2021/05/17

『입보리행론』(Bodhicaryāvatāra) A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life,

『입보리행론』(Bodhicaryāvatāra)에 사용된 산스끄리뜨 운율 연구

『입보리행론』(Bodhicaryāvatāra)에 사용된 산스끄리뜨 운율 연구
A Study of Sanskrit Meters in Bodhicaryāvatāra

인도철학

약어 : KJIP

2019, vol., no.56, pp. 71-113 (43 pages)

DOI : 10.32761/kjip.2019..56.003

발행기관 : 인도철학회
연구분야 :
인문학 >
불교학
남승호 /Seungho Nam 1

1동국대학교

초록

샨띠데바가 지은 『입보리행론』은 8세기에 인도에서 저술된 이후 인도뿐 아니라 티벳, 중국 등 대승불교권에 걸쳐 널리 전파되어 유행하였고, 오늘날에도 서구와 유럽의 많은 언어로 번역된 후 보급 되어 연구되고 있다. 그 이유는 이 책이 대승불교 철학의 핵심을 담은 입문서로서의 역할을 충실히 수행하였기 때문이다. 또한 게송을 지을 때 쓰인 산스끄리뜨 운율이 텍스트의 메시지를 담는 그릇으로서의 역할을 수행하면서 샨띠데바의 진리에 대한 철학적 통찰과 진리에 이르는 실천 수행법을 전달하는 매개체의 역할을 훌륭히 수행하고 있기 때문이다. 산스끄리뜨 운율이 주는 리듬감과 간결성은 어려운 경전들을 외워나가고 그 의미를 음미하고 이해해 나가는 데에 아주 효과적인 장치가 된다. 또한 간결하기 때문에 반복적으로 소리를 내어 암기하기에도 아주 좋다. 기록 문자가 발달하지 않았던 시대에 운율학의 발전 또한 필연적이었고, 이것을 배움으로 해서 학생들은 텍스트의 철학적인 면 외에 운율을 적용해 나가는 수학적인 면과 또한 운율의 리듬이 불러일으키는 정서적인 면도 동시에 접할 수 있게 되는 것이다. 운율의 지식은 필사본의 교정본을 만들 경우, 글자가 지워져서 잘 보이지 않거나, 또는 여러가지 판본들 중에서 다른 글자가 있을 때, 적합한 글자를 결정할 때도 유용하게 사용할 수 있다.

Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śantideva is dated around 8 C.E. and since then it has been a very popular Mahāyāna text both in the country of origin ― India and in distant China. Once it reached Tibet it came to be accepted as a standard text deliberating on the basic tenets of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Over the years it remains a much-acclaimed work that promulgates Mahāyāna principles in a mellifluous and poetic style. A lot of research has been done on the text especially in Europe and in America. Another reason for its enduring popularity is the author’s skillful use of diverse meters in Sanskrit. Perhaps he adopted this ornamental style to grip the attention initially of the listener and later the reader and make their first interaction with the text an unforgettable experience. The varied meters only enhance the sublime content of the book and not detract it. In the hands of this master craftsman the meters become an effective means to help the followers, monks and lay people of the mundane world, to emotionally connect with the profound truth of Bodhicitta and the 6 Paramitas. Virtues which one need to practice to attain the level of perfect Buddhahood for the sake of suffering sentient beings. In my article, the area of focus is the Chanda or Sanskrit prosody used by Śantideva. In India, to study the Vedas one must study the 6 limbs of the Vedas called the 6 vedāṅgas as they help one to accurately understand the holy texts. One of the 6 vedāṅgas is Meter or Prosody(Chandas). Buddhist scholars, following the Sanskrit tradition also used meters(Chandas) in their works which enhanced the musical and aesthetic appeal of their compositions. I shall discuss the kinds of Meters used by Śāntideva in his text Bodhicaryāvatāra. My purpose is to establish how Sanskrit prosody or meter assisted in the oral transmission of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. To show how the Chandas add to the efficacy in transmission of the Buddhist knowledge. It will also be my attempt to show how knowledge of meter can be useful in determining the correct meaning of the words in a text when one is working with various manuscripts (pertaining to a particular text) in order to compose a critical edition of the text.

키워드

샨띠데바,
불교 텍스트,
구전 전통,
운율의 종류,
대승불교 입문서

Śāntideva, Buddhist Text, Types of Meters, Oral transmission

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入菩提行論 (A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of ...

샨티데바의 책

설명

영어에서 번역됨-Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra 또는 Bodhicaryāvatāra는 때때로 Bodhisattva의 삶의 방식에 대한 가이드로 영어로 번역되며, c. 위키백과(영어)

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Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra or Bodhicaryāvatāra (Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའི་སྤྱོད་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa; JNP. 入菩薩行論 [1]), sometimes translated into English as A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, is a Mahāyāna Buddhist text written c. 700 AD in Sanskrit verse by Shantideva (Śāntideva), a Buddhist monk at Nālandā Monastic University in India which is also where it was composed.[1]

Contents
1Structure
2Chapter summary
3Exegetical discourse and commentary
4Commentaries and studies in English
5References
6External links

Structure[edit]

It has ten chapters dedicated to the development of bodhicitta (the mind of enlightenment) through the practice of the six perfections (Skt. Pāramitās). The text begins with a chapter describing the benefits of the wish to reach enlightenment.[2] The sixth chapter, on the perfection of patient endurance (Skt. kṣānti), strongly criticizes anger and has been the subject of recent commentaries by Robert Thurman [3] and the fourteenth Dalai Lama.[4] Tibetan scholars consider the ninth chapter, "Wisdom", to be one of the most succinct expositions of the Madhyamaka view.[5] The tenth chapter is used as one of the most popular Mahāyāna prayers.[citation needed]

Chapter summary[edit]

The benefits of bodhicitta (the wish to reach full enlightenment for others)
Purifying bad deeds
Adopting the spirit of enlightenment
Using conscientiousness
Guarding awareness
The practice of patience
The practice of joyous effort
The practice of meditative concentration
The perfection of wisdom
Dedication

Exegetical discourse and commentary[edit]

Many Tibetan scholars, such as Jamgön Ju Mipham Gyatso, have written commentaries on this text.

Commentaries and studies in English[edit]

Brassard, Francis (2000), The Concept of Bodhicitta in Santideva's Bodhicaryavatara, History of religions, State University of New York (SUNY) Press, ISBN 0-7914-4575-5
Dalai Lama, XIV; Padmakara Translation Group (1994), A Flash Lightning in the Dark of Night: Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (1st ed.), Shambhala, ISBN 0-87773-971-4
Dalai Lama, XIV; Geshe Thupten Jinpa (trans & ed) (2004), Practicing Wisdom: The Perfection of Shantideva's Bodhisattva Way, Wisdom Publications,U.S, ISBN 0-86171-182-3
Pema Chödrön (2005), No Time to Lose: A Timely Guide to the Way of the Bodhisattva, commentary on Shantideva's Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, Boston: Shambhala, ISBN 1-59030-135-8
Geshe Yeshe Topden (2005), The Way of Awakening: A Commentary on Shantideva's Bodhicharyavatara, Wisdom Publications,U.S, ISBN 0-86171-494-6
Gyatso, Kelsang (1980), Meaningful to Behold: View, meditation and action in Mahayana Buddhism : an oral commentary to Shantideva's A guide to the Bodhisattva's way of life, Wisdom Publications, ISBN 0-86171-003-7
Khenchen Kunzang Pelden; Padmakara Translation Group (2008), The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech: A Detailed Commentary on Shantideva's Way of the Bodhisattva, Shambhala, ISBN 1-59030-439-X
Khenchen Kunzang Pelden; Minyak Kunzang Sonam; Padmakara Translation Group, Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries on the Ninth Chapter of Shantideva's Bodhicharyravatara
Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche; Holmes, Ken (trans); Doctor, Thomas (trans) (2001), A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life of Shantideva, Kathmandu: Namo Buddha Seminar, ASIN: B000UO76C6
Schmidt-Leukel, Perry (2019), Buddha Mind - Christ Mind. A Christian Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra. With a new translation by Ernst Steinkellner and Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, Christian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts, Peeters, ISBN 978-90-429-3848-9
Williams, Paul (1997), Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryavatara, Routledge Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism, Routledge Curzon, ISBN 0-7007-1031-0
Williams, Paul (1997), The Reflexive Nature of Awareness (Rang Rig): Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence, Routledge Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism (1st ed.), Routledge Curzon, ISBN 0-7007-1030-2

References[edit]

^ Śāntideva (1998). Translator’s Note: The Bodhicaryāvatāra. Oxford University Press. p. xxviii. ISBN 978-0-19-283720-2.
^ Pema Chödrön (2005), No Time to Lose: A Timely Guide to the Way of the Bodhisattva, commentary on Shantideva's Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, Boston: Shambhala, p. xiii, ISBN 1-59030-135-8
^ F., Thurman, Robert A. (2005). Anger : the seven deadly sins. New York, N.Y.: New York Public Library. ISBN 0195169751. OCLC 55518464.
^ 1935-, Bstan-ʼdzin-rgya-mtsho, Dalai Lama XIV (1997). Healing anger : the power of patience from a Buddhist perspective. Thupten Jinpa., Śāntideva, active 7th century. (1st ed.). Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications. ISBN 1559390735. OCLC 36138376.
^ Pema Chödrön (2005), No Time to Lose: A Timely Guide to the Way of the Bodhisattva, commentary on Shantideva's Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, Boston: Shambhala, p. xv-xvi, ISBN 1-59030-135-8

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External links[edit]

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https://iep.utm.edu/santideva/

Śāntideva (fl. 8th c.)

Śāntideva (literally “god of peace”) was the name given to an Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher-monk, known as the author of two texts, the Bodhicaryāvatāra and the Śikṣāsamuccaya. These works both express the ideal of the bodhisattva — the ideal person of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The term Mahāyāna, literally “Great Vehicle,” came into use to mean the idea of attempting to become a bodhisattva (and eventually a buddha) oneself, rather than merely following the teachings set out by Siddhārtha Gautama (considered the original Buddha). This was the earliest usage of the term mahāyāna in Sanskrit, although even by Śāntideva’s time, understandings of what becoming a bodhisattva involved had undergone many changes; the Mahāyāna had come to be understood as a separate school rather than as a vocation (see Nattier 2003; Harrison 1987).

Both of Śāntideva’s texts explore the bodhisattva ideal as an ethical one, in that they prescribe how a person should properly live, and provide reasons for living in that way. Śāntideva’s close attention to ethics makes him relatively unusual among Indian philosophers, for whom metaphysics (or theoretical philosophy more generally) was more typically the primary concern. Śāntideva’s ethical thought is widely known, cited and loved among Tibetan Buddhists, and is increasingly coming to the attention of Western thinkers. Śāntideva’s metaphysics is of interest primarily because of its close connection to his ethics.

1. History and Works

a. Writings

The name “Śāntideva” is associated above all with two extant texts: the Bodhicaryāvatāra (hereafter BCA) and the Śikṣāsamuccaya (hereafter ŚS). The Bodhicaryāvatāra (often rendered “Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life”), in its most widely known form, is a work of just over 900 verses. Tibetan legends suggest that the text was originally recited orally (see de Jong 1975), as do the text’s own literary features. Although it has been translated into Tibetan multiple times and is revered throughout Tibetan Buddhist tradition, it was originally composed and redacted in Sanskrit. Its Sanskrit is relatively close to Pānini’s official standards of grammar, with a Buddhist vocabulary. Its ten chapters lead their reader through the path to becoming a bodhisattva — which is to say a future Buddha, and therefore a being on the way to perfection, according to Mahāyāna tradition.

The Śikṣāsamuccaya (“Training Anthology”) is a longer prose work in nineteen chapters. The ŚS is organized as a commentary on twenty-seven short mnemonic verses known as the Śikṣāsamuccaya Kārikā (hereafter ŚSK). It consists primarily of quotations (of varying length) from sūtras, authoritative texts considered to be the word of the Buddha — generally those sūtras associated with Mahāyāna tradition. Most scholars have taken the ŚS to be composed almost entirely of such quotations. However, Paul Harrison (2007) has recently claimed that a substantial portion of it is original to the redactor.

Like the BCA, the ŚS was originally composed in Sanskrit, as were the sūtras it quotes. However, while Śāntideva’s own portions are in relatively standard Sanskrit, the quotations are mostly in the heavily vernacularized language usually known as Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. It is considerably less accessible to a novice reader than the BCA, and its organization can be bewildering. Richard Mahoney (2002) has recently provided a clear account of the text’s structure, which will be discussed later in this article.

Who were these texts written for? One can infer from the texts that they are intended for an audience of men whose sexual desires are directed toward women, as the auditor’s sexual cravings are always discussed in those terms. Therefore, the use of masculine forms to refer to the implied audience is unproblematic. This auditor also understands Sanskrit, and lives in or after the seventh century CE. His knowledge of Sanskrit implies, at the least, that he is well educated, and therefore well versed in the ideas of classical Sanskritic culture. And he is not necessarily on the bodhisattva path when he begins reading or hearing the texts, but is motivated to enter that path by studying them.

The texts’ implied audience includes monks, and may also include householders (nonmonks). While monks are a significant component of the text’s implied audience (Onishi 2003), and are in some respects the ideal audience, they are not necessarily the only such audience. The principles of conduct put forth in the BCA’s fifth chapter resemble those of vinaya monastic codes, and indeed some of them have been taken directly from the prātimokṣa monastic rule books (Crosby and Skilton 1995, 32), but few of them would be impossible or absurd for a householder to follow. In the ŚS, too, Śāntideva certainly considers monasticism better and more praiseworthy than the householder life, but part of his task is to convince householding readers to pursue the monastic life. He claims that “in every birth the great bodhisattva goes forth [as a monk] . . . from the household life” (ŚS 14). But this is a process renewed in every lifetime, beginning with the household life; and Śāntideva does refer on multiple occasions to householding bodhisattvas (for example at ŚS 120 and 267). This text, then, is addressed in part to householders.

b. Life

Tibetan hagiographic histories (Bu ston, Tāranātha, Ye shes dPal ‘byor and Sum pa mKhan po) provide the most detailed accounts of Śāntideva’s life, although most contemporary historians doubt their veracity. In brief, they tell of a prince from Saurāstra (in contemporary Gujarat) who joined the great monastic university of Nālandā. His fellow monks, unaware of his wisdom, saw only a lazy man unworthy of their company. To prove his presumed lack of knowledge, they asked him to recite a Buddhist sūtra text. Śāntideva, undaunted, asked whether they would like to hear something old or something new. Asked for something new, he proceeded to recite the BCA. When he reached verse IX.34 — “When neither an entity nor a nonentity remain before thought, then thought, with no object, is pacified because it has no other destination” — he rose into the air and his body disappeared. The remainder of the text was recited by a disembodied voice. The written text of the ŚS, the voice told the audience, could be found in Śāntideva’s room, along with a text called the Sūtrasamuccaya (Pezzali 1968, 4-20). There is some debate among scholars as to the nature of the latter work, but all agree that the title does not refer to any additional surviving work of Śāntideva’s, and that the BCA and ŚS constitute his extant corpus (see Lele 2007, 17n8).

Beyond the hagiographies, most of what we know of Śāntideva comes from the ideas found in extant recensions of his texts. This article treats Śāntideva’s works together, as the works of a single author, as Indian and Tibetan Buddhist tradition has always done; similarly, it refers to the ideas found in the canonical Sanskrit recensions of the texts, not to the Tibetan or to the BCA recension found at Dunhuang. Since the article’s approach is to examine the ideas of this author, Śāntideva, it spends relatively little time on the structure of each of his two texts as separate units. For an overview of the relevant textual issues and a defense of this article’s approach to the texts, see Lele 2007, 9-31. More specifically, for a discussion of the Dunhuang recension, see Saito 1993. For discussions of the structure of the BCA, see Crosby and Skilton 1995; Saito 1993. For discussions of the structure of the ŚS, see Clayton 2006; Griffiths 1999, 133-43; Hedinger 1984; Mahoney 2002; Mrozik 2007. On both, see Pezzali 1968.

It is difficult to learn much about the texts’ historical composer, or their redactor, beyond what is found in the texts themselves. As noted, Tibetan historians recount the life story of a Śāntideva identified as the texts’ author, but it is difficult to sort fact from legend with so little corroborating evidence. There seems little reason to doubt that someone by the name of Śāntideva wrote some portion of the two texts, or that he was a monk at Nālandā. (The Tibetan historians agree on this last point, and based on what we know of Indian Buddhist history it seems a likely place for historically significant Buddhist works to have been composed.) Paul Griffiths (1999, 114-24) uses the accounts of Chinese and Tibetan visitors to reconstruct a detailed account of what life and literary culture at Nālandā might have looked like.

Beyond these points, we can say relatively little beyond the approximate date of the texts’ composition. The Tibetan translator Ye shes sde, who rendered the BCA into Tibetan, worked under the king Khri lde srong brtsan (816-838 CE), so it must have been composed before that time (Bendall 1970, v). Since the Chinese pilgrim Yijing (or I-tsing) mentions all the major Indian Mahāyāna thinkers known in India but does not mention Śāntideva, it is likely that these texts were composed, or at least became famous, after Yijing left India in 685 CE (Pezzali 1968, 38). We may therefore assign Śāntideva an approximate date of sometime in the eighth century.

c. Reception and Influence

As historical evidence on India is difficult to come by, it is relatively difficult to ascertain Śāntideva’s influence in the later Indian Buddhist philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, a significant number of later Indian texts do refer to the BCA and ŚS (Bendall 1970, viii-x), so Śāntideva’s work must have been relatively important there.

It is far easier to speak of Śāntideva’s influence in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhists revere Śāntideva and his work, especially the BCA. All the major Tibetan texts on the stages of the bodhisattva path, such as those of Tsong kha pa and sGam po pa, quote it at length (Sweet 1977, 4-5); it is a key source for the entire Tibetan literary genre of blo sbyong or lojong (“mental purification”) (Sweet 1996, 245). The present Dalai Lama cites it as the highest inspiration for his ideals and practices (Williams 1995, ix). Tibetan commentators have written many commentaries on the text over the years, several of which are now available in English translation (e.g. Gyatso 1986; Rinpoche 2002; Tobden 2005). While the ŚS was less influential overall, the tradition has not ignored it. In 1998 the present Dalai Lama gave public teachings on the ŚS, referring to it as a “key which can unlock all the teachings of the Buddha” (quoted in Clayton 2006, 2). Śāntideva’s work has played a significant role in other cultures influenced by Tibetan Buddhism, such as Mongolia (see, for example, de Rachewiltz 1996; Kanaoka 1963). A less influential translation of the BCA was also made into Chinese (Bendall 1970, xxix-xxx).

The BCA has also been widely translated, studied, and admired in the West. (See Onishi 2003 for a thesis-length discussion of the text’s Western reception.) Luís Gómez (1999, 262-3) even suggests that it is now the third most frequently translated text in all of Indian Buddhism, after the Dhammapāda and the Heart Sūtra. A recent introductory text (Cooper 1998) also treats the BCA as one of “the classic readings” in ethics, alongside such works as Plato’s Gorgias and Mill’s Utilitarianism. The BCA is an appropriate choice for a reading in Buddhist ethics, for relatively few Buddhist texts make explicit ethical arguments. This situation even leads one scholar (Keown 2005, 50) to proclaim that Buddhism “does not have normative ethics,” though he does not appear to have taken Śāntideva’s work into account in making this claim (see Lele 2007, 48-52).

2. The Progress of the Bodhisattva

The central concern of both of Śāntideva’s texts is the bodhisattva, literally “awakening-being.” A bodhisattva is a being aiming to become a buddha (literally “awakened one”); the process of the final transformation into a buddha is called bodhi, “awakening,” sometimes referred to as “enlightenment.” The title Bodhicaryâvatāra, “introduction to conduct for awakening,” is usually taken to be short for Bodhisattvacaryâvatāra — “introduction to the conduct of a bodhisattva,” or “A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life,” as one major translation (Wallace and Wallace 1997) has it. “Introduction to the conduct of a bodhisattva” is an appropriate description of the contents of the text, although “introduction to conduct for awakening” would be equally appropriate. Śāntideva also introduces the Śikṣāsamuccaya by claiming he will explain the sugatâtmajasamvārâvatāra, a similar phrase meaning “introduction to the requirements for the sons of the Sugatas” (ŚS 1). (Throughout Buddhist literature sugata, literally “gone well,” is a common term for buddhas, and Mahāyāna literature regularly refers to bodhisattvas as the buddhas’ sons.) The term “bodhisattva” occurs at least seven times in the nineteen chapters of the ŚS. This section examines the bodhisattva’s progress from being an ordinary person through to being a buddha, as this progress is discussed in Śāntideva’s texts.

To describe those who are neither bodhisattvas nor buddhas, Śāntideva most frequently uses the term “ordinary person,” prithagjana. He refers at one point to “all buddhas, bodhisattvas, solitary buddhas, noble searchers and ordinary people” (ŚS 9) — suggesting that ordinary people are the residual category of all those who do not fall into the previous categories. It is standard in Mahāyāna texts to refer to three “vehicles” (yāna) or paths, with the vehicles of the searcher (śrāvaka) and solitary buddha (pratyekabuddha) being distinguished from the Great Vehicle (mahāyāna) of the bodhisattva. It is quite rare, however, for Śāntideva to refer to searchers and solitary buddhas, and even buddhas appear relatively infrequently, so in practice the most important distinction in his texts is between bodhisattvas and ordinary people.

Śāntideva’s view of ordinary people is not flattering. The term “ordinary person” frequently occurs in his work alongside the term “fool” (bāla) — sometimes with the latter as a modifier (“foolish ordinary person,” bālaprithagjana, as at ŚS 61) and sometimes with the two terms used synonymously and interchangeably, as at ŚS 194. Ordinary people’s foolishness traps them in suffering; the way for them to escape from suffering is to enter the bodhisattva path and become a bodhisattva.

To become a bodhisattva, one must possess the awakening mind (bodhicitta). This mental transformation brings one out of the status of ordinary person and points one toward awakening. Śāntideva makes an important distinction between two kinds of the awakening mind: the mind resolved on awakening (bodhipraṇidhicitta) and the mind proceeding to awakening (bodhiprasthānacitta). The first, he tells us, can be reached quickly; it exists when the thought “I must become a buddha” arises as a vow (ŚS 8). He is not as explicit about the nature of the second, but in describing the first he notes that “the awakening mind is productive even without conduct” (ŚS 9), suggesting that conduct (caryā, bodhicaryā) may be what makes the difference between the mind resolved on awakening and the mind proceeding to awakening. (Brassard 2000 is a book-length study of the awakening mind and the BCA.)

It would appear, however, that possession of the mind resolved on awakening is sufficient to make its possessor into a bodhisattva. The BCA, recall, suggests that it is intended to be ritually recited. Its reader develops the awakening mind while reciting the third chapter sincerely — saying “Therefore I will produce the awakening mind for the welfare of the world” (BCA III.23). Two verses later, the reciter, apparently not having done anything else in the intervening time, declares: “Today I have been born into the family of the buddhas; now I am a child of the buddhas,” which is to say a bodhisattva(BCA III.25).

This is not, of course, the end of the story. Such a beginning bodhisattva has just started on the path; he has a long task ahead of him. Śāntideva does not spell out the different levels of attainment that a bodhisattva may reach, but he suggests that he agrees with the account of ten stages (bhūmi) of a bodhisattva’s achievement, as set out in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra and followed in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakâvatāra (see Sprung 1979 for a partial translation of, and commentary on, this latter text). The ŚS quotes the Daśabhūmika six times. In this context, Śāntideva distinguishes between “one who has entered a stage” (bhūmipraviṣṭa) and a beginning (ādikarmika) bodhisattva (ŚS 11), suggesting that beginning bodhisattvas have not even entered the first of the ten stages.

Notice, however, that the BCA’s reciter does not become a bodhisattva, even a beginning one, until taking the vow in the third chapter. So Śāntideva’s audience, it would seem, is not limited to bodhisattvas — a point strengthened by the profuse praises of the awakening mind in the opening chapters of both texts. The reader who starts the text might not have generated the awakening mind, hence not have started trying to become a bodhisattva, and needs to be convinced of the importance of doing so.

The eighteenth chapter of the ŚS gives some account of the end of the path. It gives a fantastical description of the buddhas — their great beauty, virtue and power (ŚS 318-22). Shortly afterwards, it also describes the qualities of bodhisattvas in similar terms and at greater length. It is difficult to imagine how a reader who had just become a bodhisattva, taking the vow, could see himself as described by these qualities — spontaneously emitting perfumes and garlands and pearls from his body, for example (ŚS 327) — so this is likely the culmination of a long period of effort, in the last stages of which one becomes a fully realized bodhisattva. The distinctions between buddhas and fully realized bodhisattvas are not clearly spelled out; one suspects that being one of these advanced bodhisattvas is almost as good as being an actual buddha.

3. Excellence in Means

To interpret Śāntideva’s ethics in the BCA and ŚS, it is important to turn to the concept of excellence in means (upāyakauśalya). This common Mahāyāna concept is best known as a way of explaining the existence of other Buddhist traditions, as in texts like the Lotus Sūtra: the Buddha preached mainstream Buddhism as a clever way to reach people who were not ready to receive the superior teaching of the Mahāyāna. (See Pye 1978 for a book-length discussion.)

The term has a number of different senses in Buddhist tradition (see Harvey 2000, 134-40). Some Mahāyāna texts treat excellence in means as the seventh of ten perfections or virtues (pāramitā); Śāntideva does not do this, as he adheres to the conception that there are only six perfections (on which see below). For him, there are two senses in which the idea is important. The first is hermeneutical: different teachings are intended for people at different levels of ability, with the idea of ultimate truth at the very highest level (see BCA IX.2-8). For this reason the BCA is usually understood as a progressive text, leading its audience through progressively deeper levels of practice and understanding (e.g. see Crosby and Skilton 1995, 83-6). Śāntideva does not specifically use the term “excellence in means” to refer to this idea, although it is a common name for the idea in other Mahāyāna texts (Harvey 2000, 134). The second sense of the term is ethical; the idea most frequently comes up when he quotes the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra, a text which claims that bodhisattvas may break standard precepts or rules out of compassion. (The sūtra exists in Chinese and has been translated into English twice: Chang 1991, 427-68, and Tatz 1994.)

This second sense of excellence in means takes on considerable importance in contemporary discussions of Śāntideva’s ethics (e.g. Clayton 2006, 102-9) because it is under this rubric that Śāntideva comes closest to addressing the “hard cases” so beloved of contemporary moral philosophy, such as situations when one seems called on to kill in order to prevent a greater evil. While discussing excellence in means, he explains that behaviors normally forbidden, including sexual activity, can be permitted out of compassion. So too, it is to explain the importance of excellence in means that Śāntideva notes that one is permitted to kill someone about to commit a grave wrong. The idea is important to this article for similar reasons, in that it seems to be a key principle involved in what we might call Śāntideva’s casuistry — his examination of particular cases where different pieces of advice seem to collide.

For Śāntideva, a key component of excellence in means is that it is an excellence — a skill and a virtue which allows one to respond appropriately to difficult situations, if not a virtue on the official list of six perfections. There is no one formula or principle for action that Śāntideva sets out in advance (along the lines of “act to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number” or “act only according to that maxim you can also will to be a universal law”). As we will shortly see, there are definite elements of consequentialist reasoning in Śāntideva, but more often the bodhisattva is called on to exercise judgment, once his character is already well developed: When Śāntideva says that “even the forbidden is permitted,” it is specifically “for a compassionate one who has sight of the purpose” (BCA V.84); that is, it depends on the agent’s ability to exercise discretion in the name of compassion.

This level of discretion is evinced in the numerous places in Śāntideva’s work where difficult cases are considered. When he approves of the killing of someone about to commit a grave wrong, he says only that there is “permission” (anujñāna), not that it must be done. Similarly, in the case of alcoholics, alcohol may be given; Śāntideva uses the gerundive form deya (ŚS 271), and the gerundive in -ya does not have the imperative force of the gerundive in -tavya.

Śāntideva explicitly refers to consequences in the case of giving a weapon: one may do so after the “consideration of good or bad consequences” (ŚS 271). This is still a consideration or reflection rather than a maximizing or weighing; “consideration,” vicāra, is literally “moving around (in the mind).” A weighing of some sort comes across in introducing the possibility that one might have sex out of compassion: “even then, if one should see a greater benefit (artha) to beings, one may discard the training” (ŚS 167). Some sort of consequentialist maximizing appears to be at work here. Clayton (2006, 107) suggests that such concern for consequences means that these “examples of upāya become problematic from the perspective of a virtue ethic.” However, for Śāntideva, any true “benefit” to other beings will ultimately be an increase in their virtue. Goodman (2008) argues strongly for a consequentialist interpretation of Śāntideva’s ethics, but on the understanding that it is a “perfectionist consequentialism,” in which the consequences to be maximized consist of virtue in oneself and others.

4. Good and Bad Karma

The terms “good karma” and “bad karma,” respectively, translate the Sanskrit terms puṇya and pāpa. These terms appear very frequently in Śāntideva’s work — often as justifications for acting and feeling in a certain way. They refer to a kind of ethical causality: the process by which ethically good and bad actions (respectively) have positive and negative results. These results most characteristically, but not exclusively, include better and worse rebirths. The Sanskrit terms parallel the English usage of “good and bad karma,” thought of as the way in which one’s good or bad actions come back to affect one positively or negatively in the future. This usage corresponds exactly to the meaning of the Buddhist terms puṇya and pāpa, even though those terms do not themselves involve the Sanskrit word karma or karman (which simply means “action”). There is, at any rate, no disputing the close connection between Sanskrit karma, on the one hand, and puṇya and pāpa on the other; the latter are typically referred to in Sanskrit as karmaphala, the fruits of action.

The concepts of good and bad karma are central to Śāntideva’s thought. The ŚS is typically thought to be structured around the idea, presented inŚSK 4, that one should “protect, purify and enhance” one’s person, one’s possessions and one’s good karma, though one should also be prepared to give all of these things away (Bendall 1970, xi). ŚS 356 connects each of these verbs to good and bad karma: to “protect” something is to prevent new karmically bad mental states (dharmas) related to it; to “purify” it is to reduce the existing karmically bad states related to it; and to “enhance” it is to increase the karmically good states related to it. (Mahoney 2002, 32-9 identifies the significance of these verbs with respect to the traditional Buddhist samyakprahānas or “right strivings”.) In a certain sense, one might see the ŚS as being all about good and bad karma — a sense strengthened by the long discussions of bad karma in ŚS III, IV and VIII, and of the good karma deriving from worship in ŚS XVII. In the BCA, too, the final chapter — the highest and most important, if one adheres strictly to a progressive understanding of the text — deals with the redirection (pariṇāmanā) of good karma. Dayal (1970, 189-90) goes so far as to say that Śāntideva substituted karmic redirection for metaphysical insight as the ultimate goal of the bodhisattva path. Clayton (2006, 83) and Lele (2007, 96-7) argue that Dayal’s claim is overstated, but neither dispute that good and bad karma are vitally important to Śāntideva’s work. Clayton (2006, 67) identifies three terms closely related to good karma (kuśala, śīla and puṇya) as the most central ethical concepts in the ŚS, and even as “probably the most important ethical concepts in Indian Buddhism” more generally.

The redirection of good karma (often called “transference of merit”) is a central part of Śāntideva’s understanding of karma’s workings. He urges his readers to redirect any good karma that they acquire, so that it does not merely result in a worldly form of well-being, such as a more prosperous rebirth for oneself. This redirection can sometimes be to ensure that the good karma brings one closer to awakening instead of worldly rebirths (bodhipariṇāmanā, ŚS 158); see Kajiyama 1989 for a discussion of this first form, which is often neglected in studies of karmic redirection. More frequently, though, it means the giving up of one’s good karma to others (puṇyotsarga). This is a common idea in Buddhist texts. Buddhist stories often emphasize the supernatural nature of karmic redirection. Especially, they commonly claim or imply that ghosts (pretas or petas) are incapable of receiving physical gifts. If one wishes to give them something, it must be one’s good karma(Kajiyama 1989, 7-8).

In contemporary philosophical terms, Śāntideva’s idea of karma suggests, though not conclusively, an internal connection between virtue or ethical excellence and well-being. That is, he often uses these terms in a way that suggests that virtue is well-being in many significant senses. He does this by using puṇya in ways that make it equivalent both to virtue or excellence and to well-being or flourishing. Śāntideva uses the term for good karma (puṇya) interchangeably with the terms for good conduct (śīla) and excellence (kuśala) (see Lele 2007, 79-82)(Clayton 2006, 73). Even more frequently, however, he equates it with well-being or welfare, śubha, as Clayton (2006, 48-51) notes. This equivalence suggests a sense in which, on Śāntideva’s understanding, good karma not only produces well-being, but is well-being — constitutive of a good life, at least at the level of conventional truth. There does remain some ambiguity, however, in the sense that Śāntideva’s work also suggests that well-being is the product of the result or “ripening” (vipāka) of good karma.

This ambiguity may be compared to that in Greek conceptions of eudaimonia, which also means human welfare or flourishing, but includes a strong element of excellence (aretē) as well. To the extent that good karma is equated with excellence, Śāntideva’s thought resembles that of the Stoics, who thought that excellence alone constituted well-being. To the extent that good karma is equated with the results of excellent action, however, it looks more like Aristotle’s view, where “external goods,” outside the control of the agent’s excellence or lack thereof, are intrinsic components of well-being. (See Greek Philosophy and Stoicism.) However, Śāntideva does not ever suggest, as Aristotle does, that everyone aims at well-being but not everyone knows what it is (NE 1095a).

However we interpret the relation between action and result, it would seem that for Śāntideva good karma, as a complex of virtue and well-being, effectively constitutes its own intrinsic reason for action, as eudaimonia does. That a given action or mental state is karmically good, and that it is good per se, seem to be one and the same; Śāntideva does not make claims of the form “one should refrain from an action or mental state in spite of the good karma it generates,” or “one should have an action or mental state even though it is karmically bad.” Amod Lele argues that “there are a number of cases where it would seem like Śāntideva is saying it is not good to have more good karma, but in nearly all such cases, he actually ends up saying that the apparent loss of good karma turns out to bring more good karma” (Lele 2007, 85-7, emphasis in original).

5. The Perfections

Śāntideva typically describes the bodhisattva in terms of his six “perfections” (pāramitās); e.g., ŚS 97, 187. The perfections are beneficial and valuable traits of character, similar to Aristotelian virtues or excellences. This article renders Śāntideva’s term pāramitā as the literal “perfection” rather than as “virtue” because Śāntideva does discuss other virtues — beneficial traits of character — which are not themselves considered pāramitās, such as nonattachment and esteem.

The six perfections are nearly always arranged in ascending order: giving or generosity (dāna), good conduct (śīla), patient endurance (kṣānti), heroic strength (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna) and metaphysical insight (prajñā). An observer might be tempted to apply Aristotle’s classification of the virtues here and identify the first four as “moral” virtues, the sixth (and possibly the fifth) as “intellectual.” However, one should bear in mind the significance of Aristotle’s distinction: intellectual virtues are primarily attained through teaching, moral virtues through habituation (NE 1103a). Śāntideva does not distinguish the perfections in this regard; as we will see in the section on metaphysical insight below, in many ways it too is acquired through habituation.

The perfections are sufficiently important to Śāntideva’s ethical thought that both of his texts are to some extent structured around them. The final four perfections are explicitly identified, in turn, as the topics of the BCA’s chapters VI through IX. Patient endurance and heroic strength are also identified as the topics of ŚS chapters IX and X. While the first two perfections — giving or generosity (dāna) and good conduct (śīla) — do not receive their own chapter headings, they do have an important place in Śāntideva’s ethical worldview, as we will see.

a. Giving

Śāntideva uses the term dāna to refer both to the act of giving, and to the perfection which might more idiomatically be rendered into English as generosity (dānapāramitā). He does not usually distinguish between the two. This article follows his usage and uses “giving” and “generosity” as synonyms.

Giving has relatively little role in the BCA except for its role in the redirection of good karma, mentioned above. In the ŚS, however, it takes pride of place. The first chapter of the ŚS closes by claiming that “giving alone is the bodhisattva’s awakening” (ŚS 34). Richard Mahoney (2002), undertaking a detailed study of the ŚS’s structure, has demonstrated that the entire text is effectively organized around the idea of protecting, purifying and enhancing one’s person, possessions and good karma — culminating in giving each of these three things away.

Why is giving so important to Śāntideva? For him, giving serves at least three important and distinct purposes: first, the development of nonattachment; second, the “upward” expression of esteem (śraddhā); and third, “downward” compassionate benefit to others. Each of these three, for him, is an essential component of the bodhisattva path, and giving allows one to realize each component, though in different ways.

i. Giving as Giving Up

The first reason Śāntideva offers for giving is that one should not be attached to things in the first place; one should be ready to give them away. Śāntideva sometimes uses terms, utsarga and tyāga, which have both the sense of “giving” and of “renunciation.” By giving something to another person, one both demonstrates one’s own lack of attachment to it and minimizes the risk that it will cause future attachment. As a result, one generates a great deal of good karma. Here giving is primarily “giving up”; “giving to” is a secondary function. Śāntideva expresses this rationale for giving most forcefully in a long passage excerpted here:

What is given must no longer be guarded; what is at home must be guarded. What is given is [the cause] for the reduction of craving (triṣṇā); what is at home is the increase of craving. What is given is nonattachment (aparigraha); what is at home is with attachment (saparigraha). What is given is safe; what is at home is dangerous. What is given is [the cause] for supporting the path of awakening; what is at home is [the cause] for supporting Māra [the demonic tempter]. What is given is imperishable; what is at home is perishable. From what is given [comes] happiness; having obtained what is at home, [there is] suffering. (ŚS 19)

This passage indicates a common theme in Śāntideva’s work, one more radical than some other Buddhist takes on attachment and possession. It is not merely that a bodhisattva should avoid attachment to possessions, but that the possessions are themselves potentially harmful, because having them creates a danger of increasing one’s attachment to them. Thus Śāntideva claims elsewhere that a bodhisattva “should have fear of material gain (lābha) and of honour,” (ŚSK 16) and that “great gain is among the obstacles to the Mahāyāna” (ŚS 145).

ii. Upward Gifts: Expressing Esteem

The second reason for giving is to express one’s esteem or trust (śraddhā) in beings who have achieved a higher level on the bodhisattva path. The term śraddhā has a number of different and related senses, usually blending together: esteem, trust, confidence, devotion, faith. Maria Hibbets’s (2000) rendering “esteem” may come closest overall to the sense in which Śāntideva uses the term, though it loses the important connotation of trust. Śraddhā, Śāntideva says, is the prasāda (peaceful pleasure) of an unsoiled mind, rooted in respect (gaurava, literally “weightiness,” like the Latin gravitas), without arrogance (ŚS 5). Those without esteem oppose or ridicule buddhas (ŚS 174). One with esteem will listen whenever the Buddha’s word is spoken (ŚS 15); esteem is that by which one approaches the noble ones (Buddhas) and does not do what should not be done (ŚS 316).

When a householder makes a gift to a monk, especially a gift of food, it is called a śraddhādeya, a gift by esteem (ŚS 137-8). Similarly, when the aspiring bodhisattva makes offerings to advanced bodhisattvas and buddhas as part of the seven-part Anuttarapūjā ritual worship in BCA II.10-19, the act expresses esteem. Śāntideva does not use the word śraddhā in this passage, but the feelings it evokes match his descriptions of esteem elsewhere: a pleasurable trust in more advanced beings, recognizing their status as more advanced, that leads to better actions. Just before describing the fabulous offerings he gives, Śāntideva’s narrator describes the esteem he places in the buddhas and bodhisattvas and the good action that will result from doing so:

by becoming your possession, I am in a state of fearlessness; I make the well-being of all beings. I overcome previous bad karma and will make no further bad karma. (BCA II.9)

This esteem has deeply important benefits. It is a pleasure taken in good actions; it is “a maker of gladness about renunciation, a maker of excitement about the Jinas’ (Buddhas’) dharma” (ŚS 3). This combination of trust and pleasure leads one on to good action; as Śāntideva says, those who always have esteem toward a respectable Buddha will abandon neither good conduct nor training (ŚS 3). So the practice of esteem helps increase one’s good karma (ŚS 317). Moreover, to encourage the growth of esteem in a giver, when an aspiring bodhisattva receives a gift, he encourages the giver and makes him feel excited about giving it (ŚS 150).

iii. Downward Gifts: Attracting Others

When one gives for either of the above reasons (expressing nonattachment or expressing esteem), one effectively does so for one’s own spiritual benefit. But Śāntideva also says that one gives to all beings (sarvasatvebhyas, ŚSK 4), for their enjoyment (ŚSK 5), adding that one also preserves the gift for the sake of their enjoyment (satvôpabhogārtham, ŚSK 6). Here he is advocating a different kind of giving, motivated by compassion and aimed at benefitting the recipient. The distinction between the second two types of giving corresponds to Maria Heim’s (Heim 2004, 74-5) distinction between “upward” and “downward” giving, out of esteem and out of compassion.

The reasons Śāntideva offers for downward giving are not as straightforward as they may first appear. For Śāntideva, the recipient of a gift benefits less from possessing the gift object, and more from receiving it in a gift encounter. When a bodhisattva gives a gift, he attracts the recipient to the bodhisattva path, so that the recipient is more likely to become a virtuous bodhisattva. The gift object itself provides little benefit, and could even be harmful (2007, 136-75).

As well as giving possessions and more conventional goods, one also gives good karma to others through its redirection (parināmanā), as noted above. Since Śāntideva tends to see good karma as intrinsically good, in this case the recipient is more likely to benefit from the gift itself. Even so, good karma involves a potential danger, since if it is not redirected it can lead merely to dangerous wealth rather than to awakening.

b. Good Conduct

Of all the perfections, Śāntideva tells us the least about the second one, śīla. This Sanskrit and Pali term has a general sense of “good conduct” or “good habits,” but its particular meaning is less clear. Unlike the final four perfections, it is not identified specifically as the single topic of a chapter in the BCA, and the chapters identified with it in the ŚS (II and V) make little reference to it. Unlike giving, it is not discussed at systematic length in either text. Śāntideva sometimes uses the term in a broad sense that would seem to encompass all of the perfections, to the point of using it interchangeably with puṇya, good karma, or śubha, well-being (Clayton 2006, 73). ŚS chapter V, entitled Śīlapāramitāyām Anarthavarjanam — abandoning of the worthless with respect to the perfection of good conduct — seems like a miscellany of topics, describing a wide variety of actions that Śāntideva endorses. A reader may then be tempted to take up the common usage in which this good conduct refers to “morality,” “virtue” or “ethics” in a general sense (see Clayton 2006, 72-3) — perhaps even a sense that includes the other perfections.

Yet Śāntideva does give some further specification of a way in which he understands “good conduct,” conceptually distinct from the other perfections, even though he does not stick consistently to this usage. His one reference to the perfection of good conduct in the BCA proclaims: “when the mind of cessation (viraticitta) is obtained, the perfection of good conduct is understood [to exist]” (BCAP 53). The ŚS specifies the goal of good conduct in a similar vein, but is more specific about what constitutes good conduct: “whichever practices are causes of meditative concentration (samādhi), those are included in good conduct” (ŚS 121). It seems that good conduct, when understood as a single perfection, consists primarily of practices that aid one to concentrate one’s mind and still its uncontrolled activity.

This suggestion is borne out by the content of the fifth BCA chapter, which, following up the claim about the mind of cessation, details exactly these sorts of practices. (Since this chapter comes immediately before the chapter on patient endurance — the third perfection — it would be a logical place for Śāntideva to discuss good conduct, the second perfection.) The chapter begins by warning the reader of the dangers of an unrestrained mind, comparing it to a mad, rutting elephant, and then specifies a number of practices that Śāntideva claims will help the mind remain under control. We may imagine, then, that this chapter gives us some idea of what Śāntideva means by the perfection of good conduct.

The practices bear some resemblance to Buddhist monastic rules (vinaya), although they could all be followed by lay householders and the text does not restrict them to monks. Śāntideva urges his readers to walk with a downcast gaze, as if continually meditating, but notes that they may look outward to rest their eyes or to greet someone. One should look ahead (or behind) before moving there, he says, and think about one’s actions before undertaking them; one should continually observe the positioning of one’s body. Each of these actions, Śāntideva specifies, allows one to restrain the mind (BCA V.35-40). Similarly, one should avoid idle chatter, or purposeless nervous tics (BCA V.45-6). In general, as Susanne Mrozik notes, “Close careful attention to one’s bodily movements and gestures generates mindfulness and awareness. Disciplining the body is thus a means of disciplining one’s thoughts and feelings” (Mrozik 1998, 63).

Śāntideva notes that the relationship between good conduct and meditative concentration is two-way: “One aiming at meditative concentration should have good conduct, for mindfulness and introspection; so too, one aiming at good conduct should make effort at meditative concentration.” He claims that the “complete perfection of mental action” will comes from the two “mutually enhancing causes” that are good conduct and meditative concentration (ŚS 121).

The second half of the fifth BCA chapter involves details about bodily comportment which aim at pleasing others, rather than at focusing the mind; similar instructions are found in the sixth chapter of the ŚS. It is possible, though not clear, that Śāntideva also intends these to be included under good conduct. Śāntideva here enjoins etiquette of various kinds (do not spit in public, do not make noises while eating) and a pleasant tone of speaking (BCA V.71-96, ŚS 124-7). Mrozik (2007, 75-6) notes that such actions are intended to generate prasāda, a kind of peaceful pleasure, in those who observe the bodhisattva. Lele (2007, 151-9) suggests further that the goal of generating this prasāda is to attract them to the bodhisattva path, making them more likely to enter that path and increase their well-being.

c. Patient Endurance

Śāntideva divides patient endurance (kṣānti) into three major varieties: first, enduring suffering (duṣkhâdhivāsanakṣānti); second, dharmic patience, the patient endurance that comes from reflecting on the Buddha’s teaching, the dharma (dharmanidhyānakṣānti); and third, patience toward others’ wrongdoing (parâpakāramarṣanakṣānti, ŚS 179). The first, which Śāntideva opposes to frustration (daurmanasya), is closer to the English word “endurance”; the third, which Śāntideva opposes to anger (dveṣa), is closer to the English word “patience.” For this reason it is helpful to use a two-word term like “patient endurance” to encapsulate the idea of kṣānti as a whole. Śāntideva does not link these phenomena under the rubric of patient endurance merely for the sake of convenience or etymology; rather, patient endurance has common elements that pervade them all. In all three cases, one remains calm and even happy in the face of various undesired events — pains, frustrations, wrongs — that one might face.

Dharmic patience, the second variety — as Śāntideva describes it in BCA VI.22-32 — is juxtaposed against anger, and involves being patient with others’ bad actions. For this reason, it seems largely like a subtype of the third type, patience toward wrongdoing, which involves reflecting on the fact that their actions all have causes. Śāntideva likely treats the two as distinct in order to emphasize the particular importance of metaphysical reasons for patient endurance. In terms of the actions and mental dispositions that they entail, they do not appear to be different from each other. So we may here subsume this second variety under the third, except as otherwise specified.

There are at least two ways in which enduring suffering and patience toward wrongdoing are closely related in Śāntideva’s work. First, there is a logical or analytical relationship. When one is wronged by others, it is likely to be an undesired event, and therefore experienced as suffering. So, effectively, the events that evoke patience toward wrongdoing are a subset of those that evoke the endurance of suffering. The appropriate reactions are intertwined as well. We see this when Śāntideva discusses being the victim of theft. While he addresses theft in the context of anger, and more generally of patience toward wrongdoing, the reason he gives to remain patient is that possessions are dangerous to have anyway (BCA VI.100) — a central part of Śāntideva’s justifications for nonattachment, which itself is very closely tied to enduring suffering.

Second, there is a causal relationship. Enduring suffering, as Śāntideva discusses it, requires that one fight frustration; patience toward wrongdoing requires that one fight anger. And both of Śāntideva’s texts (ŚS 179 and BCA VI.7-8) note that anger feeds on frustration; so enduring suffering makes it easier to have patience toward wrongdoing.

i. Happiness from Enduring Suffering

Śāntideva’s case for enduring suffering is relatively straightforward: one will feel less suffering and be happier. Early in his discussion of frustration (daurmanasya), Śāntideva makes the pragmatic point that it accomplishes little. So it is not only an unpleasant mental state, but an unnecessary one: “If indeed there is a remedy, then what’s the point of frustration? And if there is no remedy, then what’s the point of frustration?” (BCA VI.10).

Enduring suffering can lead to happiness, for Śāntideva, in a particularly extreme meditative state (samādhi). He refers to this state as the sarvadharmasukhakrānta, “making happiness toward all phenomena.” The passage describing this meditative state is one of the most provocative in the entire ŚS. Śāntideva says that “for a bodhisattva who has obtained this meditative state, with respect to all sense objects, pain is felt as happiness indeed, not as suffering or as indifference” (ŚS 181). He proceeds to describe a panoply of graphic tortures in a startlingly upbeat manner. For example:

[The bodhisattva who has attained this meditative state], while being fried in oil, or while pounded like pounded sugarcane, or while crushed like a reed, or while being burned in the way that oil or ghee or yogurt are burned — has a happy thought arisen. (ŚS 181)

While a reader might cringe at the literal masochism in this passage, it is also not hard to see the power of its appeal: It strongly suggests that a bodhisattva can be happy anywhere, any time, in any condition. And there is a particular practice that the bodhisattva pursues to reach this state. Whenever he is subjected to such an unpleasant fate, he makes a mental determination or vow (pranidhāna) that everyone, from those who honor him to those who torture him, should reach the great awakening (ŚS 182). In the BCA he suggests starting with small pains to learn to endure bigger ones: “because of the practice of mild distress, even great distress is tolerable” (BCA VI.14). Prajñākaramati draws a direct connection between the two, quoting the ŚS passage in his commentary on the BCA verse.

ii. The Case Against Anger

Śāntideva’s arguments for patience toward wrongdoing consist of arguments against anger, against which this patience is juxtaposed. He lays out these arguments primarily in the sixth chapter of the BCA; for a detailed commentary on this chapter, see Thurman 2004. His arguments here derive from premises both naturalistic and supernaturalistic: “One who destroys anger is happy in this world and the next” (BCA VI.6).

Śāntideva’s naturalistic arguments against anger rest first on psychological grounds: “The mind does not get peace, nor enjoy pleasure and happiness, nor find sleep or satisfaction, when the dart of anger rests in the heart” (BCA VI.3). This set of psychological claims has a strong intuitive plausibility, in our context as well as his; it is probably not difficult for anyone to remember times that anger has negatively affected her peace of mind or pleasure or sleep.

Beyond this, Śāntideva seeks to minimize the significance of others’ wrongdoing (apakāra). He is especially concerned to neutralize insults and the destruction of praise. He asks: “The gang of contempt, harsh speech and infamy does not bind my body. Why, O mind, do you get enraged by it?” (BCA VI.53)

Śāntideva also offers severe warnings concerning the karmic consequences of anger. There is no bad karma equal to anger, he says, so patient endurance is the most effective means to reduce bad karma (BCA VI.2). He warns that anger leads to suffering in the hell realms far greater than the suffering that originally provoked the anger:

If suffering merely here and now cannot be endured, why is anger, the cause of distress in hell, not restrained? In the same way, for the sake of anger I have been placed in hells thousands of times; I have done this neither for my own sake nor for anyone else’s. (BCA VI.73-4)

There is only one kind of anger that Śāntideva seems to approve of, effectively an exception that proves the rule. He approves of anger when it is directed at anger itself: “Let anger toward anger be my choice” (BCA VI.41). More generally, he suggests elsewhere that anger at “my enemies, craving, anger and so on” (BCA IV.28) might be valuable: “Lodged in my own mind, these well-stood ones still harm me. In this very case I do not get angry. Damn, what unsuitable patience (sahiṣṇutā)!” (BCA IV.29).

Śāntideva also makes the case for dharmic patience (dharmanidhyānakṣānti) in BCA VI.22-32; this, as mentioned earlier, is patience toward wrongdoing which is informed by metaphysical insight. Śāntideva’s point here is that the emotion of anger comes out of an incorrect belief about the world — namely that other agents can appropriately be blamed for their actions. “I have no anger at my bile and so on, though they make great suffering. Why is there anger at sentient beings? They too are angry due to a cause” (BCA VI.22). Anger, whether my own or another’s, has its causes. It is not chosen; it is merely another product of the universe’s dependent arising (BCA VI.23-26). Moreover, there is no self which is capable of being an agent of anger (BCA VI.27-30). And “therefore, whether one has seen an enemy or a friend doing something wrong, having considered that the act has causes, one should become happy” (BCA VI.33). Mark Siderits (2005) refers to this argument for dharmic patience as “paleo-compatibilist,” and suggests that it can help resolve contemporary debates on free will and determinism.

These arguments against anger are phrased in terms that could convince someone not already on the path. Other arguments are directed specifically at bodhisattvas. As has been mentioned before, it is crucial for the bodhisattva to win beings over; and anger interferes with this activity, where desire (rāga) might be able on some occasions to help with it. This is why anger, in Śāntideva’s eyes, is far worse than desire, though desire and anger are both afflictions (kleṣas) that cloud the mind and lead one on to suffering (ŚS 164).

He claims further that “bodhisattvas who are not excellent in means (upāyakuśala) fear downfalls connected with desire (rāga); bodhisattvas who are excellent in means fear downfalls connected with anger, not downfalls connected with desire” (ŚS 164-5). Excellence in means (upāyakauśalya), the ability to teach others in the appropriate way to bring them onto the path, is deeply hindered by anger. Unlike desire, anger has no saving graces. Anger both creates suffering for oneself and interferes with one’s ability to benefit others; this is why nothing is as karmically bad as anger, or as karmically good as patient endurance.

d. Heroic Strength

Śāntideva devotes relatively little attention to the fourth perfection, heroic strength (vīrya). Each of his texts has a short chapter (BCA VII and ŚS X) devoted to it; parallel discussions occur in the fourth chapter of the BCA. He defines heroic strength as “excellent effort” (kuśalotsaha, BCA VII.2), effort that is both skillful and virtuous — a tireless striving on the bodhisattva path. In BCA VII, he contrasts heroic strength with laziness (ālasya, BCA VII.3). The primary point of BCA VII is to insist on the urgency of the bodhisattva’s task. It is rare to be born as a human, and a short human life leaves one with little time for adequate spiritual development, so it is crucial to devote oneself wholeheartedly to the task.

ŚS X, the shortest chapter in the text — a mere four pages — explains the importance of listening to sacred texts (śruta). The topic is surprising, since it seems tangentially related, at best, to the more straightforward heroic strength addressed in BCA VII. The connection seems to be that, to listen to sacred texts properly, one must do so tirelessly. If one does not do so, Śāntideva claims, even a sacred text can lead to “destruction” (vināśa), probably because one reads and applies the text too selectively (ŚS 189).

e. Meditation

The fifth perfection, discussed in BCA VIII and ŚS XI-XIII, is meditation (dhyāna). Meditation for Śāntideva is very much an intellectual and even philosophical exercise, not merely a stilling of the mind; some of Śāntideva’s most famous arguments appear in a context of discussions of meditation. Śāntideva emphasizes that a calming and stilling of the mind is essential to meditation, and enjoins his reader to flee society and find a solitary spot in the wilderness in order to achieve the proper degree of undistracted calm (BCA VIII.1-40, ŚS 193-201). But becoming calm and solitary, in both texts, is only the first step to grasping arguments and transformative techniques with an explicit cognitive content.

In the BCA, the first meditation that Śāntideva describes sharpens his emphasis on solitude: one considers the foulness of the human body. Specifically, his male audience is urged to reflect on the foulness of a potential female lover. He notes that the beloved will invariably become a corpse, highlights the repulsiveness of corpses, and asks the reader rhetorically why the living beloved seems any less repulsive (VIII.41-7). He then calls attention to the repulsiveness of the body’s waste products, natural smells, and fluids (VIII.48-71). Next he notes the great effort one must take in finding and keeping a lover, and the ultimate vanity of such efforts (VIII.72-83).

This meditation takes on a strongly misogynist tone, describing as it does the repulsiveness of female bodies. A contemporary reader should keep in mind its intent as a critique of lust, the passion which so easily distracts the mind from the bodhisattva’s path. While the argument is phrased in terms of the foulness of a woman’s body, its logic would apply equally well to the foulness of a man’s body, if imagined by a heterosexual female or homosexual male meditator. (Śāntideva never inverts the argument this way himself. As Wilson 1996 notes, historically Buddhists have never turned the arguments about female foulness around to have it apply to men, even when speaking to a female audience. The point is noted here to stress the relevance of these meditations for a contemporary philosophical audience, rightly skeptical of misogynistic claims.) The ideal to achieve in this lifetime, for Śāntideva, is that of a male or female monk who forswears lust and sexuality, and he calls attention to the body’s repulsive aspects in order to convince his readers of this ideal’s value.

i. Equalization of Self and Other

The two meditations which follow in BCA VIII, on the relationship between oneself and another, are Śāntideva’s most famous. The first of these is known as the equalization of self and other (parātmasamatā). In this meditation Śāntideva argues for an ethical conclusion from a metaphysical premise: because the self is empty and unreal, it makes little sense to protect only oneself from suffering and not others.

The arguments are framed against a hypothetical objector (pūrvapakṣin) who wishes to prevent only his own suffering, but not that of others. Suffering here has a strong normative force; that suffering is bad and worthy of prevention is taken as self-evident, and Śāntideva assumes that his readers will share that assumption. When an imagined objector asks why suffering should be prevented at all, he responds, “No one disputes that!” (BCA VIII.103) If we substitute “the absence of suffering” for “pleasure,” Śāntideva’s claim here seems to work like Alasdair MacIntyre’s interpretation of Mill’s claim that we know pleasure is desirable because men desire it:

He treats the thesis that all men desire pleasure as a factual assertion which guarantees the success of an ad hominem apeal to anyone who denies his conclusion. If anyone denies that pleasure is desirable, then we can ask him, But don’t you desire it? and we know in advance that he must answer yes, and consequently must admit that pleasure is desirable. (MacIntyre 1966, 239)

To deny that suffering should be prevented at all, in other words, is to argue in bad faith: anyone who makes such a claim does not really believe it. It is not hard to see the intuitive force of Śāntideva’s claim about suffering; while one might come up with exceptions, in general most human beings in most contexts have viewed suffering as something bad and undesirable.

The selfish objector is right, then, to believe that suffering should be prevented. Where he goes awry is in focusing only on his own suffering; this focus turns out to be absurd. There is no self that endures from moment to moment, so one’s own future self is as different from one’s present self as other beings are: “If [someone else] is not protected because his suffering cannot hurt me — the sufferings of a future body are not mine. Why is that hurt protected against?” (BCA VIII.97) Śāntideva’s arguments here have been compared to those of Derek Parfit (1984), who also attacks the metaphysical premise of selfhood as a premise for an altruistic ethics.

Paul Williams (1998a, 30) notes that most commentators, including Prajñākaramati, have read this verse so that the “future body” (āgāmikāya) means only the bodies one will inhabit in future rebirths, not the future state of one’s body in the present life. A literal reading of this verse and the next would suggest that they are right; the next verse adds that “one is dead, a very different other one is born” (BCA VIII.98). So Williams thinks that “from a textual point of view” this verse must be correct. However, later Tibetan commentators, especially rGyal tshab rje, interpret the verse so that it could refer to any present suffering one might try to prevent (Williams 1998a, 32-6). The “death” and “birth” would likely then refer to the body’s non-enduring nature — dying as the present moment passes away and being born anew in the following moment — rather than to literal death and rebirth. Logically this seems a more satisfying reading. The argument seems entirely superfluous if it refers only to future births; based on everything else that Śāntideva says, one concerned with better future births should, above all, prevent the suffering of others.

Śāntideva makes an additional argument beyond the point about future selves. Even the present self should be broken up into its parts. When the opponent objects that one who suffers should only prevent the suffering that belongs to him, Śāntideva retorts: “The foot’s suffering is not the hand’s. Why does [the hand] protect [the foot]?” (BCA VIII.99)

Williams (1998b) has attempted to refute Śāntideva’s arguments against egoism, claiming that the concept of suffering or pain makes little sense without a subject or self to feel the suffering. Williams’s refutation has been controversial, provoking Barbra Clayton (Clayton 2001), John Pettit (1999) and Mark Siderits (Siderits 2000) all to defend Śāntideva’s claims.

Why do these arguments appear in the chapter on meditation, when the primary focus of that chapter seems to concern the kind of metaphysical insight that is the topic of the following chapter? Two reasons suggest themselves. First, the arguments prepare the audience for the more imaginatively focused practice of the exchange and self and other. Second, as Crosby and Skilton suggest(1995, 84-5), these meditations derive from Cittamātra (Yogācāra) metaphysical views on the ultimate equivalence of self and other. Śāntideva considers these Cittamātra views to be only a step on the road to the highest Madhyamaka view (see BCA IX). These arguments, then, are really true only at the level of conventional truth, not at the level of wordless ultimate reality, the object of real metaphysical insight.

ii. Exchange of Self and Other

The last meditation in the chapter is called the exchange of self and other (parātmaparivartana). In it, Śāntideva attempts to put the equalization of self and other into practice, even taking it a step further to dissolve all the meditator’s vestiges of egoism. Here he urges his readers to create “a sense of self in inferiors and others, and a sense of other in oneself,” (VIII.140) to literally form a concept of “I” (ahamkāra) with respect to others, just as one would do with respect to the “drops of semen and blood” (VIII.158) which created the entity that one would normally consider a self. The intervening verses manifest this idea in practice. Here Śāntideva switches pronouns and grammatical persons so that the third person refers to the meditator and the first person to “others.” The new “I” that is the others can then feel envy and contempt toward the “he” that was oneself.

One now imagines how “he” — that is, oneself — seems happy, wealthy and praised, while “I” — others — “am” miserable, poor and despised; “I” should envy “him” (BCA VIII.141-2). Having imagined oneself from the viewpoint of an envious inferior, one then imagines the inverse viewpoint of a contemptuous superior:

We joyous ones see him finally mistreated, and the mocking laughter of all the people here and there. That wretch even had a rivalry with me! . . . Even if he were to have wealth, we should take it forcibly, having given him a mere pittance, if he does any work for us. And he should be caused to fall from happiness. (BCA VIII.150-4)

This sadomasochistic advice and the play of pronouns work together to end feelings of egoism or attachment to self. Meditating in this way, one comes to live entirely for others.

iii. Meditations Against the Three Poisons

The above meditations from the BCA, while Śāntideva’s most famous, are not the only meditations that he prescribes. In the ŚS, after briefly advising solitude and the control of thoughts, Śāntideva presents in turn three meditations intended to counter the three mental “poisons” which, in Buddhist thought, are responsible for suffering: desire (rāga), anger (dveṣa) and delusion (moha).

Against desire, Śāntideva describes a meditation on the foulness of the body, as in the BCA (ŚS 209-12). To counteract anger, Śāntideva prescribes the practice of friendliness or love (maitrī, ŚS 212-19). This practice takes a number of forms, but the most notable is the redirection (parināmanā) of good karma toward others’ benefit. (This will be discussed below under “good and bad karma.”) Such acts are discussed at a number of places in Śāntideva’s texts; at ŚS 213-16 he specifically refers to the practice of friendliness, which is intended to counteract anger. The way that one redirects good karma, in practice, is through an expressly stated wish: for example, “Whoever is suffering distress of body or mind in any of the ten directions — may they obtain oceans of happiness and joy through my good karma” (BCA X.2). This rationale for karmic redirection could apply even to those skeptical whether a supernatural process of karmic causality will actually work: by regularly wishing that one’s own good deeds will benefit others’ well-being, one can at least diminish the anger that one feels toward them.

Finally, to counteract delusion, one meditates on dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), the Buddhist theory that all things come to exist in dependence upon other causes (ŚS 219-28). This meditation leads into Śāntideva’s discussion of the final perfection, metaphysical insight.

f. Metaphysical Insight

The sixth and final perfection in Śāntideva’s thought is prajñā, a complex term which this article renders as “metaphysical insight.” The term “insight” emphasizes the depth and transformative nature of this knowledge — as we will see, Śāntideva makes strong claims about the effects that prajñā has on its possessor, so that it is classified as a perfection alongside patient endurance and restrained good conduct. The term “metaphysical” emphasizes the specific content of this knowledge: claims about the nature of reality. This is a relatively loose and nontechnical sense of the term “metaphysics” that one may find in introductory textbooks on philosophy — for example, “Metaphysics is the attempt to say what reality is” (Solomon 2006, 113). This section begins with a discussion of the ideas and arguments that Śāntideva includes as the content of metaphysical insight, and then proceeds to discuss their significance for ethics and the conduct of life.

i. Content

Śāntideva’s views on metaphysics follow those of the Madhyamaka school of thought, associated with Nāgārjuna. (See Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka Buddhism for more detail.) For Madhyamaka, all things, especially the self, are empty (śūnya) and dependently originated (pratītyasamutpanna) — they have no essential or abiding existence. Tibetan tradition has typically associated Śāntideva with the more radical Prāsangika Mādhyamika school, as his metaphysical arguments follow their approach of reductio ad absurdum (prasanga) argument rather than the independent syllogisms (svatantra) of the Svātantrika school. On the other hand, Akira Saito (1996, 261) has argued that “we cannot be too careful” in using the term Prāsangika with reference to Śāntideva. (See McClintock and Dreyfus 2002 for a discussion of the distinction between the Prāsangika and Svātantrika schools.)

Śāntideva’s metaphysics is widely studied and commented on, both in Tibetan tradition and in the West. (For Tibetan commentaries see Dalai Lama XIV 1988; Palden and Seunam 1993. For Western commentaries see Oldmeadow 1994; Sweet 1977.) Nevertheless, the content of Śāntideva’s metaphysics does not seem particularly original; as Michael Sweet’s book-length study of Śāntideva’s metaphysics notes,

we do not find that his philosophical concerns or patterns of argumentation differ in any significant manner from those of Nāgārjuna, and especially from those of Candrakīrti, the great systematizer of the Prāsangika-Mādhyamika who preceded Śāntideva by at least a century. (Sweet 1977, 14)

Where Śāntideva’s approach innovates is in the way that he draws ethical conclusions directly from his metaphysical premises. Many Buddhist texts draw soteriological conclusions of some sort from metaphysical premises — the nature of the universe is such that everyday life is filled with suffering but one can be liberated from it. Moreover, texts often draw ethical conclusions from these soteriological ideas. So in earlier texts there is an indirect connection from metaphysics to ethics by way of soteriology. Śāntideva, on the other hand, argues directly from metaphysics to advice about conduct in life, in a way that is relatively unusual in South Asian Buddhist literature. One exception is Candrakīrti himself, who derives ethical conclusions from metaphysics in his Catuhṣataka commentary (see Lang 2003), though his approach to doing so is significantly different from Śāntideva’s.

Śāntideva’s prasanga arguments avoid foundational claims, in the stricter sense of attempts to definitively establish a position from which other claims can be deduced. Any such position would itself be considered empty and therefore in some sense flawed. Indeed, an earlier Madhyamaka text, the Vigrahavyāvartani of Nāgārjuna, famously refuted its opponents by proclaiming: “If I had any position, then I would have a flaw [in my argument]. But I have no position; therefore I have no flaw at all” (VV 29). Rather, the approach is intended to be purely dialectical and critical, examining alternative positions and knocking them down, as Śāntideva does in BCA IX. Because Śāntideva is deconstructing concepts and deriving ethical significance from this deconstruction, William Edelglass (2007) compares his philosophy to that of Emmanuel Lévinas.

Claims to have no position may seem absurd at first glance, especially when associated with a thinker like Śāntideva who seems to make many positive claims about how one should live. Śāntideva’s response relies on the central Madhyamaka distinction between conventional (samvriti) and ultimate (paramārtha) truth (e.g. BCA IX.2). The ultimate truth is inexpressible (anabhilāpya), untaught (adeṣita) and unmanifest (aprakāśita, ŚS 256); it is nonconceptual, and therefore nonrational. But because we are caught up in illusion, seeing substance, we still need to make provisional statements at a conventional level to make ourselves and others aware of this illusion and free ourselves from it. Since the ultimate truth is inexpressible, all of Śāntideva’s actual claims need to be understood at the conventional level.

The above is what Śāntideva appears to say in his own words, at any rate. It is worth noting here that the Tibetan dGe lugs (Geluk) school argues that such claims cannot be taken literally and that in fact the ultimate truth is accessible to the intellect, although other commentators from the Sa skya (Sakya) and rNying ma (Nyingma) schools accept a more literal interpretation like the one I have just provided (Sweet 1977, 20).

The distinction between ultimate and conventional truth lends support to a number of Śāntideva’s practical arguments. Especially, it supports his self-interested case for altruism on the grounds of the bodhisattva’s happiness: “All who are suffering in the world [are suffering] because of desire for their own happiness. All who are happy in the world [are happy] because of desire for others’ happiness” (BCA VIII.129). Śāntideva does not explain how this psychological claim is supposed to work. Lele (2007, 65-6) ties the claim to Śāntideva’s theory of nonattachment (aparigraha); concern for oneself and one’s own particular interests leads to painful feelings of grief, loss, and fear when, as inevitably happens, those interests are harmed. But however such arguments are supposed to work, they would seem to be undercut by another claim of Śāntideva’s: namely, that bodhisattvas still suffer in a sense, because of their compassion for others. He claims: “Just as one whose body is on fire has no joy at all, even through all pleasures, exactly so there is no way to joy with respect to the distress of beings, for those made of compassion” (BCA VI.123; see also ŚS 156, 166).

The distinction between conventional and ultimate, however, helps one resolve this apparent problem — for the claim that bodhisattvas suffer is made merely at the conventional level of truth. Śāntideva argues that suffering itself is unreal (BCA IX.88-91); and only one who realizes the ultimate truth, it seems, will be able to really recognize this unreality. This recognition is the way in which it is possible for suffering to end, as the Third Noble Truth of Buddhism promises. It is also probably part of the reason that Śāntideva proclaims that happy people are happy because they desire others’ happiness — a bodhisattva, who has lost the illusion of self, can also lose the illusion of suffering and thereby escape it.

If suffering is unreal, however, one may wonder why it should be prevented. A similar worry applies to good and bad karma. Śāntideva claims, after all, that good and bad karma themselves arise out of illusion (BCA IX.11); like everything else we can speak of, they are ultimately empty. Clayton (2006, 97-8) argues that this point implies that ethical action, good karma, or eliminating suffering are unnecessary or insignificant. She quotes Richard Hayes (1994, 38) to the effect that maintaining a sense of the importance of ethics in such a philosophy is merely “philosophical rigour and integrity being compromised by the perceived need to preserve a social institution.” She finds herself “not quite cynical enough” to doubt Śāntideva’s sincerity in accordance with Hayes’s quote, but provides no alternative explanation for why Śāntideva might have still believed in ethical action. Lele (2007, 89-90) argues to the contrary that Śāntideva maintains his philosophical integrity through the conventional-ultimate distinction. Ultimately good and bad karma are unreal, but they are very real at the conventional level. Most people remain trapped in the conventional level, where suffering occurs, and so they experience the suffering as real. For them, it is this conventional level of truth that matters.

ii. Practical Implications

Metaphysical insight has three major ethical and soteriological implications for Śāntideva, some of which we have already seen. First, knowing the nonexistence of self will lead one to benefit others. Second, one who knows dependent origination can become more patient with others’ wrongdoing, because he will know to avoid blaming them. Finally, “one who knows emptiness is not emotionally attached to worldly phenomena, because he is independent [of them]” (ŚS 264); recognizing the emptiness of things allows one to attach less significance to them.

These implications, for Śāntideva, are not merely a matter of logical implication. There is also a practical, cause-and-effect relationship between one’s realization of the metaphysical claims and one’s actions and mental states. For this reason Luis Gómez (1994, 121) notes that the closing verses of BCA IX “leave no room for doubt that we are dealing with a technology of the self” which is also a philosophical discourse. The passage quoted above does not merely state that one who knows emptiness also knows that he should not be emotionally attached to worldly phenomena; it states further that he himself is not in fact so attached (na samhriyate). Elsewhere in the text Śāntideva makes other, similar, causal claims that metaphysical insight will cause one to feel and act differently. For example, after having made a series of logical arguments for the equivalence of self and other, he immediately comes to add: “Those whose mental dispositions are developed in this way (evam), for whom the suffering of others is equal to their loves, go down into the Avīci hell like geese [into] a lotus pond” (BCA VIII.107, emphasis added). The “in this way” (Sanskrit evam) indicates that the logical arguments themselves are a way to develop mental dispositions; hearing these arguments is the thing that develops one’s mind to treat others’ suffering equally to one’s own. Metaphysical insight is not merely an idea added to a stock of knowledge, with which one can do as one pleases; it has direct consequences for one’s emotional states.

Such a view seems perplexing to contemporary Western ears, including some informed by Buddhism. Understanding ideas often seems not to have this liberating effect. David Burton puts the problem well, in terms of his personal experience:

I do not seem to be ignorant about the impermanence of entities. I appear to understand that entities have no fixed essence and that they often change in disagreeable ways. I seem to understand that what I possess will fall out of my possession. I apparently accept that all entities must pass away. And I seem to acknowledge that my craving causes suffering. Yet I am certainly not free from craving and attachment. . . . How, then, might one preserve the common Buddhist claim that knowledge of the three characteristics of existence [i.e. nonself, impermanence and suffering] results in liberation in the face of this objection? (Burton 2004, 31)

Burton explores several potential hypotheses to resolve his question. He labels the hypothesis which seems to come closest to Śāntideva’s view as “insufficient attentiveness and reflection.” That is, that for those who have not experienced the beneficial ethical, emotional or soteriological consequences that are presumed to accrue from knowledge of Buddhist ideas, their belief in such ideas “is something they have thought about from time to time perhaps, but they do not bring it to mind often enough” (Burton 2004, 48-9).

Śāntideva suggests such a hypothesis in two ways. First, he frequently mentions the shifting and changing nature of the mind; for example, he notes that the mind is “like a river flow, unstable, broken up and dissolved when produced,” and “like lightning, unsteadily cut off in a moment” (ŚS 234). Second, within the chapter of the BCA on metaphysical insight, he speaks of “cultivating,” or meditating on, arguments: “this reasoning (vicāra) is meditated on as an antidote to that [fixation on imagination]” (BCA IX.92). This point is reinforced elsewhere in the text; as we have seen, his most famous metaphysical argument, on the equivalence of self and other (BCA VIII.90-119), occurs in the context of a particular meditation, within the BCA’s chapter on meditation (dhyāna). It is not enough, for Śāntideva, to find an argument persuasive and then move on to other things; it must be fixed in one’s mind.

6. References and Further Reading

a. Primary Works

BCA — Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra. Edition: Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati; ed. P.L. Vaidya (1960), Buddhist Sanskrit Texts XII, Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute. References given are to chapter and verse numbers.

BCAP — Prajñākaramati, Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Edition: Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati; ed. P.L. Vaidya (1960), Buddhist Sanskrit Texts XII, Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute. Page references given are to the Poussin edition (listed with “P” in the Vaidya edition’s margins).

NE — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Edition: J. Bywater, available for download and online search at www.perseus.tufts.edu as of 14 Aug 2007.

ŚS — Śāntideva, Śikṣāsamuccaya. Edition: Çikshāsamuccaya: a compendium of Buddhistic teachings, compiled by Çāntideva chiefly from earlier Mahāyāna sūtras; ed. Cecil Bendall (1970), Bibliotheca Buddhica I, Osnabruck, Germany: Biblio Verlag.

ŚSK — Śāntideva, Śikṣāsamuccaya Kārikā, in the Bendall edition of the ŚS above.

VV — Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartani. Edition: Vigrahavyāvartani of Nāgārjuna: Sanskrit Text, eds. Christian Lindtner and Richard Mahoney (2003), available for download at http://indica-et-buddhica.org as of 14 Aug 2007.

b. Translations Cited

Bendall, Cecil. 1970. Introduction. In Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching Compiled By Çāntideva Chiefly From Earlier Mahāyāna-Sūtras. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag.
Crosby, Kate, and Andrew Skilton. 1995. The Bodhicaryāvatāra: A New Translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallace, Vesna A., and B. Alan Wallace, eds. 1997. A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion.

c. General Studies of Śāntideva

Brassard, Francis. 2000. The Concept of Bodhicitta in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Clayton, Barbra. 2006. Moral Theory in Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya: Cultivating the Fruits of Virtue. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Cooper, David E., ed. 1998. Ethics: The Classic Readings. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Dayal, Har. 1970. The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Griffiths, Paul J. 1999. Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang. 1986. Meaningful to Behold: A Commentary to Shantideva’s Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life. London: Tharpa Publications.
Harvey, Peter. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Issues. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hedinger, Jürg. 1984. Aspekte der Schulung in der Laufbahn eines Bodhisattva: Dargestellt nach dem Śikṣāsamuccaya des Śāntideva. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
Lele, Amod. 2007. Ethical Revaluation in the Thought of Śāntideva. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University.
Mahoney, Richard. 2002. Of the Progress of the Bodhisattva: The Bodhisattvamārga in the Śikṣāsamuccaya. University of Canterbury.
Pezzali, Amalia. 1968. Śāntideva: Mystique Bouddhiste Des Viie Et Viiie Siècles. Florence: Vallecchi Editore.
Rinpoche, Thrangu. 2002. A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life of Shantideva: A Commentary. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
Tobden, Geshe Yeshe. 2005. The Way of Awakening: A Commentary on Shantideva’s Bodhicharyavatara. Somerville, MA: Wisdom.
Williams, Paul. 1995. General Introduction: Śāntideva and His World. In The Bodhicaryāvatāra. Ed. Kate Crosby, and Andrew Skilton, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

d. Specialized Studies

Clayton, Barbra. 2001. Compassion as a Matter of Fact: The Argument From No-Self to Selflessness in Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya. Contemporary Buddhism 2 (1): 83-97.
Dalai Lama XIV. 1988. Transcendent Wisdom: A Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of Śāntideva’s Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion.
de Jong, J.W. 1975. La légende de Śāntideva. Indo-Iranian Journal 16 (3): 161-82.
de Rachewiltz, Igor. 1996. The Mongolian Tanjur Version of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Edited and Transcribed, With a Word-Index and a Photo-Reproduction of the Original Text (1748). Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
Edelglass, William. 2007. Ethics and the Subversion of Conceptual Reification in Lévinas and Śāntideva. In Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought. Ed. Youru Wang, London and New York: Routledge.
Gómez, Luis O. 1994. Presentations of Self: Personal Dimensions of Ritualized Speech. In Other Selves: Autobiography and Biography in Cross-Cultural Perspective. Ed. Phyllis Granoff, and Koichi Shinohara, Oakville, ON and Buffalo, NY: Mosaic Press.
Gómez, Luis O. 1999. The Way of the Translators: Three Recent Translations of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra. Buddhist Literature 1 262-354.
Goodman, Charles. 2008. Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, and Mahāyāna Ethics. Philosophy East and West 58 (1): 17-35.
Harrison, Paul. 2007. The Case of the Vanishing Poet: New Light on Śāntideva and the Śikṣā-Samuccaya. In Festschrift für Michael Hahn, zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Schülern Überreicht. Ed. Konrad Klaus, and Jens-Uwe Hartmann. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.
Kanaoka, S. 1963. Regional Characteristics of Mongolian Buddhism: A Study on the Basis of the “Bodhicaryāvatāra”. Bukkyo Shigaku 10 (4): 15-24.
Palden, Khentchen Kunzang, and Minyak Kunzang Seunam. 1993. Comprendre La Vacuité: Deux Commentaires Du Chapitre Ix De La Marche Vers L’éveil De Shāntideva. Peyzac-le-Moustier, France: Éditions Padmakara.
Mrozik, Susanne. 1998. The Relationship Between Morality and the Body in Monastic Training According to the Śikṣāsamuccaya. Harvard University.
Mrozik, Susanne. 2007. Virtuous Bodies: The Physical Dimensions of Morality in Buddhist Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oldmeadow, P.R. 1994. A Study of the Wisdom Chapter (Prajñāparamitā Pariccheda) of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā of Prajñākaramati. Australian National University.
Onishi, Kaoru. 2003. The Bodhicaryāvatāra and Its Monastic Aspects: On the Problem of Representation. University of Michigan.
Pettit, John. 1999. Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicharyavatara. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6.
Saito, Akira. 1993. A Study of Akṣayamati (=Śāntideva)’s Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra as Found in the Tibetan Manuscripts From Tun-Huang. Faculty of Humanities, Miye University.
Saito, Akira. 1996. Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika Philosophy. In Buddhism in India and Abroad: An Integrating Influence in Vedic and Post-Vedic Perspective. Ed. Kalpakam Sankarnarayan, Motohiro Yoritomi, and Shubhada A. Joshi. Mumbai: Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd.
Siderits, Mark. 2000. The Reality of Altruism: Reconstructing Śāntideva. Philosophy East and West 50 (3): 412-24.
Siderits, Mark. 2005. Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy. Contemporary Buddhism 6 (2): 87-113.
Sweet, Michael J. 1977. Śāntideva and the Mādhyamika: The Prajñāpāramitā-Pariccheda of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Sweet, Michael J. 1996. Mental Purification (Blo Sbyong): A Native Tibetan Genre of Religious Literature. In Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre. Ed. José Ignacio Cabezón, and Roger R. Jackson. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion.
Thurman, Robert A.F. 2004. Anger: The Seven Deadly Sins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, Paul. 1998a. Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press.
Williams, Paul. 1998b. The Absence of Self and the Removal of Pain: How Śāntideva Destroyed the Bodhisattva Path. In Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Richmond, UK: Curzon Press.

e. Related Interest

Burton, David. 2004. Buddhism, Knowledge, and Liberation: A Philosophical Analysis of Suffering. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Chang, Garma C.C., ed. 1991. A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras: Selections From the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Harrison, Paul. 1987. Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self-Image and Identity Among Followers of the Early Mahāyāna. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 10 (2): 67-89.
Hayes, Richard. 1994. The Analysis of Karma in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. In Hermeneutical Paths to the Sacred Worlds of India. Ed. Katherine K. Young, Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Heim, Maria. 2004. Theories of the Gift in South Asia: Hindu, Buddhist and Jain Reflections on Dāna. New York and Oxford: Routledge.
Hibbets, Maria. 2000. The Ethics of Esteem. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7 26-42.
Kajiyama, Yuichi. 1989. Transfer and Transformation of Merits in Relation to Emptiness. In Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected Papers). Ed. Katsumi Minaki. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.
Keown, Damien. 2005. Buddhism: Morality Without Ethics? In Buddhist Studies From India to America: Essays in Honor of Charles S. Prebish. Ed. Damien Keown. London: Routledge.
Lang, Karen. 2003. Four Illusions: Candrakīrti’s Advice to Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1966. A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy From the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century. New York: Touchstone.
McClintock, Sara, and Georges Dreyfus, eds. 2002. The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publiccations.
Nattier, Jan. 2003. A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path According to the Inquiry of Ugra (Ugraparipṛcchā). Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pye, Michael. 1978. Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism. London: Duckworth.
Solomon, Robert C. 2006. The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Sprung, Mervyn. 1979. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters From the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti. Boulder, CO: Prajñā Press.
Tatz, Mark. 1994. The Skill in Means (Upāyakauśalya) Sūtra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Wilson, Liz. 1996. Charming Cadavers: Horrific Figurations of the Feminine in Indian Buddhist Hagiographic Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Author Information

Amod Lele

Email: lele@bu.edu

Boston University

U.S.A.

The Only 2 Yoga Poses You Need For Mental & Physical Balance

The Only 2 Yoga Poses You Need For Mental & Physical Balance

Written byLauren Walker

Our editors have independently chosen the products listed on this page. If you purchase something mentioned in this article, we may earn a small commission.
January 3, 2015

In our increasingly busy world, where the many things pulling our attention are seemingly never-ending, we have limited time to do a practice to keep ourselves healthy and balanced both spiritually and physically. So rather than ask you to add one more thing to your already busy lives, I propose following the adage of working "smarter not harder."

I start every personal yoga practice with a squat and a hang.

These are power poses — essential poses to do even if you're not going to do anything else; they are the poses that give you the most bang for your buck.

One of the predictors of longevity is how easy it is to sit down on the ground and stand up again without assistance.

The squat and hang poses are great ways to practice these important physical movements.

Many yoga poses are simply variations on the squat or the hang. A squat is a compression and the hang is an extension. They are yin and yang movements that complement each other.

Why Squat?쪼그리고 앉기

Squat Pose (Malasana) helps us keep a deep and fluid flexibility in the hip joints. This flexibility is something we all have at birth, but diminishes as we age due to lack of use. The hip joints have been called the holders of emotions and they are also where sexual energy resides. A hip joint that is flexible is able to move easily and release emotions, instead of keeping them locked into non-beneficial energetic patterns within the body.

Also, having supple hip joints is crucial to the proper alignment of the body when we are walking and standing.

In our culture we spend far too much time sitting in chairs or in our cars and leaning forward. These postures shorten and tighten muscles in our legs (the hamstrings and Achilles tendons) and in our shoulders, necks and backs.

The tendency for the upper back and neck to be out of alignment, can be directly related to headaches, rapid aging and even bone deterioration.

Our internal organs need room to move and breathe, and how young our body stays, especially internally, can be directly related to the mobility and motility of our organs — the ability of the organs to move easily, bending and compressing as we move, and to have a healthy fluid flow within and around themselves, which helps our organs retain their elasticity. The squatting position helps to reinforce the inherent mobility and motility of organs.

Why Hang?

The hang aka, Forward Bend (Uttanasana) is about lengthening and loosening the back of the body — the hamstrings especially — but also the often-tight low back muscles and shoulder girdle.

Hanging the torso over is also an inversion, and will start to get the body used to being turned upside down — something most of us stop doing after we pass cartwheel age.

Allowing the body to extend in this way takes pressure off the vertebrae and allows the spine to lengthen without compression. This also gets us ready for backbending poses, where we are lengthening the spine — but also compressing it instead of lengthening and opening between the vertebrae. Hanging allows the muscles of the legs and hips to stretch, while at the same starting to strengthen them. It's also calming to the nervous system. In succession with the squat, it helps to free the hips, calm the mind and strengthen the lower body.

Adapted from Energy Medicine Yoga: Amplify the Healing Power of Your Yoga Practice by Lauren Walker (Sounds True, Oct. 2014).

And do you want your passion for wellness to change the world? Become A Functional Nutrition Coach! Enroll today to join our upcoming live office hours.
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Lauren Walker
Lauren Walker is a teaching assistant for Donna Eden as well as a certified energy medicine practitioner and a senior student of Para Yoga creator Rod Stryker. She started the yoga...

2021/05/16

[커버스토리]‘이상한’ 3월 벚꽃이 우울했던 당신에게, ‘재연결’을 처방합니다 - 경향신문

‘이상한’ 3월 벚꽃이 우울했던 당신에게, ‘재연결’을 처방합니다

유정인 기자

2021.05.15 06:00 입력

글자 크기 변경

기후위기를 마주하며 느끼는 부정적 감정은 어떻게 넘어서야 할까. ‘바로 지금, 이 길로 넘어가라’고 알려주는 신호등은 없다. 고통을 행동에너지로 옮기는 길은 자기 안에서 찾아야 한다. 이 과정을 도와주는 ‘재연결 작업’에 참여한 이다예, 조민지, 박시호씨(왼쪽부터)가 지난 9일 서울 중구 정동길의 신호등 없는 횡단보도를 나란히 건너고 있다. 강윤중 기자 yaja@kyunghyang.com

꽃을 보는 게 슬픈 일이 될 줄 몰랐다. 4월에 피던 동네 벚꽃이 3월에 피었다. 서울에선 지난 100년 사이 가장 개화가 빨랐다고 했다. ‘봄의 전령’이 언젠가부터 ‘기후위기의 전령’이 됐다. “아름다운 장면인데 기쁘지가 않고, 우울했습니다. 사람들이 사진 찍고 즐거워하는 모습을 보니 더 힘들고요. 꽃을 보며 이런 마음을 느껴야 한다는 게 슬펐어요.”

하모씨는 지역에서 생태적 삶을 모색하는 활동가다. 포장재 없는 채소와 중고 물품을 사고, 친구들과 밭을 가꾼다. 무력감은 시시때때로 덮친다. 지난해 이상기후로 텃밭 토마토가 쩍쩍 갈라졌다. 열심히 한다고 하는데, 변화는 더디다. 노년의 세상은 상상이 안 간다. ‘나는, 그리고 사랑하는 존재들은 무사할까.’ 미래를 내다보는 게 의미 없는 일 같다.

기후위기는 해롭다. 지구 생명체들의 물리적인 면을 무너뜨리는 것과 함께 인간의 정신을 마모시킨다. 일회용품 안 쓰기를 실천하다가 ‘이런다고 뭐가 바뀔까’ 회의감에 빠져본 사람부터, 환경단체 활동가와 학자까지 크고 작은 무력감과 불안을 느낀 이들이 적지 않다.

해외에선 10여년 전부터 ‘생태불안(eco anxiety)’ ‘기후슬픔(climate grief)’ 등의 용어를 붙인 연구가 활발하다. 무력감, 슬픔, 분노, 불안, 절망 등 기후위기가 정신건강에 주는 부정적 영향에 주목한다. 한국에선 ‘기후우울’이라는 용어로 해석하는데, 관련 연구는 아직 드물다. ‘우울’이라는 용어를 쓴다고 해서 치료가 필요한 ‘병’으로 여겨선 안 된다고 환경운동가들은 말한다. 생존에 위협을 느낀 존재들의 당연한 반응으로 본다.

무력감과 고통을 넘어가는 데는 지렛대가 필요하다. 환경운동 시민단체인 녹색연합은 ‘알수록 답답하고, 차라리 눈을 감고 싶고, 지쳐버린’ 사람들을 위해 지난 6일부터 ‘재연결 작업’을 시작했다. 50여년 전 미국의 생태철학자이자 환경운동가인 조애나 메이시가 만든 작업이다. “나와 세상이 서로 연결돼 있음을 다시 인식”하는 것을 목표로 삼는다.

고통을 ‘세상과 함께 괴로워하는 능력’으로 바라보는 게 특징이다. 기후우울을 넘어 ‘재연결’을 꿈꾸는 이들의 이야기를 들었다.

“아픈 지구를 위한 노력의 무력함…그 아픔을 오히려 에너지로 삼았죠”

이해·치유받고 싶은 마음에
자연과 인간의 끊어진 고리를 다시 잇는
‘재연결 작업’에 참여한 활동가들

지난 6일 저녁, 화상회의 플랫폼 ‘줌’에 접속한 ‘파도’(활동명)가 조용히 눈물을 흘렸다. 녹색연합 ‘재연결 작업’의 첫날 참여를 위해 접속한 참이었다. 화면에선 재연결 작업 창안자인 조애나 메이시가 작업의 의미를 설명하는 짧은 영상이 나왔다.

“세상을 향한 고통을 존중하는 일을 통해 우리가 확실하게 지구와 연결돼 있다는 걸 알게 될 거예요. ‘내가 세상과 함께 아파할 수 있구나. 나에게 그런 힘이 있었어. 나는 정말 큰 존재이구나’. (그렇게 인식하고 나면) 무엇도 나를 멈추지 못합니다.”

설명을 듣는 순간 울컥했다. 대학 때부터 환경운동 동아리를 만들어 활동하면서 자주 절망해왔다. 큰 소리로 외쳐도, 세상은 들어주지 않는 것 같았다. ‘세상을 바꿀 수 없겠구나. 이러다 내가 먼저 부러지고 말겠구나’ 싶어 활동을 중단했다. “내가 지구를 생각하며 느끼는 고통을 받아들이게 하고, 그 고통을 긍정하는 얘기를 들으니 눈물이 났어요. 마음앓이 해온 시간들을 이해받는 느낌이 들었습니다.”

이날부터 시작된 재연결 작업에는 그를 포함한 15명이 참여한다. 조애나 메이시가 1970년대에 창안한 이후, 세계 곳곳에서 작업이 진행돼왔다. 메이시는 달라이 라마, 틱낫한 스님 등의 지지를 받아 온 미국의 생태철학자이자 환경운동가다.

재연결 작업이 한국에 소개된 지는 몇 년 안 됐다. 작업의 골자는 여러 존재와 연결된 자신을 확인하면서, 자연과 인간의 끊어진 고리를 다시 잇는 것이다. 메이시가 공동저자로 참여한 <생명으로 돌아가기>에 과정이 자세히 소개돼 있는데, 고 김종철 녹색평론 발행인은 추천사에 이렇게 적었다. “이 모든 것(환경문제)은 우리가 자신을 이웃과 세상 만물로부터 분리된 존재로 여기며 오랫동안 살아온 데서 연유한다. 궁극적인 활로는 ‘인간중심주의’라는 자폐적인 세계관에서 해방되는 데 있음이 틀림없다.”

통상은 오프라인에서 만나 2박3일 정도 진행한다. 코로나19를 고려해 이번엔 일주일에 한 번씩 5주 동안 화상회의 플랫폼에서 만난다. 기후활동가인 정혜선씨가 녹색연합 활동가인 이다예씨와 함께 안내자로 나섰다.

■나의 울음

‘결국 인간이 사라져야 지구가 깨끗해질까’
‘막지도 못할 것을 막겠다고 하고 있나’ 자책하다 우울

참가자들은 각자 다른 경로로 환경문제를 인식하고, 또 좌절을 경험했다. 환경 관련 시민단체나 교육활동을 하는 이들이 다수 포함돼 있다. 활동하는 방식도, 자신이 느낀 ‘기후우울’의 양상과 정도도 다르지만 여러 번 마음이 무너졌던 경험을 공유했다.

박시호(활동명)씨는 공연예술단체를 운영한다. 6년차 다이버이기도 하다. 물속에서 고래를 만나고 싶어 다이빙을 시작했다. 2019년, 죽은 고래 기사가 많았다. 3월 필리핀, 4월 이탈리아, 12월 스코틀랜드 해변에 떠밀려 온 죽은 고래들의 배 속에선 인간이 만든 쓰레기가 많게는 100㎏까지 쏟아졌다. 매번 짓고 부수는 무대, 공연의상과 분장 도구…. 창작활동 중 나오는 쓰레기에 죄책감이 들었다. “셰익스피어, 체호프 얘기를 잠깐 내려놓고 지금은 코 밑까지 닥친 미래, 환경에 대한 이야기를 해야 하지 않을까”. 여기에 고개를 끄덕인 예술가들을 모아 환경을 생각하는 창작자들의 모임 ‘지구숨숨’을 꾸렸다. 해양환경에 대한 고민을 두 어린이가 고래 배 속에 들어가 쓰레기와 이야기를 나누는 라디오극 <요나 이야기>에 담아냈다.

때로는 힘이 빠진다. “인스타그램이 환경 관련 친구들로 채워지니까 ‘제2공항 짓는다’ ‘산 허물어 대규모 태양광 건설한다’ 같은 피드를 계속 보게 돼요. 아무리 반대해도 끝날 것 같지 않고, 무력감을 느끼죠. ‘모르고 살았으면 좋았을까’ ‘결국 인간이 사라져야 지구가 깨끗해지는 것 아닐까’ 이런 생각으로 치닫게 될 때도 있고요.”

조민지씨는 일반 직장에 다니다가 4년 전 비영리단체인 아름다운가게 활동가로 방향을 틀었다. 환경 등 자신이 중요하게 생각하는 가치를 ‘보통’으로 생각하는 사람들과 일을 하고 싶었다고 했다. 주기적으로 자책감이 찾아온다. 2019년 성공적인 기후위기 대응사례로 꼽히는 영국 토트네스 전환마을에 방문했을 즈음이다. “탄소를 엄청나게 쓰는 비행기를 타고 온 게 맞는 행동인가라는 생각을 떨칠 수 없었어요. 많은 것을 바꾸지 못하고 있다는 자책도요. ‘개인 탓으로 돌리는 것을 누가 바라는가’ 생각해보다가도, 종종 자책하는 상태로 돌아가곤 합니다.”

이다예씨는 녹색연합에서 일한 지 1년6개월쯤 됐다. 지난해 재연결 작업을 경험한 뒤, 이번에 공동안내자로 나섰다. 활동가가 되기 전 스스로 ‘암흑기’라 할 정도의 시간을 보냈다. 유럽으로 교환학생을 다녀오며 동물권과 귀농에 관심이 많아졌다. 귀국 뒤엔 우울감이 덮쳤다. “주변은 아무것도 바뀌지 않고 저만 혼자 변해서 많이 우울했어요. 할 수 있는 것도 없어 보였고요.” 진로 고민에 기후위기로 인한 불확실성이 더해졌다. “세상이 10~20년 뒤에도 온전할 거라고 장담할 수 없으니, 미래를 그리기 어려웠어요. 그래도 뭔가 해보려고, 녹색연합 면접을 봤어요. 면접 후 돌아가던 길에 지구가 티핑포인트(급변점)를 넘었다는 기사를 읽었어요. ‘막지도 못할 것을 막겠다고 활동가가 되려 하는구나’ 싶어서 울면서 집에 갔어요. 암흑기였죠.”

활동가를 향한 정형화된 시선과 자각은 종종 죄책감을 불러온다. 조씨는 “환경단체 등 비영리단체에서 일하는 사람들도 쏟을 수 있는 에너지는 한정적일 수밖에 없는데 ‘너는 활동가이니까’라며 온갖 활동을 하는 사람으로 대하는 것이 힘들 때가 있다. 그러면서도 스스로 ‘내가 이런 생각을 가져도 되나’라고 돌아보게 된다”고 말했다.

이번 재연결 작업을 주로 이끄는 기후활동가 정혜선씨는 “이런 감정들에 ‘기후우울’이라는 이름을 붙이는 작업은 의미가 있다”면서도 “위협을 느끼는 생명체의 건강한 반응이기 때문에 병리작용은 아니다. 오히려 고통을 느끼지 못하거나 피하려는 ‘무감각’이 더 위험하다”고 말한다.

그럼에도 환경운동 전면에 선 이들의 마음을 살피는 일이 필요하다고 본다. “저 스스로도 얼마 전까지 ‘기후위기’라는 단어가 꼴도 보기 싫고 부담스럽게 느껴지곤 했어요. 많은 활동가들이 이런 감정을 느끼면서도, 소리내어 말하기 어렵습니다. 듣고 싶어하지 않는 말을 듣게 하려고 앞장서는 청소년·청년 활동가들의 속이 어떨지 걱정되고 마음이 많이 쓰입니다.”

연결되고 싶은 마음, 이해받고 싶은 마음, 치유받고 싶은 마음, 다른 이들에게 확장하고픈 마음 등이 재연결 작업의 문을 두드리게 했다. 하모씨는 “1~2년 전부터 주변에 재연결 작업을 경험한 친구들이 생겨서 관심이 있었다”며 “고통을 바라보는 법과 지구와 연결되는 경험을 통해 힘을 받고 싶어 신청하게 됐다”고 말했다.

■지구의 울음

“울컥하고 답답한 감정,
내 울음 아닌 나와 연결된
지구의 울음이라 생각…
자연과 깊이 닿아 있는 사람이
아픔 안 느끼면 이상한 거죠”

정혜선씨는 앞서 영국과 호주 안내자를 통해 재연결 작업을 경험해봤다. 그는 기후우울을 다루는 강연을 할 때 틱낫한 스님의 “내 안에서 땅(지구)이 우는 소리를 듣는 게 중요하다”는 말을 자주 인용한다. 그 역시 기후위기를 알게 되면서 공포와 불안, 무력감 등을 느꼈다. 2016년 덴마크 성인 대안학교에서 기후위기를 처음 공부했다. 2018년 유엔 기후변화에 관한 정부간협의체(IPCC)에서 발표한 ‘지구 온난화 1.5도 특별보고서’에 충격을 받았다. 인류 생존을 위해 1.5도 이내로 기온 상승을 억제해야 하는데, 지금처럼 가다간 1.5도 상승까지 12년 정도밖에 남지 않았다는 내용이 담긴 보고서다. 몇 년에 걸쳐 수많은 전문가가 ‘합의’한 숫자로, 보수적이라는 평가도 있다.

그의 충격과 무관하게 사회는 대전환에 나서지 않았다. “소름끼치는 침묵”을 보며 마음이 자주 꺾였다. 그런 때면 ‘땅이 우는 소리’라는 말을 떠올렸다. “울컥하고 답답한 감정이 단순히 나의 울음이 아니라 나와 연결된 지구와 땅과 하늘의 울음일 거란 생각을 했어요. 자연과 깊이 닿아있는 사람이 아픔을 느끼지 않으면 이상한 것이라는 데 생각이 미쳤습니다.”

재연결 작업의 핵심은 이런 ‘연결성’을 돌아보게 하는 데 있다. 작업은 크게 4단계로 구성된다. ‘고마움으로 시작하기 → 세상에 대한 고통 존중하기 → 새로운 눈으로 보기 → 앞으로 나아가기’의 과정이다. 4단계에서 다시 1단계로 돌아가는 나선형 순환을 이룬다.

“반려동물, 숲밭의 생명…‘연결의 경험’ 떠올리면 헤쳐나갈 수 있어요”

‘살아있다고 느낀 순간은’
‘내가 소중한 사람임을 느끼게 해 준 사람은’…
주변의 고마운 존재 돌아보며 굳은 마음 ‘밭갈이’

생태철학과 불교철학이 밑바탕에 깔렸지만, 교리나 이념을 내세운 작업은 아니다. 작업은 누구나 활용해볼 수 있도록 구체적으로 짜였다. 문제를 한 방에 해결할 만병통치약이나 청사진, 지구 생명을 제때 구할 수 있을 거라는 확신은 없다. “그런 보장이 가능했다면 굳이 노력할 필요도 없었을 것”이라고 말하면서, 각자 스스로를 들여다보게 한다.

각 단계는 일방적 강의가 아닌, 여러 참여 활동으로 구성된다. 첫 단계인 ‘고마움으로 시작하기’에선 주변의 고마운 존재를 돌아보게 하는 활동을 한다. 지난 6일 저녁 첫 시간에는 ‘고마움으로 시작하기’가 일부 진행됐다. 빈 칸이 있는 3개의 열린 문장을 각자 생각한 뒤, 3명씩 작은 그룹으로 쪼개져 이야기를 나눴다. ‘최근 내가 살아있다고 느낀 순간은 __입니다’ ‘어렸을 때 즐거움을 느꼈던 장소는 __ 입니다’ ‘내가 소중한 사람임을 느끼게 해준 사람은 __입니다’ 등의 문장이다.

하씨는 ‘살아있다고 느낀 순간’으로 얼마 전 치른 ‘시농제’를 말했다. ‘숲밭’(숲의 생태를 본뜬 밭)을 함께 일구는 친구들과 한 해 농사를 시작하며 기원하는 자리였다. “땅 아래 미생물, 나무 위의 새, 밭의 작물과 나무 같은 모든 존재들에게 감사하면서 ‘앞으로 자주 오가며 시끄럽게 할 거야. 잘 부탁한다’고 얘기하는 자리였어요. 악기를 연주하고 춤을 추며 밭을 한 바퀴 돌았어요. 생의 감각이 살아난다는 느낌이 들었습니다.”

박씨는 ‘소중한 사람임을 느끼게 해준 사람’을 ‘존재’로 바꿔 답했다고 전했다. “저에게 고마운 존재는 고양이였거든요. 단체 운영 외에도 환경책 읽기 북클럽 호스트, 지구를 걱정하는 이들을 연결하는 온라인 카페 ‘지구별숨숨마을’ 이장 등을 맡고 있어요. 스스로 ‘지치면 안 돼, 기대에 부응해야지’라는 책임감이 계속 생겨요. 같이 사는 고양이 두 마리는 저에게 아무 기대 없이 본능에 따른 행동들을 하는데, 그걸 바라만 보고 있어도 따뜻한 위로가 돼요.”

참가자들은 자신의 경험을 말하는 동시에, 다른 사람들이 말하는 고마운 존재들에 귀를 기울였다. 3시간가량의 첫 과정을 경험한 이들은 각자 작은 의미들을 발견해갔다. 실망과 좌절을 반복하며 굳어진 마음을 다시 들여다보게 됐다는 얘기를 여럿이 들려줬다.

“다른 분들 이야기를 들으면서 그간 무던하게 생각했던 것들을 환기하게 됐어요. 너무 딱딱하게 굳어 있으면 아무리 내리쳐도 바뀌지 않잖아요. 굳어진 마음에 ‘밭갈이’가 될 수 있지 않을까 하는 생각이 들었어요. 나를 정말 살아있게 하는 게 무엇인지, 감사한 게 무엇인지 꼽아본 것도 도움이 됐습니다.”(조민지씨)

처음 안내자가 돼본 이씨 역시 ‘무뎌짐’과 ‘깨어남’을 말했다. “지난 1년간 활동을 하며 굉장히 무뎌졌어요. 일하면서 환경 관련 정책의사결정을 하는 사람들의 말을 계속 보거든요. 그러면 정말 세상은 안 바뀌는 것 같아요. 어느 순간부터는 그런 말을 봐도 아무런 감정이 느껴지지 않더라고요. 특히 지난해 긴 장마 이후로 그랬어요. 재연결 작업을 진행하면서 계속 감각을 깨우는 중인 것 같아요. 둔감해진 세포를 다시 깨우는 느낌이 들었어요.”

안내자인 정씨는 “내가 어떤 존재인지 알고 감사하는 법을 아는 게 기본이기 때문”이라고 첫 단계의 의미를 설명했다. “우리가 이 땅에 온 생명이라는 이유로 거저 받은 것이 많습니다. 삶을 살아볼 기회, 꽃과 새를 보는 시간 등을 대가를 지불하지 않고 받았죠. 자본주의는 대가 없이 받은 것을 계속 잊게 합니다. 생명으로서 거저 받은 고마운 존재들을 자각하면, 많은 게 다시 보일 수 있어요. 감사는 내가 단단히 뿌리내릴 수 있게 하는 것이면서 실은 매우 ‘혁명적’인 마음이라고 생각합니다.”

■고통 바라보기

5-2 ‘재연결 작업’에 참여한 조민지, 박시호, 이다예씨(왼쪽부터)가 ‘열린 문장’을 채운 손팻말을 들고 있다. 강윤중 기자

‘지금 가장 가슴 아픈 얘기는’…
세상에서 느끼는 고통을 표현하며
서로 연결돼 있다는 증거 인식

고마움을 돌아본 뒤에는 두 번째 단계로 고통을 바라본다. 세상에 대한 자신의 고통을 존중하면서, 이를 ‘세상과 함께 괴로워하는 능력’으로 인식하게 하는 단계라고 했다. 기후위기 때문에 느끼는 고통을 서로가 연결돼 있다는 증거, 그럼으로써 행동하게 하는 힘으로 받아들이게 하는 것이 목적이다.

이 때문에 14가지 참여 활동 중에는 자신이 느끼는 고통을 거리낌 없이 표현하게 하는 활동이 많다. 가령 듣기만 해도 진절머리가 나는 소식은 무엇인지, 지금의 세상을 살며 가장 가슴 아픈 얘기는 무엇인지, 그런 때 느끼는 고통을 어떻게 피하려 하는지 등의 질문을 던지고 표현하도록 한다.

사라지는 존재들을 돌아보는 활동도 포함된다. ‘애도의 돌무덤’이라는 프로그램은 이제 사라지고 없는 장소나 존재를 상징하는 물건을 모아놓고, 그 안에 담긴 이야기를 나누며 고별하는 활동이다. ‘사라져가는 벗에게’는 멸종위기에 놓인 생물 종을 하나씩 호명하도록 한다. 죄책감보다는 유일무이한 종의 아름다움을 기리면서 슬픔을 해소하는 데 방점을 둔다. 여기엔 메이시가 쓴 동명의 시도 활용된다.

“섬개개비, 코르시카산 호랑나비, 큰뿔야생양, 인도비단뱀, 짖는원숭이, 향유고래, 흰긴수염고래/ 고래 형제여, 우리에게 남은 이 시간 동안 나를 저 깊이 데려가다오. 우리 어머니 대양의 깊은 곳에서 나는 한때 아가미로 숨 쉬고 지느러미로 헤엄쳤으니. 아주 먼 옛날 바다의 소금이 아직도 내 눈물에 흐르는구나. 이제 눈물로는 부족하니 노래가 좋겠다. 내 마음이 감당할 수 없을 만큼 이 벅찬 슬픔에, 내 목이 버텨낼 수 없을 만큼 이 격한 분노에 맞는 노래가 좋겠다.”(‘사라져가는 벗에게’ 중에서)

다음으로는 3단계인 ‘새로운 눈으로 보기’로 나아간다. 여러 존재와 연결돼 있음을 이해한 뒤에, 새로운 관계를 생각해보도록 하는 ‘전환 단계’라고 했다. 자신뿐 아니라 반대 의견을 가진 사람, 우리의 선택으로 영향을 받는 비인간 존재들과 미래 세대 등의 입장을 고루 생각하게 하는 프로그램 등으로 구성된다. 이어 마지막 단계인 ‘앞으로 나아가기’에서 일상에서 자신이 해나갈 역할을 찾는다. 앞으로 지켜나갈 다섯 가지 정도의 약속을 스스로 만들고, 작은 서약식을 하는 활동 등이다. 안내자들은 당장 시작할 수 있는 단기적이고 구체적인 약속들을 담을 것을 추천한다.

■우리는 연결돼 있다

비인간 존재·미래 세대 등
새로운 눈으로 바라보고
일상서 해나갈 역할 찾아 서약…
기후우울을 넘는 ‘재연결’ 4단계

기후우울을 넘어서는 데 ‘재연결 작업’이 유일한 해법은 아니다. 참가자들은 이미 주기적으로 덮쳐온 기후우울을 여러 방식으로 건너왔다. 때로는 다른 사람의 말이, 때로는 주변의 생명들이 무너진 마음들을 보듬었다. ‘연결된 세상’은 이미 곁에 있었다.

‘연극을 하지 않는 게 지구에 도움되는 것 아닐까, 모두가 활동가가 돼야 하는 건 아닐까’ 고민하던 박씨는 “사람들이 잠시 멈춰서 생각할 수 있도록 해주는 게 창작자들의 역할”이라는 누군가의 말을 듣고 마음을 다잡았다. 비행기를 타고 전환마을을 찾은 데 죄책감을 느낀 조씨는 “네가 하는 활동의 근본 목적을 돌아봐라. 자신의 탓으로 돌리기보다 더 큰 차원에서 고민해야 한다”는 이야기를 들으면서 죄책감에서 벗어났다. 이씨는 주말마다 시간을 보내는 숲밭, 거리의 나무 등 여전히 아름다운 존재들을 보며 힘을 얻곤 한다.

오는 6월 재연결 작업 과정이 끝나면, 자신이 어떻게 변화하게 될지 이들도 확신하지 못한다. 정책과 기업, 사회를 굴리는 시스템이 획기적으로 변하지 않는 한, 언제고 슬픔과 무력감을 다시 마주하게 된다는 것도 안다. 다만 이들은 그런 마음이 찾아왔을 때 헤쳐나갈 수 있는 ‘또 하나의 가능성’을 위해, 좀 더 단단한 연결의 경험을 얻어가고 싶다고 했다.

기후위기 앞 ‘역시 할 수 있는 게 없어’에서
‘그럼에도 불구하고’로 나아가는 힘 얻게 돼

“무력감을 덜 느끼기 위해 재연결 작업에 참여하게 됐어요. 다 마치고 난 뒤에는 ‘역시 할 수 있는 게 없어’에서 ‘그럼에도 불구하고’로 나아가고 싶어요. 이 모든 어려움에도 불구하고, 가능성은 아직 있고, 이런 사람들이 있고, 아직 감사할 것들이 있으니 해볼 수 있다는 마음을 갖게 되길 바라고 있습니다.”(박시호씨)

조직에서 활동가 ‘공육’(함께 배워나가기)을 맡고 있는 조씨는 “마음이 지쳤을 때 시도해볼 수 있는 또 다른 도구, 또 다른 무기로서 가져갈 수 있을 거라는 기대가 있다”며 “더 많은 사람들과 함께해 보면서 확장해나갔으면 하는 바람”이라고 말했다.

마지막으로 기후위기를 맞닥뜨린 존재들에게 하고 싶은 말을 물었다. 하씨는 서로의 안부를 물으면서 이런 말을 전하고 싶다고 했다. “모든 존재가 무사했으면 좋겠습니다.”

<직접 해보세요>

　환경운동 시민단체 녹색연합이 진행 중인 ‘재연결 작업’은 기후위기에 무력감을 느껴 본 사람들이 시도해 볼 수 있는 프로그램입니다. 미국의 생태철학자이자 환경운동가인 조애나 메이시가 50여년 전 만든 작업입니다.
　작업의 골자는 ‘나와 다른 존재’, ‘인간과 지구’가 서로 연결돼 있다는 것을 다시 인식하게 하는 것입니다. 크게 ‘고마움으로 시작하기 → 세상에 대한 고통 존중하기 → 새로운 눈으로 보기 → 앞으로 나아가기’의 4단계를 거칩니다.
　4단계의 핵심을 정혜선 기후활동가의 감수를 받아 정리했습니다. 메이시가 공동저자로 참여한 <생명으로 돌아가기>를 참고했습니다. 통상 2박3일 걸리는 재연결 작업을 1~2시간 일정으로 압축한 안입니다. 마음을 터놓을 수 있는 공간에서 따로, 또 같이 해보세요.

■1단계 - 고마움으로 시작하기
　파괴와 비극을 마주해 두렵고 지칠 때, 마음의 중심을 잡는 첫 단계입니다.

　-아래 문장을 채워보세요.
　“최근에 자연의 경이로움을 느낀 순간은 ____이다.”
　“어렸을 때 즐거운 시간을 보냈던 장소는 ____이다.”
　“나 자신이 소중한 존재라는 걸 깨닫게 해준 사람은 ___이다.”
　“지금 이 시대에 태어나 살아볼 수 있어서 감사한 점은 ___이다”

■2단계 - 세상에 대한 고통 존중하기
　고통을 인정하면서 우리에게 세상과 함께 괴로워하는 능력이 있음을 인식하는 단계입니다.

　-아래 문장을 채워보세요.
　“자연 세계에서 벌어지는 일 가운데 특히나 마음이 아픈 것은 ___이다.”
　“이 모든 것에 대해 항상 느끼는 감정은 ___이다.”
　“나는 이 모든 것을 듣고/생각하고 싶지 않다. ___한 기분이 들기 때문이다.”
　“이러한 감정을 피하기 위해 사용하는 방법은 ___이다.”

　-‘사라져가는 벗’들을 불러주세요.
　멸종위기에 놓인 생물종의 목록을 하나씩 읽습니다. 사라지는 것들을 호명할 때마다, 이를 기리는 소리를 냅니다. 종이나 북, 손뼉을 쳐도 좋습니다. 죄책감의 시간이 아니라, 유일무이한 종의 아름다움과 지혜를 기리는 시간이 되도록 합니다.

■3단계 - 새로운 눈으로 보기
　우리가 모든 존재와 연결돼 있음을 이해하고, 새로운 관계를 맺는 전환 단계입니다.

　-네 가지 목소리로 ‘넓어지는 원’을 경험해보세요.
　세상의 고통을 야기하는 사안 중 관심있는 것을 택해 자신의 의견을 말합니다. 예를 들어 ‘석탄화력발전소가 없어져야 하는가’ 같은 데 대한 의견을 말할 수 있습니다. 이제 반대자가 되어 말해 봅니다. 다음으로, 이 상황에 영향을 받는 ‘인간 외의 생명체’로서 말해 봅니다. 마지막으로 이 사안으로 영향을 받게 될 미래 인간의 목소리로 말합니다. 네 가지 목소리를 낼 때 모두 ‘나’라는 주어를 사용합니다. 다른 존재의 견해를 상상하면서 자신과 사람들 내면의 관용을 느껴봅니다.

■4단계 - 앞으로 나아가기
　다시 시작될 일상을 바꿔 대전환에 참여하는 단계

　- 다섯 가지 서약
　마음을 다잡아도 수많은 이유로 흐트러지기 쉽습니다. 자신이 지켜나갈 다섯 가지 정도를 정해 스스로에게 서약해보세요. 당장 내일, 일주일 안에, 혹은 한 달 안에 할 수 있는 구체적인 약속이 좋습니다. 간단한 ‘서약식’을 하며 거듭난 자신을 축하해 주세요.

■다시 1단계로
　4단계는 나선형 순환구조입니다. 재연결 작업 이후에도 언제든 고통과 무기력을 마주할 수 있습니다. 그럴 때면 더 넓고 깊어진 자신을 경험하며 고마움으로 돌아가 새로운 여정을 시작합니다.

나야 뭐 > 씨알의소리(1970-1981) | 바보새함석헌

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작성자 바보새 14-04-08 07:13 조회968회 댓글0건

나야 뭐

씨알 여러분 안녕하십니까? 여러분의 가정에 하나님의 각별하신 은혜가 있기 바랍니다. 5월 8일, 어머니날 밤 9시 57분에 아내 황득순이 긴 병 끝에 아주 그 나라로 갔습니다.

그날 나는 기독교장로 전남노회 교사위원회 초청으로 강연을 하기로 되어있었으므로 새벽 5시에 집을 떠나 광주에 갔었습니다. 이미 여러 날째 생사선을 넘나들기를 몇 차례 거듭하고 있었으므로 언제 무슨 일이 있을지 모른다는 것은 생각하고 간 길이었지만, 그 시간이 또 그렇게 마련 된 줄은 몰랐습니다.

광주에 가닿으니 교사회 간부 여러분들이, 통지를 벌써 냈는데 그 통지서가 전달이 되지 않았다 해서, 사방으로 전화를 걸어 청중을 모으노라고 바쁠 때에, 서울서 홍남순 변호사님 댁을 통해서, 속히 돌아오는 것이 좋겠다는 전화가 왔습니다. 그러나 이제 일어서서 그냥 갈 수는 없습니다. 오후 3시다 저녁 8시의 두 차례의 강연을 하고 밤 10시 40분차로 돌아가기로 했습니다.

그래서 두 차례의 강연을 다 하고，9시 반이 지나서 끝맺는 말을 하는 중에, “지금 이 순간 아마 내 아내는 마지막 숨을 거두는지도 모릅니다.” 하고, 총총히 떠나 침대차에 몸을 던져 한잠을 자고 서울역에 내려 집으로 달려가니, 문간에 “근조”의 초롱이 달려있었습니다. 언뜻 머리속에 나타나는 이 1930년 그때도 5월 9일 이른 아침 이불속에서 채 나오기 전 두드려 깨움을 받아 “남강 선생님이 돌아가셨다”는 소리를 듣고 허둥지둥 용동으로 달려갔던 그림이었습니다.

들어가 병풍을 재친 후 덮은 수건을 벗기고 보니 고요히 자는 얼굴이요, 고통할 때는 악이라도 쓰는 듯 꽛꽛하던 몸이 어쩌면 보드럽기가 어린애 같았습니다. 수건을 덮고 나는 울지도 않았습니다.

아내는 누가 지어주었는지 모르나, 이름자대로 순(順)이었습니다. 그저 순종해 산 일생입니다. 열여섯의 소녀로 시집살이를 시작했고, 우리 집안 어른들이 본래 통히 말이 없는 분들이기도 하지만, 스물에 가까운 큰 가족에 밤낮 손님이 끊지 않는 집의 맏며느리로서 불평 한번 없이 섬김으로만 살아온 사람이었습니다. 더구나 내 손위 누님이 결혼하자마자 가정이 행복스럽지 못해, 남편과 함께 우리 집으로 들어와 칠, 팔남매를 한 솥에서 밥을 먹으며 길러냈었도, 그 부엌에서 언제 한번 큰소리 나본 일 없어서, 문중에서 칭찬거리였습니다. 1945년 해방이 되고, 공산당 천지 되어 숙청당하고 맨손으로 쫓겨나게 될 때, 나는 도리어 당황했어도 그 사람은 까딱이 없었고，1947년 내가 38선 넘어 이리 온 후 한 동안 그는 머리에 광주리를 이고 평생에 모르던 행상을 해서 가족을 연명시켰습니다. 그 후 아이들을 끌고 죽음의 선을 넘어 이리 온 것도 그의 용기로 된 것이요, 내가 경찰서, 감옥을 밤낮 드나들 때에 부족 없이 뒷바라지를 해준 것은 그의 사랑으로 된 것입니다.

그러나 그는 그렇게 순종, 봉사를 했는데 나는 그에 대해 성실을 지키지 못 했습니다. 그런데 하나님은 왜 나를 치시지 않고 그를 치셨습니다. 물론 좋아서 구경을 하려 간 것은 아니지만, 내가 세 차례 세계를 돌고 다니는 동안 그는 자주 병으로 눕게 됐습니다. 이성구, 최태사, 박충서 세분 의사님이 치료비를 안 받으시기는 고사하고 보태주시면서까지 자진 늘 치료해 주시지 않았다면 나 혼자서는 어떻게 감당했을지 모르겠습니다. 더구나 나중가서 그 병이 파킨슨병인 것이 판명되고, 그 원인이 신경성으로 되는 것이라 할 때, 나는 “하나님이 나를 치시기 위해 그를 치신 것” 이라는 생각을 아니할 수 없었습니다. 그러기 때문에 나는 칠십이 지나서 정말 인생을 공부하기 시작했습니다. 그는 나의 마땅히 받아야하는 벌을 대 신 받은 것이요, 나의 생애의 마지막 손질을 하기 위해 희생이 된 것입니다.

나의 가장 큰 잘못은 그를 내 믿음의 친구로 생각하지 못한 점입니다. 나는 아내의 선생노릇을 했던 간디를 못내 부러워하면서도 그렇게 못했습니다.

입관을 해놓고 아이들이 하는 회고담에서 나는 그들 사이에 어머니 별명이 “나야 뭐”인 것을 알았습니다. 먹을거나, 입을거나, 뭣에서나, 자기는 늘 빼놓면서 늘 하는 말의 첫 머리가 “나야 뭐……”였다는 것입니다.

남기고 간 몸을 묻고 돌아와서 아이들이 기념으로 어머니 생전에 쓰던 물건을 나눠가지려 해서 장속을 들추어 보더니 글자그대로 아무것도 없다는 것입니다. 다 아는 일이지만 새삼 듣고 나서 슬프고 부끄러웠습니다. 그러나 또 기뻤습니다.

이것을 씨알에게 내놓는 기념물로 합니다.

씨알의 소리 1978. 5월 73호

저작집; 9- 211

전집; 8- 392

간음 후 힘있는 ‘속죄론’ 개진 - 뉴시안

<함석헌과 한국교회> 간음 후 힘있는 ‘속죄론’ 개진

박신애 기자 승인 2012.08.20

(20)젖을 내라는데 어미가 썩었소!-2

이 사건 이후 함석헌은 “죄는 참말로는 없다”는 말을 하지 않는다, 오히려 인간에게 죄의 뿌리가 얼마나 깊이 박혀있는가를 누누이 강조한다. 이 점에 대해서는 다음 장에서 다룬다. 여기서는 평생에 걸쳐 진행되는 그의 속죄 과정을 살펴본다. 60년 동안 쌓아온 그의 빛나는 생애를 모래탑에 비유한 그는 이제 남은 30년 생애를 속죄과정으로 채우면서 다시 일어선다.

1960년 10월 9일에 안병무에게 보낸 편지(18-25)에서 함석헌은 “아아, 젖을 내라는데 어미가 썩었소!”라고 절규한다. 이 편지에서 일부를 발췌해보자.

“나는 지금 대한교련(大韓敎聯)에서 주최한 전국교육자대회에 나가서 시민으로서 격려사를 하라고 해서 말을 하고 왔소. 나는 끌려 나간 거요. 아니 나가야 할 내 처지인 줄 알면서도 나갔어요. 지난 18일 일이 터진 후 하루도 평안할 날 없어요.

일반 세상에서는 아직 모르지만 친구들은 내 잘못을 아니 데모를 한 거요. 그래 어디 산속으로 들어가라는 거요. 나도 그리 생각해요. 하지만 그리 아니 되는 점도 있어 이러지도 저러지도 못하고 있어 왔지요. 외국행도 그래 생각한 거요.

글을 써라 말을 해라, 실속 모르는 사회는 자꾸 요구하지요. 매일 몇 사람 혹 청년 혹 원로들이 오지만 속을 이야기할 수도 없고. 사회 형편으론 내가 뭐라거나 말해야 할 사정인 것도 알지만 이 이상 더 속임의 생활을 할 수도 없고. 유(영모) 선생님, 또 여러 친구들도 다 내가 근신해야 할 것을 말씀들 하지요. 거래는 통 없지요. 참 연옥이에요. 여기다 비하면 이때까지의 풍파는 아무것도 아니요. 형은 순풍의 길이지. 부디 이 앞 배의 파선을 거부하시오.

오늘도 나갈 수 없는 건데 내 사정 모르는 사회는 꼭 나와야 한다고 막 끌어냈어요. 이것이 허위생활 하는 나의 받는 심판이에요. 그래 각오하고 나갔지요. 죽을 각오 하고. 내 마음 아무도 모를 거요. 나는 지금 향리에서 망나니 생활 하던 놈이 갈 곳 없어 돌격대에 지원병 나가는 심리예요. 그밖에는 나의 재생의 길 없어요. 내 죄를 나의 지는 십자가로 속(贖)해야지. 대속(代贖)이 뭐요, 자속(自贖)이지. 나는 죽어야 해요. 이 죽음이나마 이용해보라는 거요. 그래 나는 애써 호소했어요. 나를 봐라, 내 속이 썩은 사람임을 봐라. …사람이 필요하다고, 바른 말 하라고 나한테 오는데, 나 자체가 썩었으니! 아아, 젖을 내라는데 어미가 썩었소! 내가 이 나라 청년 망쳤어요!”

또 석진영 님에게 보낸 1965년 6월 2일자 편지(18-159)에서 그는 다음과 같이 말한다.

“편지 고맙게 읽었소. 지나간 일을 또 한 번 생각해보오. 지나간 것도 아니오. 지나가버릴 수가 없지. 무사(武士)의 얼굴에 난 상처가 일생을 두고 말을 하듯이. 문제는 살아났나 못 났나에 있지. 다 아물고 나으면 뼛속까지 났던 상처도 자랑일 수 있고, 열매를 못 맺었으면 곱던 꽃이 되려 부끄러움이지. 세상에서 그어놓은 금을 내가 깨뜨렸던 것이 잘못이지. 남의 가슴 아프게 했던 것이 내 죄지.

나와 하나님과의 대결에는 다른 사람은 개입할 필요도 없고, 할 수도 없고, 그때의 나의 심경은 <예언자>의 서문에 썼지요.

‘이젠 다 나았어요, 다 잊었어요,’ 나는 그런 소리를 하리만큼 한 성자도 아니고, 양심이 아주 없지도 않고, 영원한 고민을 하면서도 자라자는 마음이지. 가능한 한 속(贖)을 해보아야지."

또 사건이 발생한 지 10년이 넘은 때에 함석헌이 해남에 있는 이준목 목사에게 보낸 편지(18-98)에서도 <씨알의 소리>는 그의 속죄과정의 하나로 하고 있으니 무슨 일이 있어도 그만두지 않을 것이라고 다짐한다.

“내 가슴에서는 지금까지도 늘 피가 흐르고 있습니다. 그러나 또 그 때문에 아마 그러지 않았더라면 몰랐을 것을 안 것도 많습니다. 씨알의 전체 속에 나를 발견하게 된 것도 탄탄대로식으로만 나갔다면 발견하지 못했을는지 모릅니다.

<씨알의 소리>는 나의 속죄과정의 하나로 하고 있으니 무슨 일이 있어도 그만두지는 않을 것입니다. 그렇지만 곡절이 참 많습니다. 다 됐다고 해서 손에 들어온 잡지를 받아들면 병신자식 낳아놓은 엄마 같은 생각이 듭니다. 이것이 내 자식일까? 이렇게 낳자던 것이 내 마음일까? 찢기고 할퀴고 부러지고 잘리고, 화가 나서 못 살겠습니다. 그러나 그래도 해야지요.”

함석헌의 부인인 황득순 여사는 1978년 5월 8일에 세상을 떠났다. 함석헌은 <씨알의 소리> 그 달 호에 “나야 뭐”(8-392)라는 제목으로 우리의 심금을 울리는 사부곡(思婦曲)을 발표하는데, 거기에 “그는 그렇게 순종 봉사를 했는데 나는 그에 대해서 성실을 지키지 못했습니다. 그런데 하나님은 나를 치시지 않고 그를 치셨습니다”라는 구절이 나온다. 사건 후 18년이나 지났지만 간음의 상처는 부인의 사망을 계기로 다시 살아난다. 그때까지 그의 속죄과정은 계속되고 있는 것이다.

이 사건이 일어나기 전의 그의 속죄론은 옳기는 하지마는 자신의 범법과 속죄의 체험이 빠진 것이었다. 그만큼 알맹이가 빠진 추상론이었다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 이제는 자신의 체험이 있으니 정말로 힘 있게 자신의 속죄론을 개진할 수 있게 되었다. 함석헌이 <씨알의 소리> 창간호에서 개진한 속죄론은 이러한 과정을 거친 자신의 고백인 셈이다.

박신애 기자

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거대한 전환이 시작되는 곳, 로컬

좋은 삶이란 어떤 삶일까? 각자가 지향하는 바에 따라 정의가 달라지겠지만 우리는 일단 좋은 삶을 꿈꾼다. 그런데 얼마나 많은 사람이 자신이 생각하는 좋은 삶에 근접해 살고 있을까? 신자유주의는 부자는 부자대로 서민은 서민대로 저마다의 불만을 품에 안고 살아가게 만든다. 우리에게 세상은 원래 그러니 네가 세상에 맞춰 살라며 은연중에 포기하는 삶을 강요한다. 그렇다보니 ‘행복한 노동’은 실종된 지 오래다. 그저 돈을 많이 벌 수 있으면 뭐라도 해야 한다. 인간은 점점 자본의 노예가 되고 있는 것이다. 소비하지 않으면 단 하루도 생존이 어려운 도시의 삶은 더욱 인간의 삶을 가혹하게 만든다. 소확행이나 워라밸은 바로 이러한 세상을 그래도 정신 차리고 버텨보려는 몸부림일지도 모른다.

어떻게 해야 우리는 노동의 주체가 되어 행복한 삶을 영위할 수 있을까? 《천연균에서 찾은 오래된 미래》에서 와타나베 이타루는 말한다. ‘빚을 지지 않는 삶’을 살아야 한다고. 그렇다. 자본주의 사회 안에서는 돈을 많이 버는 것보다 빚을 지지 않는 삶을 사는 게 훨씬 어렵다. 돈을 벌기 위해서는 어디선가 돈을 빌려야하는 사회. 아파트를 사기 위해, 주식 투자를 위해 돈을 꾼다. 은행도 기꺼이 빌려준다. 이렇게 빚은 레버리지가 되어버렸다. 또한 차를 사고, TV를 바꾸고 장을 보기 위해 우리는 카드를 긁는다. 카드 또한 빚이란 걸 잊은 채 말이다. 이처럼 빚은 이미 우리 삶 깊숙하게 침투해 뱀처럼 똬리를 틀고 있다. 이러한 상황에서 빚을 갚기 위해 우리는 일에 종속될 수밖에 없다. 노동이 삶을 짚어 삼키고 있는 형국이다. 더구나 요즘에는 일자리라도 끊이지 않으면 다행이니 삶은 고달픔의 연속이다.

와타나베의 삶도 우리가 크게 다르지 않았다. 도시의 가혹한 노동과 부조리한 경제 구조로 삶을 위협받았었다. 그랬던 그가 돌연 아내와 함께 도시를 떠나 일본 시골 마을로 들어가 빵집 ‘타루마리’를 연다. 특히 2011년 동일본대지진으로 삶의 터전이었던 동일본 지역이 방사능 오염에 노출되자 또다시 더욱 깊숙한 시골로 이주한다. 이른바 소멸위기에 처한 아무도 주목하지 않는 지역으로. 그런데 와타나베 부부가 야생 상태의 천연균에서 직접 채취한 효모로 빵을 굽기 시작하자 와타나베 부부의 삶뿐만 아니라 마을이 변하기 시작했다. 쇠락일로에 있던 마을이 활력을 되찾은 것이다.

도대체 타루마리에서 어떤 일이 벌어졌을까? 대안형 혁신학교 이우학교 교사 우경윤은 타루마리에서 보여준 와타나베 부부의 삶에 노동의 참된 가치가 있음을 발견하고 즉시 타루마리 빵집을 향한다. 마침 마을 회복이 미래의 희망이라고 생각하는 이우학교의 철학과 맞닿은 지점도 있었고 학생에게 보다 다양한 삶의 방식을 보여줄 수 있겠다고 생각한 것이다.

《천연균에서 찾은 오래된 미래》는 이처럼 이우학교 교사와 타루마리 빵집의 와타나베 부부가 수차례 교류하면서 교육을 비롯한 정치, 사회, 경제에 이르기까지 삶과 미래 등을 주제로 더 나은 삶의 방향을 모색해 본 좌담집이다. 또한 타루마리 부부의 전작 《시골빵집에서 자본론을 굽다》 이후의 타루마리 이야기이가 담겨있는데 로컬에서 찾은 미래가 이 책의 주제라고 할 수 있다.

와타나베는 돗토리 현의 작은 마을의 자원을 발굴한다. 그 자원이란 다름 아닌 깨끗한 자연 환경과 지방 정부 소유이 유휴 공간 그리고 풍부한 지역 농산물이다. 지역 소멸로 폐교한 어린이집을 싼값에 임대해 천연균을 채취하고 빵을 만들 수 있는 시설을 마련했다. 무엇보다 지역 커뮤니티와 관계를 맺으면서 빵을 만드는 데 필요한 밀가루를 비롯한 각종 원재료를 공급 받으면서 지역 내 경제순환 생태계를 구축했다.

지역에서 인간관계를 넓혀가고, 교육을 포함한 다양한 지역 과제를 해결할 방법도 조금씩 찾아가다 보면 뭔가 길이 보이지 않을까요? 시간이 오래 걸리겠지만 가장 중요한 생산 활동을 착실하게 계속하는 한 반드시 무언가가 바뀔 거라고 믿습니다.와나타베 이타루

빚을 지지 않는 삶을 살기 위해 와타나베는 무에서 유를 낳는 시스템을 구축했다. 돈이 없더라도 빵을 만들 수 있는 환경을 만들었는데 무엇보다 발효에 필요한 균을 사지 않고 직접 채취하는 방식을 택했다. 아울러 인근 농가에서 재배한 밀을 사용하기 위해 제분기를 샀다. 시중에서 판매하는 밀가루를 사면 편리하겠지만 그러한 소비 행위는 지역 경제와 전혀 상관없기 때문이었다. 지역경제 순환에 초점을 맞춘 타루마리의 경영철학이 담긴 선택이라 할 수 있다.

타루마리가 보여줬듯이 로컬의 삶이란 단순히 도시의 빡빡한 삶을 벗어나는 것을 의미하진 않는다. 도시를 지탱하는 촘촘한 자본주의 시스템 영향에서 벗어나 나 자신이 원하는 일과 삶을 되찾기 위한 도전이기도 하며 삶의 태도를 전환하는 일이기도 하다. 최근에 활발히 진행되고 있는 청년마을 지역 유치 사업이 어떻게 하면 지속가능할지 참고할 만한 대목이라 하겠다. 타루마리가 실험하고 도전하면서 이뤄낸 변화는 보기에는 미약하지만 그 파장과 영향은 크리라 생각한다. 특히 코로나19 판데믹으로 미래가 더욱 불투명해진 세상에서 이 책의 가치가 더욱 빛난다.

로컬그라운드 편집부 / local@localground.co.kr