a crucial asymmetry between the good and the bad things, such as pleasure and pain:
the presence of pain is bad;
the presence of pleasure is good;
the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.[46][47]
Scenario A (X exists)Scenario B (X never exists)
1. Presence of pain (Bad) 3. Absence of pain (Good)
2. Presence of pleasure (Good) 4. Absence of pleasure (Not bad)
Regarding procreation, the argument follows that coming into existence generates both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not coming into existence entails neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.
Benatar explains the above asymmetry using four other asymmetries that he considers quite plausible:
We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why we think there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that the presence of this suffering would be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence of the suffering is good (even though there is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffering). By contrast, the reason we think there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although their pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create them, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create them. That the child may be happy is not a morally important reason to create them. By contrast, that the child may be unhappy is an important moral reason not to create them. If it were the case that the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, then we would have a significant moral reason to create a child and to create as many children as possible. And if it were not the case that the absence of pain is good even if someone does not exist to experience this good, then we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child.
Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create them – a person will not be deprived of happiness, because he or she will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence in a place where there are happy people. When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good.
Suffering experienced by descendents[edit]
According to Benatar, by creating a child, we are responsible not only for this child's suffering, but we may also be co-responsible for the suffering of further offspring of this child.[48]
Assuming that each couple has three children, an original pair's cumulative descendants over ten generations amount to 88,572 people. That constitutes a lot of pointless, avoidable suffering. To be sure, full responsibility for it all does not lie with the original couple because each new generation faces the choice of whether to continue that line of descendants. Nevertheless, they bear some responsibility for the generations that ensue. If one does not desist from having children, one can hardly expect one's descendants to do so.[49]
Consequences of procreation[edit]
Benatar cites statistics showing where the creation of people leads. It is estimated that:
more than fifteen million people are thought to have died from natural disasters in the last 1,000 years,
approximately 20,000 people die every day from hunger,
an estimated 840 million people suffer from hunger and malnutrition,
between 541 and 1912, it is estimated that over 102 million people succumbed to plague,
the 1918 influenza epidemic killed 50 million people,
nearly 11 million people die every year from infectious diseases,
malignant neoplasms take more than a further 7 million lives each year,
approximately 3.5 million people die every year in accidents,
approximately 56.5 million people died in 2001, that is more than 107 people per minute,
before the twentieth century over 133 million people were killed in mass killings,
in the first 88 years of the twentieth century 170 million (and possibly as many as 360 million) people were shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to death; buried alive, drowned, hanged, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways governments have inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citizens and foreigners,
there were 1.6 million conflict-related deaths in the sixteenth century, 6.1 million in the seventeenth century, 7 million in the eighteenth, 19.4 million in the nineteenth, and 109.7 million in the twentieth,
war-related injuries led to 310,000 deaths in 2000,
about 40 million children are maltreated each year,
more than 100 million currently living women and girls have been subjected to genital cutting,
815,000 people are thought to have committed suicide in 2000[50] (currently, it is estimated that someone commits suicide every 40 seconds, more than 800,000 people per year).[51]
Misanthropy[edit]
In addition to the philanthropic arguments, which are based on a concern for the humans who will be brought into existence, Benatar also posits that another path to antinatalism is the misanthropic argument[52][53] that can be summarized in his opinion as follows:
Another route to anti-natalism is via what I call a "misanthropic" argument. According to this argument, humans are a deeply flawed and destructive species that is responsible for the suffering and deaths of billions of other humans and non-human animals. If that level of destruction were caused by another species we would rapidly recommend that new members of that species not be brought into existence.[54]
Harm to non-human animals[edit]
David Benatar,[55][56] Gunter Bleibohm,[57] Gerald Harrison, Julia Tanner,[58] and Patricia MacCormack[59] are attentive to the harm caused to other sentient beings by humans. They would say that billions of non-human animals are abused and slaughtered each year by our species for the production of animal products, for experimentation and after the experiments (when they are no longer needed), as a result of the destruction of habitats or other environmental damage and for sadistic pleasure. They tend to agree with animal rights thinkers that the harm we do to them is immoral. They consider the human species the most destructive on the planet, arguing that without new humans, there will be no harm caused to other sentient beings by new humans.
Some antinatalists are also vegetarians or vegans for moral reasons, and postulate that such views should complement each other as having a common denominator: not causing harm to other sentient beings.[60][61] This attitude was already present in Manichaeism and Catharism.[62]
Environmental impact[edit]
Volunteers of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement argue that human activity is the primary cause of environmental degradation, and therefore refraining from reproduction is "the humanitarian alternative to human disasters".[63][64][65] Others, in the United States and other developed countries, are similarly concerned about contributing to climate change and other environmental problems by having biological children.[66]
Realism[edit]
Some antinatalists believe that most people do not evaluate reality accurately, which affects the desire to have children.
Peter Wessel Zapffe identifies four repressive mechanisms we use, consciously or not, to restrict our consciousness of life and the world:
isolation – an arbitrary dismissal from our consciousness and the consciousness of others about all negative thoughts and feelings associated with the unpleasant facts of our existence. In daily life, this manifests as a tacit agreement to remain silent on certain subjects – especially around children, to prevent instilling in them a fear of the world and what awaits them in life, before they will be able to learn other mechanisms.
anchoring – the creation and use of personal values to ensure our attachment to reality, such as parents, home, the street, school, God, the church, the State, morality, fate, the law of life, the people, the future, accumulation of material goods or authority, etc. This can be characterized as creating a defensive structure, "a fixation of points within, or construction of walls around, the liquid fray of consciousness", and defending the structure against threats.
distraction – shifting focus to new impressions to flee from circumstances and ideas we consider harmful or unpleasant.
sublimation – refocusing the tragic parts of life into something creative or valuable, usually through an aesthetic confrontation for the purpose of catharsis. We focus on the imaginary, dramatic, heroic, lyric or comic aspects of life, to allow ourselves and others an escape from their true impact.
According to Zapffe, depressive disorders are often "messages from a deeper, more immediate sense of life, bitter fruits of a geniality of thought".[24] Some studies seem to confirm this, it is said about the phenomenon of depressive realism, and Colin Feltham writes about antinatalism as one of its possible consequences.[67]
David Benatar citing numerous studies lists three phenomena described by psychologists, which, according to him, are responsible for making our self-assessments about the quality of our lives unreliable:
Tendency towards optimism (or Pollyanna principle) – we have a positively distorted picture of our lives in the past, present and future.
Adaptation (or accommodation, habituation) – we adapt to negative situations and adjust our expectations accordingly.
Comparison – for our self-assessments about the quality of our lives, more important than how our lives go is how they go in comparison with the lives of others. One of the effects of this is that negative aspects of life that affect everyone are not taken into account when assessing our own well-being. We are also more likely to compare ourselves with those who are worse off than those who are better off.
Benatar concludes:
The above psychological phenomena are unsurprising from an evolutionary perspective. They militate against suicide and in favour of reproduction. If our lives are quite as bad as I shall still suggest they are, and if people were prone to see this true quality of their lives for what it is, they might be much more inclined to kill themselves, or at least not to produce more such lives. Pessimism, then, tends not to be naturally selected.[68]
Thomas Ligotti draws attention to the similarity between Zapffe's philosophy and terror management theory. Terror management theory argues that humans are equipped with unique cognitive abilities beyond what is necessary for survival, which includes symbolic thinking, extensive self-consciousness and perception of themselves as temporal beings aware of the finitude of their existence. The desire to live alongside our awareness of the inevitability of death triggers terror in us. Opposition to this fear is among our primary motivations. To escape it, we build defensive structures around ourselves to ensure our symbolic or literal immortality, to feel like valuable members of a meaningful universe, and to focus on protecting ourselves from immediate external threats.[69]
Practical implications[edit]
Abortion[edit]
Antinatalism can lead to a particular position on the morality of abortion.
According to David Benatar, one comes into existence in the morally relevant sense when consciousness arises, when a fetus becomes sentient, and up until that time an abortion is moral, whereas continued pregnancy would be immoral. Benatar refers to EEG brain studies and studies on the pain perception of the fetus, which states that fetal consciousness arises no earlier than between twenty-eight and thirty weeks of pregnancy, before which it is incapable of feeling pain.[70] Contrary to that, the latest report from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists showed that the fetus gains consciousness no earlier than week twenty-four of the pregnancy.[71] Some assumptions of this report regarding sentience of the fetus after the second trimester were criticized.[72] In a similar way argues Karim Akerma. He distinguishes between organisms that do not have mental properties and living beings that have mental properties. According to his view, which he calls the mentalistic view, a living being begins to exist when an organism (or another entity) produces a simple form of consciousness for the first time.[73][74]
Julio Cabrera believes that the moral problem of abortion is totally different from the problem of abstention of procreation because in the case of abortion, there is no longer a non-being, but an already existing being – the most helpless and defenseless of the parties involved, that someday will have the autonomy to decide, and we cannot decide for them. From the point of view of Cabrera's negative ethics, abortion is immoral for similar reasons as procreation. For Cabrera, the exception in which abortion is morally justified is cases of irreversible illness of the foetus (or some serious "social illnesses" like American conquest or Nazism), according to him in such cases we are clearly thinking about the unborn, and not simply of our own interests. In addition, Cabrera believes that under certain circumstances, it is legitimate and comprehensible to commit unethical actions, for example, abortion is legitimate and comprehensible when the mother's life is at risk.[75]
Adoption[edit]
Herman Vetter,[42] Théophile de Giraud,[76] Travis N. Rieder,[77] Tina Rulli,[78] Karim Akerma[79] and Julio Cabrera[80] argue that presently rather than engaging in the morally problematic act of procreation, one could do good by adopting already existing children. De Giraud emphasizes that, across the world, there are millions of existing children who need care.
Famine relief[edit]
Stuart Rachels[81] and David Benatar[82] argue that presently, in a situation where a huge number of people live in poverty, we should cease procreation and divert these resources, that would have been used to raise our own children, to the poor.
Non-human animals[edit]
Some antinatalists recognize the procreation of non-human sentient animals as morally bad, and some view sterilization as morally good in their case. Karim Akerma defines antinatalism, that includes non-human sentient animals, as universal antinatalism[83] and he assumes such a position himself:
By sterilising animals, we can free them from being slaves to their instincts and from bringing more and more captive animals into the cycle of being born, contracting parasites, ageing, falling ill and dying; eating and being eaten.[84]
David Benatar emphasizes that his asymmetry applies to all sentient beings, and mentions that humans play a role in deciding how many animals there will be: humans breed many species of animals.[85]
Magnus Vinding argues that the lives of wild animals in their natural environment are generally very bad. He draws attention to phenomena such as dying before adulthood, starvation, disease, parasitism, infanticide, predation and being eaten alive. He cites research on what animal life looks like in the wild. One of eight male lion cubs survives into adulthood. Others die as a result of starvation, disease and often fall victims to the teeth and claws of other lions. Attaining adulthood is much rarer for fish. Only one in a hundred male chinook salmon survives into adulthood. Vinding is of the opinion that if human lives and the survival of human children looked like this, current human values would disallow procreation; however, this is not possible when it comes to non-human animals, who are guided by instinct. He takes the view that even if one does not agree that procreation is always morally bad, one should recognize procreation in wildlife as morally bad and something that ought to be prevented (at least in theory, not necessarily in practice). He maintains that non-intervention cannot be defended if we reject speciesism and that we should reject the unjustifiable dogma stating that what is happening in nature is what should be happening in nature.
We cannot allow ourselves to spuriously rationalize away the suffering that takes place in nature, and to forget the victims of the horrors of nature merely because that reality does not fit into our convenient moral theories, theories that ultimately just serve to make us feel consistent and good about ourselves in the face of an incomprehensibly bad reality.[86]
Criticism[edit]
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (June 2020)
Criticism of antinatalism comes from any number of views that see positive value in bringing humans into existence.[87] David Wasserman in his criticism of antinatalism, criticizes David Benatar's asymmetry argument and the consent argument.[88]
See also[edit]
Audianism
Borborites
Catharism
Human population planning
Philosophical pessimism
Priscillianism
Voluntary childlessness
Voluntary Human Extinction Movement
Notes[edit]
^ K. Akerma, Antinatalismus – Ein Handbuch, epubli, 2017.
^ K. Coates, Anti-Natalism: Rejectionist Philosophy from Buddhism to Benatar, First Edition Design Publisher, 2014.
^ K. Lochmanová (ed.), History of Antinatalism: How Philosophy Has Challenged the Question of Procreation, Independently published, 2020.
^ W. Tatarkiewicz, O szczęściu (On Happiness), Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1979, pp. 420–421.
^ K. Akerma, Antinatalismus... op. cit., p. 301.
^ H. Singh Gour, The Spirit of Buddhism, Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2005, pp. 286–288.
^ H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, pp. 144–145.
^ P. Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria, Leiden: Brill, 1999, p. 94.
^ Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, Books 1–3 (The Fathers of the Church, volume 85), Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 2010, pp. 263–271.
^ P. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 96.
^ G. Quispel, Gnostica, Judaica, Catholica: Collected Essays of Gilles Quispel, Leiden: Brill, 2008, p. 228.
^ Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, op. cit., pp. 295–296.
^ H. Jonas, The Gnostic..., op. cit., pp. 228, 231.
^ I. Gardner and S.N.C. Lieu, Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 7, 22.
^ S.G. Kochuthara, The Concept of Sexual Pleasure in the Catholic Moral Tradition, Rome: Gregorian Biblical BookShop, 2007, p. 165.
^ D. Obolensky, The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 114.
^ F. Curta, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500–1250, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 236.
^ J. Lacarrière, The Gnostics, London: Owen, 1977, p. 116.
^ M.J. Fromer, Ethical issues in Sexuality and Reproduction, St. Louis: Mosby, 1983, p. 110.
^ S. Runciman, The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1947, pp. 151–152.
^ D. Elliott, Spiritual Marriage: Sexual Abstinence in Medieval Wedlock, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 133–134.
^ Jump up to:a b J. Cabrera, Projeto de Ética Negativa, São Paulo: Edicões Mandacaru, 1989 (second edition: A Ética e Suas Negações, Não nascer, suicídio e pequenos assassinatos, Rio De Janeiro: Rocco, 2011). [1] English translation of the first chapter.
^ Jump up to:a b K. Akerma, Verebben der Menschheit?: Neganthropie und Anthropodizee, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Karl Alber, 2000.
^ Jump up to:a b P.W. Zapffe, The Last Messiah, Philosophy Now, 2004, number 45, pp. 35–39.
^ P. W. Zapffe, Om det tragiske, Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1996.
^ P. W. Zapffe, H. Tønnessen, Jeg velger sannheten: En dialog mellom Peter Wessel Zapffe og Herman Tønnessen, Oslo: Universitets forlaget, 1983.
^ [2] J. Cabrera, A critique of affirmative morality (A reflection on death, birth and the value of life), Brasília: Julio Cabrera Editions, 2014 (English edition). J. Cabrera, Crítica de la moral afirmativa: Una reflexión sobre nacimiento, muerte y valor de la vida, Barcelona: Gedisa, 1996 (original Spanish edition, second edition in 2014).
^ [3] J. Cabrera, T. Lenharo di Santis, Porque te amo, Não nascerás!: Nascituri te salutant, Brasília: LGE, 2009. [4] English translation.
^ J. Cabrera, Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019. [5] A thirty-page extract on the publisher's website. J. Cabrera, Mal-estar e moralidade: situação humana, ética e procriação responsável, Brasília: UnB, 2018 (original Portuguese edition).
^ [6] J. Cabrera, T. Lenharo di Santis, Porque..., op. cit, pp. 52–67.
^ D. Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, pp. 129–131.
^ [7] K. Akerma, Theodicy shading off into Anthropodicy in Milton, Twain, and Kant, Tabula Rasa. Die Kulturzeitung aus Mitteldeutschland, 2010, number 49.
^ H. Puls, Kant’s Justification of Parental Duties, Kantian Review, 21 (1), 2016, pp. 53–75.
^ [8] S. Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 133.
^ [9] G. Harrison, J. Tanner, Better Not To Have Children, Think, 2011, volume 10, issue 27, p. 113.
^ [10] G. Harrison, Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties, South African Journal of Philosophy, volume 31, issue 1, 2012.
^ G. Harrison, J. Tanner, How Many Children Should We Have? None, The Philosophers' Magazine75, 2016, pp. 72–77.
^ [11] G. Harrison, Antinatalism and Moral Particularism, Essays in Philosophy, Is Procreation Immoral?, volume 20, issue 1, article 5, 2019.
^ [12] A. Singh, Assessing anti-natalism: a philosophical examination of the morality of procreation, University of Johannesburg, 2012, p. 5.
^ [13] M. Larock, Possible preferences and the harm of existence, University of St. Andrews, 2009.
^ J. Narveson, Utilitarianism and New Generations, Mind, 1967, LXXVI (301), pp. 62–67.
^ Jump up to:a b H. Vetter, The production of children as a problem for utilitarian ethics, Inquiry, 12, 1969, pp. 445–447.
^ H. Vetter, Utilitarianism and New Generations, Mind, 1971, LXXX (318), pp. 301–302.
^ K. Akerma, Soll eine Menschheit sein? Eine fundamentalethische Frage, Cuxhaven-Dartford: Traude Junghans, 1995.
^ B. Contestabile, The Denial of the World from an Impartial View, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, volume 17, issue 1, Taylor and Francis, 2016.
^ D. Benatar, Why it is Better Never to Come Into Existence, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1997, volume 34, number 3, pp. 345–355.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 30–40.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 6–7.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 6–7 (introduction).
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 88–92.
^ [14] International Association for Suicide Prevention, World Suicide Prevention Day.
^ D. Benatar, The Misanthropic Argument, Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong To Reproduce?, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 87–121.
^ D. Benatar, The Misanthropic Argument for Anti-natalism, Permissible Progeny?: The Morality of Procreation and Parenting, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 34–61.
^ [15] D. Benatar, "We Are Creatures That Should Not Exist": The Theory of Anti-Natalism, The Critique, 15 July 2015.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., p. 109.
^ D. Benatar, D. Wasserman, Debating..., op. cit., pp. 93–99.
^ G. Bleibohm, Fluch der Geburt – Thesen einer Überlebensethik, Landau-Godramstein: Gegensich, 2011.
^ G. Harrison, J. Tanner, Better..., op. cit., pp. 113–121.
^ P. MacCormack, The Ahuman Manifesto: Activism for the End of the Anthropocene, London-New York-Oxford-New Delhi-Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020, pp. 47–50.
^ [16] K. Akerma, Ist der Vegetarismus ein Antinatalismus?, Pro iure animalis, 24 March 2014. [17] English translation.
^ [18] V. Pelley, This Extreme Sect of Vegans Thinks Your Baby Will Destroy the Planet, Marie Claire, 29 January 2018.
^ K. Akerma, Antinatalismus... op. cit., p. 305.
^ V. Baird, The No-nonsense Guide to World Population, Oxford: New Internationalist, 2011, p. 119.
^ [19] An NBC interview with Les U. Knight, founder of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement.
^ [20] The official Voluntary Human Extinction Movement website.
^ Schneider-Mayerson, Matthew; Leong, Kit Ling (17 November 2020). "Eco-reproductive concerns in the age of climate change". Climatic Change. doi:10.1007/s10584-020-02923-y. ISSN 0165-0009.
^ C. Feltham, Depressive Realism: Interdisciplinary perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 64–69.
^ T. Ligotti, The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror, New York: Hippocampus Press, 2010, pp. 112–113.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 132–162.
^ [21] Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Fetal Awareness – Review of Research and Recommendations for Practice, London: RCOG Press, 2010.
^ [22] M. W. Platt, Fetal awareness and fetal pain: the Emperor's new clothes, Archives of Disease in Childhood, 2011, volume 96, issue 4.
^ K. Akerma, Lebensende und Lebensbeginn: Philosophische Implikationen und mentalistische Begründung des Hirn-Todeskriterium, Lit: Hamburg 2006.
^ K. Akerma, Antinatalismus... op. cit., p. 404.
^ J.Cabrera, Discomfort, op. cit., pp. 208–233.
^ [23] T. de Giraud, L'art de guillotiner les procréateurs: Manifeste anti-nataliste, Nancy: Le Mort-Qui-Trompe, 2006, p. 51.
^ T.N. Rieder, Procreation, Adoption and the Contours of Obligation, Journal Of Applied Philosophy, August 2015, pp. 293–309.
^ T. Rulli, The Ethics of Procreation and Adoption, Philosophy Compass, 11/6, 2016, pp. 305–315.
^ K. Akerma, Antinatalismus..., op. cit., p. 74.
^ J.Cabrera, Discomfort, op. cit., p. 181.
^ [24] S. Rachels, The Immorality of Having Children, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 28 August 2013, pp. 567–582.
^ D. Benatar, Famine, Affluence, and Procreation: Peter Singer and Anti-Natalism Lite, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2020.
^ K. Akerma, Antinatalismus... op. cit., pp. 100–101.
^ [25] K. Akerma, Manifest zum antinatalismus. Zur Ethik des Antinatalismus. Für Nachkommenlosigkeit bei Mensch und Tier, Pro iure animalis, July 2014. [26] English translation.
^ D. Benatar, Better..., op. cit., pp. 2–3 (introduction), 163.
^ [27] M. Vinding, The Speciesism of Leaving Nature Alone, and the Theoretical Case for "Wildlife Anti-Natalism", 2017, Apeiron, 8, pp. 169–183.
^ D. Benatar, D. Wasserman, Debating..., op. cit., pp. 133–259.
^ D. Benatar, D. Wasserman, Debating..., op. cit., pp. 148–181.
External links[edit]
Wikiquote has quotations related to: AntinatalismAntinatalism International
Interview with David Benatar for Cape Talk on Radio 702, about "Better Never to Have Been", 2009
Julio Cabrera's conference Birth as a bioethical problem: first steps towards a radical bioethics at the University of Brasília, 2018
"Antinatalism – list of books, articles and quotes"
"Anti-natalists: The people who want you to stop having babies", BBC News, 13 August 2019
"I wish I'd never been born: the rise of the anti-natalists", The Guardian, 14 November 2019
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