화엄불교: 인드라의 보석망 - 프랜시스 쿡 Full text 3
Full text of "hua-yen-buddhism-the-jewel-net-of-indra"
Hua-yen Buddhism the Jewel Net of Indra
Francis H. Cook 1977
==
Contents
Preface
- The Jewel Net of Indra
- The Hua-yen School
- The Indian Background of Hua-yen
- Identity
- Intercausality
- The Part and the Whole
- Vairocan
- Living in the Net of Indra
Note
Glossary
Index
===
===
3 The Indian Background of Hua-yen
When Buddhologists say that Hua~yen Buddhism is the high-water mark of
Buddhist philosophical development, they are referring primarily to its great
concern with what we may call ‘“‘causation,” particularly in the form variously
named dependent origination, conditioned co-production, or mterdependent
existence (pratityasamutpada). Undoubtedly the student of Buddhism will be
impressed with the sophistication and subtlety of this concept as it has been
treated by the Hua~yen thinkers. Furthermore, one wonders how this ancient
concept would be capable of any greater development. To acknowledge this 1s to
acknowledge several separate facts. First, Hua-yen 1s mainly concerned with
causation, and we need to recall that this tradition commonly referred to itself as
the tradition which taught the interdependent existence of the universe or,
possibly, the interdependent existence which 1s the universe (Skt. dharma-dhatu
pratityasamutpdda). Second, what we call Hua-yen 1s a Chinese development of
the doctrine; it arose on Chinese soil with no real counterpart in India; while
men like Fa-tsang were as much Buddhists as their Indian counterparts, the
perfected Hua-yen system exhibits more characteristics i common with Chinese
modes of thinking than with Indian modes. This is still true despite the fact that
many of the origins of the Chinese system are to be found in Indian sutras and
treatises. Third, while Fa-tsang and his tradition contributed much of a distinctly
Chinese character to the new tradition, its overriding concern with causation 1s
a continuation of a strain of thought which goes back, presumably, to the earliest
days of Indian Buddhism and which continued to exercise the finest minds of
the sangha throughout the history of Buddhism. That 1s, as has already been
mentioned, the problem of causation.’ Because of this contmuity, the question
is now raised as to the Indian Buddhist antecedents themselves, for in order to
understand just what is going onin Hua-yen thought, it is necessary to determine
what the parent ideas were and what the Chinese did with these parent ideas.
The Indian Background — 35
‘We may safely say that in a sense the Chinese inherited all the concepts of
Indian Buddhism. This is true in a double sense. First, although it seems that
certain hallowed doctrinal items which were important to Indian Buddhists were
only formally accepted by the Chinese, no teaching could really be rejected as
false or unimportant, inasmuch as it was taught in the scriptures, and these were
presumably an accurate recording of the true words of the Blessed One. There-
fore, as Buddhists, the Chinese at least gave lip service to certain doctrinal items
which in fact did not concern them greatly. An example of this is the Indian
conviction that the goal 1s necessarily attained by a very long moral and intel-
lectual training which precedes the goal. Second, part of the mission of the Hua-
yen masters was to gather together all the 1mportant doctrines that had been
encapsulated in separate traditions and recombine them into a single whole
Dharma. This is a recognition of the intrinsic wholeness of the Dharma which
sees that all the parts are parts of a whole. Hua-yen thus referred to itself as the
“One Vehicle,” i-ch’eng (Skt. eka~yana), and the sense of the title is that there 1s
only one path or vehicle leading to the goal, and all separate traditions or philo-
sophical specialties are merely partial, incomplete aspects of the one whole.
One vehicle universalism or catholicism thus sees the separate traditions not as
competing but rather as embodying stages of development and ultimately as
mutually complementary. The Dharma is one to the extent that all followers—
whatever their ordination lines, whatever their philosophical specialties, whatever
their sectarian inclinations—are included within the fold of the Dharma, and all
will in the end find their way to Mahayana, to the whole truth, and to the final
goal of Buddhahood. Inasmuch as all forms of Buddhism and all the teachings
are included within Hua-yen, the latter has no téaching distinct from all other
traditions, and as such it 1s the ‘‘one vehicle with common teaching.”’ Conse-
quently, Hua-yen recognizes all teachings as valid to some degree and manages
to incorporate them into the body of its own system. Hua-yen thus incorporates
the dharma theory of the Sarvastivadins, the anatman doctrine, the tradition of
the ten stages of the Bodhisattva’s career, the doctrines of emptiness and “‘mind-
only,” the Madhyamika dialectic, the doctrmes of Buddha-nature and tathagata-
garbha (womb of Buddhahood), and many others.
‘However, while Hua-yen incorporates all these doctrines, it also has something
special and distinct to offer as a tradition. It is then not only the one vehicle with
common teaching, but it 1s also the “one vehicle with distinct teaching.” In the
latter capacity, it teaches something which is new in Buddhism, or which at
least had existed before in only a partial, incomplete form; that 1s, the universe
as the infimitely repeated identity and interdependence of all phenomena.
4
36 = Hua-yen Buddhism
Specifically, Hua-yen teaches shih shih wu-ai, the mterpenetration of all things,
and ch’ung ch’ung wu-chin chu pan chii-tzu. Ch’ung ch’ung wu-chin means “infinitely
repeated” ; chu means “‘chief” or ‘“‘primary,” and pants “retinue,” or “secondary.”
If one object is analyzed in relation to all other objects, the one object 1s the
“chief? ” and the others are the “retinue.” But depending on point of view, any
object is simultaneously both chu and part of pan. Chii-tzu means “‘possessing,”’
so that the whole phrase may be translated as “‘the infinitely repeated possession
of retinue by the chief.” Thus, inasmuch as Hua-yen incorporates all Buddhist
teachings, it is the one vehicle with common teachings; but inasmuch as it
recombines these diverse elements into the special teaching mentioned above,
which does not exist elsewhere in Buddhism and which is presumably the total
truth, it is the one vehicle with distinct teachings.
If we investigate those elements which were of primary importance in the
creation of the Hua~yen system, we find that there were two, which are 1n fact
very closely related. They are the doctrines of emptiness (sunyata) and the
“womb of Buddhahood” (tathagatagarbha). We might, as a matter of fact,
characterize Hua~yen as a species of tathagatagarbha thought which 1s in turn
based on the doctrine of emptiness. Even this is not the whole truth, for it tends
to distort the relationship between the two doctrines. Ultimately, Sanyata and
‘tathagatagarbha are alternate expressions for the same reality. Thus, according to
a text cited occasionally by Fa-tsang, “ ‘paramartha,’ O Sariputra, 1s an expression
for sattva-dhatu ; ‘sattva-dhatu,’ O Sariputra, is an expression for tathagatagarbha;
‘tathagatagarbha,’ O Sariputra, is an expression for Dharma-kaya.”? That is, the
realm of beings, the highest truth, and tathagatagarbha are the same thing. When
we speak of Sanyatd, we are within the realm of the epistemological and ontolog-
ical. When the term tathagatagarbha 1s used, we are concerned with this same
reality but now with reference to soteriology. The former hints of the nature of
truth, while the latter tells us where it is and implies a course of action
Both doctrines played a tremendous part in the formation of Hua-yen thought,
and both:had had a long history in India prior to their utilization by Hua-yen.
Before any discussion of the details of Hua-yen thought, we must turn briefly to
the two doctrines as they were used in India and then consider the changes that
occurred in them when they were used by Fa-tsang and his tradition. Little in
the way of a full-length treatment has been written m a Western language on
tathagatagarbha thought,? but there are several books on the Sanyatd doctrine,*
which the reader may consult for alternate interpretations or for details necessarily
neglected in the following summary. .
The Indian Background = 37
Sarvam Stinyam
“Everything is empty.” This terse but momentous statement, which 1s the con-
ceptual foundation of Mahayana Buddhism, first appeared 1 India as the message
of a group of scriptures named the “Perfection of Wisdom” (prajiaparamita).
They were probably composed about 350 years after the death of the Buddha.
But this was only their first appearance in literary form, and we are still unsure
as to how long prior to this time the concept may have been entertained within
the sangha. It must have antedated its literary debut by some time, although
how long is unclear. Some Buddhologists have suggested that this concept, as
well as others now identified as ““Mahayana,” may well have existed side by side
with others considered to be more orthodox as far back as the formative days of
Buddhism.® Thus what may seem to be a radical innovation within the Buddhist
community may well have been simply the new prominence and power of a
group of monks who preferred “Mahayana” ideas. In other words, the dawning
of a distinct tradition called ““Mahayana” may have been the emergence from
relative obscurity of a doctrine which had been preferred by a segment of the
sangha for several prior generations. At any rate, with the appearance of the
sutras on the perfection of wisdom, the Buddhist world was transformed by a
message which is stunning 1n its brevity and simplicity, difficult in its apprehen-
sion, and impressive 1n its implications for action in the world.
Ata late period in the development of the Prajiaparamitd literature, a synopsized
version of this vast literature was composed, named the Heart Siitra. It will be
useful here for purposes of discussing the message of this literature because it
contains, in the space of about two printed pages of English translation, the very
heart or essence of the doctrine. As Edward Conze has pomted out, all this vast
literature says, over and over, 1s “Everything 1s empty,’’© and this 1s what we find
in this synopsized version. Structurally, the sutra 1s a sustained criticism of the
older Buddhist belief that the irreducible components of existence—skandhas,
dyatanas, dhatus, etc.—are real, independent entities. The sutra proceeds system-
atically to apply the criticism of emptiness successively to the skandhas, ayatanas,
and dhatus, saying that each is empty. Then 1t proceeds to such hallowed items
as the Four Holy Truths, ignorance, the elimination of ignorance, and the
attainment of the goal, nirvana. All are said to be empty. Toward the conclusion
of the sutra, it is said that there 1s nothing to be obtained, and it 1s because the
Bodhisattva relies on the perfection of wisdom and attains this *“‘nothing-to-be-
obtained” that in the end there is final nirvana. In a very brief space, then, the
38 Hua-yen Buddhism
sutra has in effect claimed that all things without exception are empty, including
the holy truths of Buddhism. Thus there is no thing anywhere at any time that is
exempt from this emptiness. But what is emptiness? The sutra does not tell us,
nor do the other Mahayana scriptures, which are notoriously silent and undemon-
strative when it comes to proving, explaining, or demonstrating. Our sole clue
comes from the very beginning of the sutra, where 1t 1s said that Avalokitesvara
saw five skandhas and perceived that they were empty of independent existence
(svabhava-sunya pasyati sma).
It was the office of the great treatise writers such as Nagarjuna to elucidate and
clarify the meaning of emptiness and to combat incorrect interpretations. The
doctrine lends itself easily to wrong interpretations, and from the beginning
some saw the doctrine of emptiness as a species of nihilism which would undercut
religion and the ethical life. Some came to the conclusion that emptiness 1s the
inner essence of things which could be perceived with special traming. Those
who saw the doctrine as a nihilistic threat interpreted the expression sarvam
Sunyam as meaning that nothing whatever exists. The others interpreted emptiness
as an entity, somehow more real than ordinary things, inhering in these things
and constituting their true being.
These views are taken up by Nagarjuna in his Madhyamika-karikas, and by
Candrakirti in the Prasannapada commentary on Nagarjuna’s verses, and each
view is systematically refuted. Nagarjuna warns us (Ch. 24) that he who grasps
emptiness incorrectly is destroyed, like a man who incorrectly picks up a snake.
To the question of whether emptiness 1s equivalent to mere nonbeing, he replies,
“You understand neither the object of emptiness, nor emptiness itself, nor the
meaning of emptiness” (Ch. 24, vs. 7).7 Candrakirti adds, in his commentary,
“Victim of your own thought processes, you superimpose on [the term]
‘emptiness’ the false interpretation of ‘non-existence.’”’ He contimues: “But in
this treatise we are not giving emptiness the meaning which you are attached to.”’8
He then makes the crucial point that emptiness 1s taught “in order to put all
distinctions to rest without exception,” including such distinctions as being and
nonbeing.? Thus emptiness is not nonexistence, nor does 1t imply nihilism,
because emptiness is a device the object of which 1s to criticize all views and all
philosophies. In fact, even emptiness itself, inasmuch as it can become the sole
remaining view when all others are destroyed, is no less exempt from the criticism
of emptiness. Even emptiness is empty.
Is emptiness then some substance or essence of a metaphysical nature which
remains when the yogi penetrates beneath the superficial, illusory surface of
The Indian Background 39
things? After all, the expression “everything 1s empty” seems to indicate this m
attributing the predicate “emptiness” to things. When we say, ‘The flower is
blue.” we look for the blue in the flowers; when we say “everything is empty,”
we should look for something called ‘“‘emptiness” in things. This problem has
been acerbated within Buddhism itself from time to time by the tendency to
hypostatize emptiness and give it a positive content.1° Also, the emouonally
warm apostrophes to emptiness in some texts might easily lead to the suspicion
that emptiness is some thing, a spirit or entity wholly transcendent and supreme,
a wholly other beyond the world of samsara. But Buddhists have always been
wary of a practice which will lead to a final attachment to emptiness, and it
has been said that such an attachment 1s so destructive that it 1s better for a person
to be attached to the concept of atman than to that of emptiness. Emptiness 1s
not a thing, nor 1s it even a superior view which 1s meant to replace less tenable
views. Emptiness is meant to oppose all views, even the view of emptiness.
It is this knowledge that even emptiness 1s empty that has saved it from reification
and deification. Thus the negation of views and systems of thought 1s absolute;
the Siinyavada negation does not imply an alternative “correct” position. The
correct view is no view.
The suspicion that the doctrine of emptiness undercuts religion and the
ethical life, as well as the value of phenomenal existence, 1s in turn based on the
mistaken notion that emptiness is equivalent to utter nonbeing. In the karikas
(Ch. 24), an imaginary opponent objects that if everything is empty, then the
Four Holy Truths do not exist, and consequently there 1s no elimination of
ignorance or the attainment of the goal. Ultimately, neither do the Three Jewels
exist, so that there 1s no Buddhism, no community of believers, and not even a
Buddha. Nagarjuna devotes most of Chapter 24 to showing that, on the contrary,
if things are not empty, then the elimination of ignorance, the holy life, and the
final goal are likewise impossible. It 1s rather the opponent’s view of all things as
having independent existence by virtue of some metaphysical substance which
mitigates all moral and intellectual change either for the better or worse. Why
this 1s so will become clearer in the succeeding discussion; indeed, the whole of
the Hua-yen philosophy itself is a substantiation of this point.
These errors all arise from the misplacement of sinyata. Richard Robinson
has clearly and accurately placed emptiness:
Emptiness 1s not a term in the primary system referring to the world, but a
term in the descriptive system (meta-system) referring to the primary
40 Hua-yen Buddhism
system. Thus it has no status as an entity, nor as the property of an existent
nor an inexistent. If anyone considers it so, he turns the key term in the
descriptive system into the root of all delusions.1?
Elsewhere Robinson says, ‘Emptiness is not a term outside the expressional
system, but 1s simply the key term within it. Those who would hypostatize
emptiness are confusing the symbol system with the fact system.” +? Emptiness
is not some entity “‘out there” in the objective world but rather a term which
negates the system of words and concepts with which we categorize that which
is “out there.”” Whenever we attempt to grasp experience through the medium
of any concept, such as “existent”? or “‘nonexistent,” we are superimposing a
character on the objective world which is 1n fact not there 1n the world at all;
“existent’’ and “nonexistent” (or any other character) exist only in our minds,
not “out there.” Emptiness functions as a weapon which destroys the naive,
uncritical belief that such concepts refer to entities. This is why emptiness as a
concept must also be emptied, for masmuch as human turmoil results from the
dogmatic adherence to concepts, any concept is pernicious, including that of
“allis empty.” It is of no use to simply substitute one concept for another.
The problem with words and concepts is that instead of understanding that
they have a purely provisional status and a purely utilitarian value, human beings
tend to believe that there is a really existing entity to which the word or concept
corresponds. It is the fundamental teaching of Buddhism that there 1s only
incessant change, or flux, and that there is no thing which undergoes the change.
There is a very great difference between this view and that which is commonly
held; the former rests on the naive assumption that there 1s really an object (or
complex of objects) which undergoes successive states—1.e., birth, subsistence,
and cessation—but which itself is a real entity serving as the locus for the change,
while the second view rests on the assumption that there 1s nothing but change,
with no real, permanent locus for the change. The intricate fabric of being is
thus not really being at all but a ceaseless becoming, pure flux. The change itself
at any point comes about as a result of other events which act as the environment
ofthe one pointand condition it, causing it to assume a new, different, momentary
form. These conditioning events themselves have no more permanence and
stability than the one pomt mentioned above, because they in turn are being
conditioned by other events. The web of interconditionality is thus nearly
infinite in scope. For this reason, there is no point anywhere which 1s exempt
from this process of change, and nothing anywhere which lasts m one form for
two moments in a row. In this maze of interconditionality, to speak of real
objects is a highly artificial process which is ndebted to abstraction, and, accord-
|
las egg tearemer een
The Indian Background 41
ing to adherents of the doctrine of emptiness, it 1s a futile process completely
divorced from reality.
This view of existence as change by virtue of interconditionality is called
pratityasamutpada, and 1t 1s, basically, a substitution for a view of real entities
undergoing modification. On the one hand, such a view rejects the common-
sense impression that events possess a permanent, fixed being of an autonomous
nature. On the other hand, it sees “‘things”’ as being mere abstractions from the
process itself, possessing a merely conventional existence the purpose of which
is social and utilitarian. This does not at all deny the existence ‘‘out there” of
something which I may hold in my hand or bump into in the dark. I may desire
some milk and ask someone to go get the cow, and he will return with something
that has horns, udder, brown-spotted skin, and that says “‘moo.”’ J will thus have
milk. The real issue 1s the nature of this something which I call ‘“‘cow.”’ Is its
cowness something which is given by nature, or 1s 1t an abstraction superimposed
on a pomt in space-time which 1s ever changing and never the same for two
successive instants? The trouble with using words the way we do is that in
believing that there is really an objective referent for the word, I can also believe
that it 1s possible to possess it. Along with ‘‘cow’’ there 1s a whole constellation
of other ‘‘real” entities, such as “‘me,” “mine,” “possessing,” “good,” and “bad,”
and it is this situation which causes human turmoil, hatred, greed, killing, envy
jealousy, andso on. We cannot really possess (or lose) because there 1s no enduring
object to possess. It is like trying to grasp a rapidly moving stream in our hands;
it not only slips through our hands, we end up all wet.
But once we are able to perceive that there 1s change only, and that we ourselves
are a part of the change, there is no longer anything to possess, no me to possess,
no such thing as possession. Moreover, I can understand that the impulses which
torment me and of which I am ashamed have no more solidity and fixity than
any other event. If anger, for instance, were to possess any independent, real
existence, then I would be faced with a great problem, for 1t would exist in me
apart from other internal or external causes, a constant personality defect with
which I would have to cope. However, since anger is a momentary state arising
from conditions and then subsiding because of other conditions, when it is gone,
it is really gone, extinct. I am thus not intrinsically an angry person, or a good
person, or a bad person, or any other kind of person. The point is, I need not
become obsessed with momentary states, nor need I be anxious about or ashamed
of some imaginary fixed character. These momentary states thus have no hold
on meat all. 1 am always free to assume a new state in the next instant. All events,
whether psychic or material, are mere momentary links between an extinct event
and a new one which does not yet exist, momentary and fleeting. ““Things” are
42 Hua-yen Buddhism
only abstractions from a process which constantly, rapidly changes simultaneously
at every point, in what Whitehead called “‘the creative advance into novelty.”
Here, no self or other selves can be found to compete, hate, and destroy in what,
to use another phrase of Whitehead’s, is a “‘bagatelle of transient experience.”
This ‘interdependent being” is a synonym for sunyata, as Nagarjuna says in
his karikas, and Candrakirti reaffirms this in commenting that “arising by condi-
tions and emptiness are thus synonyms.” +3 For something to be empty means to
be empty of independent being (svabhava), which is synonymous with existing
only in dependence upon the other. It is because emptiness is the same as inter-
dependent being that Nagarjuna can say that it is just because events are empty
that the religious life and its goal are possible. They are possible because of the
very fluidity, the nonfixedness, of events; unwholesome states pass away into
extinction, and wholesome states can arise under the influence of the proper
conditions. If states such as hatred or benevolence exist in and of themselves, the
individual cannot change and modification is precluded. Also, because emptiness
1s interdependent being, it is not tantamount to nihilism, for emptiness does not
cancel out nature as a hallucination. Primarily, the doctrine of emptiness is an
attack on the conceptual mode of grasping the world. It says that although words
and concepts are normally valid for purposes of accomplishmg our business,
they are totally invalid from the standpoint of the highest truth, wherein it 1s
seen that there is nowhere a fixed entity which corresponds to the label. It is for
this reason that compassionate action in the world 1s possible for the Bodhisattva,
for although he-leads countless beings to nirvana, according to the Vajracchedika
Siitra, he does so, and can only successfully do so, as long as there exists in him no
concept of bemgs. Any adherence to the concept “beings” would be a direct
contradiction with his nature and would prevent his exercising the skillful means
which become effective only with the removal of the conceptual grasp of being.
Because he works in the context of complete freedom from concepts, he must,
in his career, move even beyond the concept of emptiness, because this last
concept freezes the fluid nature of reality no less than does the concept of selves.
It seems that the emptiness doctrine as it was held in India had mainly an
epistemological force and did not assert the existence in the natural world of
some metaphysical substance of a transcendental nature. However, ontology 1s
necessarily brought into a discussion of the means and nature of knowledge, for
to say that concepts do not grasp the real nature of things is to imply, however
tacitly, a real nature. The Bodhisattva who has become free from concepts 1s
presumably in contact with a reality which is obscured for most of us by the
screen of words, images, symbols, and patterns of thinking. But Mahayana
Buddhism in India, and primarily in its Madhyamika form, has always been
The Indian Background 43
reluctant to try to say just what reality is apart from our ideas of it. We know
that it is incessant change and pure fluidity, but these words themselves are
understood to be only inadequate attempts to be accurate. We do not know what
a Buddha sees. However, 1t does seem that Nagarjuna and others in India who
taught the doctrine of emptiness were primarily emphasizing a way of knowing,
and they did not believe that emptiness was something to be observed in phe-
nomena. If there 1s something which we may call the absolute, it is not some
transcendental spirit or entity lurking behind the world of mere appearance, but
1s really the mode of apprehending the world about us; as T.R.V. Murti said,
the absolute 1s intuition or insight itself ( prajna).14 This is further substantiated by
the very useful doctrine of the three natures. According to this doctrine, each
thing has three natures (trisvabhava) : there is the nature which consists of being
dependent on another, and this is the phenomenal world in its interdependent
existence discussed previously 1n several places. Then there is the nature of being
discriminated; this 1s the dependent nature now bifurcated into subject and object,
and which is further falsely discriminated in its objective aspect. Finally there is
the perfected nature, which we may also call the “absolute’’; this is, according to
the texts, nothing else but the dependent nature perceived, or understood, apart from
the discriminated nature. The dependent nature, which is the natural world of
phenomena, does not at all change itself, nor does the new dawning of prajna
reveal some previously obscured spirit glowing within the objects of perception.
The change has taken place in the perceiver; it is his new nondual perception
which 1s of highest value and which frees him from samsara.
It 1s abundantly clear in the whole of Mahayana literature that perceiving
things in the light of prajfa, or seeing things in the empty mode of perception,
leads to a higher affirmation which is marked by clear-headed action and profound
compassion. However, there also seems to be some basis for the feeling on the
part of many Chinese Buddhists, as well as some Indian contemporaries of the
Sunyavadins, that there was something negative about the doctrine.15 The
problem originated in a simple matter of emphasis, for while emptiness and
interdependent being are synonymous, the former term seems to have negative
connotations lacking in the latter. Indians, whether Buddhists or otherwise, have
traditionally sought the higher spiritual life through detachment from what we
might simply term the ‘‘natural.” Buddhist literature is well known for the
abundance of passages which portray physical functions and natural objects as
disgusting, and while it 1s true that from the standpoint of the highest truth the
world 1s neither desirable nor loathsome, nevertheless the common strategy
for emancipation was to devaluate these common elements of experience.
“Emptiness”? may be the same as “‘interdependent being,” but to say that some-
44 Atua-yen Buddhism
thing 1s empty 1s to devaluate that thing, to see it as an intangible, slippery,
impermanent bit of phantasmagoria not worthy of one’s attention and totally
incapable of supplying any lasting satisfaction. Emptiness removes 1t from serious
consideration. The object thus becomes delusive to the meditator because in
seeming to be something capable of being possessed or controlled, it will surely
lead to frustration and sorrow when it evades the grasp. Actually, such a negation
of personal value and meaning may even be inherent in the emphasis on inter-
dependence, for Whitehead also, in reflecting upon existence as a rapidly changing
stream of process in which substances were utterly lacking, ruefully reflected that
life 1s “‘a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a
bagatelle of transient experience.’’!® At any rate, for Indian Buddhists, emptiness
was a weapon which demolished ordinary value and significance in the world.
Once that value and meaning was demolished thoroughly, a higher value and
meaning emerged which expressed itself in the selfless career of the Bodhisattva.
However, his power and effectiveness were won at the expense of those factors
of experience which most ordinary men prize most. But there was a latent
potential within this doctrine for a more affirmative or positive approach to
emancipation which was to be exploited by the Chinese (to be discussed later).
Sarvasattvas tathagatagarbhah
“All beings are the wombs of Buddhahood.” The emptiness doctrine cannot be
thoroughly discussed without a brief review of another doctrine which was
important in the development of Indian Buddhism and which had a great impact
on Chinese Buddhist thought. This is the doctrine of tathagatagarbha, “the womb
of Buddhahood.” This doctrine, in the words of D.S. Ruegg,
deals essentially with the presence among all beings of a spiritual embryo
or element which 1s basically pure and naturally luminous, whose envelope
or gangue of defilements is merely extrinsic and adventitious. And by virtue
of the nondifferentiation of this spiritual principle representing the absolute
reality in its causal state, and in spite of the division of beings into classes
which are conditionally distinct following temporarily different paths, all
beings without exception thus have the certainty of attaming the state of
Buddhahood—supreme, perfect awakening—and nirvana. [My translation
of the French]!
Closely related to this doctrine is another, that of gotra, which means clan or
&
}
p
;
censor gitsranginseey me
The Indian Background — 45
lineage, and this doctrine consists of the teaching of the affiliation of all beings to
either one certain lineage which will result in their attainment of Buddhahood,
or to one of several lineages which direct the respective members of each lineage
to a particular goal, such as Arhatship and Pratyekabuddhahood. As with the
concept of tathadgatagarbha, there is the assertion of some element or quality
possessed by each being which ensures his ultimate attainment of some spiritual
fruit, often Buddhahood.
Whether the doctrine of tathagatagarbha or that of gotra, the basic idea 1s that
of some element which is intrinsic to beings which will ensure their ultimate
attainment of the goal. The doctrine of tathagatagarbha 1s a recogmition of the fact
that the goal of Buddhahood is not to be sought exterior to beings themselves,
in some other time and place, but is a potential always existing within them.
Thus sarvasattvas tathagatagarbhah, translated as “‘all beings are the wombs of
Buddhahood,” means beings are the containers or matrix in which Buddhahood
can grow. Sometimes, however, a text seems to interpret the Sanskrit as meaning
“all beings possess the embryo (or seed) of Buddhahood,” in which case the
emphasis is on the fact that there isa seed-potential found in beings which 1s the
cause for the ultimate result of Buddhahood. In the first case, the emphasis 1s on
beings as wombs or receptacles, while in the second the emphasis 1s on the seed-
potential itself. However, needless to say, either one implies the other.
But in Indian Buddhist literature, for the most part this seed or potential is
merely a seed, the undeveloped source or cause of the fully grown fruit of
Buddhahood. It does not exist within ordinary beings in its fully developed
state as fruit-result, and so the concept is closely bound up with the corollary
concept of potential and with the defiled nature of ordinary beings. Conse-
quently, traming is necessary to mature the seed-potential. The potentual, that 1s,
must be made manifest, a concrete reality in life, and as Professor Ruegg’s
statement shows, the seed-potential 1s merely potential, because it is obscured by
extrinsic moral and intellectual faults (klesa). Once these are removed, the element
itself, which is eternally pure and luminescent, shines forth in dazzling brilliance.
The value of the doctrine seems thus to be twofold: it locates the goal within
the seeker himself, and it indicates the necessity for purification, for the garbha
(seed) or dhatu (element) must first be freed from accidental klesa. In more general
terms, the doctrine is soteriological in nature, and not cosmological, as it tends
to be in Chinese Buddhist thought.
The Indian Buddhists, in insisting on the potential nature of the tathagatagarbha,
were concerned with avoiding a misapprehension concerning the nature of this
element. For to concede that the garbha was exactly identical with Buddha-result
could easily have led to the suspicion on the part of some that the doctrine
46 Hlua-yen Buddhism
of tathagatagarbha was merely a Buddhist substitute for the Hindu doctrine
of Brahman, in which the atman of beings is identified with Brahman. This
would have led to a pantheistic interpretation of tathagatagarbha which would
have horrified Buddhists, and at the least it would have fostered a substantialist
interpretation which, along with the pantheist, would have been a betrayal of
the most ancient and fundamental position of Buddhist thought. Therefore, a
sharp distinction was made between cause and result, with the garbha or dhatu
being interpreted as cause (hetu)+® and viewed as mere potential, not at all full,
perfect Buddhahood, which is the stage of result (phala). Even when certain texts
assimilated the tathdgatagarbha to tathata (Ultumate Reality), Buddhahood,
Tathagata, and sunyata, the distinction was made between this reality in its defiled
state (samala-tathata) and 1n its purified state (nirmala-tathata). The first 1s none
other than living beings in their ordinary state of ignorance, which is the prevail-
ing interpretation of the term tathagatagarbha, while the second 1s perfect Buddha-
hood 1tself.
The status of the tathagatagarbha may be further clarified if 1t 1s seen in the
context of the universalism of Mahayana Buddhism. In a system such as Maha- |
yana, such a doctrine, at least in some form, is perhaps a necessary outcome of
an insistence on the possibility of universal emancipation. This possibility itself
is based on the recognition, taught throughout the Mahayana sutras, that the
“tormentors”’ (klesa), such as hatred or greed, are not really-existing things which
infest beings and which constitute real, permanent facets of personality. Since
these factors appear merely as a result of conditions, they can be removed by
anyone who trains properly and comes to see their true nature. The doctrine of
tathagatagarbha 1s upaya, a means, like all other doctrines, the function of which
is to express the possibility of universal perfection due to the contingent nature
of the klesa. In short, then, the tathagatagarbha, whether container-being or
contained-seed, must be seen as possibility, potential. It 1s the motivating source
of practice because it instills confidence and assurance, for there is no one who
cannot transform himself if he will but make the attempt. No one is left out; all
are wombs of Buddhahood.
The doctrine of tathagatagarbha is often considered to be the special possession
of the Vijnanavadins or Yogacarins, for the concept of a seed potential or of a
womb-like container in which Buddhahood grows 1s in fact often encountered
in Vijnanavadin texts, such as the Lankavatara Sitra, Samdhinirmocana Sitra, and
the Mahayanasamgraha, where tathagatagarbha 1s often assimilated to the concept
of the dlaya-vijnana. The alaya, or “receptacle-consciousness,”’ which is the
storehouse of impressions in seed form, 1s in such texts conceived as the garbha.
When the store-consciousness is purified through the “transformation of the
nevewemerenpenminsimmana simi te amet snare netmapr rane er
‘ea pennniracretenaa perme tin areramnnttnrent nt
The Indian Background 47
basis” (asraya-paravrtti) 1t becomes the source of Buddhahood, for it contains,
from beginningless time, not only the seeds of defilement and ignorance, but
the seeds of purification and wisdom as well.
However, as Professor Ruegg has argued, the doctrine does not belong
exclusively, or even primarily, to the Vijhanavadins.1° It not only does not
conflict with the doctrine of emptiness but may be seen as a development within
the latter doctrine, and some texts, such as the Srimaladevi Sutra, equate tathagata-
garbha with sinyata.2° The Madhyamika treatises do not make this correlation,
probably due to their concern with combating all doctrines and views, but some
other Siinyavada texts less concerned with this occasionally discuss the garbha.
The main concern of course 1s to avoid an interpretation of tathagatagarbha as
assimilated to sinyatd which will make either one a positive entity of a substantial
nature. But as long as these interpretations are avoided, there seems to be no
objection to equating the two. As was remarked earlier in this chapter, if the term
Siinyatd is used, the emphasis is on the epistemological and perhaps onrolonica
if tathagatagarbha 1s used, the stress 1s on the soteriological and “‘practical. The
doctrine of tathagatagarbha stresses the mnate potential for Buddhahood in beings,
but this Buddhahood itself is nothing more than the perfection of the ability to
experience reality in the emptiness mode, and so we may legiumately conceive
of this emptiness mode of perception as an innate potential capable of develop-
ment or of being freed from various obstacles. Indian Buddhist texts seem to
have, for the most part, used the doctrine of emptiness when occupied with a
criticism of the common mode of experiencing reality, that is, when criticizing
the conceptual mode of experiencing the world. However, when addressing
themselves to the question of whether this correct mode of perception was innate
or acquired, they rather spoke of the seed-potential existing: in beings from
beginningless time. But we must remember also that the fathigetager vite refers
to beings in the state of ignorance and passion, and so the doctrine of “womb of
Buddhahood”’ 1s partially addressed to the problem of why beings are not able to
see things as empty and why they cannot live as Buddhas.
The relationship between the two doctrines will be made clearer in a separate
chapter devoted to the cosmic Buddha, Vairocana, who symbolizes this reality,
but here some mention needs to be made of the Chinese utilization of the two
doctrines and of their identity.
It is my contention that although Chinese Buddhists of an earlier period may
have made some serious errors in understanding the doctrine of emptiness,
certainly by the time of Fa-tsang the Chinese had grasped the doctrine correctly,
so correctly that they were able to deal truly creatively with it.2! The Hua-yen
thinkers such as Fa-tsang discuss the doctrine essentially like the Indian masters
48 Hua-yen Buddhism
did. The one difference, as I have already mentioned, is one of emphasis, or
perhaps point of view. That is, the main difference 1s that the Chinese chose to
emphasize the point that emptiness is interdependence. But mterdependence 1s also
emptiness, and even for the Chinese the fact of emptiness functioned as a way of
criticizing the common mode of experience, thus devaluing it, so that this aspect
was not ignored. But what is evident in the Hua-yen texts is that simultaneously
as the empty mode of perception abolished the clinging to the concept of sub-
stances or selves, there emerged from the new mode of experience a very positive
appreciation for the way in which things related to each other in identity and
interdependence. This 1s what seems to be lacking in the Indian literature. The
genius of the Chinese lay in their ability to interpret emptiness in a positive manner
without hypostatizing emptiness, without falling into the error of even greater
attachment to the world, and without abandoning the basic Buddhist conviction
that ordinary experience is delusive and destructive. Thus by “positive” I do
not mean that emptiness became a positive entity, which would have been
extremely un-Buddhist, but that in its emphasis on interdependent being, Hua-
yen was able to retain a positive, even joyous, appreciation of the absolute value
of each facet of this being.
Fa-tsang himself was well aware of this difference in emphasis. In the tenth
chapter of his Treatise he makes the following statement:
The eight negations [of Nagarjuna] are based on negation; the six meanings
[of cause] are based on affirmation. In the eight negations, the principle is
manifested by the negation of commonsense Judgments; in the six meanings,
these commonsense judgments are negated by manifesting the principle.
[However,] these two [methods] are merely two sides of the same coin.22
By “principle,” presumably “lacking in an independent being”’ is meant, for
according to the commentary on this passage by the Japanese Kegon master
Gyonen, both Fa-tsang and Nagarjuna accomplished the same end: both demon-
strate that things do not exist independently of each other.23 This seems to be
the essence of the matter. Nagarjuna uses the “eight noes”—no arising, no
cessation, no destruction, no permanence, etc.—to demonstrate that things do
not exist as substantial entities in and of themselves. However, as 1s well known,
he avoided making any positive statement about the world in its ‘‘suchness.”
Fa-tsang attacks the problem from a unique angle; he shows how any object
functions as an active cause in six different ways, and by stressing the active,
creative force which any object exerts on all other objects, he also demonstrates
that phenomena exist only in interdependence and have no self-existence. The
The Indian Background 49
result 1s substantially the same as that arrived at in Nagarjuna’s method, but the
way in which the demonstration is made 1s very different, and the difference is
significant in the way in which someone like Fa-tsang saw phenomena. He was
not merely content with demolishing false views; he wished to give some idea,
however imperfect, of the way things looked to a Buddha, that 1s, the glory and
splendor of being illuminated by prajna.
It seems clear from this passage from the Treatise that Fa-tsang was concerned
with the traditional function of the sinyata doctrine, but as he himself says, his
strategy 1s to demonstrate interdependent existence, or conditioned co-arising
in an affirmative or positive manner, which is to show how.a dharma is causal in
six ways. Also, because the causal power 1s freely exerted among all phenomena,
the dharma or object is also shown to be a result or effect of other causes. Thus
the dharma is demonstrated to exist only due to supportive conditions and is
utterly lacking in independent being. Nagarjuna’s strategy is just the reverse;
” “ceasing,” and the like,
22 Gee 99 66
the commonsense judgments of “‘is,” “‘is not,” “‘arising,
are shown to be inappropriate, and in the course of negating all views, the
principle, the nonexistence of independent being, 1s manifested. The difference
in strategy, to repeat, is considerable. With Fa-tsang’s method, there is a very
strong emphasis on the positive manner in which any dharma acts as a necessary
support for the others, the upshot of which 1s that any phenomenon must be
viewed as having an absolute value in the nexus of interdependence. The view
of uniformity or sameness of all things (samata), which was attained in Indian
Buddhism primarily by reducing all things to the common level of insignificance,
1s attained i Hua-yen by raising all things to the common level of supreme
value. In both cases, the cause of turmoil, which is desiring and loathing, is
removed. .
Thus the main difference between the Indian and Chinese treatment of empti-
ness is one of approach, but it 1s one which has great consequences for the styles
of the respective traditions, and a difference which in turn has major consequences
with regard to practice. But other than this difference, one may search in vain in
Hua-yen literature for any significant deviation from classical Sinyavada
doctrine. (I shall reserve further comment on this for the later chapter on Vairo-
cana, where I try to show the orthodoxy of the Hua-yen treatment of emptiness.)
One further clarification should be made before these comments on emptiness
are concluded. According to Richard Robinson and other reliable students of
the doctrine, the Indian Buddhists, notably in the Madhyamika tradition, seem
to have considered the doctrine to be epistemological for the most part. The
sorts of statements which the Hua-yen masters make about the relationships
among phenomena are lacking in the treatises of Nagarjuna and his school.
50 Hua-yen Buddhism
These we may call “ontological” statements. But it would be a serious mistake
to think that Fa-tsang and his tradition completely abandoned the epistemologi-
cal force of the emptiness doctrine. Rather, the Hua-yen writers use the doctrine
with a force both epistemological and ontological. Consequently, for Fa-tsang
to say that “‘all is empty” 1s simultaneously to make a criticism of the ordinary,
conceptual mode of experience and to indicate something of the nature of things
seen correctly. Nagarjuna probably would not have agreed with this approach,
which is Chinese rather than Indian, but if both methods are equally effective
in abolishing man’s delusions, who 1s to say whether one 1s superior to the other
or more correct?
The ontological force of the Hua-yen treatment of emptiness is nowhere more
evident than in its insistence that this whole inconceivably vast and diverse cosmos
in its utter emptiness 1s itself the dharma-kaya, the glorious body of the Tathagata.
In this insistence can be found the very great importance of the doctrine of
tathagatagarbha in Hua-yen thought. Reflected in the Hua-yen interest, also,
there can be witnessed the great interest in the doctrine generally among Chinese
Buddhists, perhaps due in part to indigenous conditions in China which facili-
tated the acceptance and development of Indian Buddhism.
Many scholars in the area of Chinese Buddhism believe that one of the main
reasons why the Chinese became interested in foreign religion 1s that many
elements of Indian Buddhism were often more or less consonant with ideas which
had already had a long prehistory on Chinese soil.?4 These ideas are those which
we call “Taoist,” meaning the thought of Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Neo-
taoists, primarily. Although there were areas of difference or disagreement
between the two systems of thought, there were undeniably other areas where
the two seemed to share the same insights. It was the interpretation of the Tao,
held chiefly by the group called ‘“Neo-taoists” as the name for the way in which
things exist, which predisposed Chinese thinkers to take a great interest in the
doctrine of tathagatagarbha. That is, the Neo-taoists reyected any interpretation
of the Tao which would make it conceptually or ontologically separate from
phenomena themselves. Accordingly, there is no longer any conception of the
Tao as a cosmologically antecedent matrix from which the ten thousand things
evolved, nor is there any understanding of the Tao as some sort of metaphysical
substance inhering in things. Instead, the manner in which things exist singly
and collectively, and the way in which they exist in harmontous interrelationship,
is what is meant by “Tao.” The similarity of this concept with that of emptiness
is fairly obvious. To many who held this view of things, the tathagatagarbha
doctrine seemed very similar, and the difference between the parent Indian
doctrine and the doctrine as it was enunciated by Chinese such as Fa-tsang is
cer ce a A CS
The Indian Background 51
due in large part to the weighty influence of the Taoist concept on the Indian
doctrine.
Again, a statement made by Fa-tsang seems to show the major difference
between the Indian and Chinese concepts. In his lengthy commentary on the
Avatamsaka Sutra, the T’an hsiian chu, he says that while the three vehicles (meaning
mainly Indian forms of Buddhism) admit only to the existence of Buddha nature
1n its causal form in the minds of beings, Hua-yen sees them as also possessing it
in the form of result.25 What he means by this 1s that while all other forms of
Buddhism admit only to the existence of some sort of seed-potential which
functions as cause for the attainment of final Buddhahood, his own traditions
offer the view that this intrinsic element which exists within all beings 1s none
other than perfect Buddhahood itself. Actually, Hua-yen goes even beyond
this position, holding that everything, animate and inanimate, possesses Buddha-
nature. Neither is this a completely accurate statement; it is not a question of
things possessing Buddha-nature, all things are Buddha-nature.
The ability of Fa-tsang to make this assertion is the result of much thought
and work which had taken place in the centuries preceding his own time. One
momentous landmark in the development of this concept was the composition
of the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (Ta-ch’eng ch’i hsin lun). It now appears
to be almost completely agreed among scholars that this is not the work of the
Indian Asvaghosa but is an apocryphal text composed in China at a late period.
The picture of reality portrayed in that work seems to be based on material
deriving from several sources, such as the Tathagatagarbha Sutra and the Rat-
nagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra). The text is an attempt at systematizing various
fragmentary ideas found im these other sources, and the resultant structure
appears to have been completely satisfying to the Chinese, as can be attested by
the great authority the treatise came to have in later Chinese Buddhism. The
Chi hsin lun presents a picture of ultimate reality or truth, there referred to as
the ‘One Mind,” as assuming a dual form under the influence of conditions.
The two forms are the One Mind as tathata, or as ultimate reality in its intrinsi-
cally pure form, and as samsara, n which the One Mind has assumed an impure
form. What this means, consequently, is that beings are a mixture of truth and
falsehood, an intersection of the absolute and the phenomenal. It 1s a remarkable
document in the history of Buddhism because 1t claims the tathata, the Absolute,
can and does exist in an impure form as well as a pure form. Its implications
are considerable, for 1t does not place tathata outside the realm of the phenomenal,
nor does it even make the absolute an order of being completely distinct from
the phenomenal order. Whatever reality 1s, it is right here before our eyes, able
to be seen if we can once cease to make false discriminations. Practice—meaning
52 Hua-yen Buddhism
meditation, primarily—becomes the means of expunging the false and seeing
existence as tathata, the body of Truth.
The question of the relationship between the true and the false, or the pure
and the impure, continued to exercise the minds of Buddhist thinkers in the
years antedating the arising of the Hua-yen tradition. Particularly during the
Sui dynasty, which corresponds in time to the beginning of Hua-yen activity,
such men as Hui-yiian pondered the relationship between true and false, nirvana
and samsara, Buddha and beings, and so on. In Hui-yiian’s case, his interest is
evident, among other places, in his commentary on the Ch’i hsin lun.?© Others
were also occupied with the same questions, and one stream of investigation
and commentary which was later incorporated into the Hua-yen tradition was
the She lun school, which based its work on the Mahayanasamgraha. This whole
line of questioning indicates that there was something very attractive about
matters directly or indirectly concerning tathagatagarbha thought for the Chinese.
Without doubt, Fa-tsang’s position with regard to this doctrine owes much
to the Awakening of Faith, as well as to some other texts which bore on the matter.
Not only did he also compose a commentary on the Awakening of Faith,2” but
a study of his other treatises and commentaries, including the Treatise referred
to so often in this book, reveals that he cited the Awakening of Faith many times
as a corroboration of his own position. The content of the Treatise makes it
clear that a great part of his own system was based on the ideas of the Awakening
of Faith. He relied, that is, heavily on the word of that text that the world we
see about us is a mixture of the absolute and phenomenal, and his doctrine of
the identity of all things derives from his observation that if all things are both
phenomenal and absolute, then despite the differences in characteristics and
functions of the infinity of things which constitute the world, they are ultimately
identical in sharing as their basic reality the absolute. The Hua-yen pattern of
evolution whereby the immutable absolute comes to assume the form of the
conditioned world of phenomena while still somehow retaining its immutability
is very similar to that of the Awakening of Faith, though demonstrations are
lacking in that rather dogmatic composition.
While relying heavily on the basic structures of the Awakening of Faith, Fa-
tsang nevertheless took these ideas further than they had been in that text. That
text, as well as his other sources, stopped with what Fa-tsang called the “identity
of the phenomenal and absolute,” but the tathagatagarbha doctrine which we
encounter in Hua-yen 1s unique 1n its picture of a conjunctively whole universe
correctly seen as the mutual identity and interdependence of all the disjunctively
separate objects which constitute it, this totality beg none other than the One
Mind and the body of the Buddha. This is the identity of phenomenon with
The Indian Background 53
phenomenon, a doctrine missing in the Awakening of Faith and other sources.
Hua-yen also refers to this situation as the ““Dharma-dhatu Buddha.”?* This
Buddha which is the dharma-dhatu 1s totally present 1n not only human beings
but in ants, grass, and dirt.
In its eclecticism, Hua-yen of course incorporates all varieties of the doctrine
of reality as ‘‘mind-only,” or “‘one mind,” but the special type which is the
contribution of Hua-yen may be seen in the comments which Fa-tsang makes
with regard to these various types. In his T’an hsiian chi, he lists ten varieties of
one mind or mind-only doctrine as they are presumably held by different seg-
ments of the sangha:
Both visual perception and its objects exist.
Characteristics of perceived objects are functions of perception.
Discrimination 1s a function of consciousness.
The derivative is a function of the fundamental (mind).
. Characteristics (hsiang) are ultimately essence (hsing).
. Things are formed from the transformation of Reality.
. The phenomenal and absolute are interfused.
. The things of the phenomenal world all interpenetrate.
. All things are identical.
10. Characteristics and functions of all things freely interpenetrate as seen
in the image of the net of Indra.?°
These ten varieties of mind-only doctrine include the common varieties of
Mahayana and non-Mahayana Buddhism. They include ‘‘Hinayana”’ (1), which
is not a doctrine of mind-only at all; the doctrine held by Hsiian-tsang’s Wei-
shih school (2 and perhaps 3); and the doctrine of the Awakening of Faith (6 and 7).
While these are all incorporated to some extent in the Hua-yen system, 1t 1s only
the last three which are considered to be the special province of Hua-yen. That
is, these last three kinds refer to the dharma-dhatu which 1s mind-only, or the one
mind, as the mutual identity and interdependence of all phenomena. It 1s this
reality which is dharma-kaya, and it is tathagatagarbha to the extent that all phe-
nomena without exception participate in this fundamental reality.>°
This species of tathagatagarbha seems to be more cosmological in nature than
the Indian varieties in its systematic attempt to identify ultimate reality with the
universe itself in its true state. Indian texts did this also, in the sense that they
equated nirvana and samsara, as well as all other dualities, but only 1n the sense
that all dualities were identical in their common emptiness. There seems to be
at least very little concern in Indian texts with identifying the empty universe
54 Hua-yen Buddhism
with the body of the Tathagata. I say “little” because Indian texts are not com-
pletely void of statements that seem to identify the two. It 1s significant that
many of the texts which Fa-tsang cites to substantiate his own position are Indian
in origin and do contain passages which could easily be interpreted as holding an
analogous position. Among these texts are such sutras as the Lankavatara, Srima-
ladevi, and Aninatvapurnatva-nirdesa and such treatises as the Mahayanasamgraha
and Uttaratantra. Thus he quotes the Srimaladevi Siitra as saying, ‘‘ ‘Not impure
yet impure’ means that the eternal becomes the non-eternal. ‘Impure yet not
impure’ means that when 1t becomes non-eternal, 1t does not lose its eternality.”’3!
Fa-tsang cites this text as substantiation for the idea that the impermanent world
of things and the eternal reality are one and the same. According to the Aniinat-
vapurnatva-nirdesa, ““The Dharma-kaya transmigrating in the five paths [of
sentient existence] is called ‘beings.’”32 From the Mahayanasamgraha he takes
another passage which apparently substantiates his claim that the absolute and
conditioned are one and the same:
- There are three kinds of dharmas taught by the Buddha: a soiled aspect, a
pure aspect, and an aspect which 1s both soiled and pure. Why are three
aspects taught? Within the dependent nature [ paratantra-svabhava] the
discriminated nature [parikalpita svabhava] is the soiled aspect, and the
nature which 1s tathata [i.e., =parinispanna-svabhava] 1s the pure aspect.
The dependent nature itself 1s the aspect which 1s both soiled and pure.33
Thus the phenomenal world of interdependence is capable of being seen as
impure when under the hypnotic spell of discrimination or as pure when seen
in the light of prajfia. But to see it a8 pure, which means to see it in its real aspect,
is merely to see it as the interdependence and identity of its parts. In this way,
Fa-tsang gave an authoritative basis for his own system by appealing to un-
impeachable sources. However, those texts, as I have already pointed out, sub-
stantiate the view of the identity of the noumenal and phenomenal; the final
step in the Hua-yen system is to assert the identity and interdependence of the
parts of the whole, and it is this universe which 1s seen as the very body of the
Buddha. It is no less empty than the universe as seen by Indian Buddhists, but
there 1s an affirmation of it which seems to be missing in Indian Buddhism.
This view of existence is probably nightly seen as a modification of classical
Indian views concerning tathdgatagarbha. I suspect that 1t was the Taoist—partic-
ularly Neo-taoist—tendency to find ultimate good in the harmonious co-
existence of the phenomena of the world which led later Buddhists such as
Fa-tsang to also see the ultumate good—emptiness, the body of the Buddha,
The Indian Background 55
reality, Buddha nature, etc.—as coterminous with a universe where ultimately
all distinctions are harmonized, and in which all things are necessary conditions
for the whole. It was fortunate for men like Fa-tsang that their private intuitions
with regard to the structure of reality could be satisfactorily expressed in orthodox
Buddhist language, and that there were indeed many doctrines within Buddhism
which, properly syncretized in the subtle mind of someone such as Fa-tsang,
could form a system of thought which was quite respectably Buddhist and yet
conformed to a sensibility which was probably much more Chinese than Indian.
Yet the intuitions which lay at the root of the Hua-yen cosmology are certainly
not exclusively Chinese. After all, the figure of Vairocana, the cosmic Buddha,
1s of Indian, not Chinese, origin, and the figure of Dorje Sempa in Tibetan
Buddhism attests to the fact that others besides the Chinese were inclined to
identify the cosmos 1n its true nature with the body of the Buddha. What distin-
guishes Hua-yen and makes it unique as a system of thought is the centrality of
this vision of the interpenetration in identity and interdependence of things as
the supreme good, the very body of the Tathagata.
In other words, we may say that the unique contribution of Hua-yen lay in
its systematic attempt to syncretize various Buddhist doctrines, primarily those
of emptiness and tathagatagarbha, in order to give a rational basis for an intuition
of the nature of things which, although foreshadowed in Indian literature, was
particularly congenial to the Chinese sensibility. There is nothing mean or
inferior, or anything to be despised in the whole of existence, when it is properly
seen apart from self-interest. Every item in the cosmic inventory 1s of supreme
value, for everything is empty, and therefore it contains and teaches that reality
which shines from its heart.
