SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect
Man
Ibn 'Arabi recognizes in the Perfect Man a particular kind of magi-
cal power. This is hardly to be wondered at, because the Perfect
Man, as a 'knower' ('arif), is by definition a man with an unusually
developed spiritual power. His mind naturally shows an extraordi-
nary activity.
This extraordinary power is known as himmah, meaning a con-
centrated spiritual energy. According to Ibn' Arabi, a 'knower' can,
if he likes, affect any abject by merely concentrating all his spiritual
energy upon it; he can even bring into existence a thing which is not
actually existent. In brief, a 'knower' is able to subjugate anything to
his will. He is endowed with the power of taskhir. 1
The word taskhir reminds us of King Salomon. It is widely known
and accepted in Islam that Salomon was in possession of a super-
natural power by which he could dominate Nature and move it at
will. He could, for instance, cause winds to blow in whatever direc-
tion he wished. He is said to have been able to contrai at will
invisible beings.
According to Ibn 'Arabi, however, Salomon did not exercise his
contrai over Nature by his himmah. In this respect, Salomon
occupies a very special place. It was a special favor of God granted
to him in a peculiar way. For, in order to work miracles, he did not
have to have recourse to the particular concentration of mind
known as himmah. He had only to 'command' ( amr). Whatever was
commanded by him to do anything, moved immediately as it was
commanded. This kind of taskhir is, in the judgment of Ibn' Arabi, a
degree higher than the taskhir by himmah, because the former is a
direct working upon the abject.
The taskhïr which was peculiar to Solomon, which made him superior
to others, and which God had given him as (an essential) part of the
kingship never to be given to anybody after him - this taskhïr was
characterized by its being exercised by his 'command'. God says:
'Thus have We subjugated to him (i.e., Solomon) the wind so that it
might blow by his command (XXI, 81) (That which is really
lii1
11
1
11
1
276 Sufism and Taoism
characteristic of Solomon' s case) is not the simple fact that he could
exercise taskhir. For God says concerning ail of us without any
discrimination: 'And We have subjugated to you ail that are in
heaven and in earth' (XXXI, 20). Thus He speaks of having put
under our control winds, stars, and others. But (in our case) the
taskhir occurs not by our command, but by the Command of God. So
you will find by reflection that what was peculiar to Solomon was (not
the taskhïr itself) but in fact that (the taskhïr) could be exercised by
his own command. In order to do that, he did not need any mental
concentration or himmah; ail he had to do was to 'command'.
I mention this point specifically because we ail know that the things of
the world can be affected and influenced by a particular kind
of mental force when the latter happens to be in a heightened state of
concentration. I have witnessed this phenomenon in my own (mysti-
cal) life. Solomon, however, had only to pronounce the word of
command to anything he wanted to control, without there being any
need for himmah and concentration. 2
What kind of thing, then, is this spiritual concentration called him-
mah? It may be most easily understood if we try to conceive it on the
analogy of our ordinary experience of imagination. We can produce
in imagination anything we like, even things that are not existent in
the outside world. Such an imagined abject exists only within our
minds. In a somewhat similar way, a true 'knower' who has attained
to the stage of walayah is able to produce by his concentrated
spiritual power things that are not actually there, with this differ-
ence, however, that he produces the object in the outer world of
reality. This is obviously a kind of 'creation' (khalq). But it should
not be identified or confused with the Divine act of creation.
Anybody can create within his mind by means of his faculty of
imagination things that have no existence except in imagination
itself. This is a matter of common experience. But the 'knower'
creates by himmah things that do have existence outside the place of
the himmah (i.e., outside the mind).
(However, the object thus created by himmah continues to exist)
only as long as the himmah maintains it without being weakened by
the keeping of what it has created. As soon as the concentration
slackens and the mind of the 'knower' becomes distracted from the
keeping of what it has created, the object created disappears. This,
however, does not apply to those special cases in which a 'knower'
has obtained a firm control over ail the Presences ( ontological levels
of Being) so that his mind never loses sight of them ail at the same
time. In fact, the mind of such a man ( even if it loses sight of the
Presences, does not lose sight of ail together); there surely remains at
least one Presence present to his mind. 3
We must recall at this juncture the five Presences of Being to which
reference was made in the first chapter. The Presences are classified
variously. One of the classifications, to give an example of
The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 277
classification which is a little different from the one explained in the
first chapter, makes the whole world of Being consist of ( 1) the
Presence of the senses (i.e., the plane of the sensible experience),
(2) the Presence of Images-Exemplars, (3) the Presence of the
Spirits (arwah ), ( 4) the Presence of the Intellects ('uqül), and the
Presence of the Essence. But the way in which the Presences are
classified is not very important in the present context. What is of
primary importance is to know that the world of Being is structured
in terms of levels or planes and that these planes are related to each
other in an organic way. This means that anything that exists in the
plane of sensible experience, for instance, has a corresponding
existence also in the higher planes in a particular form peculiar to
each plane, so that ultimately it goes back to the very Essence of the
Absolute as its ontological ground.
Because of this particular structure of Being, the' knower' can, by
concentrating his entire spiritual energy upon an object on one of
the suprasensible levels, produce the object in a sensible form on
the level of concrete reality. Also by maintaining spiritually the
form of an object on a higher level he can maintain the forms of the
same object on the lower levels of Being.
But this spiritual 'creation' is essentially different from the Divine
Creation in one vital point. When, for example, the 'knower' has
produced by himmah an object in a sensible form, the object thus
'created' on the level of sensible experience continues to subsist on
that level only during the time in which he continues to maintain his
spiritual concentration. The moment his attention becomes less
keen by the effect of drowsiness or by a different idea occurring to
his mind, the object ceases to exist on the level of the senses.
However, Ibn' Arabi adds, in the case of the highest 'knower', his
spiritual power dominating all the basic five planes of Being, there is
always at least one level on which the spiritual concentration is
maintained even if his attention becomes less keen and less intense
on other levels. In such a case, the object 'created' may be preserved
for a long period of time.
By saying this, I have disdosed a secret which the people of God (i.e.,
mystics) have always jealously guarded themselves from revealing
for fear that something might corne to light which would contradict
their daim to the effect that they are the Absolute. (Against this
daim I have disdosed the fact that) the Absolute never becomes
forgetful of anything, white man must necessarily be always forgetful
of this particular thing or that.
Only as long as a man spiritually maintains what he has 'created', is he
in a position to say, 'I am the Creator!' (ana al-f}aqq). However, his
maintaining the 'created' object is entirely different from God's
maintaining. I have just explained the difference.
278 Sufism and Taoism
As long as he becomes forgetful of even one form and its ontological
level, man is to be distinguished from the Absolu te. He is naturally to
be distinguished from the Absolu te even if he main tains all the forms
(of an object on different levels) by maintaining one of the forms on
its proper level of which he happens to be unforgetful, because this is
after alla kind of'implicit' (tacf,ammun) maintaining. God's maintain-
ing what He has created is not like this; He maintains every form
'explicitly' (i.e., He maintains all forms of the thing, each on its
proper level individually).
This is a question which no one, as far as 1 know, has even written in
any book, neither myself nor others. This is the only and the first
book in which (the secret has been disclosed). The present work is in
this sense a unique pearl of the age. Keep this well in mind!
The particular level of Being4 to which the mind of the 'knower' is
kept present, being concentrated on the form (of an object which he
has created on that ontological level), may be compared to the 'Book'
of which God says: 'We have not neglected anything in the Book (of
Decrees)' (VI, 38), so that it comprehends both what has been
actualized and what has not yet been actualized. But what 1 say here
will never be understood except by those who are themselves the
'gathering' principle ( qur' iin). 5
Thus it has been clarified that a man who can gather his himmah in
such a comprehensive way is able to do so because he 'gathers'
together in his consciousness all the levels of Being into a com-
prehensive unity. Such a man stands closest to God, with the only
difference which has just been explained. The difference, in short,
results from the furqan. And precisely because of the furqan he is
essentially distinguished from God.
The important point, however, is that this 'separating' is not an
ordinary furqan. It is the highestfurqan (arfa' furqan) 1 because it is
a furqan after the 'gathering'. In the case of an ordinary man, the
'separating' which he exercises is a pre-fana' phenomenon; he has
not yet had any experience of 'self-annihilation', that is, he has not
yet 'tasted' his essential oneness with the Absolute. The 'separating'
he exercises in such a state is an absolute, unconditional 'separa-
tion'. He is absolutely and unconditionally 'separated' and distin-
guished' from the Absolute.
The 'knower', on the contrary, is a man who has already passed
through the experience of 'self-annihilation' and, consequently,
knows through personal experience his essential oneness with the
Absolu te. He knows it, and yet distinguishes in himself between the
'Divine aspect' (lahüt) and the 'human aspect' (nasüt), i.e., between
the Absolute and the creature. This 'separating' is not a mere
'separating'; it is a 'separating' of a higher order. And this corres-
ponds to what is generally known in Sufi terminology as 'self-
subsistence' (baqa').
The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 279
Now, if we consider in the light of this conception the idea of
himmah, we are led to the following understanding of it. The highest
'knower', while he is actually exercising his himmah, is in a certain
sense a 'creator' (khaliq); all the traces of his 'servant-ness' disap-
pear from his consciousness, and he feels 'Lordship' living and
acting in himself. He f eels himself to be a 'Lord', and has the clear
consciousness that everything in the whole world is under his con-
trai. This is the stage of 'gathering' (qur' an). However, this state is
but a temporary and unstable one, because if his mind slackens and
loses its highest intensity of concentration even for a moment, he
becomes immediately conscious of his 'impotence' ('ajz) and is
necessarily faced with his own 'servantness'. And this is the stage of
'separating' (furqan). 8
We must observe also that himmah is, in its practical aspect, a free
disposai of things (taskhir al-ashya'), while in its cognitive aspect it
is an extraordinary power to penetrate the secret of Being which lies
beyond the grasp of Reason. It is significant in this respect that Ibn
'Arabï in a passage of the declares that the true reality
(IJ,aqiqah) of Being can only be known by a 'servant endowed with
himmah'. Himmah consists essentially in that a 'knower' concen-
trates all his spiritual powers upon one single point and projects his
concentrated heart (qalb) toward a certain definite direction. This
act works in two different, but closely related, ways: (1) producing
something or some state of affairs in a place where such a thing or
state of affairs does not sensibly exist, and (2) tearing apart the veil
of Reason and bringing to light the reality lying behind it.
The supernatural power of himmah being as described, the next
question that naturally arises is: Does the 'knower', i.e., the Perfect
Man, work 'miracles' (karamat) as he likes?
According to the usual theory among Sufis, a 'knower' who has
reached the stage of 'saintship' is in a position to perform 'things
that go against the customs' (khawariq-al- 'adat), i.e., 'miracles'.
Such a man is usually represented as a kind of superman who,
projecting his spiritual power to anything and an y body, affects and
changes the abject at will.
Ibn' Arabï does not accept this view. In the Qoran, he argues, 10
we find the Divine words: 'God is He who creates you of weakness'
(XXX, 54). The very root of man's creation is 'weakness' (<J,a'f).
Man is essentially and naturally 'weak' (<J,a'ïf) and 'powerless'
('ajiz). He begins with the weakness of the infant and ends with the
weakness of the old man. Of course, as the Qoran verse itself
admits, 11 the child, as he grows into a man, acquires 'strength'
(quwwah) and becomes conscious of his own strength. But this,
after ail, is a transitory state. Soon he grows old and falls into
11
1
280 Sujism and Taoism
decrepitude. Besides, the 'strength' which he obtains in the inter-
mediary stage is but an 'accidentai strength' (quwwah 'ara<J,iyah).
Moreover, this accidentai strength is not something which he pro-
duces in himself, but is a result of God's 'putting'. In reality, he
shows strength only because he happens to be at that stage a locus of
theophany in which God manifests Himself under the Name
'Powerful' ( qawiy).
What is by essence strong is the Absolute alone; man is strong
only by accident. Ordinary men do not know this. Only the true
'knower' knows that the strength (including himmah) which he feels
in himself is not his own but God's.
And since he is conscious of this, the 'knower' knows also that it is
not right for him to try to exercise at will the power of himmah. Thus
he confides its exercise to the real owner of that power, and puts
himself in the original state of the 'absolute powerlessness' ('ajz
mutfaq).
Someone may say: 'What prevents (the highest 'knower') from exer-
cising his himmah that has a positive power to affect things? Since
such a power does exist even in those mystics who merely follow the
Apostles, the Apostles must be more appropriate to possess it'.
To this 1 will answer: 'You are certainly right. But you do not know
another important point. A true "knowledge" does not allow him-
mah to be freely exercised. And the higher the knowledge, the less
possibility there is for a free exercise of himmah'.
And this for two reasons. One is that such a man fully realizes his
state of 'servant-ness' and that he is always conscious of the original
ground of his own creation (which is the above-mentioned 'weak-
ness'). The other is the oneness of the subject who exercises himmah
and the object upon which it is exercised (for both are essentially and
ultimately the Absolute, nothing else), so that he does not know upon
whom to project his himmah. This prevents him from exercising
himmah. 12
Tuen Ibn' Arabi says 13 that another reason for which the 'knower'
refrains from working 'miracles' in the world is the knowledge
about the absolute determining power of the permanent
archetypes, which we have discussed in detail in an earlier chapter.
Suppose there is in the presence of the 'knower' a man who
disobeys the commands of the Apostle and thereby disobeys God.
Why does the 'knower' not exercise his himmah upon this man so
that he might be brought back to the right road? It is because
everything, every event in the world is in accordance with what has
been eternally determined in the form of an or
archetypes. The 'knower' knows that this ontological determination
can never be changed. In the eyes of a man who has penetrated into
the depth of the structure of Being, everything follows the track
The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 281
fixed by the very nature of Being, and nothing can deviate from it. In
the light of this knowledge, even a man disobedient to God is
walking along the God-determined way. And it is not in the power
of an Apostle to bring such a man back to the 'right road', because
the man is already on the 'right road'.
A certain Sufi of the highest rank once said to Mas ter 'Abd al-
Razzâq: Go and ask Master Abü Madyan, after salutations, 'O Abü
Madyan, why is it that nothing is impossible tous, while everything is
impossible to you? And yet here we are, aspiring to your spiritual
stage, while you do not care for our spiritual stage. Why?' 14
In fact, the situation was exactly like that (i.e., Abü Madyan really
showed signs of'powerlessness') in spite of the fact that Abü Madyan
had, beside this state (i.e. the state of 'powerlessness'), the other state
(i.e., that of free disposai of things by means of himmah).
We (i.e., Ibn' Arabi himself) are even more complete as regards the
state of 'weakness' and 'powerlessness'. But ( even though Abü
Madyan did not show so much of 'weakness' as we do) the afore-
mentioned Sufi of the highest rank said to him what he said. (How
much more should we be worthy of such a remark, if the same Sufi
were to criticize us.) In any event, however, Abü Madyan's case
clearly exemplifies that kind of thing (i.e., the showing of 'weakness'
because of a deep knowledge of the truth).15
Ibn 'Arabi goes on to argue that even this state of 'weakness' or
refraining from exercising himmah should not properly be taken as
a willful act on the part of the 'knower'. The true 'knower' puts
himself entirely in the hands of God; if He commands him to
exercise his himmah he does, if He forbids him to do so he refrains
from it, and if God Himself gives him a choice between the two he
chooses refraining from the exercise of himmah.
Abu al-Su'üd (Ibn al-Shibl) once said to his followers: Verily God
gave me the power of the free disposai of things fifteen years ago. But
I have refrained from exercising that power for the sake of courtesy
(tazarrufan) toward God.
This saying implies too much bold familiarity ( toward God). I myself
do not refrain from exercising himmah for the sake of courtesy,
because such an attitude would imply a willful choice on my part. No.
I refrain from it because of the perfection of knowledge. The true
knowledge of the matter does not require refraining from the exer-
cise of himmah by way of willful choice. Whenever a 'knower' does
exercise his himmah in this world, he does soin obedience to a Divine
Command; that is to say, he does so because he is constrained to do
so, not by way of willful choice. 16
The position of an Apostle regarding this problem of 'refraining' is
somewhat more delicate than that of a Saint.17 Properly speaking
the fonction itself of' apostleship' requires his exercising himmah in
282 Sufism and Taoism
order that his being an Apostle be made clear to the people. For
only when he is accepted as such by the community, is he able to
spread the true religion of God. The Saint perse has nothing to do
with such a mission.
And yet, even the Apostle (Mul)ammad) did not try to show
prophetic 'miracles' (mu'jizat). For one thing, he refrained from
exercising his himmah because of his compassion for the people. He
did not go to extremes in ma nif esting the conclusive evidence of his
'apostleship' because it would have brought destruction to them. He
spared them by not showing them too strong evidences of his
'apostleship'. Besides this, Mul)ammad had another reason shared
by all true Saints for refraining from working miracles; namely, his
knowledge that a 'miracle' can never change the eternally fixed
course of events. Whether a man becomes a Muslim or not is
determined by his archetype; it is not something which can easily be·
changed by the Apostle accomplishing before his eyes a 'miracle'.
Thus even the most perfect of all Apostles (akmal al-rusul),
Mul)ammad, did not exercise himmah. There was actually a practi-
cal need for showing 'miracles', and he was unquestionably
endowed with such a power. And yet he did not exercise his spiritual
power in that way. For, being the highest 'knower', he knew better
than anybody else that 'miracles' were, in truth, .ineffective.
The most ideal state of the Perfect Man is a spiritual tranquility and
quietude of an unfathomable depth. He is a quiet man content with
a passivity in which he confides himself and every thing else to God's
disposai. The Perfect Man is a man who, having in himself a tre-
mendous spiritual power and being adorned with the highest know-
ledge of Being, gives the impression of a deep cairn ocean. He is
such because he is the most perf ect image, in a concrete individual
form, of the cosmic Perfect Man who comprehends and actualizes
all the Names and Attributes of the Absolute.
Notes
1. Taskhir literally means 'forcing somebody to compulsory service, controlling
something at will'. In discussing the problem of the 'compulsory' force of the
permanent archetypes we have already corne across the word taskhir in the form of a
'mutual taskhir' between the Absolute and the world.
2. Fu.!i., p. 199/158.
3. Fu$., p. 90/88-89.
4. Again Ibn' Arabï goes back to the case in which the' knower' main tains spiritually
all the forms of an object on all the levels of Being by actually concentrating on one of
the levels.
The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 283
5. Fu.!i ., p. 91189-90.
6. On the difference between 'gathering' (qur'àn) and 'separating' (fu.rqàn) see
above, Chapter II.
7. Fu.!i., p. 91190.
8. Cf. Fu.!i., p. 92/90.
9. Fu.!i., p. 148/121.
10. Fu.!i., p. 156/127.
11. The verse reads: 'God is He who creates you of weakness, then puts (ja'ala) after
weakness strength (quwwah), then again puts weakness after strength.'
12. Fu.!i., p. 157/127-128.
13. Fu.!i., pp. 157-158/128.
14. It means: We can freely accomplish 'miracles', but you apparently cannot. And
yet we want to attain to your spiritual stage, while you do not show any sign of being
desirous of attaining to our spiritual stage.
15. Fu.!i., p. 158/129.
16. Fu.!i., p. 159/129-130.
17. ibid.
