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The Problem of Pain (C. S. Lewis Signature Classic)

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For centuries people have been tormented by one question above all – ‘If God is good and all-powerful, why does he allow his creatures to suffer pain?’ And what of the suffering of animals, who neither deserve pain nor can be improved by it?

Listen to A Life Observed Audiobook by Devin Brown

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A Life Observed: A Spiritual Biography of C.s. Lewis

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C. S. Lewis is one of the most influential Christian writers of our time. But while it was clear from the start that he would be a writer, it was not always clear he would become a Christian. A Life Observed tells the inspiring story of Lewis' spiritual journey from cynical atheist to joyous Christian. Drawing on Lewis' autobiographical works, books by those who knew him personally, and his apologetic and fictional writing, this spiritual biography brings the beloved author's story to life while shedding light on his best-known works.

New Age & Spirituality

2021/11/11

Divine Ground | Janet Smith Warfield

Janet Smith Warfield

SHIFT Change Your Words, Change Your World

The Perennial Philosophy—A Golden Thread of Awakening

May 25 2011

By Guest Bloggers, Lee and Steven Hager

http://www.thebeginningoffearlessness.com/blog

In our world, nothing stays the same for very long. We’re taught to rely on the advice of experts, but their opinions seem to change with the breeze. If you knew that something had remained unchanged for over two thousand years and had continued to help people find the peace and joy they were seeking for that entire time, would you be curious?

The perennial philosophy is a golden thread of spiritual thought that can be found in virtually all cultures and time periods. It’s a group of harmonious spiritual concepts that are free of dogma and ritual. It’s been a part of so-called “primitive” and pagan belief systems as well as the mystical branches of nearly every organized religion.

The concept of an “eternal philosophy” that incorporates universal spiritual truths and exists free of human influence has intrigued philosophers for hundreds of years.

In the West, it’s been thought of as a “philosophy of harmony” or a “universal religion” that remains untainted by sectarian views.

In the East, it’s been thought of as Sanatana Dharma (eternal law) or Manava Dharma (religion of man).

In 1945 Aldous Huxley wrote the aptly titled Perennial Philosophy, which outlines the universal truths that have continued to crop up in spiritual thought worldwide.

The perennial philosophy is not a formula for enlightenment, but its simple concepts have encouraged countless seekers to reach spiritual mastery. Although the perennial philosophy has far more to offer, here are four of its most basic and helpful concepts:

There is a Divine Ground that permeates the universe. The world we think we see is a temporary projection that originates from that Divine Ground
A change in consciousness is required to become aware of, and experience, the Divine Ground.
Everyone has the ability to experience the Divine.
Experiencing the Divine is life’s highest purpose.

Simply put: Life-giving intelligence permeates everything in existence. This intelligence wants to be known and can be known.

Most of us have been taught that spiritual mastery is a nearly impossible goal, but the perennial philosophy does not agree. No secrets, methods, formulas or spiritual practices are involved, and none are necessary to experience the Divine. Knowing the Divine does require a shift in our awareness, but everyone is capable of making that shift. How do we shift our awareness?

Huxley pointed out that successful spiritual seekers have all shared a mindset that includes these features:

“Pure in heart.” This does not mean we need to “clean up our act.” It refers to our motives. A pure heart is looking for a connection with the Divine for the sheer joy of that connection. A pure heart isn’t asking for material blessings.
“Poor in spirit.” This has nothing to do with poverty. It means that we understand that the world can make us rich, but it can never enrich us. We’re poor in spirit when we understand that our life will be empty until we have a direct connection with the Divine.
“Empty hands.” Seekers with empty hands are willing to let go of all mental conditioning, preconceived notions and the desire for a particular outcome. They are willing to be instructed by the Divine instead of trying to fit the Divine into their own belief system.

These qualities are free and available to everyone, no matter what our circumstances might be. Most of us have been taught that we can learn about God by taking in information, but there is no need for us to be satisfied with that.

Spiritual masters have never been interested in learning “about” the Divine; instead, they expect to “know” the Divine through personal experience. You don’t have to become a spiritual master before you can experience the Divine, in fact, it works the opposite way. As you open yourself to the experience, you grow spiritually. The perennial philosophy tells us this is not only possible, it’s our highest purpose. Best of all, experiencing the Divine is the beginning of a life of fearlessness that you can enjoy.

Know by your own direct experience that the Divine within you is the Divine in all—Shankara ____________________________________________________________

Lee and Steven Hager are the authors of The Beginning of Fearlessness: Quantum Prodigal Son, a spiritual quest and scientific adventure based on Jesus’ parable of the prodigal son, quantum physics and the gnostic gospels. Their blog http://www.thebeginningoffearlessness.com/blog features articles on oneness, spiritual awakening, quantum physics, the gnostic gospels and the direct, personal experience of the Divine.

Written by janet in: Aldous Huxley, Awareness, Belief, change, Consciousness, dogma, Joy, Lee and Steven Hager, Mystical, Pagan, Peace, Perennial philosophy, Ritual | Tags: Aldous Huxley, Awareness, change, Consciousness, Divine, Divine Ground, dogma, empty hands, fearlessness, intelligence, Joy, Lee and Steven Hager, Manava Dharma, mental conditioning, motive, mystical, outcome, pagan, Peace, Perennial philosophy, poor in spirit, preconceived notions, pure in heart, ritual, Sanatana Dharma, Shankara, shift, spiritual master, spiritual mastery, universal spiritual truth, Universal truth

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Selected Writings of Dorothee Soelle | PDF | Mysticism | Obedience (Human Behavior)

Selected Writings of Dorothee Soelle | PDF | Mysticism | Obedience (Human Behavior)

Selected Writings of Dorothee Soelle

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The most important wrtitings of Dorothee Sorelle.Full description
pp 1-92

Dorothee Soelle: Essential Writings
(Modern Spiritual Masters)
by
Dorothee Sölle
4.57 · Rating details · 23 ratings · 1 review
Dorothee Soelle was one of the most creative and prophetic German theologians of the post-war generation whose work was shaped by the memory of the war, the Holocaust, and totalitarianism. Her writings integrated feminism, ecology, a witness for peace, and global solidarity.

""My life is that of a theological worker who tries to tell something of Gods pain and Gods joy... A conversation, in the full sense of the word, comes into being when people share together their hunger for spirit in leaden, spiritless times. The satiated have no need to talk to each other."" --Dorothee Soelle

Dorothee Soelle, who died in 2003, was one of the most creative and prophetic German theologians of the post-war generation whose work was shaped by the memory of war, the Holocaust, and totalitarianism.

In her ""political theology,"" which joined a strong mystical dimension with a concern for the challenges of history, she integrated feminism, ecology, a witness for peace, and global solidarity.

Dianne L. Oliver, who selected the text, an Associate Professor of Religion at the University of Evansville in Indiana, has published studies of Soelles theology. (less)

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Published March 1st 2006 by Orbis Books

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Read The Anthem Companion to Robert N. Bellah Online by Anthem Press | Books

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The Anthem Companion to Robert N. Bellah

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"The Anthem Companion to Robert N. Bellah" is the first major collection of essays on the life and work of Robert N. Bellah (1927–2013), one of the foremost sociologists of religion of the twentieth century. Bellah’s work was central to many fields: the sociology of Japanese religion; the relationship between sociology and the humanities; the relationship between American religion and politics; the cultures of modern individualism; evolution and society.

Bellah’s seminal work on “civil religion” in the early 1970s created a huge debate across the disciplines that continues into the present times; his coauthored book "Habits of the Heart" (1985) was a best seller and the object of sustained discussion in the general public sphere; his last magnum opus, Religion in Human Evolution, published at 84, was a monument to an extraordinary scholarly and intellectual career. The object of this collection of essays by top American and European scholars from the social sciences and humanities is to highlight the richness of Bellah’s work. Each essay has a double character: it introduces a single topic in an accessible and complete way and then presents a reflection on the viability and import of Bellah’s ideas for interpreting contemporary phenomena.

Read Ch 1,3,8

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Real Zen for Real Life Course [1-10] links

https://draft.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/933322945938724907/8045557472495841281

Lessons In Truth Book

https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2023/01/lessons-in-truth-book.html

Kelly [Book] Reality Of The Spiritual World

https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/08/kelly-reality-of-spiritual-world.html

Kelly [Book] A Testament of Devotion

https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/07/kelly-book-testment-of-devotion.html

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Kelly [Book] The Eternal Promise

https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/07/the-eternal-promise-contemporary-quaker.html

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Toshihiko Izutsu [Book] Sufism and Taoism
https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/05/toshihiko-izutsu-sufism-and-taoism_78.html
====
Aldous Huxley [Book] Perennial Philosopy
https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2021/11/perennial-philosopy-tag-philosophy-bk.html
===
Sheeran [Book] Beyond Majority Rule
https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/01/beyond-majority-rule-directory.html
====
[[이즈쓰 도시히코의 동양 철학이란 무엇인가 No.1,2,3,4 : 모리시타 나오키
https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/07/no1234.html

===

van der Kolk [Book] The body keeps the score

https://sejinlifeforce.blogspot.com/2022/08/the-body-keeps-score-bessel-van-der-kolk.html

동학 교리 현존 최고본 〈동경대전〉 세상에 나왔다 : 충청 : 전국 : 뉴스 : 한겨레

동학 교리 현존 최고본 〈동경대전〉 세상에 나왔다 : 충청 : 전국 : 뉴스 : 한겨레

동학 교리 현존 최고본 〈동경대전〉 세상에 나왔다

등록 :2021-10-28
송인걸 기자 사진
송인걸 기자

1880년 초본 수정한 1883년 계미중춘판 목판본
북접 접주 김은경 후손 충남역사문화연구원 기탁

〈동경대전〉 계미중춘판의 표지와 책머리.

“세상에 나오면 (너희가) 위험해지니 열지 마라. 좋은 세상이 오거든 공개하여라.”

충남 천안지역 동학의 우두머리 북접 접주 김은경은 충남 천원군 목천면 집에 항아리를 파묻고는 후손들에게 “항아리를 열지 말라”고 신신당부했다. 후손들은 이 당부를 오랫동안 지켰다.

집안의 판도라 상자였던 이 항아리는 1990년대 후손 김찬암이 열었다. 이중으로 된 항아리의 안에는 동학 경전이 들어 있었다. 〈동경대전〉 계미중춘판(계미년 봄 간행본), 〈용담유사〉 필사본 등 동학 관련 경전과 대한제국 학부에서 발간한 역사교과서인 <동국역사> 등 이었다.

〈동경대전〉 계미중춘판은 2000년께 발견됐다는 소식이 동학 연구자들 사이에 전해졌으나 소장자 쪽이 공개를 꺼려 실물은 확인되지 않았다,

항아리에서 나온 〈동경대전〉 계미중춘판 등 동학 관련 유물이 발견된지 20여년 만에 일반에 공개된다. 지난 4월 김찬암씨의 손자인 김진관씨가 충남역사문화연구원에 기탁해 모습을 드러냈다.

〈동경대전〉 계미중춘판 간기, 왼쪽에 후손 김찬암이 쓴 주소, 오른쪽에 계미년 봄에 북접에서 간행했다는 기록이 남아있다.

충남역사문화연구원(원장 조한필)은 11월3일 연구원 강당에서 〈동경대전〉 가운데 가장 오래된 것으로 알려진 계미중춘판 수탁식을 연다고 28일 밝혔다. 수탁식에는 소장자 김진관씨, 양승조 충남지사, 기탁을 주선한 김종식 천안향토문화연구회 회장, 이용길 천안역사문화연구회 회장 등이 참석한다.

겉표지를 포함해 90쪽인 이 경전은 서문에서 ‘1880년 간행한 〈동경대전〉 초판을 수정하고 빠진 내용을 보완해 1883년 간행했다’고 기록돼 있다.

지난 5월부터 윤석산 한양대 명예교수, 박맹수 원광대 총장, 신영우 충북대 명예교수 등 학계의 대표적인 동학 연구자들과 서지학자 손계영 대구가톨릭대 교수 등이 이 경전을 분석해 진본 임을 확인했다.

이들의 분석을 종합하면, 항아리를 묻은 김은경은 천안지역 동학의 우두머리인 북접 접주 출신으로, 이 목판본은 그의 집인 충남 천원군 목천면 한천(현재 천안시 동남구 동면 죽계리 450번지)에서 간행됐다. 이 경전은 최제우의 동학사상과 그가 지은 시 등 문집이 한문으로 담겼다.

동학 연구자와 서지학자 등 전문가들이 지난 5월 충남역사문화연구원에서 〈동경대전〉 계미중춘판을 감정하고 있다.

연구원 쪽은 “이 책은 논학문(동학을 논한 경문)에서 서학과 동학의 다른 점을 설명하고 있다. 이 책이 한문으로 간행된 것은 최제우가 유학자였기 때문으로 추정된다”고 전했다. 이어 “독립기념관이 소장하고 있는 〈동경대전〉 경진판(1880년)은 전문가들 사이에 이견이 있어 이번에 공개된 계미중춘판을 현존하는 〈동경대전〉 가운데 가장 오래된 판본으로 봐야 한다는 게 전문가들의 공통된 견해”라고 덧붙였다. 연구원은 다음 달 30일 연구원에서 이 경전의 문화재적 가치와 의의를 논하는 세미나를 열 예정이다.

이상현 충남역사문화연구원 선임연구원은 “〈동경대전〉계미중춘판은 문화재 지정을 추진하고 있다. 또 이 책을 간행하는데 사용한 나무활자가 상용되던 것인지, 별도로 제작한 것인지 등 다양한 연구도 진행하고 있다”며 “충남의 동학혁명은 제대로 알려지지 못했다는 평이 많다. 시·군에 산재한 동학 사료를 모아 학술대회를 열고 누구나 역사적 실체에 쉽게 접근할 수 있도록 동학 관련 개설서를 발간할 계획”이라고 말했다.

송인걸 기자 igsong@hani.co.kr, 사진 충남역사문화연구원 제공

원문보기:
https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/area/chungcheong/1017069.html?fbclid=IwAR39o9wkAF7cxbIB4iQqt81gasPTpq_jr6PU3qYB9BpRf9Q4CiumtkXB4RM#csidx4fb58ab8d60d53c919900f962672743

Namgok Lee 박석 ‘인도의 문화적 토양과 석가모니의 깨달음’이라는 장(章)

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Namgok Lee

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생활의 리듬으로 새벽에 독서를 하고 내용을 발췌해서 기록해 본다.

속독(速讀)의 부족함을 메꾸기도 하고, 내 의견을 첨부하기도 할 겸.

박석 지음 “인문학, 동서양을 꿰뚫다‘를 계속 읽고 있다.

오늘은 ‘인도의 문화적 토양과 석가모니의 깨달음’이라는 장(章)에서 일부 발췌.

(* 인도와 석가모니를 빼고, ‘문화적 토양과 깨달음’이라고 하면 상당히 보편적인 시각으로 볼 수 있을 것 같다)

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앞에서 화광동진의 관점에서 예수와 공자의 삶과 가르침과 명상을 살펴 보았는데 이 장에서 석가를 이야기하겠다. 한마디로 말하자면 석가의 삶과 가르침과 명상은 예수와 공자의 중간이다.

앞에서 예수와 공자를 비교할 때 이미 짐작했겠지만 개인의 삶과 깨달음은 그가 속한 사회분위기와 불가분의 관계에 있다.

중국은 기원전 11세기를 전후로 은나라에서 주나라로 넘어가면서 종교적 무속적 사회시스템에서 예(禮)와 악(樂)이 중심이 되는 사회시스템으로 전환했다. 모든 것을 저 초월적인 하늘과 신에게 물어보고 결정하던 신본주의에서 인간 중심, 땅 중심의 인문주의로 방향을 틀었던 것이다. 그리고 그 인문주의의 방점을 방점을 찍은 사람이 바로 공자이다.

중국과 마찬가지로 인도에서도 기원전 5~6세기에 이르러 사회적 경제적으로 큰 변화가 일어났는데 낡은 종교인 브라만교가 이런 변화에 대응하지 못하자 새로운 사상운동이 일어났다.

공자를 비롯한 중국의 대부분 사상가들이 천하를 어떻게 다스릴 것인가에 대해 고민했던데 비해 인도의 사상가 대부분은 어떻게 하면 존재의 근원적 고통을 해결하고 해탈에 이를 것인가에 대해 고민했다.

이는 사회문화적 코드의 차이가 얼마나 중요한가를 잘 보여준다. 중국에서는 오래 전에 이미 예(禮) 시스템이 중요한 사회문화적 코드가 되어 있었기 때문에 춘추전국 시대의 수많은 사상가들이 예(禮) 범주 안에서 새로운 사회를 통합할 수 있는 사상을 전개했다.

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(*이 코드에 반대한 사상가들도 이런 문화적 사회적 배경이 바탕이 되어 있다고 말할 수 있다.)

이에 비해 인도에서는 종교가 사회문화의 가장 중요한 코드가 되어 있었기 때문에 새로운 사상운동에서도 어떻게 하면 낡은 종교인 브라만교를 개혁하여 새로운 사회에 어울리는 종교를 만들어낼 것인가가 가장 중요한 과제였다.

석가가 왕의 길을 포기하고 출가의 길을 걸었던 것은 당시 인도사회에서는 종교가 정치보다 더욱 중요한 과제였기 때문일 것이다.

--------

(*중국의 인문적 토양과 인도의 종교적 토양을 읽으면서 드는 생각의 하나.

사회문화적 코드 또한 시대의 변천과 인지의 발달 그리고 사회의 진화에 따라 그 역할이 달라진다고 생각한다.

우열(愚劣)로 단순평가할 수는 없다고 본다.

물론 인도에서 불교는 토착적인 종교에게 밀렸지만, 인도의 사상 풍토에서 발전한 불교는 어떤 점에서 화광동진의 인문적 유교보다 존재에 대한 성찰의 깊이라는 점에서 오히려 현대 즉 물질과 제도의 진화가 상당수준으로 진척된 사회에서 근본적으로 제기되는 ‘관념계에 내재하는 근원적 부자유로부터 벗어나기 위한 대단히 귀중한 정신적 토양을 제공하고 있는 면이 있다.

이런 면에서 볼 때 지금 한국의 사회문화적 코드를 생각하게 된다.

우리는

a] 중국의 유교를 비롯한 여러 사상들, 그리고
b] 인도에서 출발한 불교와 중국을 통해 변화된 내용들,
c] 근대 이후 서양의 기독교 문화를

시대를 거쳐가면서 고스란히 받아들인 사회문화적 배경을 가지고 있다.

그리고 식민지 분단 동족상쟁의 전쟁 절대빈곤을 극복하고 산업화와 민주화를 급속하게 이루어 2차대전 후 독립한 나라들 가운데서 유일하게 선진국에 진입하는 나라로 되었다.

지금 사회적으로는 극심한 양극화, 정신적으로는 극심한 문화지체 속에서

과도기적 혼돈을 겪고 있지만, 그것을 슬기롭게 넘어설 수 있다면

21세기의 새로운 문명을 일구는 대단히 좋은 사회문화적 배경을 가졌다고 볼 수 있다.

혼돈과 쇠퇴의 길일 갈 것인가? 새로운 문명을 향한 창조의 길을 갈 것인가?

요즘의 혼돈 속에서 그 바탕의 힘을 살리는 노력이 이 시대 우리 공동체에 부여된 과제라는 생각이 든다)

2021/11/10

느티나무TV - 노자, 예수, 무위당 이야기 / 이현주 목사(2013.2.5.)

2021/11/09

Confucianism as a Religious Tradition

AAR-Still Hazy.pdf

Confucianism as a Religious Tradition

Confucianism as a Religious Tradition:

Linguistic and Methodological Problems1

Joseph A. Adler

Kenyon College

Gambier, Ohio, USA

Presented to the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (National

Taiwan University, Taipei) and the Department of Philosophy (Tunghai University, Taichung)

2014

This paper is an attempt to sort out some of the semantic difficulties in judging whether or not the Confucian tradition can or should be considered a religion, a religious tradition, or neither. I will focus on three sets of problems:

(1) the question of defining both "Confucianism" and "religion;"

(2) the distinction between "institutional" and "diffused" religion; and

(3) problems introduced by the Sino-Japanese translation of the Anglo-European words for "religion" (宗教 / zongjiao / shūkyō).

The religious status of Confucianism has been controversial in Western intellectual circles since the Chinese Rites Controversy of the 17th century. When Matteo Ricci argued that ancestor worship by Chinese Christian converts should be accomodated by the Church because it was only mere veneration, not true worship, he was obviously assuming a Western (or Abrahamic) model of religion. He and later missionaries searched for "God" and other signs of revelation in the Chinese scriptures; they argued whether Shangdi 上帝 (High Lord) or Tian 天 (Heaven) fit the bill, and whether Chinese "natural theology" was compatible with Christian revelation. In 1877 James Legge, the great missionary-translator, shocked the Shanghai Missionary Conference by averring that the Confucian (and Daoist) scriptures were alternative ways of reaching ultimate truths. His view, however, was based on the erroneous belief that buried beneath the Chinese tradition was an obscured monotheistic revelation, reflected, for example, in the worship of Shangdi and Tian.2

1 This paper was originally presented in slightly shorter form under the title "Confucianism as

Religion / Religious Tradition / Neither: Still Hazy After All These Years" at the 2006 Annual

Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Washington, D.C.; and again in 2010 at the Institute of Religious Studies, Minzu University of China in Beijing. It has been revised again for this presentation.

2 See Norman J. Girardot, The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge's Oriental Pilgrimage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 214-228.

Legge and the forerunners of the field of religious studies (e.g. Max Müller) included Confucianism in their understanding of "world religions." But throughout most of the 20th century the predominant view was that Confucianism was not "really" a religion, at least in the same sense as the more familiar (mainly Western) traditions. The majority of North American scholars in Confucian studies today take it for granted that the religious dimensions of Confucianism are abundantly evident. Yet, despite the growing sophistication of non-Eurocentric theoretical understandings of religion since the late 20th century, there is still widespread disagreement on the issue in the field of religious studies at large, and even more so in other academic fields. Many historians of East Asia, for example, still uncritically assume a Western model of what constitutes religion and exclude Confucianism from that category.

Definitional issues

Aside from the obvious necessity of defining the terms of our discussion, there are particular circumstances involving the Confucian tradition that require clarification. First is the fact that the name of the tradition in Chinese does not include a reference to the historical Master Kong (Kongzi 孔子), except insofar as the Western term in modern times has been translated into Chinese. (Kang Youwei used the term "Kongjiao" in the early 20th century to suggest the parallel with Christianity.) The followers of Confucius were called ru 儒, althogh the semantic range and intent of that term varied throughout the Warring States period. It originally meant "weak" or "pliable, " perhaps referring to the dispossessed members of either the defeated Shang people or the "collateral members of the Zhou royal family who had been disinherited after the breakdown of the feudal order in 770 BC[E]." By the end of the period, though, the meaning had more or less settled on something like "scholars" or "literati" or "classicists," and had come to refer specifically to the followers of Confucius. The teaching or Way (dao 道) of the ru focused on Confucius, the earlier "sages" (shengren 聖人) he venerated, and (importantly) the texts associated with them all. Mencius referred to that tradition as the "Way of the Sages" (shengren zhi dao 聖人之道). But since the late Warring States period the primary names for the tradition have been rujia 儒家 (the ru school of thought, or individuals in that category) and rujiao 儒教

(literally the teaching of the ru, but suggesting Confucianism as a religion because of the parallel with Buddhism as fojiao and Daoism as daojiao). Ruxue is yet another term, referring not to the tradition per se but to Confucian learning or scholarship.

The ru came to be known as the experts in and custodians, as it were, of the cultural traditions embodied in the "Five Scriptures " (wujing 五經) and "Six Arts " (liuyi 六藝). An important corollary is that the term ru clearly implies literacy. So from the beginning, the ru tradition was limited to the literati; it could therefore never become a religion of the masses like Buddhism or Christianity. This is not to deny that elements of Confucian thought and values permeated nearly all levels of Chinese society throughout the imperial period (and beyond). But as a comprehensive religious worldview it is, for the most part, limited to literate intellectuals; it is, pre-eminently, a religion for scholars or intellectuals.

By the Song period, ru were clearly understood to be the literate followers of the

Confucian-Mencian tradition, as opposed to followers of the Buddha, who were usually called shi 釋 (from Shijiamouni 釋迦牟尼, or Śākyamuni), and Daoist adepts (daoshi 道士). In addition, the term daoxue 道學 (learning of the Way), used at first by the Cheng-Zhu school to refer to themselves, eventually came to be roughly equivalent to what has been called in the West "neo-Confucianism," or the revived and reconstituted Confucian tradition that took shape from the Song through the Ming periods. While there are some problems with this term, we can at least be confident that what we designate by the terms "Confucianism" and "Neo-Confucianism" are pretty much equivalent to what in Chinese have been called rujia / rujiao since the Han and daoxue since the Yuan. So this is not so much a problem as a cautionary indication that problems of translation may be involved.

Another problematic aspect of the term "Confucianism" is the question "which Confucianism?" The English term "Confucianism" is a tidy umbrella-term, suggesting a single, more-or-less unified tradition. But as just mentioned, in Chinese we have three terms (rujia, rujiao, and ruxue), all with slightly different connotations. There is also the fact that the Confucian tradition looks quite different depending on whether we are looking at theory or practice. From the 2nd century BCE to the end of the imperial period Confucianism was the official ideology of government in China. This was primarily manifested in the state sponsorship of Confucian texts (the so-called "classics," more accurately called "scriptures") during and after the Han, and the use of Zhu Xi's teachings as the authoritative basis of the civil service examinations beginning in the Yuan dynasty. In terms of practice or application, this resulted in a synergy that supported a hard conservative turn, since governments tend to have a strong stake in preserving social order. For this reason, Confucianism in China became to a great extent the ideology of preserving the status quo and reinforcing social hierarchy. There was also a theoretical component to this shift, resulting largely from Dong Zhongshu in the 2nd century BCE, and reflected, for example, in the Bohu tong 白虎通 (Comprehensive Discussions in the White

Tiger Hall) of 79 CE. This text reflects the conservative trend that, over centuries, would draw Confucianism consistently toward support of stability, a hierarchical order, and the status quo, especially in its statements about women. This "politicized Confucianism" cannot be ignored, but neither should it obscure the fact that there was also, especially from the Song dynasty onward, a strong "spiritual" tradition within Confucianism, whose followers aimed at perfecting themselves and perfecting society. So what we count as Confucianism should not be limited to its manifestation as a conservative ideology.

While the definitional problems surrounding the term Confucianism can be sorted out fairly easily, defining religion seems to be a never-ending process. In fact, the very use of the categories "religion" and "religions" has increasingly been called into question. Recent scholars have taken up Wilfrid Cantwell Smith's seemingly audacious claim, in 1963, that "[n]either religion in general nor any one of the religions ... is in itself an intelligible entity, a valid object of inquiry or of concern either for the scholar or for the man of faith." Jonathan Z. Smith, in a similar vein, claimed in 1982 that "religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study" and "has no independent existence apart from the academy." The argument of the two Smiths is that "religion" as a general category is merely a construct arising from the particular social and historical circumstances of the modern West, and were never conceptualized as distinguishable entities. In Buddhist terminology, neither religion in general nor any specific religion has any "own-being" (svabhāva) or "self-nature" (zixing 自性) and so all statements about religion or religions are statements about nothing. To ask whether Confucianism is a religion is therefore wrongly put on both counts, in their view: there's no such thing as Confucianism and there's no such thing as religion. In W.C. Smith's oft-quoted remark, "the question 'Is Confucianism a religion?' is one that the West has never been able to answer, and China never able to ask" (because the modern Chinese word for religion, zongjiao 宗教, was not coined until the late 19th century -- a point to be discussed shortly).

More recent scholars have stepped back from this brink of disciplinary self-destruction and have successfully refuted W.C. Smith's claim that the pre-modern absence of the modern Chinese word for "religion" prevented the Chinese from thinking about religion. Robert Campany, in a 2003 article in History of Religions, has shown that there are certainly Chinese terms, dating back to classical times, analogous to our various "isms." Chief among these have been dao 道, or "way, " in earlier periods and jiao 教, or "teaching, " in later periods (but considerably before western influence). The term sanjiao 三教, or "Three Teachings, " dating from the Tang dynasty, is clearly an indigenous term referring to three distinguishable things (Rujiao, Daojiao, Fojiao) belonging to one distinguishable category. And for our purposes the fact that one of those things corresponds to what we call "Confucianism" and the other two to what we call "Buddhism" and "Daoism" is, of course, significant. Clearly Confucianism was playing in the same league as Buddhism and Daoism, so it must have been playing the same game (as Ninian Smart used to put it).

Still, there remains the question: what is the game? This brings us back to the hoary problem of defining religion, which I will not discuss at length here. But it is important to note that referring to religion in general does not necessarily imply that such a thing exists apart from specific actors, institutions, or traditions. What we are trying to define is the characteristics or qualities that distinguish some actors, institutions, and traditions as "religious" from others that are not religious. We can ask that question meaningfully without falling into the trap of reification.

The most important point, especially in regard to Chinese religions, is to have a culture-neutral definition. Yet it is still not unusual to find statements to the effect that "while Confucianism may contain religious dimensions, it is not a religion in the Western (or usual) sense of the word." This, obviously, will not do. With the proviso that we need not think of any single definition as universally appropriate, but rather as a provisional way of shedding light on one or more aspects of the multi-dimensional set of phenomena we call "religious," I will note that many scholars have found Frederick Streng's definition of religion to be especially suitable to

Chinese religions. Streng said that religion is "a means to ultimate transformation," where "ultimate" can be understood in whatever terms are appropriate to the tradition. This is, therefore, a formal, culture-neutral definition. In the case of Confucianism, the goal of Sagehood is the endpoint of that transformation, and Heaven symbolizes the ultimacy that makes it religious. "Transformation" not only characterizes the process by which human beings become Sages (or fully humane, ren 仁); it is also a characteristic of the Sage, who "transforms where he passes" (Mencius 7A.13). The Sage, through his de 德 or "moral power, " transforms others and society itself. So by this definition -- one that focuses on what we might call the "spirituality" of the Confucian tradition -- it is not difficult to justify referring to Confucianism as a religious tradition.

Institutional and Diffused Religion

C. K. Yang's distinction between institutional and diffused religion is most helpful in understanding Chinese popular (or local) religion (minjian zongjiao 民間宗教).17 The distinction hinges on the social setting of the practices in question: institutional religion is practiced in a specifically religious social setting, such as a temple or monastery operated by clergy (priests or monks); diffused religion is practiced in a "secular" social setting: one that is not specifically religious, such as the family, community, or state. The case of local community temples is somewhat ambiguous, as Daoist priests usually conduct formal rituals in them, such as the community jiao 醮 ritual, or specific rituals requested and paid for by families or individuals.

But these temples are operated by the local, non-clerical community, and so would primarily fall into the "diffused" category.

The question for us then becomes, what is the social setting of Confucian practice? What, indeed, are the varieties of Confucian practice? It is customary to identify Confucian practice on the levels of the individual, the family, the community, and the state (the last primarily in imperial times). On the level of the individual there is the work of self-cultivation (gongfu 工夫), such as study, self-reflection, and (for some, especially after the Song dynasty) meditation in the form of "quiet-sitting" (jingzuo 靜坐). In the family and clan, or lineage, there is filial behavior and ancestor worship; these, of course, are practiced as well by people who do not self-identify as Confucians. Corresponding to practice at the level of the community in popular religion is the private Confucian school or academy -- again, especially after the Song. Since Confucianism is a tradition for literati (or, today, intellectuals), the academy is the natural social setting for it. The Confucian academies that flourished from the Song through the Qing periods in China -- not to mention those in Korea and those few that are beginning to reappear in the PRC, such as Jiang Qing's "Yangming Retreat" (陽明精舍) -- were central to the self-identification of avowed

Confucians. In addition to being places of learning -- and Confucian learning, of course, is learning to be a Sage, which, as noted above, is a religious goal -- there were also daily ritual observances, including prayers to Confucius and other sages and worthies. On the state level, before 1911 there were the imperial rituals at the Confucian temple, which fell into the "middle" category of state sacrifices. The "great" sacrifices were those to Heaven and Earth, which are

between spirit or mind and body, because the category of qi 氣 covers the entire spectrum from matter to energy to spirit. See my"Varieties of Spiritual Experience, " loc. cit.

17 C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), ch. 12.

often loosely put under the Confucian umbrella, although that usage needs to be defended.

All four levels of Confucian practice -- the individual, the family, the academy, and the state -- are primarily "secular," so Confucianism can be considered an example of "diffused" religion. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to speak of Confucianism as "a religion." To call Confucianism a religion implicitly reifies the phenomenon as a distinct "thing," yet as diffused religion Confucianism does not exist separately and apart from the secular social settings in which it is practiced. The same difficulty applies to popular religion: we do not call popular religion "a religion, " because it is really a large and locally-variable set of religious practices. The inadequacy of such reificationist language is one of the factors that Tu Weiming was referring to when he wrote:

The problem of whether Neo-Confucianism is a religion should not be confused with the more significant question: what does it mean to be religious in the Neo-Confucian community? The solution to the former often depends on the particular interpretive position we choose to take on what consitutes the paradigmatic example of a religion, which may have little to do with our knowledge about Neo-Confucianism as a spiritual tradition (my emphasis). The problem of the reification of "religion" and particular "religions" was central to Wilfrid Cantwell Smith's argument that these terms refer to nothing and have no equivalents outside the modern West. As we have seen, there are, in fact, analogous terms in pre-modern Chinese usage for both the general and specific categories religion and religions . Yet an entirely new set of problems was introduced when the Japanese coined a neologism for the general category in the early years of the Meiji Restoration.

Translating "religion"

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese translators of Western texts and treaties explored a variety of options for rendering the word "religion" and its European equivalents. A few of these options, cited by Anthony Yu, were shinkyō / shenjiao 神教 (spiritual teaching), seidō / shengdao 聖道 (holy or sagely way), and simply kyō / jiao 教 (teaching). The

Japanese eventually settled on shūkyō / zongjiao 宗教 (ancestral teaching), which they appropriated from Chinese Buddhist usages going back at least to the 6th century. In Buddhist usage zongjiao usually meant simply the teachings of a particular school or sect (zong 宗); it was also used in the sense of "revered teaching, " sometimes in reference to Buddhist doctrine as a whole.

Yu argues that the choice of a kanji (Chinese) term bespeaks a deliberate suggestion of "cultural otherness," consistent with the fact that the prime example of "religion" in question in the texts being translated was Christianity. And Christianity was not only a foreign religion; it was a religion that differed in important respects from Shinto and Buddhism. First, it was a religion that demanded exclusive membership, which was vastly different from the usually comfortable coexistence and syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism in Japan. Second, Christianity placed a great deal more emphasis on belief in doctrines than did either of the Japanese religions, which have always focused more on action than on belief (and this generalization applies equally well to Chinese religion). Both of these characteristics are reflected in the binome shūkyō: shū (zong

宗) carries the connotation of separateness, as it is the word that denotes the individual schools or sects of Buddhism (e.g. Zenshū, Tendaishū; kyō (jiao 教) connotes doctrine. According to this line of reasoning, shūkyō was deliberately coined to denote something alien to Japanese culture, and when it was picked up by the Chinese shortly thereafter it carried much the same flavor.

Peter Beyer suggests that another connotation of the zong in zongjiao is organization, and that it is this characteristic of Daoism and Buddhism -- i.e. the fact that they are institutional religions in C.K. Yang's sense -- that renders them good examples of the general category of religion. Organization, he says, "is the prime factor through which religions express their difference, from each other and from matters non-religious." He quotes a statement by Wing-tsit Chan, in the context of a discussion of Kang Youwei's attempts to make Confucianism the state religion of the early Republic of China:

All these arguments, reasonable and factual as they are, can only lead to the conclusion that Confucianism is religious, but they do not prove that Confucianism is a religion, certainly not in the Western sense of an organized church comparable to Buddhism and Taoism. To this day, the Chinese are practically unanimous in denying Confucianism as a religion.

Chan's willingness to count Buddhist and Daoism as religions is clearly based on their institutional organization. Confucianism, being a diffused religion, does not qualify; but it "is religious." The distinction between a "religious tradition" and a "religion" is therefore not as trivial as it may appear. In the case of Confucianism, calling it "a religion" does not work because it is an example of diffused religion, like popular religion in China -- which also resists being called "a religion." Yet both are clearly religious. Adding to this problem is the fact that

Confucianism is basically non-theistic. While Heaven (tian) has some characteristics that overlap the category of deity, it is primarily an impersonal absolute, like dao and Brahman. "Deity" (theos, deus), on the other hand connotes something personal (he or she, not it).

To summarize, much of the "problem" of the religious status of Confucianism centers on the terminology we use in reference to religion and religions. It is not difficult to agree on a "definition" of religion that is capable of illuminating certain aspects of the Confucian tradition in a "religious" light. The problem seems rather to arise when we try to call Confucianism "a religion." The reason for this problem is that "a religion" implies an institutional entity, analogous to a church, and Confucianism is in fact a "diffused religion" whose social base lies in the "secular" realm, in the social institutions of family and the academy. Furthermore, Confucianism is non-theistic. Buddhism is also non-theistic, but it is institutional. So the two most common connotations of "religion" – belief in God or gods and an institutional base – are missing from Confucianism. This, I believe, is why so many people in both the West and East Asia resist calling Confucianism "a religion." So, just as we do not refer to Chinese popular religion as "a religion" because it lacks an organized, institutional base, so too we should recognize that the question "Is Confucianism a religion?" is wrongly put. The better question is, as Tu Weiming suggested, "Is Confucianism a religious tradition?" Although it is important to note that

Confucianism has not always and everywhere been practiced as a religious tradition, as a general statement the question can be answered affirmatively without raising any serious problems.

The suggestion that we refer to Confucianism as "a religious tradition" (zongjiao xing de chuantong 宗教性的傳統) rather than "a religion" (zongjiao 宗教) may sound trivial, especially since there is already such a trend in English-speaking academia. English-speaking scholars increasingly use terminology like "Christian tradition" instead of "Christianity" precisely to avoid reifying or essentializing the tradition. But to make this shift in usage more self-conscious and deliberate would be consistent with Robert Campany's suggestion to think and speak of religions as "repertoires of resources" that are "used variously by individuals negotiating their lives." A "tradition" can be conceived as a repertoire (or "tool-kit") in that what the previous generation chooses to hand down is selectively passed on to the following generation. In focusing on the act of "handing down" and the choices involved therein, the notion of a religious tradition shifts the language toward a more process-oriented way of thinking about religion, thereby weakening the tendency to reify religion and religions that W.C. Smith identified.

To be sure, Smith's own prescription for avoiding the problems of reification also involved the language of "tradition:" he said that we should replace our "religion" language with the language of "personal faith" and "cumulative tradition." "Faith," however, carries too much Western, especially Christian, baggage, and it privileges belief and doctrine over action. This renders Smith's model unsuitable for both Chinese and Japanese religion, and therefore unsuitable as a general model. Smith may have formulated the question for us, but we are still working on the answer.

Confucianism indeed challenges us to critically examine our own assumptions and conceptual framework, including both the western concept of religion and the Chinese concept of zongjiao. The first step is to understand the difference between these two terms. Although zongjiao is the direct translation of "religion, " it does not carry precisely the same connotations as the English term, as we have seen. Another step is to reexamine the conceptual dichotomy of "sacred and profane," as developed by Émile Durkheim, Joachim Wach, and Mircea Eliade. The concept of the sacred as that which is "set apart" from the mundane, secular world is generally considered, at least in Western academic circles, to be a common characteristic of all forms of religion. But Confucianism deconstructs the sacred-profane dichotomy; it asserts that sacredness is to be found in, not behind or beyond, the ordinary activities of human life -- and especially in human relationships. Human relationships are sacred in Confucianism because they are the expression of our moral nature (xing 性), which has a transcendent anchorage in Aheaven@ (tian 天). Herbert Fingarette captured this essential feature of Confucianism in the title of his 1972 book, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred. To assume a dualistic relationship between sacred and profane and to use this as a criterion of religion is to beg the question of whether Confucian can count as a religious tradition.

I therefore conclude that Confucianism is a non-theistic, diffused religious tradition that regards the secular realm of human relations as sacred. Being non-theistic it is like Buddhism. As diffused religion it is like Chinese popular religion. In regarding certain aspects of the mundane world as sacred it is like Tibetan Bӧn, Japanese Shinto, and other indigenous religious traditions. All of these points are part of the unique character of Confucianism and cannot be used a priori to exclude Confucianism from the general category of religion.