2019/01/07

A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution under Raúl Castro: Philip Brenner, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, William M. LeoGrande: 9781442230996: Amazon.com: Books

A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution under Raúl Castro: Philip Brenner, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, William M. LeoGrande: 9781442230996: Amazon.com: Books


 Cuba has undergone dramatic changes since the collapse of European communism. The loss of economic aid and preferential trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries forced the Cuban government to search out new ways of organizing the domestic economy and new commercial relations in an international system dominated by market economies. The resulting economic reforms have reverberated through Cuban society and politics, recreating social inequalities unknown since the 1950s and confronting the political system with unprecedented new challenges. The resulting ferment is increasingly evident in Cuban cultural expression, and the responses to adversity and scarcity have reshaped Cuban social relations.

This completely revised and updated edition focuses on Cuba since Raúl Castro took over the country’s leadership in 2006. A Contemporary Cuba Reader brings together the best recent scholarship and writing on Cuban politics, economics, foreign relations, society, and culture in present-day Cuba. Ideally suited for students and general readers seeking to understand this still-contentious and controversial island, the book includes a substantive introduction setting the historical context, as well as part introductions and a chronology. 

Supplementary resources for students and professors are available here.

Contributions by: Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Denise Blum, Philip Brenner, Michael J. Bustamante, Mariela Castro, Soraya M. Castro Mariño, María Auxiliadora César, Armando Chaguaceda, Margaret E. Crahan, Simon C. Darnell, Antonio Aja Díaz, Jorge I. Domínguez, María Isabel Domínguez, Tracey Eaton, H. Michael Erisman, Richard E. Feinberg, Reina Fleitas Ruiz, Edmundo García, Graciela González Olmedo, Conner Gorry, Katrin Hansing, Adrian H. Hearn, Ted A. Henken, Rafael Hernández, Monica Hirst, Robert Huish, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, Antoni Kapcia, C. William Keck, Emily J. Kirk, John M. Kirk, Hal Klepak, Sinan Koont, Par Kumaraswami, Saul Landau, William M. LeoGrande, Sandra Levinson, Esteban Morales, Nancy Morejón, Blanca Múnster Infante, Armando Nova González, Manuel Orozco, Leonardo Padura Fuentes, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Philip Peters, Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes, Archibald Ritter, Ana M. Ruiz Aguirre, Daniel Salas González, Jorge Mario Sánchez Egozcue, Ann Marie Stock, Julia E. Sweig, Carlos Varela, Sjamme van de Voort, and María del Carmen Zabala Argüelles.

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C.P.M.
3.0 out of 5 starsThe Results of 50+ Years of Castro's Cuba
July 2, 2015
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Roger Chiasson
4.0 out of 5 starsThis new edition of a university textbook was just what ...
March 18, 2015
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Marc Lichtman
3.0 out of 5 starsWhere's Raúl?
May 5, 2016
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A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution Under Raúl Castro

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 3.50  ·  Rating details ·  4 ratings  ·  2 reviews
Cuba has undergone dramatic changes since the collapse of European communism. The loss of economic aid and preferential trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries forced the Cuban government to search out new ways of organizing the domestic economy and new commercial relations in an international system dominated by market economies. The resulting economic reforms have reverberated through Cuban society and politics, recreating social inequalities unknown since the 1950s and confronting the political system with unprecedented new challenges. The resulting ferment is increasingly evident in Cuban cultural expression, and the responses to adversity and scarcity have reshaped Cuban social relations. This completely revised and updated edition focuses on Cuba since Raul Castro took over the country's leadership in 2006. A Contemporary Cuba Reader brings together the best recent scholarship and writing on Cuban politics, economics, foreign relations, society, and culture in present-day Cuba. Ideally suited for students and general readers seeking to understand this still-contentious and controversial island, the book includes a substantive introduction setting the historical context, as well as part introductions and a chronology. Supplementary resources for students and professors are available here. Contributions by: Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Denise Blum, Philip Brenner, Michael J. Bustamante, Mariela Castro, Soraya M. Castro Marino, Maria Auxiliadora Cesar, Armando Chaguaceda, Margaret E. Crahan, Simon C. Darnell, Antonio Aja Diaz, Jorge I. Dominguez, Maria Isabel Dominguez, Tracey Eaton, H. Michael Erisman, Richard E. Feinberg, Reina Fleitas Ruiz, Edmundo Garcia, Graciela Gonzalez Olmedo, Conner Gorry, Katrin Hansing, Adrian H. Hearn, Ted A. Henken, Rafael Hernandez, Monica Hirst, Robert Huish, Marguerite Rose Jimenez, Antoni Kapcia, C. William Keck, Emily J. Kirk, John M. Kirk, Hal Klepak, Sinan Koont, Par Kumaraswami, Saul Landau, William M. LeoGrande, Sandra Levinson, Esteban Morales, Nancy Morejon, Blanca Munster Infante, Armando Nova Gonzalez, Manuel Orozco, Leonardo Padura Fuentes, Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva, Philip Peters, Camila Pineiro Harnecker, Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes, Archibald Ritter, Ana M. Ruiz Aguirre, Daniel Salas Gonzalez, Jorge Mario Sanchez Egozcue, Ann Marie Stock, Julia E. Sweig, Carlos Varela, Sjamme van de Voort, and Maria del Carmen Zabala Arguelles. (less)

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Christopher
Apr 04, 2015rated it liked it  ·  review of another edition
Shelves: politics, history, international-affairs, latin-american-the-caribbean
As Cuba undergoes changes in its domestic politics with the ending of the Castro era and in its foreign policy as relations between the U.S. and Cuba begin to open up, understanding what 50+ years of Castro's socialist planning has done to Cuban society and the Cuban people. This book does a fine job of that approaching Cuban society from multiple angles from the economy and government to society and filmmaking. What is great about this reader is that, unlike many readers out there, the essays are relatively short, covering between 5 and 10 pages on average. Thus any reading assignments from this book will not be too taxing. On the other hand, there are so many articles that, unless you are already a Cuba expert, it is hard to say which ones are worthwhile and which ones aren't. Not really for the general public, but I would recommend this for college classes on contemporary Cuba. (less)
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Agriculture in North Korea - Wikipedia



Agriculture in North Korea - Wikipedia



Agriculture in North Korea
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to navigationJump to search

North Korean farmers in a field.

A North Korean farm, 2008.

The Hungju Chicken Farm, 2007.

A tractor in North Korea.

Crops growing in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Food grown in the private gardens surrounding people's homes.
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Farming in North Korea is concentrated in the flatlands of the four west coast provinces, where a longer growing season, level land, adequate rainfall, and good irrigated soil permit the most intensive cultivation of crops.[1] A narrow strip of similarly fertile land runs through the eastern seaboard Hamgyŏngprovinces and Kangwŏn Province.[1]

The interior provinces of Chagangand Ryanggang are too mountainous, cold, and dry to allow much farming.[1] The mountains contain the bulk of North Korea's forest reserves while the foothills within and between the major agricultural regions provide lands for livestock grazing and fruit tree cultivation.[1]

Major crops include rice and potatoes. 23.4% of North Korea's labor force worked in agriculture in 2012.[2]


Contents
1Farming conditions
2Agricultural products
2.1Rice
2.2Potatoes
2.3Greenhouse products

Farming conditions[edit]

North Korea's sparse agricultural resources limit agricultural production. Climate, terrain, and soil conditions are not particularly favorable for farming, with a relatively short cropping season. Only about 17% of the total landmass, or approximately 20,000 km2, is arable, of which 14,000 km2 is well suited for cereal cultivation; the major portion of the country is rugged mountain terrain.[1]

The weather varies markedly according to elevation, and lack of precipitation, along with infertile soil, makes land at elevations higher than 400 meters unsuitable for purposes other than grazing. Precipitation is geographically and seasonally irregular, and in most parts of the country as much as half the annual rainfall occurs in the three summer months. This pattern favors the cultivation of paddy rice in warmer regions that are outfitted with irrigation and flood control networks. Rice yields are 5.3 tonnes per hectare, close to international norms.[3]

--

Agricultural products[edit]
Rice[edit]

Rice is North Korea's primary farm product.[4]
Potatoes[edit]
Further information: Potato production in North Korea

Potatoes have become an important food source in North Korea. After the 1990s famine, a "potato revolution" has taken place. Between 1998 and 2008 the area of potato cultivation in North Korea quadrupled to 200,000 ha and per capita consumption increased from 16 to 60 kilograms (35 to 132 lb) per year.[5]

The potato was considered a second grade food item, but has become the main staple in rural areas, replacing rice.[6]

Greenhouse products[edit]
Since 2014 many greenhouses have been built, funded by the new semi-private traders in co-operation with farmers, growing soft fruits such as strawberries and melons. The traders arrange distribution and sale in the Jangmadang markets in cities.[7]

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Food distribution system[edit]

Since the 1950s, a majority of North Koreans have received their food through the Public Distribution System (PDS). The PDS requires farmers in agricultural regions to hand over a portion of their production to the government and then reallocates the surplus to urban regions, which cannot grow their own foods. About 70% of the North Korean population, including the entire urban population, receives food through this government-run system.[1]

Before the floods, recipients were generally allotted 600–700 grams per day while high officials, military men, heavy laborers, and public security personnel were allotted slightly larger portions of 700–800 grams per day.[citation needed] As of 2013, the target average distribution was 573 grams of cereal equivalent per person per day, but varied according to age, occupation, and whether rations are received elsewhere (such as school meals).[1]

Decreases in production affected the quantity of food available through the public distribution system. Shortages were compounded when the North Korean government imposed further restrictions on collective farmers. When farmers, who had never been covered by the PDS, were mandated by the government to reduce their own food allotments from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms of grain per person each year, they responded by withholding portions of the required amount of grain. Famine refugeesreported[citation needed] that the government decreased PDS rations to 150 grams in 1994 and to as low as 30 grams by 1997.

The PDS failed to provide any food from April to August 1998 (the “lean” season) as well as from March to June 1999. In January 1998, the North Korean government publicly announced that the PDS would no longer distribute rations and that families needed to somehow procure their own food supplies.[citation needed] By 2005 the PDS was only supplying households with approximately one half of an absolute minimum caloric need.[citation needed] By 2008 the system had significantly recovered, and from 2009 to 2013 daily per person rations averaged at 400 grams per day for much of the year, though in 2011 it dropped to 200 grams per day from May to September.[1]

It is estimated that in the early 2000s, the average North Korean family drew some 80% of its income from small businesses that were technically illegal (though unenforced) in North Korea. 
In 2002, and in 2010, private markets were progressively legalized.[8] As of 2013, urban and farmer markets were held every 10 days, and most urban residents lived within 2 km of a market, with markets having an increasing role in obtaining food.[1]

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Agricultural policy[edit]

Since self-sufficiency remains an important pillar of North Korean ideology, self-sufficiency in food production is deemed a worthy goal. Another aim of government policies—to reduce the "gap" between urban and rural living standards—requires continued investment in the agricultural sector. Finally, as in most countries, changes in the supply or prices of foodstuffs probably are the most conspicuous and sensitive economic concerns for the average citizen.[original research?] The stability of the country depends on steady, if not rapid, increases in the availability of food items at reasonable prices. In the early 1990s, there were severe food shortages.[9][10]

The most far-reaching statement on agricultural policy is embodied in Kim Il-sung's 1964 Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country, which underscores the government's concern for agricultural development. Kim emphasized technological and educational progress in the countryside as well as collective forms of ownership and management.[11]

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Agricultural history[edit]

Agriculture in North Korea relies heavily on manual labor with few machines in sight. During harvest season, students are often drafted in from cities to help bring in the crops in time before the autumn rains.

As industrialization progressed, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the total national output declined from 63.5% and 31.4%, respectively, in 1945 and 1946, to a low of 26.8% in 1990. Their share in the labor force also declined from 57.6% in 1960 to 34.4% in 1989.

In the 1990s decreasing ability to carry out mechanized operations (including the pumping of water for irrigation), as well as lack of chemical inputs, was clearly contributing to reduced yields and increased harvesting and post-harvest losses.[1]

Incremental improvements in agricultural production have been made since the late 1990s, bringing North Korea close to self-sufficiency in staple foods by 2013. In particular rice yields have steadily improved, though yields on other crops have generally not improved. The production of protein foods remains inadequate. Access to chemical fertilizer has declined, but the use of compost and other organic fertilizer has been encouraged.[1][3]

---
Crisis and famine (1994–1998)[edit]
Main article: North Korean famine

From 1994 to 1998 North Korea suffered a famine. Since 1998 there has been a gradual recovery in agriculture production, which by 2013 brought North Korea back close to self-sufficiency in staple foods. However, as of 2013, most households have borderline or poor food consumption, and consumption of protein remains inadequate.[1]

In the 1990s the North Korean economy saw stagnation turning into crisis. Economic assistance received from the USSR and China was an important factor of its economic growth. In 1991 USSR collapsed, withdrew its support and demanded payment in hard currency for imports. China stepped in to provide some assistance and supplied food and oil, most of it reportedly at concessionary prices.[citation needed] But in 1994 China reduced its exports to North Korea. The rigidity in the political and economic systems of North Korea left the country ill-prepared for a changing world. The North Korean economy was undermined and its industrial output began to decline in 1990.

Deprived of industrial inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, and electricity for irrigation, agricultural output also started to decrease even before North Korea had a series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s. This evolution, combined with a series of natural disasters including record floods in 1995, caused one of the worst economic crises in North Korea's history. Other causes of this crisis were high defense spending (about 25% of GDP) and bad governance. It is estimated[citation needed] that between 1992 and 1998 North Korea's economy contracted by 50% and several hundred thousand (possibly up to 3 million) people died of starvation.[12]

North Korea announced in December 1993 a 3-year transitional economic policy placing primary emphasis on agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade. A lack of fertilizer, natural disasters, and poor storage and transportation practices have left the country more than a million tons per year short of grain self-sufficiency. Moreover, lack of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts and oil for electricity generation left many factories idle.

The 1990s famine paralyzed many of the Stalinist economic institutions. The government pursued Kim Jong Il's Songun policy, under which the military is deployed to direct production and infrastructure projects. As a consequence of the government's policy of establishing economic self-sufficiency, the North Korean economy has become increasingly isolated from that of the rest of the world, and its industrial development and structure do not reflect its international competitiveness.

Food shortages[edit]

The food shortage was caused as a direct result of the massive flooding and a mix of political failure and poor amounts of arable land in the country.[9][10][13][14] In 2004, more than half (57%) of the population didn't have enough food to stay healthy. 37% of the children had their growth stunted and 1/3 of mothers were severely undernourished.[15][16]

In 2006, the World Food Program (WFP) and FAO estimated a requirement of 5.3 to 6.5 million tons of grain when domestic production fulfilled only 3.8 million tons.[17] The country also faces land degradation after forests stripped for agriculture resulted in soil erosion.[18] Harsh weather conditions that dented the agricultural output (wheat and barley production dropped 50% and 80% respectively in 2011) and rising global food prices stressed greater food shortage, putting 6 million North Koreans at risk.[19]

With a dramatic increase on the reliance on private sales of goods, as well as increased international aid, the situation has improved somewhat with undernourishment no longer being a major concern for most North Koreans as of 2014, although PDS (the Public Distribution System) still continues.[20]

The yield in food production in 2016 increased by 7 percent from 4.5 million tonnes in 2015 to 4.8 million tonnes and North has produced more food than South.[21][22][23] It is estimated production decreased by 2 percent in 2017 to 4.7 million tonnes.[24] Food production further fell in 2018 thus 641 thousand tons is needed to be imported and in comparison to last year when required 456 thousand tons with 390 thousand bought by and 66 thousand received by North Korea.[25]

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References[edit]

North Korea portal
Agriculture portal

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j k l FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (PDF) (Report). Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Programme. 2013. Retrieved 7 January 2014.
  2. ^ "CIA World Factbook (2012 estimate)". Cia.gov. Retrieved January 5, 2015.
  3. ^ Jump up to:a b Randall Ireson (18 December 2013). "The State of North Korean Farming: New Information from the UN Crop Assessment Report". 38 North. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Retrieved 7 January 2014.
  4. ^ Suominen, Heli (July 31, 2000). "North Koreans study potato farming in Ostrobothnia". Archived from the original on 12 May 2014. Retrieved 10 June 2013.
  5. ^ "2008 – The International Year of the Potato". Current Concerns Journal. Retrieved 9 June 2013.
  6. ^ Ralph Hassig; Kongdan Oh (16 November 2009). The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 110–. ISBN 978-0-7425-6720-7.
  7. ^ Lankov, Andrei (5 March 2017). "Taste of strawberries". The Korea Times. Retrieved 1 May 2017.
  8. ^ "It's not all doom and gloom in Pyongyang". Asia Times. September 23, 2011. Retrieved October 9, 2011.
  9. ^ Jump up to:a b United Nations Development Program, Millennium Development Goals and the DPRK, retrieved 21 October 21, 2011, "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2011-12-01. Retrieved 2013-05-15.
  10. ^ Jump up to:a b Woo-Cumings, Meredith (2002) The political ecology of famine: the North Korean catastrophe and its lessons. Online at: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/SIDEL/images/WooFamine.pdf
  11. ^ Josephson, Paul R. (25 December 2009). Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth?: Technological Utopianism under Socialism, 1917–1989. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 143. ISBN 978-0-8018-9841-9.
  12. ^ "Foreign Assistance to North Korea" (PDF). Congressional Research Service.
  13. ^ Coll, Steve. "North Korea's Hunger". The New Yorker – Daily Comment. Retrieved February 16, 2012.
  14. ^ "CIA World Fact Book".
  15. ^ Václav Havel; Kjell Magne Bondevik; Elie Wiesel (October 30, 2006). Failure to Protect – A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea (PDF) (Report). DLA Piper and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. p. 12.
  16. ^ "Mass Starvations in North Korea". North Korea Now. Archived from the original on October 10, 2009. Retrieved February 16, 2012.
  17. ^ Human Rights Watch (2006). "A matter of survival: the North Korean government's control of food and the risk of hunger". 18 (3). Retrieved December 14, 2013.
  18. ^ "CIA World Factbook". Central Intelligence Agency.
  19. ^ Kate, Daniel Ten (September 16, 2011). "North Korea's food shortages worsening, U.N. says". Bloomberg News. Retrieved February 16, 2012.
  20. ^ Andrei, Lankov (March 21, 2013). The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. ISBN 9780199975846.
  21. ^ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-15/north-korea-s-economy-remains-tiny-but-has-some-bright-spots
  22. ^ http://www.dailynk.com/english/m/read.php?cataId=nk03600&num=14330
  23. ^ https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/09/27/North-Koreas-food-shortage-grows-but-elites-remain-unaffected-Seoul-says/4001474997303/
  24. ^ http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20180228006500320&site=0200000000&mobile
  25. ^ https://www.france24.com/en/20181213-n-korea-food-production-down-2018-un-body?ref=tw
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Economy of Cuba - Wikipedia

Economy of Cuba - Wikipedia



Private businesses[edit]

Owners of small private restaurants (paladares) originally could seat no more than 12 people[75] and can only employ family members. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated.
As of 2012, more than 150,000 farmers had signed up to lease land from the government for bonus crops. Before, home-owners were only allowed to swap; once buying and selling were allowed, prices rose.[45]
In cities, "urban agriculture" farms small parcels. Growing organopónicos (organic gardens) in the private sector has been attractive to city-dwelling small producers who sell their products where they produce them, avoiding taxes and enjoying a measure of government help from the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) in the form of seed houses and advisers.

Poverty[edit]

Typical wages range from 400 non-convertible Cuban pesos a month, for a factory worker, to 700 per month for a doctor, or a range of around 17–30 US dollars per month. However, the Human Development Index of Cuba still ranks much higher than the vast majority of Latin American nations.[76] After Cuba lost Soviet subsidies in 1991, malnutrition resulted in an outbreak of diseases.[77] Despite this, the poverty level reported by the government is one of the lowest in the developing world, ranking 6th out of 108 countries, 4th in Latin America and 48th among all countries.[78] Pensions are among the smallest in the Americas at $9.50/month. In 2009, Raúl Castro increased minimum pensions by 2 dollars, which he said was to recompense for those who have "dedicated a great part of their lives to working... and who remain firm in defense of socialism".[79]

Public facilities[edit]

  • La Bodega – For Cuban nationals only. Redeems coupons for rice, sugar, oil, matches and sells other foodstuffs including rum.[45]
  • La Coppelia – A government-owned facility offering ice cream, juice and sweets.
  • Paladar – A type of small, privately owned restaurant facility.
  • La Farmacia – Low-priced medicine, with the lowest costs anywhere in the world.
  • Etecsa – National telephone service provider.
  • La Feria – A weekly market (Sunday market-type) owned by the government.
  • Cervecería Bucanero – A beverage manufacturer, providing both alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.
  • Ciego Montero – The main soft-drink and beverage distributor.

Connection with Venezuela[edit]

The relationship cultivated between Cuba and Venezuela in recent years resulted in agreements in which Venezuela provides cheap oil in exchange for Cuban "missions" of doctors to bolster the Venezuelan health care system. Cuba has the second-highest per capita number of physicians in the world (behind Italy). The country sends tens of thousands of doctors to other countries as aid, as well as to obtain favorable trade terms.[80] In nominal terms, the Venezuelan subsidy is higher than whatever subsidy the Soviet Union gave to Cuba,[81] with the Cuban state receiving cheap oil and the Cuban economy receiving around $6 billion annually. According to Mesa-Lago, a Cuban-born US economist. "If this help stops, industry is paralysed, transportation is paralysed and you'll see the effects in everything from electricity to sugar mills," he said.[82]
From an economic standpoint, Cuba relies much more on Venezuela than Venezuela does on Cuba. As of 2012, Venezuela accounted for 20.8% of Cuba's GDP while Cuba only accounted for roughly 4% of Venezuela's.[83] Because of this reliance, the most recent economic Crisis in Venezuela (2012-present), with inflation nearing 800% and GDP shrinking by 19% in 2016, Cuba is not receiving their amount of payment and heavily subsidized oil. Further budget cuts are in the plans for 2018 marking a third straight year.[84]

Economic freedom[edit]

In 2014 Cuba's economic freedom score was 28.7, making its economy one of the world's least free. Its overall score was 0.2 point higher than last year, with deteriorations in trade freedom, fiscal freedom, monetary freedom and freedom from corruption counterbalanced by an improvement in business freedom. Cuba ranked least free of 29 countries in the South and Central America/Caribbean region and its overall score was significantly lower than the regional average. Over the 20-year history of the Index, Cuba's economic freedom remained stagnant near the bottom of the “repressed” category. Its overall score improvement was less than 1 point over the past two decades, with score gains in fiscal freedom and freedom from corruption offset by double-digit declines in business freedom and investment freedom.
Despite some progress in restructuring the state sector since 2010, the private sector remained constrained by heavy regulations and tight state controls. The Heritage Foundation states that open-market policies were not in place to spur growth in trade and investment and the lack of competition continued to stifle dynamic economic expansion. A watered-down reform package endorsed by the Party trimmed the number of state workers and expanded the list of approved professions, but many details of the reform remained obscure.[74]

Taxes and revenues[edit]

As of 2009, Cuba had $47.08 billion in revenues and $50.34 billion in expenditures with 34.6% of GDP in public debt, an account balance of $513 million and $4.647 billion in reserves of foreign exchange and gold.[2] Government spending is around 67 percent of GDP and public debt is around 35 percent of the domestic economy. Despite reforms, the government continues to play a large role in the economy.[74]
The top individual income tax rate is 50 percent. The top corporate tax rate is 30 percent (35 percent for wholly foreign-owned companies). Other taxes include a tax on
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Agriculture in Cuba - Wikipedia



Agriculture in Cuba - Wikipedia
Agriculture in Cuba
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to navigationJump to search

A sugarcane plantation in rural Cuba

Agriculture in Cuba has played an important part in the economy for several hundred years. Today, it contributes less than 10% to the gross domestic product (GDP), but it employs about 20% of the working population. About 30% of the country's land is used for crop cultivation.[1]

The inefficient agricultural industry in Cuba has led to the need to import large amounts of beef and lard.[citation needed][2] Cuba now imports about 70–80% of all the food its people consume[3] and 80–84% of the food it provides via the rations to the public.[2] The rationing program accounts for about a third of the food energy the average Cuban consumes.[4] However these affirmations are contested. [5]


Contents
1History
2Urban agriculture
3Crops
3.1Cassava
3.2Citrus
3.3Coffee
3.4Potato
3.5Rice
3.6Sugar
3.7Tobacco
3.8Tropical fruits
4See also
5References
6External links
History[edit]

Cuba's agricultural history can be divided into five periods, reflecting Cuban history in general:
Precolonial (before 1492)
Spanish colonial (1492–1902)
Cuban Republic (1902–1958)
Castro's Cuba, pre-Soviet bloc collapse (1959–1992)
Castro's Cuba, post-Soviet bloc collapse (1993–present)

During each of these periods, agriculture in Cuba has confronted many and unique obstacles.

Before the revolution 1959, the agricultural sector in Cuba was largely oriented towards and dominated by the US economy. After the Cuban Revolution, the revolutionary government nationalised farmland, and the Soviet Union supported Cuban agriculture by paying premium prices for Cuba's main agricultural product, sugarcane, and by delivering fertilizers. Sugar was bought by the Soviets at more than five times the market price. 95% of its citrus crop was exported to the COMECON. On the other hand, the Soviets provided Cuba with 63% of its food imports and 90% of its petrol.[6]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cuban agricultural sector faced a very difficult period. Cuba had to rely on sustainable farming methods. Agricultural production fell by 54% between 1989 and 1994.[7] The government aimed to strengthen agricultural biodiversity by making a greater range of varieties of seed available to farmers.[8] In the 1990s, the government prioritized food production and put focus on small farmers.[6]Already in 1994, the government allowed farmers to sell their surplus product directly to the population. This was the first move to lift the state's monopoly on food distribution.[9]Due to the shortage in artificial fertilizers and pesticides, Cuba's agricultural sector largely turned organic,[10] with the Organopónicos playing a major role in this transition.

Today, there are several forms of agricultural production, including cooperatives such as UBPCs (Unidad Básica de Producción Cooperativa) and CPAs (Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria).
Urban agriculture[edit]
Main article: Organopónicos

Due to the shortage of the fuel, and so severe lack of transportation, a growing proportion of the agricultural production takes place in urban agriculture. In 2002, 35,000 acres (140 km2) of urban gardens produced 3.4 million metric tons of food. Current estimates are as high as 81,000 acres (330 km2).[11] In Havana, 90% of the city's fresh produce come from local urban farms and gardens. In 2003, more than 200,000 Cubans worked in the expanding urban agriculture sector.[12]
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The good life in Havana: Cuba's green revolution - Independent Online Edition > Americas

The good life in Havana: Cuba's green revolution - Independent Online Edition > Americas

The good life in Havana: Cuba's green revolution
Twenty years ago, following the collapse of the Soviet empire, Fidel Castro's small island faced a food crisis. Today, its network of small urban farmers is thriving, an organic success story that is feeding the nation. Andrew Buncombe reports

Published: 08 August 2006



To the right lay revolutionary tomatoes and to the left lay revolutionary lettuces, while in the glass in my hand - filled to the brim and frothing with vitality - was the juice from revolutionary mangoes. It was thick, unfiltered and fabulously sweet. It was also organic.

"Yes, it is very good. It's all natural," said Miguel Salcines Lopez, his brow dotted with sweat from the midday sun, as he raised a glassful to his lips. "Growing food in this way is much more interesting. It is much more intelligent," he adds.

Almost five decades after the now ailing Fidel Castro and his comrades overthrew the dictator Fulgencio Batista and seized power in Cuba, another revolution, largely unnoticed by most visitors and tourists, is well underway on this Caribbean island. And Mr Salcines and his small urban farm at Alamar, an eastern suburb of the capital, Havana, are at the centre of a social transformation that may turn out to be as important as anything else that has been achieved during Castro's 47 years in power.

Spurred into action by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disastrous impact this had on its subsidised economy, the government of Cuba was forced to take radical steps to feed its people. The solution it chose - essentially unprecedented both within the developed and undeveloped world - was to establish a self-sustaining system of agriculture that by necessity was essentially organic.

Laura Enriquez, a sociologist at the University of California Berkeley, who has written extensively on the subject of Latin American agriculture, said: "What happened in Cuba was remarkable. It was remarkable that they decided to prioritise food production. Other countries in the region took the neo-liberal option and exported 'what they were good at' and imported food. The Cubans went for food security and part of that was prioritising small farmers."

Cuba is filled with more than 7,000 urban allotments or "organoponicos", which fill perhaps as many as 81,000 acres. They have been established on tiny plots of land in the centre of tower-block estates or between the crumbling colonial homes that fill Havana. One afternoon I visited a small garden of tomatoes and spinach that had been dug just a few hundred yards from the Plaza de la Revolution, a vast concrete square where Castro and his senior regime members annually oversee Cuba's May Day parade. More than 200 gardens in Havana supply its citizens with more than 90 per cent of their fruit and vegetables.

Of all these gardens, the Vivero Organoponico Alamar is considered one of the most successful. Established less than 10 years ago, the 0.7 hectare plot employs about 25 people and provides a range of healthy, low-cost food to the local community. The hand-written blackboard at the shop attached to the garden listed mangoes at the equivalent of 2p a pound, black beans at about 15 pence and plantains for 12p. Everything looked as if it had been picked just that morning, which it probably had.

Mr Salcines led a brief tour of his garden, stopping off to point out things of which he was particularly proud. There was the shed of tomatoes that had produced five tons of fruit in six months, a self-designed metal pyramid structure which he claimed focused natural energy and benefited not just the plants but the gardeners as well; a worm farm wriggling with California Red worms and the bright marigolds planted at the end of each row of vegetables to attract bees and butterflies. He was also very proud of his crop of splendid, shiny mint. "The Hotel Nacional [Havana's state-run landmark hotel once frequented by the likes of Al Capone] uses our mint for its mojitos [a mint-based cocktail]," he said. "It's because it's organic."

The economics of various organoponicos differ. At the Metropolitana Organoponico in the city centre, two of the four workers who tend the plot said that the land was owned by the government and that everything grown there was split 50-50. "It's very good. It means that food does not have to be brought into the city," said one of the men.

At Alamar, Mr Salcines said that once the workers had grown their set quota of food and given that to the government, the surplus was theirs to sell with the profits then divided among them. Such a sense of co-operation - along with the free meals for the workers - added to the heady sense of idealism at Alamar, the sort of socialist idealism that has earned Cuba many international supporters over the years, despite Castro's dictatorial rule and his repression of political dissent.

Such farms barely existed in the late 1980s. Back then, Cuba's economy was extraordinarily reliant on subsidies from its political older brother, the Soviet Union. It's agriculture was designed with one aim in mind - namely to produce as much sugar cane as possible, which the Soviets bought at more than five times the market price, in addition to purchasing 95 per cent of its citrus crop and 73 per cent of its nickel. In exchange, the Soviets provided Cuba with 63 per cent of its food imports and 90 per cent of its petrol. Such a relationship made Cuba extraordinarily vulnerable. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, such subsidies halted almost overnight. Suddenly, the future looked bleak.

Nowhere was the impact felt more strongly than in the stomachs of the ordinary people. Figures produced by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) suggest that the daily calorie intake of the average Cuban fell from about 2,600 calories a day in the late 1980s to between 1,000 and 1,500 by 1993. Essentially, people were having to get by on about half the food they had been eating.

With no subsidies and limited resources, the Cuban regime took the decision to look inwards. Ceasing to organise its economy around the export of "tropical products" and the import of food, it decided to maximise food production. By necessity, this meant a back-to-basics approach; with no Soviet oil for tractors or fertiliser it turned to oxen, with no Soviet oil for its fertiliser and pesticide it turned to natural compost and the production of natural pesticides and beneficial insects. It is estimated that more than 200 locally based centres specialising in biopesticides annually produce 200 tons of verticillium to control whitefly, and 800 tons of beaveria sprays to control beetles.

Professor Jules Pretty, of the University of Essex's department of biological sciences, recently wrote: "Cut banana stems baited with honey to attract ants are placed in sweet potato fields and have led to control of sweet potato weevil. There are 170 vermicompost centres, the annual production of which has grown from 3 to 9,300 tons. Crop rotations, green maturing, intercropping and soil conservation have all been incorporated into polyculture farming."

Remarkably, this organic revolution has worked. Annual calorie intake now stands at about 2,600 a day, while UNFAO estimates that the percentage of the population considered undernourished fell from 8 per cent in 1990-2 to about 3 per cent in 2000-2. Cuba's infant mortality rate is lower than that of the US, while at 77 years life expectancy is the same.

Everyone appears to agree that this new, organic approach is far more efficient than the previous Soviet model that stressed production at all costs. Fernando Funes, head of the national Pasture and Forage Research Unit, told Harper's magazine: "In that old system it took 10 or 15 units of energy to produce one unit of food energy. At first we did not care about economics, [but] we were realising just how inefficient it was."

A second step Cuba took in the mid-1990s to try to save its economy was the establishment of mass tourism. Yet while this has provided the government with a ready source of millions of dollars in hard currency, it has also helped produce a dual-track society with its own tensions and clear divide between those who have access to foreign currency - or the Cuban Convertible Peso - and those who make do with the lowly Cuban peso, which cannot be used to buy many goods.

By contrast, Mr Salcines believes the introduction of organoponicos - a loosening of government control that also saw small restaurants and some private businsesses established - has been a success. He also believes these allotments have stayed true to Cuba's revolutionary ideas.

"Not everything is perfect," said Mr Salcines. "But if you look what capitalism has done for other countries in the region, I believe that the situation for poor people is better in Cuba. Our society is more equal. "

Experts, such as Professor Pretty, believe Cuba may be one of the only countries in the world to have adopted wholesale a self-sustaining system of agriculture. "They had no choice," he said. "Their only choice was to look inwards, to the resources they had and say: 'Can we make more of these resources?'"

Champions of organic, non-intensive agriculture might cite Cuba as an example that other countries could adopt rather than following the large-scale, industrial agriculture system. But could Cuba's labour-intensive example be repeated without the availability of large numbers of enforced workers? "I don't know. I think it is true that it has required much labour," said Professor Pretty. "The thing is that it has also produced a lot of food ... People are also closer to their food production. [In the west] we are worried that we don't know about where our food comes from. In Havana, people are closer to their food production and that may also have psychological benefits."

The same day as visiting the allotment at Alamar, I took a visit to the other side of Cuba's dual-track economy. The Hotel Nacional has hosted the likes of Winston Churchill and Fred Astaire, and more recently Naomi Campbell and Leonardo DiCaprio. On a lawn overlooking the ocean, I paid the equivalent of an ordinary Cuban's weekly wage paid for a mojito. It tasted great, but it didn't taste of the revolution.

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Organopónicos - Wikipedia



Organopónicos - Wikipedia
Organopónicos
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Produce and flowers from a Cuban organopónico

Crop rows at Alamar Organic Farm in Havana. Many organoponics have been developed in urban environments, as seen by the city-scape in the background.

Organopónicos or organoponics is a system of urban agriculture using organic gardens. It originated in Cuba and is still mostly focused there. It often consists of low-level concrete walls filled with organic matter and soil, with lines of drip irrigation laid on the surface of the growing media. Organopónicos is a labour-intensive form of localagriculture.

Organopónico farmers employ a wide variety of agroecological techniques including integrated pest management, polyculture, and crop rotation. Most organic materials are also produced within the gardens through composting. This allows production to take place with few petroleum-based inputs.[1]

Organopónicos first arose as a community response to lack of food security during the Special Period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is publicly functioning in terms of ownership, access, and management, but heavily subsidized and supported by the Cuban government.


Contents
1Background
2Current status
3Applicability beyond Cuba
4See also
5References
6External links
Background[edit]

During the Cold War, the Cuban economy relied heavily on support from the Soviet Union. In exchange for sugar, Cuba received subsidized petroleum, petroleum products, agrochemicals (such as fertilizers and pesticides), and other farm products. Moreover, approximately 50% of Cuba's food was imported. Cuba's food production was organized around Soviet-style, large-scale, industrial agricultural collectives.[2] Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba used more than 1 million tons of synthetic fertilizers and up to 35,000 tons of herbicides and pesticides per year.[2]

With the collapse of the USSR, Cuba lost its main trading partner and the favorable trade subsidies it received, as well as access to oil, chemical fertilizers, pesticides etc. From 1989 to 1993, the Cuban economy contracted by 35%; foreign trade dropped 75%.[2]Without Soviet aid, domestic agriculture production fell by half. This time, called in Cuba the Special Period, food scarcities became acute. The average per capita calorie intake fell from 2,900 a day in 1989 to 1,800 calories in 1995. Protein consumption plummeted 40%.[2]

Without food, Cubans had to learn to start growing their own food rather than importing it. This was done through small private farms and thousands of pocket-sized urban market gardens—and, lacking chemicals and fertilizers, food became de facto organic.[3]Thousands of new urban individual farmers called parceleros (for their parcelas, or plots) emerged. They formed and developed farmer cooperatives and farmers markets. These urban farmers found the support of the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), who provided university experts to train volunteers with organic pesticides and beneficial insects.

Without artificial fertilizers, hydroponic equipment from the Soviet Union was no longer usable. Instead, they were converted for the use of organic gardening. The original hydroponic units, long cement planting troughs and raised metal containers, were filled with composted sugar waste, thus turning hydroponicos ("hydroponics") into organopónicos.

The rapid expansion of urban agriculture in the early 1990s included the colonization of vacant land both by community and commercial groups. In Havana, organopónicos were created in vacant lots, old parking lots, abandoned building sites and even spaces between roads.

Current status[edit]

Havana small farm

More than 35,000 hectares (over 87,000 acres) of land are being used in urban agriculture in Havana alone.[4]

Havana produces enough food for each resident to receive a daily serving of 280 grams (9.88 ounces) of fruits and vegetables. The urban agricultural workforce in Havana has grown from 9,000 in 1999 to 23,000 in 2001 and more than 44,000 in 2006.[4] However, Cuba still has food rationing for basic staples. Approximately 69% of these rationed basic staples (wheat, vegetable oils, rice, etc.) are imported.[5] Overall, however, approximately 16% of food is imported from abroad.[5]

The structures of organopónicos vary from garden to garden. Some are run by state employees, others are run cooperatively by the gardeners themselves. The reliance on the state government cannot be overlooked. The government provides community farmers with the land and the water, and sells key materials such as organic compost, seeds, irrigation parts, and organic pesticides called "biocontrols" in the form of beneficial insectsand plant-based oils. These biological pest and disease controls are produced in some 200 government centers across the country.[2] 

All garden crops such as beans, tomatoes, bananas, lettuce, okra, eggplant and taro are grown intensively within Havana using only organic methods, the only methods permitted in the urban parts of Havana. No chemicals are used in 68% of Cuban corn, 96% of cassava, 72% of coffee and 40% of bananas. Between 1998 and 2001, chemicals were reduced by 60% in potatoes, 89% in tomatoes, 28% in onion and 43% in tobacco.[4]

By 1999, some farmers could have black beans, rice, tomato or even a boiled potato to eat; this is impressive by Cuban standards.[6]

Despite the successes of organoponics, efforts of the Cuban government have been negatively evaluated by some authors. A 2012 article in the free-market oriented magazine The Economist stated:

The grip of the state on Cuban farming has been disastrous. State farms of various kinds hold 75% of Cuba's 6.7m hectares of agricultural land. In 2007 some 45% of this was lying idle, much of it overrun by marabú, a tenacious weed. Cuba is the only country in Latin America where killing a cow is a crime (and eating beef a rare luxury). That has not stopped the cattle herd declining from 7m in 1967 to 4m in 2011.
— The Economist

The same article claimed that As of 2012, there were plans to privatise farming and dismantle organopónicos, as part of broader plans to improve productivity.[7]

Applicability beyond Cuba[edit]

In Venezuela, the socialist government is trying to introduce urban agriculture to the populace.[8] In Caracas, the government has launched Organoponico Bolivar I, a pilot program to bring organopónicos to Venezuela. Urban agriculture has not been embraced in Caracas.[8] Unlike Cuba, where organopónicos arose from the bottom-up out of necessity, the Venezuelan organopónicos are a top-down initiative based on Cuba's success. Another problem for urban agriculture in Venezuela is the pollution in major urban areas. At the Organoponico Bolivar I, a technician reads a pollution meter in the garden every 15 days.[8]
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