Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch16XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

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Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

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XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

The preceding chapter has revealed that the moment we begin to

consider Man on the individual level, we are faced with the exist-

ence of several degrees among men. We have seen also that the

highest of ail human degrees is 'saintship' ( waliiyah). The Saint

( waliy) is the highest 'knower' of God, and consequently (in terms

of the world-view of Ibn' Arabï) of the essential structure of Being.

Otherwise expressed, the Saint is the Perfect Man par excellence.

The central topic of this chapter will be the concept of 'saintship' .1

We may begin by remarking that, in Ibn' Arabï's understanding, the

concept of Saint comprises both Prophet (nabiy) and Apostle

(rasül). Briefly stated, the Saint is the widest concept comprising

Prophet and Apostle; next is the concept of Prophet which com-

prises that of Apostle; and the Apostle is the narrowest of ail. As

al-Qâshânï says, 'every Apostle is a Prophet, and every Prophet is a

Saint', but not vice versa.

On the relation between the three concepts, there is a consider-

ably long passage in the Fu$Ü$ 2 in which Ibn 'Arabï develops his

thought. The argument is very entangled and somewhat confusing,

but the gist of it may be clarified in the following way.

The first point to note concerning the concept of Saint is that

waliy is properly a Divine Name. The fact that waliy is one of the

Names of God implies that it is an aspect of the Absolute. In this

respect, the Saint is radically different from the Prophet and the

Apostle because the words nabiy and rasül are not Divine Names;

they are peculiar to human beings. 'Waliy is a Name of God', as Ibn

'Arabi says, 'but God has neither called Himself nabiy nor rasül,

while He has named Himself waliy and has made it one of His own

Names' .3

Thus waliy is a Divine Name. But even a man, when his know-

ledge of God attains to its highest point, becomes entitled to be

called by the same name; he is a waliy. However, the human waliy

himself, being so keenly conscious of his 'servant-ness' ('ubüd-

ïyah) does not like to make the name publicly his own. For he knows

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264 Sufem and Taoism

that the word waliy properly belongs to God alone, and that when a

human being becomes a waliy he is supposed to have transcended

his position of 'servant-ness' and have put himself in the position of

Lordship (rubübïyah ). But, whether he likes it or not, it does

sometimes happen that a mystic transcends his position of

'servant-ness'. This occurs by a mystic being completely drowned in

the Absolute and losing the consciousness of his own

'servant-ness' .4

lt is to be remarked that, since waliy is a name common to God

and Man, the walayah never ceases to exist. As God exists everlast-

ingly, the 'saintship' will exist forever. As long as there remains in

the world even a single man of the highest spiritual power who

attains to the rank of 'saintship' - and, in fact, such a man will

certainly exist in every age -the 'saintship' itself will be kept intact.

In contrast to this, the prophethood and apostleship are histori-

cally conditioned, and can, therefore, be intermittent or even disap-

pear completely. 5 As a matter of fact, we know that the chain of

prophethood has historically corne to an end at Mu])ammad, the last

of all authentic Prophets. After Mu])ammad, there does not exist

any longer a Prophet, who is at the same time a Law-giver

(musharri'). After Mu])ammad we have only what Ibn' Arabi calls

'general prophethood' (nubuwwah 'ammah ), i.e., prophethood

without institution of Law, which is nothing other than 'saintship'.

Only this name (i.e., waliy) remains forever among mankind, not

only in the present world but also in the Hereafter. As for the names

which are peculiar to Man to the exclusion of God (i.e., Prophet and

Apostle), they cease to exist with the cessation of prophethood and

apostleship. God, however, has shown special mercy upon his ser-

vants and has allowed to subsist among them 'general prophethood'

which is not accompanied by institution of Law. 6

This passage makes it clear that, in the conception of Ibn 'Arabi,

institution of Law (tashri') constitutes one of the characteristics of

the Prophet. From this particular point of view, he divides the

Prophets into two kinds: (1) those who institute Law (nabiy

musharri') and (2) those whose prophetic activity is done within a

given Law (nabiy musharra' la-hu). The first category is represented

by men like Moses, Jesus, and Mu])ammad, each one of whom

instituted a particular Law by a Divine Command. The second

category is exemplified by those who, like the successive Prophets in

Israel, live and fulfil their prophetic mission within the boundaries

of a given Law instituted by Moses.

Since, as we have seen, the Saint is the widest concept in terms of

extension and is the most basic one at that, there can be no Prophet,

no Apostle unless the' saintship' is first established. The Prophet is a

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Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 265

Saint who adds to his 'saintship' one more distinguishing mark;

namely, a particular knowledge of things unknown and unseen.

And the Apostle is a Saint who adds to his 'saintship' and 'prophet-

hood' one more characteristic; namely being conscious of the mis-

sion and capacity of conveying Divine messages to the people who

follow him.

From this we leam that the first requirement for a man to be a

Perfect Man is to be in the rank of a waliy, and that waliiyah is the

mostfundamental and most general attribute of all types of Perfect

Man. What, then, does walayah mean?

Waliiyah implies, first and foremost, a perfect knowledge of the

ultimate truth conceming the Absolute, the world, and the relation

between the Absolute and the world. 7 A man who has attained to

the rank of 'saintship' has a clear consciousness that he is a self-

manifestation of the Absolute, and that, as such, he is essentially

one with the Absolute, and, indeed, ultimately is the Absolute itself.

He is also conscious of the fact that, on the analogy of the inner

structure of himself, all the phenomenal Many are self-

manifestations of the Absolute and are, in the sense, one with the

Absolute. This precisely is the consciousness of the ultimate and

essential 'oneness of Being' (wa}Jdah al-wujüd).

This consciousness of the 'oneness of Being' he obtains only by

being 'annihilated' and completely immersed in the Absolute.

Through the experience of'self-annihilation' he transforms himself,

so to speak, into the 'inside' of the Absolute, and from there sees the

reality of all things by 'immediate tasting'. The concept of 'self-

annihilation' (fana') in this sense plays an exceedingly important

role in the theory of waliiyah. The 'self-annihilation' is, in fact, the

first item in the essential attributes of the Saint.

Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes three stages in 'self-annihilation' .8 The

first is the annihilation of the attributes. This stage is called by Ibn

'Arabi takhalluq. lt means that the mystic has all his human attri-

butes 'annihilated' and in their place 'assumes as his own' (takhal-

luq) the Divine Attributes. lt is, as Bali Efendi tersely describes it,9

'annihilating his attributes in the Attributes of the Absolute'. The

second stage is called tal)aqquq. It means that the mystic has his

essence (dhat) 'annihilated' and realizes (tal)aqquq) in himself his

being one with the Absolute. Bali Efendi 10 describes it as 'annihilat-

ing his essence in the Essence of the Absolute'. The third and the

last stage is called ta'alluq. The word ta'alluq, meaning literally 'firm

adherence', indicates that the man in this state remains firmly

attached to the essential property of walâyah so that he is never

separated from it no matter what he may do in the world of empiri-

cal existence. The state of ta'alluq corresponds to what is more

266 Sufism and Taoism

usually known as the state of 'self-subsistence' (baqâ') which cornes

after the state of fanâ'. In this spiritual state, the mystic regains his

self which he has once annihilated, but he regains it not in himself

but in the very midst of the Divine Essence. In his fully illumined

consciousness, there is no longer any trace of his old persona! ego.

He is only conscious that after having lost his life he now subsists in

the Divine Essence, and that, therefore, it is, in reality, not he who

exists but the Absolute itself. Whatever he does, it is not he but God

who does it. Bali Efendi describes it as 'annihilating his actions in

the actions of the Absolu te'. 11

'Saintship' cornes into existence only on the basis of the experi-

ence of 'self-annihilation' here depicted. And wide indeed is the

consciousness of the Saint who has passed through such an experi-

ence. For he witnesses the astonishing scene of all things merging

into the limitless ocean of Divine Life, and he is conscious that all

this is actually taking place in himself. At the very height of this

spiritual state, the consciousness of the Saint is identical with the

Divine Consciousness which has not yet begun to become split into

an infinity of 'determillations' (ta'ayynnât). 12 Such a man is the

highest 'knower'. And such a man naturally falls into deep silence

(suküt), 13 because the content of the deepest knowledge is ineffable.

Such is the existential ground on which stands 'saintship'. And on

this basis stands 'prophethood' with an additional property, and on

'prophethood' stands 'apostleship' with a further addition. The

Prophet and the Apostle are closely tied to the present world; their

fonctions concern the life in this world, for institution of Law always

aims at regulating the worldly life with a view to letting people

obtain the everlasting happiness in the next world. 'Saintship', on

the contrary, has no such essential relation to the present world.

Thus 'prophethood' and 'apostleship' can disappear from their

subjects, but the quality or title of 'saintship' never leaves its sub-

ject. Those from whom the titles of 'prophethood' and 'apostleship'

disappear become immediately Saints without any qualifications.

And sin ce, in the Hereafter, there can be no institution of Law,

everybody who is in the present world a Prophet or Apostle will

continue to exist in the next world in the rank of 'saintship' .14

As we have just remarked, the Prophet is a Saint with the addition

of a different qualification (i.e., the rank of 'saintship' plus the rank

of 'prophethood'), and the Apostle is a Prophet with the addition of

a further qualification (i.e., the rank of 'saintship' plus the rank of

'prophethood' plus the rank of 'apostleship'). So the Prophet uni tes

in one person two ranks, and the Apostle unîtes in himself three

different ranks. There are thus three different ranks recognized:

'saintship', 'prophethood' and 'apostleship'. The question is natur-

i •.

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 267

ally raised as to which of them·is higher than which. With regard to

this question, the most problematic point, according to Ibn 'Arabï,

concerns the position of 'saintship'. Against those sufis who regard

'saintship' qua 'saintship' as higher than 'prophethood' and

'apostleship', he emphatically states that it is only when these two or

three ranks co-exist in one person that we can rightly regard his

'saintship' as higher than his 'prophethood' and 'apostleship'.

(When one and the same person unites in him these two or three

qualifications) the man in the capacity of a 'knower' or Saint is more

complete and more perfect than himself in the capacity of an Apostle

or in that of a man who has instituted a Divine Law (i.e., Prophet).

So whenever you hear a man belonging to the 'people of God' saying

- or whenever such a saying is conveyed to you through somebody

else - that 'saintship' is higher than 'prophethood', you must under-

stand him to mean what 1 have just remarked.

Likewise, when such a man declares that the Saint stands above the

Prophet and the Apostle, he is simply talking about one and the same

person. In fact, the Apostle qua Saint is more complete (and perfect)

than himself qua Prophet and Apostle. It is not the case, however,

that a Saint (i.e., a different person who happens to be a Saint) who

follows ( another person who happens to be a Prophet or Apostle in

the community) is higher than the Prophet or Apostle. 15

The last sentence of this passage points out the fact that in case the

three qualifications (Saint, Prophet, and Apostle) do not concern

one and the same person but three different persons, there is a

respect in which the Saint must necessarily follow and be subordi-

nate to the Prophet or Apostle. And this because the Apostle

possesses a knowledge of the particular Law (i.e., 'exterior know-

ledge' 'ilm zàhir) with which he has been sent to his community,

while the Saint has no such knowledge. In what concerns the regula-

tions of the Law, the latter must follow the Apostle of his age.

But there is also a certain respect in which the Saint is superior to

the Apostle. For the Saint not only possesses a complete knowledge

about God and the reality of things ('interior knowledge', 'ilm

bàtin) but also is conscious of the fact that he has that knowledge.

But neither the Apostle nor the Prophet is conscious of it, although

they, too, do possess the same knowledge.

From the fact that 'apostleship' is based on three different con-

stituents there naturally follows that there are differences among

the Apostles regarding their degrees. This is the conception of the

'difference in degrees among the Apostles' (tafâ<J,ul al-rusul).

All Apostles, in terms of their 'saintship', are equal and stand on

the same level, but in actuality they must necessarily differ one from

the other because of their intimate relations with the concrete

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268 Sufism and Taoism

situations of the age and country in which they live. And the same is

true of the Prophet. The nature and rank of an Apostle is decisively

affected by the conditions, material and spiritual, determining the

situation of the nation of which he happens to be the Apostle.

Likewise, the rank of a Prophet is gravely affected by the amount of

knowledge he actually has.

Know that the Apostles qua Apostles - not qua Saints or 'knowers' -

stand in different degrees, each according to the state of his commun-

ity. For the a mou nt of his knowledge concerning his own apostolic

mission is exactly measured to what his community needs, no more,

no less. And since communities differ from each other in terms

of relative superiority, the Apostles also are higher and lower in

terms of the knowledge of their mission in exact accordance with the

difference that exists among the nations. And to this refers the saying

of God: 'Those Apostles, We have made some of them superior to

others'. (II, 253)

Likewise, (the Prophets) diff er in rank among themselves in accor-

dance with their individual capacities with regard to their persona!

knowledges and judgments. 'And to this refers the saying of God:

And We have made some of the Prophets superior to others'. (XVII,

55)16

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the Perfect Man on the

cosmic level is the 'vicegerent' of God. The same is true also of the

Perfect Man on the individual level. Here on the level of individual

persans, the idea of the Perfect Man is embodied by Saint, Prophet,

and Apostle. These three are the 'vicegerents' (khulafa') of God

because they are the most perfect and most complete loci of

theophany on the earth. 11 They are concrete manifestations of the

'Reality of Mub.ammad' (al-}Jaqiqah al-mu}Jammadiyah) which we

have discussed in the previous chapter. 18

The term khalifah meaning 'vicegerent' is a little ambiguous,

because we ordinarily use it to designate the political head of the

Muslim community, the Caliph. 19 In view of this fact, Ibn 'Arabï

strictly distinguishes between two kinds of khalifah: (1) the 'vice-

gerent of God' (khalifah Allah, or khalifah 'an Allah) and (2) the

'vicegerent (or successor) of the Apostle' (khalifah al-rasül, or

khalifah 'an al-rasül). The 'vicegerent' in the sense of the Perfect

Man (1) is totally different from the Caliph, the historical and

political head of the Muslim community, who assumes the same

name khalifah (2).

God has His 'vicegerents' on the earth; they are the Apostles. As for

the Caliphs we know today, they are ('vicegerents' or 'successors') of

the Apostles, not of God, because a Caliph governs (the community)

strictly according to the dicta tes of the Law of an apostolic origin, and

never goes beyond it. 20

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 269

There are, however, exceptional cases in which a Caliph, i.e., a

'vicegerent' succeeding the Apostle, is in touch with the very source

from which the latter has drawn his knowledge, and govems the

community according to the inner Law which he receives direct

from God. Such a man is outwardly a khalifah of the Apostle, but

inwardly is a khalifah of God.

Su ch a man is outwardly a follower (muttabi', namely, of the Apostle)

in the sense that he conforms himself (to the Law) in governing the

community: Jesus, for example, when he will corne down to the earth

and govern the world. 21 Another example is the Prophet Mul)am-

mad. And to this refers the saying of God: 'These are the men whom

God has given guidance. So follow their guidance' (VI, 90). A man of

this sort is, in virtue of the way in which he derives (his knowledge)

and of which he is conscious, both 'specially privileged'

and 'conforming' (muwafiq). 22 In this respect he is somewhat in the

same position as the Prophet (Mul)ammad) who, confirming as he did

the Law of the Apostles who had preceded him, confirmed it in his

own name, so that we, his followers, actually follow him (accepting

the Law) as his own, and not as a Law established by some of his

predecessors. In like manner, the 'vicegerent of God' obtains (his

knowledge) from exactly the sa me source as the Apostle.

Such a man is called, in mystic terminology, 'the vicegerent of God',

but, in ordinary (non-mystic) terminology, 'the vicegerent of the

Apostle of God'.

This is the reason why the Apostle of God (Mul)ammad) died with-

out explicitly designating anyone as his khalïfah. He acted in this way

because he knew that among the believers there would appear some-

one who would receive 'vicegerency' directly from his Lord and

thereby become a 'vicegerent of God', while conforming himself

perfectly to the given Law ( established by the Apostle).

One of the key-terms of Ibn 'Arabï' s theory of walayah is the' Seal'

(khatam), meaning the ultimate and final unit of a series. 1 should

like to close this chapter by a brief consideration of this concept,

although the problems it raises mostly go far beyond the scope of

the present book which aims at elucidating the ontological structure of

Ibn' Arabï's world-view.

The term khàtam appears in two phrases: ( 1) the Seal of the

Prophets (khàtam al-anbiyà') or Seal of the Apostles (khàtam al-

rusul), and (2) the Seal of the Saints (khàtam al-awliyà'). In conformity

with the commonly-accepted usage in Islam, the first phrase 'Seal of

the Prophets' designates the Prophet Mub.ammad himself. The phrase

in itself has nothing original aboutit; it is an expression often used in

accordance with the common belief in Islam that the Prophet

Mub.ammad represents historically the last ring of a long chain of

Prophets, there being absolutely no possibility of an authentic Prophet

appearing after him.

270 Sufism and Taoism

By the second phrase: 'the seal of the Saints', which is naturally more

problematic, Ibn 'Arabi means most probably himself, at least as long

as the present world lasts,23 although he does not say so explicitly in the

As Affifi points out,24 Ibn 'Arabi, besides hinting at the idea in

man y places of his writings by ambiguous expressions as, for example,

'the Seal of the Mul)ammadan saintship ( waliiyah mulJ,ammadiyah) is a

man of noble Arab birth, living in our own time' etc., declares in one

passage of the FutulJ,iit al-Makkiyyah: '1 am the Seal of the saintship, no

doubt, (the Seal of) the heritage of the Hashimite (Mul)ammad) and

the Messiah'.

But whether or not Ibn' Arabï really means by the Seal himself,

the problem is merely of a peripheral significance to us. For the

specific purposes of the present work, what is important is the

concept of Seal itself.

The problem turns round the ultimate source of the highest know-

ledge peculiar to the class of the highest 'knowers'.

This (highest) knowledge properly belongs only to the Seal of the

Apostles and the Seal of the Saints. No one of the Prophets and

Apostles obtains this knowledge except from the sacred niche of the

Last Apostle,25 and no one of the Saints obtains it except from the

niche of the Last Saint. 26

The last sentence might suggest the wrong idea that Ibn 'Arabï is

speaking here of two different 'niches'. In truth, however, there is

only one ultimate 'niche' from which ail obtain the highest know-

ledge. For, as al-Qâshânï says,27 if ail the Apostles obtain it from the

Seal of the Apostles, the latter obtains it from his own innermost

'niche', in the very capacity of the Seal of the Saints,28 so that all the

Apostles and the Saints ultimately obtain their Light from the Seal

of the Saints.

As to the relative superiority between the Seal of the Apostles

and the Seal of the Saints, Ibn' Arabi gives his view as follows: 29

It is true that the Seal of the Saints follows externally what the Seal of

the Apostles has established, namely, the Sacred Law. This, how-

ever, does not minimize in any way the spiritual rank of the Seal of

the Saints. Nor does this contradict what I have said above ( concern-

ing ail Apostles obtaining their esoteric knowledge from the 'niche'

of the Seal of the Saints). For (it simply means that) the Seal of the

Saints is in a certain respect lower in rank (than the Seal of the

Apostles) but is higher in another respect.

This interpretation is confirmed by what actually took place in our

religion, namely, by the fact, (for instance) that 'Umar proved to be

superior (to Mul)ammad) in his decision about the right treatment of

the prisoners of Badr and also regarding the fertilization of the

date-palm. A 'perfect' man need not be superior to others in every

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 271

matter and in every respect. What the (spiritual persans) consider

important is superiority in terms of knowledge about God. That only

is the central point. As for worldly affairs, they are of no importance

at all in the minds (of spiritual persons).

In connection with the problem of the relation between the Seal

of the Saints and the Seal of the Apostles, Ibn 'Arabï refers to a

famous Tradition in which Mul;lammad compares himself to the one

last brick that finishes and completes an entire wall. Then he corre-

lates this Tradition with a vision he had at Mecca in the year 599

A.H.

In this vision Ibn' Arabï saw the Ka' bah, the House of God. The

Ka' bah was built of gold and silver brick ('sil ver brick' being a

symbol of the Prophet, and 'gold brick' of the Saint). The wall of the

Ka' bah as he saw it still lacked two final pieces of brick, one gold and

another silver. Ibn 'Arabï, in the dream, keenly felt that the two

missing bricks were no other than himself. And the construction of

the Ka'bah was brought to completion when he filled the place of

these two bricks.

The Prophet (Mul)ammad) once compared the 'prophethood' to a

wall made of brick which was complete except in one place which was

to be filled by a piece of brick. Mul)ammad himself was that brick.

The important point is that he saw, as he says (in this Tradition), only

one single piece of brick still missing.

As for the Seal of the Saints, he would surely have visions of a similar

nature; he would surely see what the Prophet symbolized by a wall.

(The only difference would, however, be that) he would see in the

wall two bricks still missing, the entire wall being built of gold and

silver bricks. And he would notice that the two bricks that were

lacking in the wall were one gold and the other sil ver. Further, he

would surely see in the vision himself just fit to be put into the place of

these two bricks. Thus he would see that what was meant by the two

bricks completing the wall was no other than the Seal of the Saints.

The reason why he must necessarily see himself as two bricks is as

follows. He is, externally, a follower of the Law established by the

Seal of the Apostles. This fact was (symbolized in the vision by) the

place for the silver brick. But this is only the 'external' side of the Seal

of the Saints, concerning as it does only the legal regulations about

which he simply follows the Seal of the Apostles. But, on the other

hand, in his innermost heart, he obtains directly from God that very

thing in which externally he is a simple follower (of the Seal of the

Apostles).

All this because he sees the state of affairs as it really is. So he cannot

but see the matter in this way. And in this capacity he corresponds,

internally, to the place for the gold brick, for he obtains his know-

ledge from the same source from which the angel (Gabriel) obtains

that which he conveys to the Apostle.

272 Sufism and Taoism

If you have understood what 1 have here indicated metaphorically

you have obtained an extremely valuable knowledge about everything.

Thus every Prophet, (in the long historical chain of 'prophethood')

beginning with Adam and ending with the last Prophet, invariably

obtained his (prophetic Light) from the 'niche' of the Sea! of the

Prophets, although the corporeal existence of the latter was posterior

to others. This because MuJ:rnmmad, in his Reality ,30 was existent

(from eternity). To this refer his words (in a Tradition): 'I was a

Prophet even while Adam was still between water and clay' .31

On the implication of this passage al-Qâshâni makes an interesting

remark. 32 Ibn 'Arabi' s description might be taken to imply the

superiority of the Seal of the Saints to the Prophet Mubammad,

because the position of the latter is symbolized only by one brick,

whereas that of the Seal of the Saints is symbolized by two bricks,

one of silver as the sign of his 'external' subordination to Mubam-

mad, and the other of brilliant gold as the sign of his own Light.

Against this understanding al-Qâshâni warns the reader and points

out that, according to the Tradition in question, the Ka'bah had

lacked one single piece of brick, and that when Mubammad filled

the place the building was completed. This means, he says, that

Mubammad was de facto the Seal of the Saints. Except that

Mubammad himself appeared only as a Prophet-Apostle, and did

what he did only in that capacity, not in the capacity of a Saint. He

did not, in other words, manifest the form of waliiyah.

The vision which Ibn 'Arabi saw in Mecca was formed in the

world of Imagination on the basis of this historical fact. Mubammad

was de facto the Seal of the Saints, but since he did not manifest

himself as such, there still remained the necessity for another persan

to appear as a historical phenomenon in the capacity of the Seal of

the Saints. Otherwise expressed, the 'saintships', with Mubammad,

remained to the last 'interior'. This 'interior', i.e., hidden, 'saintship'

has corne to light only with the appearance of the Seal of the Saints.

Regarding the difference between the Seal of the Saints and the

rest of the Saints, Ibn' Arabi remarks that in the former the 'saint-

ship' is something essential while in the latter it is something that

must be 'acquired' first. And this is the reason why ( according to

al-Qâshâni) 33 the 'saintship' of the former is called 'solar saintship'

(waliiyah shamsiyah) while that of the latter is called 'lunar saint-

ship' ( waliiyah qamariyah).

Notes

1. In this book I use provisionally the words 'saint' and 'saintship' as the English

equivalents of waliy and walâyah respectively. Whether the meaning of the Arabie

word waliy is covered by the English word 'saint' is another question.

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 273

2. Fu$., pp. 160-169/135-136.

3. Fu$., p. 168/135. See for example the Qoran (II, 257) where we read: 'God is the

waliy (close, protecting Friend) of those who believe'.

4. Fu$., p. 167/135.

5. Cf. also FU$., p. 34/62.

6. FU$., p. 167/135.

7. The concrete content of such a knowledge is precisely what we have analytically

discussed throughout the preceding pages.

8. FU$., pp. 168-169/136.

9. p. 168.

10. ibid.

11. p. 169.

12. FU$., p. 89/88.

13. FU$., p. 34/62.

14. FuL p. 169/136.

15. Fu$., p. 168/135-136.

16. Fu$., p. 162/132.

17. Fu$., p.259/207.

18. Cf. Chapter XIV, (IV).

19. The English word Caliph is itself nothing but an Anglicized form of khalïfah.

20. Fu$., p. 204/162-163.

21. The reference is to the eschatological figure of Jesus. According to the Muslim

belief, Jesus will descend from Heaven once again at the end of the present world,

and will govern the world by the Sacred Law of Islam. In that state, Jesus will be

formally a 'vicegerent' of Mul)ammad, while deriving his knowledge from the same

source from which Mul)ammad received his Law. Jesus will be, in that state, the Seal

of the Saints.

22. 'Specially privileged', because he is conscious of the fact that he has received

directly from Godan inner Law by which he governs the community, but 'conform-

ing', at the same time, because outwardly he owes his Law to his predecessors.

23. 1 say 'at least as long as the present world lasts' because, as we saw above (cf.

note 21), at the very end of the present world, in the eschatological situation, Jesus

will corne down to the earth and assume the function of the Seal of the Saints. This

latter is called the 'general saintship' (walâyah 'âmmah) as distinguished from the

274 Suftsm and Taoism

'Mul)ammadan saintship' (waliiyah mulJ,ammadïyah). Regarding this distinction, see

the relevant passages quoted from the Futû/:tiit by Dr Osman Yahya in his edition of

al-Tirmidhï: Khatm al-Awliyii, Beyrouth, 1965, p. 161, Footnote 53.

24. Philosophy, pp. 100-101.

25. 'Niche' (miskhiit) symbolizes the Divine Light in the deepest core of the saintly

heart; the Divine Light is nothing other than the 'Reality of Mul)ammad'.

26. p. 34/62.

27. p. 34.

28. We have observed above that by the 'Sea! of the Saints' Ibn 'Arabi means

himself. But here al-Qâshâni seems to be saying that the Sea! of the Apostles, i.e.,

Mul)ammad, was also the Sea! of the Saints. This, however, is nota contradiction. As

we noticed before in discussing the 'Reality of Mul)ammad', in the consciousness of

Ibn 'Arabi, 'Mul)ammad' is not only a historical individual person but a cosmic

principle of creation, and the two aspects seem to be constantly present in bis mind

when he speaks about 'Mul)ammad'.

29. pp. 34-35/62-63.

30. Reference to the above-mentioned 'Reality of Mul)ammad'.

31. p. 35/63.

32. p. 36.

33. ibid.

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch15XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

XV The Perfect Man as an lndividual

At the outset of the preceding chapter 1 pointed out that Man, in the

thought of Ibn' Arabi, is conceived on two different levels, cosmic

and individual. The present chapter will be concemed with the

second of these two levels.

Man on the first level, or - logically - Man as a species, is in the

intermediary stage between the Absolute and the world, and, as an

intermediary, occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of the

created beings. As soon as we begin to consider Man on the indi-

vidual level, however, we cannot help noticing the existence of

many degrees (mariitib ). Otherwise expressed, on the cosmic level

Man himself is the Perfect Man, but on the individual level not all

men are 'perfect'; on the contrary, only a few deserve the title of the

Perfect Man.

How is it possible that a such a fondamental difference should

occur between the two levels? Any man, as long as he is a 'man', is

expected to have the 'comprehensiveness' actualized in him,

because the ontological 'comprehensiveness' belongs to the very

nature of the human species. There can be no possible exception in

this respect. Ontologically, there can be no difference in this respect

between one individual and another. All this is certainly true. But

individual differences arise in accordance with the degrees of lucid-

ity in the mind of those who become conscious of this very fact. All

men are naturally endowed with the same ontological 'comprehen-

siveness' but not all men are equally conscious of the 'comprehen-

siveness' in themselves. They are variously conscious of it, ranging

from the highest degree of lucidity which cornes very close to that of

the Divine Consciousness of the Names and Attributes, down to the

lowest which is practically the same as complete opaqueness. And

only at the highest degree of lucidity can the human mind play the

role of a 'polished mirror'. Only at the highest degree of lucidity can

Man be the Perfect Man. This is the gist of the whole problem.

In a passage of the Ibn 'Arabi writes: 'God has brought to

light their various degrees in him (i.e., Adam)' .1 Here the pronoun

11ll 1

248 Sufism and Taoism

'their' refers to the sons of Adam. Thus the meaning of this short

sentence may be paraphrased as: 'God bas made clear the existence

of various degrees among men within Adam, i.e., the same one

species of Man'.

The cause which brings into being such degrees among individual

men is explained by Ibn 'Arabi through the metaphor of colored

glass, a metaphor which we have met in an earlier context. Just as

one and the same light is variously colored as it passes through

pieces of glass of various colors, the same Form of the Absolute is

differently manifested in different men with different capacities. 2

A man who has 'actualized in himself the Absolute' (al-

mutaljaqqiq bi-al-l}aqq) is completely permeated by the Absolu te,

so much so that each of his bodily members is a self-manifestation of

the Absolute. And yet, when such men - the people of God (ahl

Allàh) - obtain knowledge by 'immediate tasting', one and the same

knowledge becomes variously inflected according to the capacities

of individual organs.

Know that all mystical knowledges which, originating from the

ontological level of the Name Allah, are actualized in the people of

God, differ from each other according to the differences in the

cognitive faculties through which they are actualized, although all

these knowledges are derived ultimately from one source. This last

point is proved by the fact that God Himself declares (in a well-

known Tradition): 'I am his hearing with which he hears, his sight

with which he sees, his hand with which he seizes, his foot with which

he walks', God declares in this way that His He-ness (huwiyah) is

the very bodily members, which, in their turn, are the man himself.

The He-ness is one, and the bodily members (of the man in whom the

He-ness is actualized) are diverse. And each of his bodily members

has a special knowledge by 'immediate tasting' which is peculiar toit

and which is derived from the unique source (from which ail the other

bodily members obtain their peculiar knowledges). Thus (the same

knowledge coming from one source) becomes differentiated by the

different bodily members. 3

In the passage just quoted, Ibn' Arabi is speaking of the inflection of

one and the same intuitive cognition in one and the same man

through his different bodily members. He is not talking about

differences in intuition among different 'men of God'. He describes

here simply how one knowledge coming from one source becomes

differently modulated in one man according to which of bis faculties

is used. But if in one and the same man the situation is like that, it is

naturally to be expected that even greater differences should arise

in different individuals. In bis commentary on this passage, al-

Qàshani understands it in this sense and says: 4

The Perfect Man as an lndividual 249

Knowledges by 'immediate tasting' are differentiated by the differ-

ence of natural capacities (lit. 'preparedness'), because the 'people of

God' do not all stand on one level. And this causes a difference in

their 'tasting' experiences and (the resulting) knowledges ... just as

one and the same person obtains different knowledges through dif-

ferent faculties. Differences arise (in both cases) in spite of the fact

that all these knowledges go back to one single source, which is the

He-ness of the Absolute.

Ibn 'Arabï himself explains this phenomenon by comparing it to

water which may have different tastes despite the oneness of its

reality.

This may be understood by the example of water. Water is every-

where one single reality, but it has different tas tes according to

places. Here it is sweet, there it is salty and bitter. And yet water is

water in all the states; its reality does not become different however

different its tastes may be.5

The above explanation gives the ontological cause from which all

differences and degrees occur among men. In addition to this, Ibn

'Arabi gives another, theological cause for the same phenomenon:

the 'jealousy' (ghayrah) of God.

The idea of God being 'jealous' (ghayür) goes back historically to

a very old Semitic conception of God. And it plays also a consider-

ably important part in Sufism.

Now 'jealousy' in reference to God is capable of being under-

stood in various meanings. God is 'jealous', for example, because

He does not like the secret between Him and His servants be

disclosed to others. Or God is 'jealous' in the sense that He forbids

that anything other than Himself be adored and worshipped. Ibn

'Arabi understands the idea of Divine 'jealousy' in terms of the

concept of 'self-manifestation' (tajallï).

The Absolute, he says, manifests itself endlessly; it freely dis-

closes and reveals its inner mysteries. And yet the Absolute is,

paradoxically enough, 'jealous' of its mysteries, in the sense that it

conceals them from the eyes of ordinary men. From this particular

point of view, Ibn 'Arabi goes even to the extent of calling the

Divine self-manifestations fawàl}ish (sg. fal}ishah meaning literally

'shameful thing' 'something scandalous or disgraceful'). Here he is

looking at the whole matter from, so to speak, the subjective view-

point of the Absolute itself. God's feeling, Ibn 'Arabi surmises,

would be that He should not have disclosed his secrets, that He

should rather have kept them forever hidden in Himself. On the

human level, it is always an act of shamelessness for man to disclose

to the eyes of the public what he should keep concealed.

Furthermore, Ibn' Arabi exercises here again bis favorite method

250 Sufism and Taoism

of thinking by phonetic associations, and connects the wordghayrah

(jealously) with ghayr ('other').

God admits that He has the Attribute of' jealousy' (ghayrah). It is out

of 'jealousy' that He 'has forbidden the shameful things (JawâfJ,ish)'

(V, 33).

But 'shameful' is only that which has been made openly manifest

(while in truth it should have been kept concealed.) Asto what is kept

within, it is 'shameful' only to those who can see it.6

The last sentence would seem to need a few explanatory words.

Here Ibn 'Arabi <livides the 'shameful things', i.e., the self-

manifestations of God, into two kinds. The first consists of those

things that are openly manifest to our senses, in the world of

concrete reality. The second refers to the 'inner' (batin) self-

manifestations of the Divine Essence in the form of the permanent

archetypes. These are not manifest to the eyes of ordinary people,

and in this respect they are not 'shameful'. And yet they are

nonetheless manifested forms, and as such are clearly visible to

those who have the proper eyes with which to perceive them. They

are, to that extent, equally 'shameful' .7

Thus God 'has forbidden the shameful things', that is, God has

forbidden the reality to be known openly; namely, the fact that He is

nothing other than the ( created) things. So He has concealed the

reality with the veil of 'jealousy' -'other-ness' (ghayrah). 8 And (the

'other') is yourself (i.e., your ego which is conscious of being some-

thing independent and different from the Absolute). (This connec-

tion between 'jealousy' and' other-ness' is natural) because ghayrah

cornes from ghayr.

As a result of this, the 'other' judges that this (particular act of)

hearing, for instance, is the hearing of such-and-such an individual

persan, while the 'knower' of the truth judges that the hearing (i.e.,

ail particular acts of hearing) is the very (act of) the Absolute. And

the same is true of ail human faculties and bodily organs.

Thus not everyone knows the Absolute (in the same degree). There

are superior men and inferior men, and a number of ranks are clearly

discernible among them. 9

The highest rank, according to Ibn 'Arabi, belongs to a man who

throws himself wholly into the act of (dhikr) - that

is, not only with his tongue and heart alone - and becomes internally

unified with the Absolute.

It must be kept in mind that 'remembrance' (dhikr), for Ibn

'Arabi, does not simply mean the act of remembering God with

one's tangue and heart; the word is rather synonymous with mysti-

cal 'self-annihilation' in God. The dhikr in this meaning is a spirituar

state in which a mystic concentrates ail his bodily and spiritual

powers on Godin such a way that his whole existence is united with

The Perfect Man as an Individual 251

God completely, without any residue. When a mystic attains to this

state, the distinction between the subject (who exercises the con-

centration of the mind) and the abject (upon which his mind is

concentrated) naturally disappears, and he experiences the immed-

iate tasting' of the essential unity with the Absolute. The ordinary

kind of dhikr which consists in merely 'remembering' the

Absolute with tongue or mind without a total existential involve-

ment of the person represents a lower degree of dhikr-experience.

When a dhikr of the highest rank actually occurs in a mystic, the

natural perfection of Man is completely realized, and he occupies a

position in the world higher than that of other creatures, including

even angels. Of course ail creatures manifest the glory of God each

according to its degree of dhikr, but it is only in Man that this

experience can be heightened to that of the essential unity with God.

The real value of the human existence which is ours is known only to

those who 'remember' Godin the proper way of 'remembering'. For

God is the intima te Companion (jalïs) of th ose who 'remember' Him,

and those who 'remember' Him do witness the Companion. As long

as a man who 'remembers' does not witness God who is his Compan-

ion, he is not 'remembering' (in the proper way).

The 'remembrance' of God (when it is real) runs through ail the parts

of a man, unlike the case in which a man 'remembers' only with his

tangue. For in the latter case, God happens to be only momentarily

the Companion of the tangue exclusively, so that the tangue alone

sees God while the man himself does not see Him by means of the

sight by which he is properly supposed to see.

You must understand (in the light of this explanation) the following

mystery concerning the 'remembrance' of those who are not serious

enough. Even in a man who is not serious enough, the (particular

bodily organ) which happens to be 'remembering' Him is doubtless in

the presence of God, and the abject of 'remembrance' (i.e., God) is

its Companion and it does witness Him. But the man himself, as long

as he lacks seriousness, is not exercising 'remembrance' (as he

should), and consequently God is not his Companion (in the real

sense).

Ali this cornes from the fact that man is 'many' (i.e., composed of

many parts); he is not one single (non-composite) reality. The Abso-

lute, on the contrary, is One in its essential reality although it is Many

in its Divine Names. But man is 'many' with his parts, so that, even if

one of his parts is engaged in 'remembrance', it does not necessarily

follow that other parts, too, are 'remembering'. The Absolute hap-

pens to be the Companion of that particular part of his which is

actually engaged in 'remembrance', but his other parts are being

negligent of 'remembrance' .10

Such being the case, it is naturally to be expected that there should

arise many degrees among men regarding the capacity for knowing

God and the mystery of Being. On the basis of this fact Ibn' Arabi

252 Sujism and Taoism

classifies men in several different ways, each classification having its

peculiar standard. 1 have already introduced some of them. Here 1

shall give three typical classifications.

The first classification <livides men into two categories: (1) those

whose minds have an otherworldly structure and (2) those whose

minds are of a worldly structure. The first category is represented by

a man who, pure of mind and heart, free from all bodily desires, can

see through things and grasp immediately the realities underlying

them. A man like this knows God by 'unveiling' and 'immediate

tasting', not by Reason. Of course, he, too, exercises his Reason

within its proper domain, but never pushes it beyond its natural

limits. Rather, he readily goes beyond the realm of Reason, and

follows the judgments given by mystical intuition. Such a man is a

'knower' ('arif) and a 'servant of the Lord' ('abd rabb).

The second category, on the contrary, is represented by a man

whose mind is deeply involved in bodily attachments, who is com-

pletely under the sway of desires, and who, consequently, cannot

see the reality of things. In trying to know God, such a man depends

exclusively upon Reason. He cannot step over the boundaries of

logical thinking. Even such a man may taste, on rare occasions,

something of the experience of' unveiling'. In su ch cases, his Reason

recognizes the fact that he is experiencing something unusual. But

this he knows only by Reason. So as soon as the experience ends, he

falls into confusion, and ends up by submitting himself to the

judgment of Reason. Such a man is nota 'servant of the Lord'; he is

rather a 'servant of reasoning' ('abd nazar).

lt must be noticed that Ibn' Arabi does not simply disparage and

deprecate Reason. lt has its own field in which to work prop-

erly. But it has its limitations. A real 'knower' is one who assigns to

Reason a proper place and restrains it from overstepping its

domain. The prophets and apostles are not people devoid of

Reason. On the contrary, they are pre-eminently men of Reason.

But they have a wider field at their command which lies beyond the

reach of Reason.

In fact, no one is more reasonable than the apostles. But (in addition

to Reason) they are (endowed with another capacity by which) they

bring informations directly from God.

Thus the apostles admit the authority of Reason ( within its proper

domain), but add toit something which Reason cannot grasp by its

own power, and which Reason rejects it at first; it is only in the Divine

self-manifestation (i.e., during the time in which the mind happens to

be actually experiencing it by 'unveiling') that it admits that it is true.

However, as soon as the experience of the Divine self-manifestation

leaves the mind, the latter falls into confusion concerning what it has

The Perfect Man as an lndividual 253

just seen. If the man in such a case happens to be a 'servant of the

Lord', he immediately subjugates his Reason to Him, but if the man

happens to be a 'servant of reasoning', he subjugates the truth to the

judgment of Reason.

This state or affairs, however, occurs only as long as the man remains

in the worldly dimension of existence, being veiled from the other

worldly dimensions (which is realized) in the very midst of the

present world.

Even the 'knowers' of the truth look in this world as if they were in a

form peculiar to the present world because of the earthly properties

appearing in them. In their 'interior', however, they have already

been transported by God to the state of being which is peculiar to the

Hereafter. There can be no doubt aboutit. So they are not recogniz-

able outwardly except to those whose spiritual eyes have been

opened by God to see through things. In reality, every true 'knower'

of God, (who knows God) through the experience of (His direct)

self-manifestation in himself, is actually living in a mode of being

peculiar to the Hereafter. Such a man has, already in the present

world, been resurrected from the dead and brought to life from his

tomb. So he sees what others cannot see and witnesses what others

cannot witness. This is a result of a special favor which God grants to

some of His servants. 11

The second classification which Ibn 'Arabi proposes consists in

dividing men into three type: (1) 'knower' ('ârif), (2) 'non-knower'

(ghayr 'arif) and (3) 'ignorant' (jâhil).

He defines 12 the first type as 'a man who sees the Absolute from

the Absolute, in the Absolute, and by the Absolute itself'. The

second, the 'non-knower', is 'a man who sees the Absolute from the

Absolute, in the Absolute, and by his own self'. The 'ignorant' is 'a

man who sees the Absolute neither from the Absolute nor in the

Absolu te, and who expects to see the Absolu te (in the Hereafter) by

his own self'.

The 'knower' is a man who completely identifies himself with

Godin very possible respect and sees God with God's own eyes

from the very viewpoint of God. Since he sees God with God's eyes,

all the self-manifestations of God are within his sight. He actually

witnesses the whole world of Being as it pulsates with Divine Life.

As to the 'non-knower', though he sees the Absolute in the

Absolute and from the viewpoint of the Absolute, the eye with

which he sees is his own. So the reality cannot but be deformed by

his sight.

The 'ignorant' is by no means in a.position to see the Absolute as

it really is. His mind is naturally restricted in an extreme degree.

Each 'ignorant' adores and worships God only in a form peculiar te

a particular religion which he happens to hold, and denies all othe:

forms of worshipping God.

111111

,:1111,

1111111

254 Sufism and Taoism

Generally speaking each man (i.e., of the class of the 'ignorant')

necessarily sticks to a particular religion ('aqïdah, i.e., religion as a

system of dogmas) concerning his Lord. He always goes back to his

Lord through his particular religious belief and seeks God therein.

Such a man positively recognizes God only when He manifests Him-

self to him in the form recognized by his traditional religion. But

when He manifests Himself in other religions, he ftatly refuses to

accept Him and runs away from Him. In so doing, he simply behaves

in an improper way towards God, while imagining that he is practis-

ing good manners toward Him. Thus a man who sticks to the belief of

his particular religion believes in a god according to what he has

subjectively posited in his mind. God in ail particular religions

(i'tiqâdât) is dependent upon the subjective act of positing (ja'l) on

the part of the believers. Thus a man of this kind sees (in the form of

God) only his own self and what he has posited in his mind. 13

The last paragraph of the passage just quoted discloses in a daring

and outspoken way Ibn' Arabï's fondamental position regarding the

etemal Religion and various historical religions. As we have

observed in an earlier context, 14 it is his unshakeable conviction that

ail religions are ultimately one because every religion worships the

Absolute in a very particular and limited way. Whatever one wor-

ships as God, one is worshipping through that particular form the

Absolute itself, nothing else, because there is nothing in the whole

world but particular self-manifestations of the Absolute.

In this connection, Ibn' Arabï draws our attention to a famous

Tradition that depicts one of the occurrences of the day or Resur-

rection. It reads: 'On the day of Resurrection, God will appear to

the creatures in a strange form and say, "1 am your Lord, the

Highest". The people will say, "No, we take refuge with God from

thee!" Then He will make Himself manifest in a form familiar to

them in their religions. Thereupon the people will cry out, "Glory

be to Thee, o God" '. Ibn 'Arabï observes that this is not only a

matter of the day of Resurrection, for exactly the same thing is

actually happening in the present world. 'Behold how the degrees of

men conceming their knowledge of God correspond exactly to their

degrees conceming the seeing of Godon the day of Resurrection'.

And he closes the passage by giving us the following waming and

advice:

Beware of being bound up by a particular religion and rejecting ail

others as unbelief! If you do that, you will fail to obtain a great

benefit. Nay, you will fail to obtain the true knowledge of the reality.

Try to make yourself a (kind of) Prime Matter for all forms of

religious belief. God is wider and greater than to be confined to one

particular religion to the exclusion of others. For He says: 'To

whichever direction you turn, there surely is the Face of God' (II,

115). God does not specify (in this verse) a particular place in which

The Perfect Man as an Individual 255

the Face of God is to be found. He only said: 'There is the Face of

God.'

The 'face' of a thing means its real essence. So God has admonished

by this verse the hearts of the 'knowers' so that they might not be

distracted by non-essential matters in the present world from being

constantly conscious of this kind of thing. For no human being ever

knows at which moment he will die. If a man happens to die at a

moment when he is forgetful of this, his position will certainly be not

equal to another who dies in the state of clear awareness. 15

The third classification of men which Ibn 'Arabï proposes is also a

tripartite division. According to this classification, the lowest degree

is represented by a man who relies upon Reason and who, there-

fore, is content with understanding both God and the world by

exercising his thinking power. The middle position is occupied by

men of 'imagination' (khayal), i.e., those who understand the Abso-

lu te according to the authentic imagery based on visions of

prophets. And the highest degree is of th ose who know the reality of

the things through the experience of 'unveiling' and 'immediate

tasting'.

Let us begin with the lowest class, that is, men of Reason. These

people blindly believe in Reason, do not recognize anything as truth

unless it is acceptable to Reason, and refuse to admit anything

which happens to be in conftict with Reason. They do not know that

Reason, in matters conceming the Absolute, is utterly powerless,

and that it can never go deep into the reality of Being. In various

passages of the Ibn' Arabï emphasizes the narrow limitations

and the essential powerlessness of Reason in contrast to the 'unveil-

ing' (kashf) which is for him the highest form of human cognition.

He sees in the Theologians (mutakallimün) a typical example of the

men of Reason.

As an illustration, he adduces a Qoranic verse: 'thou (Mu\lam-

mad) wert not the one who threw when thou threwest, but God it

was who really threw' 16 (VIII, 17). This verse, according to Ibn

'Arabï, is a most concise symbolic description of the essential rela-

tion between the Absolute and the world. The verse begins by

negating that Mu\lammad 'threw'. Then it affirms that he did throw

- 'when thou threwest' - and finally Mu\lammad's having thrown is

again negated, and the verse ends by establishing that the real

thrower was God Himself. All this is reducible to the proposition:

'the real thrower is God, but it is Godïn the phenomenal form of

Mu\lammad'. The verse, thus understood, expresses nothing other

than the truth about the self-manifestation of the Absolute.

However, only a real 'knower' is capable of interpreting the verse

in this sense. As for the Theologians, its true meaning is completely

out of their reach. In confusion they interpret it arbitrarily

256 Sufism and Taoism

according to the dictates of their Reason. As a result, their conclu-

sion clashes with that of' immediate tasting'. And in most cases they

go to the extreme of declaring impossible and absurd what mystical

intuition recognizes as true.

This and similar verses can be rightly understood only by those

who are possessed of an infini tel y flexible mind. On the basis of this

single verse one can say, 'it was Mul;iammad who threw', just as one

can say, 'it was not Mul;iammad who threw'. Likewise, one can say,

'it was God who threw', just as one can say, 'it was Mul;iammad who

threw, not God'. The verse, in this way, is liable to produce various

statements that seemingly contradict each other. For, after all, the

question is one of different relations and viewpoints. One and the

same event can be looked at variously according to various possible

viewpoints. And yet all this variation takes place within the

infinitely wide Reality which comprises everything and every poss-

ible viewpoint. All are ultimately the activity of the Absolute. But

Reason which by nature is one-sided, rigid, and inflexible, cannot

accept such a view.

As another good example aptly illustrating the natural and essen-

tial deficiency of Reason, Ibn 'Arabï considers the problem of the

relation between 'cause' and 'caused'. The Theologians and

Philosophers, who try to understand everything in the light of what

Reason tells them, often discuss the concept of' cause' ('il/ah). The

reality of 'cause', however, can never be revealed to their minds as

long as they remain so utterly dependent upon logical thinking.

As an illustration disclosing the natural weakness of Reason in its

reasoning activity we may mention the judgment given by Reason

concerning 'cause': that a 'cause' cannot be the 'caused' of that of

which it is the 'cause'. This is evidently what Reason judges. But in

the light of knowledge obtained by mystical illumination, we must

assert precisely this proposition (which is rejected by Reason);

namely, that a 'cause' does become the 'caused' of that of which it is

the 'cause' .17

The judgment given by Reason can be made (more) correct through

theoretical elaboration within the boundaries of logical thinking.

But, even so, the ultimate limit to which Reason can go, when it is

actually faced with a state of affairs which contradicts the evidence

furnished by logical proof, is to think that - admitting the essential

unity of Reality through all the multifarious forms of things in the

world-(this unique Reality), in so far as it actually and positively acts

as a 'cause' in the form of some concrete thing (A, for example) and

causes some other concrete thing (B), it can never be the 'caused' of

that very thing (B) which it (A) has caused as long as it is the 'cause'.

The truth of the matter, Reason will think, is rather that, as the

Reality changes its form (fromA to C, for example, and enters into a

different relationship with B), its capacity may also change in such a

The Perfect Man as an Individual 257

way that it (now in the form of C) could very well be the 'caused' of

what (B) it has caused (in the capacity of A), so that, as a result, the

'caused' may become the 'cause' of its own 'cause'. This, 1 say, is the

furthest limit to which Reason can go even when it perceives the

reality (of Being, by perceiving one single Essence underlying all the

things and events that stand in 'cause' -'caused' relations), and steps

beyond the proper domain of logical reasoning. 18

The latter half of this passage may be explicated as follows. Properly

speaking, Reason has a very narrowly limited domain of its own. As

long as it remains within the strict limits of this domain, Reason

cannot even see that everything is but a different self-manifestation

of one single Reality, the Absolute. But if Reason does stretch itself

forcibly to the furthest possible limit and goes beyond the domain of

its natural capacity, it will be able to see that the Many in the

possible world are ultimately so many different forms of one and the

same Reality. Of course, such a cognition itself goes against the

judgment of Reason in its normal activity. But at least this mu ch

may be conceded by it if it succeeds in extending its capacity in the

way just described.

Reason, once it has admitted that the Many, i.e., all things and

events in the world of concrete reality, are ultimately One and are

but so many phenomenal forms assumed by one single Reality, must

necessarily admit also that the distinction usually made between

'cause' and 'caused' is merely a relative matter, because bath are

two different forms assumed by one and the same thing. And in this

particular sense, Reason will have to admit that a 'cause' can be a

'caused'.

However, even at this stage, Reason is limited by its own logic. lt

will still assert that so long as a certain concrete thing (A) actually is

the 'cause' of another concrete thing (B), A remains a 'cause', and

will never be a 'caused' of B. A, in the capacity of B's 'cause', can

never be a 'caused' of B .A can rightly be a 'caused' of B only when it

is considered from a different angle in a different capacity, i.e., no

longer exactly as A but rather as something different,. C.

Thus it is the final judgment of Reason, even at its unusually

extended limit, that a 'cause', unless it be considered in terms of a

different relationship, cannot be caused by its own 'caused'. This is

the self-evident and primary truth of reason which it can never

abandon as long as Reason remains Reason.

However, if we look at the matter in the light of the intuition

gained by the experience of 'immediate tasting', we find immedi-

ately that a 'cause' can possibly be a 'caused', just as a 'caused' can

possibly be a 'cause'.

It is worthy of notice that the thought pattern that underlies this

conception is very characteristic of Ibn 'Arabï; we have already met

258 Suftsm and Taoism

with it in the preceding in various forms. The idea, for example, that

the creatures are 'food' of God, just as God is 'food' of the crea-

tures, or the idea of the mutual taskhir between God and the

creatures, namely, that the creatures make God 'subservient' to

themselves, just as God makes the creatures 'subservient' to Him -

these and similar 'daring' ideas are structurally of the same category

as that of the mutual causal relationship between God and the

creatures.

How, then, can a 'caused' act positively upon its own 'cause' in

such a way that it makes the latter its own 'caused'? The answer runs

as follows. 'The 'cause-ness' ('illïyah) of a 'cause' ('illah) is incon-

ceivable without the 'caused-ness' (ma'lülïyah) of the 'caused'

(ma'lül), nor can the first actually exist without the latter. The

'cause-ness' completely depends upon the 'caused-ness' of the

'caused'. 'Cause', in this sense, contains in itself 'caused-ness', just

as 'caused' contains 'cause-ness'. Moreover, all things, in Ibn

'Arabi's view, are but different phenomenal forms of one single

Existence. So everything is in one aspect 'cause', and in another

'caused'.

Representing the people of 'immediate tasting', al-Qashani for-

mulates the right answer in the following terms: 19

The one single Reality appearing in two different forms (i.e., 'cause'

and' caused') is apt to receive the two qualifications according to ( our

subjective) points of view. That is to say, it has, when it is in the state

of being a 'cause', the aptitude to be a 'caused', and when it is in the

state of being a 'caused', it has the aptitude to be a 'cause'. For the

one Reality comprehends in itself both 'cause-ness' and 'caused-

ness' with ail the properties peculiar to both. Thus one and the same

thing is a 'cause' in its 'cause-ness', and a 'caused' in its 'caused-ness'.

It has in itself all these and similar aspects (which i.t manifests)

according to particular circumstances.

Exactly the same holds true of the phenomenon of the self-

manifestation. For (such distinctions as) the 'self-manifester', the

locus of self-manifestation, the act of self-manifestation, the being of

the self-manifester a self-manifester and the being of the locus a

locus, etc. ( - ail these are simply [reftections of our] subjective

viewpoints.) In reality they are nothing other than the Absolu te

which is essentially One and which appears in these various capacities

according to our subjective perspectives. These are all notions con-

ceived by our discriminating Reason, the distinctions existing only in

our Reason. They are ail matters of relative forms, supposed rela-

tions secondarily derived from the one single Reality. This Reality is

God, the One and the Unique. There is nothing in Being except God!

If we have gone into a considerably long digression on the problem

of the 'cause' - 'caused' relationship, it is partly because of its

intrinsic value as a theory of causality typical of Ibn 'Arabi. The

The Perfect Man as an Individual 259

main purpose, however, has been to give an illustration showing the

natural incapability of Reason to reach any deep truth about the

Absolute and the world of Being.

'He who knows himself (lit. 'his soul') knows his Lord' - this

famous Tradition is one of Ibn' Arabi' s favorite adages. Here again

he refers to it and declares that there has not been even a single

person, among the Philosophers and Theologians, who has grasped

his own 'self' (soul) in its real depth.

Of ail the men of knowledge no one has obtained a real insight into

the 'soul' and its reality except the divinely inspired Apostles and

great Sufis. Asto the men of reasoning and logical thinking, whether

the ancient Philosophers or the Theologians in Islam, not even one of

them has hit upon the truth in their discussions on 'soul' and its

quiddity. (This is but natural because) logical thinking can never

arrive at the truth in this matter. Therefore, he who seeks the true

knowledge of 'soul' by means of thinking is like a person who,

looking at a man with a tumor, thinks him to be fat, or like a person

who blows upon something which is not fuel.

People of this kind are precisely 'those whose effort goes astray in the

present world, being convinced that they are doing good work'

(XVIII, 14). For he who seeks anything by a wrong method is sure to

fail in achieving his aim. 20

Between the real 'knowers' and the men of Reason are situated the

people of Imagination (khayâl). These are men who try with sincer-

ity to approach the Absolute by the aid of the images given by their

Prophet and Apostle. Concerning the above-quoted Qoranic verse

about the 'one who threw', for example, the men of this kind believe

firmly that the true 'thrower' is God Himself, although the deep

meaning of the verse escapes their understanding. They readily

accept as true whatever their Prophet teaches them, and do not dare

to be critical of anything which they think contradicts Reason. Ibn

'Arabi calls these men 'people of Belief (or Faith)' (ah! al-ïmân).

The 'people of Belief are those who accept unquestioningly what-

ever the Prophets and Apostles convey from the Absolute. They

should not be confused with those who accept unquestioningly the

teaching of the (Philosophers and Theologians) who think by Reason

and who are not content unless they interpret any message (i.e.,

Qoranic verse or prophetic Tradition) that is transmitted to them in

the light of logical evidences.

To these people (of Belief) refers the Qoranic expression: 'or he who

lends his ear' (L, 37) to the Divine messages as they are conveyed

through the tongues of the Prophets. And such a man, i.e., a man who

tends his ear in this way, 'is a witness' (L, 37). God here refers to the

ontological dimension of Imagination and the proper use of the

faculty of Imagination. And this corresponds to the saying of the

Prophet (Muf)ammad) on the 'perfection of Belief'

260 Sufism and Taoism

(il;san ): ' 21 ••• that you worship Godas if you saw Him'. God is always

in the direction toward which man prays. This is why such a man is a

witness. 22

'Being a witness (shahid)' in this passage means, in Ibn Arabi's

interpretation, the spiritual state in which a man 'witnesses', i.e., is

present by his heart to the ontological plane of Imagination. lt is a

state at which the heart of a 'knower' perceives in sensible imagery

some of the things that properly belong to the world of the Unseen.

The heart of a' knower', when he reaches this stage, finds itself in the

world of Imagination and begins to witness in images various states

of affairs of the invisible world.

lt is worthy of notice that toward the end of the passage just

quoted, Ibn 'Arabi, referring to the famous Tradition about il)siin,

draws attention to the expression: ' ... that you worship Him as if

you saw Him'. In Ibn 'Arabi's interpretation, this describes the

lowest and weakest degree of the 'witnessing' here in question. lt is

the lowest degree of the mental presence in the ontological plane of

Imagination, for it is said: 'as if you saw Him'. As the very wording

of this phrase indicates, man is notas yet actually seeing God. There

is as yet no actual vision. Man only acts as if he had a real vision.

But when the heart of the 'knower' becomes strengthened and

mounts a step higher, the object of the 'witnessing' becomes visible

to the internai, spiritual eye (ba$irah), though as yet no vision occurs

to his physical eye. 23

As the 'knower' goes up to the next degree, the object becomes

visible to both his physical eye and his spiritual eye. And if he still

goes up and reaches finally the ultimate and highest stage, the one

who 'witnesses' and the object 'witnessed' become completely

unified. At this stage it is no longer the human heart that 'witnesses'

its object; but it is the Absolute itself 'witnessing' itself in itself. And

this is the stage of the 'saint' (waliy).

Thus when a man 'wakes up', and rises to the highest degree of

'saintship', he begins to witness an extraordinary phenomenon, for

his spiritual eye is now open to the reality of what we have described

earlier under the title of 'new creation'.

In the eye of a real 'knower', the Absolute (in whatever form it may

appear) remains always the 'recognized' one which is never denied. 24

The people who recognized the same Absolu te un der ail phenomenal

forms in the present world will do exactly the same in the Hereafter,

too.

This is why God ( speaking of a man of this kind) says 'for whomever

has a heart (qalb)' (L, 37). For (such a man) knows the constant

changing of the Absolute in various forms; he knows this judging by

The Perfect Man as an Individual 261

the fact that his 'heart' is constantly changing from one form to

another. 25

Thus such a man cornes to know his .own 'self' through (the know-

ledge of the constant transformation of) himself. (And from this he

obtains the real knowledge about the Absolute, for) his own 'self' is

nothing other than the He-ness of the Absolute, (and his knowledge

thus obtained is easily extended to everything because) everything in

the world of Being, whether present or future, is nothing other than

the He-ness of the Absolute; indeed, everything is the He-ness

itself. 26

A real 'knower' who knows his 'heart' (qalb) sees with his own inner

eye how it changes constantly and transforms-itself (qalb or taqal-

lub) at every moment in a myriad of modes and states. He knows at

the same time that his 'heart' is but a self-manifestion of the Abso-

lute, and that it is nothing other than the He-ness of the Absolute.

Of course his 'heart' is the only thing in the whole world whose inner

structure he can know through introspection. But he is well aware

also that all other things must be exactly of the same structure as his

'heart'. Thus a man who knows his own 'heart' from inside knows

also the Absolute as it goes on transforming itself moment after

moment in all the possible forms of the world.

The category to which such a 'knower' belongs constitutes the

highest degree on the scale of humanity. The subject of the next

chapter will be this highest category of men.

Notes

1. FU'f., p. 26/56.

2. FU'f ., p. 118/114. The whole passage has been given in translation in Chapter IV.

3. FU'f., pp. 125-126/107.

4. p. 126.

5. FU!i., p. 126/107.

6. FU'f., p. 130/109-110.

7. Cf. Affifi, FU'f., Corn., p. 126.

8. As I have remarked above, the word ghayrah meaning 'jealousy' is, in the

linguistic consciousness of Ibn' Arabi, directly connected with ghayr meaning 'other'.

So the sentence: 'God covered or concealed the reality with ghayrah' not only means

that He concealed it with 'jealousy', but at the same time that He has concealed the

reality by an infinite number of particular 'determinations', ail of which are regarded

as 'other' than God Himself, so that in this view everything appears as something

1111

: 11:

1111

I'

1

1

11.J

!I

262 Sufism and Taoism

'other' than the rest of the things as well as' other' than the Absolute. And the view of

'other-ness' covers the reality of Being and hinders it from being perceived by the

eyes of ordinary people.

9. Fu$., p. 130/110.

10. FIJ-î., p. 211/168-169.

11. FU$., pp. 234-235/185-186.

12. FIJ-î., pp. 135-136/113.

13. ibid.

14. Cf. Chapter V, where the same idea is dealt with in connection with a different

problem, that of 'metaphysical perplexity'.

15. FU$., p. 136/113.

16. Wa-mâ rama y ta idh rama y ta wa-lâkinna Allâha ramà.

17. Suppose Ais the 'cause' of B, for instance.Bis of course the 'caused' of A. But

there is also a certain respect in which B must be regarded as the 'cause' of A. In this

latter respect, A would be the 'caused' of B.

18. FIJ-î., p. 233/185.

19. p. 234.

20. FU$., p. 153/125.

21. On the exact meaning of the word il]sân see my The Concept of Belief in Islamic

Theology, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 58-60.

22. FU$., p. 149/123.

23. Qàshànî, p. 150.

24 The reference is to the Tradition, which has been quoted and explained earlier in

the present chapter, concerning what will happen on the day of Resurrection.

25. By the 'etymological' way of thinking which, as we have observed several times,

is so typical of Ibn 'Arabî, he brings together the 'heart' (qalb) and 'change' or

'transformation' (qalb).

26. Fu$., p. 149/122.

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch14 XIV Man as Microcosm

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

XIV Man as Microcosm

As I remarked earlier, the world-view of Ibn 'Arabï stands on two

bases: one is the Absolute, and the other the Perfect Man. And all

through the preceding pages, we have been analyzing his ontologi-

cal world-view exclusively from the first angle. The remaining chap-

ters will be concerned with the analysis of the same world-view

looked at from the second point of view.

I Microcosm and Macrocosm

In setting out to discuss the concept of the Perfect Man (al-insiin

al-kiimil) it is, I think of special importance to observe that Ibn

'Arabi considers 'man' on two different levels. It is important to

keep this basic distinction in mind, because if we neglect to do so, we

shall easily be led into confusion.

The first is the cosmic level. Here 'man' is treated as a cosmic

entity. In popular terminology we might say that what is at issue on

this level is 'mankind'. In logical terminology, we might say that it is

'man' as a species. In any event, the question is not about 'man' as an

individual persan.

'Man' on this lev el is the most perf ect of all beings of the world,

for he is the Imago Dei. Here 'man' himself is perfect; 'man' is the

Perfect Man. The Perfect Man in this sense is 'man' viewed as a

perfect epitome of the universe, the very spirit of the whole world of

Being, a being summing up and gathering together in himself all the

elements that are manifested in the universe. 'Man' is, in short, the

Microcosm.

At the second level, on the contrary, 'man' means an individual.

On this level, not all men are equally perfect. There are, from this

point of view, a number of degrees among men. And only few of

them deserve the appellation of the Perfect Man. The majority -of

men are far from being 'perfect'.

The present chapter will be concerned with the Perfect Man as

understood in the first sense.

Man as Microcosm 219

As has just been remarked 'man' on the first of the two levels is an

epitome of the whole universe. He is, in this sense, called the

'comprehensive being' (al-kawn al-jiimi', lit. 'a being that gathers

together'), that is, Microcosm.

Concerning the birth of' man' as the' comprehensive being', there

is at the very outset of the Fu$Û$, a very famous passage. The

passage is filled with technical terms peculiar to Ibn 'Arabi, all of

which have already been analyzed in the preceding chapters. Here

Ibn 'Arabï describes the mysterious process by which the self-

manifestation of the Absolu te is activated by the inner requirement

of the Divine Names, leading toward the creation of the world, and

in particular the creation of' man' as the being who su ms up in itself

all the properties that are diffused in the whole universe. The

passage begins with the following words: 1

When the Absolute God, at the level of his Beautiful Names that

exceed enumeration, wished to see the (latent) realities of the Na mes

- or if you like, say, His inner reality itself - as (actualized) in a

'comprehensive being· which, because of its being qualified by

'existence', contains in itself the whole universe, and (wished) to

make manifest to Himself His own secret through it (i.e., the 'com-

prehensive being·) ...

These opening words of the passage constitute a brief summary of

the ontology of Ibn' Arabi which we have been studying in detail in

the preceding. The argument may be explained as follows.

Ibn' Arabi begins by stating that the Divine Wish (mashï'ah) for

the creation of the world (and man in particular) did not arise from

the Absolute qua Absolute. The creative Wish arase due to the

essential inner drive of the Beautiful Names or Attributes. The

Absolute qua Absolute characterized by an absolute 'indepen-

dence' (istighnii') does not require by itself and for itself any crea-

tive activity. It is the Divine Names that require the existence of the

universe, the created world. It is in the very nature of the Divine

Names to require the world, because they are actualized only by the

concrete existents, and without the latter they lose positive

signifi can ce.

Ibn 'Arabï expresses this situation by saying: 'The Absolute

wished to see the realities (a'yiin) of the Divine Names', or 'The

Absolu te wished to see its own inner reality ('ayn ). The first formula

corresponds to what we already know as 'the holy emanation', while

the second corresponds to the 'most holy emanation'. The distinc-

tion does not make much difference in this particular context,

because 'the holy emanation' necessarily presupposes the 'most

holy emanation', and the latter necessarily entails the former. What

Ibn' Arabï wants to say is that God had the mashï'ah to see Himself

•11

220 Sufism and Taoism

as reftected in the mirror of the world, that He wished to see Himself

in the very manifestation-forms of His own Attributes.

The phrase, 'because of its being qualified by existence', gives an

answer to the question: How is it possible for the Absolute to see

itself by the creation of the universe as epitomized by Man? The

uni verse possesses 'existence'. This 'existence' is not the absolu te

Existence itself, but is a 'relative existence' (wujüd i<J,afiy), i.e.,

'existence' as determined and delimited in various ways and forms.

But, however determined and delimited, the relative existence is,

after ail, a direct reftection of the absolute Existence. lt is the figure

of the Absolute itself as the latter is manifested in 'possible' exist-

ents, being determined and particularized by each of the loci of its

self-manifestation. The relative existence is - to use a favorite

metaphor of Ibn 'Arabi - the absolu te Existence as reftected in the

mirror of relative determinations.

An image in a mirror is not the object itself, but it does represent

the object. In this sense, the universe discloses the 'secret' (sirr) of

the Absolute. The word 'secret' in the above-quoted passage means

the hidden (i.e., absolutely invisible) depths of Existence, and cor-

responds to the phrase 'the hidden treasure' (kanz makhfiy) in the

famous Tradition which we discussed earlier.

Ibn' Arabi sets out to develop his thought in terms of the metaphor

of the mirror. He begins by distinguishing between two kinds of

vision: 2

The vision which a being obtains of itself is different from the vision

of itself which it obtains in something else serving as a mirror for it.

The first of these two kinds of vision consists in a being seeing itself

in itself. And it goes without saying that the Absolute has vision of

itself in this sense. Here the Absolu te needs no mirror. The Abso-

lu te is 'All-seeing by itself from eternity', and nothing of itself is

concealed from its inner gaze.

But the Absolute has also an aspect in which it is an Essence

qualified by Attributes. And since the Attributes become real only

when they are externalized, it becomes necessary for the Absolute

to see itself in the 'other'. Thus the 'other' is created in order that

God might see Himself therein in externalized forms.

The first thing which God created in order to see Himself therein

was the world or universe. Ibn' Arabi calls the world in this particu-

lar context the Big Man (al-insan al-kabïr), i.e., Macrocosm. 3 The

most salient feature of the Big Man is that every single existent in it

Man as Microcosm 221

represents one particular aspect (Name) of God, and one only, so

that the whole thing lacks a clear delineation and a definite articula-

tion, being as it is a loose co11glomeration of discrete points. It is, so

to speak, a clouded mirror.

In contrast to this, the second thing which God created for the

purpose of seeing Himself as reflected therein, namely, Man, is a

well-polished spotless mirror reflecting any object as it really is.

Rather, Man is the polishing itself of this mirror which is called the

universe. Those discrete things and properties that have been dif-

fused and scattered ail over the immense universe become united

and unified into a sharp focus in Man. The structure of the whole

universe with ail its complicated details is reflected in him in a clear

and distinctly articulated miniature. This is the meaning of his being

a Microcosm. Man is a Small Universe, while the universe is a Big

Man, as al-Qashànî says.4

The contrast between the universe and Man in the capacity of a

'mirror' which God holds up to Himself is described by Ibn' Arabi in

the following terms: 5

God makes Himself visible to Himself in a (particular) form that is

provided by the locus (i.e., the mirror) in which He is seen. Some-

thing in this way becomes visible to Him which would never be visible

if it were not for this particular locus and His self-manifestation

therein.

(Before the creation of Man) God had already brought into being the

whole universe with an existence like that of a vague and obscure

image having a form but no soul within. It was like a mirror that was

left unpolished ....

This situation naturally demanded the polishing up of the mirror of

the universe. And Man (âdam, i.e., the reality of Man) was ( created

to be) the very polishing of that mirror and the very spirit of that

form.

The ontological meaning of the metaphor of the 'unpolished mirror'

is explained by al-Qàshànî as follows: 6

Before Man, the Microcosm, was created, the universe (the Macro-

cosm) had already been existent due to the requirement of the Divine

Names, because it is in the nature of each Name to require singly the

actualization of its content, i.e., the Essence accompanied by an

Attribute, or an existence particularized by an Attribute, while

another Name asks for an existence particularized by another Attri-

bute. No single Name, however, requires an existence which would

unify all the Attributes together, for no Name has an essential unity

comprising all the Attributes in itself. Thus the universe has no

property of being a comprehensive locus for manifesting all the

aspects of existence in its unity.

222 Sufism and Taoism

This fact that the universe was an 'unpolished mirror' required the

creation of Man who was meant to be the very polishing of the

mirror.

This is a very important statement for determining the cosmic

significance of Man. We might interpret it in terms of modern

philosophie thinking and say that what is symbolized by the 'polish-

ing' - or rather 'the state of having been polished' (jalii') - of the

mirror is the' consciousness' of Man. All beings other than Man only

reftect, each one of them, singly, one aspect of the Absolu te. It is

only when put together in the form of the universe that they consti-

tute a big whole corresponding to the Consciousness itself of the

Absolu te. In this sense, the universe, certainly, is 'one', but, since

the universe lacks consciousness, it does not constitute real unity.

Man, on the contrary, not only synthesizes all the forms of the

Divine self-manifestation which are scattered over the world of

Being, but also is conscious of this whole. This is why a true com-

prehensive unity is established by Man, corresponding to the Unity

of the Absolute. Man is in this sense the Imago Dei. And because of

this peculiarity, Man can be, as we shall see presently, the 'viceger-

ent' of God on the earth.

On the correspondence just mentioned between the human

unity and the Divine Unity, al-Qàshàni makes the following

remark: 7

The Presence (i.e., the ontological lev el) of 'God' gathers together ail

the Names without there being anything mediatory between them

and the Divine Essence. The ontological level of Man gathers them

together in a similar way. This can be understood from the following

consideration. Existence cornes down first from the comprehensive

Unity of the Essence to the Presence of Divinity, and thence it

overflows into ail the degrees of the 'possible' things spreading more

and more in various forms until, when it reaches Man, it has already

been tinged with ail the col ors of the ( ontological) grades.

Man becomes in this way an intermediate stage (barzakh) comprising

the properties both of necessity and possibility, as the Presence of

Divinity comprises both the Essence and ail the Names.

The above quoted passage from the Fu$Ü$, together with this

explanatory remark by al-Qâshânï, makes it clear that the most

important significance of Man lies in his 'comprehensiveness'

(jam'ïyah, lit. 'gathering-ness'). Before we proceed with this prob-

lem, we must analyze further in detail the metaphor of the mirror.

A mirror reftects objects. Sometimes it reftects them as they really

are. But in many cases an object is reftected in a mirror more or less

changed or transformed.

Man as Microcosm 223

The image of a person appearing on the polished (surface of a) body

is nothing other than the person himself, except that the locus or the

Presence, in which he perceives the reflection of his own image, gives

back the image to him with a certain transformation8 according to the

constitution of that Presence. In the sa me way, a big thing appears

small in a small mirror, oblong in an oblong mirror, and moving in a

moving mirror (i.e., running water).

Thus the mirror sometimes gives back the image of the person in

inversion, the inversion being caused by the particular constitution of

a particular Presence. But sometimes it gives back the very thing (i.e.,

the person who is looking) appearing in it, in such a way that the left

side (for example) of the reflected image faces the left side of the

person. 9 Sometimes, again, the right side (of the image in the mirror)

faces the left side (of the person) as is typical of what customarily

happens to (an image in) a mirror. Only by a 'break of custom' does

the right si de (for example) face the right side. 10

On the transforming effect of mirrors, Ibn 'Arabï says as follows in

another passage: 11

A mirrnr affects the images in a certain sense, but it does not affect

them in another sense. It does affect in that it gives back the image of

an object in a changed formas regards smallness, bigness, length, and

shortness. Thus it has a positive effect upon the quantities, and that

effect is properly due toit. On the other hand, however, (it has no

positive effect of its own in the sense that) ail these changes caused by

the mirror are in the last resort due to the different sizes of the objects

reflected.

Even one and the same object is reftected in varying magnitudes in

mirrors of various magnitudes. Here we see clearly suggested the

idea that although each individual man, as a mirror of the Absolu te,

reftects the Absolute and nothing else, the reftected images vary

from person to person according to the individual capacities of

different men. There is, however, as Ibn 'Arabï adds, a certain

respect in which a man, the mirror, must be said to exercise no

positive, transforming effect upon the image of the Absolu te, for all

transformations of the reftected image ultimately corne from the

internai modifications of the Absolute itself

Man, unlike the rest of the creatures, actualizes in himself the

whole of the Divine Names in miniature, and is, in this sense, a

miraculous mirror which is able to reftect the original unity of the

Names as it is. But, on the other hand, men considered individually,

differ from each other in the 'polishing' of the cosmic mirror. Only

in the case of the highest 'knowers' does the human consciousness

reftect on its spotless surface the Absolute as it really is.

But by making these observations, we are already encroaching

upon the realm of the next chapter. We must turn our steps back and

continue our discussion of the nature of Man as Microcosm.

224 Sufism and Taoism

II Comprehensiveness of Man

The 'humanity' (insanïyah) of Man on the cosmic level lies, as we

have already seen, in his 'comprehensiveness' (jam'ïyah). Man, as

Microcosm, contains in himself all the attributes that are found in

the universe. The Absolute, in this sense, manifests itself in Man in

the most perfect way. And Man is the Perfect Man because he is the

most perfect self-manifestation of the Absolute.

The following is a very important passage in which Ibn 'Arabï

explains to us his concept of the Perfect Man on the cosmic level. 12

He takes the prophet Moses as an illustration. Moses, when he was

bom, was put into a chest, and was thrown into the Nile. Ibn' Arabï,

by explicating the symbolic meaning of this story, develops it into a

theory of the Perfect Man.

As regards the wisdom of Moses' being put into a chest and thrown

into the great river, we must notice that the ch est (tabüt) symbolizes

the 'human aspect (of man)' (nasüt, i.e., the body) while the 'great

river' (yamm) symbolizes the knowledge which he acquires by means

of this body .13 This Knowledge is acquired by him through the power

of thinking, and representation. These and similar powers of the

human soul can only fonction when the physical body is in existence.

So, as soon as the soul is actualized in the body and is commanded (by

God) to use and govern the body freely, God produces in the soul all

the above-mentioned powers as so many instruments by which the

soul might achieve the purpose - according to the Will of God - of

governing this 'ch est' containing the invisible Presence (sakînah) 14 of

the Lord.

Thus (Moses) was thrown into the great river so that he might acquire

by means of these powers all kinds of knowledge. (God) let him

understand thereby the fact that although the spirit (rüh) governing

(the body) is the 'king' (i.e., the supreme commander of the human

body), yet it cannot govern it at will save by means of the body. This is

why God furnished the body with all these powers existing in the

'human aspect' which He called symbolically and esoterically the

'chest'.

The same holds true of the governing of the world by God. For He

governs the world at will only by means of it (i.e., the world), or by

means of its form. 15

God governs the world only by the world (by establishing certain

necessary relations among the things of the world): for example, the

child depends upon the generating act of the father, the generated

depend upon their generators, the conditioned upon their con-

ditions, the effects upon their causes, the conclusions upon their

proofs, and the concrete existents upon their inner realities. All these

belong to the world as a result of God's disposai of the thing. Thus it is

clear that He governs the world only by the world.

1 have said above: 'or by means of its form', i.e., by means of the form

Man as Microcosm 225

of the world. What 1 understand here un der the word 'form' (sürah) is

the Most Beautiful Names by which He has named Himself and the

highest Attributes by which He has qualified Himself.

In fact, of every Name of God, which we have corne to know, we find

the meaning actualized in the world and its spirit being active in the

world. So in this respect, too, God does not govern the world except

by the form of the world.

Thus Ibn' Arabï <livides the goveming (tadbïr) of the world by the

Absolute into two kinds: (1) 'by the world' and (2) 'by the form of

the world'. The first has been illustrated by such necessary relations

as exist between the child and the father, the caused and the causes,

etc. Here God, so to speak, lets the world govem itself by putting

the things of the world in certain necessary relations. The second

kind is completely different from this. lt consists in God's making

His Names and Attributes, i.e., the etemal forms, govem and

regulate from inside the ever changing phenomenal forms of the

world. 16 This point is brought out with admirable clarity by al-

Qashanï in his following remark on the just quoted passage of the

FU$Ù$. 11

What is meant by the 'form of the world' here is not its sensible

individual form. If it were so, it. (i.e., the second type of governing)

would simply be reduced to the first type ....

What is really meant by it is the intelligible, specific form of the world,

which is nothing but the Most beautiful Names and its realities, i.e.,

the highest Attributes.

The (phenomenal) forms of the world are simply outwardly man-

ifested forms of the Names and Attributes. These latter are the real

inner forms of the world. All sensible things are but outward, indi-

vidualized forms; they are ever changing imprints and external

shapes, while the (inner forms) are permanent and everlasting, never

changing. The former are transitory forms, surface phenomena,

while the latter are the inner meanings and spirits of the former.

Ail the Names by which God has named Himself, such as Living,

Knowing, Willing, Powerful, are there in the world. All the Attri-

butes with which He has qualified Himself, such as Life, Knowledge,

Will, Power, are there in the world. Thus God governs the outside of

the world by its inside.

(So there are two types in God's governing the world:) the first is the

governing exercised by some of the phenomenal forms of the world

over other phenomenal forms. The second is the governing of the

phenomenal individual forms by the internai specific forms. Both

types are the governing of the world by the world.

Ibn 'Arabï goes on to argue:

This is why (the Prophet) said concerning the creation of Adam:

'Verily God created Adam in His Form', for Adam is an exemplar

synthesizing ail the constituent elements of the Presence of Divinity,

226 Sufism and Taoism

namely, the Essence, the Attributes, and the Actions. The expression

'His Form' means nothing but the Presence of Divinity itself.

Thus God has put into this noble epitome (mukhtasar), the Perfect

Man (as symbolized by Adam), ail the Divine Na mes and the realities

of ail things existing outside of him in the Macrocosm which (appar-

ently) subsists independently of him.

This passage explains the meaning of the 'comprehensiveness' of

Man. As we have seen above, the Perfect Man synthesizes in himself

all the things that exist in the universe, ranging from the four natural

elements to minerais, plants, and animais. But the important point

is that all these things do not exist in Man in their concrete indi-

vidual forms. They exist in him only as 'realities' (haqà'iq), that is, in

their universality. Man gathers together in himself all the things of

the universe in the sense that he is a synthesis of the non-material

realities of the individual things. The Perfect Man is an epitome of

the Macrocosm only in this particular sense.

God in this way has made Man the Spirit (rüh) of the universe, and

made everything, high and low, subservient to him because of the

perfection of his (inner) form.

Thus it cornes about that, as 'there is nothing' in the whole universe

'but gives praises unto God' (XVII, 44), so there is nothing in the

universe but is subservient to Man due to the essential merit of his

inner form. To this refers God's saying: 'thus He has made ail that is

in the heavens and in the earth subservient unto you ail together,

from Him' (XXII, 65).

So everything in the uni verse is un der the supreme dominion of Man.

But this fact is known only to those who know it - such a man is the

Perfect Man 18 - and th ose who do not know it do not know - such is

the Animal Man.

Outwardly considered, the fact that Moses was put into a ch est, which

was then thrown into the great river, meant death, but inwardly, it

was for him deliverance from being killed. For, as a result, he gained

life, just as the souls are enlivened by knowledge and are delivered

from the death of ignorance.

The long passage which we have quoted explains the real nature of

the perfection of Man on the cosmic lev el. In the view of Ibn' Arabi,

the perfection of Man and the high position assigned to him 19 are

due to bis microcosmic nature, that is, bis 'comprehensiveness'.

And bis 'comprehensiveness' consists in bis reftecting and realizing

faithfully the Divine Comprehensiveness.

Ali the Names that are contained in the Divine Form20 have been

manifested in the ontological dimension of Man. And the latter has

obtained through this (kind of) existence the (highest) rank of

integral comprehensiveness. 21

Man as Microcosm 227

As regards the Divine Comprehensiveness (al-jam'ïyah al-ilàhïyah)

Ibn 'Arabi gives the following explanation, dividing it into three

constituents. 22

(We can distinguish) in the Divine Comprehensiveness: (1) that

which must be attributed to God Himself (as represented by the

supreme Name Allah or God, comprehending within itself ail the

Divine Names), (2) that which is ascribable to the Reality of realities,

and (3) that which -in this constitution (i.e. the bodily constitution of

Man which comprehends ail the recipients of the world ranging from

the highest to the lowest - is ascribable to what is required by the

universal Nature.

The first of these three elements is evidently the Divine aspect of

Unity, i.e., the Divine Essence, not in its absoluteness but as

qualified by the Divine Name 'God'. The second is the ontological

plane in which the permanent archetypes corne into being, i.e., God

conceived as the highest creative Principle regulating and unifying

the archetypes. It is called the Reality of realities because through

this Reality all the realities of the world become actualized. The

third, the universal Nature (tabf'ah kulllyah) is the ontological

region of 'reality' occupying the intermediary position between the

purely Divine and positively creative 'reality' of Divine Names and

the purely creaturely and essentially passive 'reality' of the physical

world, comprising within itself both these properties - positively

creative on the one band, and passively receptive on the other.

From all this Ibn 'Arabi cornes to the following conclusion. 23

This being (i.e., the 'comprehensive being') is called Man and also a

Vicegerent (khalïfah). 24 His being (named) Man is due to the com-

prehensiveness of his constitution, comprising as it does ail the

realities. Furthermore (he deserves to be named Man - insan

because) he is to God as the pupil (insan) is to the eye as the

instrument of vision, i.e., seeing. Thus he is called insan because God

sees His creatures through man, and has Mercy upon them.

Man on the cosmic level, or the Perfect Man, is endowed with a

perf ect 'comprehensiveness'. And because of this 'comprehensive-

ness' by which he synthesizes in himself all the existents of the

uni verse not individually but in their universality, the Perfect Man

shows two characteristic properties which are not shared by any-

thing else. One is that he is the only being who is really and fully

entitled to be a perfect 'servant' ('abd) of God. All other beings do

not fully reftect God, because each actualizes only a single Divine

Name; they cannot, therefore, be perfect 'servants'. The second

characteristic feature of the Perfect Man consists in bis being in a

certain sense the Absolute itself. In the case of beings other than

human, we can say that the Absolu te is the inner reality ('ayn) of

228 Sufism and Taoism

them, but we cannot surely reverse the relation and say that they are

the inner reality of the Absolute, for they are but partial actualiza-

tions of the Divine Self. The following two verses by Ibn' Arabi put

these two characteristics of Man in a concise form. 25

Verily, we are real servants; verily, God is our Master.

Verily, we are His Self, and ail this is implied when I say 'Man'.

That is to say, we are 'servants' in the true sense of the word, because

we serve Him with an essential service, i.e., with the most com-

prehensive Unity which is realized on the ontological level of 'God',

while God with the whole of His Names is our Master, governing us,

administering our affairs. We are different in this respect from the

rest of beings, for they are His servants merely in certain aspects, and

God is their Master with some of His Names.

The Perfect Man is the inner reality of the Absolute because he

appears in the Form of the latter with its comprehensive unity. The

rest of the things, on the contrary, though the Absolu te is the inner

reality of each one of them, are not the inner reality of the Absolu te

because they are but loci of manifestation for some of the Names so

that the Absolute does not manifest itself in them in its essential

Form.

But when I say 'Man', meaning thereby the Perfect Man, i.e., Man

perfect in 'humanity', what is meant is the being in which the Abso-

lute manifests itself in its essential Form. Man, in this sense, is the

very reality of the Absolute.

Ibn' Arabi considers, further, the 'comprehensiveness' of Man from

the point of view of the Inward-Outward opposition. In exact

correspondence to the distinction between the Divine Names

Inward and Outward, there is in Man also a distinction between the

'inward' and the 'outward', and he covers thereby the whole of the

universe.

You must know, further, that God describes Himself as being the

Inward and the Outward. He has correspondingly produced the

world of the Unseen and the world of sensory experience so that we

might perceive the Inward by our own 'unseen' element and the

Outward by our 'sensible' element. 26

Thus God has created two worlds, the inner and the outer, corres-

ponding to His own lnward and Outward, and has given Man, and

Man only, the 'inner' and the 'outer'. In this respect, Man alone is

the true Imago of the Absolute.

You must have understood by now the real nature of Adam, i.e., his

outward 'form', as well as the real nature of his spirit (rülJ, ), i.e., his

inward 'form'. Adam is the Absolu te (in view of his inward form) and

a creature (in view of his outward form). You know also the real

Man as Microcosm 229

nature of his ( ontological) rank which, being a synthesis, makes him

entitled to be the Vicegerent (of God). 27

The position of Adam, i.e., the Perfect Man as understood in this

chapter, is 'in the middle' between the Absolute and the creatures.

He essentially reftects both, represents both, and is a 'synthesis'

(majmü') of the two 'forms'. His 'outward' discloses the form of the

created world and its realities, while his 'inward' reveals the Form

itself of the Absolute and its essential Names. And because of this

'synthesis' and perfect 'comprehensiveness', his rank is higher than

that of angels.

Thus ail the Names that are contained in the Divine Form are

manifested in the ontological dimension of Man. The latter has

obtained through this (kind of) existence the rank of integral com-

prehensiveness.

And this precisely was the ground on which God the Exalted refuted

the argument of the angels 28 ••• The angels were not aware of what

was implied by the constitution of this 'vicegerent' (of God on the

earth). Nor did they know the 'essential service' 29 required by

the Presence of the Absolute. For nobody can know concerning the

Absolute except that which his own essence allows him to know, and

the an gels did not possess the 'comprehensiveness' of Adam. They

were not even aware of (the limitedness of) the Divine Names that

were ( manifested) in themselves. So they were praising the Absolu te

and sanctifying it simply through the (limited Names that they hap-

pened to have in themselves). They were not aware of the fact that

God has ( other) Na mes about which no knowledge had been given

them. Consequently the angels were not praising Him through these

Names; nor were they sanctifying Him in the same way as Adam did.

Thus they were completely under the sway of what 1 have just

mentioned (i.e., their limited knowledge of the Names), and were

dominated by this ( deficient) state of theirs.

Because of this ( deficiency in their) constitution, the angels said ( to

God when He was about to create Adam):' Art Thou going to place

on the earth one who will do harm therein?' (II, 30). But 'harm' can

be nothing other than 'opening up an argument (against God, instead

of accepting His words with docility and submission)'. lt was exactly

what they themselves did (when they dared to put the above-

mentioned question to God). So what they said concerning Adam

was what they themselves were actually doing toward God. lt is

evident, th en, that, if their own nature had not been agreeable to this

particular behavior, they would not have said about Adam what they

said without being conscious (of the truth of the matter). Had they

but known their own selves, (i.e., their own essential constitution),

they would have known (the truth about Adam), and had they but

known (the truth) they would never have committed such a mistake.

In reality, however, they were not content with denigrating (Adam);

they went even further and boastfully claimed that they were praising

and sanctifying God.30

230 Sufism and Taoism

But Adam had in himself such Divine Names as were not represented

by the angels. The latter naturally could not praise God with those

Names, nor could they sanctify Him with them, as Adam did. 31

In the Qoran (II, 31) we read that 'God taught Adam all the

Names'. This means, according to Ibn 'Arabi, that Man represents

and actualizes all Divine Names. The angels, on the contrary, man-

ifest only some of the Names. But they are not aware of it.

The diff erence between the human and the angelic act of praising

God which is discussed here by Ibn 'Arabi is also based on the

Qoranic verse which reads: 'There is nothing (in the world) but

praises Him in adoration, but you do not understand their praise'

(XVII, 44).

The dictum that everything in the world is praising God bas, for

Ibn 'Arabi, a very special meaning. God manifests Himself in all

things, according to their peculiar capacities and within the limits

determined by the latter. This fact, when considered from the si de

of the created things, is capable of being interpreted as the created

things manifesting the Divine Perfection (kamiil) in variously

limited forms. This manifestation of the Divine Perfection by each

thing in its peculiar form is what is understood by Ibn 'Arabi under

the word 'praising' (tasbi}J,) or 'sanctifying' (taqdis).

Otherwise expressed, all things 'praise and sanctify' God by the

very fact that they exist in the world. But since each thing exists in its

own peculiar way, each thing praises and sanctifies God in a differ-

ent way from all the rest. And the higher the level of Being to which

a thing belongs, the greater and stronger is its 'praising and sanctify-

ing', because a higher being actualizes a greater number of Names

than those which belong to lower levels. In this respect, Man

occupies the highest position among all the beings of the world,

because he is a locus in which all the Names, i.e., all the Perfections

(kamiiliit) of God become manifested.

We must recall at this juncture what we have observed in an

earlier context about the essential indifference of Perfection

(kamiil) to the commonly accepted distinction between good and

evil. In Ibn 'Arabi' s world-view, the distinction which is ordinarily

made in human societies between good and evil is of an entirely

conventional, relative, and secondary nature. Primarily, existence

itself is Perfection, and every ontological attribute is also a Perfec-

tion. Just as 'obedience' (to God) is a Perfection, 'disobedience' is a

Perfection, because the latter is in no less a degree than the former

an ontological attribute, i.e., a form of Being. The fact that 'obedi-

ence' is a Perfection bas essentially nothing to do with its being

ethically 'good'; 'obedience' is a Perfection because it is a locus in

which such Divine Names as the Merciful and the Bountiful are

Man as Microcosm 231

manifested. l\nd 'disobedience' is a Perfection because it is a locus

in which suc;;h N ames as the Vindictive and the Chas tiser are

manifested.

If we lose sight of this basic ontological fact, we cannot under-

stand why lbh 'Arabi considers the position of Man higher than that

of angels. Frc)m the standpoint of Ibn' Arabi, the nature (tabi'ah) of

angels is solely 'spiritual' (rü}J,iyah ), while the nature of Man is

'spiritual-bocfüy' (rü}J,ïyah-badaniyah) and th us comprises all the

attributes of Being, ranging from the highest to the lowest. And

because of tbis particularly, Man is superior to angels. 32

Regarding the highest position of Man in the hierarchy of Being,

Ibn 'Arabi dlscerns a deep symbolic meaning in the Qoranic state-

ment that God created Adam 'with both His bands'.

God jointed His two hands for ( creating) Adam. This He did sol el y

by way of qmferring upon him a great honor. And this is why He said

to Iblïs (Satan): 'What hinders thee from falling prostrate before that

which 1 have created with both My hands?' (XXXVIII, 76). The

(joining of His two hands) symbolizes nothing other than the fact that

Adam joim; in him two 'forms': the form of the world and the form of

the Absolute. These two are the 'hands' of God.

Iblis, on contrary, is but a part of the world, and this 'gathering'

has not given him.33

In a different: passage of the Ibn 'Arabi returns to the idea of

God having created Adam with both His bands, and says: 34

God kneatled the clay of Man with both His hands, which are

opposed to each other, though, (in a certain sense), each one of His

two hands ts a right hand (i.e., both are exactly equal to each other in

being and merciful). In any case, there can be no doubt that

there is a d.ifference between the two if only for the reason that they

are 'two', \.e., two hands.

Nature is not affected except by what is proportional toit, and Nature

itself is diVided into pairs of opposition. That is why (it is said that

God creatM Adam) with both His hands.

And since He created Adam with both His hands, He named him

bashar,35 because of His 'touching' (mubasharah) him directly with

the two han.ds that are attributed to Him, the word 'touching' being

taken here. in a special sense which is applicable to the Divine

He did so as an expression of His special concern with this

human species. And He said to (lblis) who refused to fall prostrate

before Adqm: 'What hinders thee from falling prostrate before that

which 1 have created with both My bands? Oost thou scornfully look

down' upon one who is equal to thee, i.e., in being made of natural

elements, 'or art thou of a higher order' which, in reality, thou art not

- than elen1ental ('un$uri) beings?37 God means by 'those of a higher

order' ('altn) those (spiritual beings) who, due to their luminous

232 Sufism and Taoism

constitution, transcend, by their own essence, being 'elemental',

though they are 'natural' ,38

Man is superior to other beings of the 'elemental' species only by

being a bashar of clay (i.e., clay kneaded directly by the two hands of

God). Thus he is higher than all that have been created of elements

without having been touched by his hands.

So Man is in rank higher than all the angels, terrestrial and celestial,

although, according to the sacred texts, the archangels are superior to

the human species.

As a concrete example showing in the most perfect form possible

the 'comprehensiveness' of the Perfect Man, Ibn 'Arabi discusses

Abraham (Ibrahim).

In Islam, Abraham is generally known as the 'intimate friend of

God' (kha/U Allâh). Ibn 'Arabi finds this phrase quite symbolic.

But we must remember also that he understands the word khalil in a

very special sense which is typical of his way of thinking.

The word khalil appearing in the phrase khalil Allàh means in

ordinary understanding an 'intimate friend' .39 Ibn 'Arabi explains

the word by a completely different etymology; he derives it from

takhallul which means 'penetration', 'permeation'. The Perfect

Man is the one whom the Absolute penetrates and whose faculties

and bodily members are all permeated by the Absolute in such a

way that he thereby manifests all the Perfections of the Divine

Attributes and Names.

We have already discussed in an earlier context the problem of

Being running through (sarayàn) all beings. The important point,

for our immediate purpose, is that this sarayàn or 'pervasion',

although it is universal, differs in intensity or density from one thing

to another. The sarayàn of Being reaches its highest degree in the

Perfect Man. And Being, that is, all the Perfections of the Absolute,

permeate Man and become manifested in him both inwardly and

outwardly. The title of honor of Abraham, khalil, symbolizes this

fact. Ibn 'Arabi himself gives the following explanation on this point: 40

(Abraham) is called khalïl for no other reason than that he 'perme-

ates', and comprises in himself, all (the qualities) by which the Divine

Essence is qualified41 ••• just as a color 'permeates' a colored object

in such a way that the accident (i.e., the color) exists in all the parts of

the substance. The relation is different from that between a place and

an object occupying it. Or rather we should say that (Abraham is

called khalïl) because the Absolute 'permeates' the existence of the

form of Abraham.42

Here Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes between two forms of 'permeation'

(takhallul): (1) one in which Man (symbolized by Abraham) plays

" ::p1 Man as Microcosm 233

the active role, Abraham appearing in the Form of the Absolute,

and (2) the other in which the Absolute plays the active role, the

Absolute appearing in the form of Abraham. The distinction was

explained in an earlier context from a somewhat different point of

view, when we discussed the idea of the bestowal of Being. What is

of particular importance in the present context is that in the second

type of 'permeation' the Absolu te manifests itself in an individual-

ized form, determined by the latter in its Existence, so that in this

case creaturely attributes are ascribed to God, including even attri-

butes denoting 'defects'.

Both these statements are right according to what God Himself

affirms, for each of these aspects has its own proper field in which it is

valid and which it never oversteps.

Do you not see that God appears assuming the attributes that are

peculiar to the temporal beings?43 He affirms this about Himself.

Thus He assumes even attributes of defects and attributes of a

blamable nature.

Do you not see (on the other hand) 44 that the creatures appear

assuming the Attributes of the Absolute from the first Attribute to

the very last?

Thus ail of them (i.e., all the Attributes of the Absolu te) are necessar-

ily and rightly to be ascribed to the creatures just as the attributes of

the temporal beings are necessarily and rightly to be ascribed to the

Absolu te.

All the Attributes of the Absolute are to be affirmed of the crea-

tures because the essential reality (IJ,aqiqah) of the latter is nothing

other than the Absolute appearing with its own Reality in their

forms, so that the Attributes of the Absolute are the attributes of

the creatures. In the same way, all the attributes of the temporal

beings are rightly to be affirmed of the Abs'olute, because these

attributes are so man y states and aspects of the Absolu te. If the very

existence of the temporal beings is the Existence of the Absolute as

manifested in them, how much more should this be the case with the

attributes of the temporal beings.45

Regarding the structure of the phenomenon of 'permeation', Ibn

'Arabi gives the following explanation:46

Know that whenever something 'permeates' (takhallala) another, the

first is necessarily contained in the second. The permeater becomes

veiled by the permeated, so that the passive one (i.e., the permeated)

is the 'outward' while the active one (i.e., the permeater) is the

'inward' which is invisible. Thus it (i.e., the permeater) is food for the

other (i.e., the permeated), just as water permeates wool and makes

the latter bigger and more voluminous.

And when it is God that plays the part of the 'outward', the creatures

are hidden within Him, and they become all the Names of God,

234 Sufism and Taoism

namely, His hearing, His sight, etc., and ail His relations and ail His

modes of cognition. But when it is the creatures that play the rôle of

the 'outward', God becomes hidden in them, being inside of them,

and God (in this case) is the hearing of the creatures, their sight, their

hands and feet, and ail their faculties.

Thus the ontological 'permeation' is completely reciprocal between

the Absolute and the world, and the Perfect Man represents this

reciprocal 'permeation' in its most perfect form. Abraham is a

typical example of this phenomenon.

III The Vicegerency of God

The Perfect Man is the 'vicegerent' (khalifah) of Godon the earth,

or in the world of Being. Reference has been made earlier to this

concept in an incidental way. The present section will be devoted to

a more detailed and concentrated discussion of this problem.

The Perfect Man is entitled to be the 'vicegerent' of God because

of his 'comprehensiveness'. This idea, which has been mentioned

more than once in what precedes, will fumish us with a good

starting-point for an analysis of the concept of vicegerency.

After having stated that Man alone in the whole world possesses

the unique property of 'being comprehensive' (jam'iyah), Ibn

'Arabi goes on to argue: 47

lblïs (Satan) was but a part of the world, having no such 'comprehen-

siveness'. But Adam was a 'vicegerent' because of this 'comprehen-

siveness'. If he had not appeared in the Form of God who appointed

him as His 'vicegerent' to take care of the things (i.e., the world and

everything in the world) in His stead, he would not have been His

'vicegerent' .48 If, on the other hand, he had not contained in himself

all the things of the world and all that was demanded of him by th ose

people over whom he had been commanded to exercise sovereign

power, (he would not have been His 'vicegerent'). For the people

depended upon him, and he was naturally expected to take care of ail

the needs of the people. Otherwise, he would not have been a

'vicegerent' governing them (in the place of the King).

Thus no one was entitled to be the 'vicegerent' except the Perfect

Man, for God created his 'outward' form out of ail the realities and

forms of the world,49 and his 'inward' form on the model of His own

Form.50 This is why God says (in a Tradition): 'I am his hearing and

his sight'. It is to be remarked that God does not say: 'I am his eye and

his ear'. God distinguishes here between the two forms (i.e., the

outward form and the inward form).

The same holds true of everything existent in the world (i.e., just as

God appears in Adam in his form, so He appears in everything in

its peculiar form) in accordance with the requirement of the reality of

Man as Microcosm 235

each thing. However, nothing in the world possesses the 'comprehen-

siveness' which is possessed by the 'vicegerent'. In fact he has

obtained (his vicegerency) only because of his 'comprehensiveness'.

In another passage Ibn 'Arabi considers again the same problem of

'vicegerency' of Man based on the 'comprehensiveness' of his con-

stitution. This time he approaches the problem from a somewhat

different angle. 51

(The Perfect Man) is Man, temporally produced (in his body), but

eternal (i.e., having no temporal origin, with regard to his spirit),

something that grows up forever, the Word that distinguishes (bet-

ween possibility and necessity) and gathers (them) together. The

universe reached completion when he came into existence. He is to

the uni verse what the bezel is to the seal. He is (comparable to) the

place (of the seal) where there is engraved the device with which the

king seals his treasuries.

This is the reason why God has called him a 'vicegerent' ,52 because he

acts as the guardian of His creatures just as the treasuries (of the

king) are guarded by a seal. For as long as the royal seal is upon them,

no one dares to open them unless the king gives permission.

Thus God has appointed him as the 'vicegerent' in the guarding of the

universe. The universe will remain guarded as long as there is in the

universe the Perfect Man.

Do you not see that when he departs (from the present world) and the

seal of the treasuries is broken, there will not remain in the world that

which God has stored there, and ail that are therein will corne out and

will become confused one with another and everything will be trans-

ported to the Hereafter? And there (in the next world) he (i.e., the

Perfect Man) will again become a seal on the treasury of the Here-

after to remain there as the seal for ever and ever.

The whole world of Being, or the universe, is the 'treasury' of God,

and of God alone. And Man is a custodian and curator (wakil)

whom God Himself has put in charge of the guardianship of the

treasury. This idea, which is the only right one concerning the

position of Man in the cosmic order, is according to Ibn 'Arabi, an

idea peculiar to the 'people of Mul)ammad'.

Unlike Noah who had called his people exclusively to tanzih,

Mul)ammad called his people to both tanzih and tashbih. 53 He called

them to tanzih because the whole universe is a possession of God,

and of God alone. He called them to tashbih, emphasizing thereby

the human element in the created world, because God Himself has

put the administration of His own possession in the hands of Man as

His 'vicegerent'. Man is not the real owner of the 'treasury', but he

has the status of its 'curator'. 54 And Man owes this high status to the

fact that he is the only existent in the whole world of Being in whom

all the Attributes and Names of the Absolute are manifested.

236 Sufism and Taoism

IV The Reality of Mul;lammad

The 'Reality of Mul;lammad' (IJaqïqah MufJammad or al-haqiqah

al-mufJammadiyah), is one of the most important concepts in the

philosophy of Ibn' Arabï. But since it has been dealt with in detail by

Affifi, as Ibn 'Arabï's doctrine of the logos, in his Philosophy ,55 1

shall be content here with discussing it only as an aspect of the

problem of the Perfect Man.

All prophets, in Ibn 'Arabï's view, are embodiments of the idea of

the Perfect Man. But the Islamic Prophet, Mul;lammad, occupies

among them a very special place. What is particularly important

about Mul;lammad is that he had been a cosmic being before he was

raised as an individual prophet at a certain moment of human

history in the èapacity of God's Messenger to the Arabs. Ibn' Arabï

bases this conception on a well-known Tradition in which Mul;lam-

mad describes himself as a being of a cosmic nature by saying: 'I was

a prophet even while Adam was between clay and water'. 56

Ontologically, Mul;lammad as a cosmic being who existed from

eternity corresponds to, or represents, the level of the permanent

archetypes; that is, the level of Being 'which is neither existent nor

non-existent', the intermediary stage (barzakh) between the abso-

lute Absolute and the world which is the outer self-manifestation of

the Absolute. This intermediary stage is divine in so far as it is

identified with the Divine Consciousness, but it is, at the same time,

essentially creaturely or human in that it has significance only as it is

related to the created world. The intermediary stage in this latter

aspect, i.e., considered in its human aspect, is the Reality

of Mul;lammad. And it is also the Perfect Man on the cosmic

level.

Thus understood, the Reality of Mul;lammad is not exactly the

permanent archetypes themselves. Rather, it is the unifying princi-

ple of all archetypes, the active principle on which depends the very

existence of the archetypes. Considered from the side of the Abso-

lute, the Reality of Mul;lammad is the creative activity itself of the

Absolute, or God 'conceived as the self-revealing Principle of the

universe' .57 It is the Absolute in the first stage of its eternal self-

manifestation, i.e., the Absolute as the universal Consciousness.

It is also called ontologically, the 'Reality of realities' (IJaqiqah

al-IJaqa'iq). The 'Reality of realities' is ultimately nothing but the

Absolute, but it is not the Absolute in its primordial absoluteness; it

is the very first form in which the Absolute begins to manifest itself.

And this Divine Consciousness is reftected most faithfully by the

self-consciousness of the Perfect Man. The Perfect Man, in this

sense, is the outwardly manifested Consciousness of God. Thus the

Man as Microcosm 237

Prophet Mul;lammad on the cosmic level corresponds almost

exactly to the Plotinian First Intellect.

Mul;lammad, as the Perfect Man on the cosmic level, is the first of

all self-determinations (ta'ayyunat) of the Absolu te. Theologically,

it is the first 'creature' of God.

Basing himself on a Tradition: 'the first thing which God created

was my Light', Ibn' Arabï calls the Reality of Mul;lammad also the

'Light of Mul;lammad' (al-nür al-mufJammadiy). This Light had

been existent even before ail the creatures came into existence. lt is,

in this sense, 'eternal (a parte ante)' (qadim), and 'non-temporal'

(ghayr fJadith). And this eternal Light went on being manifested in

successive prophets: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus etc.,

until it reached its final historical manifestation, the Prophet

Mul;lammad.

Since the Light was that which God created before anything else

and that from which he created everything else, it was the very basis

of the creation of the world. And it was 'Light' because it was

nothing else than the First Intellect, i.e., the Divine Consciousness,

by which God manifested Himself to Himself in the state of the

Absolute Unity. And the Light is in its persona! aspect the Reality

of Mul;lammad.

Regarding Mul;lammad's being the first self-determination of the

Absolute and bis being, therefore, the most comprehensive and the

highest, al-Qashanï writes: 58

(Mul)ammad was) the first self-determination with which the

Essence at the lev el of Unity determined itself before any other forms

of self-determination. So ail the infinite self-determinations became

actualized through him. As we have seen above, ail the self-

determinations (of the Absolute) are arranged in a hierarchy of

genera, species, kinds, and individuals, ail being disposed in a vertical

order. So (Mul)ammad) comprises in himself ail these self-

determinations without leaving anything. He is, in this sense, unique

in the whole world of Being; nothing can compete with him, because

nothing is found equal to him in the hierarchy. In fact, there is above

him only the Essence at the level of its absolute Unity, which trans-

cends ail self-determinations, whether that of an attribute, name,

description, definition, or qualification.

Such being the case, it will be evident that Mul;lammad, as the

Logos, is the most perfect being within the species of man.

He was the most perfect being of the human species. This is why the

whole process of creation was commenced and finished through him.

'He was a prophet even while Adam was between water and clay' (as

the cosmic Logos), but later (i.e., in historical time) he was born

compounded of elements (i.e., in a bodily form) and proved to be the

238 Sufism and Taoism

final seal of the prophets ... (As an individual), Mubammad was the

most powerful proof of his Lord, because he had been given all the

'words' (kalim) which were the very contents of the names59 (of all

the things of the world) which (the Lord taught) Adam.60

As has been touched upon earlier in this section, Mul)ammad as the

first creature of the Absolute clearly corresponds to the First Intel-

lect of Plotinus, which is the 'first emanation' from the absolute

One. And in this aspect Mul)ammad is called by Ibn 'Arabi the

'Mul)ammadan Spirit' (al-rül], al-mul],ammadiy).

In the world-view of Plotin us, the Nüs, the first emanation from

the One, has two aspects: (1) it is 'passive' in relation to that from

which it has emanated, and (2) 'active' in relation to that which

emanates from itself. It is 'passive' toward the higher level of Being

and 'active' toward the lower level of Being.

In the particular context of Ibn' Arabi' s philosophy, this Plotinian

'passivity' (infi'al) changes into 'servant-ness' ('ubüdïyah) and the

'activity' (fi' l) becomes 'Lordship' (rubübïyah). Thus the

'Mul)ammadan Spirit' stands in the position of 'passivity', i.e.,

'servant-ness', in relation to the Creator, i.e., the source of its own

appearance and manifestation, while in relation to the world it

shows a thoroughgoing 'activity', acting as it does as the first prin-

ciple of creation. Ibn' Arabi explains this as follows in a mythopoe-

tic form: 61

Mul)ammad (i.e., the 'Mul)ammadan Spirit') was created basically as

a 'servant'. So he never dared raise his head seeking to be a master.

Nay, he kept humbly prostrating and never transgressing the state of

being 'passive', until, when God had produced from him all that He

produced, He conferred upon him the rank of 'activity' over the

world of (Divine) breaths.

Mul)ammad, in this respect, shows perfectly his 'intermediary

nature' (barzakhïyah). He is a 'servant' and is 'passive' vis-à-vis the

Absolute, but he is a 'lord' and is 'active' vis-à-vis the world.

V The Perfect Man and God

The Absolute, in its self-revealing aspect, reaches perfection in the

Perfect Man. In the latter the Absolute manifests itself in the most

perfect form, and there can be no self-manifestation more perfect

than this. The Perfect Man, in this respect, is the Absolute, while

being at the same time a creature. We know already what Ibn' Arabi

means when he says that Man is the Absolute. Man is the Absolute

because of his essential 'comprehensiveness', or because, as Ibn

'Arabi says, God put into Adam, the human species, all of its

Man as Microcosm 239

Attributes, whether active of passive. After stating that God joined

both His hands 'to knead the clay of Adam' and created him in this

particular way, Ibn 'Arabi goes on to say: 62

Then (i.e:, after having created Adam) God made him behold ail that

He had put into him, and grasped the whole in His two hands: in the

one, He held the universe, and in the other, Adam and his offspring.

This passage is explicated by al-Qashani in the following terms: 63

This means that God let the Real Man (al-insàn al-IJ,aqïqiy) observe

all the Divine secrets (i.e., invisible realities which are actualized at

the ontological level of the all-comprehensive NameAllàh) which He

had placed in him, then put together the whole of what He had

created and the whole of what He had placed in Adam, grasping them

with his both hands. He placed in His right hand, which is His

stronger hand, the reality of Adam and his descendants, i.e., ail His

active Attributes and His (active) Names belonging to the higher

spiritual world, and in the left hand, which is the weaker hand, the

forms of the world, i.e., His passive (lit. receiving) Attributes and His

(passive) Names belonging properly to the physical world.

(This distinction between the right and the left hand as the stronger

and the weaker is not an essential one, for) each of the two hands of

the Merciful is in truth a right hand. (And, consequently, there is no

real distinction in terms of rank between the two kinds of the Attri-

butes) because the 'receptivity' (qàbilïyah) with regard to the power

of 'receiving' is perfectly equal to the 'positive activity' (fa'ilïyah)

with regard to the power of 'acting', the former being in no way

inferior to the latter.

Since Man in whom God has thus placed everything is His perfect

image, whatever can be predicated of Man can also be predicated, at

least in a certain sense, of God, And this is what is meant by the

dictum: Man is the Absolute.

Is there, then, no essential difference between Man as the Micro-

cosm, i.e., the Perfect Man and the Absolute? Of course, there is,

and a very essential one. The difference lies in the 'necessity'

( wujüb) of existence.

You must know that since, as we have said every temporal thing

appears in His Form, clearly God has so arranged that we should, in

trying to know Him, resort to studying carefully the temporal things.

Thus He Himself tells us (in the Qoran, XLI, 53) that He shows us

His signs in the temporal things, 64 so that we might infer from our

own states the state of God. And by whatever quality we may

describe Him, we ourselves are that very quality. The only exception

from this is the 'essential necessity' (wujüb dhàtiy) which is peculiar

to God alone.

Sin ce we corne to know God, in this way, by ourselves, it is natural

that we should attribute to Him whatever we attribute to ourselves.

240 Sufism and Taoism

This is contirmed by that of which God Himself has informed through

the tongues of the interpreters (i.e., the prophets). In fact He has

described Himself tous through us. Thus, whenever we observe Him

(through some attribute) we are observing (through the same attri-

bute) our own selves. And whenever He observes us, He is observing

Himself.

No one will doubt that we are many as individuals and species.

Certainly, ail of us have in corn mon one and the sa me 'reality' (or

'essence') which unites us, but we know definitely that there is also a

distinction by which are distinguished ail the individuals one from

another. If it were not for this distinction there would not be multi-

plicity within the unity. Likewise, though God describes us precisely

with what He describes Himself with, there must be a distinction

(between us and God). And that distinction can consist only in our

essential need (for Him) regarding our existence, and the depen-

dence of our existence upon Him because of our 'possibility', and in

His being absolutely free from ail such need. 65

Thus the Absolute and the creatures are the same in a certain

respect, but a fundamental distinction separates the one from the

other: the 'necessity of existence' (wujüb al-wujüd) which is pecul-

iar to the Absolute alone. And due to this 'necessity', the Absolute

has certain Attributes which are not shared by anything else, like

quidam ('etemity a parte ante' and 'etemity a parte post').

It is to be remarked that, though this is philosophically the only

real difference between God and the creatures, it is an essential and

fundamental difference. And being a fundamental difference, it

determines the position of Man in a decisive way vis-à-vis God. Man

is certainly the highest of ail in the world of Being. To him is

ascribed an ontological 'height' ('uluw). The 'height', however,

is not the 'height' of the Absolute. Unlike the latter, Man's 'height' is

only 'consequential' (bi-al-tab'iyah) or 'secondary'; it is not an

'essential (dhiitiy) height'.

In the Qoran (XL VII, 35) God says to the followers of Mul).am-

mad: 'Y ou are the highest and sois God, too, with you' .66 This verse,

Ibn 'Arabï says, might suggest that God and Man share the same

'height'. But such an understanding is completely wrong. For God

definitely denies such an equality in 'height' between Himself and

Man.

Although Man is the 'highest' in a particular sense and partici-

pates with God in the 'height' in the general connotation of the

word, the real content of the 'height' is different when the word is

applied to God from when it is applied to Man. A Peripatetic

philosopher would simplify the matter by saying that the same word

a'là ('highest') is here used secundum prius et posterius. This is

clearly what is meant by al-Qashanï when he says: 67

Man as Microcosm 241

The participation (of Man) in 'being the highest', which God affirms

of him is liable to produce the wrong view that Man does participa te

(with God) in the same height of rank. So He says: 'Praise the Name

of thy Lord, the Highest' (LXXXVII, 1) in order to deny categori-

cally the possibility of such participation. In fact, the absolute and

essential 'height' belongs to God, and to God alone. He is the highest

by His Essence, in an absolu te sense, not in relation to anything other

than Himself. Thus ail 'height' belongs properly to Him alone, and

everything to which His 'height' is attributed (i.e., everything that is

said to be 'high') is 'high' according to the degree in which God

manifests himself under the Name 'High' ('aliy).

Nothing really participates with Him in the very source of the

'height'. God has no 'height' in a relative sense, while ail other things

become 'high' through His Name 'High'.

Ibn' Arabï further stresses the non-essential nature of the' height' of

Man by pointing out that although Man, i.e., the Perfect Man, is the

highest of all beings, his 'height' does not properly belong to him-

self, but rather to the 'place' 68 that has been assigned to him. What is

high is not so much Man himself as his 'place'. This is why God says:

'And We raised him to a high place' (XIX, 57). It is worthy of

remark that the adjective ('aliy) in this verse qualifies 'place'

(makiin), not Man. Likewise, Man's being the 'vicegerent' of God

on the earth is simply the 'height' of place or position; it is not his

essential 'height'.

The preceding pages have clarified Ibn 'Arabï's thesis that the

'height' of man is not of an essential nature. But whatever the nature

of his 'height', it is true that Man is 'high' or even the 'highest' of all

beings. Here Ibn 'Arabï points out a very paradoxical fact about

Man. Certainly, Man is the highest of all beings as long as we

consider him ideally. But once we open our eyes to the real situation

of human existence, we find the strange fact that, far from being

'high' or 'highest', Man is the 'lowest' of all in the whole world of

Being. Of course, in doing so we are taking a very particular point

ofview. But at least from this particular point of view, the hierarchy

of values becomes completely reversed. For in this new system, the

inanimate beings occupy the highest rank, then the plants, then the

animais, and the human beings are found in the lowest position.

Usually, Man is considered the highest of all beings because of his

Reason ('aql). But, in truth, this very Reason which is peculiar to

Man weaves around him an opaque veil which develops into an

'ego'. And the 'ego' th us produced hinders Man from knowing

the Absolute as it really is. Precisely because of his Reason, Man

cannot but be a 'mirror which reflects the Absolute only with

inversion'.

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242 Sufism and Taoism

There is no creature higher than minerals; then corne the plants with

their various degree and ranks. The plants are followed by those

possessed of the senses (i.e., animals). Each of these (three classes of

beings) knows its own Creator through natural intuition or through

an immediate evidential knowledge. But what is called Adam (i.e.,

Man) is shackled by Reason and thinking or is in the pillory of

belief. 69

The inanimate things, or 'minerais', have no ego. So they are

obedient to God's commandments absolutely and unconditionally.

Their 'servant-ness' ('ubüdïyah) is perfect in this sense. They are

exposed naked to God's activity upon them, there being no veil at

all between them. In this respect, they occupy the highest place in

the hierarchy of Being.

The second position is given to the plants. They grow, assimila te

nourishment, and generate. To that extent they act positively on

their own accord. And to that extent they are farther removed from

the Absolute than the minerais.

The third position is occupied by the animais. They are possessed

of senses, and they show the activity of will. The sense perception

and will disclose a certain amount of ego. But the animal ego is not

as strong as that of Man.

These three, the minerais, plants, and animais, having no Reason,

know God by a natural 'unveiling' or immediate evidential know-

ledge. Man, on the contrary, possesses Reason, and the Reason

develops his ego to a full extent, and he becomes veiled by his own

ego.

Thus from the viewpoint of the ideal state of 'servant-ness', Man is

situated on the lowest level on the scale of Being. In order to climb

the scale upward, he must first of all dispel from himself Reason -

which is, paradoxically, exactly the thing that makes him a Man -

and bring to naught all the properties that derive from Reason. Only

when he succeeds in doing so, does he ascend to the rank of animais.

He must then go on to ascend to the rank of plants, and thence

finally to the rank of minerais. Then only does he find himself in the

highest position on the whole scale of Being. There will no longer

remain in him even a shadow of Reason, and the Light of the

Absolute will illumine him undimmed, unhindered, in its original

splendor.

These considerations make us aware of the fact that Man as an Idea

is perse 'perfect' and occupies the highest position, but that in his

actual situation he is far from being a perfect realization of his own

ideal. We can maintain that Man is the highest being in the world

Man as Microcosm 243

only when we take the viewpoint of a philosophical anthropology

standing on the supposition that the ideal of Man is perfectly real-

ized in the actual Man. The actual Man, however, is a being in full

possession of Reason, a being dependent upon his Reason and

brandishing it everywhere in his understanding of everything. He

who brandishes his Reason is not capable of penetrating the mys-

tery of Being.

But while making this observation, we realize that we are already

far removed from the sphere in which we began our discussion of

Man. We started from the basic assumption that Man can be consi-

dered on two entirely different levels: cosmic and individual. And

the purpose of the present chapter has been to elucidate the concept

of Man on the cosmic level, as Microcosm. And on this level, Man is

certainly the highest of all beings. However, in the last section of this

chapter, we have been moving down to the concept of Man on the

individual level. We have learnt that on this latter level, Man is, in a

certain sense, even lower than animais, plants and minerais. On this

level, not all men, but only a small number of special men are

worthy to be called 'perfect men'. They are 'perfect' because, hav-

ing already <lied to their own ego through the mystical experience of

self-annihilation and subsistence, they are no longer veiled by

Reason. The next chapter will be devoted to a more detailed con-

sideration of the idea of the Perfect Man on the individual level.

Notes

1. FUî ., p. 8/48.

2. FUî ., p. 9/48.

3. FfLî., p. 11/49; p. 132/115.

4. p. 11.

5. FfLî., p. 9/48-49.

6. p. 10.

7. p. 11.

8. 1 read with tulqi ilay-hi bi-taqallub min wajh.

9. Al-Qâshâni says that this is the case when the Absolute manifests itself in the very

form of a Perfect Man - p. 42.

10. FfLî., pp. 41-42/66-67.

11. FfLî., p. 232/184.

244 Sufism and Taoism

12. Fu:f., pp. 251-253/198-199.

13. The' great river' Nile symbolizes an ocean of Knowledge into which Moses' body

was thrown in order thal he might acquire ail the possible perfections by which Man is

distinguished from ail other beings - cf. Affifi, FWi., Corn., p. 293.

14. sakinah from the Hebrew shekina meaning the Divine Presence. Here it means

the' Divine aspect' (lahüt) of man to be correlated with the above-mentioned nasüt.

15. 'its form ($Ürah)', that is, the form of the world. The meaning of this expression

will be clarified by al-Qàshànï's explanatory remark which will immediately follow

the present passage.

16. This is tantamount to saying that God governs ail the things in the world by

means of their permanent archetypes.

17. p. 252.

18. Here, be it noticed, Ibn 'Arabï understands Man not on the cosmic, but on the

individual level.

19. As we shall see presently, Man occupies a higher position than angels in the

world-view of Ibn 'Arabï.

20. The 'Divine Form' (al-$ürah a/-iliihiyah) itself means nothing else than the

whole of the Divine Names.

21. FU$., p. 14/50.

22. FWi., p. 12/49.

23. FU$., 13/49-50.

24. On this concept see la ter, III.

25. FWi., p. 180/143. The explanatory words that follow the verses are by al-

Qàshànï.

26. Fu:f., p. 21154.

27. FWi., pp. 25-26156.

28. Reference to the Qoran, Il, 30-33.

29. 'ibiidah dhiitiyah 'essential service' means, as we have seen above, the perfect

and complete adoration of God which consists in that an existent actualizes in itself

ail the Names.

30. 'Art Thou going to place on the earth one who will do harm therein and shed

blood, when we are praising and sanctifying Thee?' (II, 30).

31. FWi., pp. 14-15/50-51.

32. Although, to,be sure, he is not superior to ail the angels, as we shall see.

Man as Microcosm 245

33. Fu$., pp. 22-23/55.

34. Fu$., p. 184/144-145.

35. Reference to the Qoran, XV, 28: inni khaliqun basharan, etc. Bashar means

'man' considered from the point of view of his being 'mortal'. But Ibn' Arabï in this

passage understands the word in terms of the verb bashara (inf. mubasharah)

meaning 'to touch something directly with one's own hands'.

36. That is to say, in a non-material, non-anthropomorphic, sense.

37. Qoran, XXXVIII, 76.

38. They stand above the sphere of elements, though they are of the domain of

Nature.

39. From khullah, meaning 'sincere friendship'.

40. Fu$., pp. 71-72/80-81.

41. According to al-Qàshàni, this means the appearance of Abraham in the Form of

the Absolu te in such a way that the Absolu te is his hearing, his sight, and ail his other

faculties - p. 72.

42. This means that the Absolute, by being 'determined' by the 'determination' of

Abraham, becomes qualified by the attributes of Abraham and his form, so that ail

the attributes that are ascribed to Abraham are ascribed to the Absolute, too. The

result of this process is that God does whatever He does through Abraham, hears by

his hearing, and sees with his - al-Qàshàni, p. 71.

43. Here Ibn 'Arabi takes up the second type of 'permeation' first.

44. This refers to the first type of 'permeation'.

45. Qàshàni, p. 72.

46. FWi ., p. 73/81.

47. FWi., pp. 23-24/55.

48. 'because a vicegerent should know the will of the man who has appointed him as

his representative, so that he might carry out his command. Thus if the vicegerent of

God does not know Him with ail His Attributes, he would not be able to carry out His

Command' - al-Qàshàni, p. 23.

49. so that everything that exists in the world is reflected in Man by a corresponding

element.

50. so that his inner form is modeled on the Name and Attributes of God. Thus he is

'hearing', 'seeing', 'knowing' etc., as God Himself is, i.e., he is qualified by ail the

Divine Attributes.

51. FWi., pp. 13-14/50.

246 Sufism and Taoism

52. 'The engraved seal is the Greatest of all the Divine Names, namely, the Divine

Essence with all the Names. This seal is engraved on the 'heart' of the Perfect Man,

which is symbolized here by the bezel of the royal seal. Thus the Perfect Man guards

the treasury of the universe with all that is contained therein, and keeps them in the

established order' - al-Qâshânï, p. 13.

53. Cf. Chapter IV

54. Cf. Fw;., p. 53/71.

55. Chapter V, pp. 66-101. For a discussion of the historical relation between this

Islamic/ogos-doctrine and the /ogos-Christology see Arthur Jeffery: Ibn al-'Arabî's

Shajarat al-Kawn (Studia Islamica, X, Paris, 1959, pp. 45-62).

56. Kantu nabiy wa-Adam bayna al-mii' wa-al-tin.

57. Affifi, Philosophy, p. 69.

58. p. 266.

59. Reference to the Qoran, II, 31.

60. Fw;., p. 267/214.

61. Fw;., p. 275/220.

62. Fw;., p. 26/56.

63. p. 26.

64. 'We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves'.

65. Fw;., p. 19/53-54.

66. Wa-antum al-a'lawna wa-Allahu ma'a-kum. Ibn' Arabï's interpretation of this

verse ('you are the highest and God, too, is the highest with you') is quite an original

one. Contextually, the verse simply means: 'you, believers, will surely win (in your

struggle with the disbelievers) for God is with you (i.e., on your side)'.

67. p. 62.

68. either in the sense of makan, i.e., physical place, or makanah, i.e., non-material

place, position or rank.

69. Fw;., pp. 82-83/85. The original is a part of a poem.