화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망 - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 7
Full text of "hua-yen-buddhism-the-jewel-net-of-indra"
Hua-yen Buddhism the Jewel Net of Indra
Francis H. Cook 1977
==
Contents
Preface
- The Jewel Net of Indra
- The Hua-yen School
- The Indian Background of Hua-yen
- Identity
- Intercausality
- The Part and the Whole
- Vairocan
- Living in the Net of Indra
Note
Glossary
Index
===
===
7
Vairocana
Towering over the broad, flat plain of Nara, a few miles south of Kyoto, Todai-ji
still maintains much of the grandeur and dignity of a temple which was concetved
as the national cathedral of Japan back in the days when Nara was the capital.
The visitor at Todai-ji approaches it on a long stone walk which 1s lined with
trees and open parks. Walking leisurely along the path through a succession of
huge gates, the visitor has the impression of being part of one of those stately
processions to the temple that passed through these gates in the days of Nara’s
glory. Passing through the Middle Gate, the visitor stands somewhat awed
before the Hall of the Great Buddha. Over 159 feet high and 187 feet wide, 1t
is the largest standing wooden building in the world. When he now crosses
the last open courtyard and passes from the bright Japanese sun into the cool,
dim mterior, he is confronted with an even more impressive sight. It 1s the
massive bronze figure of the sitting Buddha, Vairocana, $3.1 feet high. He sits
on an open lotus in true Buddha fashion, with legs crossed in the traditional -
manner, his right hand extended palm out in the gesture of removing fear, his
left hand lying palm up in his lap. His half-closed eyes indicate that he 1s in
profound samadhi, and the faint smile on his lips, indicating his unfathomable
bliss, taunts the foolish worldling caught up in the treadmill of life. The whole
figure 1s circled with an aureole, much like the halo around the head ofa Christian
saint, and imbedded 1n the aureole, as if radiating from the central figure, there
can be seen many other smaller Buddhas, sitting in identical fashion.
The traveler who has seen many of the impressive sights of Japan is neverthe-
less still very impressed by the overwhelming figure of Vairocana, and rightly
so, because the figure was meant to impress. Tédat-ji is the central temple of the
Japanese branch of Hua-yen Buddhism, and Vairocana is the cosmic Buddha,
whose body is infinitely large, and whose life 1s infinitely long. In fact, the Hua-
yen universe which has been described in the foregoing pages is said to be the
very body of this Buddha, and his presence shines sublimely forth from every
Vairocana 91
particle in the universe. Hence his name, Vairocana, the Buddha of Great Illumi-
nation, whose light shines into every corner of the universe. A pamphlet which
the visitor receives at Todai-ji informs him that “‘Vairocana Buddha exists every-
where and every time in the universe, and the universe itself is his body. At the
same time, the songs of birds, the colors of flowers, the currents of streams, the
figures of clouds—all these are the sermon of Buddha.”! He thus preaches his
wisdom constantly and eternally for the salvation of all beings. Tu-shun, the
first patriarch of Chinese Hua-yen says,
The past practices of the Buddha Vairocana
Cause oceans of Buddha-lands to be purified.
Immeasurable, incalculable, infinite,
He freely pervades all places.
The Dharma-body of the Tathagata is inconceivable;
It 1s formless, markless, and incomparable.
He manifests a form and marks for the sake of living beings
And there is no place he is not manifested.
In all the atoms of all Buddha-lands,
Vairocana displays his sovereign might.
He vows with the earth-shaking sounds of oceans of Buddhas
To tame every kind of living being.”
This universal and eternal pervasiveness is symbolized by the many images in
the aureole surrounding, and emanating from, the Great Buddha of Nara. Each
smaller Buddha is one of the infinity of things which constitute the universe, and
1s nothing but the reality of Vairocana himself, shining forth as each entity.
The dharma-dhatu of identity and interdependence which was described in
previous chapters 1s thus none other than the body of Vairocana. How are we
to understand this? Has the intricate and careful philosophy of Hua-yen become
sullied with some absurd species of pantheism? Did rational men such as Fa-tsang
really believe that the universe was in the form of a gigantic being, similar to
the cosmic purusa of the ancient Indian non-Buddhist literature? Certainly the
language of the Hua-yen spokesmen exemplified in the above passages, as well
as many more, support such a supposition. In some sense, at least, Vairocana, a
Buddha, is coterminous with the material universe.
Of course the problem of pantheism, strictly defined, 1s no issue here at all.
Whatever Vairocana 1s, he is not a god, nor has he any of the functions of a god
such as conceived by the mam Western monotheistic religions (or even Indian
religions). He 1s not the creator of the universe, he does not judge either the
92 Hua-yen Buddhism
living or the dead, nor 1s he a stern but just father who governs the activities of
his children. One cannot bargain with Vairocana or petition him for special
favors, since nothing can transgress the law that says that what 1s going to be 1s
going to be. Vairocana, like the Tao, is ruthless; it is pointless to pray to him,
love him, fear him, or flee him, for Vairocana is not that sort of being. In short,
Vairocana 1s not a god, so there is no question of Hua-yen holding some notion
that everything 1s god. He is not even a “he.”
Sometimes, however, and with a little more justification, some scholars of
both the East and the West have referred to Hua-yen and similar types of Bud-
dhism as “pan-Buddhism’’; i.e., they hold that everything 1s the Buddha, or
that the Buddha is everywhere. This resembles the language of the above passages.
Certainly Vairocana is a Buddha, and it is said that he exists in all places at all
times. In his Treatise, Fa-tsang speaks of Vairocana as the “Buddha with the
ten bodies,” and since Hua-yen habitually uses the number ten to symbolize
infinity, this is another way of saying that Vairocana is omnipresent.? Thus
flatly stated without qualification, Hua-yen 1s certainly a type of pan-Buddhism.
The infinite universe is his body, and every particle of the universe, however
minute or humble, constantly teaches the Dharma with his voice. The Sung
dynasty poet Su Tung-p’o says,
The sounds of valley streams are his long, broad tongue;
The forms of the mountains are his pure body.
At might, I hear the myriad hymns of praise:
How can I tell men what they say?4
The question 1s not whether Vairocana is the universe, or perhaps is in the uni-
verse. That he is the universe is clearly shown by all the literature, and the Great
Buddha of Nara shows it most graphically in monumental bronze. The real
question 1s, in what sense 1s Vairocana the universe? This 1s a good opportunity
to look into the question not only of who or what Vairocana 1s, but also what a
“Buddha” meant to Buddhists of the Sino-Japanese tradition.
It is very easy to interpret such passages as the above advocating some kind
_of animism or a view of nature as possessing some kind of metaphysical substance.
The problem derives partly from the language of Hua-yen literature and partly
from the common Western categories by which we think. Western people,
reared in a tradition which conceives of the holy as always the totally other, a
separate, transcendent deity who abides apart from his own creation, tend to
interpret systems of thought such as the Hua-yen as holding a view of two distinct
element eon ihiieald meee
Vairocana 93
orders of being, in which there is some divine being which acts as the true sub-
stance or essence underlying an outward, phenomenal level of reality. The
picture we get is, to state it crudely, of hollow objects inhabited by some kind
of spirit. The spirit is a “ghost in the machine” which gives life and meaning to
otherwise senseless, lifeless machines. Therefore, when told that the universe is
the body of Vairocana, we naturally construe this as meaning that Vairocana 1s
one sort of thing and that the universe 1s another, and that Vairocana 1s a divine
being who dwells in men, trees, animals, rocks, and so forth. But this is not the
way in which we should understand Vairocana.
The language of Hua-yen texts seems to support an animistic or “pantheistic”’
interpretation, without doubt, and part of the purpose of this chapter 1s to inves-
tigate this language and its meaning. For instance, a metaphor which Hua-yen
uses, derived from the common stock of Mahayana Buddhist figures of speech,
1s that of the water and the wave, used to illustrate the relationship between the
absolute and the phenomenal. Under the influence of wind, the water becomes
disturbed and forms waves. Here, water stands for the absolute, and waves stand
for the phenomenal manifestation in time and space of this absolute. Thus, while
we see waves, their true substance is the water. However, even though water
manifests itself as waves, 1t never loses its intrinsic nature as water. At the same
time, it indubitably appears as waves. In fact, says Fa-tsang, if it did not retain
its water nature, it could not become waves. This 1s very similar to the language
of the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, which says that ‘“‘as a result of the
winds of ignorance; Mind which is intrinsically pure becomes agitated and forms
waves.’’> In the use of the metaphor, as well as its use in the Awakening of Faith
and other texts, the meaning seems to be that there 1s some metaphysical substance,
more real, true, and pure, which underlies the outward appearance of things.
Another image 1s that of gold and the forms taken by this gold. Fa-tsang says,
Gold has the two aspects of immutability and conditionedness. It has the
meaning of immutability because it does not lose its weight [i.e., does not
become diminished in its uses]. It has the meaning of conditionedness
because it easily becomes finger rings [and the like]. Also, the ring has the
two meanings of emptiness and manifestation. It has no existence apart
from the gold, so it is empty. It 1s manifested because the ring looks like a
ring. Now, because the emptiness of the ring is dependent on the 1m-
mutability of the gold, even though the ring may lose its form as a ring,
the gold 1s not diminished. Consequently, living beings are the Dharma-
body [of Vairocana]. Also, because the manifestation of the ring is dependent
94 Hua-yen Buddhism
on the gold’s obedience to conditions, the whole essence of the gold is
manifested as a ring. Therefore, the Dharma-body [of Vairocana] becomes
living beings (and other things].°
Here, as in the analogy of the water and the waves, the meaning seems to be
that Vairocana is the substance underlying phenomenal reality. Living beings
(and nonliving beings) are the Dharma-body of the Buddha. In these two
metaphors, another element is. also added which complicates understanding.
Both metaphors speak of a reality which presumably 1s antecedent to the world
of things which it becomes. First there is water, then it manifests itself as waves;
first there is gold, then it becomes necklaces, rings, and so on. There is thus,
along with the tendency to conceive of Vairocana as a substance, a corollary
tendency to see Hua-yen as teaching a kind of emanationism, in which the
universe 1s considered to be the efflux or emanation of a pure, solitary, unmoved
prior Being. This is.a serious error also, for then we imagine that there was some
primordial deity, similar to Brahman of the Upanisads, who, for some inscrutable
reason, manifested ‘himself as the present phenomenal universe which we see
about us and of which we are a part.
This same impression can be had from much of Fa-tsang’s systematic presenta-
tion of his philosophy, and it will be recalled that in Chapter 4, where Fa-tsang’s
ideas on identity were discussed, the very basis of Hua-yen thought seems to be
a view of an Absolute which existed prior in time to a concrete world of things
(shih) which it became. There it was said that any phenomenal object is a mixture
of the’ True and the false, or the Unconditioned and conditioned. (Of course,
the sum total of all things is this same mixture.) Taking up the absolute side of
things first, Fa-tsang says that it itself has two aspects. First, he says, it is
immutable. This is not surprising, because all religions claim immutability as the
nature of the absolute. What kind of absolute would it be which changed just
like the ordinary things of the world? Being immutable, the absolute is forever
unmoved, pure, eternal, still, and serene. This is, n fact, a common description
of the absolute m all Mahayana forms of Buddhism. However, Fa-tsang next says
something which not only seems to contradict this statement, but which also is
very unusual in Buddhism; he says that moved by certain conditions, this pure,
unmoved, eternal Reality changes and appears as the universe of phenomenal
objects. % However, like the gold which has become a ring, the immutable absolute
remains the immutable absolute. Here again the picture is apparently one of the
emanation of the concrete universe from an immutable absolute, with the result
that things are a mixture of the absolute and phenomenal.
Vairocana 95
The analogy of the gold and the ring mentioned another aspect of reality also,
its concrete existence as “things.” In his Treatise, Fa-tsang turns from his analysis
of the absolute to phenomenal things themselves, and here too he finds a dual
aspect. When we gaze at the world around us, we in fact see no absolute at all.
This is the everyday experience of most of us, in which we perceive a world
of ordinary things, probably totally lacking in anything we would construe as
being noumenous. Rocks, trees, mountains, stars, men, and animals—these, we
realize, come into existence, survive a while, and then disappear forever. They do,
however, seem to be solid enough to the perceiver, who 1s reluctant to deny
their existence “‘out there” beyond his own mind and body. He gives the real-
looking rock a kick, as did Samuel Johnson when he kicked the rock in order
to refute Berkeleian idealism for his friend Boswell, and exclaims, “‘It feels real
enough to me!” The Buddhist foot encounters something just as Johnson’s foot
did. It is there, just as the ring is there in the analogy, and there is no gainsaying
the sudden pain in one’s toes. Fa-tsang calls this quality of things ‘“‘quasi-
existence,” by which he means that entities seem to be as existent as the absolute is.
In other words, this is the commonsense solidness and reality of ordinary
experience, and it is really “there.”
Along with this concreteness there is another aspect of phenomena which
Fa-tsang calls emptiness, the emptiness which was discussed in an earlier chapter
devoted to indigenous Indian Buddhist concepts. That 1s, things do not exist in
their own right, independently, but rather exist only in dependence upon
something else. When the Buddhist subjects the solid rock to a careful scrutiny,
he finds nothing about the rock which would give it an independent existence.
It 1s lacking: in a svabhava, an independence or self-existence which would allow
it to exist apart from any contributing or supporting conditions. This 1s its
emptiness; it 1s nothing but its complete dependence on conditions for its own
existence. Needless to say, it also serves as a condition for others. At any rate,
we can see that an entity, or concrete fact of experience, has a dual nature in the
same way that the absolute does. A simple chart will show the two aspects of
both the absolute and the phenomenal (what Chinese frequently. refer to as li
and shih respectively).
Immutability
Absolute { ; ;
Conditionedness
Quasi-existence
Phenomenal {
Emptiness
96 Hua-yen Buddhism
If we keep in mind one of the major Hua-yen premises, that the immutable
absolute becomes conditioned and appears as phenomenal existence, it will be
clear that there is a close relationship between the two aspects of the absolute
and the two of the phenomenal world. In fact, what Fa-tsang calls “quasi-
existence,” the seeming ultimacy of concrete facts, is none other than the condi-
tionedness of the absolute, and the empty nature of this same concrete reality 1
really nothing other than the immutability ascribed to the absolute. In reality,
what seems to be several aspects of two levels of reality 1s only one single reality,
and what is seen as the ordinary, everyday world of things 1s indeed that, but at
the same time, 1ts true nature is 1ts immutable, absolute nature. Again, we have
a view of existence which sees things as being an intersection of the True and the
false, the Absolute and relative, the Unconditioned and the conditioned. Fa-tsang
says the same thing many times in his writings. In his long commentary on the
Avatamsaka Sutra, the T’an hsiian chi, he says that the absolute, in obedience to
conditions, becomes different things, and these different things are not apart from
the absolute.8 Other examples are abundant.
Does this sort of language really mean what it seems to? If Hua~yen Buddhism
indeed holds to a view of the emanation of the phenomenal world from a prior
existing absolute, as well as a view of things as consequently possessing this
metaphysical substance, then Hua-yen Buddhism has strayed far away from its
Indian parent. However, I doubt whether any form of Chinese or Japanese
Buddhism has ever, at least outside the popular understanding, held such views,
language notwithstanding. In all the varieties of forms which Buddhism has
assumed in ts 2,500-year history, one of the common elements which has bound
these diverse forms together has been the consistent and insistent denial of any:
kind of essence in things, including a divine or transcendental essence. The
doctrine of the emptiness of all things is the very cornerstone of Buddhist philo-
sophy and practice, and despite the occurrence of “Seed of Buddhahood”
(tathagatagarbha), “‘Store Consciousness” (alaya-vijfiana), and other doctrines
similar to these, Buddhists have always insisted (rightly I believe) that these
should not be mistaken for metaphysical substances, spirits, and the like. We
would probably better understand Buddhism if we took their protestations
seriously. Much of the problem of understanding begins with our failure to
grasp the very fundamentals of Buddhism.
Part of the problem with understanding Hua-yen lies in its habitual use of
such terms as “immutable,” “existence,” and “nonexistence.” Although we may
take it for granted that the words must mean what they seem to mean, the truth
of the matter is that Buddhists often use such terms in different ways than do
Westerners. A case in point is “nonexistence” (Chin. wu). Now, nonexistence
esha anarnationnsaadin eatin nae ene ha ag: Aeterna eeneneennennnene vatinenam rors sai 2 ee sai , enrde bers = : aad ie :
Vairocana 97
stands in opposition to existence, and if Ican be said to exist now, my nonexistence
would seem to be the complete negation of this state of beingness. Nonbeing is
thus similar to the mathematical zero, and denotes voidness, vacuity, or the
barrenness of any given locus. We usually associate nonexistence with privation
of some sort, and the corresponding attitude is one of fear, dislike, and disgust.
My own potential nonexistence thus fills me with fear and loathing, the non-
existence of money in my pocket arouses emotions of dislike, anxiety, and the
like. Or there may be the nonexistence of pain, poverty, and death, in which
case the corresponding emotion may be one of gratitude or gladness. At any rate,
nonexistence denotes the complete absence of something from some place.
It means that there 1s a kind of hole in existence some place (maybe in all places),
and there 1s no positive value in this hole. However, the Sino-Japanese Buddhist
tradition uses the term “nonexistence” to stand for a state of optimum fullness.
It is a state of overbrimming potential for creativity, and it is, in fact, another
word for the absolute.? Without this nonexistence there could not for a second
be any existence, and so rather than denoting denial or privation, it denotes
something positive. It is what might be called “‘warm”’ in its connotations, and
the Buddhist’s emotional response to the word 1s often the same as the Westerner’s
response to the word “God.” Thus awareness of the nonexistence which is
thoroughly mixed with existence is not a cause for some Kierkegaardian anxiety ;
it is cause rather for gratitude, confidence, and perhaps even love, in the con-
templation of the very root source of everything which exists. It will be recalled
that Taoists such as Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu usually referred to the absolute as
“nonexistence” in the knowledge that this absolute was not an existent, or not a
thing, in the same way that a man, a thought, or an abstraction such as time 1s
a thing. If it 1s not a thing, what better name for it than ‘‘no thing’’?
Thus “nonexistence” means something other than what we would think it
meant. The same applies to other common Hua-yen terms, such as “immutable.”
The word means, for most people, ‘“‘nonchanging,” and we tend to think
therefore of a static entity of some kind, for how can something be both unchang-
ing and dynamic at the same time? When Fa-tsang says that the immutable
absolute transforms itself into phenomenal objects but at the same time retains its
immutability, we tend to conclude that the absolute must be a static entity
which lurks beneath the surface of its changing surface appearances. The mental
picture 1s somewhat like the popular Western concert of the soul; though the
body-shell grows old, suffers sickness and injury, and finally dies, the inner soul,
the real “‘me,” is eternal and immutable. The only apparent difference 1s that
whereas the Western soul is always individual and distinct, the Buddhist equiv-
alent is one single essence common to all entities. This interpretation is remnforced
98 Hua-yen Buddhism
in Hua-yen writings by the tendency to equate the immutable absolute qua
absolute with existence, and to equate phenomenal reality qua absolute with
nonexistence or emptiness. Therefore, when we are told that phenomenal
reality is empty, we make the logical jump of concluding that the real reality of
entities must be an immutable substance or spirit of some sort. This is entirely
possible due to such passages as the following:
Tathata [i.e., the absolute, Vairocana] has the meaning of existence, because
it is the basis of error and enlightenment. Also it means nonempty, ‘because
it is indestructible. ... Also, tathata means emptiness, because it 1s divorced
from characteristics, because 1t obeys conditions, and because it is opposed
to impurity. ... Also, tathata both exists and does not exist [i.e., is empty],
because it is endowed with [both] qualities [of existence and emptiness].
The nature which is dependent on another [ paratantra svabhava; i.e.,
phenomenal reality as the product of causes and conditions] means existence,
because it 1s formed from conditions and because it lacks a nature of its
own.... Also, it means nonexistence, because that which is created from
conditions has no nature of its own.... It both exists and does not exist,
because it is formed from conditions and has no nature of its own.!°
Several important statements are made in this passage. First, the absolute 1s
said to be existent or nonempty because it 1s immutable (or indestructible, which
is the term used here). It 1s also empty because it 1s subject to conditions, and we
thus have here another form of the statement made about the gold in the foregoing
analogy. When he turns to phenomenal existence, Fa-tsang also says that it is
both existent and empty; it 1s existent because it is a product of conditions, and
it is empty because it has no nature of its own. Keeping in mind that Fa-tsang,
like many Chinese Buddhists, used the terms ‘‘existence” and “‘nonexistence”
interchangeably with the more orthodox ‘‘form’’ (riipa) and “emptiness”
respectively, his equations will look like this:
— Immutability = existence
Absolute { :
Obeys conditions = emptiness (nonexistence)
Quasi-existence (conditionedness) = existence
Phenomena {
Without a svabhava = nonexistence (emptiness)
Of course, since the absolute expresses itself as the world of things, the two main
categories above are simply two sides of the same thing, their “‘thingness” and
i eS Se a SSSR SITEI I nana
Vairocana 99
their absoluteness, and it 13 obvious that no matter which aspect we examine,
we find the same two qualities of existence and emptiness. Looked at from the
standpoint of absoluteness, immutability 1s equated with existence and condi-
tionedness is equated with emptiness. When we further examine the object from
the standpoint of its phenomenality, its conditionedness is equated with existence,
while its lack of self-nature (svabhava) is equated with emptiness. Since the
conditionedness of the absolute 1s none other than its appearance as conditioned
existence, what is called emptiness from one point of view 1s called existence
from the other. Likewise, the emptiness of phenomenal things 1s merely the
“existence” of the immutable absolute. In this way, emptiness and existence are
one and the same thing, a perfect reflection of the well-known statement from
the Prajnaparamita Sutra which says that form (existence) 1s emptiness and
emptiness is form (ripam Sunyata, Sinyataiva ripam). Here, once more, Fa-tsang
1s saying that the real existence of conditioned things is an immutable absolute.
Primary in importance, however, 1s his use of the terms “‘existence’” and
“emptiness”’ in connection with the absolute and the phenomenal. If we can
further determine how he understood these two terms, we can then better
understand what he means by “immutability” and consequently how we may
understand what Vairocana is. °
Fortunately, there are many passages in Hua-yen literature which discuss
existence and emptiness; actually, the whole of the literature deals with little else
than these categories and their relationship. Like most Buddhist literature, Hua-
yen texts are greatly concerned with the question of how, or in what manner,
things exist. This is to be expected of a religion which 1s based on the assumption
that the foremost problem confronting man in his existential plight is his in-
ability to understand the nature of things, including himself. Therefore, most
Buddhist literature eschews any discussion of the religious goal of emancipation
and wisdom per se as ultimately incommunicable, and rather devotes its energies
to an analysis of the phenomenal world. Hua~yen 1s remarkable in that more than
other forms of Buddhism it attempts to give some idea of what existence is like
im the eyes of those who are awakened, but in the course of this description, there
is much talk of existence, or form, and emptiness.
One of the best sources for a study of Fa-tsang’s understanding of these terms
1s his commentary on the famous Heart Sutra (Prajnaparamita-hrdaya Sutra). As is
well known by all students of Buddhism, this brief sutra, of about one printed
page in its English translation, presents the gist or “heart” of the teachings of
the vast Prajnaparamita literature: “form is emptiness and emptiness 1s form.”
Since this scripture 1s wholly concerned with the relationship between the two
categories of form and emptiness, Fa-tsang’s commentary on it will illuminate
100 Hua-yen Buddhism
his own grasp of these terms, and this in turn will help us to understand what he
means when he says that the immutable absolute 1s the true reality of phenomenal
existence.
In commenting on the lines of the sutra which say, “O Sariputra, form is not
different from emptiness, emptiness 1s not different from form. Form 1s identical
with emptiness and emptiness is identical with form. The same 1s true with regard
to feelings, ideas, volition, and consciousness,”” Fa-tsang says that the passage is
meant to dispel doubts and misunderstanding of some Buddhists concerning
emptiness:
The doubts [of the Hinayana] are as follows: ““Our small vehicle sees that
while the psycho-physical being exists, the constituents of personality
[skandhas] are lacking in a self:. What is the difference between this and the
emptiness of dharmas?” We explain this by saying that your belief 1s that
the absence ofa self among the constituents of personality 1s called ‘emptiness
of the person.” It is not that each of the skandhas itselfis empty. In your case,
_the skandhas are different from emptiness. Now we explain that the skandhas
themselves are [each] empty of a self-essence [svabhava], which 1s different
from your position. Therefore, the sutra says that ‘Form is not different
from emptiness,” etc.
Also, they doubt in this way: ‘According to our small vehicle, when
one enters the state in which there is no more psycho-physical being [i.e.,
final nirvana], mind and body are both terminated. How does this differ
from [your doctrine of] “emptiness is without form’?’’ The explanation is
this: m your doctrine, form 1s not [in itself] empty, but only when form 1s
‘destroyed is there then emptiness. This, however, is not the case. Form is
identical with emptiness; it 1s not an emptiness which results from the
destruction of form. Therefore, it 1s not at all the same [as what you teach].!4
Further on, the same explanation 1s given to the fledgling Bodhisattva, whose
understanding is still unripe; this time, however, a third point is added:
The third doubt [entertained by the Bodhisattva] 1s that he believes that
emptiness is an entity. Now [the sutra]. shows that emptiness 1s identical
with form. One should not try to seize emptiness with [the notion of]
emptiness.12
Several conclusions about Fa-tsang’s grasp of the emptiness doctrine can be made
etna et ss tanentnmtn
Vairocana 101
on the basis of these passages. First, in keeping with general Mahayana doctrine,
Fa-tsang knew that emptiness refers not to just the absence of a central self or
substance around which the five skandhas are organized (i.e., pudgala sunyata),
but that it means that each of the five skandhas is in itself empty of a svabhava
(dharma Sinyata). Thus, for instance, riipa, or matter, has no substance, nor has
feeling, and so on. The non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism believed that while
there was no iner self which possessed and used the psycho-physical organism,
the organism itself as the five skandhas was a real thing. Now Fa-tsang, a good
Mahayanist and a good student of Stinyavada doctrine, shows that each of the
skandhas 1s, as well, empty of a self or substance. Second, he was well aware that
emptiness does not refer merely to the absence or annihilation of something.
In other words, he did not make the naive mistake of thinking that to say that
something was empty meant that it was a nonentity. Emptiness 1s not something
which occurs when a thing vanishes but is said of things which are there, just
as to say that my pocket is empty does not mean I have no pocket, but rather means
that there is a pocket which has nothing in it. Again, Fa-tsang appeals to the
sutra, which says that form and emptiness are literally identical. Finally, in
clearing up the problem of the Bodhisattva, Fa-tsang makes the extremely
important point that emptiness 1s not a thing and that the Bodhisattva should not
make the mistake of reifying emptiness and thus making it just one more thing,
albeit perhaps a more exalted thing. As far back as Seng-chao, Chinese Buddhists
knew that emptiness was not merely a more spiritual thing among lesser things,
and thus was not some noumenous entity within phenomenal entities.*? Form
itself is emptiness.
So far, Fa-tsang’s views appear to be well within the older orthodox Mahayana
tradition. Later on, in the same commentary, he continues his discussion of
existence and emptiness.
First, they are opposed to each other. A passage a little further on [in the
sutra] says “in emptiness there 1s no form,” because emptiness injures form.
In the same way, it can be said that “in form there is no emptiness,” because
form opposes emptiness. The reason for this is that even though they always
exist together, they also nevertheless destroy each other. Second, they are
not mutually opposing. This means that since form 1s illusory form, form
cannot obstruct emptiness. Because emptiness 1s true emptiness [and not the
emptiness of annihilation or absence], it does not obstruct illusory form.
If it did obstruct form, it would be emptiness as annihilation and therefore
not real emptiness. If [form] really obstructed emptiness, then it would be
real form, not illusory form. Third, they are mutually creative. That 1s, if
102 Hua-yen Buddhism
this illusory form were to exhibit an essence, then it would not be empty,
and therefore could not become illusory form. The PancavimSatisahasrika-
prajfiaparamita Siitra says, “If all dharmas are not empty, there can be no
religious practices, no religious goal,” etc. According to the Madhyamika-
karikas [by Nagarjuna], “Because there 1s the principle of emptiness, all
dharmas are able to be formed.” 14
Fa-tsang makes the following points in this passage: (1) To say that dharmas are
empty is to deny the ultimacy and self-existence of the dharmas. Accordingly, to
speak of form 1s to deny emptiness, in the sense that to see only form 1s to overlook
its emptiness. Even though the two are never really found apart, to see the one
aspect of things only is to be oblivious to the other. (2) The two aspects do not
really negate each other. Real emptiness does not nullify or abolish form because
emptiness 1s not to be construed as utter nonbeing. At the same time, form cannot
nullify emptiness because it is lacking in ultimate reality. On the contrary, things
exist as things only by virtue of their true emptiness. (3) Form and emptiness are
mutually creative. If things were not empty of a substance or essence, they could
not exist even for a second; conversely, without things, there can be no emptiness.
This is not hard to understand if it is remembered that emptiness refers only to
the mode of being of existents. Fa-tsang quotes the Prajnaparamita literature in
support of this last pomt, as well as Nagarjuna’s treatise, which is a systematic
discussion of these same concepts.15 The Buddhist axiom at the base of this latter
statement is that if an entity possesses a svabhava, which by definition 1s eternal
and immutable, then that entity 1s not capable of any modification. If a dharma
such as the Buddhist marga hada svabhava and thus existed absolutely independent
of all conditions, there could never be any change in the aspirant either for better
or worse. However, since the dharma-entity is empty, meaning existing only in
interdependence with other factors, then conditions can effect a modification in
that entity. Thus it is a orthodox for Fa-tsang to say that things can only exist
because they are empty. To repeat, emptiness cannot exist apart from entities,
since emptiness is a relationship between entities: they create each other, are
thoroughly interfused, and in fact are one and the same thing.
Fa-tsang concludes the above passage with the following comment: “Even
though this true emptiness is the same as form [and other dharmas], still, form
arises from conditions. True emptiness does not create form. In accordance with
conditions, [form] perishes. True emptiness does not extinguish [form].”+¢
Thus although form and emptiness are thoroughly mixed and in a real sense
mutually creative, form is not produced from emptiness nor does it perish from
its operation. Emptiness, which is the law of interdependent origination, should
rer
Vairocana 103
not be conceived as an ontologically prior entity or being out.of which things
originate and through the operation of which they cease to be. However,
at the same time, even though emptiness does not exist apart from entities, the
appearance and disappearance of these entities does not affect the law of inter-
dependent existence, nor, in sentient bemgs, does merit or demerit have any
effect on emptiness. It 1s not, says Fa-tsang, soiled in its form of samsara, nor 1s it
purified when the being eliminates moral and intellectual faults (klesa).*7
Whatis particularly significant in all these discussions of emptiness and existence
in Fa-tsang’s writings is that he seems to have had an accurate and deep under-
standing of the Indian Buddhist concept of emptiness as being synonymous
with the teaching of interdependent origination, pratityasamutpada. Hence he was
aware of the statement and the consequences of the statement made by Nagarjuna
in his karikas: “It is declared that interdependent origination is emptiness”
(Karikas 24:18). Nowhere in these passages, or in any other, is there any evidence
that Fa-tsang had an incorrect understanding of the Indian teaching. Another
passage from Fa-tsang’s writings, the “Tranquillity and Insight of the Five
Doctrines of Buddhism,” indicates this beyond any question:
All dharmas without exception are characterized by emptiness. . . . First, they
are contemplated as being birthless. Second, they are contemplated as being
markless [i.e., animitta]. “‘Contemplated as being birthless’” means that
dharmas have no nature of their own [i.e., svabhava]. They are mutually
causative and come into existence in this manner. In their birth, they do not
exist mn reality, and so they are empty. They are as empty and nonexistent
as anythmg can be. Therefore, they are said to be birthless. A sutra says,
“They are conditioned and therefore exist; they are without a nature of their
own and therefore are empty.” This means that bemg without a nature of
its own is identical with being conditioned. Being conditioned is identical
with being without a nature of its own. The Madhyamika-karikas say, “All
dharmas are formed as a result of existence and emptiness.’’'®
Here, Fa-tsang uses the technical term dharma to mean “an entity,” and it corre-
sponds to his use of the term “existence” and to the “form” of the Heart Sutra
(although technically form is merely one of many dharmas). He says of a dharma:
(1) it has no svabhava, (2) 1t comes into existence (and passes out of existence)
as a result of conditions, and (3) its existence consists of its being formed from
conditions, and its emptiness lies in its being utterly lacking in a svabhava. The
upshot of this discussion, consequently, 1s that emptiness and existence (or dharmas,
entities, or form) are literally identical, because existing purely as a result of
104 Hua-yen Buddhism
conditions and being without an independent existence (empty) are one and the
same, a fundamental point in Buddhist thought. Thus, when there are things,
there is emptiness, and when there 1s emptiness, there are empty things. We need
not look for emptiness outside the world of phenomenal entities.1°
Therefore, since form is identical with emptiness, the Vimalakirti Sutra, a vastly
influential Mahayana scripture, says, ‘“Beings are identical with nirvana and do
not have to enter nirvana again.”’?° At the same time, since emptiness 1s identical
with form, the Sutra on Neither Increase Nor Decrease can say, ‘“The Dharma-body
of the Tathagata transmigrating among the five forms of sentient existence 1s
called ‘sentient beings.’ ”’?4 In other words, all things are the body of Vairocana.
It is now time to return to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter:
Who, or What, is Vairocana? We know that the emptiness of phenomenal
reality, which is conceived by Buddhists to be the absolute, and anthropomor-
phized in the form of Vairocana, is the interdependent, or intercausal, mode by
which things come into existence, exist, and cease to exist. It would already seem
evident, then, that “‘Vairocana” is merely a name given to the law of interde-
pendent origination or interdependent existence. Far from being a substance or
metaphysical essence, it 1s the law which utterly denies the existence of such an
entity. Then m what sense are we to understand Vairocana as immutable?
Certainly not as stasis, since interdependent existence 1s a dynamic process beyond
comprehension. It 1s, in fact, this very dynamic process itself which is immutable;
L.e., 101s the immutability of mutability, the law which determines that every single
particle of the universe constantly changes due to the existence of conditions about
it. It may seem strange to speak of the immutability of mutability, but for the
Buddhist, who subjects experience to the most thoroughgoing, ruthless positiv-
istic scrutiny, there is nothing in experience which seems to mitigate a perpetual
cosmic. change. It 1s the transcendental, “‘ever-thus” character of interdependence
which is the immutability of Vairocana, or ascribed to Vairocana. On the other
hand, the conditionedness of the absolute does not imply its prior existence or
the emanation serially of the universe of entities from its own substance. It means
simply that the emptiness or nonexistence which is the absolute is immanent in
phenomena and never found apart from them. In what sense emptiness constitutes
the ground of these entities, and in what sense it can be said that it becomes entities,
and that it is subject to conditions, can be clarified if we digress for a moment in
the area of general Buddhist teachings concerning man’s problems.
According to Mahayana Buddhism, the problem for human beings begins
with the habit of superimposing constructs of a purely subjective nature upon
the immediacy of concrete experience,?? thus imposing categories of a valuative
nature upon an experience which does not intrinsically possess these values.
{
i
'
i
{
}
i
i
Vairocana 105
Moreover, the division of the unity of experience itself into fragments must be
seen as the outcome of a desire to manipulate experience for one’s own selfish
purposes. Thus according to Hua-yen, which 1s certainly well within the tradition
of Mahayana Buddhism, the essential unity of the dharma-dhatu of identity and
interdependence becomes, for all of us, divided into pieces, these pieces are
invested with imaginary substances which seem to give them an aura of ultimacy,
and then these pieces are arranged in a hierarchy of good and bad. Conversely,
liberation, moksa, is achieved through the eradication of this divisive, categorizing,
and evaluative habit. This 1s the point of the emptiness doctrine, which attempts
to make people see that reality does not correspond with our concepts of it. Thus
the absolute becomes conditioned in the sense that the real manner of being of
phenomenal existence 1s conditioned by our ignorance (avidya), so that rather
than appearing as itself, as emptiness, it appears in the ignorant manner discussed
above. (There 1s another sense in which the absolute 1s conditioned, which will
be mentioned further on.) In Buddhist terms, tathata, the ‘“‘thusness’” quality of
things seen as they really are, becomes subjected to false imaginings (vikalpa).
The world as it exists for most of us 1s thus 1n a very real sense born of ignorance
and desire.
Immutability may be considered to be the transcendental aspect of the absolute,
while conditionedness may be regarded as its immanent aspect. Although it may
seem that the absolute cannot be both transcendental and immanent, it 1s in fact
both. The word “transcendental” only seems to conflict with the immanence of
the absolute, but this is because we who were raised in the Western tradition
usually conceive of the transcendental nature of the absolute as raising 1t beyond
the world of nature, so that there 1s a true gulf, forever unremovable, between
the absolute and the phenomenal or relative. The Western god does not abide in
his creation, and it is a heresy to locate him in it. He may be involved in it in some
sense, but he is apart from it in the same way that a great king dwells apart from
his subjects. The very idea of mmanence raises the specter of that pantheism
which 1s so abhorred by the great Western monotheistic religions, and which
they regard as the mark of a “lower” religion. However, “transcendental” can
be used in another sense besides the spatial one; 1t can indicate that ‘‘plus-quality”
which raises the absolute above the relative in terms of value, without removing
it actually from the relative itself. This 1s particularly appropriate for Vairocana,
who is the emptiness of things, for, as we have seen, since emptiness refers to
the relational mode of entities, 1t cannot ever exist apart from the things which
we say are empty and therefore must be immanent in a most integral manner.
However, it 1s precisely this emptiness, the face of Vairocana, hidden to empirical
investigation, which is revealed in the Buddhist enlightenment with a concom-
iy
106 Hua-yen Buddhism
itant spiritualizing and saving effect on the devotee. It 1s the revelation of this
emptiness as a “‘plus-quality”’ in things, elevating them above the brute materiality
and facticity of mere things, and at the same time effecting a profound inner
transformation 1n the individual, which we may recognize as the transcendental
quality of the absolute. Therefore, there is really no inconsistency im referring
to Vairocana as both transcendental and immanent. He 1s indeed both. We may
return again briefly to the pregnant assertion of the Heart Sutra, which says “form
1s emptiness, and emptiness 1s form.” Because form 1s empty, there is a tran-
scendental “plus-quality” in phenomenal existence which 1s ultimately knowable
if one can but see clearly and wholly. At the same time, because emptiness is form,
we may search for this quality in phenomenal existence itself, for it can be dis-
covered nowhere else. In the end, this means nothing more—difficult as it 1s to
truly see and then act accordingly—than that things exist only in an inter-
dependent manner.
“Vairocana,’’ then, 1s a mere sound, a symbol for the manner in which things
exist, and therefore there 1s no point in praying to Vairocana, loving him, fearing
him, asking for favors, and so on. One cannot ask the law of gravity to give one
some special favor or to relax its mexorable work for a moment. It may seem
peculiar to speak of a law in such a manner as Buddhists do of Vairocana, or to
anthropomorphize this law as a being named Vairocana, but then we are only
quarreling with the human habits of language, not with the meaning of the word.
Were it not for habit, Buddhists would undoubtedly be willing to call the law
something else—‘‘God,”’ for instance—since words are not important as long as
we know what they mean. But, having said this, another doubt may arise; if
Vairocana is the same as emptiness, and if emptiness 1s the same as interdepen-
dence, is the Buddhist attitude toward Vairocana nothing but a sophisticated
nature worship? Moreover, is not this nature worship merely estheticism raised
ten degrees, and not religion at all? Certainly the esthetic element is not missing
from the Hua-yen attitude toward the natural world, but it goes beyond estheti-
cism. As has been mentioned before, the Hua-yen vision 1s not the vision of the
common man, trapped in greed, hatred, and delusion. It 1s the vision of Buddhas,
those rare individuals who have destroyed these impulses in themselves and who
thus no longer are subject to the sorrow, anxiety, and turmoil that torment
others. Thus the vision of things as described by Hua-yen is much more than the
ecstatic appreciation of nature in its beauty and awesomeness; 1t comes only with
the most cataclysmic spiritual and psychological transformation of the individual.
More than this, it accompanies a radical reorientation in one’s dealings with other
people and all other things living and nonliving. It is said that enlightenment
Vairocana 107
ideally 1s the beginning of a career of selfless giving and unconditional compassion
for all that exists. Can this be construed as mere nature worship?
It may be thought that the object of worship in Hua-yen—if we can use that
word—is a rather thin abstraction, after all, perhaps somewhat sumilar in kind
to the second law of thermodynamics or the law of gravity. Yet it 1s indeed true
that in Buddhism in general, the object of devotion 1s law, the Dharma. Chinese
Buddhists habitually used the terms ““Tao” and li, the first meaning the “Way”
in which things occurred naturally, the second having the original meanmg of
“‘pattern,”? meaning the pattern found throughout nature. But a Buddha 1s more
than the mere personification of an abstract law; there have been flesh and blood
Buddhas in the world from time to time. Earlier it was said that the absolute 1s
conditioned in the sense that man’s ignorance as condition causes the absolute to
appear as “things,” but there is another sense also in which 1t can be said that the
absolute is conditioned. The model for this event has been established by the
historical founder of Buddhism, Sakyamuni. His biographies show him as being
motivated to leave the life of worldly self-mdulgence and going forth to seek
the truth because he was overcome with pity for the suffering of mankind. Thus
his own enlightenment, which is the actualization or realization of the law
within himself, must be seen as conditioned by the suffering and wailing of living
beings. Put in another way, the absolute has appeared in the world of time and
space because of conditions, and these conditions are those of ignorance and
suffering. When the Buddhist of later trmes made his Bodhisattva vows to help
all sentient beings to become free and then proceeded to carry out the practices |
which culminated in his own enlightenment, he only reenacted the event which
occurred in the person of Sakyamuni, when the absolute, under the strong pull of
overwhelming conditions, took on form. Indeed, it is because of this event that
Buddhists can identify the emptiness which lies at the root of existence with
compassion.
Finally, 1t needs to be said that the vision of Vairocana 1s this same realization
of Vairocana within oneself, so that seeing and being become identical. Another
way of saying this 1s that the dawning of prajna, by which one sees the emptiness
of things, is an act of absolute encompassing whereby one’s own boundaries
expand to include everything. Thus to see emptiness 1s to become emptiness, or,
better, to become empty 1s to see emptiness. The Avatamsaka Sutra succinctly
and clearly says what I have tried to clarify in many pages:
Clearly know that all dharmas
Are without any self-essence at all;
108 Hua-yen Buddhism
To understand the nature of dharmas in this way
Is to see Vairocana.23
The whole of existence is thus the body of Vairocana, for what 1s there that is
not empty? Understood in this way, and only in this way, Hua-yen can be said
to teach pan-Buddhism.24
