NUM EN, Vol. 40 (1993)
“ZEN IS NOT BUDDHISM”
RECENT JAPANESE CRITI@UES OF BUDDHA-NATURE*
PAUL L . SWANSON
Summary
===
Early in A.D . 817, Saichö, the founder of J apanese Tendai Bud- dhism, entered into a debate with Tokuitsu over the idea of Buddha-nature and universal enlightenment. Tokuitsu , a Hossö monk who lived in the Kantö region, had written a tract called Bussöshk [On buddha-nature], and Saichö responded with Hokje kou›aku [Vanquishing misunderstandings about the Lotus Sïitra]. For the next four years these two scholars exchanged essays and arguments in what grew to be one of the most important doctrinal debates in Japanese Buddhist history. In short, Saichö championed the idea of universal buddhahood, the ekayana ideal epoused in the Lotus Selma that all beings are destined for the highest enlightenment of a Buddha, while Tokuitsu supported the Yogäcära interpretation of five golra, or five inherent potentials latent in sentient beings, including that of the icchantika who have no hope of ever attaining buddhahood.’
116 Paul L. Smanson
What, you might ask, does this debate have to to do with the con- temporary study of religion and our understanding of Bu ddhism in japan? Just this. we are in the midst ‹if a very provocative ‘‘ rethinking’ ’ of Japanese Buddhism by some prominent Buddhist scholars and thinkers who claim that Ch’an/Zen, the tathägala- garbha (“womb of the Buddha”) tradition, hongaku shisä (‘‘ origin al” or ‘‘ inherent’ ’ cnlighten ment), and relatcd ideas are ‘ ‘not Bud- dhism.” This is tantamount to saying that most, if not all, of Japancse Buddhism is not Buddhism at all. In a sense what they are saying is not at all that new—the talhägata -garbha tradition and Buddha-nature ideas have always been open to the charge that they posit an un-Buddhist substantialist or ätman-like existence, and it is akin to the debate between Saichö and Tokuitsu in our contem- porary context. What is the ‘ ‘true’’ understanding of’ the teaching of the Buddha? Which of the many and varied strands (if any) of Buddhist tradition should be accepted as correct and proper, and which (if any) should be rejected as contrary to the Ruddha- Dharma? What are the wider social implications of accepting or rejecting ccrtain interpretations of the Buddhist tradition.’
It is usually assumed that Saichö ‘ ‘won’ the debate against
Tokuitsu, and certainly Saichö’s stand of universal buddhahood became the accepted presupposition for most of Japanese Bud- dhism, and is in fact the dominant religious ethos in japan. Hongaku iÄiiö—a way of thinking that came to include such ideas as thc inherent enlightenment of all things (inclu ding non-sentient beings such as grasses and trees, rocks and mountains); the identity of sarpsära and nirväna; no differentiation between the “indigcnous’ ’ kami and the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; the transcendence of all dualities, including good and evil— grew to be pervasive and unquestioned in much of J apanese religious activity and thought. However, there have also been times, though few and far between, when the idea and implications of hongaku shisä were questioned. Now is such a time.
The current attack is led by two Buddhist scholars at Komazawa University (associated with the Sötö Zen sect): Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirö. The main focus of their attack is the hongaku shisä tradition—strictly speaking the idea that all things are “inherently’ ’ or “originally’ ’ enlightened—and the implications of
“Zen ii Not Buddhism ” 117
this kind ol thinking (such as the ideal of aha, ‘‘harmony’ ’ or ‘ ‘con- formity’ ’) that is pervasive in Japanese society. In this paper I will briefly examine the development of this tradition in J apan, its significance for Japanese religion and society, and the recent criti- que ot‘ this tradition by Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and other japanese scholars.
History o[ Honyaku Shisö
The term hongaku [Chin . pen-chiao has no Sanskrit equivalent, and makes iis first appearance in the Awakening of Failh, a text prob- ably compiled in China,2 and in two Chinese apocryphal Buddhist texts, the fen-rang ching [T 8.825-834, 834-845]' and the Vayrasamâdhi-stitra [T 9. 365-373]. In the Awakening of Failh, hongaku is used in contrast to shigaku, the ‘ ‘inception’ ’or ‘ ‘ actualiza- tion’’ of enlightenment, i.e. the process by which one realizes
enlightenment in his life; thus the English rendering ‘‘original enlightenment. The Awakening of Failh teaches that
‘ ‘ original cnligh ten ment” indicates the essence of Mind ‹a priori) in con - tradistinction to [the essence of Mind in] the process of actualization of enligh ten ment; the process r›t’ actu a!izati on of enligh tcnm ent is none other than [the process of integrating] the identity with the original enlighten ment.'
This idea of original or inherent enlightenment, along with the An akening of Faith in general, had a great influence on the develop- ment of East Asian Buddhism.6 Some brief examples: Fa-tsang (643-712), the Hua-yen patriarch, is also well known for his influential commentary on the Au›akening o/Fai/#; 7 the idea was per- vasive in the C h'an tradition; and it influenced the development of the concept of “the Buddha-nature in non -sentient beings’’ in the T’ien-t’ai tradition.
In japan hongaku thought took on a life of its own. Its influence was Ï'elt in the Shingon school, particularly through Kfikai’s exten- sive 'use of the Shakumakaen-ron T # 1668, 32. 591-668] , an apocryphal commentary on the Amakening of Faith attributed to Nägärju na. The development of h0ngaku ihiiö was especially promi- nent in the Tendai school. After the Tendai school was transmitted to japan by Saichö it underwent many developments,' one of which
was the growth of an identifiably independent branch called hongakumon. Texts devoted to hongaku shisö made the'ir appearance in the late Heian and Kamakura periods and some were attributed to prominent Tendai figures such as Saichö, Genshin, and Ryögen. These texts include the Honri taiko shu, attributed to Saichö, which interprets the most important Tendai teachings in terms of hongaku shlsö, Hymns on Inherenl Enlightenmenl Hongaku -san , with commen- tary attributed to Ryögen [Choi-hongaku -san and Genshin [Hongaku- san shaku , and texts such as the Shuzen-fi ketsu, attributed in part to Saichö, which contain details on the oral transmissions (kuden) of hongaku ideas, practices, and lineages. 9 Such oral transmissions and the accompanying lineages were an important part of the hongaku tradition.
It is no accident that these developments were contemporaneous with (even part of) the growth of the syncretistic hon)’i-sui‘akufshin- bulsu shugö movement, the tendency to emphasize the unity of Bud- dhist and “Shinto” deities and practices. Its influence can be seen in the development of Shugendö (the way of mountain asceticism), in Shinto, and in all of the Buddhist schools. Building on the Mahäyäna idea of the “identity of samsära and nirväna, ’ hongaku shisö developed into an ethos (to use Tam ura Yoshirö’s words) of “absolute non-duality’’ and total affirmation’ ’ of the mundane world. The ideal is perhaps best expressed in the phrases sömoku kokudo shikkai j‘fiéu/itt and sausen söiTioku sbikkai jkbutsu the grasses, trees, mountains and rivers all attain buddhahood] , phrases which pop up almost incessentl y in J apanese literature, art, theatre, and so forth.'0 This religious ethos was the overwhelming status quo for most of J apanese history, and continues to dominate today despite the attempt by the State to forcibly “separate’ Buddhism and Shinto elements (shinbulsu 6unri) in the early Meiji period.
There have been a few exceptions to the dominance of the hongaku ethos. Noteworthy is the work of Höchibö Shöshin in the 12th century,' Shöshin was critical of hongaku shisö, saying that one should not understand it to mean that sentient beings are “already’’ enlightened, and that such an interpretation denies causality and is the heresy of “naturalism (shizen gedo}.'2 It is often pointed out that the so-called ‘ ‘new’ Kamakura Buddhist schools arose in reaction against the hongaku stance of the Tendai establish-
ment, but I think that in actual practice these movements soon “reverted to’’ (if they had ever rejected) what Hakamaya and Matsumoto criticize as a hongaku ethos. In the Tokugawa period Myöyïi (1637 -1690) and Reikïi (1652-1739) of the Anraku school urged a revival of the keeping of the precepts based on the Sen-fen l'u [Jpn. N#iéun-ri/iu] in response to what they perceived as a decadence encouraged by hongaku shisö. This movement was excep- tional, however, and the hongaku ethos continues as an unques- tioned assumption for much, if not all, of Japanese Buddhism.
Recent Cri'liques of Hongaku Shisö
The current controversy concerning hongaku shisâ centers around two figures associated with Komazawa University, Matsumoto Shirö and Hakamaya Noriaki, but includes a number of others. It is significant that thèse figures are all first-rate textual scholars and philosophers, as well as faculty members of the Sötö-Zen-affiliated Komazawa University. Theirs are not casual criticism made by outsiders or sloppy scholarship based on lack of familiarity with the Buddhist tradition and its texts. Thèse are first-rate academic studies prepared by comrnitted Buddhists.
Matsumoto Shirö, a specialist in Mähyamika Buddhism, pub-
lished a collection of his essays in 1989 called Engi to kîI—nyoraizà JÀiiâ hihan [Causality @ralûlya-samulpâda) and emptiness (îîinyalâ)— A critique of lalhôgala-garbha thought]. I will attempt to summarize the main points Matsumoto makes in thèse essays.
I. The first essay, provocatively titled ' Tathâgala-garbha thought is not Buddhism’’ [Nyoraizâ shisâ wn bukkyâ ni arazu leaves no doubt as to Matsumoto's position or intent. Talhâgata-garbha thought is not Buddhism —then what is the correct teaching of the Buddha? Buddhism is the teaching of non-self [muka; and/man], the teaching of causality Qratitya-xamutpâda]. This teaching of causality is not the teaching of universal mutual co-arising and non-temporal causality developed later (e.g. by Hua-yen thinkers), but the temporal, twelvefold chain of dependent arising as discovered by the Buddha during his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree and classically expressed in the Maññrn§gu.'3 The critical point is a denial of any
eternal, substantial, underlying basis or locus on which everything else depends or arises from. This “locus” that is denied by the teaching or causality is given the name “dhätu,’’ and any teaching that implies the existence of a dhätu is called ‘ ‘dhätu-väda,’ ’ a neo- Sanskritism coined by Matsumoto. Dhätu-väda is antithetical to Buddhism, since it is the very teaching that Säkyamuni intended to deny. The idea of a tathagata-garbha, the ‘‘womb,” “matrix,” or “seed’’ of buddhahood inherent in all sentient beings, is a form of dhätu-väda and thus is not Buddhism.
Dhätu-väda is further explained using a chart:
= super - I oc us
= locus
The ‘‘locus’’ (L) is the underlying basis, and the ‘‘super-locus
(S) are the phenornenal dharmas” which arise based on the locus. The teaching of dhätu-väda follows a certain pattern:
1. L is the basis for S;
2. L gives rise to [is the source oÇ S;
3. L is one, S are many;
4. L is real (existent), and S are not real (non-existent);
5. L is the essential nature (honshitsu; ätman) of S;
6. S is not ultimately real, but participates’ ’ in reality as something that arises based on L,
The teaching of dhätu-väda appears to be a teaching of ‘‘equality’’ (byödo i#iio)—after all, it says that all things are based on a single, universal, eternal reality. However, in practice it leads to discrimination (sabetsu iÄiio , because if one assumes a single basis and underlying reality for all things—that good and evil, strong and weak, rich and poor, right and wrong, are fundamen- tally “the same’’—there is no need or incentive to correct any injustice or right any wrong. In practice, then, dhätu-väda supports and fosters discrimination and injustice. The idea of a universal,
inherent buddhahood appears optimistic, but in fact enhances the status quo and inhibits improving the hu man condition .
The article closes (p. 8) with a summary conclusion in three parts:
1. Tathâgaía -garbha thought is ap form of dhàtu-vàda.
2. Dhãtu-vãda is the object of Sãkyamuni’s criticism, and the correct Buddhist teaching of causality @ratYt a-samutpâda) is a denial of dhãtu-vãda.
3. Contemporary Japanese Buddhism can only claim to be truly Buddhist insofar as it denies the validity o1 tathágaía-garbha thought.
II. The second essay, ’ ’On pratût a-samufpâda,' ’ as well as the rest of Matsumoto’s work, expands and gives detailed support to the basic assertions outlined in the first essay. Here Matsumoto criti- ques the work of many of the most prominent modem Japanese Buddhist scholars, such as Ui Hakuju, Watsuji Tetsurö, Hirakawa Akira, Tamaki Köshirö, Fujita Kötatsu, and Tsuda Shin’ichi.
Some of the more interesting points made in this long essay:
There is no religion without time. The correct understanding of causality is not that of thcoretical, spatial, or mutually inclusive causality, but a temporal causality of an effect following after a cause. Thc twelve-linked chain of causation rcfers not to the rela- tionship between things, but the temporal sequence from cause to effect. In terms of the locus/super-locus scheme, pralilya -samutpâda is a sequence of super-locus without a locus; a sequence of proper- ties and not things (dharmas). There is no reality (dhätu) beyond or underlying this temporal sequence. [pp. 14-36] This under- standing of pratLtya-samutpâda can be schematizcd as follows:
Paul L. Smanson
The concept of hongaku (Matsumoto uses the English original enlightenment”) posits ‘pre-time’ ’ or state beyond time from which all things arise, or in or on which all things are simulta- neously and mutually related. This is dhàtu-vàda. [pp. 65-77]
In a note ( # 11, pp. 7 9-81) Matsumoto says that the dhätu-väda way of thinking can be found in all ancient societies regardless of East or West. It is the idea that ‘‘all things arise from and return to One.’’ If so, then it is possible to say that Talhâgata -garbha thought/dhâtu-vàda is the theoretical/philosophical development of “native’’ (docÀatu—dare I say ‘ ‘primitive’ ‘) animistic ideas and “folk religion’ ’ (minzoku shîikyo}.' Some claim that the idea of sansen sàmoku shikkai jâbutsu is the climactic development of Buddhist thought, but it is only a form of animism. Therc is no period in history where animism has been held in higher esteem than today. Recently at a conference in Japan, a certain scholar claimed that “The basis of the religious consciousness of the Japanese people is animism and ancestor veneration.’’ This kind of understanding of folk religion and tathâgata -garbha thought is closely related. Both are the theoretical development of ‘ ‘native’’ (dochaku) ways of thinking and its most representative exposent is the Nihongaku (‘‘Japanism’ ’) of Umehara Takeshi. It is not at all surprising that Umehara is a proponent of both J apanese folk religion and lalhâgala -garbha thought.
III. This last theme is taken up in the third essay, Bukkyâ to shingi—han-nihonshugileki kâsatsu [Buddhism and the kami— thoughts against ‘Japanism’ ‘]. Here Matsumoto criticizes the kind of easy ‘ ‘J apanism’’ and pro-Japan glorification represented by the Nihongaku of Umehara Takeshi. He first introduces the ideas of Umehara, who often speaks of the superiority of the Japanese race, and who presents Japanese Buddhism positively in terms of its talhâgala -garbha elements, the ‘‘buddahood” of inanimate things, and the emphasis on ten. '^ He points out that ideas such as “no thought and no conceptualization’’ (omen musofi, “direct intui- tion’’ (cli0kkan), and “non-reliance on words” fiuryii monji), that have been introduced in the West as representative of Zen, are in fact ideas based on tathâgala-garbha and hongaku thought, and should not be considered positive Buddhist virtues.
The ‘J apanism” of Motoori Norinaga, Kawabata Yasunari, and Mishima Yukio are then briefly outlined, showing their close identification of themselves with the country or concept of ‘Japan.’ He concludes that such thinking is a “philosophy of death” (shi no letsugaku) and as a Buddhist he must reject all philosophies of death.
He concludes (p. 111):
The idea that the ancie nt Japanese people had an optimistic attitude toward life and this became pessimistic due to the introduction of Buddhism is a lot of rubbish put forth by people who know nothing about religion. In fact, the ancient Japanese people had no basis for living with hope. They lived their lives in this world knowing only that they must wait in fear for their inevitable death, and that after death they were faced with the feared land of darkness fomi no kuni . It was only through their encounter with Buddhism that they were given hope, or in other words, given the convict ion of life (resurrection) after death.
Finally, allow me to share some of my thought with regard to my personal relationship with Japan . I believe that to love Japan is to love one’s self. To mc ‘‘J apan’’ is an extension of my own mind and body. As I love my own body, so 1 love Japan. Self-love—n arcissism—is very enticing and sweet. .. . H owevcr, love is something which should be directed to others; il’ it is directed at one's self, it becomes self-attachment.
On the basis of the Buddhist tcachin g of non- sell (mule-ir/iu), I have come to the following conclusions:
1. One should disda in oneself; and
2. One should love only the absolute other (C›od or Buddha).
Therefore, as a Budd h ist, based on the teaching of non -selt, I m ust not love j apan since it is an extension of my self.
Even if I believe I should not love myself, it is cert ainly true that I am always loving myself; even if I believe I sh ould not love apan, I cannot avoid loving Japan. However, the teaching of the Buddha is absolute. A Rud-
dhist must not love Japan [i.e. one's own country] .
IV. The fourth essay, Ji/iuzairoa hihan [A critique of “existence’ ‘] , deals with Tsuda Shin’ichi's criticisms of” Matsumoto's arguments made in chapter 2 (which had been published as an article earlier). Matsumoto m akes a detailed, technical, and textual argument (pp. 12 l- 190) against understanding dharma’’ as ‘ ‘existence,’ ’ and expands on his critique of dhatu-vada.
V. In Gedalsu to nehan —kono hi- bukkyâteki’ naru mono [Liberation (vimukli) and nirvana—Some non-Buddhist ideas] M atsumoto goes even further in his critique to say that
the final goal of Buddhism is said to be ‘ ‘I iberation’’ (gedalsu, 0 imukii°). How- ever, in the effort to correctly understand Buddhism there is no greater
124 Paul L. Swanson
misundcrstanding. The reason is that the idea of liberation (rim«I/i) is based on the non-Buddhist idea that there is a self (a/mnrddo) [to be liberated] , and is thereforc an an tt -Buddhist idea. Not only liberation, but alsti the ideas of nirvfina, a concentrated state of mind 'häna, samädhi), and cven the idea of a mind (ci!lta), are all based on the non -Buddhist idea of a self. [p. 191]
In this essay Matsumoto leaves aside the ideas ofJûdna, samàdhi,
and citta and concentrates on liberation and nirvàna.
In short, he argues that the idea of liberation and nirvàna presupposes a “self ’ to be liberated, and is thus a dhätu-väda. He argues against the prevalent interpretation of nirväna as ‘‘extinc- tion’’ —based on the etymology of nirÇvà, to “blow out’’—and instead argues fÔr the etymology of nirÇrr, to “uncover. ” Matsu- moto gives a painstaking textual study to support his contention, and conclu des with four points (pp. 195-219):
1. The original meaning o1 ‘‘ nirväna’’ was not ‘‘extinction’’
but “to uncover.’’
2. The basic idea of ‘ ‘ nirvän a’’ is ‘ the liberation of the ät man from that which is not ätman,’’ and is thus related to the idea of “libcratitin’ ’ as the goal of Buddhisrn. Thus both ideas of ‘‘ nirväna’ and ‘‘liberation ’ ’ are based on the idea of an ätrnan.
3. The ät man is often compared to ‘‘light,’ or it is said that the ät man gives forth light. If one uncovcrs or takes away that which is hindering the light, then the light can shine forth and illuminate the darkness. Thus the ‘ ‘extinction of light’’ ‹:annot be the meaning of a liberation or “nirväna’ of an ätman.
4. “The liberation of thc ät man from that which is not ät man’’ is, in other words, the liberation of the ‘ ‘spirit’’ from the ‘ ‘body.’’ Thus, complete liberation is possible only by com- plctcly escaping the body, and therefore this kind Uf liberation thought is a ‘ ‘ philosophy of death . ’ ’
We have yet to see how lar Matsumoto is willing to go in denying or reinterprctiny traditional Buddhist terms anrl concepts. As we shall see later, Takasaki J ikidö takes Matsumoto to task for going too far and leaving nothing that can be called ‘ ‘ Buddhist.’
VI. The next essay on Hanna a-kNo lo ri oraizo sùisà The Prajnà- päramitä Su tras and talhâgala-garbha thought] shows that although
the P rajnäparamitä Siitras bcgan [with the AJlasahasrtkñ-¡brnJnñ- pàramità as writings based on the idea of emptiness (iïlnyalà), dhàtu- väda-type ideas gradually crept in and one must be careful to discrirriinate the contents of the Prajñ äpäramitä Sïit ras texts.
One of the main arguments here is that the earliest extant version of the Aslasahasrikà-pra)‘ñà-pàramità, the C hinese translation made in 179 A.D. (Dodo-hannya -kyù, T # 2 24, 8. 425-478), does not contain the famous passage that the ‘mind is originally pure’ ’ @rakrliÎ cil- lasya prabhâsuarà , a passage used to support fa/Âôga/a-gar6ña-like ideas.
M atsumoto cuncludes that the early Prajnäpàram itä Ski tras taught emptiness, but gradually incorporated talhà,gala -garbha tendencies, linally resulting in the compilation of the AbhlsamaJàlamkara, an inllue ntial commentary on the Larger PraJiià- parami'ta Stilra that embraces /n/Ààga/a-MarôÀa ideas. M atsumoto advocates studying early versions of the Prajn äpàram itä Siitras, such as the Dàgyà-hannya -k ä, to help weed out thèse 1atcr (and mistaken) accretions.
VII. The next essay on Shâman,qyâ no it‘hi F s hisâ ni tsuile [On the eka âna idea in the Sr?mâlâdeu? Stoma is an early essay by M atsumoto, the arguments of which are better developed in other essays. By examining the talbâ(ala -garbha ideas in the r?mâlâdevi Stitra Mat- sumoto concludes that
I ndian M ahfiy än a Buddhism is u suallv consicle real to have harl two major scholastic traclitio ns: the II ädhyarn ika and Yo¿acfira. This is fine for classify- ing the scholasiic [,qakuha) tracJitions, ancJ I cannot agree with the opinion that the tall*gata-garbha tradition v'as a third school. In India there were certainly seholastic debates w'ithin the Yogäcara school, and debates within the M ädhyainika school, and there wcrc also debates between the Yogacä ra and Madhyamika schools, but can it be saicl that there wc rc debates between the tathä¿ata -gorblia and the Yogäcfira schools? [No, I don’ t tliink su. ]
VII I. The tinal essay, Km ni huile [On emptiness] , cliscu sses îîinyalâ from the perspective of pralitya -sainulpàdu. Matsumoto argues that the main theme of Nägärjuna's Mïilamadù amaka -kârikà is not crnp- tiness but pralil a-samulpàda. Hc does not claim that Îunyatà and pratïtya -samutpàda are opposing or c rintradictory concepts, but does caution that îîlnJalà must be understood in terms of praltlya-
1?6 Paul L. Swanson
samutpàda, and not the other way around. Otherwise there is the
danger that iïinyatà will be misunderstood in dhätu-vàda terms.
Finally, Matsumoto has developed a wider social critique in a paper he gave in 1990 in Vancouver on the meaning of the Lotus Sîitra in Japanese culture. In this paper he makes a general critique of Japanese culture based on the ideas outlined above.
This optimistic philosophy of ‘‘j apanese identity’’ exhibits the followin g characteristics:
a) An adoration of naturalism rather than humanism .
b) A praise of experiential anti-rationalism (e. g. mysticism of Zen or tan- tric Buddhism) over logic and intellect.
c) A praise of totalitarianism over individualism, which in turn paves the way to corporate nationalism, in a forced application of wa or ‘‘harmony.’ ’
d) A praise of an inn is m and polytheis m or pantheism , on the basis of relativism, over absolute monotheism.’°
As Mat sumoto points out many times in his book, Hakamaya Noriaki is his colleague and confidante, and their thinking has developed in tandem. Let us now take a look at the critique of hongaku shisâ published by H akamaya.
The Critique of Hongaku Shisö by Hakamaça Noriaki
Hakamaya Noriaki, also a faculty member of thc Buddhist Studies department of Komazawa University, is a noted specialist in Yogäcära. He is a prolific writer, scholar, and social critic with a long list ot“ textual studies to his credit , and has recently published two collections of his essays on the su bject at hand: Hongaku shisä hihan [A critique of hongaku shisä] and Hihan bukkyä [C ritical Buddhism] .
In his prcfacc tr› Hongaku shisä hihan Hakamaya clearly spells out his intent: to show that Äongatu iéiiö is not Buddhism. In addition, he claims that Zen, the Kyoto school of philosophy, even the teaching of no n-du ality in the hier/atFr/i Su/ra, are not Buddhism. And as a specialist in Yogäcära, he hopes eventu ally to write an article about the idea that Yogäcära is not Buddhism!
By Äonpnlti shisä Hakamaya means a way of thinking that all things are embraced in a basic, singular, ineffable reality (a state of ‘ ‘origin al enligh tenm ent’’) that functions as an authoritarian ideology that does not admit the validity either of words or concepts
or faith or intellect. The structure of reality is expressed as con- sisting of a “pure’’ basis (object)—expressed as “original enlighte- ment,’ ’ the basis, essence, or principle—and the (subject) which is based on this reality—expressed as ‘‘actualized enlightenment’‘, traces, function, or phenomena. This “basis’’—no matter how it is expressed—is a dhätu, and anything that admits a dhàtu is not Buddhism.
What, then, is Buddhism? In a substantial introduction Hakamaya, like Matsumoto, lays out three defining characteristics of Buddhism as a rule by which to measure what is and what is not Buddhism (pp. 9-10):
1. The basic teaching of the Buddha is the law of causation @ratïlya -samutpâda), formulated in response to the Indian phi- losophy of a substantial ätman. Any idea that implies an underlying substance (a “topos ; basho) and any philosophy that accepts a ‘‘topos’ ’ is called a “dhätu-väda.’ ’ Examples of dhàtu-vàda are the àtman concept in India, the idea of “nature’’ (shlzen) in Chinese philosophy, and the ‘ ‘ inherent enlightenment’’ idea in Japan. Thèse ideas run contrary to the basic Buddhist idea of causation.
2. The moral imperative of Buddhism is to act selflessly (anât- nan) to benefit others. Any religion that favors the self to the neglect of others contradicts the Buddhist ideal. The bongaku shlsà idea that “grasses, trees, mountains, and rivers have all attained buddhahood; that sentient and non-sentient beings are all endowed with the way of the Buddha” (or, in Hakamaya's words, “included in the substance of Buddha’’) leaves no room for this moral imperative.
3. Buddhism requires faith, words, and the use of the intellect (wisdom, prajiiâ) to choose the truth of pralitya-samutpâda. The Zen allergy to the use of words is more native Chinese than Buddhist, and the ineffability of thusness (shinnyo) clairned in hongaku xhixâ leaves no room for words or faith.
The paradigm for these three characteristics, Hakamaya insists, is to be found in the thought and enlightenment experience of the Buddha himself. Sakyamuni realized (Hakamaya prefers the word “chose’ ’) the truth of causation during his enlightenment
(Hakamaya prefers ‘ ‘thinking’ ‘) under the Bodhi tree, resisted the temptation to keep the truth and bliss or’ enlightenment to himself and instead shared it for the benefit of others, and preached about his discovery of the truth of causation with words, appealing to people’s intellect as well as their faith.
This pattern is also found in T’ien-t'ai Chih-i's critique of Taoism (p. 13). From the standpoint of Buddhism Chih-i rejected his country's native philosophy—one of the few to do so—because it does not recognize cau sality (inga), it lacks the ideal of benefiting others (rila), and it tends towards a denial of words (zelugon).
Limits of time and space do not allow us to even briefly sum- marize each of Hakamaya's essays, so I will just mention most of them and then concentrate on a few representative and recent essays.
I. Hongaku shisö hihan, 1989
1. Kîishâ rikai no mondailen [Some problems in understanding
îunyala]
-on various uses and intcrpretations of îîlnyalà in Buddhist texts and the importance of words (lo(os, mr)
DaiJ!ôkishin -ron ni kansuru hihanlekl oboegaki [Some cr'itica1 notes on the Amakening of Faith]
-a critique of the concepts of thusness (shinnyo, tathata) and ‘ ‘mind’’ in the Awakenin( off Faith
3. Engi lo shinnyo @ ralïlya -samulpâda and lalhalâ]
-an important study included in the commcmorative volume of essays in honor of Hirakawa Akira; a warn- ing against understanding pralitya -samutpâda in terms of talhalà or ‘‘réalité’’
4. Norinaga no bukkyô hihan zalsukà [Miscellaneous thoughts on Motoori Norinaga's critique of Buddhism]
5 Sabelsu Jishô o umidashila shiskteki haikei ni kansuru shiken
[Some personal opinions on the way of thinking that gave rise to discrimination]
-on the role of boulots shisà in encouraging and m aintain
ing discrimination against outcastes in apanese society
6. Norinaga no r)àbu shinlâ hihan —Shisâ to gengo no mondai ni kan-
shile Motoori Norinaga's critique of Ryobu Shinto—On the question of the relationship between thought and words]
-on Norinaga's criticism against hongaku influence in Ryöbu Shinto, and the importance of words (i.e. , they are not just “the fin ger pointing at the moon’‘)
1. Shie (catu¡-pralisarana) À ihanko josetsu Introductory critical thoughts on the “four criteria’ ’ (of the Buddhist tradition)]
-a warning against acccpting the criteria that people should depend (1) on the Dharma but not on people, (2) on the meaning but not the words (of the teachings), (3) on the ‘‘definitive meaning’ ’ but not on the ‘ ‘interpretable meaning’ ‘, and (4) on wisdom but not on consciousness
8. Bukkyâ to vingt—Han-Niùongakuteki kàsatsu [Buddhism and the kami—Thouyhts against Japanism]
9. Yulma à hihan A critique of the Vimalakïrli Sutra]
-on the idea that the teaching of non-Quality in the
VlmalakLrti Sîitra is not Buddhism.
10. Hâshàron ni okeru shin no kàzâ hihan [A critique of the struc- ture of faith in the Ratnagotrav ibhâga
11. Basho (topos) lo sh rte no shinnyo — “Basho no letsugaku’’ hihan
[ Tathatâ as topos —A critique ot” the philosophy of “place”]
-a critique of ‘ ‘topical philosophy’ ’ [6nsÀo no tetsugaku] in contrast to ‘ ‘ critical philosophy’’ [hihan no tetsugaku
12. Dàgen rikai no ketteiteki Ahi'ten [The definitive perspective for understanding Dögen]
-that despite the understanding of most of the interpreters of his philosophy, Dögen should be understood as being critical of Àon§aiu iÀiiô
lS. Bendâma no omikala How to read (Dogen’s) Rendoma
14. jun ikan-bon Shôbôgenzô sen)’ulxuselsu saikô [A re-cxam ination of the theories concerning the compilation of the Shâbâgenzô in twelve fascicles]
-thut the twelve-fascicle compilation of the Shàbogenzà was written by Dögen late in his life and was critical of hongaku shlsôl’
1 ô. Sank â itchi hihan shàkà Some minor thoughts critical of the unity of the three tcachings’ ’ (Confucianism, Taoism,
Buddhism)]
-that Buddhism should not accept the fuzzy and mistakenly tolerant idea that these three religious tradi- tions are fundamentally compatible’’
16. Dógen ni taisuru ’‘zenichi no buppõ”-teki rlkai no hihan [A criti- que of understanding Dõgen in terms of the complete unity of the Buddha Dharma’ ’ ]
-a response to comments by his colleague Ishii Shúdõ and a critique of the interpretation of Dõgen based on the theory of one (irńi) and all (new)
17. Kÿoge betsuden to kyozen itlchi —Zen no yíìgõshugi hihan [The transmission outside the teachings’ ’ and the unity of teachings and meditation (new)—A critique of Zen syn-
cretism]
-(the title says it all)
18. Dàgen no hitei shiía mono [That which Dõgen denied]
-that in his later years DÖgen rejected the fuzzy spirituality based on hongaku sh isà
19. Nananj íì-go -kan hon “H0tsu mu)!ãshin ” to )íìni-kan bon “Hołsu bodaishin’’ [The ‘ ‘ arousing the supreme mind’’ chapter in the 75-kan Shãbãgenzã and the arousing bodhicitta' ' chapter in the 1? -kan Shobogenzo
-that both of these essays deal with the same subject but come to completely different conclusions, thus showing that Dõgen’s thought changed from the former to the latter.
II. H ihan Bukkyö Critical Buddhism , 1990
1. Híhan bukkyõ yosetsu — ‘hiban no telsugaku ” lai ’bakho no telsu- gaku’’ Introduction to critical Buddhism—“Critical phi- losophy’ ’ vs. “topical philosophy’ ‘]
-In short, to be a Buddhist is to be critical, i.e., to be able to make distinctions; the only truly Buddhist stand is to be critical; Buddhism must be a “critical philosophy’ able to make distinctions, not a topical (basho) philoso- phy’’ [e. g. hongaku shisá that is “all-inclusive’’ and uncritically tolerant, an ‘ ‘experimential’’ philosophy.
2. Kyölogakuha bihan [A critique of the Kyöto school of phi- losophy]
-a critique of the idea of basho in the Kyoto school [Nishida Kitarö and Nishitani Keiji] and that it is an extension of the non-Buddhist ideas of hongaku shisä
3. Hihan lo while no gakum0n [Scholarship as critique]
-on the importance of a critical method for scholarship; that what is wrong should be pointed out as wrong and not papered over for the sake of a shallow harmonious tolerance [This may seem rather standard and not worth saying for Western scholarship, but is a radical stance in the world off apanese scholarship. In contrast, perhaps the Western world of scholarship needs some of the tolerance and graciousness of J apanese
scholarship.]
4. Kobayash i Hideo ’’Watashi no J'inseikan’ ’ hi'han [A critique of
Kobayashi Hideo's My Vier of Life]
5 Amerika bukkyä jljo bekken —Amerika no aru wakaki bukkyä kenkyïisha no happyä ui mukele [A glance at the state of Bud- dhism in the United States—On a paper given by a young Buddhist scholar]
-A report on his experience at the U. S.-japan Conference on apanese Buddhism held at the University of Wisconsin-M adison, August 25-28, 1985: in particular the paper by Paul Griffiths, On the Possible Future of the Buddhist-C hristian Interaction’
6. Shinnyo, hokkai, hosshä [ Talbatä, dharmadbälu, dharmalä
-on the non-Buddhist implications of these concepts
7 “Wa ’ ’ no han -buik ä-set lo bukkyä no han -sen -set [The anti- Buddhist character of na and the anti-violcnt character of Buddhism]
-the idea of na is not a positive Buddhist virtue but in practice is an excuse for uncritical syncretism and plays into the hands of the powerful in coercing conformity from above; true Buddhist virtue is anti-violent, and requ ires a critical stance against discrimination and injustice; faith” should be the ideal, not en.
8. Gi-bukkyö o haisuru [Rejection of false Buddhism]
132 Paul L. Swanson
-the importance of choosing what is right and rcjccting what is wrong
9. WatsuJ‘i-hakase ui okeru “hö” to “kim ” ri'kai no mondaiten [Problems in Dr. Watsuji Tetsurö’s understanding of “dharma’ ’ and ‘ ‘emptiness’ ‘]
10. Nyojitsu chiken — ’’Shi ui i'laru amai” o yominagara [ThouJhts on ‘ ‘truth” while reading A Sickness Unlo Dealh
11. Yuishiki lo muga —Boku no shikan taza Vijnäpti-m ätra and anätman—My ‘‘just sitting’’ ]
III. Sonne esays published recently:
1. Shötoku Tai'shi no wa no shisö hthan |A critique of Shötoku Taishi’s idea of ca (“harmony’ ‘)] [1989/10]
-a continutation of essay II-7
2. Tennösei hthan [A critique of the emperor system] 1989/10]
-on the dangers of thc Japanese emperor system and its similarity to the hon(aku shiso ethos
3. Zenshii hihan [A critique of the Zen school] [1990/3]
-a call for the “Zen’’ tradition to reject non-Buddhist ideas such as hongaku shisö and Taoist influences, and recover the “true Dharma’’
4. “Hokkekyö’’ fo hon,qaku sbisö [The Lotus 5’titra and hongaku shisö] [1990/10]
-on the differences between the ekayana teaching of the Lotus Sei tra and honqaku ehisö
5. Shizen hihan to white no bukkyö Buddhism as critical of the idea of “nature’‘] [1990/10]
-Buddhism does not teach ‘ ‘oneness with nature’ but rejects the at man-like idea of an all-encompassing “nature’’ (shizen); a Buddhist must escape from “nature’’ and project ‘ ‘ nature’ from destruction by becoming the “masters and possessors of nature’’ maitres el possesseurs de la Nature .
Many of the points Hakamaya makes in his more technical ‘ ‘ Bud- dhological cssays have already been mentioned in summarizing Matsumotri’s work. Thus I will concentrate on Hakamaya's social commentary, and some of his recent essays:
1. “ la ” no han -bukk â-set to bukkyâ no han-set [The anti-Buddhist character of ma and the anti-violence character of Buddhism] [1987]
This essay opens with a long quote on the increasing interest in religion in Japan, the cooperation between state and religion, and how this is a good thing for the country. Except for the dated style, one gets the impression that the quote was written recently, given the fact that Japan is now experiencing another shutyo bîimu. The perspective shifts, however, when one realizes that the quote is by Nishitani Keiji, written in 1941 as apan was in the throes of a world war, religious persecution, and domestic repression. Hakamaya uses this quote as a springboard to argue that the idea of en (“harmony’‘) is promoted as a positive ideal, but in reality it is a coercive principle used by the powerful to maintain the status quo and social order, and to restrict criticism. The mo promoted since the time of Shéitoku Taishi and his famous 17-articlc Con- stitution is not a Buddhist virtue. la is an enemy of Buddhism and an enemy of true peace. Buddhists should not give in to a com- promising and mushy ‘ ‘ tolerance’ ’ that uncritically accepts all things as ‘equal.”
Coeval with the ideal of sa is the hongaku s‘hisà religious ethos.
Both support an attitude of uncritical tolerance, which Hakamaya compares to mixing miie and kuso brown bean paste and dung— ‘ ‘curds and turds”] (p. 110). Both support a superficial syncretism that ignores differences of right and wrong or good and bad, and thus ironically works to maintain discrimination and injustice and the whims of those in positions of power and authority.
In contrast to sa, the Buddhist should emphasize faith. The sa ideal encourages acceptance of any teaching or idea, whether it is Confucian, Toaist, native Japanese animism, or un-Buddhistic dhätu -vàda tendencies; “faith’’ requires one to have a firm belief in certain Buddhist truths and to reject ideas that are contrary to thèse truths. Thus Buddhist faith (rhin, !raddhà) is the same as the Latin credo—one believes in order to be able to judge whether an idea is correct or not correct. This is faith” as taught in the Ao/uJ Sutra. The faith’’ taught in lathàgala-garbha texts such as the Rama- golravlbhàga and Amakening of Failh, in contrast, emphasizes the unity uf the believer and the object of belief, and confidence in one's own
buddha-nature or potential to become a buddha (see essay I-10). The faith of the Lolus Stltra means to believe the words of the Bud- dha, and then judge with one's intelligent @raJiiâ) between the cor- rect and the incorrect, and criticize the incorrect with words.
The ma ethos led people in prewar Japan to uncritically sacrifice their bodies to the war effort and maintain silence. Buddhist faith requires intellect to critically respond with words and actions against mistaken notions and activity. This is the ‘‘anti-violent stand of Buddhism. To oppose rna ’is to be truly anti-violent and anti-war (hansen).
2. Tennksei hihan [A critique of the emperor system] [1989/10] This essay opens with a quote from Dögen:
Sentient beings should not be full of fear and take refuge in the mountain deities, oni , kami, and so forth, or take refuge in non-Buddhist (yed0) spiritua! powers ‹cartya). There is no liberation from suffering by relying on such things. By following the mistaken teaching oakyo} of non-Buddhist ways, one does not attain any causes for liberation. The wise person does not praise these things; they add to suffering and not to good recompense. Thus one should not take refuge in mistaken ways, but should clearly exclude them.
Hakamaya takes the occasion of Emperor Shöwa's death, and the period of “voluntary restraint’ ’ Ç'ishuku) among the Japanese people during the Emperor's terminal illness, to comment on the place and dangerous tendencies of the emperor system in modem Japan. He wonders how it can be claimed that Japan is a country “with unusual freedom of thought and expression’ when social pressurcs during this period were so strong that hardly anyone dared to make any comment or take any action that could be con- strued as ‘ ‘inappropriate’’ to the occasion.
The emperor system is like the hongaku and honji siiljaku ethos—it is structured with an ineffable center and a murky syncretisrn and relies on the ideal of zu to muffle any ideological criticism. It is a non-Buddhist system of spirituality that Dögen clearly rejected. Buddhists must be critical of the emperor system and its hothouse atmosphère that stifler dissent.
3. Zenshïi hihan [A critique of the Zen school] [1990/3]
In this article Hakamaya reiterates and expands his criticism that “Zen is not Buddhism,’’ makes a bliste ring attack on the Zen inter-
pretations of Yanagida Seizan and D.T. Suzuki, and also responds to some questions raised by his collègue Ishii Shtidö.
One passage in particular clarifies the intent of Hakamaya's critique:
I have said that ‘ ‘ Zen is not Buddhism’ ’ but d o not recall ever saying that ‘ ‘Chinese Ch ’an is not Buddhism .’’ This difference may appear to be minor, but it is an important distinction . The reason is that anything which shows no attempt at ‘ ‘critical philosophy’’ based on intellect prayiiâ), but merely an experiential ‘ ‘Zen’’ (dhyâna, beam plan), whether it be in India or Tibet or wherever, cannot be Buddhism . (p. 64)
Hakamaya’s harsh critique of Yanigida Seizan and D. T. Suzuki is based on the idea that if, on the one hand the correct Dharma (saddharma) of Buddhism is a critical philosophy and a foreign and imported way of thinking, and on the other hand Zen is a topical philosophy no different from the customs and ways of the culture in which it is imported, then the fact both Suzuki and Yanagida wrote books concerning two phenomena that should be understood in opposition to each other, namely “Buddhism’ and “Japanese culture,” shows that they are not aware of the fundamental opposi- tion between thèse two. According to Hakamaya, the triumph of Zen in China and Japan is the triumph of the indigenous (dochaku) ways in absorbing Buddhisrn into itself and neutering the critical thrust of the Buddha's teaching.
In concluding this essay and in response to questions from Ishii, Hakamaya clarifies his position on some points, including:
—there is no ‘‘ good’’ hongaku iÀiiö—no parts of it can be admit- ted as Buddhism, and it can only be rejected;
—as Ishii points out, the correct Dharma (saddbarma) recognizes both sitting in mediation and various religious rituals as valuable, and also recognizes a proper role for a teacher to guide one in the correct Dharma. However, Hakamaya points out, one must completely reject the authoritarian idea that a teacher is absolute and never mistaken.
4. “Hokkekyk’ ’ lo hongaku shisô [The Lotus Sîllra and bongaku sbisô
[1990/10]
This paper was prepared to deliver in English at the conference on the Lotus Siitra and japanese Culture at the University of British
Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, in August 1990. It therefore repeats and neatly summarizes many of Hakamaya's major points. He points out that the Lotus Selma (Saddharma-purtdarika-extra), since it claims to proclaim the only right and true Buddhism , and is an imported way of thinking, should be understood as antithetical to the indigenous ways of thinking in the countries it enters. Hongaku shrek, on the other hand, is naturally amenable to indigenous ways of thinking. Thus these two standpoints should, at least theoretically, be in opposition.
It has already been shown that hongaku shisö is a dhätu-väda. ” The three criteria for a “correct’ ’ Buddhism are that it teacher causality, it promotes an altruistic, other-benefitting ideal, and words are valued to express the truth. The Lotus Sillra meets all these criteria.
The Lotus Siitra ‘is a “critical philosophy,’’ in contrast to the “topical philosophy’ ’ of hongaku shisö. It urges people to have faith, is critical of mistaken understanding of the Buddha Dharma, and values the skillful use (hoben, «page) of language.
Unfortunately, Hakamaya says, the Lotus Siitra has been under- stood in an un-Buddhistic way for most of Japanese history, The interpretations of Seng-chao, Chi-tsan g, and others, who under- stood the Lotus Siitra in terms of Taoist or Buddha-nature ideas, were imported into japan from the earliest days, influenccd the zo ethos attrihuted to Shötoku Taishi, and from the very beginning turned the critical Lotus Sigma approach into an overly tolerant ethos. Thus from the very beginning the hongaku shisö attitude won out over the radical, critical, and truly Buddhist approach of the Lolus Stilra.
Response and Olher Conlributions to the Issue
Although Matsumoto and Hakamaya are the central figures in this on-going controversy, there are other scholars who have made similar claims or have contributed to this subject. The work of four more faculty members of Komazawa University should be men- tioned, though once again limits of space and time do not allow a full treatment.
1. Ishii Shïidö has published an important volume on “Studies
in the history of Zen in the Sung period” ( 1989). In his introduc- tion he refers to the work of M atsumoto and H akamaya and their conclusion that Chinesc Zen is not Budd hisrn (anti-U pani ad).’’ He adds that “this may seem rather stran ge at first glance, but it c‹arrcsponds to my understanding that ‘the indigenous Taoist thought is not Buddhism,’ and their statements promise to be valuable in my attempt to clarify the character of Chinese Ch’an’’ (p. ix). Ishii is careful not to give full support to the claims of H akamaya and Matsum oto, however, and as we have seen from H akamaya’s response to Ishii’s qucries (in ‘ ‘ Zenshú hihan’‘), they are in the midst oł a public debate to clarify their positions. Ishii appears willing to admit the value oł’ ‘‘ indigenous’ elements with- out them compromising Buddhism ; H akamaya will have none of it.
2. Yamauchi Shun’yú has published two massive tomes on Dõgen-Zen and Tendai hongaku shiso” (1985) and ‘ ‘Zen and Ten- dai meditation ’ ’ (1986). The former provides detailed studies on the dcvclopmc nt of Roma/rn shisà, and underscores Dõgen ’s critique against it. In his preface he acknowledges that his studies are an extension of the work of H az ama Jikõ ( 192 3) and Tamura Yoshirõ
(1965, 1973) (see below).
3. Yoshizu Yoshihidc has published studies on ‘ ‘Ke gon-Zen’’ (1985) fõcu ssinç on Fa-tsan g, C h’t:nJ-ku an , and Ysun g-m i, with special attention to the inł1uence of han(aku shisã. He concludes that although the thought or original awakening (domain ińiiô) is said to have taken root in Japanese Ruddh ism from the He ian period through the Kamakura period, further research must be conducted on the contact and incurring differences (sic?) between the Chinese meaning of original enlightenment, which I have called here Hua- yen-C h’an , and the Japanese usage oł“ the concept of original
awaken iny’’ (p. 15).
4, Ito Takatoshi has published a number of works (1988, 1990) on the early C hinesc assimilation of Budd hism. He focusses on the work of Seng-chao and his influence on Chi-tsang, the systematizer of the San-lun school. He points out that it is currently u nderstood that these two figures were very influential in helping Buddhism take root in C hina. lto, however, argues that in făct these two figures assimilated Buddhist teachings on the basis of indigenous Chinese ideas. In his essay on matching terms, a phrase usually
138 Paul L. Su›anson
used to describe only the early, pre-Seng-chao phase of the intro- duction of Buddhism into China, Itö argues that ‘ ‘All of Chinese Buddhism, from the time of its introduction to the dominance of the Ch'an school, is a Buddhism of ‘matching terms’ ’’ (p. 57). In other words, Chinese Buddhism is always understood on the basis of the indigenous ideas such as tao and /i. A Buddhism of “mat- ching terms’’ is no more than an extension of indigenous Chinese ideas (rösö shisofi, and cannot be considered correct or proper Buddhism.
Responses to the Challenge by Buddy tel Scholars
1. The topic of éongatu ibiifi was brought to the fore of current Buddhist studies through the work of Tamura Yoshirö, who fol- lowed in the footsteps of Hazama Jikö and Shimaji Taitö in identi- fying hongaku shisö as a dominant ethos in Japanese Buddhism and religion in general. Tamura's study on the influence of hongaku shisö on the new Kamakura Buddhist movements (1965) and the com- pilation of hongaku texts (TADA 1973) laid the foundation for current studies on hongaku shisö.
It was a great loss to the world of Buddhist scholarship when Tamura Yoshirö passed away in 1989. We can only speculate how he would have responded to the challenge presented by Matsumoto and Hakamaya. Tamura is on record as saying the hongaku shisö was the climactic development of Mahäyäna Buddhism, and was a tireless advocate of the positive influences of this ethos, not only on Japanese religion but in various areas of Japanese culture. What
D.T. Suzuki claimed for “Zen,’’ Tamura would have claimed for hongaku iÄiifi.' His collected works on the subject, published in 1990, must serve as his “response’ on the subject.
2. The greatest authority on talhägata-garbha thought in japan
today is Takasaki Jikidö, and his masterful Nyoraizö shisö no kerker was published in 1974. Both Matsumoto and Hakamaya quote his work with respect, and in some of his recent publications Takasaki makes a preliminary response. 20 Takasaki praises them for their careful scholarship and critical approach, but cannot accept their conclusion that lalhagata-garbha thought and hongaku shisö is “not Buddhism . ’’ He points out (1991, p. 206) that the lalhägata-garbha
texts themselves are constantly aware of the possible criticism that they are positing an ätman, and deny the charge. Their openness to this charge did not lead to them being accused in India of being not Buddhism’ ‘. It is true that the Mädhyamika school criticized the lalhägala-garbha and Yogäcàra traditions of usiny expressions which implied substantial existence, but this was accepted as still being a part of Mahäyäna Buddhism, although an ‘ ‘incomplète’ ’ teaching. The talhagata-garbha ideas were accepted in Tibet also as
part of the M ahäyäna tradition.
As for Matsumoto’s idea of dhàtu-vàda, Takasaki adds, it is a useful proposition with which to criticize lathàgala-garbha and Yogäcära ideas, and it is structurally similar to the U panisadic idea of the unity of Brahman and àtman. However, Takasaki doubts if it is necessarily and always un- or anti-B uddhist, and whether it can be a litmus test to determine what is and is not Buddliism. Takasaki finds Matsumoto’s defining characteristics of Buddhism too restric- tive, and wonders if maybe Sàkyamuni himself was “poisoned’ by dhàtu-vàda influences.
Matsumoto’s logic should lead him to criticize the Mädhyamika idea of ‘supreme truth” @aramàrtha -sat)a) , and eventually any and all aspects of the Buddhist tradition (1989, p. 373). M atsumoto admits that ultimately he can only rely on “an absolute Other,’’ and Takasaki wonders if Matsumoto will eventually embrace Christianity.
Hakamaya, Takasaki points out ( 1989, p. 373 ff.), attacks lalhâgata-garbha more as a social critic, and there is no denying that Buddhism has contributed to social injustice and discrimination. However, Takasaki claims, the fault for thèse shortcomings cannot be laid solely at the feet of ÀontaIo iÀiiô—a “pure” philosophy of emptiness could have led to the same results. In any case it is undeniable that a Buddhist should have compassionate concern for others and not ignore proper practices.
Hakamaya’ s critique of languages also makes important points, and logical, verbal expressions are important in Buddhism, but Takasaki thinks that one must recognize the limits of language. It is not anti-Buddhist to admit thèse limits.
Takasaki conclu des his brief comments by noting (1991, p. 212)
that important questions have been raised by M atsumoto's and
Hakamaya’s critique, and it is time for him and others to rethink lalhâgata -garbha ideas and the A wakening of faith, and for him to reconsider his work as presented in Nyoraizâ shisâ kelsei.
3. Hirakawa Akira is one of the deans of J apanese Buddhist studies, and he responds to Matsumoto’s work in the leading essay in a collection of articles he edited on lalhägala -garbha and the Amaken ing of Faith” (1990, pp. 78J”l.). First he states his own under- standing of /a/höqafa-Jarbha as the ‘ ‘ nature’’ or “potential’ ’ to attain buddhahood. It is not static but is ev er-changing: this is the talhägata-garbha-dhätu. Dliätu does not necessarily mean a substantial foundation’ ’ or “basis’’ as Matsumoto claims. In fact there are passages in the Ägama sïitras which identify dhätu with pralitya- samutpäda. Thc Srïmälädeui Sïitra ‘itself says that the lathä,qala-garbha is not an ätman (T 12. 2 22 b19-21). H irakawa agrees with Matsumoto that pralitya-samulpäda !ïinyatä and anälman are the tundamental teachings of Buddhism, but cannot agrcc that therefore talhägala-
garbha thought is not Buddhism. 2’
4. Lambert Schmithausen has published “Remarks on N. Hakamaya's view of the problem of Buddhism and Nature’ ’ ’ (1991, pp. 33-62). He critiques Hakamaya's view ul' Buddhism and nature and concludes that, despite his epousal of a ‘‘ge nuinc Bud- dhism,’ some of his ideas are borrowed from the Western tradition and are ‘ ‘rather Cartcsianisin in a Buddhist yarb’’ (1991, p. 62).
Responses Outside the World of Buddli tel Scholars‘b ip
1 . Response of the Sötö Sect
I have no direct infÔrmation on the rcsponse ol the rank and file of those in the Sötö sect, but one would assume that the criticism is not welcome. The daily routine of Sötö temples, likc rrn›st other apanese Buddhist scct s, mostly involves funerary rites. 22 The hongaku ethos is as prevalent in Sötïi circles as in any other Buddhist school. What would be the reaction among church members in England if a first-rate scholar and theoloJian at a major seminary (or the University of Cambridge) claimed that the C hurch of England is ‘ ‘not Christian’’ ?
2. H0ngaku shisà and apanese Feminism
One of the most interesting responses to the critique ot hongaku shisà is by apanese ferninists, who have picked up on the thème and applied it to their critique of contemporary Japanese society. Ogoshi Ai ko, Minamoto Junko, and Yamashita Akiko have made quite a splash with a best-selling publication of their essays entitled Set-sahelen sure BukLyä (1990, “Buddhism as a promotor of sexual discrimination’‘). They point out that so far the feminist movement in Japan has largely consisted in activities and analysis influenced by Western models, and that f'eminism must respond to the indigenous situation in order for it to take root and be meaningful lÔr apanesc society. In this context they refer to H akamaya's criti- que of’ honçaku shisà and argue that this ethos has contributed greatly to sexual discrimination in apan. They point out that the usa ethos puts the burden ïÔr staying at h‹ame and maintaining the “har- mony’’ of tamily life on women, and this acts to inhibit the libera- tion of Japanese women from restrictive traditional roles, not to mention the unconscious effect of this ethos in all aspects of their daily life. M inamoto (1990) attacks sa as a repressive element of Japanism (Nihonshugi) and a discriminatory ethos based on hongaku shiso (p. 9-13). Surely no one lamiliar with the place of women in Japanese society can deny the validity of’ thèse claim s.
Some Personal Obsetvalions
The question still remains whether or not all Buddha-natu re for- mulations are necessarily dhätu-väda and thus antithetical to Bud- dhism. One can come up with many examples ol" Buddha-nature formulations that take pains to avoid just that sort of substantialist interpretation. T’ien-t'ai Chih -i's concept of threefold Buddha- nature (san'in busshâ), for example, proposes a synergy ot reality, wisdom, and practice that avoids proposing a substantial Jhâlu. Buddha-nature is threet“old: Buddh‹i-nature as the way things arc (the ‘ ‘direct’’ cause of buddhahood), the wisdom that illuminates the way thin is are (the ‘ ‘ sul“ficient’ ’ cause of buddhahood) and the practice that pcrfects inherent disposition for wisdom (the “condi- tional” causes of buddhahr›od). I n order to avoid a simplistic treat-
ment of whether or not Buddha-nature “exists, Chih-i interprets Buddha-nature in terms of the ekayana principle of the Lotus Sïitra: the promise of potential buddhahood for all beings. Buddha-nature is thus not a static entity, and yet one cannot say that it does not ‘‘exist. ’ ’ Everyone is not a Buddha ‘ ‘just as they are’‘—a process is required to manifest the inherent potential of buddhahood. Buddha-nature is part of a larger world of experience that involves three aspects: the way things are, the wisdom to perceive things cor- rectly, and the practice required to attain this wisdom."”
As for hongaku shiso, perhaps the difficulty in rendering this term in English reveals the tension and danger in the term itself. I have always been wary of the translation “original’ ’ enlightenment because it has too strong a temporal implication, and yet many of the interpretations of this term (and the Aæakening of Faith itself) do indeed encourage this understanding (and provide good reason for Matsumoto and Hakamaya to reject it as dhätu-vàda). The terms “innate’’ and “inherent’’ enlightenment also smack of a substantialist heterodoxy. If indeed hongaku shisà (and universal Buddha-nature) is a valid expression of the Buddha Dharma, it is incumbent on the proponents of this kind of thinking to show how it is compatible with the basic Buddhist teachings of anô/mao (non- self) and pra/i*/yn-ram/§ôda (causality)2’ One could start by discuss- ing why it was necessary to come up with a new term in Chinese instead of using thc traditional term tathâgata-garbba.
Finally, apart from the technical arguments as to whether Buddha-nature ideas and ùongaku iÀiiô arc “orthodox’ ’ or “not really Buddhism,’’ it cannot be denied that this ethos has failed to provide a broad ethical dimension or stimulate a social ethic in apanese society. Japanese Buddhists may—and in fact have— argued that this is not a problem, and that for Zen the priority is for the individu al to rcalize one's own enlightenment, after which compassion and concern fÔr others should “flow forth spon- taneously. ’ ’ Nevertheless history has shown that this ethos tends to support the status quo; it provides neithcr a stimulus for necessary social change and altruistit: activity, nor a basis to resist social struc- tures that prey on the wcak and oppressed. Was the Zen master who dismisscd a beggar at the gate and refused him food and clothing, saying, “He has the Buddha-nature,” failing as a Bud-
dhist to be compassionate, or was he merely following through with the implications that flow naturally from the Buddha-nature ethos?
Concluding Summary
The criticisms of Hakamaya and Matsumoto seem to be directed at a number of different targets, often at the same time and not always readily apparent. At least three levels can be distinguished: Buddhological, sectarian, and social criticism.
1) At the Buddhological level Hakamaya and Matsumoto are questioning the consistency of concepts such as Buddha- nature and hongaku shiso with other basic Buddhist concepts such as pralitya-samutpàda. They use textual and doctrinal arguments in an attempt to show that Bu ddha-nature ideas (dhätu-väda) are incompatible with other, more basic, Bud- dhist teachings. Whether or not one agrees with the specifics of their argument, the time is ripe for a Buddhological reevaluation of the Buddha-nature concept.
2) At a sectarian level they are resisting what they perceive as
an incorrect understanding of Dögen’s teachings by their own Sötö scct, and scek to reform the sect by re-eva1uating Dögen's teachings, especially with re gard to the idea of Buddha-nature.
3) At the level of social criticism they intend to show that the
acceptance of the Buddha-nature/Sociale shisà ethos in Japan has led to objectionable social conditions and attitudes, and that a recognition of the danger of this ethos is necessary to change such unfortunate social conditions. That such social criticism should arise at this time in apanese society, and from such a source, is a matter of great significance not only to those interested in Buddhism and its development in East Asia and its potential meaning for the West, but also for those interested in the dynamics of religious ideas and their influence on society in general,
both in the past and present.
In conclusion, it can be said that the favorable yet stereotyped description of japanese Buddhism (even Japanese religion in
general) has it emphasizing harmony with nature and a ‘‘ har- monious’ ’ society, absolute immanence, an uncritical acceptance of phenomena as they are, the interdependence or identity of kami and buddhas, love of peace, an affirming and positive attitude toward life in this world, and so on. And on the negative side it is said to be lacking impetus for social-ethical concerns; having a weak idea of justice and social injustice, and so allowing people to become easy prey to political propaganda and social pi assures to conform; encouraging an irresponsible “hands-off” ’ disposition that contributes to pollution, rcckless use ot natural resources, lit- tering, and destruction of public property, and disregard for the interest of anyone outside of one's own “group’’ ; and providing no basis for making ethical judgements between right and wrong, good and bad, correct and incorrcct. Thèse may be no less an over- simplification of the Japanese religious ethos than attempts to char- acterize the world-wide environmental destruction of the last cen- tury as a result of the Biblical injunction in Genesis to subdue the earth. ’’ But it is just this ethos that Matsumoto and H akamaya are challenging. What is the true understanding of the Buddha Dharma? What are the social implication of’ various interpretations of the Buddha Dharma? What is the role oÏ‘ Buddhism in Japanese society today? How should developments in Buddhist doctrinal history be understood? What were the social, political, and Japan of the uncritical acceptance of the idea of an inherent and universal buddha-nature? Can contcmporary apanese society be critiqued from a Buddhist perspective, and if so, how? Thcse are the questions that need to be addressed, and are being addressed, by rethinking the meaning and significance of hongaku shisà.
Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture PAUL L. SWANSON Nanzan University
18 Yamazato-chö, Shöwa-ku
Nagoya 466, Japan
* This paper was originally prepared in the sprin g of 1991 and presented as ‘‘Rethinking Japanese Buddhism: Recent japanese C ritiques of Hongaku shisâ” at a workshop on ‘ ‘Rethinking Japan ese R eligion’ ’ held at the University of Cam- bridge, England, 3-6 April 1591 . Since the subject of this paper is an ongoing and lively debate, the contents were updated for submission to NUMEN. Nevertheless
it is dest ined to dc soinc what outclated by the time it appears in print. The latest devclopm cnts (as of fall 1992) show that there is a gro win g scholarly debate brew- ing over the sign iticance ‹it Drge u’ s 1 2 -kan version of the Shohogen zo . Dögen scholars in the West are inv itccl to fill in and cxpand on my brief outline ol this specific subject. The dckate has also moved soms rn ajor J apancsc scholars to revise and/or update thei r work. Wortliy of attention is a major publication callcd Buddha kara Dägen e (F rom Iluddha t o Dögcn; Nara Yasuaki, cd . , Tokyo: Tökyö Shoseki, 1992), which grew out of a series ol twel ve colloqu ia held recen tly at Komazawa University.
' For dctails see G roner, Sai'chü, pp. 91 - 106.
" Sec the translation by H akeda (1S67); on the controversy over the ori gin of the Awakeni u j o[ Faith, see recent works (ariel list of sources) by William G rosnick (c. g. ‘ ‘The Cat c¿orics ot“ 7"’i, Hsiang, and Yiing: Evidence that Param ärtha Com- poscd the Amaken ing of Faith, ”Jo umal of the Intr.rnaliona1 h t.toriafiori o/ fiuddhtel Studi!‹.s 12/11 (1989): 6ö -92) and Whalen Lai (c. g. ‘ ‘A Cl ne to the Authorship of the Awakcnin3 ef Faith: Si ksananda’s Re daction ot“ the Wro rrl ’Nien’,”J• • ••• 1 o/ the InIer-
nofinit«/ n iioriofJon o/ Buddhisl Studie›‘ 3/ 1 : 3 4-5 3 ,’ ’ ‘The Chan -cb’a chi u : R eliyion and
Magic in Medieval China,’’ in Buswell, Chinc› Buddhist Apocrypha, 1990, pp. 1 75-206).
For details on thc Chinese apocrypha and the Jeny rond c/tin5 see Swanson 1989, pp. 41 -5Ü, and Buswell, C'hi nere Buddh ist Apocr pha, 1950.
For details on this siitra sec Buswcll, The Formation of Chinese Ideolo , 1959. “ See Hakeda, p. 37.
" For details see the au th orit at ive essay on the subject by Tamu ra YoshirÔ, 1973, pp. 47 7-548, and othcr works by Tam ura.
la -ch‘eng chi’i!-hein Inn i-clii, W # 1846.
" For d et ailô see my int roduct ion to the spccial issue on Ten dai Buddhism in the Ja§anew’. Jo«rn«/ 0/ Reli!giou› Sludi'es 14/2-3, 19h 7 ; sec also in t he same issue the articles on ‘ ‘ The €? haracte rist ics of J apanes e Tenclai’ ’ by H azarna ikö and ‘ ‘ Inherent Enlightenment and Saich i's Acce}atance of the Bodhisatt va P reccpts’’ fay Sli irat o Waka.
" For details sec "1'arnura 1974 .
' lt is often assu med that these ph rases arc quot cs frotn a Matt äy äna text, but in tact they are not at least as tar as I was aL*1e to dete rtn ine—if soineo ne can fi nd there phrases in a elassical Burldhist text, I ‘d like to k now about it]. See M iyam oto Shöson, “ ‘Sömok tt kok uf o shikkai jöbu tsu ' no busshöron tek i igi to sono sakusha,” Indogaku Bukk y0gak u Kenkyu 19/2, 1961, pp. 672 - 7 01 . There are similar phrases, such as iiiai shujü shitsu'u husshJ [all sentient bein gs h ave the Bu ddha- nature] in thc Mafiö§oriniruopa-Jiifra, but such Mah äyäna texts do not ge› so lar as to ad rriit the implications erf these two phrases that even non-sentient things have Buddha-nature. In fact, at least one Fassade in the Mabäparinircä;a-siitra says exactly the opposite: ‘‘T'hat which is without Bucldha Nature is the grciu nd, the trees, grave1, and rocks. That which is othcr than thcsc nonscntient things is all called Budclha Nature’ ’ [T 1 2. fi81a22-2.3 & 82Sb26-2 7]. See Jamie Hulobard, ‘ ‘ Absolute Delusion, Per1‘ect Buddhahood—The Un iversal Buddha of the San- chieh-chiao,’ ’ in €*riftiths and Keenan, ed., Buddha Nature, 1590.
' ’ Shöshin is known for his volu minous commentaries on the maj or works ot "1’’ ien-t’ai Chih-i, the creativc Lenin s and fou ndcr of the T’ ien-t’ai tradition ; it is said that he was so involvcd in his studics that hc was not aware of the contem- porary struggle bist wcen the Taira and M inamoto families, equivalent to a C*er- man scholar in the 1940’s bcing unawarc of World War II.
' " See Tamu ra 1954 and 1590, Ja. 353 IL ; Yam au t:hi (19P 5), pp. 7 18 ff.
' ' For a t ranslation of t his cx position in the Mabâca5ÿa sec Warren, Buddhism
f*fî "l'ran laÏI’on6, pp. 83 -87.
' M atsurn oto takes pains to poin t out that he is not using t he term ‘ ‘native’’ in a derogatory sense.
'“ I will return to the the ne of no la ter.
' From a copy of the pap cr dclivcrcd by M atsumoto at the conference on the I.otus Sü t ra and J apanese C ultu re at t he Uni versity of B rit ish C olumbia in Van- couver, C anada, August 1990.
' ' Sinec this papcr was prepared Hakam aya has published another book, spccificall y on this topic. See Hakamaya 1992.
' See M inoru Kiyota, cd . , 1987.
‘* And H akamaya would say that they are both the same dhatu -nada, and neither arc Bu ddhîsm.
"’ M atsumoto (p. 1 47) points ou t that Takasaki gave a paper entitled /woyurtt Dhàtu ràdo ni / i«i/é {Cin so-callec1 Jha tuoada at the Inciogaku Bukkyiigak u CE akkai in 1988, but this papcr did not appcar in the Indo,qaku Bukk àgaku KenkyYî which pub- lished the procccd ings of this confc rence, and I have not been able to get a copy of his rcmarks.
Both books (1989, 1990) were under preparation l ong before the appearance of M atsu moto and H akamaya’s critique, so T akasaki’s response is contained in rcmarks appendcd at the end of the books.
"' I t should bc notcd that H irakawa's essay was w rittcn in response to Matsu- iiioto’s early article o ri the Srïmaladc0 i Sutra, and does not take into account his later developments on the theme.
“ See Ian Readcr’s articles on ‘ ‘Zazenless Zen’’ (1986) and ‘ ‘Transformations
and Cihanges in the Teachin gs ot the Séitö Zen Buddhist Sect’ ’ (1985).
"" Sec in y article on ‘ ‘T’ icn-t’ai Chih-i's Concept of Threefold Buddha-nature: A Synergy of Reality, Wisdo tri , ariel P ract ice’’ in G riffi ths and Keenan, ed. Buddha Nulur , 1950.
*' An important step in this direction is made by Sa llie Kin g in her recent book
Buddba Naiure (199i ).
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