2026/06/29

화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망 - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 2

 화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망  - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 2


Full text of "hua-yen-buddhism-the-jewel-net-of-indra"

Hua-yen Buddhism the Jewel Net of Indra
Francis H. Cook  1977

==
Contents

Preface
  1. The Jewel Net of Indra
  2. The Hua-yen School
  3. The Indian Background of Hua-yen
  4. Identity
  5. Intercausality
  6. The Part and the Whole
  7. Vairocan
  8. Living in the Net of Indra

Notes
Glossary
Index
===

2  The Hua-yen School 





The universe of the wonderful jewel net of Indra described in the previous 

chapter is the teaching of a school of Buddhism which arose and flourished in 

China in the T’ang dynasty (618-907), although its intellectual roots are far more 

ancient. This form of Buddhism, called Hua-yen (pronounced Hwah-yen, the 

last syllable rhyming with ‘‘men’’), looked for its inspiration to a Buddhist 

scripture of Indian, or partly Indian, origin named the Avatamsaka Siitra. Hua-yen 

“is the Chinese translation of Avatamsaka, meaning ‘Flower Ornament.” The 

school or sect of Hua-yen took its name from the scripture which served as the 

basis for its own special concern. 



When I refer to the “‘school” or “sect” of Hua-yen, I am not suggesting that 

Hua-yen was anything like a sect in the Western tradition, for there was no 

feeling of sectarian exclusiveness or rivalry involved in belonging to this tradition. 

Hua-yen, like the other Chinese scholastic traditions such as T’ien-t’ai, San-lun, 

and Fa-hsiang, was more in the order of an academic tradition, devoted to 

systematizing, studying, and propagating one particular aspect of the whole of 

Buddhist thought. A monk who was associated with the Hua~yen school might 

very. well devote his entire life to the study and exegesis of the Avatamsaka Sutra, 

writing many learned treatises on the complexities and niceties of that scripture, 

but he also very well might practice a form of meditation such as was taught by 

the new Ch’an school, or he might recite the name of Amito, the Buddha, as was 

done in the Pure Land tradition, and he probably would have an extensive 

knowledge of other forms of Buddhism as well. The fifth patriarch of Hua-yen, 

Tsung-mi (779-840), for example, was simultaneously a Hua-yen master and a 

Ch’an master. 



Hua-yen is an example of a peculiarity of Chinese Buddhism, in which 

traditions of scholarship and teaching arose and were centered around the study of 

one or more Indian scriptural or commentarial works. For instance, the T’ien-t’a1 

tradition was primarily concerned with the Saddharmpundarika Sutra, the Fa- 





The. Hua-yen School 21 





hsiang concerned itself with the Vijfaptimatrata-siddhi, and the She-lun school 

concentrated on the Mahayanasamgraha-Sastra. It was as if in the West a group of 

Christians were to decide that there was something special about the Book of 

Ecclesiastes and start a tradition of study, exegesis, and commentary centering 

almost exclusively around this one part of the whole scriptural tradition. They 

would still be Christians, with by and large the same beliefs and practices as other 

Christians, but because of their primary concern with Ecclesiastes, they would 

become known as the “‘Ecclesiastesians” or the ‘Ecclesiastes School.” This is 

what the mén did who began the Hua-yen tradition. Their work centered 

around one scripture, which for them was not necessarily more correct than any 

other Buddhist scripture, but rather was more complete. Though in time it was 

considered to be a distinct form of Buddhism, at all times there was more to link 

them with the whole larger body of Buddhism than there was to separate them. 

Though the Hua-yen masters are distinguished by their scholarly work, they 

seem to have been pious Buddhists involved 1n the practical life of Buddhism 

also. 



Much of the history of the Avatamsaka Sutra, as with many other Mahayana 

Buddhist scriptures, 1s still unclear. What does seem clear is that most of the 

separate chapters which now constitute the larger work were composed in 

Central Asia or even in China.! Though the work was translated into Chinese 

from Sanskrit by Buddhabhadra in about 420, only two parts are now wholly 

extant in their Sanskrit originals, and with the exception of a brief quotation of 

another chapter in the Siksdsamuccaya, there 1s no mention in Indian Buddhist 

literature of any other of the many chapters of the Avatamsaka.? This, coupled 

with the appearance m the sutra of Central Asian and Chinese place names, 

would seem to indicate that much of the sutra was composed outside of India.3 



Two very important portions of the sutra do, however, exist in Sanskrit. The 

chapter called the “Ten Stages” (Dasabhimika) has apparently also existed from 

the time of its composition in the second century of the Christian era as an 

independent sutra. The Sanskrit original was edited some years. ago by Johannes 

Rahder, and it bears a strong resemblance to the Chinese of Buddhabhadra’s 

translation.* Since it first appeared in India, this important text has generally been 

the standard in any discussion of the stages a Bodhisattva passes through from the 

beginning of his religious career up to final enlightenment. The Hua-yen school 

was interested both in this description of the Bodhisattva’s progress and in 

several passages which say that the whole world is nothing but Mind. The interest 

of Hua-yen in this text was also excited because of Vasubandhu’s commentary 

on it, which contained an interpretation of the relationship of the ten stages to 

each other which became part of later Hua-yen philosophy. In a way, the 










22 Hua-yen Buddhism 





Dasabhumika 1s one of the most crucial chapters of the larger sutra, because it gives 

an epitome of the larger structure, and there is reason to believe that the larger 

structure of the Avatamsaka itself was inspired by the Dasabhiimika. Despite its 

eventual inclusion m the larger sutra, 1t has always maintained a separate existence 

and importance, and with the advent of the work of Bodhiruci in the sixth 

century, a separate Chinese school, the Ti-lun, arose which was exclusively 

devoted to the study of the sutra and its commentary. 



The other chapter for which a complete Sanskrit original exists 1s the Ganda- 

vyuha, a very large sutra in itself which now constitutes the final portion of the 

Avatamsaka. It also dates from the second century. The Sanskrit text was edited 

by Hokei Idzumi and D.T. Suzuki.5 This sutra describes the wandering of the 

youth Sudhana, who, in his search for enlightenment, travels about speaking to 

various people who can help enlighten him. He receives this teaching from 

fifty-two people before he perceives the truth. Sudhana is a Buddhist Everyman, 

and his indefatigable search 1s another epitome of the long journey to enlighten- 

ment which the Avatamsaka describes in almost excruciating detail. Suzuki has 

spoken of it as one of the most dazzling works ever conceived by homo religiosus. 

It 1s,.1n fact, similar in many ways to Dante’s Divine Comedy and Bunyan’s 

Pilgrim’s Progress, but without their terror, superstition, and idolatry. When, at 

the end.of his epic journey, Sudhana is ushered into the Tower of Maitreya and 

shown the truth, it is the world of the Buddhas, which transcends ignorance, 

hatred, and desire. It is tempting to give a résumé of this astonishing work here, 

but it would take us beyond the scope of this chapter. However, Suzuki’s Essays 

in Zen Buddhism (Third Series) contains an excellent résumé. The Hua~yen was 

interested in this work not only for its portrayal of the life of the Bodhisattva, but 

also for its rich material on the harmonious and totalistic nature of existence. 



There are several theories concerning the composition of the Avatamsaka, 

but students of this text are agreed on several points. Somewhere in Central 

Asia, probably in the region of Khotan, a single compiler or several compilers, 

probably inspired by the Dasabhiimika and Gandavyitha, assembled a number of 

independent sutras in such a manner that the finished work gave a very detailed 

description of the progress of the Bodhisattva from the time he began his 

practice up to his achievement of enlightenment. In some instances, new sutras 

may have been composed to fill crucial gaps in this preconceived structure. The 

finished work was then translated into Chinese in sixty volumes, by Buddha- 

bhadra, in 420; it was later translated by Siksananda, in eighty volumes, in 

about 699, and the Gandavyiiha section was separately translated in forty 

volumes by Prajna, in the late eighth century. 



Reading this mammoth work is, to put it mildly, an unforgettable experience. 





The Hua-yen School — 23 





Buddhabhadra’s translation, for instance, comprises thirty-four chapters and 





‘contains over 400 pages of Chinese in the Japanese Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo 





edition with each page comprising over 1,500 Chinese characters. But the sheer 

volume of words is nowhere near as formidable as the content itself; like most 

Mahayana Buddhist works, everything 1s done on a gargantuan scale. If one 

simile is good, ten are always much better. The reader is staggered by the loving 

description of scenery, down to the numbers of leaves on the trees, with their 

configuration and coloring; with the descriptions of perfumed trees and golden 

lotuses, singing birds, clouds that emit wonderful odors and sounds, varieties of 

clothing and jewels, the long lists of names of Bodhisattvas and Sravakas assem- 

bled to hear the teaching, more numerous than all the sands in a million Ganges 

Rivers, and so on for page after page. Moreover, the sutra is a vehicle for many of 

the more abstruse and subtle doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism, such as those of 










““Mind-only” and “Emptiness,” not to mention that which became the special 

province of Hua-yen, the doctrine of the infinitely repeated intercausality and 

identity of all phenomena. There 1s a great amount of drama and color in the 

Avatamsaka, but it 1s all there to serve the overriding concern of Buddhism, to 

show man what he must do to become free, and what freedom is. 



The richness and profundity: of the sutra began to attract the attention of 

Chinese Buddhists from the time of its first translation. There 1s much in the 

sutra to attract a pious and zealous Buddhist, but primarily the attraction lies in 

the doctrine of identity and intercausality, which is unique to this one sutra. 

An academic tradition: of study, exegesis, and teaching gradually grew up 

around the sutra, but it was several centuries after its translation before there 

existed an independent school as such. During the period from its translation in 

the first decade of the fifth century up to the early T’ang, the tradition centered 

around the scholarly work of individual monks belonging to various other 

academic traditions, as well as the work of schools like the Ti-lun and She-lun, 

each working on various problems and contributing their insights to what was 

later to be recognized as a separate school. Some of the other traditions, such as 

Ti-lun and She-lun, became absorbed into Hua-yen, because the latter thorough- 

ly encompassed their own special areas of interest. Even the three men who are 

considered now to have been the first three patriarchs of Hua-yen—Tu-shun, 

Chih-yen, and Fa-tsang—were not themselves conscious of belonging to some 

distinct school called ‘‘Hua-yen”’: it was not until the time of Ch’eng-kuan, the 

fourth patriarch (783-839), that a separate school was recognized and given the 

name of Hua-yen. 



Ihave, from time to time, used the word “patriarch” with reference to leading 

figures in the development of Hua-yen, but these early figures in the history of 





24 Hua-yen Buddhism 





the school did not consider themselves to be anything like patriarchs of a new 

school. They were just Buddhists who were especially attracted to one particular 

scripture. The patriarchal tradition of Hua-yen, like that of Ch’an and other 

Chinese forms of Buddhism, was established much later than the time of the 

“patriarchs,” when some need arose to base the teachings of the school squarely 

on an unbroken line of masters stretching far back mto Chinese history and often 

beyond to a line of Indian masters who in turn were descended in authority 

from the Buddha himself. The conferring of the exalted title of ‘master’ or 

spokesman for a school was thus often made long after the life of the master in 

question. In some patriarchal traditions, there 1s occasionally some real trans- 

mussion of doctrine from master to disciple, but often the lineage 1s in great part 

fictional. 



In the case of Hua-yen, Tu-shun (557-640), the acknowledged first patriarch, 

was given that title after the time of Tsung-m1 (779-840), the fifth patriarch, who 

himself is recognized as being a Ch’an master as well as Hua-yen master. How- 

ever, there 1s real doubt as to whether Tu-shun should be considered a Hua-yen 

master at all. Some scholars have suggested Chih-cheng (602-668) as having a 

better right to the title, since he was the teacher of Chih-yen, who is recognized 

as the second master. Some have suggested that Chih-yen himself was the first 

master of Hua-yen.® Nevertheless, the present accepted history according to 

Hua-yen has Tu-shun as first master, Chih-yen as the second, and Fa-tsang the 

third. After the time of Fa-tsang (643-712), apparently a monk named Hui-yiian 

was recognized as the foremost scholar of Hua-yen thought, but the later creators 

of the Hua-yen patriarchal lineage apparently felt that his interpretation of Fa- 

tsang’s system was not orthodox enough. Therefore, he was made a “nonperson”’; 

1.€., he was denied the title of fourth patriarch, and Ch’eng-kuan, even though 

born twenty-six years after the death of Fa-tsang and therefore by no means a 

real heir to Fa-tsang’s teaching, was given the title of patriarch. The patchy 

nature of patriarchal lineages 1s further evidenced by the fact that Tsung-mi could 

be considered a patriarch in both Hua-yen and Ch’an simultaneously. 



The study of Hua-yen continued, of course, after the tme of Tsung-mi, but 

the times were hard for Buddhism. In 845, the great persecution of Buddhism by 

the Emperor Wu brought Hua-yen, as well as most other forms of Chinese 

Buddhism, to an end, as far as creative vitality is concerned. Only the non- 

philosophical forms such as Ch’an and Pure Land continued to develop and 

flourish. Some useful commentaries on Hua-yen treatises were composed during 

the Sung dynasty and later, but by that trme, Hua-yen had ceased to exist as an 

independent entity, and Tsung-mi is the last of the Hua-yen masters. But for that 

matter, with the intricate and difficult works of Fa-tsang, Chinese Buddhist 





The Hua-yen School 25 





philosophical work had really reached its high point, and perhaps not much more 

was possible. Part of the reason for the decline of Hua-yen, as well as T’ien-t’ai, 

San-lun, She-lun, Fa-hsiang, and’ other academic traditions, was that they 

stressed a very high level of intellectual activity, and in limiting their appeal 

to the very small number of monks with the talent and taste for abstruse philos- 

ophy, they denied themselves the broad base of mass support required to 

maintain a tradition in need of money, land, books, and other material resources. 

There was, of course, no moral support either, so that Wu did not hesitate to 

squash these schools, destroying the monastery-university complexes, defrocking 

the monks, and appropriating the wealth of the schools. With no popular support 

and without the active support of the emperor, Hua-yen could no longer exist. 

The tradition continued to live in Japan, where 1t was imported earlier, as one of 

the famous six schools of Nara, but it is safe to say that there was never any real 

creative vitality in the Japanese school. In Japan, Hua-yen (or Kegon, as 1t 1s 

pronounced there) itself was in turn eclipsed by the great Tendai and Shingon 

schools of the Heian period. 



The above story of the fortunes of Hua-yen may give the reader the impression 

that Hua-yen never amounted to much in the overall history of Buddhism. This 

would be an incorrect assessment of the influence of Hua-yen thought. As long 

as there is a Mahayana tradition of Buddhism, Hua-yen thought will continue to 

guide and inspire the seeker, for, as Hua~yen has always claimed, 1t was the 

historical mission of the school to try to present in its fullest and most perfect 

form that vision of the truth which is presumably the content of the enlightenment 

experience. Hua~yen had accomplished this mission im two ways. First, it had 

taken many different strands of Buddhist thought and brought them together 

in the form of a grand syncretism. Hua-yen created no new school of philosophy. 

Admittedly, even triumphantly syncretic, Hua-yen thinkers saw their task as 

that of being able to see the interrelationships between different schools of 

Buddhist thought and reassembling them to form their real whole. This can bea 

risky enterprise if there is very little real common ground among the various 

elements. Imagine someone trying to tack together the philosophies of Aquinas, 

Bishop Berkeley, Marx, and Wittgenstein. The result would be a mere patch- 

work, because each philosophy is largely discontinuous with the others, despite 

certain common presuppositions. However, Hua-yen could achieve a real syn- 

cretism because each different philosophical form of Buddhism 1s only part of 

the larger whole, and the study of any one aspect 1s no more isolated from its 

context than is the brain specialist’s concern isolated from the more general con- 

cern for the total organism. It was the peculiar mission of Hua-yen to try, on.a 

scale more vast and to a degree more satisfying than any other school of Bud- 





26  Hua-yen Buddhism 





dhism, to reassemble all the apparently separate, diverse threads of Buddhist 

thought and weave them into a seamless whole. 



Second, along with its syncretic effort, Hua-yen came to serve as the philo- 

sophical basis for the other schools of Buddhism more concerned with practice 

and realization. Thus not only 1s there no mutual exclusiveness at all between 

Hua-yen and Ch’an, but they are mutually complementary in a most profound 

and organic way. The Chinese have a saying: “Hua-yen for philosophy, Ch’an 

for practice.” This does not imply a choice, but rather the interrelationship of the 

two. As D.T. Suzuki remarked, Hua-yen is the philosophy of Zen and Zen 1s the 

practice of Hua-yen.” Put another way, the picture of existence presented by 

Hua-yen 1s the universe experienced in Zen enlightenment. Without the practice 

and realization of Zen, Hua-yen philosophy remains mere intellectual fun, never a 

vibrant reality. Hua-yen, in turn, serves as an intriguing lure to the practitioner, 

a stimulus to effort, and a promise of a vision undreamed of in our more common 

hours. For these two reasons, Hua-yen 1s far from insignificant in the-history of 

Buddhism. A third reason lies in the fact that it mspired some rather impressive 

art in China, Japan, and Java, but this lies outside the scope of this book.® 



The syncretistic efforts of Hua-yen were so comprehensive that they managed 

to include not only most of what was significant in Buddhist thought, but much 

of what might be considered the characteristic features of mdigenous Chinese 

thought as well. These native Chinese ideas are those usually associated with the 

philosophical Taoist traditions of Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Neo-taoists. 

It is doubtful that the architects of Hua-yen, such as Chih-yen and Fa-tsang, 

deliberately incorporated these Taoist elements into their system, rather, they 

were Chinese who had what might be called “pictures” in their minds of how 

reality was constructed, and these pictures tended to influence subsequent modes 

of thinking. They were presuppositions of the most vital form, fundamental 

symbol systems by means of which experience was ordered. 



First of all, there is the persistent, characteristic tendency on the part of people 

like Fa-tsang to take what might be called a totalistic view of existence. We 

first notice this tendency in earlier Taoist literature, particularly in the writings 

of Chuang-tzu and the later Neo-taoists. For instance, we find in Chuang-tzu’s 

teachings the following: 





By what is the Tao hidden that there should be a distinction of true and 

false? By what is speech obscured that there should be a distinction of “is” 

and “‘is not’? How can the Tao depart and not be there? And how could 

there be speech and yet it be not appropriate? The Tao is hidden by petty 

virtues. Speech 1s obscured by flowery eloquence. So it is that there are 





The Hua-yen School 27 





contentions between the Confucianists and Moists, each affirming what the 

other denies and denying what the other confirms. But if we are to decide 

between their several affirmations and denials, there 1s nothing better than 

to apply the light of reason. 



Everything 1s its own “‘self’’?; everything 1s something else’s ‘‘other.” 

Things do not know that they are other things’ “other”; they only know 

that they are themselves. Thus it 1s said that the other rises out of the self, 

just as the self rises out of the other. This is the theory that “‘self”’ and “other” 

give rise to each other. Besides, [it has been said that] where there 1s life 

there 1s death, and where there 1s death, there 1s life. Where there is impos- 

sibility, there is possibility, and where there is possibility, there 1s impos- 

sibility. It 1s because there 1s “‘is” that there 1s “is not’’; it 1s because there 

is “is not’’ that there is “‘is.” This being the situation, the sages do not ap- 

proach things on this level, but reflect the light of nature. Thereupon, the 

“self”? is also the “other”’; the ‘‘other”’ is the “‘self.”’ According to the “other’”’ 

there 1s one kind of “‘is” and “‘is not.” According to the “‘self”’ there 1s another 

kind of “is” and “is not.” But really are there such distinctions as “‘self”’ 

and “‘other,’’ or are there no such distinctions? When “self” and ‘“‘other’’ lose 

their contrariety, there we have the very essence of the Tao. Only the essence 

of the Tao may occupy the center of the circle, and respond therefrom to 

the endless opinions from all directions. Affirmation 1s one of the endless 

opinions; denial is another. Therefore, it is said that there is nothing better 

than the light of reason. [Adapted]? 





This passage, as well as the whole section from which it is taken, 1s a criticism of 

the partial view of things and an admonition to take a totalistic view of it. With 

the substitution of some Buddhist terminology, it could easily pass for a passage 

from a Hua-yen text. 



It is probably in Chuang-tzu's writings that the totalistic view of existence is 

urged strongly for the first ttme in Chinese literature, but we find it again in the 

later Neo-taoists, where 1t occurs in an even more pronounced way. Such a view 

of things runs, for instance, throughout the pages of Kuo-hsiang’s writings, 

particularly in his well-known commentary on the Chuang-tzu, where two 

principles in particular are enunciated which will appear several centuries later 

in the Hua-yen system. These are the principles of the self-transformation of 

things and the necessary interrelationships among these same things. Thus, for 

instance, in commenting on the line of Chuang-tzu’s text which says ““Was what 

there was before the universe a thing ?,”’ Kuo-hsiang says, 





28 Hua-yen Buddhism 





In existence, what was prior to things? We say that yin and yang are prior 

to things. But the yin and yang are themselves things. What, then, is prior to 

the yin and yang? We say that nature (tzu-jan) 1s prior to them. But nature is 

simply the naturalness of things. Or we may say that the supreme Tao is 

prior to things. But this supreme Tao is supreme non-being (wu). Since it 1s 

non-being, how can it be prior? Thus, what can it be that is prior to things? 

And yet things are continuously being produced. This shows that things 

are spontaneously what they are. There is nothing which causes them to be 

such,1° , 





The refusal of Kuo-hsiang to look for any external creative agency prior to the 

“ten thousand things” themselves, or to consider even a time prior to being, 1s a 

strong foreshadowing of the later Hua-yen doctrine of the self-creation and 

self-transformation of a universe which for all practical purposes is beginningless 

and endless. 

Yet, while Kuo-hsiang denies a cosmologically antecedent creative agent and 

insists that things are mutually creative and sustaining through the dynamics of 

thezr own interrelationships, this does not mean that things exist in isolation from 

each other. In fact, their interrelationship is an extremely profound and intricate 

one, reminding us again of the cardinal tenet of Hua~yen—that while the universe 

is a universe of particulars with distinct qualities and functions, their existence, 

even their reality, lies more in their fundamental interrelationship than 1n their 

discreteness. We find a foreshadowing of this in the Kuo-hsiang commentary: 





When a man 1s born, insignificant though he be, he has the properties that 

he necessarily has. However trivial though his life may be, he needs the 

whole universe as a condition for his existence. All things in the universe, 

all that exist, can not cease to exist without some effect on him. If one factor 





is lacking, he might not exist. If one principle is vrolated, he might not be ‘ 





living. [My emphasis]*4 





This is a striking parallel to some of Fa-tsang’s statements. The Hua-yen picture 

of existence presented in the Treatise (from which much of this material is drawn) 

1s so close to Kuo-hsiang’s that it would be difficult to deny strong influences. 

In the final pages of his Treatise, Fa-tsang illustrates the relationships pertaining 

between the individuals of a totality by means of the analogy of a building and a 

rafter, which is part of the building, and there too we notice that the total building 

1s a necessary condition for the rafter just as much as the rafter is a condition for 

the building. Everything needs everything else. 





The Hua~yen School 29 





' Another element which found its way into the Hua-yen syncretism is the 

respect for, and delight in, the natural. It is a persistent trait in Taoist thought, and 

1s nowhere as evident as in the poems and landscape paintings of the Taoists and 

Ch’an devotees. It 1s an element which 1s absent from Indian Buddhism, where 

there was, to say the least, little affection for the natural. However, the Hua-yen 

Buddhist world view leads directly to a new attitude toward the natural which is 

not only deeply respectful but imbued with a profound gratitude and even 

ecstatic appreciation. We need only abandon our usual partial, prejudiced point 

of view in order to discover that what was hitherto insignificant, mean, or 

loathsome has come to have significance, value, and beauty. A worn pair of 

straw sandals, a bamboo dipper, the water in the dipper, all these things are 

friends and helpers, worthy of reverence and gratitude. 



Closely connected with this love of the natural world and its inhabitants was a 

tendency in Chinese Buddhism to interpret the Buddhist goal of enlightenment 

as a return to naturalness. In Taoist terms, this meant ceasing to pick and choose 

in the artificial, learned manner which has become our nature. By a return to the 

“source,” which is that innate ability to respond innocently and in a childlike 

manner to experience, the individual transcended those maddening contraries 

of “is” and ‘“‘is not” which Chuang-tzu spoke of, and learned the difficult art of 

noncalculating action, or the nonaction in action which in Chinese 1s called 

wu-wei. The enlightened person is presumably he who has expunged from his 

nature the learned responses to life’s situations which lead ordinary men to 

favor one experience over another./? In ‘‘returning to the source,”’ the individual 

has discovered that inmost core of subjectivity in which all the ferocious contraries 

are completely resolved. The difference between this view of the sage and that of 

Indian Buddhists can be seen quite clearly when we compare the two as portrayed 

in their respective traditions. The Indian figure—a Manjusri, Sakyamuni, or 

Avalokitesvara—is dressed in a manner befitting royalty, and royalty they are, 

though not a profane royalty. Jewels hang from neck, ears, arms, and legs; the 

hair is elaborately arranged; and he wears the robes of a prince. The pose is 

especially remarkable. The figure often sits cross-legged in yogic meditation, 

regal, aloof, with eyes half closed in eternal samadhi, the faint smile on the lips 

betraying the unspeakable bliss of one who has found a peace far removed from 

the dust and turmoil of the earthly arena. In contrast, the Chinese saint, perhaps 

best portrayed in the figures of Pu-tai and those rascally saints Shih-te and Han- 

shan, 1s frequently rather fat, jovial, and totally relaxed. He 1s barefooted and his 

hair and clothes (more like rags) are in negligent disarray. He obviously still 

enjoys plum wine and a good meal; there 1s nothing of the renunciant about him. 

He travels freely from village to village, dispensing goodies from his bag to the 





30 = Hua-yen Buddhism 





children who tease him and adore him, never for a moment losing the happy, silly 

grin of a man who knows who he is (“‘Nobody”’) and where he 1s (““Nowhere’’). 

These figures are painted over and over by Chinese artists, and their lesson is 

clear. The emancipated individual is not superhuman or royal, like the Indian 

Buddhas and Bodhisattvas; he would never walk on water or levitate. And who 

wants to sit forever in yogic withdrawal when one can play games with the village 

urchins? They delight in the ordinary, the simple, and the humble—chopping 

wood and carrying water, therein lies the wonderful Way. To the person who 

has seen things in their true form, what can there be which 1s really negligible 

or contemptible? 



These are some of the more important native Chinese influences on Hua-yen. 

There were others besides these, such as the tendency of Chinese like Fa-tsang to 

think of existence in terms of traditional patterns of thought. The li-shih pattern 

is one of these patterns of thought, but since it had particularly weighty con- 

sequences for the understanding and use of the Indian Buddhist doctrine of 

emptiness (Sinyata), I shall reserve my comments on this pattern for a later 

chapter dealing with that doctrine. 



However, among these influences, the most crucial insofar as Hua-yen was 

concerned. was the strong tendency to take what has been called a totalistic view 

of existence, which was discussed in the first chapter. As will be shown in greater 

detail later, I believe that a study of Hua-yen will reveal that the whole system of 

thought is an elaborate reworking of the Indian concept of emptiness. In this way, 

it is a continuation of the Indian Buddhists’ rather general concern with causation. 

It is evident from the alternative name which Hua-yen gave itself, the school of 

the ‘interdependent origination of the universe” (dharma-dhatu pratityasamutpada), 

that their primary concern was to demonstrate a universe in which the foremost 

fact was that. of a pervasive, unfailing, vastly intricate intercausality or inter- 

conditionality, theimplications of which are inestimable in terms of an individual’s 

own relationship with the infinitely multitudinous ‘“‘other.”’ For the Chinese, 

the net result of such a philosophical effort was a view of existence which was 

totalistic rather than particularistic: In a particularistic view of existence, the 

emphasis is overwhelmingly on the discrete individual, whether a human being, 

a table, or an atom, and these entities, seen as being each locked up within the 

boundaries of its own skin, are considered by and large to be discontinuous with 

each other. Despite agreed continuity in such areas as genus, species, blood 

relationship, nationality, race, sex, and the like, it 1s felt that each individual 1s 

autonomous, isolated within its own skin, and is in no real way identical with, 

or continuous with, other individuals. A model for existence seen in this way 

would be a basket full of marbles. In a totalistic view of existence, on the other 










The Hua-yen School 31 





hand, while the reality of individuals is admitted, the emphasis 1s on the totality of 

being seen as necessarily composed of individuals which sustain each other in an 

unimaginably complex network of intercausality and interdependence. The 

tendency, then, 1s to see everything in terms of the totality of which it 1s a part. 

A good model for this view would be a living body. 



This view of things, so evident in Chinese thought and art, happily coincided 

in many ways with a view of existence which was imported. from India. The 

Chinese did not have to violently force Indian Buddhist doctrines into their own 

patterns of thought because there were from the beginning great, important 

areas of consensus.1 The influence of indigenous Chinese modes of thought 

occurred in part in a subtle but significant change in emphasis and in part in 

reinterpretation of several fundamental Indian Buddhist ideas. But this will be 

discussed in a separate chapter. 



From the standpoint of the Hua-yen school itself, the previous centuries can 

be seen as preparation for the final syncretic work of Fa-tsang and a few other 

central figures in the history of the school. The Ti-lun school contributed much in 

its concentration on the Dasabhumika Sutra and the very important commentary 

on it by Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu’s insistence that each of the ten bhumis was 

identical with the other nine, that all were empty and existed only by virtue of 

conditional interdependence, and that all the qualities of the ten stages were 

inherent in any one stage (including the Buddhahood of the final stage) was not 

only quite respectable Sinyavada but probably contributed as much to the creation 

of the independent Hua-yen school of later times as the data found in the 

Gandavyiha and other portions of the Avatamsaka Stra. From the She-lun school 

the Hua~yen thinkers inherited the very important results of the work done on 

the Mahayana-samgraha, especially with regard to the material in that text dealing 

with the nature of Mind. In fact, the Hua-yen system seen as a species of 

tathagatagarbha thought owes a very considerable debt not only to the work of 

the She-lun scholars, but to the whole tradition of study and exegesis of tathagata- 

garbha thought which is epitomized in the highly systematic Ta-ch’eng.ch’i hsin 

tun (Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana), a work quoted frequently in Fa-tsang’s 

writings. In building the architectonic grandeur of the Hua-yen system, Fa-tsang 

and his fellow Buddhists turned to the Mahayanasamgraha, Ta-ch’eng ch’i hsin 

lun, and cognate texts and traditions for their ideas on the relationship of the 

absolute to the phenomenal, not to the Ch’eng wei-shih lun of the Fa-hsiang tradi- 

tion of Hsiian-tsang and K’uei-chi. 



Besides these major philosophical or scholastic traditions, the work of many 

individual scholar-monks not belonging particularly to these traditions also 

helped in the later formation of the Hua-yen school. All during the later part of 





32  Hua-yen Buddhism 





the political division of China into North and South and into the following Sui 

dynasty, a number of monks continued to study the texts, think, and write. They 

pondered such problems as the relationship between the two spheres of the 

absolute and phenomenal, whether or not the absolute interpenetrated the world 

of desire and turmoil, and, what was particularly pertinent to later developments, 

whether the “ten thousand things” themselves were ultimately different, or 

whether in fact they might be, in some absolute sense, identical. The possibility 

of complete identity was offered during the Sm period by Seng-tsan, thus 

anticipating the work of the Hua-yen masters.!* The point of this is that Hua-yen 

did not emerge full-blown with Tu-shun or any of his successors but was rather 

the converging point of much thought which had gone on during previous 

generations. Most of it was there by late Sui times (i.e., during the time of 

Tu-shun, the first Hua-yen patriarch) and only needed to be mastered and 

interrelated within a more comprehensive scheme. This work was to be accom- 

plished by the third patriarch of Hua-yen, Fa-tsang, who, though he was presum- 

ably third spokesman for the new tradition, was in fact the real creator of what is 

now known as Hua-yen. 



Fa-tsang’s importance in the history of the Hua-yen school lay in the fact that 

he was more successful than any of his predecessors in effecting the great syn- 

cretizing work of his school. The foregoing discussion makes it clear that he 

was heavily indebted to the work of several generations of earlier Buddhists. 

Moreover, his own work began where the work of his immediate predecessor, 

Chih-yen, left off, and undoubtedly Tu-shun, the first patriarch, contributed his 

share to the growing tradition. However, the work of all these men was incom- 

plete from the standpoint of the requirements of the Hua~yen school. They created 

pieces of the puzzle, if you will, but it was Fa-tsang, with his remarkable learning, 

pious zeal, and, above all, his genius for seeing relationships, who was able to 

take all the pieces and create a picture out of them. In essay after essay, he refined 

and developed the work of his predecessors, until, it 1s safe to say, the fully 

developed philosophy of Hua-yen took form in his hands. His writings, such as 

the Treatise, indicate that he had a very wide acquaintance with Buddhist 

literature, including the treatises of earlier Chinese Buddhists, and it was out of a 

vast knowledge which perhaps only the old Chinese scholars had at one time that 

he was able to create a structure which im its perfection was greater than the sum of 

its parts. Though his successors, Ch’eng-kuan and Tsung-mi, were able to clarify 

certain important facets of Fa~tsang’s thought and even add a few innovations of 

their own, it must be said that an appraisal of Fa-tsang’s work will reveal that he 

is the de facto founder and the brightest light of the Hua-yen tradition.!5 



One final point should be made concerning the Hua-yen school. It 1s true 





The Hua-yen School — 33 





that for many generations of Buddhists, Hua-yen has been regarded not only as 

a philosophical or academic form of Buddhism but as the culmination of Buddhist 

philosophical effort. This 1s undoubtedly true, for the most part, but as was 

mentioned earlier, it was probably the overwhelming concern with philosophy of 

great difficulty that prevented the school from ever gaining a foothold among 

the Chinese masses. Yet it is safe to say that Hua-yen, like all forms of Buddhism, 

was never an end in itself. The goal of Buddhism throughout its long history has 

been to free men from greed, hatred, and ignorance, and whatever we may 

isolate from the body of Buddhism as “philosophy” or “practice” was always 

pursued with that goal in mind. Therefore, it may have been, and often was, 

good philosophy, but that philosophy existed only within the context of the 

Buddhist goal. This 1s true of Hua-yen philosophy. Fa-tsang was a great philoso- 

pher, but his philosophizing did not exist in a vacuum; it was not engaged in for 

the sake of intellectual fun. The Hua-yen universe as described by the philosophers 

was meant to be a description of existence as seen in the light of prajna, 1.¢., as 

a Buddha sees it. The philosophy thus serves as a kind of road map drawn by 

one who has made the journey, observed the terrain, and returned. The words, 

admittedly a faint reflection of their referent, serve to guide and inspire us to 

seck the reality itself. First there 1s experience, then the philosophy, and either 

implicitly or explicitly the demand on the reader to seek the experience itself, 

Philosophy grows out of experience and then leads back to experience, a finger 

pointing to the moon of interior space. It is significant that Tu-shun, the man who 

1s given credit for founding a school called Hua-yen, was not a philosopher at 

all, but rather a meditator. The only document now extant which is associated 

with Tu-shun, the “Practice of Tranquillity and Insight According to the Five 

Teachings of Buddhism,” is centered around meditation; it is not a philosophical 

work.!® Tu-shun saw in his meditations the Hua-yen cosmos which later was 

transformed into a philosophical system. In fact, all five Hua-~yen masters wrote 

treatises on meditation, indicating an ongoing concern with the necessity of 

realizing in experience what was otherwise words on paper.'”? With Tsung-mi, 

who was a Ch’an master as well as a Hua-yen master, the full circle seems to be 

completed, for his writmgs show a return to a primary concern for meditation 

and experience. The practical implications of the Hua-yen system, as well as the 

background of the philosophical enterprise, are to be found in these treatises on 

meditation, and they indicate clearly that men like Tu-shun and Fa-tsang were 

not mere armchair philosophers but were aware that Buddhism 1s always more 

than philosophy; that it is, in fact, an event, a cataclysmic imner transformation 

without which there can be no real Buddhism at all. The Hua-yen picture of exis- 

tence 1s grand, beautiful, and inspiring, but it 1s nothing if it 1s not a lived reality.