やしの実通信 新渡戸稲造、矢内原忠雄の植民地論

やしの実通信

新渡戸稲造、矢内原忠雄の植民地論 [2014年11月05日（Wed）]



植民地、Colony
この言葉からは過去500年の西洋人による、搾取、奴隷、暴力、独占、人種差別、等の言葉しか思い浮かばない。
最初にこの偏見を改めさせてくれたのが、考古学者の愚夫が３千年、５万年前の人類の移動にcolonizationという言葉を使っていた時だ。
人類の移動イコール植民なのである。

アダム•スミスの『国富論』では、植民地論をギリシャ、ローマ当たりから初めている。新渡戸、矢内原もギリシャ、ローマの植民地論を論じている。


この数週間で読んだのは下記の文献

新渡戸稲造全集　第四巻　植民地政策講義及論文集
Nitobe, Inazo, "Japan as a Colonizer" The Journal of Race Development. Vol 2, No. 4 (April., 1912), pp. 347-361
矢内原忠雄、『アダム•スミスの植民地論』、矢内原忠雄全集


矢内原の文章は難しいが新渡戸はわかりやすくて面白い。
なんでもっと早くこの論文に出会わなかったのであろう。新渡戸稲造といえば『武士道』しかない、と思っていた。
もしこれからこの論文を読もうとする方は、スミスの『国富論』にある植民地の章を読んでから、新渡戸稲造と矢内原忠雄の植民地論を読むとわかりやすいです。きっと先に新渡戸、矢内原を読んでも意味がわからない、と思います。
スミスはああだ、こうだとゴネゴネ言い回していますが、でも丁寧な解説でわかりやすいです。


新渡戸稲造全集第四巻は思い切って購入した。矢内原忠雄全集は図書館でかりた。１－５巻が植民政策研究である。
この二人の植民地論がアダム•スミスを基盤にしている事は疑いようがない。矢内原はスミスが経済学の父であるだけでなく、植民地論の父でもあると明言している。
この植民地論、矢内原が戦後国際経済という科目で教えたように、国際経済、即ち国際政治にもつながる。ということはスミスは国際経済、国際政治、そして開発学の父、とも言えるのではないだろうか？




Posted by 早川理恵子 at 17:06 | 新渡戸稲造と矢内原忠雄 | この記事のURL | コメント(0

ーーー

Japan as a Colonizer - Inazo Nitobe [2014年11月13日（Thu）]

今日は朝からフィジーのイノケ外相（在日大使をされていた）に「日本は中国とインドに対して悪魔の行いをしてきた。二度と両国と友人関係にはなれない。」とTWされてショックを受けている。

日本が旧植民地で何をしてきたか。
新渡戸稲造が「植民者としての日本」という英文のペーパーを出している。1912年だ。
当時、既に日本への批判、猜疑心が米国の中に生まれていたようだ。

新渡戸によれば、当時台湾は李鴻章から、首狩り族と麻薬と、強盗だらけで、決して統治できる代物ではない。日本は気の毒である、とまで言われているような状況であった。
日本はこの状況を数年で改善し、台湾の北から南まで、女性一人で旅をしても大丈夫な程安全な場所にした。
新渡戸は、首狩り族対策、強盗対策、麻薬対策、衛生改善等々、李鴻章が統治不可能と言った問題を日本がどのように解決して行ったのか詳細に述べている。

日本統治前の台湾では、強盗は体格がよく、店の前に立って商売の邪魔をしていた。これに困った商人はお金で解決していた、という。新渡戸は同様な光景を満州でも見た、と書いている。

新渡戸稲造の植民地論でアダム•スミスを参考にしている事があまり、というかほとんど議論されていないようである。この"Japan as a Colonizer "もあまり引用されていなように思うが、当方の勘違いであって欲しい。

日本が悪魔的行いをしたかどうか、という問題よりも、そのような情報が外相レベルに浸透している事を日本は憂慮すべきである。



Japan as a Colonizer - Inazo Nitobe　
ここに全文があります。

http://archive.org/stream/jstor-29737924/29737924_djvu.txt

Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 

By Inazo Nitobe, Ph.D. 

President of the First National College, and Professor in 

the Imperial University, Tokyo, formerly Director of the 

Bureau of Industries in the Government of Formosa 

With the acquisition of the small island of Formosa in 1895, 
Japan joined the ranks of colonial powers. Since then she 
has had the island of Saghalien by the treaty of Portsmouth 
in 1905 and Korea by annexation last year. Besides these 
territories she has also in her possession the small province 
of Kwang-tung in the Liao Tung peninsula; and a long, 
narrow strip of land along the Manchurian railroad, the 
last two being leased from the Chinese. 

In recounting what Japan has done as a colonizer I shall 
for several reasons devote my time to a review of what Japan 
has achieved in Formosa. First, because it was the first colony 
and as such served the purpose of colonial education for us. 
Second, because it may be called the only colony with which we 
have had any experience worth speaking about. The other 
colonies and possessions are so new to us that whatever 
policy we may have formed for them has not yet borne any 
fruit. And thirdly, because the administration of this island 
of Formosa forms a precedent for the government of later 
acquisitions; and also because you can infer from a descrip- 
tion of our policy in Formosa what we shall do with other 
possessions and colonies. To these three reasons there is 
an appendix to be added — namely, because I can speak of 
this colony from a long and personal connection with it, 
and to me the last is the strongest and the best reason. 

Now Formosa, or more properly, Tai-wan (since Formosa 
is not a Chinese nor a Japanese name, being a Portuguese 
appellation), was ceded to us at the termination of theChino- 

347 



348 INAZO NITOBE 

Japanese war. When accession from China was proposed 
by Japan, we were not at all sure that the suggestion would 
be complied with by the authorities. But the Chinese 
plenipotentiary, Li Hung Chang, took up the proposition 
as though it were wise on the part of his country to be freed 
from an incumbrance, and even commiserated Japan for 
acquiring it. He pointed out that the island was not amen- 
able to good government, that brigandage could never be 
exterminated there, that the presence of head hunting tribes 
was always a menace to social order, and that the climate was 
not salubrious, and also that the opium habit among the 
people was widely spread and extreme. The island, some- 
what like Sicily, had, in the course of its history, been sub- 
ject to the flags of various nations; Holland, Spain and 
China ruled it at different times, and at one time Japanese 
pirates had practically usurped supreme power over it. 
At another time the French flag floated on its shores. Such 
an instability in government is enough to demoralize any 
people; but among the people themselves there were ele- 
ments which put law and order to naught. 

The indigenous population consists of head-hunters of 
Malay descent, who live in small communities in a very low 
grade of culture. The only art with which they are ac- 
quainted is agriculture, and that in a very primitive style 
— what the Germans name Spatencultur, not agriculture 
proper but rather what Mr. Morgan, if I remember rightly, 
in his Primitive Society calls a primitive form of horticulture. 
They have no ploughs; they have no draft animals; this hor- 
ticulture is all that they know. But these people are very 
cleanly in their habits. This may be due to their Malay 
instinct of frequent bathing; and they keep their cottages 
perfectly clean, unlike other savages of a similar grade of 
culture. The main part of the population, however, con- 
sists of Chinese who have come from the continent and 
settled in Formosa. They came chiefly from the opposite 
shores, the province of Fukien and from the city and sur- 
roundings of Canton. It seems that the Chinese emigrants 
could not perpetuate their families in their new home for 
any number of generations, succumbing as they did to the 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 349 

direct and indirect effects of malaria, and hence the Chinese 
population proper was constantly replenished by new arri- 
vals from the main land. The aborigines or savages liv- 
ing a primitive life, constantly driven into the forest regions 
and high altitudes, did not increase in numbers; so when 
Japan assumed authority in this island she found few con- 
ditions that bespoke a hopeful outlook. The Chinese, repre- 
senting two branches of their race totally different in char- 
acter and in their dialects — their dialect being unintelligible 
one to the other — occupied the coast and the plains and were 
chiefly engaged in agricultural pursuits. They had a few 
fortified cities and towns among them; Tainan and Taihoku, 
with a population of about 40,000 were the most important. 

The peaceful Chinese inhabitants were constantly exposed to 
depredations of the brigands. In fact, a great many villages, 
besides paying taxes to the government, had to make regular 
but secret tribute to the brigand for immunity from spolia- 
tion. But this is nothing peculiar to Formosa. When I was in 
Manchuria I found just the same thing there. Perhaps my 
friend, Professor Iyenaga, described to you in his speech 
this morning the brigandage in Manchuria. When I was 
there a few years ago I found that the mounted bandits 
often threatened the caravans which carried merchandise 
and silver ingots. The government could do nothing with 
them and so the caravans formed a kind of league, a kind 
of guild; and then the brigands also formed a kind of guild, 
and both the caravan guild and the brigand guild would 
send their representatives to meet somewhere; and the cara- 
van representative would offer to pay something and say, 
"Now, we will pay you so many thousands of dollars a year, 
if you promise to spare our caravans," and the brigands 
would say, "All right. If you carry such and such a flag 
we will not attack your caravans, but we will attack other 
caravans that do not pay us." Thus without any action 
on the part of the government there is peace procured 
between the brigands and the caravans. 

It is the same with the beggars; in Mukden I saw a num- 
ber of wretched looking creatures begging from house to 
house. These paupers form a very strong body; they have 



350 INAZO NITOBE 

a delegate of their own. A number of them will stand in 
front of a store and of course no one will go into such a store 
guarded by beggars, and that store loses trade. So a num- 
ber of these stores get together, form a guild and send a dele- 
gate to the guild of the beggars and say," Please don't stand 
in front of our stores." Between them the two delegates 
settle the matter for a certain sum of money. So it was with 
these Formosans, in their dealings with the bandits. They 
paid tribute, so many dollars or so many head of cattle a 
year. Still the agriculturists who had their farms away 
from the villages, even though they were free from brigand- 
age, were exposed to the attacks of head-hunters who would 
steal unawares from their haunts among the mountains to 
shoot anybody. I must make a digression and state that 
these head-hunters are very partial to Chinese heads; they 
say that they are easier to cut, being shaved in the back. 
Well, these head-hunters had a custom among them accord- 
ing to which young men must secure some head as a trophy 
without which they could not obtain recognition for bravery 
or celebrate any feast among their tribes. Hence the For- 
mosan people had never known the meaning of a quiet, 
peaceful society or of a stable government. They had 
never known the security of property or of life. Successive 
administrations had, none of them, been able to assure them 
of these elementary duties of government. With a people 
brought up under these circumstances, patriotism was a 
thing entirely unknown. 

In accordance with the stipulation of the treaty of Shi- 
monoseki, one of our generals, Count Kabayama, was dis- 
patched as governor-general of Formosa. In that capacity 
he was about to land at the island with a large army; when 
he was met by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the port of 
Kelung, and in an interview which took place on board of 
the steamer Yokohama Maru, the 17th of April, 1895, it 
was arranged that a landing should be effected without 
opposition. This marked the first landing of our troops since 
the acquisition of the island of Formosa by the Japanese. 
There were at that time some Imperial Chinese soldiers still 
remaining on the island, but on hearing of its cession to 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 351 

Japan they were required to disarm and leave the country. 
Many did so, but a few remained to oppose our army; and 
then also there were a few patriots who did not feel ready to 
accept our terms, not ready to accept an alien rule — and 
these either left the island or took up arms against us. 

Since there was now no government, some of the so-called 
patriots proclaimed a republic, one of the very few republics, 
(I say one of the very few because this is not the only case 
a — we had a similar instance in Japan), that were started in 
Asia. Mr. Tang was elected president and the republic of 
Formosa lasted three or four months, leaving behind nothing 
but some post-stamps valuable for collectors. At this time 
the professional brigands took this opportunity of general 
disturbance to ply their trade. I dare say the peaceful 
inhabitants of the island suffered more from the hands of 
their own countrymen, that is, largely from Chinese troops 
and brigands, than they did from us. Evidence of this lies 
in the fact that several towns received our army with open 
arms as a deliverer from robbery and slaughter. 

Though the island was pacified no one knew what was to 
happen next. We did not understand the character of the 
people. Very few Japanese could speak Formosan and 
fewer Formosans could speak Japanese. There was natur- 
ally mutual distrust and suspicion. The bandits abounded 
everywhere. Under these conditions military rule was the 
only form of government that could be adopted until better 
assurance could be obtained of the disposition of the people. 
For this purpose it was calculated that some ten million yen, 
I may say five million dollars, was yearly needed for the paci- 
fication and government of Formosa. Out of this necessary 
sum only three million yen could be obtained by taxation, 
according to the old regime. The balance had to be defrayed 
by the central, that is by the Japanese, government. Now 
an annual expenditure of six or seven million yen in those 
years, to be spent in an island away from home, with no 
immediate prospect of return, was by no means an easy 
task for the rather limited finance of Japan. You know how 
land values are rising everywhere. Even in Africa, England 
had to pay very much more than she had expected in getting 



352 INAZO NITOBE 

land in the south; and I think Italy has by this time found 
Tripoli rather more expensive than she had calulated at 
first. A colony that looks at a distance like the goose that 
lays the golden egg, on nearer approach and especially 
when you have to pay the bills, often proves to be a white 
elephant. So with us impatient people who had expected 
great things and great benefits to come from Formosa, 
began to call for more frugality and some of the very best 
publicists went even so far as to propose that the island of 
Formosa should be sold back to China or even to some other 
power. In the course of some thirty months, two years and 
a half, no less than three times were governors changed. 

The first governor general was Count Kabayama, known 
as a hero of the Chino- Japanese war; the second was no less 
a man than Prince Katsura, now of some international fame 
as the prime minister of Japan for many years; and the third 
was General Nogi. Finding that the country could ill afford 
such a luxury as a colony, the parliament of Japan cut down 
its subsidy of six or seven million yen from the national 
treasury by about one-third, thus reducing the subsidy from 
six or seven million to only four million. Now who would 
accept a position held by a man as Nogi, but now reduced 
financially to two-thirds of its former prestige and power? 
Only a man of unbounded resources, of keen perception and 
quick decision, not a second or a third-rate man, would 
accept such a place; and Japan is forever to be congratulated 
on finding the right man at the right time for the right place, 
Viscount Kodama, who, as a member of the General Staff, had 
made a study of the Formosan problem and was ready to accept 
the governorship and to see if he could put to rights the bank- 
rupt housekeeping of the colony. I am afraid that the name 
so well known among us is perhaps very much less known in 
this country. Kodama is a name which is cherished by 
our people with love and respect. Perhaps you can best 
remember his name if I tell you that he was the real brains 
of the Russo-Japanese war. It was he who actually directed 
the whole Japanese army in the war with Russia. 

In accepting the governorship of Formosa he was particu- 
larly fortunate in the selection of his lieutenant, his assist- 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 353 

ant, the civil governor; he made the discovery, as he called 
it, of a man who proved himself his right hand, and who 
actually came far above his most sanguine expectations. 
I mean Baron Goto, one of the rising statesmen of modern 
Japan. Baron Goto in the last cabinet held the position of 
Minister of Communications and was President of the 
Bailway Board. Until Baron Goto was made civil governor 
of Formosa under Kodama he had been known as an expert 
on hygiene, having been a medical doctor. The advent of 
these two men in Formosa marked a new era in our colonial 
administration. Upon entering their new post of duty early 
in 1898, the first thing they did was the practical suspension 
of military rule; at least it was made subservient to civil 
administration. Military rule is apt to become harsh and 
to the Chinese especially, who are not accustomed to respect 
the army, it is doubly harsh. 

Next, Kodama and Goto, to whom English colonial ser- 
vice was an inspiring example, surprised the official world 
by a summary discharge of over one thousand public ser- 
vants of high and low degrees, and collected about them men 
known and tried for their knowledge and integrity. They 
used to say often and often, "It is the man who rules and 
not red tape." In an old and well settled country "red tape" 
may be convenient, but in a new colony great latitude of 
power and initiative must be left to responsible men. I 
emphasize this point because these men, I mean the gover- 
nor general and the civil governor, attributed their success 
largely to the selection and use of right men. 

Brigandage was still rampant when Kodama went to 
Formosa, and with military rule in abeyance there was some 
likelihood of its growing worse. To offset this, the constabu- 
lary department was organized and made efficient by proper 
care in choosing men for the police and by educating them in 
the language, and in the rudiments of law and industries, for 
their arduous tasks. Exceedingly arduous were their call- 
ings, since these policemen were required not only to repre- 
sent law and order but they were expected to be teachers. 
They kept account, for instance, of every man, and they 
watched over every man and woman who smoked opium; 



354 INAZO NITOBB 

they had to be acquainted with children of school age and 
know which children went to school and which did not. 
Moreover, they were required to teach the parents the rudi- 
ments of entomology. I do not know how policemen in 
this country are educated; but I think they are better edu- 
cated, though perhaps not in entomology and hygiene. But 
our Formosan police were expected to teach the people how 
to take care of themselves, and especially about pests, about 
disinfection, and about lots of other things that would 
scarcely be required of any policeman in any other part of 
the world. Moreover these policemen were required to live 
in a village where there were no Japanese, just a purely 
Formosan village, alone or sometimes with their wives. Of 
course the policemen were required to know the language 
and to speak it. Now under civil administration armies 
were not mobilized against brigands, and if there was any 
trouble it was the policemen who had to go and settle bri- 
gandage. But the brigands were invited to subject them- 
selves to law and if they surrendered their arms they were 
assured not only of protection but against hunger. Not 
a few leaders took the hint and were given special privileges, 
so that they were assured of a future living. Those who 
resisted to the end were necessarily treated as disturbers and 
as criminals. Twelve years ago brigandage was so rampant 
that the capital of Formosa, Taihoku, was assaulted by them ; 
but in the last ten years we scarcely hear of it. I went to 
Taihoku ten years ago and whenever I went a few miles 
out of the city half a dozen policemen armed with rifles used 
to accompany me for my protection. But in the last five or 
six years a young girl can travel from one end of the island 
to the other, of course excluding savage or aboriginal dis- 
tricts, of which I shall speak later. 

Thus what Li-Hung-Chang in the conference of Shimono- 
seki said, turned out to be of no consequence. According 
to him brigandage was something inherent in the social 
constitution of Formosa. He said it was something that 
could not be uprooted in the island; yet here is Formosa 
to-day with not a trace of brigandage. That is one of the 
first things which was accomplished by Japan as a colonizer. 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 355 

Then another great evil in the island to which Li-Hung- 
Chang alluded was the opium smoking. When the island 
was taken, it was a favorite subject for discussion among 
our people. Some said opium smoking must be abolished 
at once by law. Others said, "No, no, let it alone; it is 
something from which the Chinese cannot free themselves; 
let them smoke and smoke to death." What took Baron 
Goto for the first time to Formosa was the desire to study 
the question of opium-smoking from a medical standpoint ; 
and the plan he drew up was the gradual suppression of the 
smoking habit, and the modus operandi was the control of 
the production — this was to be done by the government, 
because, if the government monopolizes the production and 
manufacture of opium, it can restrict the quantity and also 
it can improve the quality so as to make it less harmful. A 
long list of all those who were addicted to this habit was 
compiled, and only those who were confirmed smokers were 
given permission to buy opium. People who never smoked 
opium before, or children, were not allowed to buy, much 
less to smoke opium, and strict surveillance was to be insti- 
tuted by the policeman, who, as I mentioned before, knows 
every man in the village. The annual returns made of 
the confirmed smokers and of the quantity consumed in the 
island show distinct and gradual decrease of opium. At 
one time the number of smokers was, in round numbers, 
170,000. In ten years the olders ones died off and 
younger ones did not come to take their place; so there is 
constant diminution. In ten years the number decreased 
from 170,000 to 130,000; and now it is about 110,000. So 
there is this constant annual decrease and that, we think, 
is the only right way to do away with this habit. It may 
interest you, perhaps, to know that American commissioners 
from the Philippine Islands came to study our system. 
When I met them they expressed much satisfaction and I 
dare say they are going to have the same system introduced 
in the Philippines, for the Chinese in these islands. Thus 
the second evil which Li-Hung-Chang said was inherent to 
Formosa also disappeared, or rather is fast disappearing. 

There are two more obstacles which we consider are in the 



356 INAZO NITOBE 

way of the further development of the island of Formosa; 
these are, first the mosquito and second, the savages. By 
mosquitoes I mean especially the anopheles, the malaria- 
bearing mosquito. Malaria is the greatest obstacle in the 
way of developing the resources of the island. The Japanese 
immigrants who have come suffer, I may say one-third of 
them, from malaria. If I want labor and if I take with me 
100 Japanese laborers to Formosa, I can count on the effi- 
ciency of only 60 or 70, because one-third of the laborers 
must be expected to be sick with malaria. Hygienic and 
sanitary measures are vigorously enforced but this can be 
done only in the larger cities. In the city or rather the 
capital of Taihoku, they made a very perfect sewage system; 
they tore down the old castle walls and used the stones in 
making the sewage ditches, and ever since then the number 
of people suffering from malaria has decreased greatly. 
In fact, it is said that malaria has disappeared from the city. 
Careful observations resulted in substantiating the fact that 
among the mosquitoes in this city less than 1 per cent be- 
longed to the dangerous species of anopheles. The rest of 
the mosquitoes are harmless, that is to say, as far as malaria 
is concerned. Then also, speaking of sanitation, I am 
reminded of what we have done against the pest; the pest, 
or the bubonic plague, was a very common disease there, but in 
the last four years we hear nothing or it. By constant care 
and by strict enforcement of sanitary laws is the pest now 
eradicated or near eradication. 

But as to the aborigines, or the savages of Formosa we cannot 
say we have nearly eradicated them. They belong to the 
Malay race and are fierce and brave. As I have said before, 
they live in the mountains; they never live on the plains. 
And when they want a head they steal down, hide them- 
selves among the underbrush or among the branches of trees, 
and shoot the first Chinese or Japanese that passes by. In 
fact I knew of a savage who had his rifle so placed on a rock 
that he could shoot any person who happened to walk past 
in just a certain direction and at a certain height; and there 
he waited for days and days for somebody to walk right 
within his range; and he succeeded in getting a head! With 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 357 

such people it is practically impossible to do anything. 
In number they must be over 100,000; we cannot count them, 
but we are pretty sure there are 115,000. Repeated at- 
tempts we have made but we never have succeeded thus 
far in doing much damage to them, though they have suc- 
ceeded in doing much damage to us. 

All that we can do and all that we are doing, in order to 
prevent their descending from among the heights, is to 
place a wire fence on the ridge of the hills. Barbed wire 
was used at first, but now we use a wire fence which is not 
barbed but is of ordinary wire with a strong electric current 
running through it. That may sound very savage to you, 
but it is the only way that we can keep them off from us. 
I have been in this place and seen the fences. The wire is 
strung on posts about five feet high; there are four wires with 
a foot between them, and a strong electric current running 
through. At first they tried their best to get over the fence, 
but they have learned not to approach it. This wire fence 
stretches a distance of some three hundred miles. It costs 
several thousand dollars ; yet every year we build this fence 
some miles further in. The next year we go another stretch, 
so that their dominion will be more and more confined to the 
very tops of the mountains. Of course I do not wish to give 
you an impression that we are dealing harshly with them, 
because we offer them their choice. We say, "If you come 
down and don't indulge in head-hunting we will welcome 
you as a brother," — because they are brothers. These 
savages look more like Japanese than Chinese and they 
themselves say of the Japanese that we Japanese are their 
kin and that the Chinese are their enemies. Because the Chi- 
nese wear their qeues they think that their heads are espec- 
ially made to be hunted. And now every year, as I say, we 
are getting a better control over them by this constant mov- 
ing of the wire fence and by the salt-famine for they have no 
salt since they are cut off from the sea-shore; they raise their 
rice, they raise millet, they have their own animals, and so 
they do not want food, but what they want badly is salt. 
So we say, "We will give you salt if you will come down and 
give up your arms;" and tribe after tribe has recognized our 



358 INAZO NITOBE 

power and has submitted itself to Japanese rule. Then 
we build them houses, we give them agricultural tools and 
implements, give them land, and let them continue their 
own peaceful ways of livelihood. 

Thus I have dwelt in a very sketchy, very unsatisfactory 
way, on the four points to which Li-Hung-Chang in the con- 
ference at Shimonoseki alluded as great obstacles in the way 
of developing Formosa. What now is the result? At first 
we could not manage a colony with the money that we could 
raise in the island; every year we had to get some subsidy 
from the national treasury. It was expected that such a 
subsidy was necessary until 1910. But by the development 
of Formosan industries, especially of rice and of tea, (of 
Oolong tea, for which you are the best customer, because 
Oolong tea is made chiefly for American export), by develop- 
ing the camphor industry (because all the camphor that you 
use, if not artificial, is produced in Formosa) ; by developing 
sugar, the production of which was increased five-fold in the 
last ten years (a tremendous increase for any country in 
any industry) — by developing these industries, we can get 
money enough in the island to do all the work that is needed 
to be done there. By this I mean that irrigation work, 
for instance, is now being carried out on a large scale. Then 
there is the improvement of the harbors; both in the north, 
at Kelung, and in the south, at Takao, commodious and deep 
harbors are now being constructed or improved. "We have 
built a railroad from one end of the island to the other. 
Schools and hospitals are now to be met with in every vil- 
lage and town. Then the police attend to the health, to the 
industries, and to the education of the people. In all these 
things we think that we have succeeded quite well, especially 
when we compare our colony of Formosa with the experi- 
ments that other nations are making. We often speak of 
English colonies as being models; we speak of French colo- 
nies as examples not to be followed ; and we are looking to 
your experiment in the Philippines to find what it will 
amount to. Comparing our Formosa with the colonies of 
these different powers, we have good reason to congratulate 
ourselves. 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 359 

I have made a very rough, sketchy address this afternoon. 
I have only tried to show what were the general lines of 
policy pursued in the development of Formosa. We have 
been successful. A colony was at first thought to be a 
luxury, but now Formosa is to us a necessity. The example 
that we set there in that island will be followed in other 
colonies of ours. I may say that the general lines of the 
colonial policy of Formosa were first of all, the defense of 
the island. So much is said about our increased navy, 
some people in this country think that we are increasing 
our navy in order to attack San Francisco or Manila; but 
with the acquisition of Formosa, of the island of Saghalien, 
and of Korea, our coast line has increased immensely and yet 
our increased navy is not sufficient for the proper defence 
of all the coast lines that we have, for the first great object 
in the colonial policy of Formosa, and I may say of Japan, is 
the defence of the new territory. 

The second is the protection of property and life, and the 
dissemination of legal institutions. People unaccustomed 
to the protection of law feel as though it were despotism. 
But they will soon find out that, after all, good government 
and good laws are the safeguard of life and property, and we 
have to teach in Korea as well as in Formosa what govern- 
ment and what laws are. 

Then the third point is the protection of health. I have 
spoken to you of what we have done in Formosa; similar 
lines of policy will be pursued in Korea. When I saw Prince 
Ito in Seoul and when I told him that the population in 
Korea had not increased in the last hundred years and that 
perhaps the Korean race was destined to disappear, he said, 
"Well, I am not sure. I wish to see whether good laws will 
increase the fecundity of the Korean people." In Formosa 
it was a very well known fact that without new recruits 
coming from the mainland of China the population would 
diminish. There were more deaths than births. But since 
we assumed sovereignty there annual returns show a gradual 
increase of births over deaths; hence, as I said, the third 
great point in the colonial policy of Japan is the protection of 
health. 



360 INAZO NITOBE 

The fourth is the encouragement of industries. In For- 
mosa the government has done much to improve the quality 
as well as the quantity of rice, and to improve irrigation. 
The improvements in the sugar industry which have been 
made were suggested by the government. When the work 
was started ten years ago we got sixty tons of cuttings from 
Hawaii; and we have about twenty mills, the machinery 
being imported from Germany, England and Hawaii. The 
experiments in the manufacture of sugar were also made by 
the government and when the experiments resulted in im- 
provement, this was told to the people; experts were sent 
out to the different villages, preaching the advantages of 
better culture. So with other branches of industry. The 
government is constantly encouraging the people to make 
improvements. 

And then the fifth policy is that of education. In For- 
mosa we have just reached the stage when we are taking 
up education seriously. We could not do it before this, 
because our idea was first of all to give to those new people 
something which will satisfy their hunger and thirst; their 
bodies must be nourished before their minds. And now that 
the economic condition has improved in the last year or two, 
schools are being started in all the villages. 

These broad lines of colonial policy which we have prac- 
tised with good results in Formosa, will be transferred in 
Korea. We do not trouble ourselves about the question of 
assimilation. In the last number of the Journal of Race 
Development published by this University, I read an article 
by Mr. MacKay, British consul in Formosa. He concludes 
his article by expressing two doubts, namely: one in regard 
to the commingling of races, that is, Chinese and Formosans; 
and second, in regard to the Japanization of the Formosans. 
He doubts whether either will take place. Well, as far as the 
Japanese are concerned, we do not trouble ourselves about 
these questions. I think assimilation will be found easier 
in Korea because the Korean race is very much allied to 
our own. In Formosa, assimilation will be out of the ques- 
tion for long years to come and we shall not try toforceit. The 
idea is that we put no pressure upon them, with the object of 



JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 361 

assimilation or Japanization in view. Our idea is to pro- 
vide a Japanese milieu, so to speak, and if people come and 
if they assimilate themselves, well and good. We have a 
proverb in Japan which says, "He who flees is not pursued, 
but he who comes is not repulsed." If the Formosans or the 
Koreans come to us, we will not repulse them. We will 
take them with open arms and we will hold them as our 
brothers, but we will not pursue them. We leave their 
customs and manners just as they like to have them. Our 
principle is firm government and free society. Firmness in 
government is something which they did not have before, 
and that is what we offer to them. 

And therefore I beg of Americans who are interested in the 
development of Japan as a colonial power, not to be misled 
by reports which now and then appear in different peri- 
odicals and newspapers by critics of all nationalities and 
of all countries. I have often read articles written by 
foreign critics who speak of our administration in Korea 
as a failure. A well educated man, an American, wrote 
that in Formosa the people are very much opposed to the 
Japanese government, are very much dissatisfied with it. 
If I were to go among the farmers in the west of this country 
and ask, "Are you satisfied with Mr. Taft's administra- 
tion?" they would say "Yes, we are." But if I were to 
press the question. "Do you think there is something to 
improve?" "Of course," the farmers will say, "I do not 
think Mr. Taft's administration is perfect." Well, I may 
note down in my book that the American people are dissat- 
isfied with Mr. Taft and may rise against him at any mo- 
ment. Such a rumor you may hear from time to time in 
any newspaper about any country; but as our adage has 
it — "Proof is stronger than argument;" and I have given 
but a few proofs, though, if time allowed, I could give 
more.