화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망 - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 9
Full text of "hua-yen-buddhism-the-jewel-net-of-indra"
Hua-yen Buddhism the Jewel Net of IndraFrancis H. Cook 1977
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Contents
Preface
- The Jewel Net of Indra
- The Hua-yen School
- The Indian Background of Hua-yen
- Identity
- Intercausality
- The Part and the Whole
- Vairocan
- Living in the Net of Indra
Notes
GlossaryIndex
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Notes
(T. = Taisho shinshu daizokyo. The following number is the number of the text in the
Taisho collection, followed in turn by the page number and register.)
Chapter 1
1. Don Marquis, The Lives and Times of Archy and Mahitabel (New York: Doubleday,
1950), p. $6.
2. Mendel Sachs, “Space, Time and Elementary Interaction in Relativity,” Physics
Today (February 1969):59. ““The derived mass field depends upon the curvature of
space-time. The latter geometrical property 1s, in turn, a manifestation of the mutual
coupling of all the matter within the closed system. Thus, if the rest of the universe should
be depleted of all matter, the mass of the remaining electron, say, should correspondingly
go to zero. The derived field relationship 1s then a quantitative expression of the Mach
principle because here the inertial mass of any amount of matter 1s indeed a well defined
function of its dynamic coupling with all of the other matter within the entire closed
system.” bs
3. Daisetz T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, Bolligen Series, vol. 64 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 237-
4. T. 1866, p. 508c.
5. Thomas Berger, Little Big Man (New York: Dial Press, 1964), pp. 213-14.
6. Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), p. 146.
7. Sogaku Harada Roshi, “On Practice,” Journal of the Zen Center of Los Angeles
(Winter 1973): 7.
Chapter 2
1. Such is the opinion of Japanese scholars involved in the Hua-yen tradition. The
124 Notes
most thorough study 1s Ishii Kyod6, Kegon kydgaku seiritsu shi (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Jigyo
Shuppan, 1964). Other useful studies of the development of the sutra include Takamine
Rydshu, Kegon shiso shi (Kyoto: Koky6 Shoin, 1942), and Kamekawa Kyoshin, Kegon-
gaku (Kyoto: Hyakkaen, 1949). There 1s little question that the Avatamsaka 1s the result
of compilation of already existing sutras and new chapters composed specifically for the
purpose of filling in gaps in structure. The Dasabhiimika and Gandavyiha existed both
prior to and subsequent to the final compilation in the form of independent sutras.
According to Kamekawa, the text has a close association with the Khotan region.
2. Other than the Dasabhiimika and Gandavyiha, the only other reference in Indian
literature to the material now included in the Avatamsaka consists of some verses from the
chapter of the A. now called Hsien shou, in the Siksasamuccaya. No other part of the A.
seems to be mentioned elsewhere, which 1s surprising, if this text was known in Indian
proper, since there is so much rich material on the Bodhisattva practices.
3. See the sources in note 1 above, for some of the evidence for this position.
4. Johannes Rahder, ed., Dasabhiimika Sutra (Paris: Geuthner, 1926). The text has also
been edited by Kondo Ryuk6, Dasabhtimisvaro Nama Mahayana Stotram (Tokyo: Daigyo
Bukky6o Kenkyokai, 1936).
5. Daisetz T. Suzuki and Hokei Idzumi, eds., The Gandavyiha Sutra, new rev. ed.
(Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1959).
6. Kamata Shigeo, ‘““Kegon-gaku no tenseki oyobi kenkyu bunken,” m Kawada
Kumatarod and Nakamura Hajime, eds., Kegon shiso (Tokyo: Hozokan, 1960), p. $17.
Kamata concludes that most scholars now agree that Tu-shun should be considered the
first patriarch.
7. Quoted in Heinrich Dumoulin, History of Zen Buddhism (New York: Pantheon,
1963), p. 38. Zen is “the practical consummation of Buddhist thought in China, and the
Kegon (Avatamsaka) philosophy is 1ts theoretical culmination.” ““The philosophy of Zen
is Kegon and the teaching of Kegon bears its fruit in the life of Zen.”
8. Jan Fontein, The Pilgrimage of Sudhana (Netherlands: Mouton, 1967). The subtitle
of Fontein’s book is A Study of Gandavyiha Illustrations in China, Japan, and Java. It is the
fullest and most thorough study to date of the vast amount of art in Asia centering around
the episodes of the Gandavyitha section of the Avatamsaka.
9. “Selections from the Chuang-tzu,” in Sources of Chinese Tradition, ed. Theodore de
Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), vol. 1. I have taken the liberty to
alter the translation slightly, mostly in the use of some alternate translation equivalents.
For the most part, I have adopted the suggestion of A.C. Graham, 1n his paper “Chuang-
tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal,” in History of Religions, 9 (November and February
1969~70): 137-59, with regard to shih and fei. I have therefore translated these as “is”
and “is not” respectively, instead of the more common “right” and “wrong.”
to. Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derk Bodde (New York:
Macmillan Paperbacks, 1960), p. 221. I have altered this passage slightly, as in the previous
quote, though the translation as such 1s that of Fung.
11. Ibid., p. 222.
12. The opening lines of the Hsin hsin ming, “The great Tao 1s not difficult, it simply
Notes 125
does not choose,” states the matter succinctly, and this is a well-known Buddhist poem.
The point 1s not that we must avoid certain situations which may defile us or cause turmoil,
but rather that the wise man 1s he who can mix with a world of light and shadow, pleasure
and pain, life and death, and not be thrown off balance by them. The persistent Taoist
attitude is that of neither exulting in victory. nor despairing in defeat. Kuo-hsiang says,
in his commentary on the Chuang-tzu, “If one 1s contented wherever he goes, he will
be at ease wherever he goes. Even life and death can not affect him. How much less can
flood and fire? The perfect man is not besieged by calamities, not because he escapes
from them but because he advances the principles of things.” [Wing-Tsit Chan, trans.,
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press Paperback,
1969), p. 328.] Both the Indian and Chinese approaches to the higher life can be considered
to be simply alternate methods of achieving equilibrium in one’s responses to experience.
The Chinese approach was not to eliminate certain personality factors or avoid certain
experiences, but to confront any circumstance without permitting it to cause attachment
or loathing. It was a question of flexibility.
13. My argument here is simply that there were important areas of agreement between
Taoist and Buddhist ideas. This 1s not to deny that there were areas of Buddhist thought
which had no Taoist equivalent, nor would I deny that the use of Taoist terms as sub-
stitutes for the Sanskrit sometimes gave shades of meaning to the Indian concept which
were foreign to it. This is particularly true of the early period, in about the third and fourth
centuries. I am only sayimg that one of the reasons why Chinese with a scholarly or literary
leaning became attracted to Buddhism 1s that they saw in Buddhism certain concepts,
and certain ways of handling experience, which seemed familiar to them. One particular
instance of this agreement lay in the teaching of the Sinyavada sutras that emancipation
consisted in a nonconceptual mode of experience, wherein the normal symbolic, con-
ceptual, categorizing function of the mind ceased to serve as a mediating link between
the bare datum and its awareness in the subject. In other words, the world was to be
known 1n its suchness, fathata, rather than in 1ts conceptual, conventional form., A Chinese
gentleman versed in the writings of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu was bound to find this a
familiar concept, though ultimately his way of thinking about the matter owed more
to the Taoist classics than to Indian modes of thought. As I have indicated in the quotations
in the text, the Indian picture of existence as interdependent tallied very well with the
convictions of Chuang-tzu and Neo-taoists such as Kuo-hsiang.
14. Apparently the kind of identity which so greatly interested men such as Fa-tsang
was first explored systematically and seriously during the period of the division between
North and South China and during the succeeding Sui period by such monks as Seng-
tsan and Hur-yiian (i.e., not the contemporary of Kumarajiva but a later Hur-yiian).
In his Ta-ch’eng : chang Hui-yiian devotes a lot of space to the discussion of dharmas as
being alike in essence and different in function, a style of treatment which later became
standard for the Hua-yen thinkers. For a full discussion of this, see Kamata Shigeo,
Chugoku bukkyo shiso shi kenkyi (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1968), pp. 313-14, 349-50. Kamata
sees this activity as being 1n part an attempt on the part of the sangha to reconcile the secular
and sacred orders, and this need to equate Buddhism with the secular order must in turn
126 Notes
be seen against the background of Northern Chinese Buddhism of the period, which had
to function in a totalitarian state (pp. 272-74). He sees the rock carvings of Buddhas with
the faces of the Emperor, at Yun-kang and Lung-men, asa further indication of the attempt
by the sangha to say that there is no difference between the Buddha and the Emperor
(p. 279).
15. I tend to see Tu-shun and Chih-yen as continuing the work of the Ti-lun and
She-lun scholars in supplying the pieces that were finally to be assembled by Fa-tsang.
This is not to disparage the real contributions of Chih-yen, whose writings show an
important attempt at being systematic and thorough, but his work 1s simple and incom-
plete compared to that of Fa-tsang. The Hua-yen system as a coherent whole emerges
for the first time in the essays of Fa-tsang. The last two masters, Ch’eng-kuan and Tsung-
nn, refined, defined, filled in details, and gave the Hua-yen system particular orientations
dictated by their own special interests, wei~shih epistemology and Ch’an meditation
respectively. Fa-tsang was not especially noteworthy as an original thinker, but he was
a powerful thinker, and obviously had an exceptional talent for organizing and syncretizing
a large body of fragments. Without his talent for seeing the interrelationships of these
parts, and without the learning needed to give ideas a traditional support, it 1s safe to
say that there would not have been a Hua-yen tradition.
16. As the title indicates, the essay is primarily concerned with samatha-vipasyana
exercises (shih-kuan), which 1s to say, with meditation. It 1s thought that the extant essay
1s not by Tu-shun, but was composed by Fa-tsang, who utilized material onginating with
Tu-shun. See, for instance, Kamata, “Kegon-gaku no tensek1 oyob: kenkyu bunken,”
in Kegon Shiso, p. 504. Other fragments of Tu-shun’s work are found in Chih-yen’s
Hua-yen !-ch’eng shih hstian men (T. 1868). ,
17. See the above note for Tu-shun’s contributions. Chih-yen’s comments on medita-
tion are interspersed throughout his writings, particularly m the lengthy Sou hsiian chi
(T. 1732). Fa-tsang wrote a treatise named Hua-yen ta p’u-t’i hsin chang, which 1s also named
Hua-yen san-mei chang (T. 1878). His Pan-lo-po-mi-to hsin ching lio shu, which is a running
commentary on the Prajnaparamita Hridaya Sutra, contains interesting comments on the
relation of the message of the sutra to samatha and vipasyana. Ch’eng-kuan also dealt with
practice, continuing the Hua-yen concern with san-mei (samadhi) and meditation in general.
His San cheng ytian-yung kuan men (T. 1882), particularly, is concerned with meditation.
Tsung-m1 was probably most concerned of all Hua-yen masters with meditation, which
1s not surprising, because he was also a Ch’an master. He wrote much on meditation and
general Bodhisattva practices in most of his work, but Chu Hua-yen fa-chiai kuan men
(T. 1884) 1s one of the most important works concerned with this matter. He taught
throughout his writings that there 1s no real separation between meditation and study.
Chapter 3
1. Almost all of Buddhist thought may be seen as one prolonged concern with the
Notes 127
problem of causation. Such central Buddhist doctrines as Sanyata, pratityasamutpada, and
apohavada, as well as.a great amount of the psychological work of the Theravadins, the
dharma theory of the Sarvastivadins, and the complicated structure of the eight vijnanas
of the Vijnanavadins, may all be seen, for instance, as basically concerned with the problem
of causation. Hua-yen, inasmuch as the core of its system 1s concerned with a species of
pratityasamutpada, 1s a continuation of this ancient problem. Richard Robinson has said
that “causation [was] a central problem throughout the history of Indian philosophy”
in The Buddhist Religion. A Historical Introduction (Belmont, Calif.; Dickenson, 1970),
p. 21. He also makes the point, in Early Madhyamika in India and China (Madison: Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1967), that causation was the central Indian Buddhist problematic
(p. 161).
2. Quoted by D.S. Ruegg, in La théorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra (Paris: Ecole
Francaise d’Extreme-Orient, 1969), p. 299. The text quoted 1s the Aniinatvapurnatvanirdesa~
parivarta, which is also cited several times in Fa-tsang’s Treatise. There 1s a rather long
list of synonyms which Buddhism uses freely when referring to the absolute. Ruegg also
mentions the Avatamsaka itself (p. 286 ff.) as assimilating tathagatagarbha to Buddha
jiiana and Tathagata jnana. According to him (p. 265) the text mentioned above also
equates tathagatagarbha with dharma-kaya.
3. The monograph of D.S. Ruegg, mentioned in the preceding note, is the only full-
length work in a Western language devoted exclusively to the doctrine of tathdgatagarbha.
4. T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955);
Frederick Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abmgdon, 1967);
Robinson, Early Madhyamika in India and China. Edward Conze has written much about
the doctrine of emptiness, and his translations of the literature are well known. Among
his many books might be mentioned Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1967) and Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: Hillary, 1958).
5. Mentioned by Conze in Buddhist Thought in India, p. 195. He mentions Regamey,
Schayer, and Falk as‘some of those who hold this theory.
6. I am paraphrasing Dr. Conze, which will make him unhappy, I feat? In Selected
Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom (London: Buddhist Society, 1955), p. 18, he says of
the vast literature on the perfection of wisdom, “What then 1s the subject matter? It is just
the Unconditioned, nothing but the Absolute over and over again.”
7. Jacques May, Candrakirti Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve,
1959), p. 222. My translation from the French.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 223.
10. Ruegg, in La théorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra, p. 362 ff., devotes several pages to
the problem. He finds the Ratnagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra) to be one of the main sources
of this tendency, in its habit of describing the dharma-kaya or tathagatagarbha through the
use of positive epithets—i.e., tranquil, permanent, stabile. According to Ruegg (p. 319
ff.), there was a tendency in Tibet, exemplified by the Jo nan pa sect, to find in the doctrine
of the “emptiness of the other”’ (gZan stor) a basis for the positive description of emptiness/
128 Notes
tathagatagarbha. There 1s, of course, a very old tradition in Buddhism, observable in Pali
99 66
literature, of referring to nirvana as “a refuge,” “cool,” ‘‘a ford,” etc. In Mahayana
literature, there 1s a tendency to speak of nirvana in terms diametrically opposed to those
which refer to samsdara—permanent, possessing self, blissful, and extremely pure. However,
such terms are usually mterpreted as mere verbal devices used to lure the individual away
from his attachment to ordinary existence. Occasionally, however, there has been a
tendency to think of such terms as really describing the indescribable. The same may be
said of the custom in Far Eastern Buddhism of speaking of a “‘Great Self” which is realized
upon the destruction of the fictional concept of the mundane atman. Ruegg (p. 371) says
that the Mahdayanasitra-alamkara also speaks of a maha-dtman and defends its use as a con-
venient concept.
11. Robinson, Early Madhyamika, p. 43.
12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. May, Candrakirti Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti, p. 224.
14. Murti, Central Philosophy, pp. 212-13.
15. Non-Buddhist opponents of the Sinyavadins often accused them of nihilism, as
can be seen in Nagaryuna’s Madhyamika-karikas, where he takes pains to refute the charge.
I tend to interpret Hua-yen as a Chinese restatement of the Siinyavada position, 1n which
the predominant negative approach of Nagarjuna’s school has been eliminated. One
indication of the Chinese desire to give a positive connotation to emptimess may possibly
be found in a strong tendency in Chinese Buddhist treatises to substitute the old, tradition-
laden term fi for “emptiness.”’ Li, as the principle by which things are themselves, or as
the pattern of order that runs through nature, is similar in tone to emptiness interpreted
as interdependent being, but whereas “‘emptiness”’ has, at least im its semantic force, the
connotations of voidness, nullity, and the like, li connotes only the full, rch, creative
potential that lies at the root of the phenomenal world. Fa-tsang substitutes Ji frequently
for “emptiness,” and in fact he uses both terms interchangeably throughout his writings.
Thus in his mind, both terms meant the same, but li had a positive ring seemingly lacking
in Siinyata.
16. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan,
1926), p. 275.
17. Ruegg, La théorie du tathagatagarbha, p. 516.
18. Ibid., pp. 78, 126, 267. ‘In other words, while the tathdgatagarbha 1s so to speak
assimilable to the dharma-kaya of the tathdgata, the tathagatagarbha of living beings who
are affected by the kiesa and still bound to the cycle of existences 1s not simply identical
to the dharma-kaya of the perfect Buddha on the plane of Result” (p. 267; my translation).
The temptation to make a simple, unqualified identification results from the 1dea that the
tathagatagarbha ox dharma-kaya 1s utterly nondual. Since it 1s nondual, if it 1s the true basis
for all living things, then all must be perfect Buddhas. However, it 1s only the embryo
or seed of Buddhahood, in need of nurturing, and the living being 1s obviously not
endowed with such marks of full Buddhahood as the thirty-two marks or the eighteen
special qualities. The tathagatagarbha is thus something similar to musical talent; it exists
Notes’ 129
both in the beginning violinist and in Heifitz, but in one it needs training to become the
glorious miracle it is in the other.
19. Ibid., pp. 109, 117, 189, 405.
20. Ibid., pp. 315, 403. The Ratnagotravibhaga also mentions the same identification,
quoting the Srimaladevi Sitra.
21. As Richard Robinson points out, in Early Madhyamika in India and China (pp.
96-114), some members of the early Chinese sangha such as Hui-yiian never did really
understand the doctrine of emptiness, particularly in the form it has in Madhyamika
treatises. However, Fa-tsang had the benefit of almost three more centuries of work on
the part of his predecessors, and by his time, members of the sangha seem for the most
part to have correctly assimilated the concept. Some of the evidence of Fa-tsang’s grasp
of the doctrine can be seen in Chapter 7 of this book. See also my translation of, and
commentary on, Fa-tsang’s ‘“‘Brief Commentary on the Heart Sitra,” in Buddhist Medita-
tion: Theory and Practice (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976).
22. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 502Cc.
23. Bukkyo taikei: go kyo sho (Tokyo: Bukkyo Taikei Kanseikai, 1923), 2:46-47.
Gyonen’s point 1s that both the “‘six meanings” and Nagarjuna’s “eight negations” are
simply alternate approaches to the same problem. “This shows that in the Dharma there
is [the teaching method of] obstructing and manifesting, of doing away with common-~
sense [conceptions] or revealing the true principle” (p. 46). “Obstructing and manifesting,
or opposing [the false] and revealing [the true] are simply two sides of the same coin”
(p. 46). As Fa-tsang’s statement shows, both approaches deal with pratityasamutpada, but
the connotations of the eight negations are negative, while those of the six meanings are
positive.
24. See Chapter 2, n. 13. :
25. T’an hsiian chi, T. vol. 35, p. 346c. Fa-tsang says that Vairocana pervades both
kinds of karma-result, as innate prajna and as the material world-receptacle. Thus the full
Buddha-prajfia 1s present in things, not just as a seed-potential. The Avatamsaka, in the
chapter ‘“The Appearance of the Tathagata,” says that prajfia is present in the bodies of all
sentient beings. In principle, it 1s present in everything, including nonsentient things.
26. This Hui-yiian lived during the North and South dynasties and Sui dynasty. He
was very much interested in this whole line of questioning. His commentary on the Ch’i
hsin lun discusses the idea that tathata is a mixture of the pure and impure, and in his Ta-
ch’eng i chang, he discusses how dharmas are both the same and different. Fa-tsang either
knew Hur-yiian’s work or else can be seen as perpetuating the sort of speculation that
occurred in the several generations preceding his own time. He frequently uses the same
terminology that Hui-yiian uses, or, as 1s often the case in his Treatise, he uses alternate
expressions such as “immutability” and ‘“‘conditionedness,” while the patterns of thought
themselves are usually identical with those of Hui-yiian. Sometimes he uses both sets of
terms in the same passage: ““Obeying conditions and arising and ceasing is the category
of arising and ceasing. That is to say, in compliance with influences it [i.e., tathata] becomes
active and forms impure and pure [dharmas]. Even though impure and pure form its
130 Notes
nature, it is eternally unmoving. Moreover, it 1s able to become the impure and pure
because 1t does not become active. Therefore, it can be said to be active without bemg
disturbed” (T. vol. 44, p. 251b, c).
27. T. vol. 44, no. 1846.
28. Bukkyo taikei, 2:29~30. “The interpenetrating dharma-dhatu 1s the body of the
Buddha, and is called Dharma-dhatu Buddha.”
29. Quoted in Saito Yuishin, Kegon-gaku koyo (Tokyo: Shuseisha, 1920), pp. 158-59.
Fa-tsang’s thought bears a strong resemblance to that of such earlier thinkers as Hu-chao,
who, in his commentary on the Suvarnaprabhasottama Sitra, gives four meanings of the
word “mind”: mind as tathata; mind as that which thinks; mind as the accumulation of
experience; and mind as alaya-vijfiana. Fa-tsang means mind as tathata when he speaks of
the universe as mind only. This latter information is derived from Kametani Shokei,
Kegon tetsugaku kenkyii (Tokyo: Meikyd Gakkai, 1922), p. 94. I have not seen Hui-chao’s
commentary. :
30. Each thing 1s the garbha or womb of Buddhahood inasmuch as it embraces or
conceals (ts’ang) intrinsically pure tathata. According to Kamata Shigeo, in Chiigoku
bukkyo shiso shi no kenky (Tokyo: Zaidan Hojin Tokyo Daigaku, 1965), pp. 13-15,
although the Mahaparinirvana Sutra says that only living beings really possess Buddha
nature, the Chinese, under the influence of Taoist thought, tended to say that all things
have it, just as all things have Tao nature.
31. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 499b.
32. Ibid., p. 499.
33. Ibid., p. sore.
Chapter 4
1. According to Hsiian-tsang’s Ch’eng wei-shih lun, “‘Parinispanna is eternal freedom of
paratantra from the parikalpita nature.” Since his discussion of the three natures is made
purely from the standpoint of consciousness as the sole reality, he also says that “the name
Parinispanna is also given to the ‘pure conditioned,’ that 1s to say, the pure mind which is
Paratantra”’ [Wei Tat, trans., Ch’eng wei-shih tun (Hong Kong: Ch’eng Wei Shih Lun,
1973), p. 635]. The Mahayanasamgraha says of parinispanna, ‘Jt 1s the complete absence
of all objective character fi.e., :mputed character] in the dependent nature” [My translation
of the French of Etienne Lamotte, trans., La Somme du Grand Véhicule (Louvain: Biblio-
theque du Muséon, 1938), 2:91. I have altered Wei Tat’s translation slightly].
2. Kamata Shigeo, Chigoku kegon shiso shi no kenkyi (Tokyo: Zaidan Hojin Tokyo
Daigaku, 1965), pp. 144-48. Fa-tsang and the Empress Wu had a need for each other,
apparently. Fa-tsang needed the imperial patronage, and the Empress was interested in
the ability of Hua-yen thought to furnish a rationale for her relationship to her subjects
and for the relationship ofimperial T’ang China to satellite countries. Also, having usurped
the throne from her predecessor, who had patronized Hsiian-tsang’s Wei-shih school,
Notes 131
the new patronage of Hua-yen and the withdrawal of patronage from Hsiian-tsang’s
school had.an obvious symbolic value.
3. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 499.
4. Ibid.
5. Nagao Gadjin, “Some problems in Fa-tsang’s discussion of the three natures,” in
Fifty-Year Anniversary Commemorative Anthology of the Kyoto University Department of
Arts and Letters (Kyoto, 1957), p. 186. (In Japanese)
6. Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, trans., “‘Le petit traité de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur les
trois natures,” Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 2-3 (1932-35) :158.
7. Ybid., pp. 158-59.
Nispanna does not differ from kalpita, because the second has for its nature the duality
which does not exist, because the first has for its nature the existence of this duality.
Kaipita does not differ from nispanna, because the second has for its nature the inexistence
of duality, because the first has for its nature nonduality.
Nispanna does not differ from paratantra, because the second does not exist as it appears,
because the first has for 1ts nature the inexistence of this mode of appearance.
Paratantra does not differ from nispanna, because the second is the self-nature of the
duality which does not exist, because the first does not have for its nature its mode of
appearance. [My translation from the French]
8. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 503b. Fa-tsang 1s not, of course, falling into some terrible non-
Buddhist error of asserting a svabhdva, let alone two of them. “Different essence” and
“identical essence” are not svabhavas of the sort denied by Buddhism. This will be clear
if it is remembered that ‘‘identical essence’ 1s nothing more than the identity shared by
all dharmas in their complete lack of a svabhava; that is, their common or identical essence
is essencelessness. “Different essence” is simply a reference to the obvious fact of the
difference in form and function among dharmas.
9. The following quotation in the text gives his reason for this statement. His argument
in his analogy of the building (Ch. 6) is that if the rafter is not integrated into the building,
the total building will not come into being. To be complete, the building depends on the
rafter.
10. Bukkyo taikei, 1:65.
II. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 503b, c.
Chapter 5
I. Bukkyo taiket (Tokyo: Bukkyo Taikei Kanseikai, 1923), 2:65.
2. Ibid. p. $4.
3. Yusugi Ryoei, Kegon-gaku gairon (Kyoto: Ryutam University Publishing Bureau,
1941), p. 127.
4. Lam not thinking of any particular passage in Whitehead’s writings. Rather, the
132 Notes
whole of Process and Reality and much in a book such as Modes of Thought involve the idea
that anything which we may call a reality, an existent, 1s the product of antecedent causes
and 1s itself one cause for a subsequent reality. All of existence 1s thus bound up with
causation, so that to exist means to be caused and to be a cause. Whatever 1s removed from
causation is a nonentity. For Whitehead, reality is process, and process is the never-ending
transformation of the universe into ever-new realities, in a perpetual cause-effect flow.
However, for Hua-yen and Whitehead alike, in the final analysis, the causal entity should
not really be considered to be very substantial, and certainly not permanent, for what is
conventionally considered to be a cause is itself only the momentary result of antecedent
causes and perishes so soon that to think of it as a real point analyzable from process itself
is CO invest 1t with a false permanence. Whitehead agrees with Hua-yen that the “what”
of an entity can really only be understood when seen as the “how” of the thing; 1.¢., as
the sum total of contributory causes and as a causal link in a ceaseless process.
5. The “universal eye” or “untversal vision” is one of several types of “‘eye”’ enumerated
in Buddhist literature. Here it contrasts with the corporeal eye, which can only see matenal
objects, and then usually incorrectly. The universal eye is an intuitive vision within samadhi
which sees the real nature of things as identical and interdependent, which is undetectable
by the corporeal eye. It was Chih-yen, the second patriarch of Hua-yen, who first claimed
that the perfection of the Hua-yen school rested on the fact that its teachings were the
expression of the universal vision of the Buddha in the sdgara-mudra samadhi.
6. Quoted in Sait6 Yuishin, Kegon-gaku koyd (Tokyo: Shiseisha, 1920), p. 60. I have
not been able to trace his reference.
7. For the meaning of the name, see Mochizuki Shinko, Bukkyo daijiten, 1:376-77.
Other sources that discuss this samadhi are Kamata Shigeo, Chiigoku bukkyo shiso shi kenkyii
(Tokyo: Zaidan Hojin Daigaku, 1965), pp. 403-6, and Kamekawa Kyéshin, Kegon-gaku
(Kyoto: Hyakkaen, 1949), pp. 17-19. All these scholars gloss in with the compound
in-hsten, the latter part of the compound meaning “to manifest,” “to appear,” and the
like, or in-hsiang, the latter word meaning “appearance” or “image.” I believe it is clear
that the translation of in as “seal” reveals an ignorance of the simile which gives the samadhi
its name.
Chapter 6
1. Treatise, T. 1866, p. so07c ff.
2. This is Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Daéabhiimika Sitra, T. 1 $22, pp. 124c—125a.
3- The most useful commentaries are Gyonen’s Tsiiroki, Shih-hui’s Wu chiao chang fu ku
chi, and the Kegon go kyo sho shi ji ki, all of which can be found in Bukkyo taikei (Tokyo:
Bukkyo Taikei Kanseikai, 1923), vols. 13 and 14. At this point in the Treatise, all the
commentaries become very brief and perfunctory, probably because the example 1s so
clear and self-explanatory and because the details were explained in earlier sections of the
commentaries.
Notes 133
4. T. 1881. This isa very short essay, and while it 1s not nearly so detailed and systematic
as the Treatise, 1t 1s very useful for getting some idea of the inner workings of the Hua~yen
system. Much of it has to do with the “‘six characteristics.” Fa-tsang used a gold statue of
a lion as a means of demonstrating to the Empress Wu the nature of identity and inter-
penetration. There 1s a translation into English in Wing-Tsit Chan, Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 409-24.
5. While I am aware of the objections some of my colleagues in philosophy will have
with regard to ‘the linguistic and logical problems involved in this identification of
“universal” and “particular,” extensive research has convinced me that these are the proper
translation terms for the Chinese and that Fa-tsang does indeed say that they are identical.
I believe that a close reading of the Treatise will resolve their fears and doubts. ““Whole”’
and “part” are also used as equivalents in the Treatise. In that text, on p. $07c, Fa-tsang
uses the Chinese word ping as an equivalent, and Yusugi Ryoei, in his Kegon-gaku gairon
(Kyoto: Ryutani University Publishing Bureau, 1941), p. 150, says that “it is the building
which universalizes the pillars, rafters, and so on.”
6. Yusugi Ryoei, in Daizdkyd koza: go kyo sho kogi (Tokyo: Toho Shoin, 1932), p. 39,
speaks of four kinds of Samantabhadra: Samantabhadra as the Dharma; Samantabhadra
as prajna; Samantabhadra as practice; and Samantabhadra as all living beings. According
to Yusugi, all who practice the Dharma are Samantabhadra. One does not distinguish
between holy and profane, since in respect to the realm of Samantabhadra, one is either on
the early, middle, or later stages of practice, but all are alike Samantabhadra.
7. These vows are dealt with extensively in the Avatamsaka, which is nothing but 2
detailed description of the progress of the disciple from the earliest stage of traming up
through perfect enlightenment. Thus each vow 1s dealt with in detail. However, ‘this
enumeration of vows can be found in the translation of the Samantabhadracari-pranidhana,
by Prajna. For a discussion of these vows, see Kaneko Datei, Kegon-gyo gaisetsu (Kyoto:
Zenjinsha, 1948), pp. 130 ff.
8. The names and arrangement of the six characteristics make this quite evident, but
the variety of names may give the impression that something more than part and whole,
or one and many, are being discussed. See Saito Yuishin, Kegon-gaku koyd (Tokyo:
Shuseisha, 1920), p. 175, and Kamekawa Kyoshin, Kegon-gaku (Kyoto: Hyakkaen, 1949),
pp. 256 ff.
Chapter 7
1. Todai-ji, published by Todai-ji, Nara, n.d.
2. Tu-shun, Hua-yen wu chiao shih kuan, T. 1867, p. 513¢.
3. All of Hua-yen literature, particularly the writings of Fa-tsang, speak of Vairocana
as the “Buddha with ten bodies.” See his Treatise, for instance, T. 1866, pp. 498c, 499a.
4. Quoted by Dogen, in Seizei sanshoku, in his Shobogenzd. Zenyaku Shobogenzo, ed.
Nakamura Soichi (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1971), 1:438.
134 Notes
5. Quoted in Fa-tsang’s Treatise, T. 1866, p. soob.
6. Ta-ch’eng fa-chiai wu ch’a-pieh lun shu, T. 1838.
7. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 499a.
8. T. 1733, p. 214¢.
9. Foran excellent discussion of the creativity and potential of emptiness, see Hisamatsu
Shinichi, ‘‘The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness,” Philosophical Studies of Japan
2 (1960) :65—97. Buddhists use several terms to denote the same thing—emptiness, Buddha,
Buddha-nature, nonbeing, tathagatagarbha, and dharma-dhatu, to name a few. A very
interesting treatment of emptiness can also be found in Nishida Kitaro, A Study of Good,
trans. V.H. Viglielmo (Tokyo: Printing Bureau of the Japanese Government, 1960).
Io. Treatise, T. 1866, p. sorb, c.
11. Pan-lo-po-lo-mi-to hsin ching lio shu, T. 1712, p. §53a.
12. Ibid., p. $53c.
13. Richard Robinson, Early Madhyamika in India and China (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 140. Seng-chao refutes the view that “emptiness 1s the primordial
inexistence from which all existent things have arisen. . . so that inexistence is the matrix
of everything.”
14. Pan-lo-po-lo-mi-to hsin ching lio shu, T. 1712, p. §53a, b.
15. Both of the sources quoted by Fa-tsang make the point that if emptiness is inexistent,
there can be no modification ever in the status quo. In other words, according to the
understanding of svabhava held by the Sanyavadins, it 1s only because dharmas are empty,
which Is to say have no self-existence, that they are able to change in dependence upon
conditions. I believe that Fa-tsang understood this point very well. The Hua-yen dharma-
dhatu 1s if anything a constantly changing configuration as a whole and at every point in
the structure. There 1s no thing anywhere that does not constantly change in this manner;
indeed, given a perpetual, instantaneous change at all points, there cannot even be “things”
as commonly understood.
16. Pan-lo-po-lo~mi-to hsin ching lio shu, T. 1712, p. 553c.
17. Ibid.
18. Hisa-yen wu chiao shih kuan, T. 1867, p. $11a.
19. This should not be mistaken to mean that emptiness is another entity apart from
concrete reality, nor should it be taken to mean that emptiness is ix the world, as some sort
of pantheistic immanence. On the other hand, this does not mean that the natural world as
ordinarily perceived 1s the object of devotion and reverence, resulting in simple nature
worship or a quasi-religious estheticism. It 1s the world in its identity and interdependence,
which 1s to say its emptiness, which is revered as the body of the Buddha. If emptiness is
the mode of being of things, then we can understand Fa-tsang’s assertion that neither things
nor emptiness can have an independent existence.
20. T. vol. 14, p. 542. This is quoted in the Treatise, p. soob. The passage quoted can
not be found in that identical form in the Taisho text. Fa-tsang. has paraphrased material
found there.
21. T. vol. 16, p. 467. Quoted in the Treatise, p. 499a. The quote cannot be found in
et rt
Notes 135
this form in the text cited by Fa-tsang. He has-paraphrased material from that source. The
five “paths” are those of devas, humans, animals, pretas, and beings 1n the hells. Some texts
have six paths, adding that of the asuras.
22. Buddhism does not deny the concrete world of things when it says that they do not
exist. The denial is always of the world as we experience it, mediated by concepts which
are superimposed upon it. Our world is always a mental world, not the real, vibrant world
of tathata. Enlightenment restores our contact with reality. :
23. From the Chinese “new translation” of the Avatamsaka by Siksananda, during the
early T’ang period. This verse 1s from the chapter called “Peak of Sumeru,” T. 279. The
“old translation” by Buddhabhadra (T. 278) has an equivalent verse in the chapter called
“Yama Heavens”
All dharmas are birthless
And also are not extinguished.
If one can understand this,
He sees the Tathagata.
24. This chapter was originally published 1n a different form in Philosophy East and West
22 (October 1972): 403-15.
Chapter 8
1. Treatise, T. 1866, p. 491, b. “The foolish worldling acquires rebirth when his karma
1s nourished by the active defilements. Holy persons are not the same. They acquire
rebirth [in samsara] only through the retention of the latent potentialities of the defile-
ments.” This whole section of the Treatise, entitled “The Body Which Supports Practices,”
and the following section, “Extinguishing Defilements,” (p. 492b) deal extensively with
this matter. The point is that the retention of some klesa 1s an intentional act on the part of
the Bodhisattva. See also ibid., p. 493a; “Even though [the Bodhisattva] has the ability to
freely extinguish the obstacles of defilement from the first stage on, he deliberately retains
them and does not extinguish them. Why? In order to nourish rebirth and attract and
convert others.”
2. Daisetz T. Suzuki, trans., The Lankdvatara Sutra (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1932), p. 184. “Mahamati, when the Bodhisattvas face and perceive the happiness of
the Samadhi of perfect tranquilization, they are moved with the feeling of love and
sympathy owing to their original vows, and they become aware of the part they are to
perform as regards the [ten] inexhaustible vows. Thus they do not enter Nirvana. But the
fact is that they are already in Nirvana, because in them there 1s no rising of discrimination.”
3. H. Kern, trans., Saddharma-pundarika or The Lotus of the True Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1884), p. 302. “And even now, young gentlemen of good family, I have not
accomplished my ancient Bodhisattva-course, and the measure of my lifetime is not full.”
(This 1s vol. 21 of the Sacred Books of the East.)
136 Notes
4. From Hotsu bodai shin. Quoted in Okada Sembo, Shobogenzo shiso taikei (Tokyo:
Hosei University Press, 1959), 6:17-18.
5. This is the Mahayana idea of “self-benefit and benefit to others,” or ‘‘self-benefit 15
benefiting others.” It means that by acquiring enlightenment oneself, one may be able to
help others. It may also be said that constant activity on behalf of others helps oneself to
grow spiritually. It sounds a little like the Western principle of enlightened self-interest,
but the Bodhisattva does not pursue his own good 1n some sort of “trickle-down” theory
of social amelioration, nor does he help others with the attitude that like bread upon the
waters, he will be repaid a hundredfold. The true Bodhisattva is utterly selfless. In his
complete devotion to the welfare of all living bemgs, he does grow in insight and com-
passion. From the standpoint of his practices, his only reason for seeking enlightenment is
that this is the only real way he can help others. Either way, his thoughts are always on
helping others, which is the essence of the Bodhisattva.
6. Treatise, T. 1866, p- 489b.
7. Ibid., p. 489c—490a. Fa-tsang also says (484b), “The Bodhisattva exhausts the
practices of the whole dharma-dhatu in all the worlds in the ten directions, yet he does not
divide his body. He fills the worlds everywhere simultaneously and in a single instant
cultivates all practices universally.”
8. Ibid., p. 4902.
9. Ibid.
10. “Intrinsic enlightenment” 1s none other than Buddha-nature, or Buddha jiana,
which 1s an innate aspect of all living beings (and perhaps of nonliving beings). It is easily
assimilated to the concept of tathagatagarbha, the subject of Chapter 3. This intrinsic
enlightenment, however, always exists as a mere potentiality up to the time the individual
begins to “‘nourish” it by means of practice, meaning meditation for the most part. What
is ordinarily considered to be enlightenment, the historical event, is the coalescing of
intrinsic enlightenment and “acquired” enlightenment, which is Just the culmination of
practice. This historical event 1s called ‘‘initial enlightenment.” The doctrine of sudden
enlightenment 1s only indirectly concerned with the question of the length of time it
takes to perfect training or the length of time of the enlightenment event. Rather, in such
thinkers as Hui-neng and Dogen, sudden enlightenment 1s claimed on the basis of the
beginningless existence of intrinsic enlightenment in the individual. In Dogen’s Soto Zen,
for instance, meditation is considered to be the means of manifesting, or real-izing, this
intrinsic enlightenment, not a means of creating enlightenment. This 1s the Zen of sudden
enlightenment because one is always enlightened right from the beginning, and practice
is based on intrinsic enlightenment.
11. Dogen seems to have inherited the sudden enlightenment teachings of Hui-neng.
His essays in Shobogenzé are full of admonitions not to think of meditation as a means of
becoming enlightened, and the reason for this, as was pointed out in the preceding note,
1s that one already is enlightened. Thus in Fukan zazengi he says, “The Way is essentially
perfect and all-pervading. How can one thus seek the Way or realize it? The Truth which
carries us along is sovereign and does not require our efforts. It completely excels anything
Notes 137
of this world. Who can believe in the expedient of purifying the mind [literally, “mirror-
wiping’’]? The truth is always right at hand” [Tamaki Koshiro, ed. and trans., Dogen shi,
2:49, 1n Nihon no shiso (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1969) ]. Dogen also says (Dogen shi, p. 53),
“That which 1s called zazen 1s not a way of developing concentration. It 1s simply the way
of comfort. It 1s a practice which measures your enlightenment to the fullest extent.” See,
also, his Bendowa, which contains many passages of this nature.
12. Fa-tsang discusses the school of sudden enlightenment often throughout his Treatise,
so it seems tq have been a matter of common knowledge by the end of the seventh century.
This was also the tame of Hui-neng, a contemporary of Fa-tsang. As I have pointed out in
the two preceding notes, the Chinese preference for whatis called “sudden enlightenment”
seems to have found its doctrinal basis in the concept of intrinsic enlightenment. At any
rate, the Chinese seem to have rejected the Indian position that the enlightenment
experience had necessarily to be preceded by a lengthy period—indeed involving many
kalpas—of mora! and intellectual self-purification. Basing themselves on the idea that
“one instant of nonconceptual thought 1s tantamount to being a Buddha,” they argued
that the person of quick faculties could “see his original face” ;1.e., he could have a moment
of direct, unmediated experience of events which would be tantamount to having the
vision of a Buddha. He could do this even though he had not spent a long preparatory
period of eliminating klesa, analyzing dharmic events in samadhi, and so on. Thus there
was some question of the time element imvolved in the realization of one’s inherent
Buddha-nature, but the basis for such an approach was the idea of intrinsic enlightenment.
Consequently, the individual has always been a Buddha, and the sudden manifestation of
this ability to see things in their fathatd nature 1s nothing more than the manifestation of
mnate ability. Moral and intellectual self-purification then proceeds from this experience,
rather than preceding it.
13. Yuibutsu yobutsu, in Zenyaku Shobogenzo, ed. Nakamura Soich (Tokyo: Seishin
Shobo, 1971), 4:399.
14. According to Dogen, the life of the Bodhisattva truly begins when he is able to
make an utterly sincere vow to emancipate all living bemgs. This vow seems to be
coterminous with bodhicittotpada: ‘What is called ‘arousing the thought of enlightenment’
is to make a vow to emancipate all living beings even when one 1s not yet emancipated
oneself. If one arouses this thought, no matter how humble in appearance one 1s, one is
then the guide of all beings” [Okada Giho, ed., Shobogenzo shiso taikei (Hose: Daigaku
Shuppan Kyoku, 1965), 6:113]. The person who cannot make this vow is not really a
Bodhisattva.
15. Ibid., p. 118.
16. T. 278, pp. 611b ff.
17. “A Brief Commentary on the Heart of the Sutra on the Perfection of Wisdom,” T. 1712,
p- 553b. “First, one contemplates form as empty and in this way perfects the practice of
Samatha.”
18. Ibid. “When one contemplates emptiness as identical with form, one perfects the
practice of vipasyana [kuan].”
138 Notes
19. Ibid.
20. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Elements of Buddhist Iconography, 2d ed. (New Delhi:
M. Manoharial, 1972), p. 12.
