화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망 - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 4
Full text of "hua-yen-buddhism-the-jewel-net-of-indra"
Hua-yen Buddhism the Jewel Net of Indra
Francis H. Cook 1977
==
Contents
Preface
- The Jewel Net of Indra
- The Hua-yen School
- The Indian Background of Hua-yen
- Identity
- Intercausality
- The Part and the Whole
- Vairocan
- Living in the Net of Indra
Note
Glossary
Index
===
===
4 Identity
The preceding chapters illustrate that the uniqueness of Hua-yen lies in its
portrayal ofa universe in which the distinct things that constitute it are fundamen-
tally identical and exist only through a complex web of interdependency. It was
the mission of Fa-tsang and his line to construct a rational basis for this view,
which in the final analysis 1s an intuition growing out of meditative practices.
The core of Fa-tsang’s Treatise consists of a sustained, systematic attempt to
demonstrate why and how things interpenetrate in this manner. The following
three chapters will be devoted to a discussion of his arguments. The present
chapter concerns the matter of identity, but before Fa-tsang’s arguments in
favor of the identity of things are discussed, there must be some analysis of a
preliminary phase in his discussion, the identity of phenomena with the absolute.
Chapter § is devoted to interdependence, and Chapter 6 demonstrates the total
relationship between the one and the many, using Fa-tsang’s analogy ofa building.
The first step in the argument, showing the identity of the phenomenal and
absolute—or shih and li, to use Fa-tsang’s usual terminology—is a necessary step
in the construction of the system, and it shows how certain common doctrines of
Buddhism were used as “‘bricks’’ to construct the system. While Fa-tsang makes
free and extensive use of almost all the common doctrines of Buddhism in order
to build up his philosophy, his method is also interesting in the rather free and
inovative way he uses them. Three important doctrines or devices are used in
this first phase of the system: there is a basic and extensive use of the doctrine of
pratityasamutpada, which is indeed the foundation of the system, this in turn is
discussed within the framework of the doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhava),
and the proper way of viewing the three natures is discussed by means of the
application of the Madhyamika tetralemma.
The framework for this phase of the system is the doctrine of the three natures.
Icall it a framework because study indicates that the three natures are not them-
selves intrinsic to what Fa-tsang was attempting to do. The fact that he did use
Identity 57
this doctrine séems to be due to considerations other than necessity; he might
easily have used another framework with no loss to his own system.
It will be recalled that the three natures are the dependent nature (paratantra-
svabhava), the discriminated nature (parikalpita-svabhava), and the perfected
nature (parinispanna-svabhava). In Fa-tsang’s system, the dependent nature is the
nature that an object possesses consisting of its existence in total dependence on
exterior conditions. The discriminated nature of the same thing consists of the
way in which it appears erroneously to the human mind as distinct from the
subject and as further endowed with a real self-existence. The perfected nature
is the real nature of this object as it is apart from our suppositions. We may say
that this is its suchness (fathata), divorced from concepts superimposed on it
because of our naive belief that words have real referents. All three natures
belong to any given thing, and a common interpretation of the doctrine 1s that
if the discriminated nature 1s expunged from the dependent nature, the dependent
nature perceived in its real state is itself its perfected nature.
This doctrine seems to have been very useful to those Buddhist academic
traditions which were primarily occupied with problems of a psychological or
epistemological nature, for its value lies in its ability to give some indication as to
the nature of delusion and at the same time to show the nature of prajfia-insight.
It 1s important psychologically because it explains the nature of the tricks the
human mind plays on itself, and it is important in terms of epistemology because
it casts great doubt on the ability of ordinary modes of perception to divulge
reality. The dependent nature is truly pivotal in this doctrine, whether the three
natures are discussed in terms of seed impressions stored in the mind or whether
they are discussed, as Fa-tsang discusses them, in terms of the phenomenal world,
for the dependent nature is the raw, indeterminate stuff which we humans may,
and-do, interpret as either samsara or nirvana. Thus in our stupidity and desire
we may see this bare facticity of things under the sway of discrimination, in
which case the dependent nature is seen as the realm of struggle and death, or
we may see this same neutral stuff illuminated by the clarity of prajfa, in which
case we see it as nirvana.
The three natures are three distinct aspects of an object, and the three are
usually not confused or identified. There are three because there 1s a strict antithesis
between the discrimmated nature and the perfected nature, and the dependent
nature 1s in itself neither; 1t 1s just what it is, and nothing else. Furthermore, the
three are distinct because they are fundamentally different in their own modes
of being. Parikalpita does not really exist and is impermanent; paratantra exists
but 1s impermanent; and parinispanna both exists and is permanent. Basically,
however, any tendency to erase the differences in the three natures would destroy
58 Hua~yen Buddhism
their function as it existed historically in the traditions outside Hua-yen; that is,
it served to indicate something of the nature of ignorance and enlightenment,
and it both indicated the process whereby beings became deluded and pointed
out the path to light and clarity of vision.
The above discussion of the historical function of the three natures doctrine
has been made, with some simplification, from the standpoint of Hsiian-tsang’s
Wei-shih tradition, which was a new and influential form of Buddhism with
strong imperial support during the formative years of the Hua-yen school. In
incorporating it within his own system and using it in the unorthodox manner
he did, Fa-tsang was trying to do at least two things. First, because it was a very
important doctrine in Buddhism and because he was consciously attempting a
grand syncretism of Buddhist thought, he probably felt that he had to account
for it in his own system. Second, in using it in the peculiar way he did and in
subordinating it to the whole of his own thought, he in effect criticized it as a
merely partial form of the whole truth. A third reason may be offered: it has
been suggested. by some Japanese scholars that in incorporating Hsiian-tsang’s
doctrines into his own and subordinating them to a presumably more comprehen-
sive, accurate world-view, Fa-tsang was hoping to decrease the amount of
influence Hsiian-tsang and his school had with the imperial court and win the
important royal patronage needed by an academic tradition of this type.?
Fa-tsang could hope to do so because in many ways his Hua-yen world view
supplied an interesting philosophical rationale for the relationship of the emperor
(or empress) and the satellite countries coming under the rule of the T’ang court.
It did in fact have such an appeal, and the Empress Wu switched her patronage
from Hsiian-tsang’s school to that of Fa-tsang.
Fa-tsang’s strategy in laying a foundation for the idea of the identity of things
is to show that, contrary to the views of the Wei-shih tradition, what we may
call the true and false are not at all absolutely distinct orders of truth but are rather
imbedded 1n each other inseparably. There is, in fact, only one reality, which is
itself a mixture of the true and false. Drawing copiously on a vast amount of
very respectable Buddhist literature, Fa-tsang proceeds to document a case for
the existence in each of the three natures of both the true and the false. The result
of this enterprise shows better than anything else what his intentions were, for
in his hands the three natures become just two natures, the true and the false, or
emptiness and existence. Both explicitly and implicitly, he continues the Buddhist
preoccupation with the mechanisms of delusion and enlightenment, as Hsiian-
tsang had in utilizing the three natures doctrine, but in effect, by reducing the
three to two, he has switched the context of the doctrine, for he uses this method
to show that the material world “‘out there” is not merely a material world, but
is also the very body of the Buddha, the face of truth.
Identity 59
Fa-tsang’s treatment of the three natures is rather ingenious, and a brief look
at his procedure will help in understanding his discussion of identity. First, he
names the two aspects of each of the three natures:
[499a] The two aspects of tathata [i.e., parinispanna svabhava] are 1. it is
immutable, 2. it obeys conditions; the two aspects of the dependent nature
are I. it exists in a manner similar to the real, 2. it 1s without an essence of
its own; the two aspects of the discriminated nature are 1. it exists to the
senses, 2. it does not exist in reality.3
The immutability of the perfected nature consists of its ability to remain purely
itself, the absolute, despite the fact that 1t appears to us as conditioned phenomena.
On the other hand, the second aspect seems to contradict the first, for now Fa-~
tsang says that this same immutable absolute becomes conditioned, and this means
that it takes on the form of pure and impure dharmas. Next, when the dependent
nature 1s examined, it too is seen as possessing two aspects. “Existing 1n a manner
similar to the real” means that it has a quasi-permanence and reality which make it
seem to be ultimate. The second aspect contradicts this in pointing out that it
has no essence or self-existence; it 1s indeed empty, as 1s anything which is
produced from conditions. Finally, the discriminated nature has the aspect of
existing to the senses, which means that we certainly do believe that phenomena
are what they seem to be. However, the second aspect corrects this, saying that
it does not really exist as 1t appears.
Now, if we examine these three natures in their dual aspects, it will be noticed
that despite real psychological, epistemological, and soteriological differences of
a crucial kind between truth and falsity, that is, between the perfected nature on
the one hand and the other two natures on the other, the three natures are
ultimately identical in being mixtures of the true and false. This will become
evident if the three natures with their respective dual aspects are listed in a table:
A B
Parinispanna immutable conditioned
Paratantra essenceless seems to be real
Parikalpita nonexistent exists to the senses
in reality
Fa-tsang interprets all the qualities m row A as being the same. That is, the
essencelessness of the dependent nature 1s what 1s called immutability and non-
existence in reality in the perfected nature and discriminated natures respectively.
Fa-tsang equates all three with the true and furthermore identifies them as
|
t
60 Hua-yen Buddhism
emptiness. Also, all the qualities under B are the same, and these are equated with
the false and with existence, the latter being used as an equivalent to the rupa of the
Prajnaparamita literature. Consequently, each of the three natures shares the dual
character of truth and falsity, or emptiness and existence. If conditioned being
and its illusory appearance are nothing but the immutable absolute under the
sway of conditions, which 1s what the conditioned aspect of parinispanna means,
then the absolute separation of the three natures has been destroyed, and what
remains is a phenomenal world which conceals within it the eternal, immutable
truth. Yet Fa-tsang was an orthodox Buddhist, and he retained the distinction
between the true and the false, as indeed he had to if his philosophy was to remain
consonant with the most ancient religious objective of Buddhism. Simply put, it
makes a great difference to us whether we perceive only distinctions and com-
petition or sameness and harmony; although we recognize that reality is a mixture
of truth and falsity, there is a difference between the two categories. The former,
which Fa-tsang in characteristic Chinese fashion calls the ‘‘root,”’ nevertheless 1s
the source of the “‘limbs”’ or “derivative,” and the latter in turn are developments
of the ‘‘root.”” Thus, says Fa-tsang, “‘The true embraces the false and derivative,
and the false penetrates the true source.’’4 If this seems to be a radically Chinese
interpretation of Buddhist ideas, it should be remembered that we are simply
involved with an unusual manner of demonstrating something which 1s reiterated
at great length in Mahayana sutras, which 1s that form and emptiness are identical.
The two are inseparable, because emptiness is form’s mode of being, but it
matters whether we perceive just form or empty form.
Fa-tsang was a very learned man, and he was able to reach deeply into Buddhist
literature for passages which substantiate his vision, and it is indeed a remarkable
vision. In his treatment of the discriminated nature, he merely rephrased much
that had been said about it in Vijnanavada texts. They too acknowledged the
obvious fact that the subject-object split seems to be real enough to us, and that
we really do perceive the distinctions which constitute our reality. And they
were equally insistent that it was all nonexistent, pure illusion. The two aspects
of the dependent nature seem to reflect Fa-tsang’s knowledge of Madhyamika
views.° They, before Fa-tsang, spoke of the emptiness of phenomena, while at
the same time admitting that the seemingly ultimate reality of these things derives
from their having sprung into existence as a result of conditions. The perfected
nature, however, is treated in the most unusual manner. Fa-tsang obviously made
great efforts to find textual authorities to back him up, for while all schools of
Buddhism agreed that nirvana, emptiness, Buddha nature, and so on, were
immutable by definition, the conditionality of this absolute was not part of ortho-
dox Buddhist thinking. Fa-tsang’s position is that this absolute comes to exist
in both a pure and impure form as conditioned phenomena, and Buddhists
tp thence erent yaneereett _ i tI
Identity 61
traditionally. were not inclined to agree that the Buddha-nature had a soiled
aspect. For Fa-tsang to treat the perfected nature m this manner depends, perhaps,
on ‘his willingness to take liberties with the passages from older texts which
leaned in that direction. In fact, the most important source for proof of his
position seems to have been the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, which is now
generally accepted as a Chinese synthesis of several other texts, perhaps given a
particularly Chinese interpretation. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the picture of
the immutable absolute becoming conditioned and assuming the form of pure
and impure dharmas follows the outline in that text, where the One Mind is said
to assume a form which is a mixture of the pure and impure.
It appears that Fa-tsang had at least one precedent for asserting a dual aspect
for each of the three natures. The Trisvabhava-nirdesa, for instance, speaks in the
following manner of the three natures (numbers refer to verses in that text):
10. The profundity of the three natures consists of bemg and nonbeing,
duality and unity, obscurity and purification, and nondistinction of marks.
11. Parikalpita 1s grasped as existing but does not really exist; thus it 1s held
that its marks are both being and nonbeing.
12. Paratantra exists in an illusory manner but does not exist in the manner
in which it appears; thus it is held... .
13. Parinispanna exists in nonduality and 1s the absence of duality; thus 1t 1s
held... .©
The verses then continue to explain how each of the three natures 1s also dual
from the standpoint of obscurity and purification, and so on. While Fa-tsang’s
treatment frequently differs in particulars, and certamly in intent, the style of
treatment is no different from that of the Nirdesa. In fact, some later verses speak
of the identity of each of the three natures with the other two.”
The main support for Fa-tsang’s view of the identity of the three natures 1s
scriptural testimony, as was mentioned above. I have quoted several illustrative
passages in the section on the doctrine of tathagatagarbha in Chapter 3. By ranging
over an extensive collection of sutra and treatise literature, and extracting such
passages as the one which says that the Tathagata transmigrating in the six paths
of sentient existence is called “living beings,” Fa-tsang was able to make a
convincing argument for the qualities he assigned to the three natures. It1s evident,
then, thathe was mainly concerned with giving the weight of traditional authority
to a view of existence as being a mixture of the true and false, or emptiness and
phenomenality. The result, in Buddhist terms, 1s a vision of the dharma-dhatu
as Buddha-body, dharma-dhatu kaya.
Finally, Fa-tsang takes great pains to forestall any attachment to the categories
62 Hua-yen Buddhism
he has established, particularly as 1t might arise from a naive, crude interpretation
ofsuch categories as being and nonbeing. To do this, he subjects his own categories
to a lengthy criticism through the use of the Madhyamika tetralemma. Thus he
asks, “‘Does the perfected nature exist ?”” The answer is “no,” because it obeys
conditions. Is it nonexistent? It is not nonexistent because it 1s smmutable. Is it
both existent and nonexistent? No, because it does not have a dual nature. Then
is it neither existent nor nonexistent? No, because it is endowed with qualities
as countless as the sands in the Ganges River. Then the same questions are raised
with regard to the other two natures, and each is answered 1n the same manner.
The reason this process 1s followed 1s that if the questioner thinks that the perfected
nature exists in the ordinary sense of “existence,” the answer must be in the
negative. This attachment to a false existence is annihilationism because in
asserting a misconceived existence, true existence is destroyed. The same 1s so
for nonexistence. If tathata is nonexistent, then there is no support for dharmas,
and to assert the existence of dharmas without a cause is eternalism. Moreover,
if it does not exist, there is no cause for holy wisdom, for (as was noted 1n the
chapter on tathagatagarbha) the cause of wisdom is innate Buddha-wisdom as
tathata. By means of a lengthy criticism of such views, Fa-tsang warns the careless
reader not to misunderstand the language he uses when discussing the three
natures.
With the attempt to cut off attachment, the first phase in the establishment of
the relationship of identity is completed. By finding the two aspects of existence
and emptiness within each of the three natures, he has established the identity of
the three natures. However, the final result is a view of existence as a mixture of
the true and false, i.e., as phenomena, but also as the absolute truth. As Fa-tsang
says in conclusion to this part of his essay, the true is included 1n the false deriva-
tive so that there is nothing which is not the true, and the false permeates the
true source so that there is none which 1s not included in the true. They embrace
one another freely, without obstacle.
The next step in the system is basically very simple, but the validity of Fa-
tsang’s claim that any object, or dharma, is identical with all other dharmas depends
very much on our ability to accept certain premises. First, we must accept the
basic concept of emptiness itself. Second, we must be able to consider emptiness
to be so completely fundamental to the being of things that despite their obvious
and real differences, they are alike in a more essential way in being empty. If we
can accept these premises, then the claim that all things are identical does not
seem quite so improbable, because identity is claimed on the basis of this common
emptiness. It 1s not as if Fa-tsang, or any other Buddhist, has high-handedly
tenes
Identity 63
obliterated the differences, for the Hua-yen position 1s that of identity in difference.
In the analogy of the body (in Chapter 1), there is no real contradiction beiced
identity and difference, indeed, things are identical because theey 256 different.
This is neither mysticism nor badly confused thinking, which 1s evident once we
become aware of Fa-tsang’s criterion for identity.
This position of identity in difference is reflected in the analysts ofa phenomenal
object into two different “essences,” which Fa-tsang calls identical essence
and ‘“‘different essence.’’® These two essences are derived from the unusual analysis
of the three natures discussed earlier. There, Fa-tsang treated each of the three
natures in such a way that each separately and all three collectively were seen to
have two natures, which Fa-tsang calls, variously, emptiness and existence, the
true and false, and so on. Now, when Fa-tsang speaks of identical essence and
different essence, he is once again concerned with the situation whereby a dharma
4s said to be existent because 1t 1s solely a product of contributory conditions, and
empty because that. which comes into being as a result of conditions has no self-
existence. Identical essence thus means that all things have an identical essence
because all are intrinsically empty, and all have different essences because, as
existents, each is different 1n nature. Thus fire and ice can be said to be identical
because both are empty, i-e., both are products of conditions and have no self-
existence. At the same time, they are different, for obvious reasons. However,
the real differences between things are more pertinent to the matter of inter-
dependence, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. Identity is related to the fact pe
all things are empty, and this relationship will be discussed in the remainder o
pins ata are said to possess an identical essence, this should not be
confused with the mutual identity among dharmas as entities. Identical essence
refers to the fact that all dharmas function identically as causes. This means that
any dharma in and of itself, without any reference to another dharma, functions
as the total cause for the totality of dharmas. Since the totality as that totality 1s
impossible without the contributory function of this one dharma, ane since any
dharma functions identically in this manner, any one dharma 1s said to have a
causal essence identical with all other causes. Fa-tsang derives the concept of
identical essence from the ability of the one dharma to act ina total causal caper
without the aid of collaborating conditions.? A commentary on Fa-tsang’s text
discusses this point 1n the following manner:
Because of the concept of not requiring conditions there is the category of
identical essence. This means a single cause universally serves as many
64 Hua-yen Buddhism
conditions, so that there are many individual causes within the one cause.
Th i i
ese many other causes and the one original cause are not differentiated,
so this is called “identical essence.’’!°
If this principle is then applied to some situation such.as the twelve-linked cham
of interdependent being, then any one link among the twelve conditions will
be seen as having the same causal essence as the remaining eleven, in spite of the
fact that from another point of view, ignorance and karmic preconditions, for
instance, are different in other ways. What this is, then, is a recognition of the
power of any one dharma to function as total cause, aside from any consideration
of being assisted by other dharmas, and even aside from any question of relation-
ship. The one dharma as contributory cause is no different from any other dharma-
cause, and therefore all are identical as causes. With regard to the twelve-linked
chain of interdependent being, all twelve dharmas are then considered to be
avidya from the standpoint of avidyd itself. If we switch our attention to another
dharma, such as vijfana, then it can be said that there are twelve vijnanas there.
Identical essence, ‘then, 1s discussed with reference to the identity of all dharmas
in their causal capacities. There is absolutely no difference in things as far as
their respective abilities to function as sole cause for the result 1s concerned.
Now, when we speak of the identity of things as things, we are speaking within
the frame of reference of the simultaneous emptiness and existence of a dharma
which Fa-tsang postulates on the basis of his treatment of the three natures.
Existence means that the object exists as a result of conditions; emptiness refers
to the fact that what exists in dependence on conditions has no ultimate being in
and of itself. Now, if we examine the relationship between a single dharma
conceived as a cause and the many other dharmas which are the result of that other
cause, we will discover that despite the real numerical distinctness of the many
and despite the obvious differences in character, there is no essential difference
between the one dharma and the many others. In short, there is a fundamental
identity among all things as things.
Fa-tsang uses the analogy of ten coins to demonstrate this relationship.*?
The ten coins are an analogy for the totality of existence, and the relationship
between any one coin and the remaining coins is a model for the relationship
between any thing and the infinity of all other objects which constitute existence.
If we start with coin one and analyze its relationship to the other nine coins
singly and collectively, it will then be said that coin one 1s identical with coin
two, coin three, all the way up to coin ten. Now the question 1s why. According
to the reasoning of the Hua-yen masters, coin two is not a self-existent entity in
its context of the.ten (whole). It is com two as a result of coin one, and looked at
-
yg tenn
= —— pe gry eee ett
‘Identity 65
from the standpoint of com one, coin one 1s the cause and coin two 1s the result,
1.¢., itis a conditioned coin two. If this were not the case, then even in the absence
of coin one, coin two would be number two. In Buddhist terminology, it would
have a self-existence. But it does not. Looked at from the standpoint of the first
coin, which is an entity with a distinct appearance and individual nature, coin
two, which becomes what it 1s purely due to the presence and conditioning
function of the -first coin, 1s empty. Consequently, comm one exists—1.c., 18 a
phenomenal object—and coin two 1s empty—t.e., exists only in a conditioned
manner. Next, the same may be said with regard to coin three, seen from the
standpoint of the first coin. The same relationship of cause and effect and the same
status of existence and emptiness pertains between coin one and each of the
remaining coins.
But this is still not identity, since coin one 1s the cause and the other nine coins
are the result, and coin one exists while the other nine are empty. Identity can
be seen when it is recalled that no thing enjoys an independent existence, for
everything enjoys a merely conditioned existence and is consequently empty.
This is true of coin one, which we are in danger of thinking of as ultimately
existent in contrast to its empty result. It too 1s empty, for it 1s coin one only in
the context of the totality. In other words, it is conditioned by coin ten, coin
nine, all the way down to coin two. Thus the remaining nine coins are now
existent entities which function as the cause for coin one, which 1s the result, and
as a product of conditions 1s empty. Then when we ask where the identity comes
in, if we look at the relationship of coins one and two, it can be seen that coin
one is existent in its emptiness (i.¢., 18 a cause) while coin two is empty in its
existence (i.¢., 1s conditioned and 1s the result), but since the law of interdependent
being 1s universal, then since coin one derives its being from the conditioning
power of coin two (as well as from all the other coins), com two 1s simultaneously
existent 1n its emptiness while coin one 1s empty 1n Its existence. The coins are
identical in their simultaneous possession of the natures of emptiness and existence.
Needless to say, the same situation exists for each of the ten comms simultaneously
with respect to the remaming coins. This must necessarily be the case because
causality 1s not unidirectional, for since each exerts total causa! power with relation
to the many, each coin must be simultaneously the cause and the caused, existent
and empty. Existence 1s interdependent existence because this causal efficacy is
exerted universally, simultaneously, and reciprocally among all dharmas.
The emptiness and existence which serve as the source for the identity of things
function primarily as a means of indicating the flow of causal efficacy between a
dharma considered to be cause and the totality of remaining dharmas which are
in this context considered to be result. As I have shown, i an examination of
66 Hua-yen Buddhism
the relationship existing between two dharmas, it is clear that this one dharma
1s also empty when seen as the result of another dharma, because causality is
constant and multidirectional among all dharmas. Therefore, of course, any
dharma is always both existent and empty. The reason for insisting on the existence
of the dharma which is being considered as cause is partly to emphasize the
concrete reality of the dharma but also, and primarily, to emphasize the condi-
tioned, empty nature of its result. Thus Fa-tsang tends to equate the causal dharma
with existence and the result with emptiness. But the true state of things becomes
evident only when it is realized that that first dharma, considered to be cause, 1s
also empty, because it is the result of other conditions at the same time it is a
cause for those very dharmas. A good example of this may be witnessed in Chapter
6, 1n the causal relationship between a rafter and the barn of which it is a part.
Fa-tsang thus has a criterion for his assertion of universal identity, and the only
obstacle lying in the way of admitting this identity is that of recognizing the
reality of emptiness as a sufficiently important aspect of things. If it 1s not a
sufficiently unifying quality of things, then identity becomes difficult to perceive.
Hence in human affairs, the notion that all humans are “children of God” is
sufficient for the perception of identity, and such a perception ideally entails a
loving, humane relationship with one’s neighbors, whoever they are. However,
the fact that all human beings have two legs 1s not normally considered to be a
reason for asserting identity, for although both our bipededness and our being.
children of God are presumably realities, one is important enough for us to
postulate identity on its basis while the other remains nonfunctional. Buddhists
have believed that the category of emptiness not only 1s more significant than that
of humanity, two-footedness, and so on, but is the most significant of all, because
only in the perception of emptiness are we able to become truly free of the hal-
lucinations and nightmares that torment us. Indeed, other perceptions of the
type mentioned above seem to have the contrary effect of dividing us from every-
thing else, enslaving us to egotism, pride, hatred, and delusion.
The perception of identity is the perception of interdependence. It is the
perception of the contingency and fragility of our own life, as well as that of all
other things. In the perception of emptiness, we discover that we owe our being
to countless other beings, animate and inanimate, near and far. From this new
sense of mutual need is born a gratitude and respect which is unconditional and
unqualified. The Pure Land of Amida is nothing more than this ordinary world,
completely pervaded with unconditional respect and gratitude.
gts nar
ene em ONEONTA EL
. 5 Seep onan Soon nein
PYAR oc Uggs RECO nical nein naeaasansiiat teem TS 3 . :
AN
