Showing posts with label Garfield. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Garfield. Show all posts

2024/02/23

The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna, Jay L. Garfield

The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (Audio Download): Nāgārjuna, Jay L. Garfield - translator, Zehra Jane Naqvi, Tantor Audio: Amazon.com.au: Audible Books & Originals


The Fundamental Wisdom Of The Middle Way  Nagarjuna 
by Jay L Garfield


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The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika Audible Audiobook – Unabridged
Nāgārjuna (Author), Jay L. Garfield - Translator (Author), Zehra Jane Naqvi (Narrator), Tantor Audio (Publisher)
4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars 208 ratings
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The Buddhist saint Nāgārjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the second century CE, is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher. His greatest philosophical work, the Mūlamadhyamikakārikā - read and studied by philosophers in all major Buddhist schools of Tibet, China, Japan, and Korea - is one of the most influential works in the history of Indian philosophy.

Now, in The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Jay L. Garfield provides a clear translation of Nāgārjuna's seminal work, offering those with little or no prior knowledge of Buddhist philosophy a view into the profound logic of the Mūlamadhyamikakārikā. Garfield presents a superb translation of the Tibetan text of Mūlamadhyamikakārikā in its entirety and a commentary reflecting the Tibetan tradition through which Nāgārjuna's philosophical influence has largely been transmitted. Illuminating the systematic character of Nāgārjuna's reasoning, Garfield shows how Nāgārjuna develops his doctrine that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, that is, than nothing exists substantially or independently. He offers a verse-by-verse commentary that explains Nāgārjuna's positions and arguments in the language of Western metaphysics and epistemology and connects Nāgārjuna's concerns to those of Western philosophers.
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©1995 Jay L. Garfield (P)2021 Tantor


Listening Length

12 hours and 4 minutes
Author

Nāgārjuna, see all
Narrator

Zehra Jane Naqvi
Audible release date

13 July 2021
Product details

Listening Length 12 hours and 4 minutes
Author Nāgārjuna, Jay L. Garfield - translator
Narrator Zehra Jane Naqvi
Audible.com.au Release Date 13 July 2021
Publisher I hear so much
Program Type Audiobook
Version Unabridged
Language English
SALT B097QBYQXD
Best Sellers Rank 44,285 in Audible Books & Originals (See Top 100 in Audible Books & Originals)
85 in Eastern Philosophy (Audible Books & Originals)
194 in Buddhism (Audible Books & Originals)
595 in Buddhism (Books)
======
Customer reviews
4.6 out of 5 stars

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Carlo Dolif
5.0 out of 5 stars ExcellentReviewed in Italy on 17 September 2021
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Excellent
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Djamel
5.0 out of 5 stars Nargarjuna’s teaching well commented. InsightfulReviewed in France on 20 May 2020
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Fabulous book!!
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Lynette
5.0 out of 5 stars Five StarsReviewed in Canada on 7 December 2016
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Good
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Theatermann
5.0 out of 5 stars Great commentary on an epochal workReviewed in Germany on 1 January 2016
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With this book - his masterpiece, which he himself probably won't be able to top - Garfield provides a commentary on Nagarjuna's main philosophical work that is as profound as it is easy to read. Garfield succeeds in breaking down the difficult and often almost incomprehensible original text in an immediately comprehensible way and presenting the lines of argument in such a way that both the outstanding intellectual power of the 1800-year-old text emerges as well as its possible meaning for today Philosophize. In doing so, he neither blurs the differences to our current European thinking nor pushes the text into an “oriental” distance. This book is definitely not part of Western wellness Buddhism and would be out of place on the richly stocked esoteric shelves of our bookstores. In short: It is one of the most important and insightful books for anyone who seriously wants to know something about Buddhist thought, especially Madhyamaka.

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T Wright.
5.0 out of 5 stars The Best.Reviewed in the United States on 22 June 2010
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(redaction & addendum of previous review)
In reading the entire text, i found the arguements quite overwelming, however the beginning buddhist is not without help. In searching for applicatons to the examinations it can be said that madhyamaka is the synthsis of all other schools. This is a great starting place for organization. monastics usually study these topics for 20 years intensively , they relate most to the abidharma. Having said this , i would reccomend Geshe Tashi Tsering's Foundations book series, especially Relative truth , ultimate truth ( Vol 2) as the companion to this text. In learning the divisions of the two truths by the four major schools one may place the examinations of nagarjuna in thier context and avoid misintrepretation which garfield says " the danger is to mistakenly view the subtleties of emptiness as nihlism". ( paraphrase) So this would be a great guide to the study applicaton and classification of the book's chapters .. July 8, 2010

I am not a monk, nor have i been given a systematic , structured schooling in buddhist philosophy. My review is based solely upon comparison with my limited understanding of the subtleties of madhyamaka. Nagarjuna is called a master by many prominent buddhist thinkers, to note Tsong khapa. It is said that Nagarjuna is an "Arya" being. "Arya" meaning sees all subtle levels of Dukkha. ( Rather elementary) However it is said repeadedly that without ethics,concentration and then wisdom the madhaymaka is an enigma. Thats why the dalai lama explains it as such. Presupposing the student has built this foundation - Ethics, Concentration, Wisdom. Then one is ready for Madhyamaka.

Garfield gives the best version to western philosophers. I would caution though taking Garfield's view as the monastic view. Even though he gives a great explanation , thouroughly extensive and simplifies deep points in the madhyamaka, he is not able to approach it from the soterilogical point of view, as compared to that of an Arya being. in the madhyamakaavatara, which is like an introduction to Nagarjuna, chandrakirti says that he isn't even an Arya, of the 6th bhumi. Im sure Garfield would agree, that to have a thourough understanding of this text one would have to explain from that view.

This text would be greatly understanded by the most extensive commentary extant by Rje Tsong Khapa. (Ocean of reasoning) with this commentary one would get the jest of the major commentaries from Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita, and Tsong Khapa. Ocean is a great companion to this text.

With this in mind this version of Nagarjuna's seminal treatise is the best buddhist book available, aside from Lamrim Chenmo.

100% gift to the west, Thank you Garfield,Newland and everyone else for this gift to us all.
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Nicholas R. Hunter
4.0 out of 5 stars Demanding but satisfying
Reviewed in the United States on 16 November 2001
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As Garfield states in the introduction, his analysis of the text is more from an analytical, Western philosophical perspective than from a "Buddhalogical" (his word) one. The result is authoritative, scholarly and a little dry. His presentation reminds me of David Brazier's presentation of the Abhidharma in his book "Zen Therapy: Transcending the Sorrows of the Human Mind." The experience of reading this book is very demanding, but also very satisfying. The benefits to be derived are probably directly proportional with the work one puts in to understanding it.
A more poetically compelling translation of the Mulamadhyamikakarika, along with a very thought-provoking introduction, is to be found in Stephen Batchelor's "Verses from the Center."
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Alex
5.0 out of 5 stars Essential reading
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 30 April 2017
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Essential reading for any Buddhist, or even anyone truly interested in philosophy and the nature of reality. A deep and difficult but ultimately worthy read.
3 people found this helpful
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Reader
5.0 out of 5 stars Rating an ancient classic? Really?
Reviewed in the United States on 27 August 2015
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Amazon requested a review. It seems beyond absurd to "rate" an ancient classic text. This is a classic ancient Buddhist text, accompanied by a scholarly and deeply insightful commentary by Jay Garfield. It has academic value as well as value for serious practitioners in any of the major Buddhist traditions. It's not a bedtime read - you would not read it unless you already had a commitment to understanding the approach of this seminal Buddhist thinker and shaper of the tradition (Nagarjuna). Again, too silly to give it a rating, but I just did.
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Werner
5.0 out of 5 stars Eternally true
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 21 July 2013
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As a study work of just for reference then this book does cover the basic philosophical epithets of Buddhist philosophy.
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Brian
5.0 out of 5 stars Difficult in the beginning but it's worth it
Reviewed in the United States on 1 March 2019
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A very detailed commentary and helpful guide through Nagarjuna's fundamental verses. Very digestible for astute lay philosophers and others interested in gaining deeper knowledge of Buddhist studies. Because it can be challenging, I would not recommend if you don't already have some experience with Buddhist texts.
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Mudrooroo Nyoongah
5.0 out of 5 stars I recommend this book
Reviewed in the United States on 11 September 2017
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Ah Buddhism and the emptiness of everything thing and subject. To seek to uderstand the Buddhist Doctrine of Emptiness, I recommend this book. It is not easy going, but work your way through it and then again if you like following an argument.
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philip hynes
5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 4 June 2015
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Superb
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Amazon Customer
5.0 out of 5 stars interesting
Reviewed in the United States on 15 April 2020
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great exploration and elucidation of the topic
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buddhavanhalen
5.0 out of 5 stars Mind boggling and yet unfathomable great
Reviewed in the United States on 17 April 2017
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Just read and see for yourself. It's hard to understand in just one read I think, but I hope to have a firm "grasp" on it soon.
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TOM CORBETT
3.0 out of 5 stars attachment to emptiness
Reviewed in the United States on 21 January 2007
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i have not studied all of nagarjunas logic carefully in this book, it seems that he is arguing for the underlying emptiness of all things on the basis of his assumption of dependent or mutual arising. perhaps its a bit more complicated than this though. a cup of tea is not a cup of tea in itself. nor does the teabag have any individual or inherent identity, rather the teabag is a collection of collections without any individuality. just as my finger is a collection of cells, so a teabag is a combination of dependent things. infact he believes that everything depends on the presence or absence of something else. tea leaves depend on the presence of tanins, flavins, cells, maturation, drying, there is nothing inherently existent that could be called the individuality of the teabag. this of course defies common sense, but is reasonable. why cannot a collection be at one and the same time an individuality. ie one in many, or many as one. such an argument though would be contrary to nagarjunas thrust, which is to emphasise the existence of emptiness through dependence. ie everything that is dependent has no individual uniqueness (or soul) since all individuals are merely collections.

i am still studying nagarjuna, it seems that a statement such as "walker is not the same as walking, nor is it different from walking" can be argued any way which can. "walker is not the same as walking, if it were how could the two be told apart, nor is walker different from walking, or otherwise there would be walking without walker." it could be argued on the grounds of oneness that walker and walking are one and the same, that structure and function are inseperable. you could just as easily say that walker is the same as walking and that is why there isnt walking without walker. if nagarjuna says that legs are not the same as arms because they can be told apart he is right, because they can be told apart, but wrong because arms and legs are all part of one body and cannot be separated. so paradoxically one can say that walker and walking are not the same, but one can also say that they are the same (the same body/oneness).

it can be argued that walker is walking, walker is not walking, and as nagarjuna says walker is not the same as, nor different from walking. infact whatever you seek to prove, if you are clever enough, you can prove it. this is the nature of reason and logic. a donkey that is lead by the carrot of the person who possesses it.

i find his logic is clear (it is)infact, it is pure genius, but as with all logic one has to realise that at this moment logic is thoroughly illogical. though perhaps when he wrote it was thoroughly logical. logic being logical? logic being illogical? two sides of the same coin. if logical can be illogical why discuss something as important as emptiness using logic? this defies a common understanding of nagarjuna, unless of course he wished to impress buddhist emptiness upon the minds of the common people. or, perhaps he really did believe in the immutable logos (reason) of plato. that insoluble all pervasive notion of truth. personally i see that reason has its uses (many of them groundbreaking and earth shattering), but can often be used to say what you want, especially when it comes to philosophy.

i find the argument for emptiness grounded in dependent arising 'can' be compelling, or not compelling. its just how you approach it. in that a collection does not necessarily indicate an individuality, it could be seen as a collective, for example a sea sponge colony 'may' have no singular conscious individuality as the colony as a whole, but then a human being is a collection with a consciousness . but as i see it, dependent arising could be used as a proof against emptiness just as much as a proof for it. i believe that the buddha would have days where he took time out from such an approach, that is he would respect the agile logical display of nagarjuna, but have said "not on mondays nagarjuna" (but only if you dont mind my friend).

i dont think that the buddha was about dogmatising certain concepts and words such as emptiness, as useful as they may be. even freedom can become an obstacle to relationship and his word "liberation" can be in buddhism taken to mean many different things. it may just be that mental freedom and freedom from suffering are synonymous. emptiness is representative of water and air, but one should not forget the presence of fire, or gold (earth)(male elements)that are representative of fullness/form. to argue away form for emptiness seems unbalanced. just as to argue away emptiness for form would be unbalanced, though it may be an interesting excercise (and not too difficult). infact rising to the challenge if one looks in minute detail/huge magnification at an area of space one will find it a quantum soup, and not nearly as empty as one expected. infact buddha is implacable when he says emptiness is form for this could imply that there is no emptiness, only form. or visa-versa one could argue that all is empty.

i have also read nagarjunas, i think its called the flower garland, which was less a discussion of emptiness and logical proof for such, though his approach in the middle way comes across in this book too. no, i remember now its called the discourse of the precious flower garland.

i realise that my comments on nagarguna's mulamadhyamakakarika may seem disrespectful regarding the buddhist saint, and have no desire to show disrespect, but i do feel that all in all, though brilliant his arguments are not compelling ground for emptiness. this is because i am aware of the bias behind reason. there are other ways to illustrate emptiness. the buddhas "emptiness is form" for example is a much clearer statement of anti-logic, that i find very elegant. also the prescence of the zero in any effective numerical system requires a hypothetical emptiness.

i have no doubt that in the original tongue nagarjuna was a marvellous poet, sadly this does not come across in this translation or in "verses from the centre" a different translation of the same work. perhaps, in his poetic form his genius would have shone out as much as it does from his rational genius.

this is an interesting book to read, a fascinating insight into the mind of an early buddhist saint and an example of how one can use logic to prove anything, even that which intuitively seems almost impossible. but personally i dont feel it tells me anything, other than showing patterns of logic, which are a useful thing to aquire. i must say though that i am 'astonished' by the mans logical dexterity.

i would have found nagarjuna more interesting if he had tried to prove the existence of form and balanced this with a proof for the existence of emptiness. for in truth it is not balanced to prove the existence of emptiness without proving the existence of form. and you cannot prove the existence of emptiness without proving the existence of form, for emptiness is form. it can be argued that all is emptiness, but it can also be argued that all is form. whatever you look for is whatever you find. such is the nature of reality. seek and you will find.

infact... making things fun, and killing the buddhas word, i would say that "form is not emptiness, form is form" is just as true as "emptiness is form". this is the buddas freedom. playing with logic, one does not take reason too seriously on mondays, but... aah, on tuesdays it is profoundly important.

thank you nagarjuna for the encouragement you have given many.

love, flakey xxx.
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Full text of "Nagarjuna The Fundamental Wisdom Of The Middle Way"
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Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika 

"So 

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY RY JAY L. GARFIELD 






The 

Fundamental 
Wisdom 
of the 
Middle 
Way 

Nagarjuna’s 

Mulamadhyamakakdrika 

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY BY 

JAY L. GARFIELD 


New York Oxford 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
1995 



Oxford University Press 

Oxford New York 
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Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi 
Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne 
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and associated companies in 
Berlin Ibadan 

Copyright © 1995 by Jay L. Garfield 

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 

198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press, Inc. 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Nagarjuna, 2nd cent. 

[Madhyamakakarika. English & Sanskrit] 

The fundamental wisdom of the middle way : 

Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika / 

Translation and commentary by 
Jay L. Garfield, 
p. cm. 

ISBN 0-19-509336-4 (pbk.); 

ISBN 0-19-510317-3 (cloth) 

1. Madhyamika (Buddhism) — Early works to 1800. 

I. Garfield, Jay L., 1955—. 

BQ2792.E5G37 1995 294.3'85— dc20 95-1051 



Printed in the United States of America 



I dedicate this work, 
with profound gratitude 
and respect, 

to the Most Ven. Professor Samdhong Rinpoche: 
scholar, educator, statesman, public servant 
and shining exemplar of monastic life. 




Preface 


This is a translation of the Tibetan text of Mulamadhyamakaka- 
rika. It is perhaps an odd idea to translate a Tibetan translation of 
a Sanskrit text and to retranslate a text of which there are four 
extant English versions. My reasons for doing so are these: First, I 
am not satisfied with any of the other English versions. Every 
translation, this one included, of any text embodies an interpreta- 
tion, and my interpretation differs in various respects from those of 
my predecessors in this endeavor. This is to be expected. As Tuck 
(1990) has correctly observed, Nagarjuna, like any philosopher 
from a distant cultural context, is always read against an interpre- 
tive backdrop provided by the philosophical presuppositions of the 
interpreter, and by previous readings of Nagarjuna. So I claim no 
special privileged position vis a vis Streng (1967), Inada (1970), 
Sprung (1979), or Kalupahana (1986)— only a different position, 
one that I hope will prove useful in bringing Mulamadhyama- 
kakarika into contemporary philosophical discourse. I, like any 
translator/interpreter must acknowledge that there is simply no 
fact of the matter about the correct rendering of any important and 
genuinely interesting text. Interpretations, and with them, transla- 
tions, will continue to evolve as our understanding of the text 
evolves and as our interpretive horizon changes. Matters are even 
more complex and indeterminate when the translation crosses cen- 
turies, traditions and languages, and sets of philosophical assump- 
tions that are quite distant from one another, as is the case in the 
present project. So each of the available versions of the text em- 
bodies a reading. Inada reads Nagarjuna from the standpoint of 



Preface 


viii 

the Zen tradition, and his translation reflects that reading; Kalu- 
pahana reads Nagarjuna as a Theravada commentator on the 
Kaccayanagotta-sutra , and his translation reflects that reading, as 
well as his view about the affinities between James’s pragmatism 
and Theravada Buddhism. Sprung adopts Murti’s Kantian interpre- 
tation of Madhyamika, and his translation reflects that interpreta- 
tion. Streng reads the text as primarily concerned with religious 
phenomenology. There is no translation of this text into English, 
and no commentary on it, that specifically reflects an Indo-Tibetan 
Prasangika-Madhyamika interpretation. Inasmuch as this is my 
own preferred way to read Nagarjuna, and the reading dominant 
in Tibetan and highly influential in Japanese and Chinese discus- 
sions of Mulamadhyamakakarikd , I believe that it is important to 
fill this lacuna in the English bibliography. 

Having argued that all translation involves some interpretation 
and, hence, that there is always some distance between an original 
text and a translation, however good and canonical that translation 
may be, it follows that Mulamadhyamakakarikd and dBu-ma rtsa- 
ba shes-rab differ, however close they may be and however canoni- 
cally the latter is treated. Since dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab is the text 
read by and commented on by generations of Tibetan philoso- 
phers, I think that it is important that an English translation of this 
very text be available to the Western philosophical public. This 
text is hence worthy in its own right of translation inasmuch as it is 
the proper subject of the Tibetan philosophical literature I and 
others find so deep and fascinating. 

This is not a critical scholarly edition of the text. It is not philo- 
logical in intent; nor is it a discussion of the commentarial litera- 
ture on Nagarj una’s text. There is indeed a need for such a book, 
but that need will have to be filled by someone else. This is rather 
meant to be a presentation of a philosophical text to philosophers, 
and not an edition of the text for Buddhologists. If philosophers 
and students who read my book thereby gain an entrance into 
Nagarj una’s philosophy and see Mulamadhyamakakarikd , as inter- 
preted herein, as a text worthy of study and discussion, this work 
will have served its purpose. Since my intended audience is not 
Buddhologists, per se, but Western philosophers who are inter- 
ested in Buddhist philosophy, I have tried to balance standard 



Preface 


IX 


renderings of Buddhist terminology with more perspicuous contem- 
porary philosophical language. I am not sure that I have always 
made the right decisions or that I have found the middle path 
between the extremes of Buddhological orthodoxy and Western 
revisionism. But that is the aim. 

I am also striving for that elusive middle path between two other 
extremes in translation: I am trying on the one hand to avoid the 
unreadable literalism of translations that strive to provide a verba- 
tim report of the words used the original, regardless of whether 
that results in a comprehensible English text. But there is on the 
other hand the extreme represented by a translation written in 
lucid English prose purporting to be what the original author 
would have written had he been a twentieth-century philosopher 
writing in English, or one that, in an attempt to convey what the 
text really means on some particular interpretation, is in fact not a 
translation of the original text, but a completely new book, bearing 
only a distant relation to the original. This hopelessly mixes the 
tasks of translation on the one hand and critical commentary on 
the other. Of course, as I have noted above, these tasks are inter- 
twined. But there is the fault of allowing the translation to become 
so mixed with the commentary that one no longer has a grip on, for 
example, what is Nagarjuna and what is Garfield. After all, al- 
though the text is interpreted in being translated, this text should 
still come out in translation as a text which could be interpreted in 
the ways that others have read it. Because the original does indeed 
justify competing interpretations. That is one of the things that 
makes it such an important philosophical work. 


Amherst , Mass. 
November 1994 


J. L. G. 




Acknowledgments 


Thanks are already due to many who have helped at different 
stages of this project: Thanks to Bob Thurman and David Sloss for 
first introducing me to Buddhist philosophy and then for encourag- 
ing me to wade deeper. Thanks to David Kalupahana, Steve Odin, 
Kenneth Inada, and Guy Newland, as well as to David Karnos, 
Joel Aubel, Dick Garner, and William Herbrechtsmeier for many 
hours of valuable and enjoyable discussion of this text at the Na- 
tional Endowment for the Humanities Summer institute on Nagar- 
juna in Hawaii. And thanks to the NEH for the grant support that 
enabled my participation in that institute. I am especially grateful 
to Guy Newland for many subsequent conversations, useful sugges- 
tions, encouragement, and a critical reading of my work. Thanks 
to Janet Gyatso for countless hours of profitable and enjoyable 
philosophical conversation and for many useful and detailed criti- 
cisms and suggestions on this and other related work. Thanks to 
the Ven. Geshe Lobzang Tsetan for starting me in Tibetan, for 
much useful philosophical interchange, for teaching me an im- 
mense amount about Madhyamika, and for his close criticism of 
this text; to Georges Dreyfus (Geshe Sengye Samdup) for much 
useful advice and discussion; and to Joshua and Dianne Cutler and 
the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center of North America for hospi- 
tality. I also thank John Dunne for detailed comments on several 
chapters of an earlier draft of this translation. 

I am grateful to the Indo- American Foundation, the Council for 
the International Exchange of Scholars, and the Smithsonian Insti- 
tution for an Indo- American Fellowship in 1990-91. During that 



xii 


Acknowledgments 


time, as a Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Central Institute 
of Higher Tibetan Studies, I began work on this project. I owe an 
enormous debt of gratitude to The Most Ven. Prof. Samdhong 
Rinpoche and his staff for hosting me and my family at the Central 
Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies and to Rinpoche himself for his 
generous personal help. I thank the Ven. Geshe Ngawang Sherab 
for all of his kind logistical help at Santarakshita Library and for 
friendship and philosophical interchange. Thanks also to the Ven. 
Lobzang Norbu Shastri and the Ven. Acarya Ngawang Samten for 
extensive conversations from which I learned much and for useful 
comments on this work and to Karma for Tibetan lessons. 

I am deeply grateful to the Ven. Prof. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas 
for reading dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab and related texts with me and 
for giving me his invaluable oral commentary on these texts during 
that year and on many subsequent occasions. Nobody has taught me 
more about Madhyamika philosophy, and it is hard to imagine a 
more patient, generous, and incisive scholar and teacher. Without 
his lucid teachings, and without Geshe-la’s enormous patience, I 
could never have approached this text with any degree of success. 
While he would not agree with everything I say, my own reading of 
this text is enormously influenced by his. Special thanks to Sri Yeshi 
Tashi Shastri for his translation and transcription assistance during 
many of these sessions and for an enormous amount of cheerful and 
generous general research assistance, including a great deal of care- 
ful proofreading and detailed comments on this translation. 

During that year and in subsequent years I also benefited greatly 
from my visits to the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics. I am deeply 
grateful to the Ven. Prof. Geshe Lobzang Gyatso for his hospitality 
and for his teaching. In our many conversations and from his writ- 
ings I have learned a great deal, and this project certainly reflects 
his influence. Without his patient advice on interpretative and 
expository details and without his vigorous critique of many of my 
ideas it would have been impossible to produce this commentary. I 
thank the Ven. Sherab Gyatso for his tireless and invaluable trans- 
lation and assistance during that time. The Ven. Sherab Gyasto, 
The Ven. Graham Woodhouse, the Ven. Tenzin Dechen, and the 
Ven. Huen have given much to me in many hours of philosophical 
interchange through translation help and through their hospitality 



Acknowledgments 


xiii 


and friendship. Mr. Phillipe Goldin has also offered many helpful 
suggestions on the translation and commentary. I also thank the 
Ven. Khamtrul Rinpoche, the Ven. Geshe Yeshe Topden (Gen 
Drup-Thop) and Gen Lam-Rim-pa for their teachings and Acarya 
Nyima Tshering for his introduction and translation on those occa- 
sions. Special thanks to Nyima Penthog for improving my Tibetan. 

I thank His Holiness the Dalai Lama for his encouragement and 
for valuable discussion of some difficult interpretative issues. 

I am also very grateful to friends and colleagues at Drepung 
Loseling Monastic College. My visit there was extremely enjoyable 
and also philosophically fruitful. Thanks to the Ven. Geshe Dak-pa 
Toepgyal and the Ven. Thupten Dorjee for arranging everything 
and for talking with me about this and other work. I am very 
grateful to the Ven. Geshe Namgyal Wangchen for detailed com- 
ments and encouragement on this work and for useful discussions 
about Madhyamika, translation, the task of presenting Buddhist 
philosophical texts to the West, and other topics. 

My acknowledgment of help in India would not be complete 
without acknowledging the gracious hospitality and assistance in 
living of Sri N. N. Rai, Sri Arun Kumar Rai, Sri A. R. Singh, and 
their families in Sarnath; the hospitality of Kunzom Topden 
Martam and his family in Sikkim — it was the Martam house in 
which the writing actually got started; and Dr. L. S. Suri of the 
American Institute of Indian Studies in New Delhi, whose adminis- 
trative efficiency kept everything moving smoothly. 

I am deeply grateful to four friends who read a complete draft of 
this work and provided honest, searching, sometimes scathing criti- 
cism. What more could one ask from colleagues and friends? Many 
of their suggestions are incorporated in the book as it now stands, 
and much of whatever is good in it is due to their enormous contribu- 
tions. Sometimes I have disagreed with each of them. And whatever 
errors remain are certainly my own. So thanks especially to the Ven. 
Gareth Sparham, the Ven. Sherab Gyatso, Guy Newland, and Jane 
Braaten for copious corrections and criticism and for extensive pro- 
ductive discussion. Thanks also to Prof. Alan Sponberg for useful 
comments on an earlier draft and to Janet Gyatso, Graham Parkes, 
and Georges Dreyfus for reading and commenting on the penulti- 
mate draft. 



xiv 


Acknowledgments 


Another group of colleagues to whom I owe thanks are those 
who kept faith. This may require some explanation. I discovered 
when I — a Western, analytically trained philosopher of mind — 
began to work on Buddhist philosophy that many in philosophy 
and cognitive science took this as evidence of some kind of insan- 
ity, or at least as an abandonment of philosophy, per se. This is not 
the place to speculate on the origins or nature of the stigma attach- 
ing in some parts of our profession to Asian philosophy. But it is a 
sad fact to be noted and to be rectified. In any case, I therefore 
owe special thanks to those who went out of their way to support 
this work and to let me know that they took it and me seriously. I 
thank especially my friend and colleague Meredith Michaels for 
constant support, advice, and encouragement. And I thank Mur- 
ray Kiteley, John Connolly, Nalini Bhushan, Kathryn Addelson, 
Elizabeth Spellman, Frederique Marglin, Lee Bowie, Tom Warten- 
burg, Vere Chappell, Gareth Matthews, and John Robison, as well 
as Dan Lloyd, Steve Horst, and Joe Rouse. Thanks under this 
head also go to many of my nonphilosopher colleagues in the 
Hampshire College Cultural Studies program. I single out Mary 
Russo, Joan Landes, Susan Douglas, Jeffery Wallen, Norman Hol- 
land, and L. Brown Kennedy. 

I also gratefully acknowledge the support of several Hewlett- 
Mellon faculty development grants from Hampshire College and 
thank the deans of the college for supporting this work so gener- 
ously. I am also grateful for the support of this project and of 
related projects involving academic exchange between the Ameri- 
can and Tibetan academic communities from President Greg 
Prince of Hampshire College. Thanks also to Ms. Ruth Hammen 
and Ms. Leni Bowen for regular logistical support, to Mr. Andrew 
Janiak for his extensive assistance and editorial suggestions in the 
final stages of manuscript preparation, and to Mr. Shua Garfield 
and Mr. Jeremy Mage for additional assistance in manuscript prepa- 
ration and proofreading. Thanks as well to many groups of stu- 
dents in “Convention, Knowledge and Existence: European and 
Indo-Tibetan Perspectives” for putting up with and helping me to 
refine my presentation of this text and for my students in Buddhist 
Philosophy at Mount Holyoke College for working through an 
earlier draft of this text. 



Acknowledgments 


xv 


Portions of the translations of and commentaries on Chapters I, 
II, XIII, and XXIV appeared in Philosophy East and West in Gar- 
field (1990) and (1994). I thank the editors for permission to use 
that material here. The Tibetan edition of the text is from dGe 
’dun grub, dBu ma rtsa shes rtsa y grel bzhugs (Commentary on 
Mulamadhyamakakarika ), Ge Lugs Pa Students’ Welfare Publish- 
ing, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, 1987. 

I am more grateful than I could ever express to my family for 
accompanying me to India for one year, for enduring my absence 
when I have been in India alone, and for enduring my preoccupa- 
tion with this and related philosophical projects. I am especially 
grateful to Blaine Garson, who has shouldered far more than her 
fair share of parenting and other household responsibilities. Every 
stage of this project is dependent upon her help, sacrifice, and 
support. 

I hope that I haven’t forgotten anybody. 




2022/10/23

** [The Meaning of Life: Garfield: L34-35, 36 Dalai Lama

LECTURE 34

HH Dalai Lama XIV—A Modern Buddhist View ..............................120

LECTURE 35

HH Dalai Lama XIV—Discernment and Happiness........................124

===

HH Dalai Lama XIV—A Modern Buddhist View

Lecture 34




[The Dalai Lama] has argued repeatedly that as far as he is concerned, it’s the deliverances of science that tell us about the fundamental nature of reality, not classical religious scriptures, and he has repeatedly said that where Buddhism or when any religion conÀ icts with science, we should go with science, not with the deliverances of religion.

T

he Dalai Lama’s view of the meaning of life is, of course, deeply inÀ ected and motivated by Buddhism, but he articulates it primarily as a modern secular vision, a vision with roots in ideas of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, democratic theory, and the importance of science. He follows Aristotle in seeing the universal goal of human life to be happiness, but that happiness can only be attained in the context of social interdependence. Like any Buddhist, the Dalai Lama sees the problem of life as constituted by suffering, whose modern sources he ¿ nds in consumer capitalism and industrialism. He sees the sources of happiness in purposive action in a human context.

The Dalai Lama agrees with Aristotle that happiness, À ourishing, meets the criteria for the highest good in life: ¿ nality and self-suf¿ ciency. The components of happiness in a modern life include food, shelter, physical security, peace, education, access to health care, the opportunity for free expression of ideas, a certain amount of leisure, and possibility for personal development. The fact that people around the world are willing to ¿ ght to achieve these goals must mean that they are universal.

Because the Dalai Lama’s is a Buddhist account of the nature of reality, it is rooted in the doctrine of dependent origination, in which all things are interdependent in three senses. The ¿ rst is causal dependence; everything occurs as a consequence of innumerable causes and conditions, and every event produces innumerable effects. The second form of interdependence is part-whole dependence; parts depend upon the whole for their nature and functioning, and wholes depend upon parts in order to exist. The third form of interdependence is dependence on conceptual imputation, that is, dependence of things for their identity and function on the way in which we think about them.

The Dalai Lama argues that interdependence provides us with the deepest analysis of the fundamental nature of reality. Everything around us, in particular, our own lives and the lives of the communities in which we participate, is characterized by this threefold interdependence. Moreover, the Dalai Lama emphasizes that this is completely consistent with the deliverance of modern science. Physics, for example, demonstrates that everything is part of a uniform, causal whole and interdependent in all these ways. He



argues that if our lives are to be meaningful, they must be grounded in reality, and given that interdependence is the fundamental nature of reality, a meaningful life is one that responds to and reÀ ects an appreciation of interdependence.

For the Dalai Lama, human interdependence deserves special emphasis. Social reality develops for us distinctive kinds of partwhole interdependence because so much of our lives and our identities are determined by the wholes of which we’re parts. Conceptual imputation in the construction of identity and roles is also salient in human affairs in ways that it’s not in physical affairs. Our decisions that a particular person is a



Interconnection also constitutes our happiness because so much of our happiness is social. We become happy when our actions actually match the goals and values we endorse. That’s often only possible socially because so many of our goals and so many of our values are collective social values.



criminal versus an upright citizen, a colleague versus a competitor, and so on determine the nature of our relations, the nature of our lives, and the nature of our happiness.

Each of the dimensions of interdependence is implicated in the arising of suffering and the production of happiness. All these forms of interdependence give us the possibility of having complex effects in our actions. Everything we do ripples through societies instantly and in countless ways and in ways that we can’t always control but that demand our reÀ ection. And because our actions have so many effects, we have obligations to make sure that

those effects are bene¿ cial, and we have responsibilities to those who can be affected by our actions.

According to the Dalai Lama, modern capitalism has brought Everything we do ripples through societies instantly and in countless ways and in ways that we can’t always control but that demand our reÀ ection.

the original source of suffering— primal confusion that results in attraction and aversion—to new heights. Advertising, for example, creates both need and fear, attraction and aversion, and it isolates us in a marketplace with a given commodity, forcing a decision on whether or not we need something. The Dalai Lama thinks that commodi¿ cation has also infected politics because it creates politicians and ideas as commodities, then generates attraction or aversion. The mass media and mass culture are, thus, sources of confusion and suffering.

Oddly, the sources of happiness in the modern world are similar to the sources of unhappiness. One such source is our interconnection with others, which enables us to produce both the material and the collective social goods we want and allows us to discover truth in learning from one another. This interconnection also brings us happiness in the form of social interactions and activities with friends and families. It offers us the opportunity to work out the kinds of social values and ideals we endorse and lead a life of integrity and authenticity. Ŷ

Name to Know

His Holiness the Dalai Lama XIV, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935): The Dalai Lama lineage in Tibet is regarded by Tibetans as a reincarnate lineage: Each successive Dalai Lama is recognized as a rebirth of his predecessor, and all are regarded by Tibetans as emanations of AvalalokiteĞvara, the Buddhist celestial bodhisattva of compassion.




Suggested Reading


  • Prebish and Baumann, eds., Westward Dharma.


Study Questions

1. In what sense is the Dalai Lama’s diagnosis of modern life Buddhist? In what sense is it modern?

2. What is the difference between the analysis of modernity presented by Gandhi and that presented by the Dalai Lama?

===

HH Dalai Lama XIV—Discernment and Happiness

Lecture 35


The union of compassion and discernment is a union of moral perceptual skills—where, when we see a situation, we see the sources of suffering, we see the possibilities for happiness—and the interpersonal skills that allow us to see what kinds of interventions will be most useful and commit us to those kinds of interventions.

A

s we saw in the last lecture, dependent origination grounds the possibility of both suffering and happiness. For the Dalai Lama, the source of suffering in the modern world is the ideology of commodity fetishism, and the only solution to suffering is to develop a deep kind of compassion, an attitude that respects interdependence and commits us to the creation of happiness.

The Dalai Lama notes that unhappiness doesn’t derive directly from external circumstances but from our emotional reactions to adversity. Such emotional reactions arise from both attachment and aversion and can be either individual or collective. The Dalai Lama thinks of emotions that cause suffering as pathologies; examples include greed, lust, hate, and so on. In some cases, such as when we speak of righteous anger, we mistake pathology for virtue, but as we’ve seen, anger never results in positive outcomes. If we’re going to understand the nature of suffering and happiness, we must be able to distinguish between bene¿ cial and pathological emotions.

According to the Dalai Lama, pathological emotions are grounded in confusion, a misperception of reality. We see something else as the source of our unhappiness instead of ourselves; we see some object as necessary instead of simply an option. To cultivate positive emotions, we need a clear, accurate understanding of reality and not just on a theoretical or abstract level. We must seek instinctive, spontaneous responses to the world as causally dependent, part-whole dependent, and dependent on imputation. This instinctive cognitive habit is dif¿ cult to accomplish, and that’s why the notion of karunƗ—compassion—is so important. KarunƗ gives us commitment, that altruistic aspiration to act, impelling us to develop spontaneous ways of interacting with the world in place of our ordinary approaches. The use of moral imagination is important here because we need to be able to understand that the interests of others are, in a deep sense, just like our interests and that their pain is just like our pain.

The Dalai Lama argues that the cultivation of compassion comes in two parts: the cultivation of restraint and the cultivation of virtue. By restraint, he means the holding back of instinctive negative reactions, actions of anger, greed, carelessness, and so forth. By virtue, he means developing a positive commitment to bene¿ t others. Restraint cuts off the roots

To cultivate positive emotions, we need a clear, accurate understanding of reality and not just on a theoretical or abstract level. of suffering by prompting us to reÀ ect on the causes of pathological emotions, thus subverting primal confusion and ignorance. ReÀ ection also highlights the impermanence of the world, including the

impermanence of the things that cause us to experience suffering and

our own emotional reactions. Through reÀ ecting on selÀ essness, we’re able to suspend the ordinary cognitive habit of thinking of ourselves as subjects and everything else in the world as objects. That way of thinking reÀ ects the nature of reality as determined by a polar coordinate system with oneself at the center and everything else arrayed in terms of its relationship to the center. This conception gives rise to conÀ ict, but by reÀ ecting on selÀ essness, we come to take our own importance less seriously.

Restraint keeps us from doing bad things, but it doesn’t by itself motivate us to do the things that are necessary for own happiness or the happiness of others. To do that, we need to cultivate generosity, the willingness to detach ourselves from our possessions. As ĝƗntideva reminded us, virtue also requires patience, not only with others but with ourselves. The moral development that we come to demand of ourselves when we adopt this understanding of the nature of our lives isn’t acquired in a moment.

The concept of virtue that the Dalai Lama emphasizes requires attentive concern, mindfulness, discernment, and compassion. The dimension of attentiveness commits us to truly understanding the nature of the problem and the solutions that would rectify it. The dimension of concern is a commitment to take action. Mindfulness of our own emotional states enables us to focus on virtuous rather than nonvirtuous emotions. Discernment is necessary to allow us to understand the details of any particular situation: What are the causes, conditions, and effects? Finally, we need compassion in the sense of karunƗ, an altruistic commitment to act. For compassion to be genuine and ef¿ cacious, it must rest on discernment, a deep analytical understanding of suffering.

The Dalai Lama emphasizes that this kind of compassion entails a Gandhian universal responsibility, a responsibility for the welfare of all, because there are no limitations on compassion. Any limitations could originate only in pathological distinctions between ourselves and others. Compassion must be rooted in the de-centering of the individual, which will make such distinctions impossible. What we’re seeing here is a modern version of the bodhisattva path: the altruistic resolution to act for the bene¿ t of all sentient beings. Ŷ




Suggested Reading

Study Questions

1. In what sense is the Dalai Lama’s recommendation for a meaningful life different from those of Gandhi and Lame Deer? In what respects is it similar?

2. Why is compassion, as opposed to a sense of duty, the foundation for a meaningful life in the modern world, according to the Dalai Lama?










So, What Is the Meaning of Life?

Lecture 36




Often, one is led to ¿ nd super¿ cial similarities and to overemphasize those and, therefore, to lose a lot of the texture and detail that’s bequeathed to us by the textual traditions that we’ve been examining.

W

e’ve encountered a great deal of diversity in this course, but we can still point to certain recurrent themes. For example, almost every position we’ve considered has emphasized the importance of a

connection between our own lives and some larger context, of temporality, of some ideal of human perfection, and of spontaneity. In conjunction with spontaneity, we’ve seen an emphasis on freedom. We’ve also seen the need to understand the nature of the world we live in and the nature of our own lives in order to live an authentic life. In this lecture, we examine each of these themes to see what general conclusions we might draw.

The larger context required for a meaningful life has sometimes been conceived as a universal, divine, or cosmic context, as in the BhagavadGƯtƗ, the book of Job, and the Stoics. For the Daoists, this larger context is similar but more impersonal; it’s the context of the dao, the way of things. Sometimes, this context is a bit more narrow—a global context or a natural one. Lame Deer, for instance, emphasized that the context of our lives that matters most is that of nature, and the Dalai Lama, along with Aristotle, Confucius, and others, emphasizes a social context. In each case, the key to ¿ nding meaning in our lives is to ¿ rst identify the larger context in which our small lives make sense, then to understand how we can make our lives meaningful by connecting them to that context.

With regard to temporality, the Stoics emphasized the eternality of the universe and the fact that the period of our existence is brief and bounded by in¿ nite gulfs of our absence. Buddhism also emphasizes a constant awareness of impermanence, the beauty of impermanence, and the urgency that impermanence gives to our lives. Tolstoy, Lame Deer, and Nietzsche pick up on the theme of mindfulness of death: At each moment in our lives, we need to be aware of our own mortality and ¿ nitude.

In the texts we’ve examined, we’ve often seen the question of the meaning of life addressed in terms of an account of human perfection. Aristotle offered us an ideal of the perfect human life in the concept of eudaimonea, À ourishing, and tells us that this ideal can be achieved through a life of activity in accordance with virtue, through moral strength and

practical wisdom, and through friendship. The Daoists and Zen Buddhists give us the sage as the ideal of perfection, one who pays attention to the empty spaces This spontaneity is motivated by the idea that our actions and values don’t need to be brought together arti¿ cially.

and who lives spontaneously, effortlessly. ĝƗntideva and the

Dalai Lama extend this account of perfection to encompass the cultivation of a certain kind of compassion, a commitment to altruistic action on behalf of others. For Kant and Mill, human life is focused on reason, discourse, and participation in liberal democratic societies. That ideal was challenged by Nietzsche, who emphasized that what makes our lives beautiful is our artistry and spontaneity, our ability to re-evaluate the values we’re taught and lead our lives in harmony with values we ourselves create.

Many of the philosophers and theologians we’ve examined have urged us to cultivate spontaneity in our lives. This spontaneity is motivated by the idea that our actions and values don’t need to be brought together arti¿ cially. For Aristotle and Confucius, the model here is that of the artist, one who practices endlessly to achieve a second nature. For Daoism and Zen, the emphasis is on the need to pare away the arti¿ cial second nature and return to naturalness. Ultimately, Lame Deer tells us that we need to understand that we are fundamentally part of the biological world, a world of circles rather than squares.

For the thinkers we’ve explored, a meaningful life necessarily entails freedom. The GƯtƗ emphasized the fact that freedom emerges from discipline, while the Daoists urged us to free ourselves from social standards. Hume and Kant emphasized the need to attain freedom from authority, an idea that Mill extended to an insistence on absolute freedom of thought. Nietzsche was concerned with freedom from philosophical ideas and from an intellectual tradition that makes creativity impossible. Gandhi emphasized selfmastery similar to that in the GƯtƗ, the kind of discipline that frees us from consumerism and other external constraints.

The answer to our original question is deeply complex and conÀ icted; it requires us to cultivate an awareness of reality in all its complexity and adversity, to understand that our lives are ¿ nite, and to develop a commitment to achieving individual excellence and to creating meaning in the lives of others. Perhaps the ¿ rst step in ¿ nding meaning is to ask the question, then to engage, as we have done in this course, with the wide diversity of answers that have been given throughout history and around the world. Ŷ




Study Questions

1. What are the major dimensions along which accounts of the meaning of life differ from one another? How would one go about choosing one approach over another?

2. What common insights survive these differences? Why do these ideas transcend the different approaches? Are they consistent with one another?






====

Glossary




ahimsa: Nonviolence, or refraining from harming others.

Analects, The: The collection of sayings and dialogues attributed to Kongfuzi (Confucius). It relies on a set of key philosophical ideas, including:

x ren: Humanity, warm-heartedness x li: Ritual propriety, etiquette x de: Virtue, integrity, moral rectitude

x xiao: Filial piety; respect for, and obedience to, one’s parents, elders, and superiors x tian: Heaven, or the order of the universe

x wu-wei: Inaction or spontaneous, effortless activity in contrast to studied, deliberate action aretƝ: Virtue or excellence.

awarƝ: In Japanese Buddhist aesthetics, the particular beauty that derives from the impermanence of things, the beauty things have just before they fade.

being-time: The intimate union of existence and temporality; the fact that to exist is to be impermanent yet to have a past and a future to which one is essentially connected and the fact that human existence is always experienced in relation to past, present, and future.

bodhisattva: In Buddhism, one who has formed the altruistic aspiration to attain awakening for the bene¿ t of all sentient beings.

Chaldeans (Book of Job): An ancient Near Eastern people who lived in Mesopotamia.

depersonalization: Abstraction from one’s own personal interests or place in the world; taking a disinterested view of things.

dharma: A word with many meanings the root of which means “to hold.” Meanings include duty, virtue, doctrine, entity, and reality, depending on context.

Epicurean: A school of Greek and Roman philosophy following the teachings of Epicurus (4th3rd century B.C.E.). Central doctrines of the school were atomism, materialism, and an emphasis on the attainment of peace of mind through moderation and control of the emotions.

ƝthikƝ/ethos: Behavior or conduct.

eudaimonea: Human À ourishing, a good life, often translated as “happiness.”

foundationalism: The doctrine that knowledge must rest on a basis. Examples of foundations of knowledge are perception and reason.

Jainism: An Indian religion in which nonviolence is the central value.

karunƗ: Compassion, the commitment to act to relieve the suffering of others.

kratƝ: Moral strength, the ability to stick to one’s resolve in the face of temptation or fear.

Krishna: An Indian manifestation of divinity.

libertarianism: The belief that individuals should have the maximum personal liberty consistent with the liberty of others; resistance of the intrusion of the law into the private sphere. metaphysics: The study of the fundamental nature of reality.

neo-VedƗnta: A late 19th- and early 20th-century philosophical movement in India grounded in a revival and reinterpretation of the ancient Indian texts collectively called the Vedas. Prominent neo-VedƗnta philosophers included Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda, and Sri Aurobindo.

phenomenology: Inner experience, or the theory of inner experience.

phronesis: Practical wisdom, the ability to deliberate wisely about how to accomplish one’s goals.

postmodernity: An ideological outlook that rejects the fundamental tenets of European modernism—the unity of the subject, the fact that knowledge constitutes a uni¿ ed system that rests on sure foundations, the conviction that civilization is progressive—in favor of a conviction that subjectivity is variable and often fragmented, a suspicion of uni¿ ed systems and a conviction that knowledge is socially constructed and À uid, and a suspicion of a single narrative of human progress. The term also refers to the social conditions that reÀ ect this view, namely, conditions in which fundamental claims are contested, societies are pluralistic, and values do not sustain a uni¿ ed view of knowledge or progress.

Sabeans (Book of Job): An ancient Near Eastern tribe that lived near present-day Yemen.

Samaj movements: The Arya and Brahmo Samajs (Samaj means “society”); two prominent modernist religious reform movements that swept India in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Both emphasized a return to classical Indian texts and ideas but also the abandonment of ritual, the rejection of caste, and an embrace of modernity and Indian nationalism.

Sanskrit: The language of classical Indian scholarship, as opposed to Prakrits, classical vernacular languages.

Sapere Aude!: Kant’s motto of enlightenment: “Dare to know!”

satyƗgraha: A Gandhian term: holding on to, or insisting on, the truth. A refusal to act in accordance with any principle one does not endorse and a commitment to principled action and honesty.

Sheol (Book of Job): The underworld, the place where the dead reside in the ancient Hebrew tradition.

Ğramana: A wandering ascetic of ancient India.

svadharma: One’s own particular duty or role in life, often in India tied to caste.

swadeshi: Literally, one’s own country. Commitment to the value and practices of one’s own country or culture, to self-reliance, and to consuming only what is produced locally.

swaraj: Self-rule. This can mean individual self-mastery or the selfgovernment of a people or nation. For Gandhi, these two senses were deeply connected. theophany: Revelation of the deity.

Transcendentalists: A group of American philosophers, poets, and writers who looked to Asia for inspiration and who were oriented toward mystical values and concerns that transcend the mundane world. Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman were prominent Transcendentalists.

Utilitarianism: A moral theory according to which actions are right to the degree to which they promote happiness or pleasure and wrong to the degree that they promote unhappiness or pain.

yoga: Discipline or spiritual practice. The Bhagavad-GƯtƗ enumerates three kinds of discipline, representing three aspects of life:

x karma yoga: The discipline of action, the pursuit of divinity through action

x jñƗna yoga: The discipline of knowledge, the pursuit of divinity through knowledge

x bhakti yoga: The discipline of devotion, the pursuit of divinity through devotional practice



===============




Biographical Notes



Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.): Aristotle was born in Stageira and moved to Athens in his youth, where he was a prominent aristocrat. He studied under Plato at the Academy. After Plato’s death, he traveled in present-day Turkey, conducting scienti¿ c research. In 343 B.C.E., he was appointed tutor to Alexander the Great. In 335 B.C.E., he returned to Athens and established the Lyceum, where he taught for 12 years, probably his most philosophically creative period. He left Athens to avoid prosecution for impiety and died at age 62 in Chalcis. Aristotle, like Plato, wrote philosophical dialogues, but none of his original works survives; what we have instead are lecture notes from his students. He wrote and taught on virtually every academic subject, including the natural sciences, rhetoric, poetry, metaphysics, logic, ethics, and political philosophy. Aristotle was enormously inÀ uential in the development of Islamic philosophy and medieval European philosophy.

Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi) (perhaps c. 370–c. 300 B.C.E.): There is no consensus regarding the existence of Chuang Tzu, who may have been created as a ¿ ctional author of the text that bears his name. This text, however, may be the work of multiple authors over several centuries. It is said that he left a minor government position for a life as a hermit philosopher and that he once turned down a prime ministership.

Confucius (Kongfuzi) (c. 551–479 B.C.E.): Confucius was born in the Chinese state of Lu (the present-day Shandong province of China) to a military family near the end of the Spring-Autumn period of Chinese history, a period that saw a great deal of warfare between small Chinese states. His father apparently died when Confucius was young, leaving the young boy and his concubine mother in poverty. Confucius clearly studied the Chinese classics with great success and spent most of his life as a low-level civil servant. He became famous as a teacher and spent much of his life traveling from state to state, teaching philosophy and politics. The texts by means of which we know Confucius’s thought are records of his conversations and teachings preserved by his disciples.



His Holiness the Dalai Lama XIV, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935): The Dalai Lama lineage in Tibet is regarded by Tibetans as a reincarnate lineage: Each successive Dalai Lama is recognized as a rebirth of his predecessor, and all are regarded by Tibetans as emanations of AvalalokiteĞvara, the Buddhist celestial bodhisattva of compassion. Dalai Lamas are, hence, regarded by Tibetans as physical manifestations of compassion in the world. The Dalai Lama has traditionally been both the spiritual and political leader of Tibet. The present Dalai Lama was born in a small village in Amdo, in far northeastern Tibet. When he was 3 years old, he was recognized by a search party as the rebirth of the 13th Dalai Lama and brought to Lhasa for enthronement and education. In 1949, the Army of the People’s Republic of China entered Tibet, and despite his youth, the Dalai Lama assumed, at the age of 14, political leadership of Tibet. Shortly after this, he completed his monastic education and earned the highest academic degree conferred in Tibet, the geshe lharampa (a Ph.D. with highest honors). For 10 years, the Dalai Lama attempted to cooperate with the Chinese government in order to allow Chinese authority and modernization while preserving Tibetan cultural identity. But as Chinese repression grew more severe, Tibetan resistance increased. In 1959, the Tibetans rose up against Chinese occupation, and the Dalai Lama was forced to À ee into exile in India, followed by several hundred thousand Tibetan refugees. In India, the Dalai Lama has led a government-in-exile and overseen the establishment of Tibetan schools, orphanages, hospitals, social services, monastic institutions, universities, and ¿ nally, a democratic Tibetan government, stepping aside as head of government. He has opened a long-running dialogue with scientists and has published dozens of books, ranging from highly technical books on Buddhist philosophy to popular guides to happiness. The Dalai Lama has taught or spoken in countries around the world, always promoting nonviolent conÀ ict resolution, interfaith harmony, and a humanitarian social identity. In 1989, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.

Dǀgen (1200–1253): Dǀgen was the illegitimate son of a high-ranking Japanese courtier, who died when her son was 7 years old. Early in his life, Dǀgen joined the great Tendai monastery at Mt. Hiei. But he was dissatis¿ ed with Tendai philosophy, bothered by the problem of the need to seek awakening if all sentient beings are primordially awakened. He moved to a Zen temple in Japan, studying under the great Zen master Eisai until the latter’s death. In 1223, Dǀgen traveled to China to search for teachings that would resolve his remaining concerns. After visiting several monasteries, he encountered the Zen teacher Rujing, under whom he had his awakening experience. In 1228, Dǀgen returned to Japan with the Sǀtǀ Zen lineage inherited from Ruing; he taught at several important temples and wrote hundreds of essays, laying the philosophical foundations of Sǀtǀ Zen in Japan. He settled near the end of his life at Eiheji, which became the headquarters of the Sǀtǀ Zen lineage in Japan.

Epictetus (55–135 C.E.): Little is known of the life of Epictetus, who was born a slave. He lived the ¿ rst part of his life in Rome but was exiled to Greece. He studied Stoic philosophy in his youth and, at some point, gained his freedom. He was a popular teacher and widely respected both as a Stoic philosopher and an orator. None of his writings, if ever there were any, survives. The fragments that constitute his corpus are, in fact, lecture notes.

Gandhi, Mohandas K. (1869–1948): Gandhi was born in Porbandar, then a small princely state, in the modern state of Gujarat. His father was diwan of that state. Gandhi’s parents were both devout Hindus, but much of the surrounding community was Jain; hence, he grew up in a context of great piety and commitment to nonviolence. He was married at age 13. At age 18, he left India for London, where he studied law. While in England, he was active in the Vegetarian Society and came into contact with theosophists; thus, he developed a broader interest in world religions. Gandhi also studied liberal political theory and read Tolstoy and the American Transcendentalists. He returned to India in 1891 and, after some desultory practice, accepted a position in South Africa in 1893. In South Africa, Gandhi encountered ¿ rsthand the racial discrimination that pervaded the British Empire. Most famously, he was thrown off a train at Pietermaritzburg when he refused to vacate the ¿ rst-class compartment for which he had a ticket. This event and others led Gandhi to lead massive nonviolent protests against discriminatory laws. In this context, he formulated his principle of satyƗgraha—insistence on the truth and principled nonviolence as the only ways to challenge overwhelming repression. Gandhi returned to India in 1915, joined the Indian National Congress, and became active, ¿ rst, in the congress’s efforts to resist unjust laws and policies, then in the independence movement. Gandhi led this movement to Indian independence through careful cultivation of nonviolent resistance and refusal to comply with British imperial rule. He led numerous public protests and was jailed regularly but maintained his paci¿ sm and tolerance. Gandhi was deeply opposed to the partition of India and deeply saddened by that eventuality and the violence that came in its wake. He was assassinated by a Hindu fundamentalist terrorist as he walked to prayers in 1948. Gandhi has been a major inÀ uence on such subsequent advocates of nonviolence and insistence on truth as the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and HH the Dalai Lama XIV.

Hume, David (1711–1776): David Hume was a philosophical prodigy and a central ¿ gure of the Scottish Enlightenment. He entered the University of Edinburgh when he was 12 years old, rejecting the study of law for philosophy. After a brief career in business, he traveled to La Flèche, where in conversation with Jesuit philosophers and with access to an excellent library, he wrote his Treatise of Human Nature, published when he was 26 years of age. The Treatise is today recognized as one of the great masterpieces of Western philosophy but was ridiculed by critics at the time of its publication. Hume was undaunted and continued to publish philosophical essays, many of which were well-received, and his monumental History of England, a text that remained a standard history for more than a century after his death. He aspired to a chair in philosophy at Glasgow but was rejected as an atheist. Hume was widely admired as a humanist and as a scholar. He died in Edinburgh a very happy man.

Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804): Immanuel Kant is almost universally regarded as the greatest of all European philosophers. He was born and spent his entire life in Königsberg (present-day Kalningrad) in Prussia. Indeed, he never ventured more than 100 miles from that city. Kant studied at the University of Königsberg, then spent his entire career teaching there. He was a proli¿ c writer, but most of the books of his early years are no longer inÀ uential. In 1781, however, he produced his masterpiece, The Critique of Pure Reason, one of the most profound philosophical investigations undertaken in the Western tradition. This was followed by both The Critique of Practical Reason and The Critique of Judgment, extending Kant’s philosophical system from epistemology and metaphysics to ethics, then to aesthetics and a number of smaller but important texts. It is fair to say that Kant completely transformed the face of European philosophy. He was the ¿ rst professor of philosophy to be an important philosopher in his own right; he developed the ¿ rst comprehensive European philosophical system since the Enlightenment; and he demonstrated that philosophy can take natural science seriously yet remain an autonomous domain of thought. Today, nobody can become a serious philosopher without ¿ rst studying the work of Kant.

Lame Deer, John (1900–1976): John Lame Deer was a Lakota Sioux medicine man born on the Rosebud Reservation and educated in Bureau of Indian Affairs schools. In early adult life, he was a rodeo rider and led the rough life of that trade. After meeting the keeper of the medicine pipe of the Lakota people, he became a medicine man. The second half of his life was devoted to educating Lakota and other Americans about Lakota culture, to the revival of Lakota culture, and to the recovery of traditional Lakota land in the Black Hills.

Lao Tzu (perhaps 6th, 5th, or even 4th century B.C.E.): There is no consensus about whether Lao Tzu (Laozi) ever existed. Many scholars regard him as a mythical ¿ gure constructed as the author of the Daodejing, which may well have developed under the hands of multiple authors over several centuries. Putative biographies locate his birth in Chu (Henan province) and state that he spent much of his adult life in Zhou, near present-day Luoyang, working in a library. He is said to have left the court and disappeared into the West.

Marcus Aurelius (121–160 C.E.): Marcus Aurelius was the son of a wealthy, noble Roman family living in present-day Spain. Marcus was educated by eminent tutors and adopted, in 138, by the emperor Aurelius Antoninus (Pius), under whom he served as consul for some time. While in public service, Marcus continued to pursue his education, studying Greek, literature, philosophy, and rhetoric with some of the most prominent teachers in Rome. He also studied law, a subject for which he appears to have had little appetite. In 161, on the death of Antoninus Pius, Marcus assumed the throne as emperor of Rome along with his adopted brother Lucius, who died soon thereafter, leaving Marcus as sole emperor. His reign was marked by many border wars, all of which concluded satisfactorily for Rome. He was noted as a skilled legislator and judge and was apparently much occupied with administration. Marcus continued to pursue philosophy throughout his life and, on a visit to Athens, proclaimed himself “Protector of Philosophy.” He died while on tour in what is now Vienna.

Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873): John Stuart Mill was the son of the historian James Mill, a close follower of the Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Bentham and Mill developed a rigorous system of upbringing and education for the young John Stuart, who was isolated from other children and taught Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and algebra from age 3. By the time he was 10, he could read Plato in Greek and composed poetry in classical Greek. In his teens, Mill studied logic, rhetoric, history, and economics, but by age 20, he suffered a psychological collapse. Mill married Harriet Taylor, a brilliant young woman, and with her was a forceful advocate for the rights of women, for political liberty, and for a social policy aimed at the bene¿ t of the masses of ordinary people. Mill’s essays on political philosophy were widely read in his own time and are still inÀ uential today.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900): Nietzsche grew up in a middle-class Prussian family. He excelled in his studies, particularly in music and literature, and pursued theology and philology at the University of Bonn. Despite his parents’ piety, he dropped theology and devoted himself to classical philology. Under the inÀ uence of Arthur Schopenhauer, he also developed an intense interest in philosophy and science. In 1869, Nietzsche was appointed, at age 24, professor of philology at Basle. Nobody before or since has held such a chair at such a young age. Nietzsche held the chair for 10 years, before his health declined, and during that period, he began his philosophical work. He was a close friend of the composer Richard Wagner during his early days at Basle but became estranged from Wagner later, breaking with him over political and cultural issues. In 1879, Nietzsche resigned his chair because of ill health, and for the next 10 years, he traveled Europe and wrote almost all of his most inÀ uential philosophical books. By 1889, however, Nietzsche descended into madness. From that time, his sister and mother cared for him, and he was frequently hospitalized. He died in 1900.

ĝƗntideva (8th century C.E.): We know almost nothing of the life of ĝƗntideva. All biographical sources agree that he was born a Brahmin, converted to Buddhism, and studied at Nalanda University in present-day Bihar state in India. He composed two principal works, Siksasamuccaya

(“Collection of Teachings”) and BodhicƗryƗvatƗra (“How to Lead an Awakened Life”).

Seneca (c. 4-65 CE): We know little of Seneca’s early life, although his was an inÀ uential family. One of his brothers was a proconsul, and Seneca himself became tutor to the emperor Nero. He studied Stoic philosophy with eminent teachers but seems to have been at odds with the court, nearly executed by Caligula and exiled by Claudius. Nonetheless, he returned to Rome to serve as Nero’s tutor and counselor. Once again, however, he fell into political disrepute and retired to write. Seneca was later accused of participating in a conspiracy to assassinate Nero and was ordered to commit suicide, which he did. He was a remarkable writer, and his letters and essays have been widely read and have inÀ uenced many subsequent ethicists and moral psychologists.

Siddhartha Gautama (c. 500 B.C.E.–c. 420 B.C.E.): Siddhartha Gautama, more commonly known as ĝakyamuni Buddha or just the Buddha, was born in Lumbini to the royal family in the small state of Kapilavastu, in presentday Nepal. The precise dates of his life are uncertain, and he may have lived as much as 50 years earlier or later than the dates indicated here. What we know of his life derives from the record of his teachings and from frankly hagiographic biographies. He was raised in the royal palace as crown prince, but in his early 30s, he abandoned the palace for the life of a wandering ascetic. He studied for several years under a series of teachers and ¿ nally set off on a solitary quest for understanding, culminating in his experience of awakening at Bodh Gaya, in present-day Bihar state in India. Following that experience, he taught for about 50 years, wandering through what is now northern India and Nepal, attracting numerous disciples and the patronage of several powerful kings, and establishing a monastic community. He died at the age of 80 in Kushinagar in what is now Uttar Pradesh state.

Tolstoy, Lev (Leo) (1828–1910): Count Leo Tolstoy was born into one of the most distinguished Russian noble families, but his own youth was undistinguished. He did poorly in school, dropped out of university, ran up huge gambling debts, and joined the army. Between 1857 and 1861, Tolstoy traveled extensively in Europe. During this time, he met eminent European writers and political thinkers, experienced the difference between liberal European states and the repressive Russian regime, and was exposed to new ideas about education. He returned to Russia an anarchist and a paci¿ st and with a passionate interest in the elevation of the serfs through education. He founded schools for his own serfs’ children and began to write the magni¿ cent novels for which he is so famous, novels critical of war, of the state, and of middle-class society. Tolstoy became a devout Christian and fused his Christianity with his commitment to nonviolence. He communicated with Gandhi and was inÀ uential in Gandhi’s own fusion of religious fervor, nonviolence, and criticisms of modernity and the state. At the end of his life, at age 82, Tolstoy renounced his wealth and left home to become a wandering ascetic, but he died of pneumonia shortly after setting out.