SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
XV The Perfect Man as an lndividual
At the outset of the preceding chapter 1 pointed out that Man, in the
thought of Ibn' Arabi, is conceived on two different levels, cosmic
and individual. The present chapter will be concemed with the
second of these two levels.
Man on the first level, or - logically - Man as a species, is in the
intermediary stage between the Absolute and the world, and, as an
intermediary, occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of the
created beings. As soon as we begin to consider Man on the indi-
vidual level, however, we cannot help noticing the existence of
many degrees (mariitib ). Otherwise expressed, on the cosmic level
Man himself is the Perfect Man, but on the individual level not all
men are 'perfect'; on the contrary, only a few deserve the title of the
Perfect Man.
How is it possible that a such a fondamental difference should
occur between the two levels? Any man, as long as he is a 'man', is
expected to have the 'comprehensiveness' actualized in him,
because the ontological 'comprehensiveness' belongs to the very
nature of the human species. There can be no possible exception in
this respect. Ontologically, there can be no difference in this respect
between one individual and another. All this is certainly true. But
individual differences arise in accordance with the degrees of lucid-
ity in the mind of those who become conscious of this very fact. All
men are naturally endowed with the same ontological 'comprehen-
siveness' but not all men are equally conscious of the 'comprehen-
siveness' in themselves. They are variously conscious of it, ranging
from the highest degree of lucidity which cornes very close to that of
the Divine Consciousness of the Names and Attributes, down to the
lowest which is practically the same as complete opaqueness. And
only at the highest degree of lucidity can the human mind play the
role of a 'polished mirror'. Only at the highest degree of lucidity can
Man be the Perfect Man. This is the gist of the whole problem.
In a passage of the Ibn 'Arabi writes: 'God has brought to
light their various degrees in him (i.e., Adam)' .1 Here the pronoun
11ll 1
248 Sufism and Taoism
'their' refers to the sons of Adam. Thus the meaning of this short
sentence may be paraphrased as: 'God bas made clear the existence
of various degrees among men within Adam, i.e., the same one
species of Man'.
The cause which brings into being such degrees among individual
men is explained by Ibn 'Arabi through the metaphor of colored
glass, a metaphor which we have met in an earlier context. Just as
one and the same light is variously colored as it passes through
pieces of glass of various colors, the same Form of the Absolute is
differently manifested in different men with different capacities. 2
A man who has 'actualized in himself the Absolute' (al-
mutaljaqqiq bi-al-l}aqq) is completely permeated by the Absolu te,
so much so that each of his bodily members is a self-manifestation of
the Absolute. And yet, when such men - the people of God (ahl
Allàh) - obtain knowledge by 'immediate tasting', one and the same
knowledge becomes variously inflected according to the capacities
of individual organs.
Know that all mystical knowledges which, originating from the
ontological level of the Name Allah, are actualized in the people of
God, differ from each other according to the differences in the
cognitive faculties through which they are actualized, although all
these knowledges are derived ultimately from one source. This last
point is proved by the fact that God Himself declares (in a well-
known Tradition): 'I am his hearing with which he hears, his sight
with which he sees, his hand with which he seizes, his foot with which
he walks', God declares in this way that His He-ness (huwiyah) is
the very bodily members, which, in their turn, are the man himself.
The He-ness is one, and the bodily members (of the man in whom the
He-ness is actualized) are diverse. And each of his bodily members
has a special knowledge by 'immediate tasting' which is peculiar toit
and which is derived from the unique source (from which ail the other
bodily members obtain their peculiar knowledges). Thus (the same
knowledge coming from one source) becomes differentiated by the
different bodily members. 3
In the passage just quoted, Ibn' Arabi is speaking of the inflection of
one and the same intuitive cognition in one and the same man
through his different bodily members. He is not talking about
differences in intuition among different 'men of God'. He describes
here simply how one knowledge coming from one source becomes
differently modulated in one man according to which of bis faculties
is used. But if in one and the same man the situation is like that, it is
naturally to be expected that even greater differences should arise
in different individuals. In bis commentary on this passage, al-
Qàshani understands it in this sense and says: 4
The Perfect Man as an lndividual 249
Knowledges by 'immediate tasting' are differentiated by the differ-
ence of natural capacities (lit. 'preparedness'), because the 'people of
God' do not all stand on one level. And this causes a difference in
their 'tasting' experiences and (the resulting) knowledges ... just as
one and the same person obtains different knowledges through dif-
ferent faculties. Differences arise (in both cases) in spite of the fact
that all these knowledges go back to one single source, which is the
He-ness of the Absolute.
Ibn 'Arabï himself explains this phenomenon by comparing it to
water which may have different tastes despite the oneness of its
reality.
This may be understood by the example of water. Water is every-
where one single reality, but it has different tas tes according to
places. Here it is sweet, there it is salty and bitter. And yet water is
water in all the states; its reality does not become different however
different its tastes may be.5
The above explanation gives the ontological cause from which all
differences and degrees occur among men. In addition to this, Ibn
'Arabi gives another, theological cause for the same phenomenon:
the 'jealousy' (ghayrah) of God.
The idea of God being 'jealous' (ghayür) goes back historically to
a very old Semitic conception of God. And it plays also a consider-
ably important part in Sufism.
Now 'jealousy' in reference to God is capable of being under-
stood in various meanings. God is 'jealous', for example, because
He does not like the secret between Him and His servants be
disclosed to others. Or God is 'jealous' in the sense that He forbids
that anything other than Himself be adored and worshipped. Ibn
'Arabi understands the idea of Divine 'jealousy' in terms of the
concept of 'self-manifestation' (tajallï).
The Absolute, he says, manifests itself endlessly; it freely dis-
closes and reveals its inner mysteries. And yet the Absolute is,
paradoxically enough, 'jealous' of its mysteries, in the sense that it
conceals them from the eyes of ordinary men. From this particular
point of view, Ibn 'Arabi goes even to the extent of calling the
Divine self-manifestations fawàl}ish (sg. fal}ishah meaning literally
'shameful thing' 'something scandalous or disgraceful'). Here he is
looking at the whole matter from, so to speak, the subjective view-
point of the Absolute itself. God's feeling, Ibn 'Arabi surmises,
would be that He should not have disclosed his secrets, that He
should rather have kept them forever hidden in Himself. On the
human level, it is always an act of shamelessness for man to disclose
to the eyes of the public what he should keep concealed.
Furthermore, Ibn' Arabi exercises here again bis favorite method
250 Sufism and Taoism
of thinking by phonetic associations, and connects the wordghayrah
(jealously) with ghayr ('other').
God admits that He has the Attribute of' jealousy' (ghayrah). It is out
of 'jealousy' that He 'has forbidden the shameful things (JawâfJ,ish)'
(V, 33).
But 'shameful' is only that which has been made openly manifest
(while in truth it should have been kept concealed.) Asto what is kept
within, it is 'shameful' only to those who can see it.6
The last sentence would seem to need a few explanatory words.
Here Ibn 'Arabi <livides the 'shameful things', i.e., the self-
manifestations of God, into two kinds. The first consists of those
things that are openly manifest to our senses, in the world of
concrete reality. The second refers to the 'inner' (batin) self-
manifestations of the Divine Essence in the form of the permanent
archetypes. These are not manifest to the eyes of ordinary people,
and in this respect they are not 'shameful'. And yet they are
nonetheless manifested forms, and as such are clearly visible to
those who have the proper eyes with which to perceive them. They
are, to that extent, equally 'shameful' .7
Thus God 'has forbidden the shameful things', that is, God has
forbidden the reality to be known openly; namely, the fact that He is
nothing other than the ( created) things. So He has concealed the
reality with the veil of 'jealousy' -'other-ness' (ghayrah). 8 And (the
'other') is yourself (i.e., your ego which is conscious of being some-
thing independent and different from the Absolute). (This connec-
tion between 'jealousy' and' other-ness' is natural) because ghayrah
cornes from ghayr.
As a result of this, the 'other' judges that this (particular act of)
hearing, for instance, is the hearing of such-and-such an individual
persan, while the 'knower' of the truth judges that the hearing (i.e.,
ail particular acts of hearing) is the very (act of) the Absolute. And
the same is true of ail human faculties and bodily organs.
Thus not everyone knows the Absolute (in the same degree). There
are superior men and inferior men, and a number of ranks are clearly
discernible among them. 9
The highest rank, according to Ibn 'Arabi, belongs to a man who
throws himself wholly into the act of (dhikr) - that
is, not only with his tongue and heart alone - and becomes internally
unified with the Absolute.
It must be kept in mind that 'remembrance' (dhikr), for Ibn
'Arabi, does not simply mean the act of remembering God with
one's tangue and heart; the word is rather synonymous with mysti-
cal 'self-annihilation' in God. The dhikr in this meaning is a spirituar
state in which a mystic concentrates ail his bodily and spiritual
powers on Godin such a way that his whole existence is united with
The Perfect Man as an Individual 251
God completely, without any residue. When a mystic attains to this
state, the distinction between the subject (who exercises the con-
centration of the mind) and the abject (upon which his mind is
concentrated) naturally disappears, and he experiences the immed-
iate tasting' of the essential unity with the Absolute. The ordinary
kind of dhikr which consists in merely 'remembering' the
Absolute with tongue or mind without a total existential involve-
ment of the person represents a lower degree of dhikr-experience.
When a dhikr of the highest rank actually occurs in a mystic, the
natural perfection of Man is completely realized, and he occupies a
position in the world higher than that of other creatures, including
even angels. Of course ail creatures manifest the glory of God each
according to its degree of dhikr, but it is only in Man that this
experience can be heightened to that of the essential unity with God.
The real value of the human existence which is ours is known only to
those who 'remember' Godin the proper way of 'remembering'. For
God is the intima te Companion (jalïs) of th ose who 'remember' Him,
and those who 'remember' Him do witness the Companion. As long
as a man who 'remembers' does not witness God who is his Compan-
ion, he is not 'remembering' (in the proper way).
The 'remembrance' of God (when it is real) runs through ail the parts
of a man, unlike the case in which a man 'remembers' only with his
tangue. For in the latter case, God happens to be only momentarily
the Companion of the tangue exclusively, so that the tangue alone
sees God while the man himself does not see Him by means of the
sight by which he is properly supposed to see.
You must understand (in the light of this explanation) the following
mystery concerning the 'remembrance' of those who are not serious
enough. Even in a man who is not serious enough, the (particular
bodily organ) which happens to be 'remembering' Him is doubtless in
the presence of God, and the abject of 'remembrance' (i.e., God) is
its Companion and it does witness Him. But the man himself, as long
as he lacks seriousness, is not exercising 'remembrance' (as he
should), and consequently God is not his Companion (in the real
sense).
Ali this cornes from the fact that man is 'many' (i.e., composed of
many parts); he is not one single (non-composite) reality. The Abso-
lute, on the contrary, is One in its essential reality although it is Many
in its Divine Names. But man is 'many' with his parts, so that, even if
one of his parts is engaged in 'remembrance', it does not necessarily
follow that other parts, too, are 'remembering'. The Absolute hap-
pens to be the Companion of that particular part of his which is
actually engaged in 'remembrance', but his other parts are being
negligent of 'remembrance' .10
Such being the case, it is naturally to be expected that there should
arise many degrees among men regarding the capacity for knowing
God and the mystery of Being. On the basis of this fact Ibn' Arabi
252 Sujism and Taoism
classifies men in several different ways, each classification having its
peculiar standard. 1 have already introduced some of them. Here 1
shall give three typical classifications.
The first classification <livides men into two categories: (1) those
whose minds have an otherworldly structure and (2) those whose
minds are of a worldly structure. The first category is represented by
a man who, pure of mind and heart, free from all bodily desires, can
see through things and grasp immediately the realities underlying
them. A man like this knows God by 'unveiling' and 'immediate
tasting', not by Reason. Of course, he, too, exercises his Reason
within its proper domain, but never pushes it beyond its natural
limits. Rather, he readily goes beyond the realm of Reason, and
follows the judgments given by mystical intuition. Such a man is a
'knower' ('arif) and a 'servant of the Lord' ('abd rabb).
The second category, on the contrary, is represented by a man
whose mind is deeply involved in bodily attachments, who is com-
pletely under the sway of desires, and who, consequently, cannot
see the reality of things. In trying to know God, such a man depends
exclusively upon Reason. He cannot step over the boundaries of
logical thinking. Even such a man may taste, on rare occasions,
something of the experience of' unveiling'. In su ch cases, his Reason
recognizes the fact that he is experiencing something unusual. But
this he knows only by Reason. So as soon as the experience ends, he
falls into confusion, and ends up by submitting himself to the
judgment of Reason. Such a man is nota 'servant of the Lord'; he is
rather a 'servant of reasoning' ('abd nazar).
lt must be noticed that Ibn' Arabi does not simply disparage and
deprecate Reason. lt has its own field in which to work prop-
erly. But it has its limitations. A real 'knower' is one who assigns to
Reason a proper place and restrains it from overstepping its
domain. The prophets and apostles are not people devoid of
Reason. On the contrary, they are pre-eminently men of Reason.
But they have a wider field at their command which lies beyond the
reach of Reason.
In fact, no one is more reasonable than the apostles. But (in addition
to Reason) they are (endowed with another capacity by which) they
bring informations directly from God.
Thus the apostles admit the authority of Reason ( within its proper
domain), but add toit something which Reason cannot grasp by its
own power, and which Reason rejects it at first; it is only in the Divine
self-manifestation (i.e., during the time in which the mind happens to
be actually experiencing it by 'unveiling') that it admits that it is true.
However, as soon as the experience of the Divine self-manifestation
leaves the mind, the latter falls into confusion concerning what it has
The Perfect Man as an lndividual 253
just seen. If the man in such a case happens to be a 'servant of the
Lord', he immediately subjugates his Reason to Him, but if the man
happens to be a 'servant of reasoning', he subjugates the truth to the
judgment of Reason.
This state or affairs, however, occurs only as long as the man remains
in the worldly dimension of existence, being veiled from the other
worldly dimensions (which is realized) in the very midst of the
present world.
Even the 'knowers' of the truth look in this world as if they were in a
form peculiar to the present world because of the earthly properties
appearing in them. In their 'interior', however, they have already
been transported by God to the state of being which is peculiar to the
Hereafter. There can be no doubt aboutit. So they are not recogniz-
able outwardly except to those whose spiritual eyes have been
opened by God to see through things. In reality, every true 'knower'
of God, (who knows God) through the experience of (His direct)
self-manifestation in himself, is actually living in a mode of being
peculiar to the Hereafter. Such a man has, already in the present
world, been resurrected from the dead and brought to life from his
tomb. So he sees what others cannot see and witnesses what others
cannot witness. This is a result of a special favor which God grants to
some of His servants. 11
The second classification which Ibn 'Arabi proposes consists in
dividing men into three type: (1) 'knower' ('ârif), (2) 'non-knower'
(ghayr 'arif) and (3) 'ignorant' (jâhil).
He defines 12 the first type as 'a man who sees the Absolute from
the Absolute, in the Absolute, and by the Absolute itself'. The
second, the 'non-knower', is 'a man who sees the Absolute from the
Absolute, in the Absolute, and by his own self'. The 'ignorant' is 'a
man who sees the Absolute neither from the Absolute nor in the
Absolu te, and who expects to see the Absolu te (in the Hereafter) by
his own self'.
The 'knower' is a man who completely identifies himself with
Godin very possible respect and sees God with God's own eyes
from the very viewpoint of God. Since he sees God with God's eyes,
all the self-manifestations of God are within his sight. He actually
witnesses the whole world of Being as it pulsates with Divine Life.
As to the 'non-knower', though he sees the Absolute in the
Absolute and from the viewpoint of the Absolute, the eye with
which he sees is his own. So the reality cannot but be deformed by
his sight.
The 'ignorant' is by no means in a.position to see the Absolute as
it really is. His mind is naturally restricted in an extreme degree.
Each 'ignorant' adores and worships God only in a form peculiar te
a particular religion which he happens to hold, and denies all othe:
forms of worshipping God.
111111
,:1111,
1111111
254 Sufism and Taoism
Generally speaking each man (i.e., of the class of the 'ignorant')
necessarily sticks to a particular religion ('aqïdah, i.e., religion as a
system of dogmas) concerning his Lord. He always goes back to his
Lord through his particular religious belief and seeks God therein.
Such a man positively recognizes God only when He manifests Him-
self to him in the form recognized by his traditional religion. But
when He manifests Himself in other religions, he ftatly refuses to
accept Him and runs away from Him. In so doing, he simply behaves
in an improper way towards God, while imagining that he is practis-
ing good manners toward Him. Thus a man who sticks to the belief of
his particular religion believes in a god according to what he has
subjectively posited in his mind. God in ail particular religions
(i'tiqâdât) is dependent upon the subjective act of positing (ja'l) on
the part of the believers. Thus a man of this kind sees (in the form of
God) only his own self and what he has posited in his mind. 13
The last paragraph of the passage just quoted discloses in a daring
and outspoken way Ibn' Arabï's fondamental position regarding the
etemal Religion and various historical religions. As we have
observed in an earlier context, 14 it is his unshakeable conviction that
ail religions are ultimately one because every religion worships the
Absolute in a very particular and limited way. Whatever one wor-
ships as God, one is worshipping through that particular form the
Absolute itself, nothing else, because there is nothing in the whole
world but particular self-manifestations of the Absolute.
In this connection, Ibn' Arabï draws our attention to a famous
Tradition that depicts one of the occurrences of the day or Resur-
rection. It reads: 'On the day of Resurrection, God will appear to
the creatures in a strange form and say, "1 am your Lord, the
Highest". The people will say, "No, we take refuge with God from
thee!" Then He will make Himself manifest in a form familiar to
them in their religions. Thereupon the people will cry out, "Glory
be to Thee, o God" '. Ibn 'Arabï observes that this is not only a
matter of the day of Resurrection, for exactly the same thing is
actually happening in the present world. 'Behold how the degrees of
men conceming their knowledge of God correspond exactly to their
degrees conceming the seeing of Godon the day of Resurrection'.
And he closes the passage by giving us the following waming and
advice:
Beware of being bound up by a particular religion and rejecting ail
others as unbelief! If you do that, you will fail to obtain a great
benefit. Nay, you will fail to obtain the true knowledge of the reality.
Try to make yourself a (kind of) Prime Matter for all forms of
religious belief. God is wider and greater than to be confined to one
particular religion to the exclusion of others. For He says: 'To
whichever direction you turn, there surely is the Face of God' (II,
115). God does not specify (in this verse) a particular place in which
The Perfect Man as an Individual 255
the Face of God is to be found. He only said: 'There is the Face of
God.'
The 'face' of a thing means its real essence. So God has admonished
by this verse the hearts of the 'knowers' so that they might not be
distracted by non-essential matters in the present world from being
constantly conscious of this kind of thing. For no human being ever
knows at which moment he will die. If a man happens to die at a
moment when he is forgetful of this, his position will certainly be not
equal to another who dies in the state of clear awareness. 15
The third classification of men which Ibn 'Arabï proposes is also a
tripartite division. According to this classification, the lowest degree
is represented by a man who relies upon Reason and who, there-
fore, is content with understanding both God and the world by
exercising his thinking power. The middle position is occupied by
men of 'imagination' (khayal), i.e., those who understand the Abso-
lu te according to the authentic imagery based on visions of
prophets. And the highest degree is of th ose who know the reality of
the things through the experience of 'unveiling' and 'immediate
tasting'.
Let us begin with the lowest class, that is, men of Reason. These
people blindly believe in Reason, do not recognize anything as truth
unless it is acceptable to Reason, and refuse to admit anything
which happens to be in conftict with Reason. They do not know that
Reason, in matters conceming the Absolute, is utterly powerless,
and that it can never go deep into the reality of Being. In various
passages of the Ibn' Arabï emphasizes the narrow limitations
and the essential powerlessness of Reason in contrast to the 'unveil-
ing' (kashf) which is for him the highest form of human cognition.
He sees in the Theologians (mutakallimün) a typical example of the
men of Reason.
As an illustration, he adduces a Qoranic verse: 'thou (Mu\lam-
mad) wert not the one who threw when thou threwest, but God it
was who really threw' 16 (VIII, 17). This verse, according to Ibn
'Arabï, is a most concise symbolic description of the essential rela-
tion between the Absolute and the world. The verse begins by
negating that Mu\lammad 'threw'. Then it affirms that he did throw
- 'when thou threwest' - and finally Mu\lammad's having thrown is
again negated, and the verse ends by establishing that the real
thrower was God Himself. All this is reducible to the proposition:
'the real thrower is God, but it is Godïn the phenomenal form of
Mu\lammad'. The verse, thus understood, expresses nothing other
than the truth about the self-manifestation of the Absolute.
However, only a real 'knower' is capable of interpreting the verse
in this sense. As for the Theologians, its true meaning is completely
out of their reach. In confusion they interpret it arbitrarily
256 Sufism and Taoism
according to the dictates of their Reason. As a result, their conclu-
sion clashes with that of' immediate tasting'. And in most cases they
go to the extreme of declaring impossible and absurd what mystical
intuition recognizes as true.
This and similar verses can be rightly understood only by those
who are possessed of an infini tel y flexible mind. On the basis of this
single verse one can say, 'it was Mul;iammad who threw', just as one
can say, 'it was not Mul;iammad who threw'. Likewise, one can say,
'it was God who threw', just as one can say, 'it was Mul;iammad who
threw, not God'. The verse, in this way, is liable to produce various
statements that seemingly contradict each other. For, after all, the
question is one of different relations and viewpoints. One and the
same event can be looked at variously according to various possible
viewpoints. And yet all this variation takes place within the
infinitely wide Reality which comprises everything and every poss-
ible viewpoint. All are ultimately the activity of the Absolute. But
Reason which by nature is one-sided, rigid, and inflexible, cannot
accept such a view.
As another good example aptly illustrating the natural and essen-
tial deficiency of Reason, Ibn 'Arabï considers the problem of the
relation between 'cause' and 'caused'. The Theologians and
Philosophers, who try to understand everything in the light of what
Reason tells them, often discuss the concept of' cause' ('il/ah). The
reality of 'cause', however, can never be revealed to their minds as
long as they remain so utterly dependent upon logical thinking.
As an illustration disclosing the natural weakness of Reason in its
reasoning activity we may mention the judgment given by Reason
concerning 'cause': that a 'cause' cannot be the 'caused' of that of
which it is the 'cause'. This is evidently what Reason judges. But in
the light of knowledge obtained by mystical illumination, we must
assert precisely this proposition (which is rejected by Reason);
namely, that a 'cause' does become the 'caused' of that of which it is
the 'cause' .17
The judgment given by Reason can be made (more) correct through
theoretical elaboration within the boundaries of logical thinking.
But, even so, the ultimate limit to which Reason can go, when it is
actually faced with a state of affairs which contradicts the evidence
furnished by logical proof, is to think that - admitting the essential
unity of Reality through all the multifarious forms of things in the
world-(this unique Reality), in so far as it actually and positively acts
as a 'cause' in the form of some concrete thing (A, for example) and
causes some other concrete thing (B), it can never be the 'caused' of
that very thing (B) which it (A) has caused as long as it is the 'cause'.
The truth of the matter, Reason will think, is rather that, as the
Reality changes its form (fromA to C, for example, and enters into a
different relationship with B), its capacity may also change in such a
The Perfect Man as an Individual 257
way that it (now in the form of C) could very well be the 'caused' of
what (B) it has caused (in the capacity of A), so that, as a result, the
'caused' may become the 'cause' of its own 'cause'. This, 1 say, is the
furthest limit to which Reason can go even when it perceives the
reality (of Being, by perceiving one single Essence underlying all the
things and events that stand in 'cause' -'caused' relations), and steps
beyond the proper domain of logical reasoning. 18
The latter half of this passage may be explicated as follows. Properly
speaking, Reason has a very narrowly limited domain of its own. As
long as it remains within the strict limits of this domain, Reason
cannot even see that everything is but a different self-manifestation
of one single Reality, the Absolute. But if Reason does stretch itself
forcibly to the furthest possible limit and goes beyond the domain of
its natural capacity, it will be able to see that the Many in the
possible world are ultimately so many different forms of one and the
same Reality. Of course, such a cognition itself goes against the
judgment of Reason in its normal activity. But at least this mu ch
may be conceded by it if it succeeds in extending its capacity in the
way just described.
Reason, once it has admitted that the Many, i.e., all things and
events in the world of concrete reality, are ultimately One and are
but so many phenomenal forms assumed by one single Reality, must
necessarily admit also that the distinction usually made between
'cause' and 'caused' is merely a relative matter, because bath are
two different forms assumed by one and the same thing. And in this
particular sense, Reason will have to admit that a 'cause' can be a
'caused'.
However, even at this stage, Reason is limited by its own logic. lt
will still assert that so long as a certain concrete thing (A) actually is
the 'cause' of another concrete thing (B), A remains a 'cause', and
will never be a 'caused' of B. A, in the capacity of B's 'cause', can
never be a 'caused' of B .A can rightly be a 'caused' of B only when it
is considered from a different angle in a different capacity, i.e., no
longer exactly as A but rather as something different,. C.
Thus it is the final judgment of Reason, even at its unusually
extended limit, that a 'cause', unless it be considered in terms of a
different relationship, cannot be caused by its own 'caused'. This is
the self-evident and primary truth of reason which it can never
abandon as long as Reason remains Reason.
However, if we look at the matter in the light of the intuition
gained by the experience of 'immediate tasting', we find immedi-
ately that a 'cause' can possibly be a 'caused', just as a 'caused' can
possibly be a 'cause'.
It is worthy of notice that the thought pattern that underlies this
conception is very characteristic of Ibn 'Arabï; we have already met
258 Suftsm and Taoism
with it in the preceding in various forms. The idea, for example, that
the creatures are 'food' of God, just as God is 'food' of the crea-
tures, or the idea of the mutual taskhir between God and the
creatures, namely, that the creatures make God 'subservient' to
themselves, just as God makes the creatures 'subservient' to Him -
these and similar 'daring' ideas are structurally of the same category
as that of the mutual causal relationship between God and the
creatures.
How, then, can a 'caused' act positively upon its own 'cause' in
such a way that it makes the latter its own 'caused'? The answer runs
as follows. 'The 'cause-ness' ('illïyah) of a 'cause' ('illah) is incon-
ceivable without the 'caused-ness' (ma'lülïyah) of the 'caused'
(ma'lül), nor can the first actually exist without the latter. The
'cause-ness' completely depends upon the 'caused-ness' of the
'caused'. 'Cause', in this sense, contains in itself 'caused-ness', just
as 'caused' contains 'cause-ness'. Moreover, all things, in Ibn
'Arabi's view, are but different phenomenal forms of one single
Existence. So everything is in one aspect 'cause', and in another
'caused'.
Representing the people of 'immediate tasting', al-Qashani for-
mulates the right answer in the following terms: 19
The one single Reality appearing in two different forms (i.e., 'cause'
and' caused') is apt to receive the two qualifications according to ( our
subjective) points of view. That is to say, it has, when it is in the state
of being a 'cause', the aptitude to be a 'caused', and when it is in the
state of being a 'caused', it has the aptitude to be a 'cause'. For the
one Reality comprehends in itself both 'cause-ness' and 'caused-
ness' with ail the properties peculiar to both. Thus one and the same
thing is a 'cause' in its 'cause-ness', and a 'caused' in its 'caused-ness'.
It has in itself all these and similar aspects (which i.t manifests)
according to particular circumstances.
Exactly the same holds true of the phenomenon of the self-
manifestation. For (such distinctions as) the 'self-manifester', the
locus of self-manifestation, the act of self-manifestation, the being of
the self-manifester a self-manifester and the being of the locus a
locus, etc. ( - ail these are simply [reftections of our] subjective
viewpoints.) In reality they are nothing other than the Absolu te
which is essentially One and which appears in these various capacities
according to our subjective perspectives. These are all notions con-
ceived by our discriminating Reason, the distinctions existing only in
our Reason. They are ail matters of relative forms, supposed rela-
tions secondarily derived from the one single Reality. This Reality is
God, the One and the Unique. There is nothing in Being except God!
If we have gone into a considerably long digression on the problem
of the 'cause' - 'caused' relationship, it is partly because of its
intrinsic value as a theory of causality typical of Ibn 'Arabi. The
The Perfect Man as an Individual 259
main purpose, however, has been to give an illustration showing the
natural incapability of Reason to reach any deep truth about the
Absolute and the world of Being.
'He who knows himself (lit. 'his soul') knows his Lord' - this
famous Tradition is one of Ibn' Arabi' s favorite adages. Here again
he refers to it and declares that there has not been even a single
person, among the Philosophers and Theologians, who has grasped
his own 'self' (soul) in its real depth.
Of ail the men of knowledge no one has obtained a real insight into
the 'soul' and its reality except the divinely inspired Apostles and
great Sufis. Asto the men of reasoning and logical thinking, whether
the ancient Philosophers or the Theologians in Islam, not even one of
them has hit upon the truth in their discussions on 'soul' and its
quiddity. (This is but natural because) logical thinking can never
arrive at the truth in this matter. Therefore, he who seeks the true
knowledge of 'soul' by means of thinking is like a person who,
looking at a man with a tumor, thinks him to be fat, or like a person
who blows upon something which is not fuel.
People of this kind are precisely 'those whose effort goes astray in the
present world, being convinced that they are doing good work'
(XVIII, 14). For he who seeks anything by a wrong method is sure to
fail in achieving his aim. 20
Between the real 'knowers' and the men of Reason are situated the
people of Imagination (khayâl). These are men who try with sincer-
ity to approach the Absolute by the aid of the images given by their
Prophet and Apostle. Concerning the above-quoted Qoranic verse
about the 'one who threw', for example, the men of this kind believe
firmly that the true 'thrower' is God Himself, although the deep
meaning of the verse escapes their understanding. They readily
accept as true whatever their Prophet teaches them, and do not dare
to be critical of anything which they think contradicts Reason. Ibn
'Arabi calls these men 'people of Belief (or Faith)' (ah! al-ïmân).
The 'people of Belief are those who accept unquestioningly what-
ever the Prophets and Apostles convey from the Absolute. They
should not be confused with those who accept unquestioningly the
teaching of the (Philosophers and Theologians) who think by Reason
and who are not content unless they interpret any message (i.e.,
Qoranic verse or prophetic Tradition) that is transmitted to them in
the light of logical evidences.
To these people (of Belief) refers the Qoranic expression: 'or he who
lends his ear' (L, 37) to the Divine messages as they are conveyed
through the tongues of the Prophets. And such a man, i.e., a man who
tends his ear in this way, 'is a witness' (L, 37). God here refers to the
ontological dimension of Imagination and the proper use of the
faculty of Imagination. And this corresponds to the saying of the
Prophet (Muf)ammad) on the 'perfection of Belief'
260 Sufism and Taoism
(il;san ): ' 21 ••• that you worship Godas if you saw Him'. God is always
in the direction toward which man prays. This is why such a man is a
witness. 22
'Being a witness (shahid)' in this passage means, in Ibn Arabi's
interpretation, the spiritual state in which a man 'witnesses', i.e., is
present by his heart to the ontological plane of Imagination. lt is a
state at which the heart of a 'knower' perceives in sensible imagery
some of the things that properly belong to the world of the Unseen.
The heart of a' knower', when he reaches this stage, finds itself in the
world of Imagination and begins to witness in images various states
of affairs of the invisible world.
lt is worthy of notice that toward the end of the passage just
quoted, Ibn 'Arabi, referring to the famous Tradition about il)siin,
draws attention to the expression: ' ... that you worship Him as if
you saw Him'. In Ibn 'Arabi's interpretation, this describes the
lowest and weakest degree of the 'witnessing' here in question. lt is
the lowest degree of the mental presence in the ontological plane of
Imagination, for it is said: 'as if you saw Him'. As the very wording
of this phrase indicates, man is notas yet actually seeing God. There
is as yet no actual vision. Man only acts as if he had a real vision.
But when the heart of the 'knower' becomes strengthened and
mounts a step higher, the object of the 'witnessing' becomes visible
to the internai, spiritual eye (ba$irah), though as yet no vision occurs
to his physical eye. 23
As the 'knower' goes up to the next degree, the object becomes
visible to both his physical eye and his spiritual eye. And if he still
goes up and reaches finally the ultimate and highest stage, the one
who 'witnesses' and the object 'witnessed' become completely
unified. At this stage it is no longer the human heart that 'witnesses'
its object; but it is the Absolute itself 'witnessing' itself in itself. And
this is the stage of the 'saint' (waliy).
Thus when a man 'wakes up', and rises to the highest degree of
'saintship', he begins to witness an extraordinary phenomenon, for
his spiritual eye is now open to the reality of what we have described
earlier under the title of 'new creation'.
In the eye of a real 'knower', the Absolute (in whatever form it may
appear) remains always the 'recognized' one which is never denied. 24
The people who recognized the same Absolu te un der ail phenomenal
forms in the present world will do exactly the same in the Hereafter,
too.
This is why God ( speaking of a man of this kind) says 'for whomever
has a heart (qalb)' (L, 37). For (such a man) knows the constant
changing of the Absolute in various forms; he knows this judging by
The Perfect Man as an Individual 261
the fact that his 'heart' is constantly changing from one form to
another. 25
Thus such a man cornes to know his .own 'self' through (the know-
ledge of the constant transformation of) himself. (And from this he
obtains the real knowledge about the Absolute, for) his own 'self' is
nothing other than the He-ness of the Absolute, (and his knowledge
thus obtained is easily extended to everything because) everything in
the world of Being, whether present or future, is nothing other than
the He-ness of the Absolute; indeed, everything is the He-ness
itself. 26
A real 'knower' who knows his 'heart' (qalb) sees with his own inner
eye how it changes constantly and transforms-itself (qalb or taqal-
lub) at every moment in a myriad of modes and states. He knows at
the same time that his 'heart' is but a self-manifestion of the Abso-
lute, and that it is nothing other than the He-ness of the Absolute.
Of course his 'heart' is the only thing in the whole world whose inner
structure he can know through introspection. But he is well aware
also that all other things must be exactly of the same structure as his
'heart'. Thus a man who knows his own 'heart' from inside knows
also the Absolute as it goes on transforming itself moment after
moment in all the possible forms of the world.
The category to which such a 'knower' belongs constitutes the
highest degree on the scale of humanity. The subject of the next
chapter will be this highest category of men.
Notes
1. FU'f., p. 26/56.
2. FU'f ., p. 118/114. The whole passage has been given in translation in Chapter IV.
3. FU'f., pp. 125-126/107.
4. p. 126.
5. FU!i., p. 126/107.
6. FU'f., p. 130/109-110.
7. Cf. Affifi, FU'f., Corn., p. 126.
8. As I have remarked above, the word ghayrah meaning 'jealousy' is, in the
linguistic consciousness of Ibn' Arabi, directly connected with ghayr meaning 'other'.
So the sentence: 'God covered or concealed the reality with ghayrah' not only means
that He concealed it with 'jealousy', but at the same time that He has concealed the
reality by an infinite number of particular 'determinations', ail of which are regarded
as 'other' than God Himself, so that in this view everything appears as something
1111
: 11:
1111
I'
1
1
11.J
!I
262 Sufism and Taoism
'other' than the rest of the things as well as' other' than the Absolute. And the view of
'other-ness' covers the reality of Being and hinders it from being perceived by the
eyes of ordinary people.
9. Fu$., p. 130/110.
10. FIJ-î., p. 211/168-169.
11. FU$., pp. 234-235/185-186.
12. FIJ-î., pp. 135-136/113.
13. ibid.
14. Cf. Chapter V, where the same idea is dealt with in connection with a different
problem, that of 'metaphysical perplexity'.
15. FU$., p. 136/113.
16. Wa-mâ rama y ta idh rama y ta wa-lâkinna Allâha ramà.
17. Suppose Ais the 'cause' of B, for instance.Bis of course the 'caused' of A. But
there is also a certain respect in which B must be regarded as the 'cause' of A. In this
latter respect, A would be the 'caused' of B.
18. FIJ-î., p. 233/185.
19. p. 234.
20. FU$., p. 153/125.
21. On the exact meaning of the word il]sân see my The Concept of Belief in Islamic
Theology, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 58-60.
22. FU$., p. 149/123.
23. Qàshànî, p. 150.
24 The reference is to the Tradition, which has been quoted and explained earlier in
the present chapter, concerning what will happen on the day of Resurrection.
25. By the 'etymological' way of thinking which, as we have observed several times,
is so typical of Ibn 'Arabî, he brings together the 'heart' (qalb) and 'change' or
'transformation' (qalb).
26. Fu$., p. 149/122.
