2020/11/02

The Psychology of Emotions in Buddhist Perspective: Sir D. B. Jayatilleke Commemoration Lecture, Colombo, 1976

The Psychology of Emotions in Buddhist Perspective: Sir D. B. Jayatilleke Commemoration Lecture, Colombo, 1976


The Psychology of Emotions in Buddhist Perspective
Sir D. B. Jayatilleke Commemoration Lecture, Colombo, 1976
by Dr. Padmasiri de Silva
© 2007

Let me first thank you for inviting me to deliver the Sir D. B. Jayatilleke commemoration lecture. The invitation was accepted with mixed feelings of diffidence and hope — diffidence because our own thinking sometimes reflects the very conditions that generates the turmoil around us; hope because in the message of the Buddha there is a ray of light that will help us to emerge out of this predicament with clarity of thought and purpose. There is a need for clarity not only in the way we think, but in the way we feel, and incidentally the affective dimension of man provides thematic content of today's lecture. In this context Sir D. B. Jayatilleke is to us basically a nation builder, and a nation builder who firmly stood on the soil of our cultural traditions. This lecture is presented as a tribute to this great national leader of Sri Lanka.

We shall first raise the question, What is the place of emotions in Buddhism, then move on to an analysis of specific emotions — fear, hatred, sorrow and grief — and finally to the four sublime states. Having discussed the negative and positive aspects of emotions within the ethics and the psychology of Buddhism, we shall raise some questions regarding the aesthetic aspect of emotions in Buddhism.

The Place of Emotions in Buddhism
Emotions are generally regarded in the mind of the Buddhist as aspects of our personality that interfere with the development of a spiritual life, as unwholesome states ethically undesirable, and roadblocks to be cleared in the battleground between reason and emotion. In keeping with this perspective emotions are described as states of "agitation" or "imbalance."[1]

While a large number of emotional states discussed in Buddhist texts fit in to this description, are we to accept that all the emotions are of this sort? Within the field of experimental psychology, some accept that emotions can be both organizing (making behavior more effective) and disorganizing. In the field of ethics, the place of emotions in the moral life is a neglected subject, but a few voices in the contemporary world have expressed opinions which bring out the relevance of the psychology of emotions to moral assessment, reminding us of the very refreshing discussions in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. In these discussions too there is an acceptance of the creative role of emotions in the moral life of man. It may be that there is an emotional aspect of man that distorts his reasoning, feeds his prejudices and darkens his vision, but should we not look for an emotional facet in man that expands one's horizons of thinking, breaks through our egotism, sharpens a healthy sense of the tragic and evokes the ennobling emotions of sympathy and compassion for fellow man?

There are young people all over the world today torn between the world of the senses with its excitement and boredom and "path of renunciation" about which they are not clear, as it combines a sense of rebellion, escape, mystery, and a search for the exotic East. I am sure the message of the Buddha presents to them a philosophy of life that will combine non-attachment with zest for doing things. This evening, let us turn our minds towards an aspect of this modern predicament, with the hope of discovering a little light in the ancient wisdom of the Buddha, a light that may help us to see clearly the nature of the little world of turmoil that surrounds us.

Our discussion today is not a matter of mere academic interest. The recent drama competition organized by the Kandy Y.M.B.A., an attempt to present a drama based on the Buddhist Jataka stories, is the kind of venture that makes us think that the "education of the emotions" is not alien to the Buddhist tradition. This talk will be concerned with the psychological, the ethical and, to a limited extent, the aesthetic dimension of emotions.

What are emotions?
An emotion is the meaning we give to our felt states of arousal. Psychologists consider emotions to be complex states involving diverse aspects. On the one hand an emotion is a physiological state of arousal; on the other, it also involves an object as having a certain significance or value to the individual. Emotions are dynamically fed by our drives and dispositions; they are also interlocked with other emotions, related to an individual's beliefs, a wide-ranging network of symbols and the "cultural ethos" of a society.

Emotions basically involve dispositions to act by way of approach or withdrawal. Let us take an example to illustrate this. A man who walks a long distance across a forest track feels thirsty, he is attracted by the sight of water in a passing stream and he approaches; but there is a fierce animal close to the stream and he is impelled to withdraw or fight; if he withdraws he might then have a general feeling of anxiety, and if he gets back home safely he will be relieved. Thus perception of objects and situations is followed by a kind of appraisal of them as attractive or harmful. These appraisals initiate tendencies to feel in a certain manner and an impulse to act in a desirable way. All states of appraisal do not initiate action; for instance, in joy we like a passive continuation of the existing state and in grief we generally give up hope. Though there may be certain biologically built-in patterns of expressing emotions, learning plays a key role. Learning influences both the type and intensity of arousal as well as the control and expression of emotions.

The emotional development of people has been the subject of serious study. There are significant differences in the emotional development of people depending on the relevant cultural and social variables. In fact, certain societies are prone to give prominence to certain types of emotions (a dominant social ethos). There are also differences regarding the degree of expressiveness and control of emotions. The important point is that each of us develops a relatively consistent pattern of emotional development, colored by the individual's style of life.

The Psychology of Emotions in Buddhism
An emotion occurs generally when an object is considered as something attractive or repulsive. There is a felt tendency impelling people towards suitable objects and impelling them to move away from unsuitable or harmful objects. The individual also perceives and judges the situation in relation to himself as attractive or repulsive. While a person feels attraction (saarajjati) for agreeable material shape, he feels repugnance (byaapajjati) for disagreeable material shapes. An individual thus possessed of like (anurodha) and dislike (virodha) approaches pleasure-giving objects and avoids painful objects.[2]

Pleasant feelings (sukhaa vedanaa) and painful feelings (dukkhaa vedanaa) are affective reactions to sensations. When we make a judgment in terms of hedonic tone of these affective reactions, there are excited in us certain dispositions to possess the object (greed), to destroy it (hatred), to flee from it (fear), to get obsessed and worried over it (anxiety), and so on. Our attitudes which have been formed in the past influence our present reactions to oncoming stimuli, and these attitudes are often rooted in dynamic personality traits. These attitudes, according to Buddha, are not always the result of deliberations at a conscious level, but emerge on deep-rooted proclivities referred to as anusaya. Pleasant feelings induce an attachment to pleasant objects, as they rouse latent sensuous greed (raagaanusaya), painful feelings rouse latent anger and hatred (pa.tighaanusaya). States like pride, jealousy, elation, etc., can also be explained in terms of similar proclivities (anusaya).[3] It is even said that such proclivities as leaning towards pleasurable experience (kaama raagaanusaya) and malevolence (byaapaadaanusaya) are found latent even in "an innocent baby boy lying on his back."[4]

The motivational side of the emotions can be grasped by a study of the six roots of motivation (muula). They fall into two groups, wholesome (kusala) and unwholesome (akusala). The unwholesome roots are greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), while the wholesome roots are non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. Greed generates the approach desires in the form of the drive for self-preservation (bhava-ta.nhaa) and the drive for sensuous pursuits (kaama-ta.nhaa); hatred generates the avoidance desires in the form of the drive for annihilation and aggressive tendencies (vibhava-ta.nhaa).[5] In keeping with our initial observations, non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion should be considered as the springs of wholesome or ethically desirable emotions. In fact, in a study of the impact of the wholesome roots on the forms of wholesome consciousness, the following significant observations has been made by the Venerable Nyanaponika Maha Thera:

"Non-greed and non-hate may, according to the particular case, have either a mainly negative meaning signifying absence of greed and hate; or they may posses a distinctly positive character, for example: non-greed as renunciation, liberality; non-hate as amity, kindness, forbearance. Non-delusion has always a positive meaning: for it represents the knowledge which motivates the respective state of consciousness. In their positive aspects, non-greed and non-hate are likewise strong motives of good actions. They supply the non-rational, volitional or emotional motives, while non-delusion represents the rational motive of a good thought or action." [6]

In the light of this analysis it is plausible to accept non-greed and non-hatred as the sources of healthy and positive emotions. It is also interesting to note that non-delusion is the basis of good reasons for ethical behavior. A wrong ethical perspective also may be conditioned by one's desires and emotions. In the light of the Buddha's analysis, a materialistic ethics, influenced by the annihilationist view (uccheda di.t.thi),[7] may itself be conditioned by desires. On account of desire there is clinging (ta.nhaa-paccayaa di.t.thi-upaadaana.m), and clinging is said to be of four forms, one of which is clinging to metaphysical beliefs.[8] Thus there can be rational motives for good actions as well as rationalizations influenced by emotions. What is of importance in the observation we cited is that the Buddhist psychology of emotions does provide a base for creative emotional response, a point which, if accepted, has significant implications for Buddhist ethics, social theory and even art and aesthetics.

While we shall come to the role of the creative emotions as we proceed, let us now examine in detail the specific emotions discussed by Buddha. First we shall discuss the nature of fear, anger, guilt, and grief, and then move on to the four sublime states of loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity.

Regarding the range of our analysis, our study of emotions is basically limited to the psychodynamics of emotional states. However, there is a significant range of factors emerging out of socio-economic structure of a particular society. Differing economic and social structures stimulate differing types of psychological drives. Sometimes, even when the socio-economic conditions change, the character structure of individuals is slow to change. In general, whether it be the desire to acquire or desire to share and care for others, these desires are in truth dependent on certain social structures for nourishment and existence. The desires to save and hoard, to protect and accumulate, to spend and consume, to share and sacrifice, have significant relations to the values embedded in a certain society. The emergence of greed and hatred or compassion and sympathy is related to the value system of a society.

Fear
If we glance through the discourses of the Buddha as preserved in the Pali canon, the available material on the nature of emotions appears to be dispersed and colored by the nature of the diverse contextual situations where emotions are discussed. However, in general there appear to be four types of situations where the nature of emotions is discussed: emotions obstructing the ideal of good life sought by the layman, emotions that interfere with the recluse seeking the path to perfection, emotions enhancing the layman's ideal of good life, and emotions developed by the recluse seeking the path of perfection. The grouping of emotions in this manner brings an ethical and spiritual dimension to the psychology of emotions in Buddhism. In the context of the psychology of the West, the undesirable emotions are those that create adjustive problems and impair our mental health, and those desirable are valuable as an adaptive resource. Delineation of mental health merely in terms of adjustment is being questioned in some psychological groups in the West, and new horizons have emerged, a trend which might help to bridge the gap between the psychology of Buddhism and the currently dominant psychology of the West.[9]

Fear generally arises as a response to a danger which is of a specific nature, whereas anxiety arises as a reaction to a danger which is not clearly seen. In anxiety, both the nature of the object and one's attitude to it are not clearly recognized. However, these states fade off into each other in certain contexts. Bhaya in Pali can be rendered as fear, fright, or dread.

Regarding the genesis of the emotion of fear, there are at least two clear types of situations which cause fear. Fear is often caused by strong desires (ta.nhaaya jaayati bhaya.m)[10] Strong desires and attachment to either persons or things cause fear because if we cling to some precious and valuable object, we have to defend it against loss or theft; thieves can even be a serious threat to one's life. If one is tremendously attached to a person, and if the person is struck by a serious sickness, a concern for his well-being turns into a fear. The possibility of death causes anguish and anxiety. It is the same with the attachment to one's own self: a threat to one's life, sickness, the threat of losing one's job or reputation — all these situations are conditions for the emergence of fear. It is due to the strong self-preservative drive (bhavata.nhaa) which in turn is fed by the bhavaraaga anusaya (the lurking tendency to crave for existence) that fear becomes such an agitating condition. Apart from the drive for self-preservation, the desire for power, lust, jealousy and pride are intimately related to the emergence of fear. As we mentioned earlier, some emotions are interlocked with other emotions, as is the case, for instance, with jealousy, pride, and fear.

The second type of fear is the consequence of leading an undesirable life. Here the emotion of fear is related to the emotion of guilt. In this context the emotion of fear has an unhealthy destructive aspect and a positive healthy aspect. If a person is burdened with a heavy sense of pathological remorse, it has a bad effect; it creates worry and restlessness. On the other hand a lively sense of moral dread and shame (hiri-ottappa) prevents man from taking to an evil life and forms the basis of responsibility and a civic sense.

The damaging aspect of a heavy conscience in respect to morals has been the subject of discussion since the work of Sigmund Freud. In admonishing both the laymen and the recluse regarding the bad effects of a pathological sense of guilt, the Buddha refers to a person who is subject to anxiety, fear and dejection: a person who has done the wrong thing fears that other people talk about him, and if he is in a place where people meet together, he fears that others are talking about him. When he sees others being punished by the king, he thinks that the same will happen to him and is disturbed by this possibility. Finally, when he is resting on a chair or the bed, these thoughts come to him and he fears that he will be born in a bad place. "Monks, as at eventide the shadows of the great mountain peaks rest, lie and settle on the earth, so, monks, do these evil deeds... lie and settle on him."[11] The kind of fear and guilt that disturbs the man here is different from a healthy and productive sense of shame and fear (hiri-ottappa). In the Anguttara Nikaya there is a reference to four types of fears: Fear of self-reproach (attaanuvaada bhaya), fear of others' reproach (paraanuvaada bhaya), fear of punishment (da.n.da bhaya) and fear of lower worlds (duggati bhaya). In this context these fears have a good effect on the person: "he abandons evil," and "develops the practice of good."

Fear is often found mixed with hatred (even self-hate) and discontent, and this is often so in the emergence of pathological guilt. Kukkucca, which can be rendered as uneasiness of conscience, remorse or worry, is considered a hindrance to spiritual development. It is associated with a hateful and discontented consciousness, similar to the Freudian super-ego consisting of aggressive elements. Among people who are disappointed with the way that they have lived in the past, some successfully change into better and productive men; others who take a more unrewarding line display a complex admixture of fear, hatred, and guilt.[12] The religious melancholy, the self-punishing ascetics, and similar types have an unproductive sense of fear and dread. Restlessness and worry are described in the Nikayas with an apt analogy: if a pot of water were shaken by the wind so that the water trembles, eddies, and ripples, and a man were to look there for his own reflection, he would not see it. Thus restlessness and worry blind one's vision of oneself, and form an obstruction to the development of tranquility and insight.[13]

Hiri-ottappa (shame and dread), however, is a positive and healthy sense which must be cultivated and developed. In the words of Mrs. Rhys Davis, "Taken together they give us the emotional and conative aspects of the modern nation of conscience, just as sati represents it on its intellectual side."[14] He who lacks these positive emotions lacks a conscience.

In a recent study of "Morality and Emotions,"[15] Bernard Williams says that if we grasp the distinction made in Kleinian psychoanalytical work between "persecutory guilt" and "reparative guilt" we do not neglect the possibility of a creative aspect for remorse or guilt: "He who thinks he has done wrong may not just torment himself, he may seek to put things together again. In this rather evident possibility, we not only have in general a connection between the emotions and the moral life, we also have something that illustrates the point... about the interpretation of a set of actions in terms of an emotional structure."

It is also of interest to note that a student of Buddhism in the West has made an analysis of the "Dynamics of Confession in Early Buddhism."[16] Teresine Havens too says that in place of the external rites of purification (like bathing in the river, etc.) advocated by existing religions, the Buddha advocated a radical inner transformation of the affective side of man. According to Havens, the Buddha was as realistic as Freud or St. Paul in accepting and "recognizing the egocentric, lustful, hostile and grasping proclivities in unawakened man."[17] While advocating a method to uproot these traits, the Buddha "condemned worry over past offenses as a hindrance to concentration and found a religion which in general seems to have produced far fewer neurotic guilt feelings than has Judaism and Christianity."[18] The Buddha has thus presented the principles of the catharsis of emotions, which have certainly caught the eyes of many contemporary students of Buddhism in the West.

Fear and Anxiety
Often we make a distinction between fear and anxiety. Fear is a response to a specific situation or a particular object. It is specific and demonstrable, whereas dread is objectless, diffuse, and vague. In anxiety both the nature of the object and one's attitude to it are not clearly recognized.

Anxiety is generally caused by ego-centered desires of diverse types. There are some anxieties or vague apprehensions which under clear analysis can be reduced to some specific fear. For instance, a person approaching the possibility of marriage may feel some fear due to financial problems or a sense of apprehension whether the marriage would be success, but such vague apprehension could again under analysis be explained in a specific form. The Buddha says that there is a more basic type of anxiety due to our deep-rooted attachment to the ego. Thus in the words of Conze there is a type of "concealed suffering"[19] which lies behind much of everyday apprehensions. These emerge from the nature of the basic human condition: something which, while pleasant, is tied up with anxiety, as one is afraid to lose it. Here anxiety is inseparable from attachment; something while pleasant binds us to conditions which are the grounds on which a great deal of suffering is inevitable, like the possession of a body; and finally the five aggregates (khandha) have a kind of built-in anxiety.

Inability to face the inner vacuity of the so-called ego results in a flight from anxiety: some facets symptomatic of this overt anxiety are the frantic effort of people to join clubs, compulsive gregariousness, seeking to fill one's leisure by frantic activity such as motoring, and such diversions which will help people to avoid being alone.[20] The love of solitude and the way of silence advocated by the Buddha is anathema to large numbers of people who live in the "lonely crowd"!

The Buddha traces this predilection of the "anxious" man to his inability to grasp the basic truth of egolessness, which is the key to understand any form of anxiety. The belief in "I" and "Mine," though it gives a superficial feeling of security, is the cause of anxiety, fear, and worry. The discourse on The Snake Simile refers to anxiety (paritissanaa) about unrealities that are external and those that are internal; external unrealities refer to houses or gold that one possesses, or children and friends, and internal to the non-existing "I".

The Bhaya-bherava Sutta (Discourse on Fear and Dread) says that purely subjective conditions can cause fear in a recluse who has gone to the forest. If a recluse who has gone to the forest has not mastered his emotions like lust and covetousness, is corrupt in heart, etc., the rustling of fallen leaves by the wind or the breaking of the twig by an animal can cause fear and dread. Thus, whether we are dealing with the fears of man attached to his possessions, the anxieties of one torn between conflicting desires, the fear and dread arising in the recluse gone to the wilderness, or the fears consequent on leading a bad life — in all these senses, the Buddha is for us a "dispeller of fear, dread, and panic."[21]

Now the most important question is, "Is there no creative existential stirring that awakens man to his real predicament?" There are references to authentic religious emotions caused by the contemplation of miseries in the world. The emotion of sa.mvega, translated as "stirring" or "deeply moving," can be an invigorating experience which enhances one's faith and understanding of Dhamma. [22] The sa.mvega that is referred to here as an emotional state of existential stirring should be distinguished from paritassanaa, which is a kind of anxiety.

The doctrine of the Buddha is compared to a lion's roar.[23] In the forest, when the lesser creatures hear the roar of the king of the beast, they tremble. In the same way when the devas who are long-lived and blissful hear the doctrine of conditioned origination they tremble, but they yet understand the Buddha's doctrine of impermanence. This should be compared with the state paritassanaa, where a person finds his eternalism challenged, but sees the doctrine of the Buddha through the eyes of an annihilationist, and laments, "'I' will be annihilated." When sa.mvega is kindled in a person, he sticks to the doctrine with more earnestness.

Fear and Emotional Ambivalence
Fear is something which by its very nature entails "avoidance," but there is a strange phenomenon which may be described as "flirting with fear." There are people who search for forms of entertainment and sports which excite a mild degree of fear, like participating in mountain climbing that can be dangerous, motor sports, fire walking, etc.; there are others who like to read, see, and talk about gruesome incidents. A person who goes to see wildlife would like a little excitement rather than plainly see the animals at a distance. This kind of ambivalent nature is found in behavior where a mild degree of fear created by situations helps people to break through monotony and boredom. Also disgust with life and one's own self can make people court situations, which are a danger to their life. Freud's study of the death instinct (which we have elsewhere compared with vibhava ta.nhaa) might shed some light on this rather dark facet of human nature. Even in ancient Rome it was said that people wanted both bread and circus. It is possible that situations of disorder, turmoil, and violence, etc., are fed by this ambivalent nature.

Another facet of this compulsion to "flirt with fear" is found in the strange delight people find in violating taboos, laws, and commands. When desires are curbed through fear they are repressed and emerge through other channels. The coexistence of states which are condemned at the conscious level and approved at the unconscious level partly explain this compulsion to violate taboos. There are other types of irrational fears presently unearthed in the field of abnormal psychology,[24] which stresses that an undesirable situation has to be avoided on the basis of understanding rather than by an irrational fear or a process of drilling.

The Control and Expression of Fear
This brings us to the final aspect of the questions regarding the emotion of fear. The Buddha was not much directly concerned with the question whether the spontaneous expression of an emotion is good or whether it should be inhibited. He held that, rather, by a process of self-understanding, diligent self-analysis, and insight one can come to the point where emotions will not overwhelm him.

A recent study which attempts to work out a technique of living based on Buddhist principles has something significant to say on this problem.[25] Leonard Bullen says that there are three aspects to the disciplining of emotions: first is the development of a habit of self-observation with regard to one's emotional condition (a detailed observation of the mental state); the second involves the control of emotional manifestations as they arise; and finally the development of a new set of values, so that the situations which earlier elicited the responses of fear will fail to do so. As Bullen himself points out, the disciplining of emotions at the level of the individual has social implications.

If we begin with ourselves we do not excite the emotions of fear, hatred, jealousy, and pride in others. If others do not excite them in us, we are not impelled to see the shadows of our own fears and jealousies in the bosom of their own hearts. Self-analysis and understanding when practiced with within a community has a reciprocal effect.

The emotion of fear when it is generated at the social level creates mutual mistrust, suspicion, and hatred. The roots of racial prejudices, for instance, can be understood in the light of this phenomenon of mutual fear.

The problem of the young has to be dealt with at the level of the family. It may be said in this connection that ambivalent feelings of love and hatred within the family, irrational fears and guilt complexes, have a very bad impact on children. At the school level the medium of art, literature, and drama could do much to honestly encounter the problem emerging out of the affective side of man.

If young people do not get a glimpse of their own emotional facets, there is the possibility that they create their own forms of rebellion and defiance. There are already in the West today emerging marginal faiths of a highly exotic nature, some of which are generated by fears and impulsion of immature minds; some of these "marginal faiths" may be described as forms of siilabbatapaaraamasa (rite and ritual clinging). On the other hand, there may be an unexpected ray of hope in the rebellion of the young mind trying to break through certain forms of conventional thinking, which to them lack the warmth, ardor, and sincerity of a dynamic faith. It is by a spirited rejuvenation of our own traditions that we respond to this challenge with sympathy and understanding. Let our reflections this evening be a very humble attempt to pursue the problem in this direction.

Hatred
Emotions often create a kind of fog between the subject and the object. In "approach desires," like greed, there is an infatuation due to which the person is blind to the undesirable aspects of the objects which he longs to possess. In the case of "avoidance desires" generated by fear, and more so by hatred, the subject projects his hatred in perceiving the object; in extreme anger his vision is blinded, like the fury of a serpent. Thus there is a positive attitude regarding things we like and a negative aversion for those we dislike. If we desire to avoid a situation or a person we dislike, and we cannot do so, there is excited in us an urge to destroy, harm, fight, etc. The actual human situation is a little more complicated, as sometimes a certain aspect of an object attracts us, whereas another aspect repels us, and if so, under certain conditions what is lovable will turn out to be repulsive. The kind of emotional ambivalence that exists between parents and children is a case in point. Then there are things that we consciously like but unconsciously detest.

In the ethico-psychological analysis of emotions that we find in Buddhism, there are a number of terms used to connote the existence and expression of anger and hatred: dosa (hate), vyaapaada (ill-will), pa.tigha (aversion), kodha (anger), etc. Hatred is also related to the states such as issaa (envy), macchariya (jealousy) and hiina maana (inferiority conceit).

Dosa (hate) is one of the basic roots of immoral action, along with greed and delusion. Sometimes in a particular situation all the roots of immoral action may be excited: a person is longing to obtain object X, but A stands in his way. Thus greed for X is followed by a hatred for A, and the desire for X is in turn nourished by the root delusion. The expression of hatred can take various forms, by way of thought (wishing the person dies), by way of harsh words, and by way of aggressive behavior.

Due to certain forms of development that the human being has undergone, people often do not speak out their feelings but, by a process of repression and concealment, accumulate them. Accumulated anger of this sort can explode in very many subtle forms, as such anger exists at a subterranean level in the form of the pa.tighaanusaya. A baby who is angry with the mother will direct this on to a doll — this is called "displacement." If a person takes pleasure in beating a child, he will say it will do the child good — this is a form of rationalization. A person who unconsciously hates a person can be oversolicitous about his health — this is a reaction formation. If a person suspects that another person is harboring a grievance against him without grounds, he is merely projecting his own hatred onto someone else.

We have elsewhere discussed this concept of self-deception, but it is relevant to the emotion of hatred for very good reason. Hatred is an emotion which has been generally condemned by the Buddha, so it is difficult to think of any positive forms it may take, such as "righteous indignation" or a "just war." Thus it expresses itself in many subtle forms. If a person starves himself to death because of a social grievance it may be a way of directing the accumulated hatred on to himself. While suicide has been condemned by the Buddha, no form of self-torture can be accepted according to the path of the Buddha. There is a classic case of the child who refused to take medicine, and finally through compulsion, drank it with a vengeance. It is in the understanding of the deceptive spell of the aggressive urges in man that the Buddha condemned the path of self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga). It is a way of life that generates suffering (dukkha), annoyance (upaghaata), trouble (upaayaasa) and fret (parilaaha). The Buddha advocated a middle path that will dry up both the roots of greed and hatred, and delusion too.

It is in an era close to ours that Sigmund Freud remarked that the voice of aggression is sometimes subtle, invisible, and difficult to unravel. It is perhaps the subtle appreciation[26] of these psychological mechanisms in Buddhism which made Rhys Davis remark that "compared with the ascetic excess of the times, the Buddhist standpoint was markedly hygienic."[27] Not merely does the Buddha grasp the subtle mechanism through which the aggressive urge manifests, but he has presented the finest antidote to the spring of hatred in man preaching the doctrine of the four sublime states. If the genius for both good and evil rests within ourselves the Buddha has given us a sense of optimism to deal with the turmoil around us.

Though the Buddha attempted to deal with the emergence of hatred both at the social and individual level, the inner transformation of the individual is the basis on which the urge to aggression can be tamed. Thus in working out the different levels of spiritual development, there are references to the forms of anger, hatred, and ill-will that obstruct man. Hatred in the form of vyaapaada is referred to as one of the hindrances (nivaara.na), along with sensuality, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and doubt. Vyaapaada is one of the fetters that bind beings to the wheel of existence. Vyaapaada (ill-will), kodha (anger) and upanaaho (malice), issaa (envy) and macchariya are considered as defilements (upakkilesa) in a list of sixteen defilements. These defilements have to be eliminated for the development of insight. These states work in significant combinations; for instance, in contempt there is a combination of aversion and conceit, and denigration is a stronger form of this contempt.[28] Envy is fed by greed and aversion. If we succumb to the last defilement of negligence, then these defilements will form into a layer which is hard to break through, and has got hardened through habit. It is in this way that we can account for the emergence of certain personality types, and the type referred to as the dosa carita will be the very embodiment of hatred.

There is a graphic description of the angry man in the Anguttara Nikaya, some of which we shall reproduce briefly:


When anger does possess a man;
He looks ugly; he lies in pain;
What benefit he may come by
He misconstrues as a mischance;
He loses property (through fines)
Because he has been working harm
Through acts of body and speech
By angry passion overwhelmed;
The wrath and rage that madden him
Gain him a name of ill-repute;
His fellows, relatives and kin
Will seek to shun him from afar;
And anger fathers misery:
This fury does so cloud the mind
Of man that he cannot discern
This fearful inner danger.
An angry man no meaning knows,
No angry man sees the Dhamma,
So wrapped in darkness, as if blind,
Is he whom anger dogs.

Someone a man in anger hurts;
But, when his anger is later spent
With difficulty or with ease,
He suffers as if seared by fire.
His look betrays the sulkiness
Of some dim smoky smoldering glow.
Whence may flare up an anger-blaze
That sets the world of men aflame.
He has no shame or conscience curb,
No kindly words come forth from him,
There is no island refuge for
The man whom anger dogs.

Such acts as will ensure remorse,
Such as are far from the true Dhamma:
It is of these that I would tell,
So harken to my words.

Anger makes man a parricide,
Anger makes him a matricide,
Anger can make him slay the saint
As he would kill the common man.
Nursed and reared by a mother's care,
He comes to look upon the world,
Yet the common man in anger kills
The being who gave him life.

No being but seeks his own self's good,
None dearer to him than himself,
Yet men in anger kill themselves,
Distraught for reasons manifold:
For crazed they stab themselves with daggers,
In desperation swallow poison,
Perish hanged by ropes, or fling
Themselves over a precipice.
Yet how their life-destroying acts
Bring death unto themselves as well,
That they cannot discern, and that
Is the ruin anger breeds.

This secret place, with anger's aid,
Is where mortality sets the snare.
To blot it out with discipline,
With vision, strength, and understanding,
To blot each fault out one by one,
The wise man should apply himself,
Training likewise in the true Dhamma;
"Let smoldering be far from us."
Then rid of wrath and free from anger,
And rid of lust and free from envy,
Tamed, and with anger left behind,
Taintless, they reach Nibbana.
— AN 7.60

On the therapeutic side there are many contexts where the Buddha offers advice to face situations, such that one's anger, wrath, and ill-will not be excited, and if one is agitated there are techniques to get rid of them. This is not a process of repression by which you push them into a lower level of consciousness, but a process by which understanding, insight, and mindfulness lead one to control and restraint. While the Buddhist analysis of genesis of emotional states helps one to understand their emergence, positive techniques are advocated to deal with them and this is done in the case of anger, fear, greed, jealousy, or any such unwholesome emotional state. The Vitakkasanthana Sutta recommends five techniques to deal with such states.[29]

Grief and Sorrow
Grief is a universal phenomenon. It is basically a reaction to bereavement, but it is also consequent on other types of losses. If there has been a close identification with the person or the thing lost, the person concerned feels as if a part of himself has been lost. The most significant observations on the nature of "mourning and melancholy" were made by Sigmund Freud.[30]

When an object is charged with a strong emotional cathexis, or in Buddhist terminology "clinging" (upaadaana), a sudden loss or separation creates a disturbing vacuum. Feelings of guilt, depression, and self-pity may color the emotion of grief in various situations. The Attahasaalinii warns that sometimes people will not be able to distinguish between sorrow and compassion; while the distant enemy of compassion is cruelty, the close enemy is a kind of self-pity filled with worldly sorrow.[31] While a deep sense of compassion has a power to transform a person spiritually, worldly sorrow binds him more insidiously to the wheel of sa.msaara.

Sorrow, grief, and lamentation are all facets of dukkha and can be overcome only by grasping the philosophy of the "tragic" in Buddhism.[32] Mourning and weeping are not effective in dealing with the tragic. We should understand the causes and conditions of suffering and work out a therapy to remove the causes of suffering. The Buddhist attitude demands a sense of reality; this is different from either excessive mourning or the use of diversions to drown one's sorrow. Dukkha is a universal feature of samsaric existence along with impermanence and egolessness. The Buddha has said: "What is impermanent, that is suffering. What is suffering, that is void of an ego." To think that there is an ego where there is only a changing psycho-physical complex is to create the conditions that generate sorrow, grief and dejection.

The Buddhist philosophy of tragedy is contained in the four noble truths: the truth of suffering, the origin of suffering, the extinction of suffering, the eightfold path leading to the extinction of suffering. The nature of suffering is thus described by the Buddha: birth, decay, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are suffering. To be joined with the unpleasant and to be separated from the pleasant is suffering; the failure to get what one wants is suffering. In short, clinging to the five groups of mental and physical qualities that go to make up the individual constitutes suffering. It is the last part of the formula that gives a sense of depth to the meaning of tragedy in Buddhism.

If the nature of the Buddhist analysis of Dukkha is understood, within that setting the confrontation with genuine tragic situations in life may have a positive role to play; it could break through the natural slumber and complacency and create the sense of urgency in the mind of the Buddhist. Authentic tragic experience (sa.mvega) should be a spur to the religious life and strengthen one's faith in the doctrine.

The way in which the impact of genuine tragic situations may bring about a spiritual alertness without falling into the unwholesome extreme of morbidity is brought out clearly in the Anguttara Nikaya.[33] A certain person hears that in a village or town someone is afflicted or dead, and stirred in his way he realizes the truth; another beholds with his own eyes... and realizes the truth; the third person sees a kinsman afflicted and realizes the truth; and finally the person himself is stricken with pain and suffering and this situation stirs him to a realization of the truth of suffering. This is by analogy compared to a steed that is stirred when the stick is seen, one stirred when the stick touches the skin, a third when the flesh is pierced and a fourth when the very bone is pierced by a stick. There is an element of stirring (which the translator renders as agitation) which awakens a person to the tragic sense of life and the emergence of faith in the doctrine. Even if we call this a state of "agitation," it is different from a person whose fear, anger, or grief has been aroused. Even the sense of the tragic in life can turn out to be a creative emotional response.

The Four Sublime States
Not only does compassion form the basis for a wholesome dimension of emotional warmth and positive concern for others, but it is specifically advocated as a corrective to the elimination of hatred, fear, and allied states. But it has its own alluring disguises and as stated earlier it must be saved from the near enemies of worldly sorrow and pseudo-love and superficial attachments.

The four sublime states (the Brahma Viharas) are mettaa (loving kindness), karunaa (compassion), muditaa (sympathetic joy) and upekkhaa (equanimity). Their potentiality to deal with conflicts, jealousies, prejudice, and hatred are immense, and at the social level very significant. In the words of Ven. Nyanaponika: "They are the great removers of tension, the great peace-makers in social conflict, the great healers of wounds suffered in the struggle of existence: levelers of social barriers, builders of harmonious communities, awakeners of slumbering magnanimity long forgotten, revivers of joy and hope..."[34]

In the early part of the lecture it was mentioned that morality has a significant relation to the psychology of human emotions. In the context of the four sublime states, this observation has much relevance. Gunapala Dharmasiri has pointed out that one type of moral justification advocated by the Buddha was the appeal to sympathetic feelings.[35] "The simple fact that others are living beings is the reason why I should not harm and this is based on an inference from one's personal experience to that of others: As all people dislike punishment and are scared of death, one should not kill or harm others." In the context of the four sublime states, a kind of disinterestedness or neutrality is a safeguard against the emergence of sentimental attachments.

These states are considered as boundless, as they are not limited, narrowed down to a special person or persons. These are not merely principles of conduct, but subjects of methodical meditation, and these could only get rooted in a strong affinity with this unbounded outlook by the integration of the meditational level and the practical level of conduct. It is by meditative practice that they sink deeply into the heart and thus later become spontaneous attitudes.[36] In the four sublime states we see the finest base for a creative emotional response, and moreover a response related to the emotion of natural sympathy and concern for fellow beings.

The Aesthetic Dimension of the Emotions (an unfinished postscript)
Having dealt with the psychological and ethical aspects of the emotions in Buddhism, it would naturally fall in line with our discussion to say a few words on the aesthetic aspects too. These comments are made as an incentive to further reflection rather than in the form of a definitive statement.

In the course of our discussion it was observed that Buddhism upholds the cultivation of good emotions and the elimination of unwholesome emotions. Art and aesthetics is basically a medium of human communication. Is there a facet of the aesthetic that can enhance the education of the emotions? There are two sides to the question, one from the standpoint of art, the other from the standpoint of Buddhism.

Let us take the standpoint of art first. There are three views on the relationship between art and morality, out of which philosophers like R.W. Beardsmore favor the third.[37] The view called "Moralism" upholds that the aim of art is to teach morality; "Autonomism" is the belief that the art has nothing to do with morality. Both points are mistaken on Beardsmore's view; art does not crudely teach morality or deliberately eliminate it; rather, art can give an understanding which makes moral judgment sensitive and intelligent. In the recent development of what is called "Situational Ethics," examples from literature are used for the discussion of moral issues. By thus reflecting on the conflicts and dilemmas of the characters we can enrich our own sensibility. Without having undergone the experience ourselves, moral and religious problems can be viewed with a "sense of detachment." Thirdly, the uses of pure reason are sometimes limited, and the use of literary techniques are extremely effective on occasions; the fact is quite obviously seen in the importance of the Jatakas, the Thera- and Theri-gathas etc. Finally, philosophers like Aristotle discovered a certainly cathartic purpose in art. By the use of the sympathetic imagination, one tends to see the common human nature that exists behind the façade of divisive doctrines.[38]

Now can a Buddhist absorb the aims of art and aesthetics in this manner? As we have already mentioned, for the purpose of efficient communication a wide variety of techniques have been used by the Buddha: stories, fables, poetry, paradoxes, similes, etc. Some of these techniques are well developed — for instance, in Zen Buddhism. Drama and song are used today as media for depicting thematically a Buddhist idea. Sculpture and painting have developed over the years with a Buddhist inspiration.

But there are problems in this area. Though the five precepts do not directly prohibit artistic activity, the call to restrain the senses is important. Also in the more stringent code of morality (the ten precepts), and for monks, seeing dances and such forms of amusements is prohibited. The crucial question is how do we differentiate between the "sensuous" with its harmful effects and the "aesthetic"? O.H. de A. Wijesekera, discussing the relationship between "Buddhism and Art,"[39] says: "In the Sigala homily we have one of the best abstracts of the Buddha's attitude as to what a lay disciple should do and not do. One will find that the Buddha there admonishes Sigala not to fall into the error of developing a habitual liking for amusements, but he certainly does not ask Sigala to cut himself off completely from all aesthetic pursuits, only that which is bad and demoralizing." Thus if we do not adopt a very limited notion of the "sensuous" to eliminate the aesthetic, education of the emotion through aesthetic media is possible.

Jothiya Dhirasekera says "...the Buddhist recognizes beauty where the senses can perceive it. But in the beauty he also sees its own change and destruction. He remembers what the Buddha said with regard to all components things, that they come in to being, undergo change and are destroyed."[40] It is because of the ability to look at life with equanimity that Buddhism provided a base for the development of a very rich nature poetry: the images of peace and tranquility, of change and continuity — all these find graphic expression in Buddhist poetry.

There is also a devotional aspect of religion which finds fitting expression in aesthetic media, and within the concept of saddhaa, art and aesthetic can stimulate faith and reverence for the Dhamma.

To conclude — In the depiction of human tragedy, the lure of power, the pitfalls of ambition, the roots of passion and the springs of compassion, the Jatakas have already provided a veritable gold mine for the education of the emotions. With the tranquility and peace that one sees in the Samadhi statue or the beauty of the ancient cave paintings, we enter into a dimension which is predominantly Buddhistic. These observations are offered to re-activate a facet of human nature (namely the affective side) that comes most naturally to man and harness this potential in the wake of a higher spiritual transformation.

Notes  
1.
See, Rune Johansson, The Psychology of Nirvana, (London, 1969), p. 24.
2.
M i 226 (MN 38).
3.
There are seven such proclivities: kaama-raaga, pa.tigha, di.t.thi, vicikicchaa, maana, bhava-raaga, avijjaa.
4.
M i 433 (MN 64).
5.
For an analysis of vibhava-ta.nhaa, see Padmasiri de Silva, Buddhist and Freudian Psychology, (Sri Lanka, 1973).
6.
Nyanaponika Thera, Abhidhamma Studies, (Sri Lanka, 1965), p.79
7.
M i 65 (MN 11).
8.
The four kinds of clinging are sensuous clinging (kamuupaadaana), clinging to views (ditthuupaadaana), clinging to rules and rituals (siilabbatuupaadaana) and personality belief (attavaduupaadaana).
9.
See Buddhist and Freudian Psychology, Chapter V.
10.
Dhp 216.
11.
M iii 164 (MN 129).
12.
J. C. Flugel Man, Morals and Society, (London, 1955) p. 197.
13.
AN 5.193.
14.
Mrs. Rhys Davis, Dhammasangani (Trans.) (London, 1900) p. 20, n. 1.
15.
Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self, (London, 1973) p. 222.
16.
J. Tilakasiri, ed., Añjali, Wilesekera Felicitation Volume, (Sri Lanka, 1970) pp. 20-27.
17.
Ibid.
18.
Ibid.
19.
Edward Conze, Buddhism, (London, 1957) pp. 46-48.
20.
See Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety, (New York, 1950) p. 8.
21.
D iii 47 (DN 25).
22.
See, Padmasiri de Silva, Tangles and Webs, (Sri Lanka, 1974).
23.
Ibid. [And see MN 11 — ATI ed.]
24.
Some of the irrational fears related to behavior disorders have been the subject of psychological analysis: they are the fear of high places, fear of small places, fear of dark places, fear of animals, etc. These are called phobias.
25.
Leonard A. Bullen, A Technique of Living, B.P.S. (Sri Lanka, 1976).
26.
The BPS text reads "suppreciation," a word not found in the Oxford English Dictionary. I therefore suspect this to be a typo, and chose "appreciation." — ATI ed.
27.
Rhys Davids, "Sin," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. (New York, 1910-21, Volume II, p.71).
28.
Nyanaponika Thera, Simile of the Cloth, B.P.S. (Sri Lanka, 1957).
29.
Vitakkasanthana Sutta, MN 20. Also see Piyatissa Thera, The Elimination of Anger, B.P.S. (Sri Lanka 1975).
30.
See, Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," in Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. Strachey, (London 1953). Vol. XIV.
31.
Attahasaalinii, 63.
32.
Padmasiri de Silva, "Buddhism and the Tragic Sense of Life," University of Ceylon Review, (April-October 1967).
33.
AN 4.113.
34.
Nyanaponika Thera, The Four Sublime States, B.P.S. (Sri Lanka, 1960).
35.
Gunapala Dharmasiri "Principles of Moral Justification in Buddhism and Schopenhauer," Sonderdruck aus dem 53, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 1972.
36.
The Four Sublime States.
37.
R.W. Beardsmore, Art and Morality, (London 1971)
38.
John Hospes, "Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics," Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
39.
O. H. de A. Wijesekera, "Buddhism and Art," the Maha-Bodhi Journal May-August, 1945
40.
Jothiya Dhirasekera, Buddhism and Beauty, B.P.S. (Sri Lanka).
See also: "Affirming the Truths of the Heart: The Buddhist Teachings on Samvega & Pasada," by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.

Working with Emotions in Psychotherapy (The Practicing Professional): 9781572309418: Medicine & Health Science Books @ Amazon.com

Working with Emotions in Psychotherapy (The Practicing Professional): 9781572309418: Medicine & Health Science Books @ Amazon.com

Working with Emotions in Psychotherapy (The Practicing Professional) 1st Edition
by Leslie S. Greenberg  (Author), Sandra C. Paivio (Author)
4.4 out of 5 stars    11 ratings
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In previous books, Leslie S. Greenberg has demonstrated the importance of integrating emotional work into therapy and has laid out a compelling model of therapeutic change. Building on these foundations, WORKING WITH EMOTIONS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY sheds new light on the process and technique of intervention with specific emotions. Filled with illustrative case examples, the book shows clinicians how to identify a given emotion, discern its role in a client's self-understanding, and understand how its expression is furthering or inhibiting the client's progress. Of vital importance, the authors help readers think more differentially about emotions; to distinguish, for example, between avoided emotional pain and chronic dysfunctional bad feelings, between adaptive sadness and maladaptive depression, and between overcontrolled anger and underregulated rage. A conceptual overview and framework for intervention are delineated, and special attention is given throughout to the integration of emotion and cognition in therapeutic work.

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Editorial Reviews
Review
"The authors of this book beautifully describe the hierarchical order of emotions, how to identify specific emotions, and ultimately how to work and restructure the client's relationship to powerful and damaging maladaptive emotions....For people who are interested in cognitive and experiential work with emotions, this book is invaluable."
, The Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research Published On: 2003-07-31

"For any therapist who believes that it is important to address the powerful emotions that clients bring to therapy, this is an important and seminal book."
, Canadian Psychology Published On: 2003-07-31
About the Author
Leslie S. Greenberg, PhD, is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychotherapy Research Center at York University in Canada. He is the coauthor of Facilitating Emotional Change and coeditor of the Handbook of Experiential Psychotherapy, among many other publications.

Sandra C. Paivio, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at the University of Windsor in Canada. Formerly, she was on the Psychology faculty at the University of Saskatchewan.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
1. The Centrality of Emotion in Psychotherapy
I. Theoretical Framework
2. What Is Emotion?
3. Emotion Assessment
4. Sources of Emotional Disorder
II. Intervention Framework
5. The Process of Change
6. The Phases of Emotionally Focused Interventions
III. Differential Work with the Emotions
7. Anger
8. Sadness and Distress
9. Fear and Anxiety
10. Shame
11. The Pleasant Emotions
12. Research, Training, and Supervision
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Product details
Item Weight : 15.6 ounces
Paperback : 303 pages
ISBN-13 : 978-1572309418
Product dimensions : 6.26 x 0.85 x 8.92 inches
Publisher : The Guilford Press; 1st edition (July 29, 2003)
Language: : English
Best Sellers Rank: #1,689,551 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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4.0 out of 5 stars Very well written. This book had me at the summary on the back page.
Reviewed in the United States on August 7, 2018
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This book will have you marveling at the complexity of emotion-focused therapy. Pages 107 and 108, describing interventions and the framework of this type of therapy, are worth the price of admission by themselves. You will learn, in great detail, exactly how therapists work with emotions to help forge change. Surprisingly, the definition of emotion will leave you a little confused. I'm still looking for that concise definition that I can readily quote.
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A classic text that is vitally important to the work of the psychotherapist. Dr. Greenberg's approach is very gentle and nurturing, and is very important to the health of the therapeutic alliance and the process of lasting change in the client. This is graduate level material. The lay is best to seek Peter Breggin's book Heart of Being Helpful that also embraces Dr. Greenberg's emotional connections with flat feelings responses within the context of client centered and emotional therapeutic interventions.
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(PDF) Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective

(PDF) Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective

Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective
June 2011Sophia 50(2):253-263
DOI: 10.1007/s11841-011-0248-2
Authors:
Padmasiri de Silva
21.81Monash University (Australia)
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References (19)

Abstract
The work ‘Thinking and Feeling’ edited by Robert C. Solomon may be considered as a landmark in the history of the philosophy of the emotions. The work also has assembled together some of the best minds in the Anglo American Traditions. The central focus in this work is to mediate between the physiological arousal theories of emotions and the cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. My article is an attempt to mediate from my Asian background and in specific terms using the Buddhist perspectives on emotion studies, to find answers, a subject on which I have worked over several decades. The Buddha has discouraged people in attempting to find ultimate answers to the body- mind relationships, but use pragmatic and practical perspectives for a two way interactionism. Thus, in the Buddhist analysis the mental and the cognitive, as well as bodily and the physiological are recognised, thus giving room for a holistic understanding of emotions concepts. In fact, Buddhism expects the body, feelings, perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations as facets of emotion concepts. The second point is the domination of the metaphor of reasons as the charioteer in managing unruly emotions in the West. But Buddhism introduces the factor of ‘mindfulness’ as an important ally in the management of emotions. My personal work in therapy and counselling has helped me to explore new dimensions for managing emotions through mindfulness practice. KeywordsEmotions–Body mind relationships–Phisiological arousal theories–Cognative appraisal theories–Mindfulness

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          THINKING AND FEELING: THE WISE MANAGEMENT       
           OF EMOTIONS IN EARLY BUDDHISM


Prelude

During the last two decades there has been a significant revival in emotion studies due to new developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology and medicine. As a result of these developments, an important thesis emerged in cognitive science that understanding emotions is central to understanding intelligent systems. Thus it became necessary to locate emotions within the interacting systems of cognition, motivation and emotion. In our normal access to the sensory world, we see things as red, round, tall, dense and so on. We identify sensory stimuli as apples, trees, and rivers. But if our sensory stimulus is an unexpected and disturbing one- that something we see is a snake, the meaning of the sensory stimulus is strongly affective- fear. The difference between seeing red and “seeing fear” is important. In fact though conscious thoughts and conscious feelings appear to be similar, they are produced by different subsystems, and emotional feelings involve more subsystems than thought. It was one of the discoveries of the neurologist Joseph Ledoux, that the emotional meaning of a stimulus may be appraised by the brain, before the perceptual systems have fully processed the stimulus. Our emotions like that of fear of the snake occurs with tremendous speed that the appraisal we make- the snake is poisonous and it is a danger- occurs in a quick and automatic manner. This gives us some insight in to emotions like anger and lust, which may invade our thoughts and why it is “difficult to control our emotions”. 

Imagine walking in the woods. A crackling sound occurs. It goes straight to the amygdala through the thalamic pathways. The sound also goes from the thalamus to the cortex, which recognizes the sound to be a dry wig that snapped under the weight of your boot, or that of a rattlesnake shaking its tail. By the time the cortex has figured this out, the amygdala is already starting to defend against the snake (Ledoux, 1998,      )

This paper is concerned with the question why passions invade our thoughts and bodies and exploring Buddhist perspectives and methods for developing conscious control of these emotions. In his work, The Emotional Brain, Ledoux makes the following observation: 

…the struggle between thought and emotion may ultimately be resolved, not   simply by the dominance of the neocortical cognitions over the emotional system, but by a more harmonious integration of reason and passion in the brain, a development that will allow future humans to better know their true feelings and to use them more effectively in daily life (Ledoux, 1998, 20).

Many philosophers down the ages have raised the same question but given different answers. Spinoza the Spanish philosopher who spent a complete life devoted to the study of emotions observes: “The impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions I call bondage, for a man who is under their control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, although he sees the better before him” (Spinoza, 1963, 187). Ledoux gives an additional reason for the difficulty in managing emotions, which is of great interest from a Buddhist perspective. He says that the real predicament is that both our cognitions and emotions seem to operate unconsciously (Ledoux, 1998, 21). We can make sense of this process by referring to the analysis of subliminal propensities (anusaya) as found in the Buddhist discourses. In the discussion on anger as recorded in the book Destructive Emotions, the Dalai Lama observes: “In Buddhist psychology, there is an understanding that many of the emotions need not necessarily be manifest. In fact, the emotions themselves may be felt or experienced, but they are also present in the form of habitual propensities that remain unconscious, or dormant, until they are catalyzed” (Goleman, 2003, 141). These tendencies lie dormant and may be excited by suitable stimuli (pariyutthana) and because of their strong tenacity they provide the base for the emergence of greed, anger and conceit. 

The arousal of these tendencies is due to stimuli in the sensory field, thoughts or signals from the body. These stimuli generate pleasant, unpleasant feelings or neutral feelings. Pleasant feeling rouse subliminal tendency for lust and greed (raganusaya) and painful feelings rouse the subliminal tendencies for anger and hatred (patighanusaya). The arousal and persistence of this motivational cycle is also nourished by the roots of greed, hatred and delusion, which also make them unwholesome; morally wholesome states may have as their base generosity, compassion and wisdom. Feelings (vedana) also condition the emergence of three forms of craving: craving for sense gratification, craving for egoistic pursuits and the craving for self-annihilation (See, de Silva, 2000, 35-79). In Buddhist psychology, there is a close linkage of cognition, emotion and motivation.

“Yet, feeling by itself, in its primary state, is quite neutral when it registers the impact of an object as pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. Only when emotional or volitional additions are admitted, will there arise a desire and love, aversion and hate, anxiety, fear and distorting views. Be that need not be so. These admixtures are not inseparable parts of the respective feelings. In fact, many of the weaker impressions we receive during the day stop at the mere registering of a very faint and brief feeling, without any further emotional reaction”(Nyanaponika, 1983, 2). Nyanaponika Maha Thero concludes that this the reason why the contemplation on feelings is a key factor in the path to liberation. By directing bare attention on feelings, they will be divested of their emotional components and of their egocentric reference.

Body and Mind as Theatres of Emotion

Our feelings may often be observed in relation to the body. As both the body and mind may be considered as theatres of emotion. If we loose touch with the body, there may be blockages of communication between the psyche and soma and thus leaving the way for conditions like alexythymia. As Joyce McDougall says in her work, Theatres of the Mind (McDougal, 1986, 177), Affects are one of the most privileged links between psyche and soma. Alexythymia is a condition where people loose contact with their emotions and also the skill of discriminating between different emotions. Sensations occur in the body at all times. They may be cold and heat, heaviness and lightness, pressure and vibration. They may take place as localized
bodily sensations like a localized pain in the foot, a lump in the throat and a general bodily condition like feeling tired or refreshed. If we show preferences or negative reactions they emerge as hedonic tones which may be painful, pleasurable or neutral.
If a person feels sleepy, tired, feverish or refreshed that would be a general bodily condition, which again may be associated with any of the hedonic tones. We may compare these with attitudinal feeling which are emotional (related to the body) like feeling distressed, depressed .The following passage from the discourses of the Buddha describe very well the attitudes of a person to his body. This passage refers to those who are under the spell of the craving for self-annihilation:

“those worthy recluses and brahmanas who lay down the cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of the essential being, these, afraid of their own body, loathing their own body, simply keep running and circling round their own body” (MIII, 232-3). These attitudes towards the body are deeply emotional.

Once we make these finer distinctions in the way we speak about feelings, the next important point is that emotions have very significant physiological correlates in the body, and this is more true of emotions like anger, fear and sadness which are more closely linked to the physiology of the body and the neurology of the brain. Paul Griffiths who has written a well known work on the domination of the physiologically oriented emotions in humans or what he calls the “affect programme”, accepts that there are higher cognitive emotions like guilt, envy and jealousy which are not governed by affect programmes (Griffith,1997, 100). If we go to Buddhist texts it is quite clearly mentioned that “thoughts are translated in to sensations of the body” (sankappavitakka vedanasasamosaran, A IV 385).

What is important is to keep in mind that physiological arousal or bodily feeling is an important ingredient of emotions. In fact William James classic statement on the subject is worth quoting: “if we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind….and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains” (James, 1984, 131). But as Gerald Myers (1987, 240) and Robert M.Gordon (1987, 92) have pointed out James appear to have been careless in formulating his theory or he may have thought that the sound of paradox (we cry because we are sad) is more effective in communicating his ideas. There are good examples that fit in to what is implied by James’s theory: for example the scared to death feeling we have when we suddenly miss a step in a long winding staircase. But to move from the position that the emotional quality of consciousness is caused by bodily feelings, to- our emotions are cause by bodily symptoms- is a long road indeed.

Emotions have a cold aspect and a hot aspect. The cold aspect consists of cognitive appraisals, how we see the world, the hot aspect is the arousal aspect. Desires and craving may take a cold aspect of cool calculation or a hot impulsive form. As the etymology of the word “emotion” embodies the notion of momentum, hot desires play a crucial role in the building- up of emotions. In Pali, there are three important terms for the mind: mano representing rational thinking, vinnana, sensory perception and citta thought under the influence of affects (Karunaratne, 1995, 2). Mind as citta is said to be throbbing, trembling and wavering and is compared to a fish that is taken out of water and placed on a dry land (Dh.V33). The mind is also described as fickle, flighty and wavering. The Middle Length Sayings gives a long list of sixteen states which excite and defile the mind. The term defilement (kilesa) brings out the moral and spiritual features of Buddhist psychological concepts. Covetousness, ill will, anger, enmity, revenge, contempt, jealousy, envy-avarice, deception, fraud, obstinacy, presumption, conceit, arrogance, vanity and indolence (MI, sutta 7).

When the mind is developed through the practice of the path of morality, concentration and wisdom, it is supposed to radiate its natural luster, which has been submerged by defilements. The liberated one is completely fee of these defilements and one may say has undergone a change of body chemistry. “An arahant experiences both physical and mental bliss (so kayasdukham pi cetasukham pi patisamvedeti) as all tensions (daratha), torments (santapa), and fevers (parilaha) have been completely eliminated for good” (L.de Silva, 1996, 6). What is important in this context is that, in the way bodily states and emotional experience have a close link the emergence of negative emotions, in the positive emotions associated with a liberated monk, we see again the link of physiology and emotions. It is said that in the liberated monk, the whole body is permeated with joy and bliss (Tgh, 274). 

In the final analysis, what Buddhism offers is a contemplative perspective on feeling, and the pleasurable, painful and neutral feelings are described as “impermanent, compounded, dependently arisen, liable to destruction, to evanescence, to fading away, to cessation”.






The Domination of a Metaphor

In the way that Ledoux calls for a harmonious relationship between reason and passion, western philosophy over the years saw the problem relating to the bondage of passions in terms one dominating metaphor first used by Plato: reason as the charioteer and passions as the unruly horses. Spinoza in fact develops a ratiocentric model where he attempts a geometry of passions, working out the thought components for each passion (Spinoza, 1963). David Hume turned the metaphor upside down saying that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. It is here that Buddhism replaces this dualism by replacing it with a three factor analysis: passions, reason and mindfulness. We often attempt to over-intellectualize our attempts to deal with the chaos of passions around our lives. It is our contention in this paper that the battle between our logical perceptions and emotions found in the western philosophical tradition might be taken to a more effective faculty- the practice of mindfulness. As Ajahn Sumedho says, “But the emotional nature is not rational. It’s a feeling nature, it is not going to go along with what is reasonable, logical, sensible” (Sumedho, 1998). He observes that if we have unkind feelings towards someone we develop metta towards the person, not being judgmental and having the patience to be with that feeling. 

 Paul Ekman in his recent book, Emotions Revealed (Ekman, 2003) presents a perspective that is very much open to the use of mindfulness practice during different stages of the emergence and expression of a negative emotion like anger. He says that if we develop the habit of being attentive or in Buddhist terminology develop mindfulness practice, we also develop the skill to observe ourselves during an emotional episode, ideally before more than a few seconds have passed. We can also recognize when we are emotional and consider whether our appraisal of the situation is justified and re-evaluate our appraisal. Most emotions involve judgments. In fact, the germinal state of what develops with great sped as an emotion is found in pleasurable, painful or neutral feelings (vedana). Then with the addition of thought, appraisals, desires and the excitement of our deeprooted tendencies towards attachment, aversion and conceit, including social and cultural filters, it would be clear that what appears as an emotion is a constructions. The important point is that we can “put our breaks” at any point on the development of this sequence from primary affect in to a full emotion. As we develop the skill of being attentive we are able to moderate our emotional behaviour, from facial expressions to speech and action. In fact one of the groundbreaking discoveries in brain science during recent times is the concept of the plasticity of the brain emerging out of the research of Richard Davidson. The pats of the brain like the frontal lobes, amygdale and the hypocampus are parts of the brain affected by emotional experiences but meditative experience is able to bring out positive changes in the brain (See, Goleman, 2002, 179-2004).

It is very encouraging to see that both in the area of scientific research and a number of therapeutic orientations in the west, there are clear indications of a journey beyond the Platonic metaphor of reason the charioteer and passions the unruly horses. These extensions to a therapy based on mindfulness practice may be seen in a number of apparently competing therapies. Jon Kabat-Zinn’s work on mindfulness meditation for pain control, both physical and emotional pain, has been a true breakthrough in the area of behavioural medicine: “Mindfulness allows us to see more clearly into the nature of our pain. Sometimes it helps us to cut through confusion, hurt feelings, and emotional turmoil caused perhaps by misperceptions or exaggerations and our desire that things be in a certain way” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 321). Also the focus on stimulus control, recognizing the “spark before the flame” before you attempt damage control, avoiding certain situations, de-conditioning, control of unwanted intrusive cognitions, modification of undesirable habits and such techniques of behaviour modification, using Buddhist resources have been tested over several years by Padmal de Silva  (Padmal de Silva, 1996, 217-31). The recent work, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression by Segal, Williams and Teesdale is another landmark in the development of Buddhist resources for therapy (Segal, Williams and Teasdale, 2002). Eric From’s posthumous publication, The Art of Listening and Mark Epstein’s Thought Without a Thinker present the therapeutic value of mindfulness from yet another direction. It is for these reasons that we mentioned that the western therapeutic traditions have gone far beyond Plato’s dominating metaphor of reason as the charioteer and the unruly horses as the passions.

However, there have been a few cracks and dents in the philosopher’s epistemological disdain for using therapeutic models for understanding emotions. John Cottingham in a recent study of reason and passion in the western philosophical tradition makes this observation: “It is only by giving up, in the first instance, our pretensions to rational control that we open the way for deeper, transformed, self-understanding”. He also says, “The first stage of this process of transformation is thus one of listening, rather than declaring, of waiting rather than controlling, of attending rather than commanding” (Cottingham, 1998        ). In making this statement, Cottingham is following the footsteps of one of the most insightful philosophers of our times, Iris Murdoch, who said, “I regard the (daily, hourly, minutely) attempted purification of consciousness as the central and fundamental arena of morality” (Murdoch, 1970). These reflections of Cottingham and Murdoch are important for developing a viable philosophical perspective in the west regarding the management of emotions. In fact, during recent times E.M.Adams a philosopher was baffled by Goleman’s attempt to integrate the concept of mindfulness practice to the concept of emotional intelligence (see, de Silva, 2002, 188-93).  In suspending the rational, analytic and dissecting mind for a while, we make room for listening with the right brain. In using the art of quiet listening to be aware of the emotional inroads of our own minds, we develop diminishing reactivity to raw sensory events, do not make automatic identifications with our reactions, develop openness, impartiality and flexibility (Epstein, 1995, 110-128). Lastly, the ground is prepared for “wise seeing”, a theme that we will pick up when we explore emotions in Buddhism, as a contemplative tradition.

It must be mentioned that the Buddha did use analytical, critical and even dialectical reasoning in his debates with philosophers. Also in the discourses to householders often he appealed to their reason but unless backed by a virtuous life and the practice of mindfulness, people will lack the stability, trust and confidence to deal with the chaos of their emotional lives. He also advocated the use of positive emotions as antidotes. In the Vitakkasanthana sutta (Discourse on the forms of thought, MI, Sutta 20), he mentions five methods for dealing with unwholesome thoughts which are best  used by the method of mindfulness or to some extent through the use of rational discourse. Unwholesome thoughts may be eliminated by using antidotes, looking at the peril of unwholesome thoughts, by a process of let go (asati amanasikara), by looking at the consequences and lastly by will power. In talking to the householders about understanding the consequences of anger the Buddha makes the following points: When a person is overwhelmed by anger and wrath he earns a bad reputation, loses his friends and his relations will shun him; anger clouds the mind and an angry person looses the skill to look at a issue in an impartial manner; after venting his anger on some one he may be scared of revenge and even be struck by remorse; once anger is aroused one is able to commit the worst of crimes; anger affects a person’s health and breakdown of family and leads to failure in his profession; patience, forgiveness and understanding are positive virtues.


Healing the Chasm Between Cognitive Theories 
and Arousal Theories of Emotion

Again if we make a glance through contemporary theories of emotion in philosophy and even psychology to some extent, they do not display the flexibility and the pragmatism found in the therapeutic traditions. The release of the recent book, Thinking and Feeling edited by Robert C.Solomon ( Solomon, 2004) brings the frontier lines of the above- mentioned debate up to date. John Deigh who has written the first chapter to this volume presents two conflicting programmes in psychology, one emerging from William James and the other from Sigmund Freud. He says, “Jame’s ideas are the sources of the view that one can fruitfully study emotions by studying the neurophysiological processes that occur with experience of them. He identified them with feelings.” (Deigh, 2004, 25).  He also says, “Though Freud often described emotions as flows of nervous energy, his view of them as transmitters of meaning and purpose was nonetheless implicit in his notion of an unconscious mind and the way he used this notion to make sense of feelings, behaviour, and physiological maladies that seems otherwise inexplicable” ( Deigh, 2004, 25). He concludes his paper by saying that “The main problem for the study of emotions is how to develop a theory that reconciles these two facts”.

If we make a quick glance through the different therapeutic approaches in the west mentioned above, that have integrated Buddhist techniques of mindfulness practice to their routine agenda and their writings, it is to be seen that the impending chasm between the rival programmes have been, to some extent healed. In fact, in the discussion that follows, we bring number of points, which may help us to develop a more flexible and holistic approach to bring the rival programmes together. This is of course a Buddhist perspective that we are developing, using resources in the discourses of the Buddha and Buddhist practice.

( 1) In the context of Buddhist theory and practice, there is a close linkage between the two questions, “What is an Emotion? ” and “How do we manage emotions?” It appears to be a strange point that Buddhist text do not have a word for emotions.  This puzzle receives the attention of the discussants in the dialogue on destructive emotions (Goleman, 2003, 158-159). It is mentioned in this discussion that it is difficult to find a Tibetan or Sanskrit word for “emotion”. Let us first look at the etymology of the term emotion. The term is derived from Latin, e+movere, which meant to move from place to place. It was also used for agitation, which meaning has been popularly associated with the word. As James Averill points out, the word passion was used for approximately two thousand years, and as the derivation from Greek pathos and Latin pati (to suffer) convey, emotions came to be associated with passivity (Averill, 1980, 380).  In ordinary discourse we speak of being “gripped” and “torn” by emotion. Not only is this experience of passivity an illusion, as Averill points out, if you realize that this passivity is an illusion, this helps us to widen the area of self-awareness and not abjure responsibility for the consequences of emotions. As we have pointed out in an early study elsewhere, the notion of intention, intentionality (aboutness), responsibility and the possibility of moral criticism clearly indicate that emotions cannot be reduced to passive feelings (de Silva, 1995). They also contain a great deal of complexity. If we locate emotions like jealousy, grief, pride and guilt in the setting of a narrative (see, Goldie, 2000, Nussbaum, 2002) their rich complexity is evident. In Buddhism, a ‘significant action’ on which praise or blame can be bestowed is an action done with an intention (cetana). Even if an action is done automatically and impulsively or on the contrary as deliberate action, both these facets contain ‘intentions’ and are subject to moral criticism. There are other important features like the appropriateness, consequences, the manner in which it is done and the grades and types of consciousness that generate the action. When we look at the profile of an emotion in Buddhism the importance this analysis with a focus on intention may be evident. (Averill, 1980, 380).

An emotion in the context of Buddhism is a construction, an interactive complex or a construct emerging within a causal network. The best way to understand this complex is to first look at the five aggregates (khanda), which go to make up what we conventionally refer to as a person. Bhikkhu Bodhi says that as a meditator’s mindfulness becomes sharper and clearer, “the meditator learns to distinguish the five aggregates: matter or physical form (rupa); feeling (vedana) the affective tone of experience, either pleasant, painful or neutral; perception (sanna), the factor responsible for noting, distinguishing and recognition; volitional (sankhara), the intentional aspect of mental activity; and consciousness (vinnana), the basic awareness operating through the senses “ (Bodhi,1999, 27). The meditator discerns the marks of impermanence, suffering and non-self as characteristics of the aggregates. Thus within the five aggregates we discern the three dimensions of the cognitive, affective and conative or volitional facets of human consciousness. Now it is necessary to see the role of vedana in the construction of an emotion like anger or fear. Nyanaponika Thera clearly says in a comprehensive study of the contemplation of feeling as found in the vedana-samyutta, “It should be first made clear that, in Buddhist psychology, ‘feeling’ (Pali:vedana) is the bare sensation noted as pleasant, unpleasant (painful) and neutral (indifferent). Hence it should not be confused with emotion which, though arising from the basic feeling, adds to it likes or dislikes of varying intensity, as well as other thought processes” (Nyanaponika, 1983, 7). In more detail, it may be said that emotions emerge as a joint product of perceptions, feelings, desires, beliefs, appraisals and physiological arousal. Cultural and social filters have an impact on the experience of emotions and most of the emotions are related to interpersonal interaction. Out of the five factors cited above under the aggregates, the concept of sankhara provides a framework for placing the operative factors together.

This point is well confirmed by Nyanaponika who says “The specific factors operative in emotion belong to the aggregate of formations (sankhara-kkhanda). Feeling is one of the four mental aggregates which arise, inseparably, in all states of consciousness; the other three are perception, mental formations, and consciousness” (Nyanaponika, 1983, 7).

It must be mentioned that the term emotion covers a very broad range of emotions and they are not all alike. Some of the conflicting theories of emotions are often cast on certain selected emotions. In general, it is necessary to use a very holistic concept of emotions and contextualise discussions about emotions. In the Buddhist analysis of emotions weightage to both cognitive factors and physiological arousal is given.

(2) There is another reason why Buddhism facilitates the development of a holistic theory of emotions. This is the Buddhist perspective on the mind-body relationship. (i) The Buddha discourages people to push to the utter logical limits and engage in metaphysical wrangles about the relationship between the mind and the body, as in context of this sort, the Buddha has left it as an undetermined question. (ii) But he uses a contextual approach to refer to he mind body relationship. In accepting a reciprocal relationship between the mind and body, the Buddha did not accept any dualism or monism. There is also no place for reductive theories like epiphenomenalism. The body-mind relationship is compared to two bundles of reeds, one supporting the other (S II, 114). (iii). In the context of meditation, the Buddha adopts an anti-ontologising perspective, and considers the terms, ‘mind’ and ‘body’ as designations. And thus the phenomenal nature of experience is seen. This is the experiential context. (iv) In certain contexts the body is considered as a trap that obstructs liberation and mindfulness of the body helps us to nip passions at the bud. (v) When the Buddha discourages extreme asceticism and its mattered hair and starvation, he is advocating mind-body health, composure and sensibility of the body.

Thus in accepting that there can be feedback mechanisms by which the body can affect the mind and the mind can affect the body, Buddhism is able to bridge the chasm between cognitive theories of emotions and arousal theories of emotions.
We have already cited the convergence of different (or even competing) therapeutic approaches which use mindfulness practice; the textual basis for a holistic concept of an emotion and lastly the Buddhist contextual approach to the mind-body issue.  The Buddha was also critical of strong attachment to fixed views and even compared the dhamma to a raft that is used for crossing a river. It is a perspective that helps practice. Lastly, the meditation practices as well as the practice of morality advocated by the Buddha helps the practitioner to deal with different components of negative emotions.  The following passage describes the dynamic setting for the emergence of emotions:

Thus it is Ananda, craving comes into being because of feeling, pursuit because of craving, gain because of pursuit, decision because of gain, desire and passion (chandaraga) because of decision, tenacity because of desire and passion, possession because of tenacity, avarice because of possession, watch and ward because of avarice, and many a bad and wicked state of things arising from keeping watch and ward over possessions” (Gradual Sayings, II, 58).

(3)  In the above section on “The domination of a Metaphor”, we have shown very clearly how at the level of the applications of therapy using mindfulness techniques, different therapeutic orientations have come together. They steer clear through the debate on cognitive and arousal theories of emotions.   If we look at the structure of the Buddhist charter for meditation, the satipatthana, the four foundations for mindfulness practice cover different facets that go to make an emotion: the body (kaya), feelings (vedana), states of the mind (citta) and the psycho-physical complex (dharma). In fact states of mind are complex states emerging out of feeling like fear, doubt, restlessness and apathy. The fourth section has number of entries like the five hindrances and the seven factors of enlightenment. But the most central is the inclusion of the attachment to the psychophysical complex or the idea of the self. The idea of the self plays a central role in the inter-play of emotions (see, de Silva, 1994, 297-317).

We shall conclude this section with the Buddha’s advice to the monks not to debate about the efficacy of competing methods but practice what comes naturally to a person. On a certain day, when the Buddha was at the Jeta Grove, Venerable Sariputta asked a question about three types of practitioners seeking liberation from suffering:  
(i) One whose faculty of faith (saddha) is developed ; (ii) one whose skill in the concentration on the body is developed; (iii) One whose faculty of insight was developed. Venerable Savittha tended to think that the first type of monk would reach the goal first, Venerable Kotthita backed the second type and Venerable Sariputta thought that the surest was the third. In my own attempt to make this issue intelligible, I thought it looked like some one asking me, who will get to the wining post first? The athlete who has lots of stamina, the one who has very good harmony of speed and movement and a third who has over the years collected the practical insights of doing the half mile. The following is the Buddha’s analysis:

i. It may be that the person who is released by faith is on the path to be an arahant, that the one who has testified to the truth with the body is a once-returner or a non-returner, and the one who has won view through insight is also a once returner or non-returner.
                     

ii.It may be that the person who has testified to the truth with the body is on the path to be an arahant, that the other two are once-returners or non-returners.

iii. It may again be that the person who has gained a view through insight is on the path to be an arahant, and the other two are once-returners or non-returners. 

(4) Lastly, the philosophy of William James has accepted the twin concepts of the importance of attention and will and this falls in line with the Buddha’s critique of theories of determinism and indeterminism. A recent reference to the importance of these concepts in James presents the point in a very effective manner: “Given James’s strong philosophical bent, it’s hardly surprising these twin concepts, attention and will, were of such tremendous importance to him. He was well aware, especially given his given his goal of placing psychology squarely within natural science, that thickets of controversy awaited any one willing to tackle the question of free will. But on the key point of the efficacy of attention, and its relation to will, James held fast to his belief- one he suspected could not be proved conclusively on scientific grounds, but to one which he clung tenaciously on ethical grounds—that the effort to focus attention is an active, primary causal force, and not solely the properties of a stimulus that acts on a passive brain (Schwartz and Begley, 2002, 326; Also see, James, 1992, 272, 278). In Psychology A Brief Course, James develops the point mentioned earlier, whole drama of voluntary life hinges on the amount of attention which rival motor ideas may receive (James, 1992).

In the light of all these points, Buddhism has resources to heal the chasm between cognitive theories and arousal theories of emotion.

                            PART II

Emotions in a Contemplative Tradition

In the first part of this paper, we have focused the attention of the readers on the claim that Buddhist meditation practice and theory have created a new perspective in looking at emotions and the wise management of emotions in the west. We have specially looked at the veritable revolution created in western therapeutic orientations by the integration of mindfulness practice and also directed attention on the interface between recent developments in cognitive science and neuroscience against the background of Buddhist philosophy of mind.

But there is an important issue that we need to raise regarding the difference between Buddhism as a contemplative tradition directed towards the liberation from suffering, and Buddhism as a form of therapy. In a sense, the Buddha was the physician par excellence and the fourfold noble truths offer analogies to the diagnosis and remedial action for a disease in medicine. But there have been words of caution, “we must be able to distinguish the two and know how and when to use each one” (Finister, 2004, 50). Coltart observes, “there are many more extensive and subtle ways in which they flow in and out of each other, and are mutually reinforcing and clarifying” (Coltart, 2004, 44). Mark Epstein’s piece of writing entitled, “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” is an excellent product of the interaction between Buddhism and therapy (Epstein, 1995, 159-222).

One way of developing a new dialogue between Buddhism as a philosophy of liberation and Buddhism as a therapy is to develop interest in the diaries and notes of contemplatives – personal narratives reminiscent of William James’s Variety of Religious Experience. Keith Oatley and Maja Djikic have presented us a fascinating account of this work with a focus on emotions and identity (Oatley and Djikic, 2002, 97-116. It is remarkable that during one lifetime, James was able to enter the world of emotions, first through the sensations of the body and then through the variety of religious experience. They conclude the article by saying that the main hypothesis of James in this work is that “Identity is inescapably emotional. Each of us has a center, perhaps of anxiety, perhaps of anger, perhaps (as in James’s example of saintliness) of love of God or human kind” (Oatley and Djikic, 2002,113). The reason why the center is emotional is that emotions are our principal motivators. Emotion can also succeed each other as the plot of a story. Oatley and Djikic observes in the concluding section that though the ideas of saintliness discussed by James may be somewhat anachronistic, the question how people born with a high proclivity towards self-interest might be touched by the fate of others is a theme for our times. Our study of grief and compassion that follows is a contribution in this direction on emotions and identity.

The claim that emotions have an epistemic, cognitive and hermeneutic role in directing us to the truths of the human condition, like impermanence, suffering and non-self is an important point for reflection. There has been a misunderstanding that 
Buddhism advocates the “cutting off of the passions” and that there has been a detachment from the affective side of life. The need to open us to inner experience, our recurring thought patterns and our somatic expressions without denial, closure and repression takes a central place in Buddhism. In the first sermon, Setting the wheel in Motion, the Buddha is not asking us to get rid of suffering but to make it a subject for reflection and contemplation. It is an awakening to the truth and not a validation of the first noble truth that is necessary. By opening ourselves to our anger, fear and boredom, we transform them in to subjects for contemplation (dhammanupassana).

Emotions have important epistemic qualities in the Buddhist context. Emotions direct our attention to significant events in the outer world and it is possible to convert a challenging experience like loss of some one dear and near to us, into an experience of insight. Such insights help us to free from the entrapment of distorting cognitive structures (ditthi). Buddhist contemplative reflections help us to reduce the verbal –analytic activities of the left brain and develop the non-verbal, creative and holistic stances of the right brain.

We are in the process of narrating a story about grief with a Buddhist background. During recent times, the release of Martha Nussbaum’s work on emotions as “upheavals of thought” against the background of the immense grief triggered by her mother’s death, has brought the theme of grief to the center of philosophical reflections. She first directs our attention to the urgency and heat of emotions, their tendency to take over the personality, their connection with important attachments and the person’s sense of passivity before them and their adversarial reaction to rationality ( Nussbaum, 2001, 22). She also says that in spite of these features, emotions are suffused with intelligence and discernment, and emotions like grief can be a source of deep awareness and understanding. It is an excellent contribution to contemporary emotion studies. While we share these thoughts, we bring a new dimension for understanding the emotion of grief from the contemplative dimensions of Buddhism, the Buddhist meditative life and its social ethic. We also do not attempt to develop a theory of emotions as she does, in developing a theory of emotions as appraisals of value, as our perspective on a holistic conception of emotions has already been presented. We are also grateful to Robert C.Solomon for granting permission to refer to his recent paper on grief, to be released soon, by the Oxford University Press (Solomon, 2004). We have found his reference to the reflective quality of grief and its dedicatory quality, striking a kindred note with our own reflections on grief. But here again we follow our own intuitions. It is time that philosophers and psychologists looked more closely at emotion profiles, especially grief and sadness, covetousness and greed, boredom and slothfulness, restlessness and worry, jealousy and conceit. This is one way of diffusing the battle lines on theory.