Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch02 II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch02 II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
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Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

I Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

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II] The Absolute in its Absoluteness

1] The Absolute = haqq (Truth or Reality)
2] Oneness - The tajalli of the Absolute
3] Impossibility of the union with God or the Absolute - the mystic's experience
4] The Absolute is the Absolute being - the ontological conception of the Absolute
5] 3 categories/ levels/degrees of being
6] from the ontological to the religious
7] Pharaoh questions Moses: about the mâhiyah of God
8] Moses' answer - a symbolic expression of his own ontology.
9] the only way to approach the Absolute is to look at it in its self-revealing aspect.
10] the Divine self-manifestation (tajallï) as a mirror
11] The 'deepest truth' - the highest limit

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수피즘과 도교: 핵심 철학적 개념에 대한 비교 연구

Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

초판 발행 1983 Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
이 판은 The University of California Press에서 발행, 1984,
Rev. ed. 의: 수피즘과 도교의 핵심 철학적 개념에 대한 비교 연구. 1966-67.

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II] The Absolute in its Absoluteness 절대성 속의 절대자

1] The Absolute = haqq (Truth or Reality)

===

In religious non-philosophical discourse the Absolute is normally 

indicated by the word God or Allah. But in the technical terminology of Ibn ‘Arabi, the word Allah designates the Absolute not in its absoluteness 

but in a state of determination. 

The truly Absolute is Something which cannot be called even God. 

Since, however, one cannot talk about anything at all without linguistic designation, Ibn ‘Arabi uses the word haqq (which literally means Truth or Reality) in referring to the Absolute. 

[Haqq (Arabic: حقّ ḥaqq) is the Arabic word for truth. In Islamic contexts, it is also interpreted as right and reality. 

Al-Haqq, 'the truth, is one of the names of God in the Qur'an.]

종교적 비철학적 담론에서 절대자는 일반적으로

신 또는 알라라는 단어 로 표시됩니다 . 

그러나 이븐 아라비(Ibn' Arabi)의 기술 용어에서 

알라(Allâh)라는 단어는 절대적인 것이 아니라 한정된 상태 에 있는 절대자를 가리킵니다 . [?]

참으로 절대적인 것은 신이라고도 부를 수 없는 것입니다 . 

그러나 언어 지정 없이는 아무 것도 말할 수 없기 때문에 Ibn 'Arabi는 the Absolute. 절대자를 언급할 때 haqq 학크 (말 그대로 진실 또는 현실을 의미함 )  이라는 단어를 사용합니다 .

---

The Absolute in such an absoluteness or, 

to use a peculiarly monotheistic expression, 

God per se is absolutely inconceivable and inapproachable.

The Absolute in this sense is unknowable to us 

because it transcends all qualifications and relations that are 

humanly conceivable. 

Man can neither think of anything nor talk about anything without first giving it some qualification and thereby limiting it in some form or another. 

Therefore, the Absolute in its unconditional transcendence and essential isolation cannot be an object of human knowledge and cognition. In other words, as far as 

it remains in its absoluteness it is Something unknown and unknow- 

able. It is forever a mystery, the Mystery of mysteries. 

---

그러한 절대성 속의 절대자 , 또는 

독특하게 일신론적인 표현을 사용해서 

하나님 자체는 절대적으로 상상할 수 없고  접근할 수 없습니다. 

이런 의미에서 절대자는 인간이 생각할 수 있는 모든 자격과 관계를 초월하기 때문에 우리가 알 수 없습니다. 

인간은 먼저 그것에 어떤 자격을 부여하여 어떤 형태로든 제한하지 않고서는 어떤 것도 생각하거나 그것에 대해 말할 수 없습니다. 

그러므로 무조건적인 초월과 본질적 고립에 있는 절대자는 인간의 지식과 인식의 대상이 될 수 없다. 

다시 말해서 그것이 절대성 안에 남아 있는 한 그것은 미지의 것, 알 수 없는 것입니다. 

그것은 영원히 신비, 신비 중의 신비입니다.

---

The Absolute in this sense is said to be ankar al-nakirat, 

i.e., ‘the most indeterminate of all indeterminates’, 1 

because it has no qualities and bears no relation to anything beside itself. 

Since it is absolutely indeterminate and undetermined it is totally unknow- 

able. Thus the phrase ankar-nakirat means ‘the most unknown of all 

the unknown’. 

---

이런 의미에서 절대자는 ankar al-nakirât 라고 합니다 .

모든 불확정 중 가장 불확정', 1은 자격이 없기 때문에-

그 자체 이외의 어떤 것과도 관련이 없습니다. 이래서

절대적으로 불확실하고 결정되지 않은 것은 완전히 알려지지 않은 것입니다.

할 수 있는. 따라서 ankar-nakirât 라는 문구는 모든 미지의 것들 중에서도 가장 알려지지 않은 것'을 의미합니다.

---

From the particular viewpoint of the Divine self-manifestation (tajalli) 

which will be one of our major topics in what follows, 

the Absolute in the state of unconditional transcendence is said to be 

at  the level of ‘unity’ ( ahadiyah ). [?] There is as yet no tajalli. 

Tajalli is only expected of it in the sense that it is to be the very source of 

tajalli which has not yet begun. 

And since there is actually no occurrence of tajalli , 

there is absolutely nothing recognizable here. 

In this respect the Absolute at this stage is the One ( al-ahad ).  [?] 

[Al-Ahad describes absolute oneness and uniqueness; none compares to Him. In contrast, Al-Wahid refers to His being as the numerical one]

다음에서 우리의 주요 주제 중 하나가 될 것인,

신성한 자기 현시 (tajallï) 의 특별한 관점에서

 

무조건적인 초월의 상태에 있는 절대자는

'통일'(ahadïyah) 의 수준에 있다고 한다. 

 아직 타 잘리는 없습니다 . 

타잘리는 그것이 바로 그 근원이 될 것이라는 의미에서만 예상할 수 있습니다.

아직 시작되지 않은 타잘리. 그리고 실제로 없기 때문에 

tajallï의 발생, 여기에서 인식할 수 있는 것은 전혀 없습니다.

이와 관련하여 이 단계에서 절대자는  the One 하나(al-ahad)  [?] 입니다 . 

2] Oneness - The tajalli of the Absolute

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24 

The word ‘one’ in this particular context is not the ‘one which is a whole of ‘many’. Nor is it even ‘one’ in opposition to ‘many . 

It means the essential, primordial and absolutely unconditional simplicity of Being [?] where the concept of opposition is meaningless. 

The stage of Unity  [?] is an eternal stillness. Not the slightest movement is there observable. 

The self- manifestation of the Absolute does not yet occur. Properly speaking we cannot speak even negatively of any self-manifestation of the Absolute 

except when we look back at this stage from the later stages of Being. 

The tajalli of the Absolute begins to occur only at the next stage, that of the 

‘oneness’ ( wahidiyah ) which means the Unity of the Many. 

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Wahidiyah  Term Image (al-Wāḥidiyah)

Short Description: The (Divine) Uniqueness.

Long Description: To be distinguished from the Transcendent Unity (al-Aḥadiyah) which is beyond all distinctive knowledge, whereas the Uniqueness appears in the differentiated, just as principial distinctions appear in it.

Source(s): Introduction to Sufi Doctrine (by Titus Burckhardt)

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이 특정 문맥에서 '하나'라는 단어는 '하나'가 아닙니다.

전체 '많은'. '다수'에 반대되는 '하나'도 아닙니다. 

대립의 개념이 무의미한

 본질적이고 원초적이며 절대적으로 무조건적인 존재의 유연함을 의미합니다.

일치의 단계는 영원한 고요함 입니다 . 

조금도 움직이는 것을 거기에서 관찰할 수 없습니다. 

절대자의 자기 현시는 아직 발생하지 않습니다. 제대로 말하면 우리는 부정조차 할 수 없다.

우리가 다음과 같은 경우를 제외하고 절대적

존재의 나중 단계에서 이 단계를 되돌아보십시오. 의 

절대자의 타잘리는 다음 단계에서만 발생하기 시작합니다 .

많은 것의 통일성을 의미하는 '와이디야 (하나)'(wahidiyah) 는 

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It is impossible that the Absolute manifest itself in its absoluteness. 

‘Those who know God in the true sense assert that there can never be self-manifestation in the state of Unity , 2  [?] 

because, not only in the normal forms of cognitive experience in the phenomenal 

world but also even in the highest state of mystical experience, 

there is, according to Ibn ‘Arab!, kept intact the distinction between 

• the one who sees (nazir) and 
• the object seen (manzur). 

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3] Impossibility of the union with God or the Absolute - the mystic's experience 

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Mystics often speak of ‘becoming one with God’, 

                                                                which is the so-called unio mystica.

In the view of Ibn ‘ Arabi, however, a complete unification is but a fallacy on their part or on the part of those who misconstrue their expressions. 

If a mystic, for example, describes his experience of unio mystica 

by saying, ‘I have seen God through Him’ ( Nazartu-hu bi-hi) 

meaning ‘I have transcended my own existence into God Himself and have seen Him there with his own eyes’, 

and supposing that the expression is true to what he has really experienced, 

yet there remains here a distinction between himself who sees and himself who is seen as an object. 

---

절대자가 자신의 절대적인 모습으로 자신을 드러내는 것은 불가능합니다.

네스 호. ' 참된 의미에서 하나님을 아는 사람들은

통일된 상태에서 결코 자기 표현이 되지 마십시오',2 왜냐하면

경이로운 현상에서 정상적인 형태의인지 경험에서만

신비적 경험의 가장 높은 상태에서도

Ibn 'Arabï에 따르면,

보는 사람(nazir)과 보이는 대상(manzür). 자주

이른바 유니오(unio) 인 '신과 하나가 되는 것'을 말한다 .

미스티카. 그러나 이븐 아라비의 관점에서 완전한 통합은

그것은 그들의 부분이나 잘못 해석하는 사람들의 오류에 불과합니다.

그들의 표현. 예를 들어 신비주의자가 자신의 경험을 설명하면

unio mystica 는 '나는 그를 통하여 하나님을 보았다'

(Nazartu-hu bi-hi) '나는 나 자신의 존재를 초월했다' 라는 뜻

하나님 자신 안으로 들어가서 거기에서 자신의 눈으로 그분을 보았으며,

그 표현이 그가 실제로 경험한 것과 사실이라고 가정하면

하지만 여기에는

사물로 보이는 자신과 본다.

---

If, instead of saying ‘I have seen Him through Him , 

he said, I have seen Him through myself’, ( Nazartu-hu bi), 

does the expression describe the experience of the Unity? 

No, by the very fact that there intervenes ‘I’ (ana) the absolute Unity is lost. 

What about, then, if he said ‘ I have seen Him through Him and myself’ ( Nazartu-

hu bi-hi wa-bi )? 

Even in that case - supposing again that the expression is a faithful description of the mystic s experience — the pronominal suffix -tu (in nazartu ) meaning ‘I (did such-and-such a thing)’ suggests a split. 

That is to say, the original Unity is no longer there. Thus in every case ‘there is necessarily a certain relation which requires two elements: the subject and object of seeing. And this cannot but eliminate the Unity, even if (the mystic in such an 

experience) only sees himself through himself’. 3 

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만일 그가 '내가 그를 통하여 그를 보았다'고 말하는 대신에,

나 자신을 통해 그분을 보았다'(Nazartu-hu bi)는 다음과 같이 표현합니다.

Unity의 경험에 대해 설명해 주시겠습니까? 아니, 그 사실만으로도

거기에 'I'(ana)가 개입하여 절대적인 통일성을 상실합니다. 는 어때,

그런 다음 그가 '나는 그와 나 자신을 통해 그를 보았다' 고 말하면 (Nazartu-

후비히와비)? 이 경우에도 - 다시 가정하면

표현은 신비가의 경험에 대한 충실한 기술입니다.

대명사 접미사 -tu(나자르투어로)는 '나는(이러한 일을 했다)을 의미합니다.

thing)'은 분할을 제안합니다. 즉, 원래 Unity는 더 이상

거기. 따라서 모든 경우에 '반드시 어떤 관계가 있다.

보는 주체와 대상이라는 두 가지 요소가 필요합니다. 그리고

이것은 통일성을 제거하지 않을 수 없다.

경험) 자신을 통해서만 자신을 본다' . 삼

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Thus even in the highest degree of mystical experience, that of unio, the prime Unity must of necessity break up and turn into duality. 

The Absolute on the level of Unity, in other words, remains 

for ever unknowable. It is the inescapable destiny of the human act 

---

of cognition that, whenever man tries to know something, there

comes in a particular relation, a particular condition which impedes

an immediate grasp of the abject. 25  Man is unable to know anything

without taking up some position, without looking at it from some

definite point. The Absolute, in its absoluteness, however, is pre-

cisely Something which transcends all such relations and aspects.

 

---

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness 

In religious non-philosophical discourse the Absolute is normally 

indicated by the word God ox Allah. But in the technical terminol- 

ogy of Ibn ‘Arabi, the word Allah designates the Absolute not in its 

absoluteness but in a state of determination. The truly Absolute is 

Something which cannot be called even God. Since, however, one 

cannot talk about anything at all without linguistic designation, Ibn 

‘Arabi uses the word haqq (which literally means Truth or Reality) 

in referring to the Absolute. 

The Absolute in such an absoluteness or, to use a peculiarly 

monotheistic expression, God per se is absolutely inconceivable and 

inapproachable. The Absolute in this sense is unknowable to us 

because it transcends all qualifications and relations that are 

humanly conceivable. Man can neither think of anything nor talk 

about anything without first giving it some qualification and thereby 

limiting it in some form or another. Therefore, the Absolute in its 

unconditional transcendence and essential isolation cannot be an 

object of human knowledge and cognition. In other words, as far as 

it remains in its absoluteness it is Something unknown and unknow- 

able. It is forever a mystery, the Mystery of mysteries. 

The Absolute in this sense is said to be ankar al-nakirat, i.e., ‘the 

most indeterminate of all indeterminates’, 1 because it has no qual- 

ities and bears no relation to anything beside itself. Since it is 

absolutely indeterminate and undetermined it is totally unknow- 

able. Thus the phrase ankar-nakirat means ‘the most unknown of all 

the unknown’. 

From the particular viewpoint of the Divine self-manifestation 

(tajalli) which will be one of our major topics in what follows, the 

Absolute in the state of unconditional transcendence is said to be at 

the level of ‘unity’ ( ahadiyah ). There is as yet no tajalli. Tajalli is 

only expected of it in the sense that it is to be the very source of 

tajalli which has not yet begun. And since there is actually no 

occurrence of tajalli , there is absolutely nothing recognizable here. 

In this respect the Absolute at this stage is the One ( al-ahad ). The 

24 Sufism and Taoism 

word ‘one’ in this particular context is not the ‘one which is a 

whole of ‘many’. Nor is it even ‘one’ in opposition to ‘many . It 

means the essential, primordial and absolutely unconditional sim- 

plicity of Being where the concept of opposition is meaningless. 

The stage of Unity is an eternal stillness. Not the slightest move- 

ment is there observable. The self- manifestation of the Absolute 

does not yet occur. Properly speaking we cannot speak even nega- 

tively of any self-manifestation of the Absolute except when we 

look back at this stage from the later stages of Being. The tajalli of 

the Absolute begins to occur only at the next stage, that of the 

‘oneness’ ( wahidiyah ) which means the Unity of the Many. 

It is impossible that the Absolute manifest itself in its absolute- 

ness. ‘Those who know God in the true sense assert that there can 

never be self-manifestation in the state of Unity , 2 because, not 

only in the normal forms of cognitive experience in the phenomenal 

world but also even in the highest state of mystical experience, there 

is, according to Ibn ‘Arab!, kept intact the distinction between the 

one who sees ( nazir ) and the object seen ( manzur ). Mystics often 

speak of ‘becoming one with God’, which is the so-called unio 

mystica. In the view of Ibn ‘ Arabi, however, a complete unification 

is but a fallacy on their part or on the part of those who misconstrue 

their expressions. If a mystic, for example, describes his experience 

of unio mystica by saying, ‘I have seen God through Him’ 

( Nazartu-hu bi-hi) meaning ‘I have transcended my own existence 

into God Himself and have seen Him there with his own eyes’, and 

supposing that the expression is true to what he has really experi- 

enced, yet there remains here a distinction between himself who 

sees and himself who is seen as an object. 

If, instead of saying ‘I have seen Him through Him , he said, I 

have seen Him through myself’, ( Nazartu-hu bi), does the expres- 

sion describe the experience of the Unity? No, by the very fact that 

there intervenes ‘I’ (ana) the absolute Unity is lost. What about, 

then, if he said ‘ I have seen Him through Him and myself’ ( Nazartu- 

hu bi-hi wa-bi )? Even in that case - supposing again that the 

expression is a faithful description of the mystic s experience — the 

pronominal suffix -tu (in nazartu ) meaning ‘I (did such-and-such a 

thing)’ suggests a split. That is to say, the original Unity is no longer 

there. Thus in every case ‘there is necessarily a certain relation 

which requires two elements: the subject and object of seeing. And 

this cannot but eliminate the Unity, even if (the mystic in such an 

experience) only sees himself through himself’. 3 

Thus even in the highest degree of mystical experience, that of 

unio, the prime Unity must of necessity break up and turn into 

duality. The Absolute on the level of Unity, in other words, remains 

for ever unknowable. It is the inescapable destiny of the human act 

---

25

of cognition that, whenever man tries to know something, there

comes in a particular relation, a particular condition which impedes

an immediate grasp of the abject. Man is unable to know anything

without taking up some position, without looking at it from some

definite point. The Absolute, in its absoluteness, however, is pre-

cisely Something which transcends all such relations and aspects.

====

4] The Absolute is the Absolute being - the ontological conception of the Absolute

----

Is it impossible, then, for man to say even a word about the Absolute

Can we not predicate anything at all of the absolute Absolute?

As is clear from what has just been said, strictly speaking no predication is possible. Philosophically, however, there is one single thing which we predicate of the Absolute on this level. lt is 'being'. [ok]

As long as it is a word with a meaning, it also delimits and specifies the Absolute. But within the boundaries of philosophical thinking, 'being' is the most colorless - and therefore the least specifying predication thinkable. lt describes the Absolute with the highest degree of unconditionality.

The Absolute viewed from this standpoint is called by Ibn' Arabï

dhat 4 or 'essence'. [?]

The world dhat in this context means absolute Being (wujüd mutlaq), 

Being qua ["as,"] Being, or absolute Existence, [being = existence?]

that is, Existence viewed in its unconditional simplicity. 

As the epithet 'absolute' indicates, it should not be taken in the sense of a limited

and determined existent or existence; 

it means Something beyond all existents that exist in a limited way, 

Something lying at the very source of all such existents existentiating them. 

lt is Existence as the ultimate ground of everything. 

--

[existentiation (plural existentiations). The process of making something existential; of causing something to exist. quotations]

--

The ontological conception of the Absolute is a basic thesis that runs through the whole of the Fusus. But Ibn 'Arabï in this book  does not deal with it as a specifically philosophic subject. 

[Fusus al-Hikam (The Seals of Wisdom) book name - Muhi-e-Din Ibn Arabi. Translated to English by Aisha Bewley.] 

On behalf of the Master, al-Qashanï explains the concept of dhat scholastically. 

He considers it one of the three major ideas that concern the very foundation of Ibn' Arabï' s thought. The whole passage which is reproduced here is entitled 'an elucidation of the true nature of the Essence at the level of Unity' .5

[The word “Dhat” derives from the Sanskrit language (the mother of Indo-Aryan languages) word dhatu, meaning “metal,” “elixir” or “constituent part of the body” which is considered to be “the most concentrated, perfect and powerful bodily substance, and its preservation guarantees health and longevity.”]

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The Reality called the 'Essence at the level of Unity' (al-dhât al-

ahadiyah) in its true nature is nothing other than Being (wujüd) pure

and simple in so far as it is Being. It is conditioned neither by

non-determination nor by determination, for in itself it is too sacred

(muqaddas) to be qualified by any property and any name. It has no

quality, no delimitation; there is not even a shadow of multiplicity in

it.

It is neither a substance nor an accident, for a substance must have a

quiddity other than existence, a quiddity by which it is a substance as

differentiated from all other existents, and so does an accident which,

furthermore, needs a place (i.e., substratum) which exists and in

which it inheres.  [whatever makes something the type that it is : essence. ]

26 

And since everything other than the Necessary Being ( wàjib) is either
a substance or an accident, the Being qua Being cannot be anything

other than the Necessary Being. Every determined (i.e., non-

necessary) being is existentiated by the Necessary Being. Nay, it is

essentially [no other than the Necessary Being]6 ; it is entitled to be

regarded as 'other' than the Necessary Being only in respect of its

determination. (Properly speaking) nothing can be 'other' than it in

respect to its essence.

Such being the case (it must be admitted that in the Necessary Being)

existence is identical with essence itself, for anything which is not

Being qua Being is sheer non-Being ('adam). And since non-Being is

'nothing' pure and simple, we do not have to have recourse, in order

to distinguish Being qua Being from non-Being, to a particular act of

negation, namely, the negation of the possibility of both being com-

prehended under a third term. 7 Nor does Being ever accept non-

Being; otherwise it would, after accepting non-Being, be existence

which is non-existent. Likewise, pure non-Being, on its part, does not

accept Being. Besides, if either one of them ( e.g., Being) accepted its

contradictory ( e.g., non-Being) it would turn into its own contradic-

tory (i.e., non-Being) while being still actually itself (i.e., Being). But

this is absurd.

Moreover, in order that anything may 'accept' something else there

must necessarily be multiplicity in it. Being qua Being, however, does

not include any multiplicity at all. That which does accept Being and

non-Being is (not Being qua Being but) the 'archetypes' (a'yàn) and

their permanent states in the intelligible world, becoming visible with

Being and disappearing with non-Being.

Now everything (in the concrete world of 'reality') is existent through

Being. So in itself such an existent is not Being. Otherwise when it

comes into existence, we would have to admit that its existence had

already existence even before its own (factual) existence. But Being

qua Being is from the beginning existent, and its existence is its own

essence. Otherwise, its quiddity would be something different from

existence, and it would not be Being. If it were not so, then ( we would

have to admit that) when it came into existence, its existence had an

existence (i.e., as its own quiddity) even before its own existence.

This is absurd.

Thus Being itself must necessarily exist by its own essence, and not

through existence of some other thing. Nay, it is that which makes

every other existent exist. This because all other things exist only

through Being, without which they would simply be nothing at all.

---

5] 3 categories/ levels/degrees of being

----

It is important to notice that al-Qashanï in this passage refers to

three categories of Being: 

• (1) Being qua Being, that is, absolute Being, 
• (2) the archetypes, and 
• (3) the concrete beings or existents of the sensible world. 

This triple division is a faithful reflection of the main conception of Ibn 'Arabi himself. 

In the Fusus, he does not present a well-organized ontological discussion of this problem from this particular point of view. 27 

It is nonetheless one of the cardinal points of his philosophy. 

A concise systematic presentation is found in his short treatise, Kitiib Inshii' al-Dawii'ir. 8 

There he mentions the three categories, or, as he calls them, three 'degrees'

or 'strata' (mariitib ), of Being, and asserts that there can be no other

ontological category. These three are: 

• (1) the absolute Being 
• 2) the limited and determined Being, and 
• (3) something of which neither Being nor non-Being can be predicated. 

The second of the three is the world of the sensible things while 

the third, which he says can neither be said to exist nor not to exist, the world of the archetypes.

6] from the ontological to the religious

in the name of Allah,  we should see the self-manifestation (tajalli) of this Mystery already at work,

----

As for the ontological nature of the archetypes and the sensible

things we shall have occasions to discuss it in detail later on. The first

degree of Being alone is what interests us in the present context.

Know that the things that exist constitute three degrees, there being no other degree of Being. Only these three can be the objects of our knowledge, for anything other than these is sheer non-Being which can neither be known nor be unknown and which has nothing at all to do with anything whatsoever. 

With this understanding I would assert that of these three

( categories) of things the first is that which possesses existence by

itself, i.e., that which is existent per se in its very essence.

The existence of this thing cannot come from non-Being; on the contrary,
it is the absolute Being having no other source than itself. Otherwise,
that thing (i.e., the source) would have preceded it in existence.
lndeed, it is the very source of Being to ail the things that exist; it is
their Creator who determines them, divides them and disposes them.
It is, in brief, the absolute Being with no limitations and conditions.
Praise be to Him! He is Allah, the Living, the Everlasting, the
Omniscient, the One, who wills whatever He likes, the Omnipotent.

 9

It is remarkable that Ibn' Arabï, in the concluding sentence of the

passage just quoted, explicitly 

identifies the absolute Being with Allah,

the Living, Omniscient, Ominpotent God of the Qoran. 

It indicates that he has moved 

• from the ontological level of discourse with which he began 
• to the religious level of discourse peculiar to the living faith of the believer.

As we have remarked before, the Reality in its absoluteness is, 

in Ibn 'Arabï's metaphysical-ontological system, 

an absolutely unknowable Mystery that lies far beyond the reach of human cognition. 

Properly speaking, in the name of Allah we should see the

self-manifestation (tajalli) of this Mystery already at work,

although, to be sure, it is the very first beginning of the process and

is, in comparison with the remaining levels of tajalli, the highest and

the most perfect form assumed by the Mystery as it steps out of its

abysmal darkness. 

However, from the viewpoint of a believer who

talks about it on the level of discourse directly connected with his

living faith, the absolute Being cannot but take the form of

Allah. Existence per se cannot in itself be an object of religious

belief. 28 

This fact makes it also clear that whatever we want to say about the absolute Being and however hard we try to describe it as it really is, 

we are willy-nilly forced to talk about it in one aspect or another

of its self-manifestation, for the Absolute in the state of non-

manifestation never comes into human language. 

The absolute Reality in itself remains for ever a 'hidden treasure', hidden in its

own divine isolation.

It will be natural, then, that, from whatever point of view we may approach the problem, we see ourselves ultimately brought back to the very simple proposition from which we started; namely, that the Absolute in its absoluteness is essentially unknown and unknowable. 

In other words, the inward aspect of the Absolute defies every

attempt at definition. One cannot, therefore, ask, 'What is the Absolute?' 

And this is tantamount to saying that the Absolute has no 'quiddity' (mahïyah). 10

[In scholastic philosophy, "quiddity was another term for the essence of an object, literally its "whatness" or "what it is". ]

[mahïyah - To be honoured

----

7] Pharaoh questions Moses: about the mâhiyah of God

----

This, however, does not exclude the possibility of a believer

justifiably asking what is the mahïyah of God. [essence?] 

But the right answer to this question can take only one form. 

And that sole answer is, according to Ibn 'Arabi, represented by the answer given by Moses in the Qoran.

The reference is to XXVI (23-24) where Moses, 

asked by Pharaoh, 'And what is the Lord of the worlds?' (Mii rabbu al-'iilamïna?), 

answers, 'The Lord of the heavens and earth and what is between them'. 

Ibn 'Arabi considers the question hurled at Moses by Pharaoh (' What is ... ?') 

as a philosophical one 

asking about the mâhiyah of God, asking for a definition of God. 

And he gives the situation of this dialogue quite an original interpretation. 11

He argues: this question was asked by Pharaoh not because he

was ignorant, but simply because he wanted to try Moses. 

Knowing as he did to what degree a true apostle of God must know about

God, Pharaoh wanted to try Moses as to whether the latter was truly an apostle as he claimed to be. 

Moreover, he was sly enough to attempt cheating those who were present, that is, he designed the question in such a way that, 

even if Moses were a genuine apostle, 

those present would get the impression of Moses being far inferior to Pharaoh, 

for it was to be expected from the very beginning that Moses - or anybody else for that matter - could not in any case give a satisfactory answer to the question. However, Ibn' Arabi does not clarify the point. 

On his behalf, al-Qashani gives the following explanation. 12

By asking, 'What is God?', Pharaoh gave those who were there

the impression that God had somehow a mahïyah in addition to His existence.  29 

The onlookers were thereby led to the idea that, since God had a mahïyah, 

a true apostle must know it and must, therefore, be able to give a satisfactory answer to the question. 

Since, however, there can be no 'definition' (hadd) of God in the logical

sense, a true apostle - if he is a true apostle, and not a fraud - can never give a 'satisfactory' answer in the form of a definition. 

But in the eyes of those who are not conversant with the real nature of the

problem, a vague non-definitive answer is a sign indicating that the man who gives such an answer is not a real 'knower'.

Now the actual answer given by Moses runs: 

'the Lord of the heavens and earth and what is between them". 

This is just the right answer and the only possible and the most perfect answer in this case. 

It is, as Ibn' Arabi puts it, 'the answer of those who truly know the matter'.

Thus Moses in his answer said what there was really to be said. 

And Pharaoh, too, knew perfectly well that the right answer could not be anything other than this. 

Superficially, however, the answer looks as if it were not a real answer. 

So Pharaoh achieved his aim of producing the impression in the minds of the onlookers that Moses was ignorant of God, while he, Pharaoh, knew the truth

about God.

----

8] Moses' answer - a symbolic expression of his own ontology. 

----

Is it wrong, then, philosophically to ask, 'What is God?' as Pharaoh did? 

No, Ibn' Arabi says, 13 the question in this form is not at ail wrong in itself.

To ask about the mahïyah of something is nothing other than asking about its reality or real essence. 

And God does possess reality. 

Strictly speaking, asking about the mâhiyah of something is not exactly the same as asking for its logical definition.

To ask about the mahïyah of a thing, as understood by Ibn' Arabi, 

is to ask about the reality (haqïqah) of that object, which is unique and not shared by anything else. 14 

[ḥaqīqah, (Arabic: “reality,” “truth”), in Sufi (Muslim mystic) terminology, 

the knowledge the Sufi acquires when the secrets of the divine essence are revealed to him at the end of his journey toward union with God. ]

'Definition' in the logical sense is different from this. 

It consists of a combination of a genus and a specific difference, and such a combination is thinkable only in regard to things (i.e., universals) that allow of common participation.

Anything, therefore, that has no logical genus in which to belong cannot be 'defined', but this does not in any way prevent such a thing having its own unique reality which is not common to other things.

More generally speaking, 'there is nothing', as al-Qashanï observes, 15 'that has not its own reality (haqïqah) by which it is just as it is to the exclusion of all other things. 

Thus the question (what is God?) is a perfectly justifiable one in the view of those who know the truth. 

Only those who do not possess real knowledge assert that anything that does not admit of definition cannot be asked as to "what" (ma) it is'.

Moses, in reply to the question: 'What is God?', says that 

He is 'the Lord of the heavens and earth and what is between them, 

if you have a firm faith'. 30 

Ibn' Arabï sees here 'a great secret' (sirr kabïr) that is to say, a profound and precious truth hidden under a seemingly commonplace phrase.

Here is a great secret. Observe that Moses, when asked to give an

essential definition (hadd dhâtï), answered by mentioning the 'act'

(fi'l) 16 of God.

Moses, in other words, identitied17 the essential definition (of God)

with the (essential) relation of God to the forms of the things by

which He manifests Himself in the world or the forms of the things

which make their appearance in Him. Thus it is as though he said, in

reply to the question: 'What is the Lord of the worlds?', 'It is He in

whom appear ail the forms of the worlds ranging from the highest -

which is the heaven - to the lowest - which is the earth, or rather the

forms in which He appears' .18

Pharaoh, as the Qoran relates, sets out to show that such an answer

can come only from a man who is ignorant of God or who has but a

superficial knowledge of God. He tries thereby to prove in the

presence of his subjects his superiority over Moses. The latter,

against this, emphasizes that God is 'the Lord of the East andWest

and what is between them, if you but have understanding' (XXVI,

28).

This second statement of Moses is interpreted by Ibn 'Arabï in

such a way that it turns out to be a symbolic expression of his own

ontology. 

The East, he says, is the place from which the sun makes

its appearance. It symbolizes the visible and material aspect of

theophany. The West is the place into which the sun goes down to

conceal itself from our eyes. It symbolizes the invisibl

And these two forms of theophany, visible and invisible, correspond to the two

great Names of God: the Outward (al-zàhir) and the Inward (albàtin ). 

The visible theopany constitutes the world of concrete material things ('àlam al-ajsàm ), while the invisible theophany results in the rise of the non-material spiritual world ('alam al-arwal:z. ). 

Naturally 'what lies between the East and West' would refer to those

forms that are neither purely material nor purely spiritual, that is

what Ibn 'Arabi calls amthal or Images on the level of Imagination. 19

Here Ibn' Arabî draws attention to a fact which seems to him to

be of decisive importance; 

namely that, of the two answers given by Moses, 

the first is qualified by a conditional clause: 'if you have a firm faith' .20 

This indicates that the answer is addressed to those who have yaqïn, i.e., the 'people of unveiling' (kashf) and immediate unitative knowledge (wujud). 21 

[yaqīn (real certainty)]

Thus in the first answer Moses simply confirms what the true 'knowers' have yaqïn about. What, then, is the content of this yaqïn which Moses is said simply to be  31 confirming here? The answer is given by al-Qashanï in the following

way.22

The truth of the matter is that it is an impossibility to give a direct

answer to the question about the reality of God without any refer-

ence to any relation. Thus Moses, instead of answering directly to the

question asked concerning the mahïyah (of God), mentions the act

(of theophany). He thereby indicates that the Absolute is above ail

limitation and definition, and that it does not come under any genus

nor can it be distinguished by any specific difference because it

comprehends the whole in itself.

So (instead of trying to define the Absolute) Moses has recourse to an

explication of the reality of the Lordship (rubübïyah ). In this way 

(instead of explaining God) he is content with explaining what is

attributed to Him, namely with stating that He is the One to whom

belongs the Lordship of the world of the higher spirits, the world of

the lower abjects and ail the determinations, relations and attribu-

tions that lie between the two worlds. He states that God is the

Outward by his Lordship over ail and the Inward by his inmost nature

(huwïyah, lit.' He-ness') which resides in ail, because He is the very

essence of everything that is perceived in any form of experience.

Moses makes it clear that the definition of God is impossible except in

this way, that is, except by putting Him in relation to all without

limitation or to some (particular things). This latter case occurs when

he says (for example): '(He is) your Lord and the Lord of your

ancient ancestors'.

In contrast to the first answer which is of such a nature, the second

one is qualified by a different conditional clause: 'if you have

understanding', or more precisely 'if you know how to exercise your

reason' .23 This clause indicates that the second answer is addressed

to those who understand everything by Reason ('aql), those, in

other words, who 'bind and delimit' things24 in their understanding.

These people are those whom Ibn 'Arabï calls 'the people of

binding, limiting and restricting' (ahl 'aql wa-taqyïd wa-l)asr).

These are the people who grasp any truth only through arguments

created by their own reason, i.e., the faculty of setting formai

limitations.

-----

9] the only way to approach the Absolute is to look at it in its self-

revealing aspect. 

-----

The gist of both the first and the second answer consists in

identifying the object asked about (i.e., the Absolu te) with the very

essence of the world of Being. 

Moses, to put it in another way, tried to explain the Absolute in its self-revealing aspect, instead of making the futile effort to explain it in its absoluteness.

 Pharaoh who asked that question - apart from his bad intention - and Moses who

replied as he did, were right each in his own way. When Pharaoh asked him 'What is God?' Moses knew that what Pharaoh was asking for was not a 'definition' of God in the philosophical or logical sense. 

Therefore he did give the above-mentioned answers.

32

If he had thought that Pharaoh's intention was to ask for a definition, 

he would not have answered at all to the question,

but would have pointed out to Pharaoh the absurdity of such a question.25

All this has, 1 think, made it clear that for Ibn' Arabi 

the Absolute in its absoluteness is an 'absolute mystery' (ghayb mutlaq), and that the only way to approach the Absolute is to look at it in its self-

revealing aspect. 

Is it then possible for us to see the Absolute itself at least in this latter aspect? 

Will the Unknown-Unknowable transform itself into Something known and knowable? 

The answer, it would seem, must be in the affirmative. 

Since, according to a Tradition, 

the 'hidden treasure' unveils itself because it 'desires to be known', 

• self-manifestation must mean nothing other than 
• the Absolute becoming knowable and known.

But, on the other hand, the Absolute in this aspect is no longer the

Absolute in itself, for it is the Absolute in so far as it reveals itself. 

In Ibn 'Arabi' s world-view, the world of Being consists of 

• material objects (ajsam, sg. jism) and 
• non-material or spiritual beings (arwalJ, sg. rülJ). 

Both these categories are the forms of self-manifestation assumed by the Absolute. In this sense everything, whether material or spiritual, reveals and discloses the Absolute in its own way. 

However, there is a certain respect in which these things cover up the Absolute as thick impenetrable veils in such a way that the Absolute hides itself behind them and is invisible in itself. 

As a famous Tradition says: 

'God hides Himself behind seventy thousand veils of light and darkness.

If He took away these veils, the fulgurating lights of His face would at once destroy the sight of any creature who dared to look at it.'

In referring to this Tradition, Ibn 'Arabi makes the following remark: 26

Here God describes Himself (as being concealed) by veils of dark-
ness, which are the physical things, and by (veils) of light, which are
fine spiritual things, for the world consists of' coarse' things and 'fine'
things, so that the world in itself constitutes a veil over itself. Thus the
world does not see the Absolute as directly as it sees its own self. 27
The world, in this way, is forever covered by a veil which is never
removed. Besides (it is covered by) its knowledge (or consciousness)
that it is something different and distinct from its Creator by the fact
that it stands in need of the latter. 28 But (in spite of this inner need) it
cannot participate in the essential necessity which is peculiar to the
existence of the Absolute and can never attain it.
Thus the Absolute remains for this reason forever unknowable by an
intimate knowledge, because no contingent being has access to it
(i.e., the essential necessity of the Absolute).

---
33

Here again we come across the eternal paradox: the things of the
world, both material and non-material, are, on the one hand, so
many forms of the Divine self-manifestation, but on the other, they
act exactly as veils hindering a ( complete) self-manifestation of
God. They cover up God and do not allow man to see Him directly.
In this latter sense, the created world in relation to the absolute
Absolute is referred to in the Qoran by the pronoun 'they' (hum).
Hum is grammatically a 'pronoun of absence'. It is a word designat-
ing something which is not actually present. The creatures, in other
words, are not there in the presence of the Absolute. And this
'absence' precisely is the 'curtain'.

The recurring Qoranic phrase hum alladhïna kafarü 'they are
those who cover up' means, according to the interpretation of Ibn
'Arabi, nothing other than this situation of 'absence'. The verb
ka/ara in the Qoran stands in opposition to amana 'to believe in''
and signifies 'infidelity' or 'disbelief'. But etymologically the verb
means 'to cover up'. And for Ibn 'Arabi, who takes the word in this
etymological meaning, alladhïna kafarü does not mean 'those who
disbelieve (in God)' but 'those who cover and veil'. Thus it is an
expression referring to people who, by their 'absence', conceal the
Absolute behind the curtain of their own selves. 29
The whole world, in this view, turns out to be a 'veil' (IJ,ijab)
concealing the Absolute behind it. So those who attribute Being to
the world enclose the Absolute within the bounds of a number of
determinate forms and thereby place it beyond a thick veil. When,
for example, the Christians assert that 'God is Messiah, Son of
Mary' (V, 72), they confine the Absolute in an individual form and
lose sight of the absoluteness of the Absolute. This makes them
absent from the Absolute, and they veil it by the personal form of
Messiah. It is in the sense that such people are Kafirs, i.e., 'those
who cover up ( who disbelieve)' .30
----
10] the Divine self-manifestation (tajallï) as a mirror

-----
The same thing is also explained by 'Arabi in another interest-
ing way. The key-concept here is the Divine self-manifestation
(tajallï). And the key-symbol he usés is that of a mirror, which
incidentally, is one of his most favorite images.

The Absolute, 'in order that it be known', discloses itself in the
world. But it discloses itself strictly in accordance with the require-
ment of each individual thing, in the form appropriate to and
required by the nature of 'preparedness' (isti'dad) of each individual existent. There can absolutely be no other form of self-manifestation. And when the locus, i.e., the individual thing in which the Absolute discloses itself happens to be a human being endowed with consciousness, he sees by intuition the self-revealing

Absolute in himself. 34  

Yet, since it is after all the Absolute in a particular form determined by his own 'preparedness', what he sees in himself is nothing other than his own image or form ($ûrah) as mirrored in the Absolute. 

He never sees the Absolute itself. His Reason may tell him that his own image is visible there reflected in the Divine mirror, but, in spite of this consciousness based on reasoning, he cannot actually see the mirror itself; he sees only

himself. 

---

The Divine Essence (dhiit) discloses itself only in a form required by

the very 'preparedness' of the locus in which occurs the self-

manifestation. There can be no other way.

Thus the locus of the Divine self-manifestation does not see any-

thing, other than its own form as reflected in the mirror of the

Absolute. lt does not see the Absolute itself. Nor is it at all possible

for it to do so, although it is fully aware of the fact that it sees its own

form only in the Absolute.

This is similar to what happens to a man looking into a mirror in the

empirical world. When you are looking at forms or your own form in

a mirror you do not see the mirror itself, although you know well that

you see these forms or your own form only in the mirror.

---

Thus we are faced with a curious fact that the forms or images of

things in a mirror, precisely because they are visible, intervene

between our eyesight and the mirror and act as a veil concealing the

mirror from our eyes.

---

This symbol (of mirror) has been put forward by God as a particularly

appropriate one for His essential self-manifestation so that the per-

son who happens to be the locus of this Divine self-manifestation

might know what exactly is the thing he is seeing. Nor can there be a

symbol closer than this to (the relation between) contemplation (on

the part of man) and self-manifestation (on the part of God).

(If you have some doubt of this) try to see the body of the mirror

while looking at an image in it. You will not be able to do so, never!

So much so that some people who have experienced this with regard

to images reflected in the mirror maintain that the form seen in the

mirror stands between the eyesight of the person who is looking and

the mirror itself. This is the furthest limit which (an ordinary intel-

lect) can reach. 31

---

Thus the view that the image in the mirror behaves as a 'veil'

concealing the mirror itself is the highest knowledge attainable by

ordinary people; that is, by those who understand things through

their intellect. But Ibn' Arabï does not forget to suggest in the same

breath that for those who are above the common level of under-

standing there is a view which goes one step further than this. 

The deepest truth of the matter, he says, is represented by a view which

he already expounded in his al-Futûi}àt al-Makkiyah.  

35

-----

11] The 'deepest truth' -  the highest limit

-----

The 'deepest truth' here referred to is explained by al-Qàshàni as

follows: 32

---

That which is seen in the mirror of the Absolute is the form of the

man who is looking; it is not the form of the Absolute. To be sure, it is

no other than the very Essence of the Absolute that discloses itself to

his eye, but this self-manifestation is done in his (i.e., the man's)

form, not in its (i.e., the Essence's) form. 

However, the form seen in (the mirror of) His Essence is far from

constituting a veil between Him and the man who is looking. On the

contrary, it is the Essence at the level of Unity (ahadiyah) disclosing

itself to the man in his form. And shallow indeed is the view of those

who assert in connection with the (symbol of the) mirror that the

form (seen) works as a veil between it and the man who sees (the

form therein).

---  

And al-Qàshànï adds that 

a deep understanding of this nature is obtainable in the experience of immediate vision and 'unveiling'. 

This may be explained somewhat more theoretically and briefly in the following manner.

The image reflected in the mirror of the Absolute has two different aspects. 

• It is, in the first place, a self-manifestation of the Absolute in a particular form in accordance with the demand of the 'preparedness' of the locus. 
• But in the second place, it is the Form of the Divine self-manifestation, however much it may be particularized by the demand of the locus. 

The reflected image behaves as a concealing veil because the spiritual eye of an ordinary man is riveted to the first of these aspects. 

And as the second aspect looms in the consciousness of the man 

through the profound experience of 'unveiling' 

the reflected image ceases to be a veil, and

the man begins to see not only his own image but the Form of the Absolute assuming the form of his own.

This, Ibn 'Arabi asserts, is the highest limit beyond which the human mind is never allowed to go. 33

Once you have tasted this, you have tasted the utmost limit beyond

which there is no further stage as far as concerns the creatures. So do

not covet more than this. Do not make yourself weary by trying to go

up further than this stage, for there is no higher stage than this.

Beyond this there is sheer nothing.

We may remark that the 'highest limit' here spoken of is the stage

peculiar to the Perfect Man. 

Even for the Perfect Man

 there can be no spiritual stage realizable at which he is able to know the Absolute as it really is, i.e., in its absoluteness. 

Yet, such a man is in a position to intuit the Absolute as it reveals itself in himself and in all other things. This is the final answer given to the question: 

To what extent and in what form can man know the Absolute?  36 

And this will be the only and necessary conclusion to be reached

concerning the metaphysical capability of the Perfect Man if we are

to start from the basic assumption that Divine Essence (dhiit) and

Unity (al]adiyah) are completely identical with each other in indi-

cating one and the same thing, namely, the Absolute in its absolute-

ness as the highest metaphysical stage of Reality. 

There is, however, another theoretical possibility. 

If, following some of the outstanding philosophers of the school of Ibn' Arabi, we are to divide the highest level of Reality into two metaphysical strata and distinguish between them as 

(1) dhat, the absolute Absolute and 

(2) ahadiyah which, although it is still the same absolute Absolute, is a stage lower than dhat in the sense that it represents the Absolute as it is turning toward self-manifestation

 

- then, we should say that the Perfect Man in his ecstatic experience is capable of knowing the Absolute qua Absolute just before it reveals itself in eidetic and

sensible forms, that is, the Absolute at the stage of ahadiyah, though

to be sure the Absolute at the stage of dhat still remains unknown

and unknowable.

====

Notes

1. FWi ., p. 238/188. We may remark in this connection that in another passage (p.188) Ibn' Arabî uses the same phrase,ankaral-nakiriit, in reference to the wordshay' 'thing'. He means thereby that the concept of 'thing' is so indeterminate that it is comprehensive of anything whatsoever.

2. FWi ., p. 95/91.

3. ibid.

4. Here and elsewhere in this book in the conceptual analysis of the Absolute at the stage of absoluteness 1 follow the tradition of those who completely identify the metaphysical stage of dhiit with that of ahadiyah, like Qâshânî and It is to be

remarked that there are others (like Jili) who distinguish betweendhât anda/:iadiyah.

For them, dhât is the absolute Absolu te whilea/:iadiyah is the next metaphysical stage at which the Absolute discloses itself as the ultimate source of tajalli.

5. Fu$., Corn., p. 3.

6. The printed text is here obviously defective. 1 read: bal huwa bi-i'tibâr al-haqiqah ['aynu-hu, wa-ghayru-hu] bi-i'tibâr al-ta'ayyun.

7. because there cannot be a wider concept that would comprehend within itself

both Being and non-Being.

8. K.S., H.S. Nyberg, ed., Leiden, 1919, p. 15 et. sqq.

9. ibid.

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10. Miihiyah from Ma hiya? meaning 'what is it?' corresponding to the Greek

expression to ti ën einai.

11. FWi., p. 259/207-208.

12. p. 259.

13. Fu$., pp. 259-260/208.

14. lt is to be noted that in Islamic philosophy in general the mâhïyah 'what-is-it-

ness' is of two kinds: ( 1) mâhïyah 'in the particular sense' and (2) mâhiyah 'in a

general sense'. The former means 'quiddity' to be designated by the definition, while the latter means ontological 'reality', that which makes a thing what it is.

15. p. 260.

16. i.e., the act of 'Lordship' which in the philosophy of Ibn' Arabï means the act of

self-manifestation in the concrete phenomena of the world.

17. i.e., replaced the definition of God by the mentioning of the relation of Godto

His phenomenal forms.

18. FWf., pp. 260/208.

19. FWi ., p. 260/208-209. Concerning 'what lies between the East and West',

however, Ibn' Arabï in this passage simply says that it is intended to mean that God is Omniscient (bi kull shay' 'alim).

20. in kuntum müqinin, the Jast word being a derivative of the same root YQN from which is derived the word yaqin. Yaqin means a firm conviction in its final form.

21. ah/ al-kashf wa-al-wujüd. The word wujüd here does not mean 'existence', but a particular stage in myscal experience which follows that of wajd. In wajd, the mystic is in the spiritual state of 'self-annihilation' (fanâ' ), a state in which he has lost his individual consciousness of the self, while in wujüd he is in the state of 'subsistence' (baqâ') in the Absolute. Only in this latter state does the mystic 'finds' ( wajada) God in the true sense, cf. Affifi, FWi., Corn., p. 310.

22. p. 260.

23. in kuntum ta'qilün; the last word cornes from the root from which is derived the word 'aql 'reason'.

24. The verb 'aqala meaning 'to understand by reason or intellect' etymologically

낙타의 접힌 다리를 넓적다리에 묶는 것을 의미합니다.

25. FWf., p. 260/208-209.

26. FWf., p. 22/54-55.

27. 즉, 우리가 절대자를 볼 수 있는 유일한 방법은

그러나 다른 밴드에서는 우리가 실제로 그리고 직접적으로 보는 것은 사물이기 때문입니다.

'사물'은 우리의 시선과 절대자 사이에 끼어든다. 따라서 우리는 간접적으로 절대자를 보지만 직접적으로는 절대자를 직접적으로 보는 것을 방해하는 것만을 봅니다.

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28. 우리는 매 순간 우리의 존재를 위해 창조주가 필요함을 느낍니다.

바로 이 느낌이 우리 안에 분리 또는 구분의 의식을 만들어 냅니다.

우리와 절대자 사이.

29. Fu:f., p. 188/148-149.

30. 참조. Qashani, p. 189.

31. Fu:f., p. 33/61-62.

32. p. 33.

33. FWi., p. 33/62.