화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망 - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 6

 화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망  - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 6

Full text of "hua-yen-buddhism-the-jewel-net-of-indra"

Hua-yen Buddhism the Jewel Net of Indra
Francis H. Cook  1977

==
Contents

Preface

1. The Jewel Net of Indra
2. The Hua-yen School
3. The Indian Background of Hua-yen 
4. Identity
5. Intercausality
6. The Part and the Whole
7. Vairocan
8. Living in the Net of Indra

Note
Glossary

Index
===

6 The Part and the Whole 

The last two chapters indicate some of the care and ingenuity with whien Fa- 

tsang established a philosophical foundation for the view of existence which i 

called Hua-yen. After having done this, he then devotes the final pages of his 

Treatise to a synthesis of the two aspects of identity and interdependence by means 

of the analogy of a building and one part of the building.! In his analysis of the 

relationship between the building-whole and a paner paths he not only Ghee us 

a very complete and informative picture of the view of existence with which he 

was so occupied throughout his life, but he also answers many of the a 

that may have arisen in the course of his discussion of particular aspects of that 

view when the whole picture may have been lost sight of. . . 

Fa-tsang illustrates the relationship between a part oF Mie whole and the whole 

itself by means of the analogy of a rafter and the building of which it 1s a part. 

Ultimately, we are to understand this analogy as shoving the pclauonship 

between any part of existence—a blade of grass, a man, an idea—and the totality 

of existence. However, within the Great Immensity there are many other wholes 

which also have parts, and so we may understand the same relationships as 

pertaining between a part of the human body and the whole body, between 

one nation and all other nations, and so on. It will be evident in this last section 

that one very important application of Hua-yen principles 1s in the area of the 

path or darker of the Bodhisattva. Here, where the whole career 1s conceived as 

a whole, the question arises as to the relationship between any one phase of that 

career and the whole career, and in the process of answering this question, some 

very important concepts in Mahayana Buddhist thought are illuminated. In his 

concern with questions of practice in the Bodhisattva marga, Fa-tsang ie 

following the precedent of Vasubandhu, who, in his comment). on a irst 

bhumi of the Dasabhiimika Sutra, spoke almost exclusively of ed and inter~ 

dependence in terms of the stages of the Bodhisattva. However, while oe 

primarily with the relationship between phases of the marga, he also added that 

76  Hua-yen Buddhism 

the same relationships existed among other phenomena as well, “‘such as the 

dharmas, dyatanas, and dhatus, and so on.’’? In this interesting assertion of the 

identity and interdependence of the phases of Bodhisattva activity, as well as 

the general applicability of the idea, we can detect part of the reason for the 

interest in the Dasabhiimika Siitra and its commentary on the part of the Chinese 

who constituted the Ti-lun school and for the absorption of the Ti-lun into the 

later Hua-yen school. The debt of Fa-tsang to the Indian material and to the 

prior work of the Chinese Ti-lun school 1s also evident. 

The analogy of the building 1s very brief, and I have translated the entire 

section, Interspersing paragraphs of the translation with my own commentary. 

These remarks are largely based on Chinese commentaries, but since the same 

material has been covered in the two previous chapters, and since the Chinese 

commentaries themselves are very terse and largely silent in this section, my own 

remarks will be brief. The discussion by Fa-tsang 1s clear and informative 

and does not really need much commentary. It 1s, for one who has patiently 

followed Fa-tsang through the more systematic treatment of earlier sections, 

extremely rewarding, for in its clear picture of the nature of existence as seen by 

the Hua-yen masters, it is unrivaled in Hua-yen literature, with the possible 

exception of the small treatise called ““The Golden Lion,” also by Fa-tsang.* 

The Perfect Interpenetration of the Six Characteristics 

{so7c] The interdependent origination of the six characteristics will be 

divided [for discussion] into three parts. First, the names [of the six charac- 

teristics] will be briefly explained; second, the concepts which have given 

rise to this doctrine will be shown; third, [this teaching] will be elucidated 

by means of questions and answers. 

First, the names: they are the characteristics of universality, particularity, 

identity, difference, tegration, and disintegration. “Universality” means 

that the one includes many qualities. ‘“Particularity’’ means that the many 

qualities are not identical, because the universal is necessarily made up of 

many dissimilar particulars. ‘Identity’ means that the many elements 

[which make up the universal] are not different, because they are identical 

in forming the one universal. “Difference”? means that each element is 

different from the standpoint of any other element. “Integration” means 

that [the totality of] interdependent origination 1s formed as a result of [the 

collaboration of] these [elements]. “Disintegration” means that each element 

The Part and the Whole 77 

remains what it 1s [as an individual with its own characteristics] and 1s not 

disturbed [in 1ts own nature].° 

Inhis analogy of the building, Fa-tsang will attempt to show that any individual 

—symbolized here by a rafter—possesses six characteristics, or marks, through 

the possession of which the relationships of identity and unterdependence pertain. 

Thus any individual, such as the rafter in the building, simultaneously possesses 

the characteristics of universality, particularity, identity, difference, integration, 

and disintegration. In other words, then, the rafter will be a particular object 

with its own clear-cut appearance and function but at the same time will be 

universal, i.e., will be the building or totality, and so on. The ‘“‘one” which is referred 

to in the sentence concerning universality 1s the building or, by extension, any 

totality. 

Second, the concepts which have given mse to this teaching [of the six 

characteristics]: this teaching attempts to show such things as the interde- 

pendent origination of the dharma-dhatu, which is the perfect doctrine of 

the one vehicle [i.e., Hua-yen], the infinite mterpenetration [of all things], 

the unimpeded identity [of all things], and all other matters including the 

infinite interrelationship of noumenon and phenomenon, [the interrela- 

tionship of phenomenon and phenomenon, ] and so on, shown in the symbol 

of the net of Indra. When these concepts are manifested [in the mind of the 

Bodhisattva], then when one of the many obstacles [avarana] 1s overcome, 

all are overcome, and one acquires the destruction of [moral and intellectual 

faults, or klefa of] the nine times and ten times. In practicing the virtues, 

when ones perfected, all are perfected, and with regard to reality, when one 

[part] is revealed, everything 1s revealed. All things are endowed with univet- 

sality and particularity, beginning and end are the same, and when one first 

arouses the aspiration for enlightenment [bodhicittotpada], one also becomes 

perfectly enlightened. Indeed, the interdependent origination of the dharma- 

dhatu results from the interfusion of the stx characteristics, the simultaneity 

of cause and result, perfectly free identity, and the fact that the goal 1s 

inherent in causal practice. The cause [of enlightenment] 1s the comprehen- 

sion and practice, as well as enlightenment, of Samantabhadra, and the result 

is the anfinitude which is revealed in the realm of the ten Buddhas, all the 

details of which can be found in the Avatamsaka Sutra. 

Some of the implications of this doctrine for practice can be seen in this passage, 

78  Hua-yen Buddhism 

and a full discussion will be offered in Chapter 7. What is evident here 1s that on 

the basis of the doctrine of emptiness as it is taught by Hua-yen, when one klesa 

is exterminated, all are exterminated, and when one of the Bodhisattva virtues 

or perfections is realized, all are realized, and even in the earliest stages of the 

Bodhisattva’s practice, final perfect enlightenment is, at least 1n some sense, a 

reality. The “nine times and ten times” referred to in this passage are the chee 

times of past, future, and present as they exist in the past, future, and present 

making nine times, and the ten times are these nine times as they exist in ones 

mind in any one moment of time. Samantabhadra is the Bodhisattva who 

symbolizes the practices of the Bodhisattva. His vows and practices exemplify 

the ideal course of conduct in the aspiring Buddhist in those phases of activity 

which are conceived as causes for the ensuing enlightenment-result. This course 

of conduct is exemplified by the activities of the youth Sudhana in the final 

chapters of the Avatamsaka Sutra. The result 1s the knowledge of, and the merging 

into, the universe of identity and interdependence, which is the experience of 

the perfectly enlightened Buddhas. Samantabhadra occupies a very important 

place in the sutra, since that work 1s primarily concerned with these causal 

practices. The vows of Samantabhadra, which must be sincerely duplicated by 

each aspirant, who really 1s Samantabhadra,° are as follows: 

. Honor all Buddhas. 

. Praise the Tathagatas. 

. Make offerings to all Buddhas. 

. Confess all past transgressions of the Law. 

. Rejoice in the virtues and happiness of others (mudita). 

. Request the Buddha to teach the Dharma. 

. Request the Buddha to dwell in the world. 

Follow the Dharma. 

Always to benefit other beings. 

OMAN AY FY N 

- 

° 

; ; 

Turn over one’s own accumulated merit to others (parinamana).7 

Third, the elucidation by means of questions and answers. Now, the law of 

interdependent origination is common to all situations, but here, briefly 

I shall discuss this through the use of [the analogy of] a building formed by 

conditions. 

Question: what is the universal? Answer: it is the building. Question: that 

is nothing but various conditions, such as a rafter; what is the building itself ? 

Answer: the rafter is the building. Why? Because the rafter by itself totally 

makes the building. If you get rid of the rafter, the building is not formed. 

When there is a rafter, there is a building. 

The Part andthe Whole 79 

Question: if the rafter all by itself totally creates the building, then if there 

are still no roof tiles and other things, how canit [wholly] create the building ? 

[508a] Answer: when there are no tiles and such things, the rafter 1s not a 

rafter, so it does not create the building. A nonrafter is a rafter which does 

not create a building. Now, when I say that the rafter does create it, 1 am 

only discussing the ability of a [real] rafter to create it. | am not saying that 

a nonrafter makes it. Why 1s that? A rafter 1s a condition [for the building]. 

When it has not yet created the building, it is not yet a condition, and 

therefore it is not a rafter. If it is a [real] rafter, 1t totally forms {the building]. 

If it does not totally form 1t, it is not called a rafter. 

This passage makes it abundantly clear that Fa-tsang does in fact assert the 

identity of the rafter and the building, or, in other words, the part and the whole, 

or the particular and the universal. Is this nonsense? If there 1s any social agreement 

on the use of language at all, then when we speak of a part and a whole, we are 

speaking of two different things, and the reader may object that the assertion of 

the identity of the rafter and the building 1s a lamentable lapse in linguistic 

precision. However, by this trme, the sense in which it can be said that different 

things are identical should be clear. Moreover, the rafter certainly does not 

become lost in the building iv becoming identical with it. Fa-tsang nowhere 

denies that in the building there can be seen a piece of wood about eleven feet 

long which is placed in a diagonal position and which supports terracotta tiles. 

It cannot be confused with the tiles, metal nails, or a floor board. No, the rafter 

is clearly observable; it maintains 1ts own appearance and function, and that 

appearance and function differ from all other appearances and functions. It 1s 

there: 1t 1s itself; 1t 1s nothing other than itself. . 

However, it 1s this particular object which Fa-tsang identifies with the building 

in the clearest of language, and of course in identifying it with the whole, he 1s 

identifying it with all other particulars which constitute the building, since, as 

he argues further on, there 1s no building apart from these particular pieces. Now, 

it 1s a basic position in Buddhism that the individual has no self-existence at all 

and that any existence it may have 1s completely dependent on conditions 

exterior to itself. If we therefore examine the existence of this one object called 

“rafter,”? we notice too that it does not exist outside the building of which it is 

a part and which constitutes the many conditions just referred to. It cannot be 

argued that the rafter 1s still a rafter even prior to its inclusion m the potential 

building, because since the barn symbolizes the totality of existence, it can never 

be a question of an individual’s existence prior to its inclusion into existence. 

It does not exist, a nonentity, as has been previously mentioned, However, the 

nee fanentaging oA Sen tne ete St cen etonen-t eter itnnemncerwer eae . : 

80 Hua-yen Buddhism 

building is more than an analogy; it is an example of the relationships asserted by 

Hua-yen. Therefore, even though a piece of lumber lying on the ground may 

eventually become a rafter, it can be said that before its inclusion, it is not a rafter, 

What this means, then, 1s that it is the building into which it is fit which makes 

it a rafter, mm strict accordance with the Buddhist idea of conditioned existence. 

The building makes it a rafter, but at the same time, 1t 1s equally obvious that it 

1s the rafter which acts as a condition for the existence of the building. Also, as 

Fa-tsang says, the rafter not only acts as a necessary condition for the building, 

but indeed becomes the building or is identical with the building. It is identical in 

a double sense: first, as Fa-tsang notes, since the building-whole does not exist 

apart from the condition-particulars such as the rafter, the rafter must be the 

building, or we must search. for a building distinct from such things as rafters, 

Joists, and nails. Second, since each particular which helps to make the building 

functions identically in a strictly interdependent manner to create the whole, and 

since, as was noted in regard to the rafter, no part has a real independent existence, 

each part 1s identical with any other part in its capacity of being a condition. 

. But Fa-tsang says that the rafter is not Just 4 condition or just a cause for the 

building, it is the soe cause. When the rafter becomes a rafter through its integra- 

tion into the building, the combined powers of the total number of conditions 

which are called “building” are taken on by the rafter, which then has the total 

power to create the building. This 1s what Fa-tsang means when he says that a 

nonrafter—t.e., a rafter which has not become mtegrated into the building— 

cannot be the cause of a building. It is only when all things with the exception 

of the rafter are there that the rafter truly is a rafter. When all other present 

conditions cause the rafter to be a rafter, it then has the total power to form the 

building. If it does not, then there 1s no entity called “building,” at least not a 

perfect building. Of course, any part of the building we may wish to examine 

simultaneously acts in the same way. Some of the other questions which may be 

raised in this passage above will be answered as Fa-tsang continues. 

Question: if all the various conditions such as the rafter each exerts [its own] 

partial power, thus creating [the building] together [through the collabora- 

tion of many individual partial powers] and not through total power, what 

would be the error? Answer: there would be the errors of eternalism and 

annihilationism. If [each part] does not wholly cause [the building] to be 

made and only exerts partial power, then each condition would have only 

partial power. They would consist simply of many individual partial powers 

and would not make one whole building. This is annihilationism [because 

there could be no building]. Also, the various conditions cannot completely 

The Part and the Whole | 81 

make the building if they each possess partial power, so that if you maintain 

that there is [still] a whole building, then since it exists without a cause, this 

1s eternalism. Also, if [the rafter] does not wholly create [the building}, then 

when the one rafter is removed, the whole building should remain. How- 

ever, since the total building is not formed, then you should understand that 

the building 1s not formed by the partial power [of a condition such as the 

rafter] but by its total power. 

In this defense of his earlier statements, Fa-tsang resorts to a traditional Buddhist 

method of argument which consists of showing that if a certain position is ie 

to its logical conclusion, the result will be the positions of eternalism and annihila- 

tionism, the two extremes. The former 1s the position which holds an on entity 

exists in its own right independent of conditions, while the latter position involves 

a view of destruction, negation, and annihilation. The correct position as far as 

Buddhism 1s concerned is the well-known “Middle Ways which makes neither 

an unqualified affirmation nor an unqualified negation vis-a-vis a given ene? 

Thus, as has been argued throughout the Treatise, existence 1s neither negate or 

denied, nor is it naively affirmed as existing absolutely in ats own night. Rather, 

when certain conditions are prevalent, a result will come into being, and that 

entity will continue to exist and to evolve im a sida manner as long as the 

necessary conditions are there. Existence therefore is neither absolutely. existent, 

nor is it nonexistent; 1t is contingently existent, and it is because of contingent or 

dependent being that progress in the Dharma 1s possible. . me 

Here, for the most part, Fa-tsang 1s concerned with arguing that the particular 

individual possesses total power to create the whole. The argument seems a be 

simple enough; if the rafter does not have this total power, then if the ra sae 

removed, the whole building should remain, just as my whole body should 

remain if a leg 1s amputated. Obviously this 1s not the case, and so Fa-tsang says 

that in order for the whole to be a whole, the part must exert total power in the 

formation of the whole. To possess total power means, as was said above, the 

causative power of the whole building. Partial power, on the other Sees 

simply the power in the rafter itself. What this really means, presumably, 1s t s 

if the rafter were to exert only the causative power of itself{—1.¢., to pes the 

power of its rafterness—then it could never truly become integrated into the 

total building and become the building. In this case, ne building would be 

possible. However, once integrated into the whole building, the rafter assumes 

the causative power of the whole building and thus acts as total cause for it. 

This is, in fact, nothing more than the kind of true interdependence which Hua- 

yen teaches. 

82 Hua-yen Buddhism 

Question: why would there be no building if a single rafter is lacking? 

Answer: that would only be a spoiled building, not a perfect building. 

Therefore, you should know that the perfect building is inherent in the 

one rafter. Since it 1s inherent 1n this one rafter, you should know therefore 

that the rafter is the building. Question: since the building 1s identical with 

the rafter, then the remaining planks, tiles, and so on, must be identical with 

the rafter, aren’t they? Answer: generally speaking, they are all identical 

with the rafter. The reason is that if you take away a rafter, there 1s no 

building, because if there 1s no rafter, the building is spoiled. And when 

you have a spoiled building, you cannot speak of planks, tiles, and so on. 

Therefore, the planks, tiles, and so on, are identical with the rafter. If they 

are not the rafter, then the building is not formed, for planks, tiles, and so 

on, do not become formed either. Now, since they all are formed together, 

you should know that they are identical [with the rafter]. Since this is so 

of the one rafter, the other rafters are the same. Therefore, if all the dharmas 

which constitute interdependent origination are not formed [as an integrated 

totality of interdependence], then they cease. If they are all formed [together], 

then they are all identical with each other, interfused, completely free in 

their interrelationships, extremely difficult to conceive, and surpass com- 

monsense notions. The nature of things, which is interdependent origina- 

tion, is universal, so you can understand everything else by analogy with 

the above example. 

In this passage, which speaks of taking a rafter away from the building, there 

is some possibility of misreading Fa-tsang’s mtention. As has been mentioned 

several times, there 1s really no question of removing the part from the whole, 

at least if the whole is the whole of existence. Whether the whole be the greatest 

of wholes, or the body of a mouse, when a part 1s removed, the previously 

perfect whole is destroyed; it just 1s not that particular whole any more. The 

perfect whole is implied in the part in the sense that the whole becomes the 

whole only when the part is integrated into it and becomes the whole. Ifa part 

is removed, the previous whole now becomes a new whole and still the question 

of the relationship of the existent parts remains, because Hua-yen is concerned 

only with the question of the relationship pertaining among entities. Actually, 

even the disappearance of an entity acts as a condition for the whole and thus 

changes: the configuration of the whole in some way, as was noted by John 

Donne, who said that ‘‘any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved 

in mankind.” Death, disappearance, diminution—all these are events also, and 

constitute those conditions by which I am and by which I am defined. Moreover, 

The Part and the Whole 83 

the new appearance of an entity acts as a condition in the same way, not only 

affecting the present and future, but even the past, in the same way, according 

to T.S. Eliot, that a new poem retrospectively changes the whole history of 

literature as far back as the creation of the first poem. 

The last part of the preceding paragraph from the Treatise may be obscure 

partly because it 1s so terse and elliptical. However, if we keep in mind that the 

identity of the parts is due to their emptiness, and this emptiness is none other 

than the interdependence of these parts, much of the difficulty will be removed. 

The argument, paraphrased, 1s this: if the rafter is not integrated into the whole 

building, then we cannot speak of tiles, nails, and the like, since they derive their 

existence from the existence of the rafter. The assemblage of particulars which 

1s called “building” and the one particular called ‘“‘rafter” thus act as necessary 

conditions for the existence of the other; they have no independent existence 

at all in this interdependence, and it is this universal lack of self-existence which 

constitutes their identity. Thus, as Fa-tsang says, “‘if all the dharmas which con- 

stitute interdependent origination are not formed [as an integrated totality of 

interdependence], then they cease.” To use another analogy, my ‘‘fatherness” 

is completely dependence on the “‘sonness” of my son to the same extent that 

his “sonness” is dependent on my “‘fatherness.”” He is not a son without the 

father, and the father is not a father without him. In this way, the two existences 

arise together in strict interdependence, or neither existence is possible. 

Second, the characteristic of particularity: all the conditions such as the 

rafter are parts in the whole. If they were not parts, they could not form 

a whole, because without parts, there is no whole. What this means 1s that 

intrinsically the whole is formed of parts, so that without parts, there can 

be no whole. Therefore, the parts become parts by means of the whole. 

Question: if the whole 1s identical with the parts, how can it be a whole? 

Answer: 1t can be a whole precisely because it 1s identical with the parts. 

Just as the rafter is identical with the building, which is called the charac- 

teristic of universality [possessed by the rafter-part], so also because it is a 

rafter, we speak of the characteristic of particularity. If the rafter is not 

identical with the building, it 1s not a rafter; if [the building] is not identical 

with the rafter, it 1s not a building. The universal and the particular are 

identical. [508b} This is how you should understand 1t. 

Question: if they are identical, how can you [even] speak of parts? Answer: 

because [parts] become parts on the basis of their identity [with the whole]. 

If they [i-e., part and whole] were not identical, the whole would exist 

outside the parts, and could not then be a whole; the parts would exist 

84 Hua-yen Buddhism 

outside the whole and could not then be parts. If you think about it, it 1s clear. 

Question: what would the error be if they are not parts? Answer: the 

errors of annihilationism and eternalism. If there were no parts, there would 

be no distinct rafters, tiles, and so on. This would be annihilationism, because 

without distinct parts such as rafters, tiles, and so on, there would be no 

building. If it is maintained that there can still be a building without distinct 

rafters, tiles, and the like, this 1s eternalism. 

With the discussion of the characteristic of particularity, the major portion of 

Fa-tsang’s demonstration is complete, and the following sections dealing with 

the other four characteristics serve primarily to illuminate certain details. The 

last two pairs of characteristics—identity and difference, and integration and 

disintegration—repeat the first pair inasmuch as they are concerned with the 

relationship of the part and the whole. The commentaries discuss each of the 

three pairs of characteristics with one of the so-called “three greats,” or three 

major aspects of the absolute. 

universality—particularity = essence 

identity —difference = characteristics 

integration—disintegration = function 

While each of the three pairs of characteristics shows a different way of viewing 

existence, it is clear from the commentaries that in the above list all the items 

in the first row—universality, identity, and mtegration—-stress the essential one- 

ness and interpenetration of the many, while the items in the second row— 

particularity, difference, and disintegration—stress the many.® Thus, while 

Fa-tsang moves on to a new pair of seemingly contrary characteristics, he is 

still showing the simultaneous oneness and manyness of existence. 

The question which is raised in this passage 1s how one can speak of parts 

when it has been said that the part is the whole. Fa-tsang’s answer 1s the soul of 

simplicity: a whole is necessarily composed of parts, and to speak of parts is to 

imply that they are parts of a whole. The one does not exist apart from the other. 

If they do, then the whole has an existence independent of parts, which is the 

error of eternalism, and the part 1s not part of anything, which is nonsense. 

Again, the interdependence existing between the part and the whole is pointed 

out in the statement that “the parts become parts by means of the whole,” which 

simply means that when the part becomes integrated into the whole, and con- 

sequently becomes the whole, it 1s sustained by the whole 1m its very act of 

creating the whole. 

The Part and the Whole 85 

Third, the characteristic of identity: the various conditions such as the rafter 

all combine and create the building. Because there is no difference among 

them [as conditions], all are called ‘‘conditions of the building.” This 1s 

called the characteristic of identity because they are all identically conditions 

within the context of the building which they create. Question: what is the 

difference between this and the [above] characteristic of universality? 

Answer: the characteristic of universality 1s spoken of only from the stand- 

point of the one [whole] building; the characteristic of identity concerns 

all the various conditions such as the rafter. Even though each part is different 

im its Own nature, they each possess the characteristic of identity because 

they are all identical in their power of creation. Question: what 1s the error 

if they are not identical? Answer: the errors of annihilationism and eter- 

nalism. If they are not identical, the [particular] conditions such as the rafter 

would oppose each other, and thus would not be able to create the building 

identically. This 1s annihilationism, because there would be no building. 

If [on the other hand] they cannot create the building, because each is 

different, and you still say that there is a building, this is eternalism, because 

there 1s a building without any cause. 

The difference between the characteristics of universality and identity 1s that 

universality refers to the relationship between the part and the whole qua whole 

and to the situation by which the part 1s universalized by its inclusion in the 

whole. Identity, on the other hand, stresses the relationship between a part and 

any other part. In particular, identity stresses the fact that any part 1s interchange- 

able with another part by virtue of their both being conditions for the whole. 

The emperor of China and a sand flea are thus identical in the sense that they are 

both empty, both interdependent, both conditions for the totality of existence. 

Is there no difference at all? The differences which we detect and emphasize are 

subjective interpretations, our own self-interested values imposed on what is 

otherwise a valuative no-man’s land. 

Fourth, the characteristic of difference: the various conditions such as the 

rafter are different from each other in conformity with their own individual 

species. Question: if they are different, how can they be identical? Answer: 

they are identical precisely because they are different. If they were not 

different, then since the rafter is [about] eleven feet long, the tiles would be 

the same, and since this would destroy the original condition [i.e., the tile 

as it should be], then, as before, they could not function identically as 

conditions for the building. Now, since there 1s a building, they must all 

; 

H 

4 

i 

i 

86  Hua-yen Buddhism 

function identically as conditions, and so you can understand that they are 

different. 

Question: what 1s the difference between this and the characteristic of 

particularity? Answer: particularity means that all the conditions, such as 

the rafter, are distinct withm the one building. Now, when we speak of 

difference, we mean that each of the various conditions, such as the rafter, 

are different from ‘each other. 

Question: what 1s the error if they are not: different [from each other]? 

Answer: there would be the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. If 

they are not different, then [as I have said,] the roof tiles would be [about] 

eleven feet long, like the rafter. This would destroy the original condition 

[of the tile] and the building could not be formed. Therefore, you have 

annihilationism. Eternalism results from attachment to the existence of a 

building which has no conditions, because if the various conditions are not 

different, then the necessary conditions for the building do not exist. 

This passage should dispel any mistaken understanding of the idea of identity 

as removing the differences between things, because here Fa-tsang says quite 

clearly that things are identical just because they are different. Implicit here is 

the feeling on the part of Buddhists such as Fa-tsang that everything in its almost 

bewildering variety 1s good just as it is (or perhaps, we should say, Good), for 

the existence we know would not be possible without this variety. 

Fifth, the characteristic of integration: because the building 1s created as a 

result of these various conditions, the rafter and other parts are called con- 

ditions. If this were not so, neither of the two [i.e., forming conditions or 

formed result] would come to be. Now, since they actually form [the 

building], you should know that this is the characteristic of integration. 

Question: [s08c] when we actually see the various conditions such as the 

rafter, each retains its own character and does not literally become a building; 

how is it able to form the building? Answer: simply because the various 

conditions such as the rafter do not become [the building, and retain their 

own character], they are able to create the building. The reason for this 1s 

that if the rafter becomes the building, it loses its intrinsic character of being 

a rafter, and therefore the building cannot come into being. Now, because 

it does not become [the building], conditions such as the rafter and so on 

are manifested. Because they are manifested [as being just what they are], 

the building 1s created. Also, if they do not make the building, the rafters 

The Part and the Whole 87 

and so on are not to be called conditions. However, since they can be said 

to be conditions, you should know that they definitely create the house. 

Question: if they do not become integrated, what 1s the error? Answer: 

the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. Why? The building is created 

originally as a result of the various conditions such as the rafter. Now, if 

they do not create the building all together [in their integration], the exis- 

tence of the building is not possible, and this is annihilationism. Originally, 

the conditions create the building, and thus they are called rafters and so on. 

Now, since [hypothetically] they do not create the building, they are not 

rafters, and this [also] is annihilationism. If they do not become integrated, 

then because a building exists without a cause, this 1s eternalism. It is also 

eternalism if the rafters do not create the building but are still called rafters. 

Sixth, the characteristic of disintegration: each of the various conditions 

such as the rafter retains its own separate character [i.e., svadharma] and 

does not [literally] become [the building]. Question: if you see the various 

conditions such as the rafter right in front of you, creating and perfecting 

the building [i-e., integrated into the building], how can you say that they 

do not intrinsically become [the building]? Answer: simply because they do 

not become [the building], the dharma or building can be formed. If they 

[actually] become the building and do not retain the1r own characters, then 

the building cannot come into being. Why? Because if they [literally] become 

[the building], they lose their [individual] characters, and the building cannot 

be formed. Now, since the building 1s formed, you should know that they 

do not [literally] become [the building}. , 

Question: if they were to become the building, what would be the error? 

Answer: there would be the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. If it 

is Claimed that the rafter [literally] becomes the building, the character of 

rafterness is lost. Because the character of the rafter is lost, the building has 

no conditions [for 1ts existence] and cannot exist. This 1s annihilationism. 

If the character of the rafter 1s lost, and yet a building were able to exist, 

this would be eternalism, because the building would exist without condi- 

tions. 

Also, universality is the one building, particularity consists of the various 

conditions, identity 1s the nondifference [of the parts as conditions for the 

whole], difference 1s the difference of the various conditions [from the stand- 

point of each other], integration means that the various conditions create 

the result, and disintegration means that each [condition] retains its own 

character. To summarize this in a verse: 

88  Hua-yen Buddhism 

The many in the one 1s the characteristic of universality; 

The many not being the one is the characteristic of particularity; 

[so9a] The universal is formed by many species which are in themselves 

identical ; 

Their identity 1s shown in the difference of each 1n 1ts own essence; 

The principle of the interdependent origination of the one and the many is 

wonderful integration; 

Disintegration means that each retains its own character and does not become 

[the whole]. 

This all belongs to the realm of [Buddha-] wisdom and is not said from the 

standpoint of worldly knowledge. 

By means of this skillful device [of the teaching of the six characteristics], 

you can understand Hua-yen. 

With this verse, the Treatise comes to an end with the hope on Fa-tsang’s 

part that this teaching of the six characteristics will help us understand the Hua- 

yen view of things.’ Let us hope this wish has not been in vain, for the teaching 

of the’six characteristics is one of the important rubrics of the Hua-yen system, 

and if Fa~tsang has failed to clarify his vision by means of this teaching, then we 

also will have failed to understand the system itself. The vision that Fa-tsang 

shows us here 1s not difficult to understand if we bear in mind that it 1s nothing 

but the Chinese Buddhist way of handling the classic Buddhist doctrine of 

interdependent origimmation, which 1s another way of saying ‘“‘Emptiness.” 

Nothing which has been said in the above passages will seem strange or fantastic 

to anyone who has a firm grasp on the emptiness doctrine. Such a vision as has 

been presented to us is not even to be thought of as mystic, in the strict sense of 

the word. If the mystic effort lifts the individual above the world of cause and 

effect to a vision of things unearthly and beyond change, with a corollary re- 

jection of the world as completely deficient, then Hua-yen is not at all mystical 

in its apprehension of the world of identity and interdependence. It is true, as 

has been remarked several times, that this vision is apprehended only by those 

who have transcended themselves, but such a self-transcendence does not involve 

a transcendence of the world itself. On the contrary, the effort of self-transcen- 

dence, by which egotism, pride, and delusion are destroyed, is accompanied by 

a parallel immersion even more deeply than before into the concrete world of 

things. Rather than banish things as unworthy, such a vision reinstates the 

common and ordinary (as well as the ‘“‘horrible” and ‘‘disgusting’’) to a position 

of ultimate value. The Hua-yen vision thus entails both a loss and a gain. The 

loss is the loss of the intruding self, which will not let things be what they are. 

The Part and the Whole 89 

The gain 1s the new ability to see that everything 1s wonderful and good (or 

Good). The world 1s a Good place, even with its tigers, disease, and death. The 

loss and gain are one and the same thing, just as when one side of the scale sinks 

down, the other side comes up. In this event, the Buddhist can say of any day, 

whether 1t 1s the day he was born, the day he became enlightened, or the day he 

dies, that “every day 1s a Good day.”