Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P2.Ch04 IV Beyond This and That

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

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Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

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IV Beyond This and That

We have seen in the last pages of the preceding chapter how

Chuang-tzü obliterates the distinction or opposition between Life

and Death and brings them back to the original state of 'undifferen-

tiation'. We have spent some time on the subject because it is one of

Chuang-tzü's favorite tapies, and also because it discloses to our

eyes an important aspect of his philosophy.

Properly speaking, however, and from an ontological point of

view, Life and Death should not occupy such a privileged place. For

all so-called 'opposites' are not, in Chuang-tzü's philosophy, really

opposed to each other. In fact, nothing, in his view, is opposed to

anything else, because nothing has a firmly established 'essence' in

its ontological core. In the eye of a man who has ever experienced

the 'chaotification' of things, everything loses its solid contour,

being deprived of its 'essential' foundation. All ontological distinc-

tions between things become dim, obscure, and confused, if not

completely destroyed. The distinctions are certainly still there, but

they are no longer significant, 'essential'. And 'opposites' are no

longer 'opposites' except conceptually. 'Beautiful' and 'ugly',

'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', 'pious' and 'impious' -all these

and other conceptual pairs which are sharply distinguished, at the

level of Reason, and which actually play a leading rôle in human life,

are found to be far from being absolute.

This attitude of Chuang-tzü toward the 'opposites' and 'distinc-

tions' which are generally accepted as cultural, esthetic, or ethical

'values', would appear to be neither more nor less than so-called

relativism. The same is true of Lao-tzu's attitude. And, in fact, it is a

relativist view of values. It is of the utmost importance, however, to

keep in mind that it is not an ordinary sort of relativism as under-

stood on the empirical or pragmatic level of social life. It is a

peculiar kind of relativism based on a very peculiar kind of mystical

intuition: a mystical intuition of the Unity and Multiplicity of exist-

ence. It is a philosophy of 'undifferentiation' which is a natural

product of a metaphysical experience of Reality, an experience in

320 Sufism and Taoism

which Reality is directly witnessed as it unfolds and diversifies itself

into myriads of things and then goes back again to the original

Unity. This 'metaphysical' basis of Taoist relativism will be dealt with in

detail in the following chapter. Here we shall confine ourselves to

the 'relativist' side of this philosophy, and try to pursue Chuang-tzu

and Lao-tzu as closely as possible as they go on developing their

ideas on this particular aspect of the problem.

As I have just pointed out, the attitude of bath Chuang-tzu and

Lao-tzu toward the so-called cultural values would on its surface

appear to be nothing other than 'relativism' in the commonly

accepted sense of the term. Let us first examine this point by quoting

a few appropriate passages from the two books. Even at this pre-

liminary stage of analysis, we shall clearly observe that this relativ-

ism is directed against the 'essentialist' position of the school of

Confucius. In the last sentence of the following passage 1 there is an

explicit reference to the Confucian standpoint.

If a human being sleeps in a damp place, he will begin to suffer from

backache, and finally will become half paralyzed. But is this true of a

mudfish? If (a human being) lives in a tree, he will have to be

constantly trembling from fear and be frightened. But is this true of a

monkey? Now which of these three (i.e., man, mudfish and monkey)

knows the (absolutely) right place to live? 2

Men eat beef and pork; deer eat grass; centipedes find snakes delici-

ous; kites and crows enjoy mice. Of these four which one knows the

(absolutely) good taste?

A monkey finds its mate in a monkey; a deer mates with a deer. And

mudfishes enjoy living with other fishes. Mao Ch'iang and Li Chi3 are

regarded as ideally beautiful women by all men. And yet, if fish

happen to see a beauty like them, they will dive deep in the water;

birds will fly aloft; and deer will run away in all directions. Of these

four, which one knows the (absolute) ideal of beauty?

These considerations lead me to conclude that the boundaries be-

tween 'benevolence' (jën) and 'righteousness' (i),4 and the limits

between 'right' and 'wrong' are (also) extremely uncertain and con-

fused, so utterly and inextricably confused that we can never know

how to discriminate (between what is absolutely right and what is

absolutely wrong, etc.).

This kind of relativism is also found in the book of Lao-tzu. The

underlying conception is exactly the same as in the book of

Chuang-tzu; so also the reason for which he upholds such a view. As

we shall see later, Lao-tzu, too, looks at the apparent distinctions,

oppositions and contradictions from the point of view of the

metaphysical One in which all things lose their sharp edges of

conceptual discrimination and become blended and harmonized.

Beyond This and That 321

The only difference between Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu in this

respect is that the latter expresses himself in a very terse, concise,

and apothegmatic form, while the former likes to develop his

thought in exuberant imagery. Otherwise, the idea itself is common

to bath of them. In the first of the following quotations from the Tao

Tê Ching, for instance, Lao-tzu implicitly criticizes the cultural

essentialism of the Confucian school.5

Cast off Learning,6 and there will be no worries. How much in fact,

difference is there between 'yes, sir' and 'hum!'? Between 'good' and

'bad' what distinction is there? 'Whatever others respect 1 also must

respect', (they say).

Oh, how far away 1 am from the cè>mmon people (who adhere to such

an idea). For (on such a principle) there will be absolutely no limit to

the vast field (of petty distinctions).

People tend to imagine, Lao-tzu says, that things are essentially

distinguishable from one another, and the Confucians have built up

an elaborate system of moral values precisely on the notion that

everything is marked off from others by its own 'essence'. They

seem to be convinced that these 'distinctions' are all permanent and

unalterable. In reality, however, they are simply being deceived by

the external and phenomenal aspects of Being. A man whose eyes

are not veiled by this kind of deception sees the world of Being as a

vast and limitless space where things merge into one another. This

ontological state of things is nothing other than what Chuang-tzu

calls Chaos. On the cultural level, such a view naturally leads to

relativism. Lao-tzu describes the latter in the following way: 7

By the very fact that everybody in the world recognizes 'beautiful' as

'beautiful', the idea of 'ugly' cornes into being. By the very fact that

all men recognize 'good' as 'good', the idea of 'bad' cornes into being.

Exactly in the same way 'existence' and 'non-existence' give birth to

one another; 'difficult' and 'easy' complement one another; 'long'

and 'short' appear in contrast to one another; 'high' and 'low' incline

toward each other; 'tone' and 'voice' keep harmony with one

another; 'before' and 'behind' follow one another.

Everything, in short, is relative; nothing is absolute. We live in a

world of relative distinctions and relative antitheses. But the major-

ity of men do not realize that these are relative. They tend to think

that a thing which they - or social convention - regard as 'beautiful'

is by essence 'beautiful', thus regarding all those things that do not

conform to a certain norm as 'ugly' by essence. By taking such an

attitude they simply ignore the fact that the distinction between the

two is merely a matter of viewpoint.

As 1 remarked earlier, such equalization of opposites surely is

'relativism', but it is a relativism based on, or stemming from, a very

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322 Sufism and Taoism

remarkable intuition of the ontological structure of the world. The

original intuition is common both to Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. But

with the latter, it leads to the 'chaotic' view of things, the essential

'undifferentiation' of things, which in its dynamic aspect is con-

ceived as the Transmutation of things. In the case of Lao-tzu, the

same intuition leads, in its dynamic aspect, to an ontology of

evolvement and in-volvement, the static aspect of which is the

relativism we have just discussed.

As Transmutation (hua) is the key-word of Chuang-tzu in this

section of his philosophy, Return (fan 8 or fu9 ) is the key-term which

Lao-tzu chooses as an appropriate expression for his idea.

On the cosmic significance of the Return as understood by Lao-

tzu we shall have occasion to talk in a later context. Here we shall

confine ourselves to considering this concept in so far as it has direct

relevance to the problem of relativism.

The Return is a dynamic concept. It refers, in other words, to the

dynamic aspect of the above-mentioned relativism of Lao-tzü, or

the dynamic ontological basis on which it stands. He explicates this

concept in a terse form in the following passage, which may in fact

be considered an epitome of the whole of his ontology. 10

Returning is how the Way moves, and being weak is how the Way

works. The ten thousand things under heaven are born from Being,

and Being is born from Non-Being.

It is to be remarked that there is in this passage a covert reference to

two different meanings or aspects of 'returning' which Lao-tzü

seems to recognize in the ontological structure of all things. The first

meaning (or aspect) is suggested by the first sentence and the second

meaning by the second sentence. The first sentence means that

everything (a) that exists con tains in itself a possibility or natural

tendency to 'return', i.e., to be transformed into its opposite (b ),

which, of course, again contains the same possibility of 'returning'

toits opposite, namely the original state from which it has corne (a).

Thus all things are constantly in the process of a circular movement,

froma tob, and then from b toa. This is, Lao-tzu says, the rule of the

ontological 'movement' (tung),1 1 or the dynamic aspect of Reality.

And he adds that 'weakness' is the way this movement is made by

Reality.

The next sentence considers the dynamic structure of Reality as a

vertical, metaphysical movement from the phenomenal Many to the

pre-phenomenal One. Starting from the state. of multiplicity in

which all things are actualized and realized, it traces them back to

their ultimate origin. The 'ten thousand things under heaven', i.e.,

all things in the world, corne into actual being from the Way at its

stage of 'existence'. But the stage of 'existence', which is nothing

Beyond This and That 323

other than a stage in the process of self-manifestation of the Way,

cornes into being from the stage of 'non-existence', which is the

abysmal depth of the absolutely unknown-unknowable Way itself.

It is t-0 be observed that this 'tracing-back' of the myriad things to

'existence' and then to 'non-existence' is not only a conceptual

process; it is, for Lao-tzu, primarily a cosmic process. All things

ontologically 'return' to their ultimate source, undergoing on their

way 'circular' transformations among themselves such as have been

suggested by the first sentence. This cosmic return of all things to the

ultimate origin will be a subject of discussion in a later chapter. Here

we are concerned with the 'horizontal' Return of things as referred

to in the first sentence, i.e., the process of reciprocal 'returning'

between a and b. Lao-tzü has a peculiar way of expressing this idea

as exemplified by the two following passages.

Misfortune is what good fortune rests upon and good fortune is what

misfortune lurks in. (The two th us turn into one another indefinitely,

so that) nobody knows the point where the process cornes to an end.

There seems to be no absolu te norm. For what is ( considered) just

're-turns' to unjust, and what is ( considered) good 're-turns' to evil.

lndeed man has long been in perplexity about this. 12

The nature of things is such that he who goes in front ends by falling

behind, and he who follows others ultimately finds himself in front of

others. He who blows upon a thing to make it warm ends by making it

cold, and he who blows upon a thing to make it cold finally makes it

warm. He who tries to become strong becomes weak, and he who

wants to remain weak turns strong. He who is safe falls into danger,

while he who is in danger ends by becoming safe. 13

Thus in the view of both Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu, everything in the

world is relative; nothing is absolutely reliable or stable in this

sense. As I have indicated before, this 'relativism', in the case of

Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, must be understood in a peculiar sense,

namely, in the sense that nothing has what is called 'essence' or

'quiddity'.

All things, on the deeper level of Reality, are 'essence-less'. The

world itself is 'chaotic'. This is not only true of the external world in

which we exist, but is equally true of the world within us, the internai

world of concepts and judgments. This is not hard to understand,

because whatever judgment we may make on whatever thing we

choose to talk about in this 'chaotic' world, our judgment is bound

to be relative, one-sided, ambiguous, and unreliable, for the abject

of the judgment is itself ontologically relative.

The argument which Chuang-tzu puts forward on this point is

logically very interesting and important. The Warring States period

324 Sufism and Taoism

witnessed a remarkable development of logico-semantical theories

in China. In the days of Chuang-tzu, Confucians and Mohists 14

stood sharply opposed to each other, and these two schools were

together opposed to the Dialecticians15 (or Sophists) otherwise

known as the school of Names 16 • Heated debates were being held

among them about the foundation of human culture, its various

phenomena, the basis of ethics, the logical structure of thought, etc.,

etc .. And it was a fashion to conduct discussions of this kind in a

dialectical form. 'This is right' - 'this is wrong' or 'this is good' - 'this

is bad', was the general formula by which these people discussed

their problems. Such a situation is simply ridiculous and all these discussions are

futile from the point of view of a Chuang-tzu for whom Reality itself

is 'chaotic'. The abjects themselves about which these people

exchange heated words are essentially unstable and ambiguous.

The Dialecticians 'are talking about the distinction between "hard"

and "white", for example, as if these could be hung on different

pegs' .11

Not only that. Those who like to discuss in this way usually

commit a fatal mistake by confusing 'having the best of an argu-

ment' with 'being objectively right', and 'being cornered in an

argument' with 'being objectively wrong'. In reality, however, vic-

tory and defeat in a logical dispute in no way determines the 'right'

and 'wrong' of an objective fact.

Suppose you and 1 enter into discussion. And suppose you beat me,

and 1 cannot beat you. Does this mean that you are 'right' and that 1

am 'wrong'? Suppose 1 beat you, instead, and you cannot beat me. Does this mean

that 1 am 'right' and you are 'wrong'? Is it the case that when 1 am

'right' you are 'wrong', and when you are 'right' 1 am 'wrong'? Or are

we both 'right' or both 'wrong'? lt is not for me and you to decide.

(What about asking some other person to judge?) But other people

are in the same darkness. Whom shall we ask to give a fair judgment?

Suppose we let someone who agrees with you judge. How could such

a man give a fair judgment seeing that he shared from the beginning

the sa me opinion with you? Suppose we let someone who agrees with

me judge. How could he give a fair judgment, seeing that he shares

from the beginning the same opinion with me?

What if we let someone judge who differs from both you and me? But

he is from the beginning at variance with both of us. How could such a

man give a fair judgment? (He would simply give a third opinion.)

What if we let someone judge who agrees with both of us? But from

the beginning he shares the sa me opinion with both of us. How could

such a man give a fair judgment? (He would simply say that 1 am

'right', but you also are 'right' .)

From these considerations we must conclude that neither you nor 1

1T

Beyond This and That 325

nor the third person can know (where the truth lies). Shall we expect

a fourth person to appear? 18

How is this situation to be accounted for? Chuang-tzu answers that

all this confusion originates in the natural tendency of the Reason to

think everything in terms of the opposition of 'right' and 'wrong'.

And this natural tendency of our Reason is based on, or a product

of, an essentialist view of Being. The natural Reason is liable to

think that a thing which is conventionally or subjectively 'right' is

'right' essentially, and that a thing which is 'wrong' is 'wrong'

essentially. In truth, however, nothing is essentially 'right' or

'wrong'. So-called 'right' and 'wrong' are all relative matters.

In accordance with this non-essentialist position, Chuang-tzu

asserts that the only justifiable attitude for us to take is to know, first

of all, the relativity of 'right' and 'wrong', and then to transcend this

relativism itself into the stage of the 'equalization' of all things, a

stage at which all things are essentially undifferentiated from one

another, although they are, at a lower stage of reality, relatively

different and distinct from each other. Such an attitude which is

peculiar to the 'true man' is called by Chuang-tzu t'ien ni 19

(Heavenly Levelling), t'ien chün20 (Heavenly Equalization), or man

yen 21 (No-Limits).

'Right' is not 'right', and 'so' is not 'so'. If (what someone considers)

'right' were (absolutely) 'right', it would be (absolutely) different

from what is not 'right' and there could be no place for discussion.

And if 'so' were (absolutely) 'so', it would be (absolutely) different

from 'not-so' and there could be no place for discussion.

Thus {in the endless chain of 'shifting theses' 22 (i.e., 'right' 'not-

right' 'right' 'not-right' ... ), (theses and antitheses) depend

upon one another. And (since this dependence makes the whole

chain of mutually opposing theses and antitheses relative), we might

as well regard them as not mutually opposing each other.

(In the presence of such a situation, the only attitude we can reason-

ably take) is to harmonize all these (theses and antitheses) in the

Heavenly Levelling, and to bring (the endless oppositions among the

existents) back to the state of No-Limits. 23

'To bring back the myriad oppositions of things to the state of No-

Limits' means to reduce all things that are 'essentially' distinguish-

able from each other to the original state of 'chaotic' Unity where

there are no definite 'limits' or boundaries set among the things. On

its subjective side, it is the position of abandoning all discrimina tory

judgments that one can make on the level of everyday Reason.

Forgetting about passing judgments, whether implicit or explicit, on

any thing, one should, Chuang-tzü emphasizes, put oneself in a

mental state prior to all judgments, prior to all activity of Reason, in

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326 Sufism and Taoism

which one would see things in their original - or 'Heavenly' as he

says - 'essence-less' state.

But to achieve this is by no means an easy task. lt requires the

active functioning of a particular kind of metaphysical intuition,

which Chuang-tzu calls ming,24 'illumination'. And this kind of

illuminative intuition is not for everybody to enjoy. For just as there

are men who are physically blind and deaf, so there are also men

who are spiritually blind and deaf. And unfortunately, in the world

of Spirit the number of blind and deaf is far greater than that of

those who are capable of seeing and hearing.

The blind cannot enjoy the sight of beautiful col ors and patterns. The

deaf cannot enjoy the sound of bells and drums. But do you think that

blindness and deafness are confined to the bodily organs? No, they

are found also in the domain of knowing. 25

The structure of the ming, 'intuition', will be studied more closely in

due course. Before we proceed to this problem, we shall quote one

more passage in which Chuang-tzu develops his idea regarding the

relative and conventional nature of ontological 'distinctions'. The

passage will help to prepare the way for our discussion of the

'existentialist' position Chuang-tzu takes against the 'essentialist'

view of Being. 26

The nature of the things is such that nothing is unable to be 'that' (i.e.,

everything can be· 'that') and nothing is unable to be 'this' (i.e.,

everything can be 'this').

We usually distinguish between 'this' and 'that' and think and talk

about the things around us in terms of this basic opposition. What is

'this' is not 'that', and what is 'that' is not 'this'. The relation is

basically that of 'I' and 'others', for the term 'this' refers to the

former and the term 'that' is used in reference to the latter.

From the viewpoint of' I', 'I' am 'this', and everything other than

'I' is 'that'. But from the viewpoint of'others', the 'others' are 'this',

and 'I' am 'that'. In this sense, everything can be said to be both

'this' and 'that'. Otherwise expressed, the distinction between 'this'

and 'that' is purely relative.

From the standpoint of 'that' (alone) 'that' cannot appear (as 'that').

It is only when 1 (i.e., 'this') know myself (as 'this') that it (i.e., 'that')

cornes to be known (as 'that').

'That' establishes itself as 'that' only when 'this' establishes itself

and looks upon the former as its abject, or as something other than

'this'. Only when we realize the fondamental relativity of 'this' and

'that' can we hope to have a real understanding of the structure of

things.

Beyond This and That 327

Of course the most important point is that this relativity should be

understood through 'illumination'. The understanding of this

ontological relativity by Reason - which is by no means a difficult

thing to achieve - is useless except as a preparatory stage for an

'illuminative' grasp of the matter. lt will be made clear in the

following chapter that 'relativity' does not exhaust the whole of the

ontological structure of things. 'Relativity' is but one aspect of it.

For, in the view of Chuang-tzu, the ontological structure of things in

its reality is that 'chaotic undifferentiation' to which reference has

often been made in the foregoing. The' chaotic undifferentiation' is

something which stands far beyond the grasp of Reason. If, in spite

of that, Reason persists in trying to understand it in its own way, the

'undifferentiation' cornes into its grasp only in the form of 'relativ-

ity'. The 'relativity' of things represents, in other words, the original

ontological 'undifferentiation' as brought down to the level of logi-

cal thinking. In the present chapter we are still on that level.

Hence it is held: 21 'that' cornes out of 'this', and 'this' depends upon

'that'. This doctrine is called the Fang Shêng theory ,28 the theory of

'mutual dependence'.

However (this reciprocal relation between 'this' and 'that' must be

understood as a basic principle applicable to all things). Thus, since

there is 'birth' there is 'death', and since there is 'death' there is

'birth'. Likewise, since there is 'good' there is 'not-good', and since

there is 'not-good' there is 'good'.

Chuang-tzu means to say that the real Reality is the One which

comprehends all these opposites in itself; that the division of this

original One into 'life' and 'death', 'good' and 'bad', or 'right' and

'wrong' etc., is due to various points of view taken by men. In truth,

everything in the world is 'good' from the point of view of a man

who takes such a position. And there is nothing that cannot be

regarded as 'not-good' from the point ofview of a man who chooses

to take such a position. The real Reality is something prior to this

and similar divisions. lt is something which is 'good' and 'not-good',

and which is neither 'good' nor 'not-good'.

Thus it cornes about that the 'sacred man' 29 does not base himself

(upon any of these oppositions), but illuminates (everything) in the

light of Heaven. 30

Certainly, this (attitude of the 'sacred man') is also an attitude of a

man who bases himself upon (what he considers) 'right'. But (since it

is not the kind of 'right' which is opposed to 'wrong', but is an

absolute, transcendental Right which comprises in itself all opposi-

tions and contradictions as they are), 'this' is here the same as 'that',

and 'that' is the same as 'this'. (It is a position which comprehends

and transcends both 'right' and 'wrong', so that here) 'that' unifies

'right' and 'wrong', but 'this' also unifies 'right' and 'wrong'.

1

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328 Sufism and Taoism

(Viewed from such a standpoint) is there still a distinction between

'that' and 'this'? Or is there neither 'that' nor 'this' any longer? 31

This stage at which each 'that' and 'this' has lost its companion to

stand opposed to - this stage is to be considered the Hinge of the

Way. The hinge of a door can begin to function infinitely only when it is

fitted into the middle of the socket. (ln the same way, the Hinge of the

Way can respond infinitely and freely to endlessly changing situations

of the phenomenal world only when it is placed properly in the

middle of the absolu te One which transcends ail phenomenal opposi-

tions.) (In such a state) the 'right' is one uniform endlessness; the

'wrong' too is one uniform endlessness.

This is why 1 assert füat nothing can be better than 'illumination'.

The absolute One is of course the Way which pervades the whole

world of Being; rather it is the whole world of Being. As such it

transcends ail distinctions and oppositions. Thus from the point of

view of the Way, there can be no distinction between 'true' and

'false'. But can human language properly cope with such a situa-

tion? No, at least not as long as language is used in the way it is

actually used. 'Language', Chuang-tzu says, 'is different from the

blowing of wind, for he who speaks is supposed to have a meaning to

convey .' 32 However, language as it is actually used does not seem to

convey any real meaning, for those people, particularly the Dialec-

ticians, who are engaged in discussing 'this' being right and 'that'

being wrong, or 'this' being good and 'that' being bad etc., are

'simply talking about objects which have no definitely fixed

contents'.

Are they really saying something (meaningful)? Are they rather

saying nothing? 33 They think that their speech is different from the

chirpings of ftedglings. But is there any difference? Or is there not

any difference at ail? Where, indeed, is the Way hidden (for those people) that there

should be 'true' and 'false'? Where is Language (in the true sense)

hidden that there should be 'right' and 'wrong'? ...

(The fact is that) the Way is concealed by petty virtues,34 and Lan-

guage is concealed by vainglories.35 This is why we have the 'right' -

'wrong' discussions of the Confucians and the Mohists, the one party

regarding as 'right' what the other party regards as 'wrong', and the

one regarding as 'wrong' what the other regards as 'right'.

If we want to affirm (on a higher lev el) what both parties regard as

'wrong', and to deny what they regard as 'right', we have no better

means than 'illumination' .36

Thus we see ourselves brought back again to the problem of 'illumi-

nation'. The passages here quoted have made it already clear that

the 'illumination' represents an 'absolu te' standpoint which tran-

scends all 'relative' standpoints. lt is astate of mind which is above

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Beyond This and That 329

and beyond the distinctions between 'this' and 'that', 'I' and 'you'.

But how can one attain to such a spiritual height, if in fact it really

exists? What is the content and structure of this experience? These

are the main problems that will occupy us in the following two

chapters.

Notes

1. Chuang-tzu, II, p. 93.

2. i.e., there is no' absolutely' proper place; for each being, the place in which it lives

customarily is the right place, but the latter is 'right' only in a relative sense.

3. Two women famous for their supreme beauty.

4. That these concepts, t: jên and 1.-ll i, represented two of the most typical moral

values for Confucius and his school was pointed out in Chap. 1.

5. Tao Tê Ching, XX.

6. By Learning (hsüeh is meant the study of the meticulous rules of conduct and

behavior - concerning, for instance, on what occasions and to whom one should use

the formai and polite expression 'yes, sir' and when and to whom one should use the

informai expression' hum!' - the kind of learning which was so strongly advocated by

the Confucian school under the name of Ceremonies

7. op. cit., II.

8. fi..

9. fl ( lt1) fu( -kuei), lit. 'returning' - 'going-back'.

10. op. cit., XL.

11. Yi)J.

12. op.cit.,LVIII.

13. ibid., XXIX. This part of Chap. XXIX is regarded by Kao Hêng (op. cit.) as an

independent chapter. He remarks in addition that the passage is typical of'Lao-tzu's

relativism' ( p. 69. The last sentence of the passage quoted in its

original form is which may be translated as 'a thing which one wants to

crush (is not crushed), and a thing which one wants to destroy (is not destroyed).' But

in the Ho Shang edition we find • instead (iiUJ:li r•:ti:m, '-ffû:·tlu), which, as Yü

Yüeh (f<( fM remarks, is probably the right reading.

14. The followers of Mo-tzu

15. pien chê nf:1î.

16. ming chia 15K

'Il

1 111111

330 Sufism and Taoism

17. Chuang-tzu, XII, p. 427, quote by Fung Yu Lang, op. cit., 1, p. 192. The reference

is to the famous thesis put forward by the Dialectician Kung Sung Lung

that a 'bard white stone' is in reality two things: a bard stone and a white stone,

because 'bard' and 'white' are two entirely different attributes. The quoted sentence

may also be translated: The distinction between 'bard' and'white' is clearly visible as

if they were hung on the celestial sphere.

18. II, p. 107.

19. means usually 'boundary', 'limit', 'division'. But here 1 follow the

interpretation of Lu Shu Chih (f1Œr*: :X{5l, and

Pan by Lu Tê Ming in who makes it synonymous withJ:;:?i!t.

20.

21. The lexical meaning of this expression is difficult to ascertain. In translating

it as 'without limits' 1 am simply following an old commentator quoted by

in his who sayslli_fü,.ti-tl!J, (p. 109). The same word is used in Bk.

XXVII. And in Bk. XVII it appears in the form ofJ5Unfan yen which obviously is the

same commentator spells itiifü) becanse the passage reads: 'From the point

of view of the Way, what should we consider" precious" and what should we consider

"despicable" ?'

22. Cf. Kuo Hsiang's Commentary (p. 109): *ft§îz.f!Ho!f,

m'fJt.Uf§:iE, and Chia Shih Fu üW.Zft§J.

23. Chuang-tzu, II, p. 108.

24. fjJJ. The term literally means 'bright' or 'luminous'. We may compare it with the

Islamic notion of ma'rifah 'gnosis' as opposed to, and technically distinguished from,

'ilm '(rational) knowledge'.

25. 1, p. 30.

26. The passage is taken from II, p. 66. 1 shall <livide it into a number of smaller

sections and quote them one by one, each followed by a brief examination.

27. by the Dialectician Shih.

28. }J1:_:ifii, more exactly the 'theory of fang shêng fang ssû' held by

Hui Shih, meaning literally: the theory of 'life' giving birth to 'death' and 'death'

giving birth to 'life'. See Chuang-tzu, XXXIII. For this particular meaning of the

word fang ti, see the Shuo Wen rn-. HH'ci-tll.J 'fang means ( originally) two

ships placed side by side with each other'.

29. shêng jên IRA., which is synonymous with 'true man' or 'divine man', i.e., the

Perfect Man. The real meaning of the important word shêng has been elucidated

earlier in its shamanic context; see Chapter II. The expression shêng jen is more often

used by Lao-tzii than by Chuang-tzii.

30. t'ien J:;:, meaning the great Way of Nature, the absolute standpoint of Being

itself, which is, so to speak, a viewpoint transcending ail viewpoints.

31. This is a peculiar expression which Chuang-tzii uses very often when be wants to

deny something emphatically.

.

. '

Beyond This and That 331

32. II, p. 63.

33. See above, Note (31).

34. The 'petty virtues' iHVt:-or more literally, 'small acquirements' -refer to the five

cardinal virtues of the Confucians - Ch' êng Hsüan Ying ( Jïx:.:t!R: IJŒf-ll:UiiJ).

35. i.e., the natural tendency of the human mind toward showing-off, which mani-

fests itself typically in the form of discussions and debates.

36. op. cit., II, p. 63.