2016/11/01

Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan (The Past and Present Book Series) (9780198754251): Oleg Benesch: Books

Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan (The Past and Present Book Series) (9780198754251): Oleg Benesch: Books
Inventing the Way of the Samurai
Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan
Oleg Benesch
----
The Past and Present Book Series

The only book-length academic study of bushidō, an important subject for anyone with an interest in Japan
Provides an overview of modern Japanese history through the lens of a single concept
Offers a long-awaited re-evaluation of some of the longest-standing myths about Japanese thought and culture
The first book in English to take a historical approach to a subject that has traditionally been dealt with primarily on a philosophical level
Combines a variety of approaches and sources to provide a comprehensive history of a concept
------
Table of Contents

Introduction
1: Backgrounds
2: First Explanations of Bushidō in the Meiji Era
3: The Early Bushidō Boom, 1894-1905
4: The Late Bushidō Boom, 1905-1914
5: The End of the Bushidō Boom
6: The Showa Bushidō Resurgence
7: Bushidō in Postwar Japan
Conclusions and Considerations
Select Bibliography
----
Description

Inventing the Way of the Samurai examines the development of the 'way of the samurai' - bushidō - which is popularly viewed as a defining element of the Japanese national character and even the 'soul of Japan'. Rather than a continuation of ancient traditions, however, bushidō developed from a search for identity during Japan's modernization in the late nineteenth century. The former samurai class were widely viewed as a relic of a bygone age in the 1880s, and the first significant discussions of bushidō at the end of the decade were strongly influenced by contemporary European ideals of gentlemen and chivalry. At the same time, Japanese thinkers increasingly looked to their own traditions in search of sources of national identity, and this process accelerated as national confidence grew with military victories over China and Russia.

Inventing the Way of the Samurai considers the people, events, and writings that drove the rapid growth of bushidō, which came to emphasize martial virtues and absolute loyalty to the emperor. In the early twentieth century, bushidō became a core subject in civilian and military education, and was a key ideological pillar supporting the imperial state until its collapse in 1945. The close identification of bushidō with Japanese militarism meant that it was rejected immediately after the war, but different interpretations of bushidō were soon revived by both Japanese and foreign commentators seeking to explain Japan's past, present, and future. This volume further explores the factors behind the resurgence of bushidō, which has proven resilient through 130 years of dramatic social, political, -
-----


Review
Review from previous edition: "Benesch's history of bushido as an invented tradition with an ideological character delivers on the title's promise. Students of intellectual history will appreciate the example of an idea created, branded as tradition, and then variously applied by multiple
ideological positions. Modernists will benefit from Benesch's explanation of the Imperialist appropriation of bushido as a tool for militarization of the population through World War II. And Japan specialists are finally armed with a full argument against bushido's historicity."

--Nathan H. Ledbetter, Journal of Military History
L

"Benesch provides a comprehensive overhaul of the history of the development of bushido. He demonstrates great expertise in presenting the various texts and their roles in the discourse ... this book is a highly gripping read and provides a well-informed contribution to the historical
development and powerful influence of invented traditions."

--Julian Plenefisch, H-Soz-u-Kult [translation]
-----
About the Author

Oleg Benesch is Anniversary Research Lecturer in History, specializing in the history of early modern and modern Japan. Before arriving at the University of York, Dr Benesch was Past & Present Fellow at the Institute of Historical Research at the University of London. He has spent almost six years living and researching in Japan, including two years each at Hitotsubashi University and Reitaku University in Tokyo. Dr Benesch's publications and teaching interests cover a variety of fields, including Japanese intellectual, religious, and social history, Chinese intellectual history, as well as the transnational history of modern East Asia. He has presented his research findings at academic conferences and invited lectures throughout East Asia, Europe, North America, and Australia.
-----
Top Customer Reviews

5.0 out of 5 starsThis book is the most accurate, nuanced, and well researched examination of Bushido available
By Corydharma on December 14, 2014
Format: Hardcover
A remarkable piece of scholarship: this book is the most accurate, nuanced, and well researched examination of Bushido available. It clearly shows how the concept of Bushido has changed chronologically, rightly noting how nationalists, popular culture, and a lack of critical scholarship all affected how Bushido was portrayed and understood.

For the curious martial artists, amateur philosophers, and Japanese history buffs, this book will swipe the rug out from under you when you find out the truth about Bushido's history. It is an academic work though, so expect it to challenge you. It's not the kind of book you casually read before you go to bed. If you're looking for a broader understanding of the Samurai and their beliefs that's good but a lot easier to read you should get "When Buddhists Attack: The Curious Relationship between Zen and the Marial Arts" by Jeffery Mann instead of this book.

For the academics and those who are serious about cultivating a deeper understanding the way of the warrior: you need to read this book. If you can't afford it, call your library have them buy it. It's really good.
-----
5.0 out of 5 starsThis book does an incredible job of laying out the progression and growth of this concept as it has evolved and changed througho
By Matthew K. on January 31, 2015
Format: Kindle Edition
The concept of "bushido" and the samurai as it has been transmitted into the modern era is largely a construct of Imperial Japanese Military propaganda. This book does an incredible job of laying out the progression and growth of this concept as it has evolved and changed throughout the modern era and is highly recommended for anyone with an interest in Japanese history or the martial arts.
Comment  One person found this helpful. Was this review helpful to you?
---

"Benesch's history of bushidō as an invented tradition with an ideological character delivers on the title's promise. Students of intellectual history will appreciate the example of an idea created, branded as tradition, and then variously applied by multiple ideological positions. Modernists will benefit from Benesch's explanation of the Imperialist appropriation of bushidō as a tool for militarization of the population through World War II. And Japan specialists are finally armed with a full argument against bushidō's historicity." - Nathan H. Ledbetter, Journal of Military History

"Benesch provides a comprehensive overhaul of the history of the development of bushidō. He demonstrates great expertise in presenting the various texts and their roles in the discourse ... this book is a highly gripping read and provides a well-informed contribution to the historical development and powerful influence of invented traditions." - Julian Plenefisch, H-Soz-u-Kult [translation]

"Benesch has provided us with a valuable history of modern Japan through the lens of a particularly resilient ideology. It will be of great interest to students of Japanese history, not to mention to anyone concerned with the intellectual history of invented modern traditions." - Constantine N. Vaporis, American Historical Review

"Oleg Benesch's Inventing the way of the Samurai is a seminal, scrupulously researched work that teems with ideas. Its content is profoundly relevant to current political developments in Japan, as questions about the Constitution and the nation's identity come to the fore ... an essential guide to this crucial aspect of Japan's intellectual history." - Damian Flanagan, The Japan Times

Nitobe "The Japanese nation : its land, its people, and its life, with special consideration to its relations with the United States"

Full text of "The Japanese nation : its land, its people, and its life, with special consideration to its relations with the United States"



CHAPTER IX



JAPAN AS COLONISER



HISTORY has repeatedly shown ''how wide

the limits stand between a splendid and

a happy land." As with individuals, so with

nations, greatness and happiness lie, alas ! too often

at opposite poles. What belongs to the one may

be shared by the other; but, as a rule, he who

plucks the flower must forego the fruit. Falsely

or truly (it is not now my purpose to discuss the

moral or political issues involved in colonial enter-

prise), modem nations vie with one another to

express their greatness and splendour in territorial

expansion, or else in ethnic colonisation.



With the acquisition of the small island of For-

mosa in 1895, Japan joined the ranks of colonial

powers. Since then, she has added the southern

half of the island of Saghalien by the treaty of

Portsmouth in 1905 and the kingdom of Korea,

now officially called Chdsen, by annexation in 191 1.

Besides these territories, Japan holds the small

province of Kwang-tung in the Liao Timg penin-

sula, as well as a long and narrow strip of land



231;







232 THe Japanese Nation



along the South Manchurian railroad. These

last two were leased from China in continuation of

the contract which that nation had made with

Russia before the war.



In recounting what Japan has done as a colo-

niser, I shall for several reasons devote my time to

a review of what she has achieved in Formosa. In

the first place, because it is the first, and may be

called the only colony with which' we have had

experience of any length ; in the second place, be-

cause it has served the purpose of educating us

in the art of colonisation ; and in the third place,

because the administration of this island forms

a precedent for the government of later acquisi-

tions. To these three reasons may be appended

one other — ^namely, that I can speak of Formosa

from a long and personal connection with it ; and

to me the last is here the strongest and the best

reason.



Before proceeding further, let us refresh our

memory regarding geography.



Scattered over a wide surface of the globe are

about a dozen places christened with the Portu-

guese term Formosa — * ' Beautiful. ' * It is needless

to add that the word is of Latin origin, despite the

fact that it is not to be found in the ancient or in

the mediaeval list of nomina geographica. Among

the modem places bearing the name, some are so

small that many gazetteers do not condescend to

notice their existence.



There is an immense territory of the name of







Japan as Coloniser 233



Formosa covering 42,000 square miles, in the

north of Argentine. Then there is a Httle town

of the same name on the north-eastern coast of

Brazil, as well as one on the southern coast of

South Africa. Among the group of the Bissagos

islands, is a Formosa. In the interior of Europe,

too, on the Russian border, near the Danube, is a

village of the same name. On a map of Asia, we

find Mount Formosa, Formosa River, Formosa

Strait, Formosa Banks, etc. On the American

continent, in Bruce County, Ontario, there is a

settlement called Formosa. In the slightly modi-

fied form of Formoso, there is a banking and post

village in Kansas (Jewell Co.), and in the still more

modified Spanish form of Hermosa, one meets with

the same name in New Mexico (Sierra Co.), in

South Dakota (Custer Co.), and in California.



Thus, in Europe, Asia, Africa, North and South

America are found Formosas. But the Formosa

which is the subject of my discourse, is, I suppose,

the best known of them all. It is an island, lying

a short distance off the eastern coast of China. Its

area is 14,000 square miles, being about 240 miles

in length, with the Tropic of Cancer crossing

through its centre. Of volcanic formation, ranges

of slaty and schistose mountains, mainly of the

Tertiary age, run through its length, some of their

peaks towering as high as 1 3,000 feet. The eastern

coast is rocky and steep, affording very few landing

places ; but the western coast consists of flat, fertile,

alluvial plains, where are raised rice, sugar cane,







234 THe Japanese Nation



tea, ramie, bananas, oranges, and sweet potatoes.

Among the mountains grow gigantic trees of

various kinds, the most important being camphor

and hinoki {Thuya ohtusa,)



The island is as beautiful as it is fertile. The

Portuguese navigators, as they sailed along the

eastern coast, were so charmed by its precipitous

but wooded moimtains, its fantastic rocks and

the foaming billows which dash against them, that

they put down in their log-book their favorite

name of "Ihla Formosa." From the other side,

the Chinese, who can quite easily reach the western

coast in their junks — the distance from Foochow

to a Formosan port is only a little over a himdred

miles — were struck with its beauty, as from their

anchorage they saw hillsides inhabited and culti-

vated, and they called it Taiwan, the "Terraced

Bay," which is still the official designation of the

island. The Japanese, too, had long known of it,

and in times past venturesome spirits used to

frequent it, but in later days only the poetical

name "Takasago" (The High Sandy Tract)

remained, suggesting in popular fancy a land of

lotus-eaters.



Our knowledge of Takasago was as fanciful as

the account given of the island by that famous

literary impostor, George Psalmanazar. A French-

man by birth (bom about 1679), he was taken from

Holland to England by the chaplain of a Scotch

regiment, and was there received with much curi-

osity and honour because of his well-maintained







Japan as Coloniser 235



pretension of being a native of Formosa. His

amusing treatise on A History and Description of

the Island of Formosa off the Coast of China, pub-

lished in London in 1704, still remains an amazing

document of fabrication. The man evidently

showed no lack of intellectual ingenuity when he

constructed an entire linguistic system including

grammar and vocabulary. It is only to be ex-

pected that his description did not tally with facts.

Our acquaintance with Formosa, however, was

not much better. But it came quite forcibly and

unpleasantly upon us in 1874, when the report

spread that the savages of Southern Formosa had

slaughtered some Japanese sailors who were

wrecked on its coast. China at that time held

sway over the island. For the murder of her sub-

jects, Japan demanded satisfaction of China, but,

as the Celestial Government evaded responsibility,

we sent an army to the island itself. It is inter-

esting to notice that a number of American officers

at first joined in this expedition ; but, being warned

by their Government to observe strict neutrality,

they reluctantly left our service. After subju-

gating the hostile tribe, our army left the island,

China in the meantime offering to pay for damages.

Our interest in Formosa then ceased, and nothing

was done towards its conquest or even towards

securing its trade.



More than twenty years later, when the war

between China and Japan came to an end, For-

mosa was most imexpectedly brought into promi-







236 TKe Japanese Nation



nence. When Japan proposed that China should

cede the island, we were not at all sure that the

suggestion would be regarded with favour. But

the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hung-Chang, took

up the proposition, as though it were wise on the

part of his coiintry to be freed from an encum-

brance, and he even commiserated Japan for

acquiring it. He pointed out that the island was

not amenable to good government: (i) that brig-

andage could never be exterminated ; (2) that the

practice of smoking opium was too deep-rooted

and wide-spread among the people to eradicate;

(3) that the climate was not salubrious; and (4)

that the presence of head-hunting tribes was a

constant menace to economic development. The

island, somewhat like Sicily, had, in the course

of its history, been subject to the flags of various

nations. Holland, Spain, and China ruled it at

different times; a Hungarian nobleman once

dominated it; and at one time Japanese pirates

had practically usurped supreme power over it.

In 1884, the French under the celebrated Admiral

Courbet planted the tricolor on its shores, where

it waved for eight months. Such instability in

government is enough to demoralise any people;

but among the inhabitants themselves there were

elements which put law and order to naught.



If these were the main causes of chronic misrule

or absence of any rule in Formosa, let us see what

Japan has done.



In accordance with the stipulation of the treaty







Japan as Coloniser 237



of Shimonoseki, one of our generals, Count Kaba-

yama, was dispatched as Governor-General of

Formosa. In that capacity, he was about to land

on the island with a large army, when he was met

by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the port of

Kelung, and in an interview which took place on

board the steamer Yokohama Maru, the 17th of

April, 1895, it was arranged that a landing should

be effected without opposition. This marked the

first occupation of the island by our troops.

There were at that time some Imperial Chinese

soldiers still remaining in the island, and they

were ordered to disarm and leave the country.

Many did so, but a few remained to oppose our

advance; there were also a few patriots who did

not feel ready to accept our terms — ^not prepared

to accept alien rule, — and these either went from

the island or took up arms against us. The so-

called patriots proclaimed a republic, one of the

very few republics ever started in Asia. Tang

Ching-Stmg was elected president. The republic

of Formosa lasted three weeks, during which

mobocracy and deviltry in all its forms reigned su-

preme, leaving behind no evidence of its existence

other than some postage stamps valuable for

collectors ! At this time the professional brigands

took advantage of the general disturbance to ply

their trade. Peaceful citizens suffered more from the

hands of their own coiuitrymen — that is, from

Chinese troops and brigands — than they did from

us. Evidence of this lies in the fact that, as our







238 THe Japanese Nation



army approached the different towns, it was every-

where received with open arms as a deHverer from

robbery and slaughter. As for Tang Ching-Sung,

he fled to China, as did also some of the wealthiest

inhabitants, although many of these, learning of

the security enjoyed imder Japanese rule, have

since returned.



Though the island was pacified, no one knew

what would happen next. We did not understand

the character of the people. Very few Japanese

could speak Formosan, and fewer Formosans

could speak Japanese. There was naturally

mutual distrust and suspicion. The bandits

abounded everywhere. Under these conditions

military rule was the only form of government that

could be adopted until better assurance could be

obtained of the disposition of the people. To

carry out a military regime, it was calculated

that some ten million yen (five million dollars)

wciild be needed yearly. Out of this necessary

sum only three million yen could be obtained in

the island by taxation and from other sources of

revenue. The balance had to be defrayed by

the Imperial, that is by the Japanese, exchequer.

Now, in those years, an annual appropriation of

six or seven million yen, to be spent in an island

far from home, with no immediate prospect of

return, was a heavy burden for the rather limited

finances of Japan. We know how land values are

rising everywhere. Even in Africa, England had

to pay very much more than she expected she







Japan as Coloniser 239



would have to, in getting land in the south ; and I

think Italy has by this time found Tripoli rather

more expensive than she at first anticipated.. A

colony that looks at a distance like the goose that

lays the golden egg, on nearer approach, and

especially when you have to pay the bills, often

proves to be a white elephant. So among us,

impatient people, infatuated with gloire politique,

who had expected great things and great benefits

to come from Formosa, began to clamoiu* for

greater thrift, and some of the very best pub-

licists went even so far as to propose that the

island should be sold back to China or to some

other Power. To remedy this state of affairs, in

the course of some thirty months governors were

changed no less than three times.



The first Governor- General was Coimt Kaba-

yama, known as a hero of the Chino- Japanese

War; the second was no less a man than Prince

Katsura, of international fame as our Prime-

Minister during the war with Russia; and the

third was General Nogi, of Port Arthur renown.

Finding that the country could ill afford such

a luxury as a colony, the Parliament of Japan cut

down its appropriation of six or seven million

yen payable from the national treasury by about

one-third, thus reducing the subsidy to only four

millions. Now who wotdd accept a position

held by such a galaxy of talents, but now reduced

financially to two-thirds of its former prestige?

Only a man of imboimded resource, of keen per-







240 THe Japanese Nation



ception and quick decision — or else only a second

or third-rate man — ^would accept such a place.

Japan is forever to be congratulated on finding the

right man at the right time for the right place.

Viscoimt Kodama, who, as a member of the Gen-

eral Staff, had made a study of the Formosan prob-

lem, was ready to accept the governorship and the

task of putting to rights the bankrupt housekeep-

ing of the colony. I am afraid that this name, so

well known among us, is much less familiar in

America. Perhaps you can best remember it, if I

tell you that he was the real brains of the Russo-

Japanese War. In the choice of his assistant, the

civil governor, he made the discovery, as he called

it, of a man who proved himself a true right hand,

and who in efficiency actually exceeded his most

sanguine expectations. I refer to Baron Goto,

who in the last cabinet held the post of Minister of

Communications and was President of the Railway

Board. Until he was made civil governor of

Formosa imder Kodama, he had been known as

an expert on hygiene, having been a physician.

The advent of these two men in Formosa marked

a new era in our colonial administration. Upon

entering their new duties early in 1898, the first

thing they did was to bring about a practical sus-

pension of military rule; at least, it was made sub-

servient to civil administration. Military rule is

apt to become harsh, and to the Chinese especially,

who are not accustomed to respect the army, it is

doubly harsh.







Japan as Coloniser 241



Kodama and Goto, to whom English colonial

service was an inspiring example, surprised the

official world by a summary discharge of over one

thousand public servants of high and low degree.

They collected about them men known and tried

for their knowledge and integrity. They used

often to say: "It is the man who rules and not red

tape." In an old and well-settled country "red

tape*" may be convenient, but in a new colony

great latitude of power and initiative must be left

to individual men. I emphasise this point because

these men, I mean the Governor-General and the

civil governor, attributed their success largely to

the selection and use of right men.



When General Kodama went to Formosa, he

found brigandage still rampant, and with military

rule in abeyance there was some likelihood of its

becoming worse. To offset this, the constabiilary

department was organised and made efficient by

proper care in choosing men for the police and by

educating them in the rudiments of law and in-

dustries, to prepare them for their difficult and deli-

cate tasks. Exceedingly arduous are their callings,

for these policemen are required not only to repre-*

sent law and order but are expected to be teachers

as well. They keep account, for instance, of every

resident of the island, and they watch over every

man and woman who smokes opium; they must

become acquainted with children of school-age

and know which children go to school and which

do not. Our Formosan police are expected to



16 —







a^ TKe Japanese Nation



instruct the people how to take care of themselves,

especially in regard to pests and about disinfection.

They perform many duties that would scarcely

be required even of the Trooper Police of Australia.

They often live in villages where there are no

Japanese other than the members of their own

famines. Of course, they must know the Formosan

language and speak it.



Now, imder civil administration, armies Were

not mobiUsed against brigands, and if there was

any trouble, it was the policemen who had to go

cope with the situation. The brigands were first

invited to subject themselves to law, and if they

surrendered their arms, they were assured not only

of protection but of means of subsistence. Not a

few leaders took the hint and were given special

privileges. Those who resisted to the end were

necessarily treated as disturbers and as criminals.

Twelve years ago the brigands were so powerful

that the capital of Formosa, Taihoku (Taipeh),

was assaulted by them ; but in the last ten years we

have scarcely heard of them. I went to Taihoku

ten years ago, and, whenever I went a few miles out

of the city, half-a-dozen policemen armed with

rifles used to accompany me for my protection.

For the last five or six years a young girl could

travel unmolested from one end of the island to

the other — of course, outside of savage or abo-

riginal districts, of which I shall speak later.



Thus, what Li Hung-Chang said in the con-

ference of Shimonoseki turned out to be of little







Japan as Coloniser 243



consequence. According to him, brigandage was

something inherent in the social structure of For-

mosa. He said it was something that could not be

uprooted in the island; yet here is Formosa to-day

with not a trace of it. That is one of the first

things which was accomplished by Japan as a

coloniser.



Then, another great evil in the island, to which

Li Hung-Chang alluded, was the smoking of

opium. When the island was taken over, this

subject was much discussed by our people. Some

said opium-smoking must be summarily and

unconditionally abolished by law. Others said:

**No, no, let it alone; it is something from which

the Chinese cannot free themselves; let them

smoke and smoke themselves to death." What

took Baron Goto for the first time to Formosa was

the mission of studying this question from a medi-

cal standpoint, and the plan he drew up was for

the gradual suppression of the evil. The modus

operandi was the control of the production by the

Government; because, if the Government mono-

polises the production and manufacture of opium,

it can restrict the quantity as well as improve the

quality so as to make it less harmful. Smuggling

was watched and punished. A long list of all

those who were addicted to this habit was com-

piled, and only those who were confirmed smokers

were given permission to buy the drug. Children

and those who had never smoked were not

allowed to buy, much less to begin the use of,







244 THe Japanese Nation



opium, and strict surveillance was instituted by

the police, who, as I mentioned before, know

every man in the villages to which they are

appointed. The annual returns made of confirmed

smokers and of the quantity consumed in the

island, show a distinct and gradual decrease. In

1900 those addicted to the habit numbered in

round figures 170,000, or 6.3 per cent, of the

population. As the older smokers die off, younger

ones do not come to take their place ; so there is a

constant diminution. In five years the number

decreased to 130,000 or 3.5 per cent, of the popu-

lation. We think this is the only right way to

deal with this vice. It may interest you, perhaps,

to know that American commissioners from the

Philippine Islands came to study our system, and

that they expressed much satisfaction with its

results. Thus, the second evil which Li Hung-

Chang said was ineradicable in Formosa, has been

greatly weakened and seems destined to disappear.



What man has built up, man can destroy.

The artificial habit of opium-smoking can be

discouraged by law. But there are formidable

natural enemies which confront the sound eco-

nomic development of the island. I mean its sani-

tary disadvantages, especially some prevalent

forms of disease — above all, malaria and bubonic

plague and tropical dysentery.



What money and the spirit of enterprise have

undertaken has so often been largely nullified by a

small mosquito. There are no less than eight







Japan as Coloniser 245



kinds of Anopheles, responsible yearly for at least

twenty per cent, of all cases of sickness, many of

which end in death.



Chiefly owing, directly or indirectly, to malaria,

the population of Formosa has never been very

great. It appears that in pre-Japanese days, the

population of the island was recruited by immi-

grants from China. Only lately is the birth-rate

slowly showing a net increase over and above the

death-rate. The mortality from malaria has been

roughly estimated at three-and-a-half per thou-

sand of population. Among the Japanese, this

rate is diminishing, but not among the Chinese.

The fact that new-comers from Japan are so easily

attacked, is the greatest drawback to colonising the

island. Sugar-mills, for want of sufficient labour,

have imported Japanese; but usually one-third of

them cannot be depended upon — that is to say,

the efficiency of labour maybe said to be diminished

by one-third on account of malaria. When I

went to Panama last winter, nothing commanded

my respect for the American work conducted there

more than Colonel Goethals's system of sanitation.

As I meditated upon the careful detail of medical

supervision in the Canal Zone, I natiurally com-

pared the results with the situation in Formosa,

and thought if we could afford to spend as much

money as the Canal Commission does, if Taiwan

were smaller in size, if it could be brought imder

military administration, and if there were no rice-

fields — then we[might succeed better in our crusade







246 THe Japanese Nation



against the insect. Even under present conditions

every effort is made to drive out malaria; and in

the meantime an army of scientists is advancing

against the Anopheles in biological, physiological,

and chemical columns, with clearly visible results.

In the barracks outside of Taihoku, there is little

malaria. In the town itself, the improved drain-

age — a sewerage system having been constructed

of the stones of which, in Chinese days, the city

walls were built — has evidently contributed toward

the same end. So, also, has the good water supply,

which has taken the place of wells and cisterns.

Then, too, new building regulations enforce better

ventilation and access to sunlight. In the prin-

cipal cities, large portions of the town have been

entirely rebuilt. I have heard it said by medical

men that if the Japanese coming to Taiwan make

their domicile in the capital (Taihoku) and remain

there, they are quite free from malaria. Other

cities, notably Taingtn in the south, are making

sanitary improvements, so that they will probably

show a similar immunity within a few years. As

for the island at large, owing to the fact that

irrigation is the very life of rice-culture, there

are necessarily unlimited breeding-places for mos-

quitoes. Consequently, general hygienic progress,

such as Dr. Boyce describes with just pride in

writing of the West Indies, will not be so easy to

accomplish in Formosa.



Smallpox and cholera have been practically

eliminated from the list of prevalent diseases.







Japan as Coloniser 247



With the bubonic plague, the Government has had

a pretty hard fight. Dr. Takaki, who has been

chief of sanitation for some years, has devoted his

energy and scientific knowledge to the eradication

of it by every possible means, so that there has

been a steady and regular decrease of pest since

1906.



To give an idea of the decline and fall of the

sway of the Black Death, I will state in round

numbers the death-rates for the following years :



1905 4>5oo



1906 3,350



1907 3.250



1908 2,700



1909 1.300



1910 1,030



191 1 20



Though we still suffer from its sporadic appear-

ance, we have every promise of its near extinction.

At present, the most troublesome disease is trop-

ical dysentery, which, if not usually fatal, is ex-

tremely persistent and enervating.



Allow me to insert here a remark about the

rinderpest. Some ten years ago, its ravages were

so great that we feared we might lose all our water

buffaloes and bullocks ; but, thanks to vigilance and

inoculation, we have for the last five years .been

having only a few hundred deaths annually,

whereas they used to be counted by thousands.







34^ THe Japanese Nation



Thus the third great impediment which Li

Hung-Chang thought would prohibit progress in

Taiwaji is being steadily overcome, and now I

reach the fourth and last obstruction, — ^namely

the presence of head-hunting tribes, allied to the

head-hunters of Borneo made familiar by the pen

of Professor Haddon. These Malay people are

the oldest known inhabitants of the island. That

they are not autochthonous is evident from the

tradition, current among many tribes, that their an-

cestors arrived in a boat from some distant quar-

ter. At present they number about one hundred

and fifteen thousand. They are in a very primitive

state of social life. The only art with which they

are acquainted is agriculture, and that of a very

rude sort — ^what in Europe is called spade-culture,

or what scientific men dub "Hack-Kultur"

(hoe culture), as opposed to agriculture proper, — a

kind of farming which Mr. Morgan in his Primi-

live Society first explained as a precursor of real

agriculture, in which the plough is used. They

raise upland rice, millet, peas, beans, and some

common vegetables, such as pumpkins and rad-

ishes. They do not know the art of fertilising

land, and they look upon manuring as an act of

contamination.



They have scarcely any clothing; a few tribes

wear none. Their houses are usually built of

wood and bamboo and are roofed with slate or

straw. Scrupulously clean in their personal habits,

bathing frequently, they keep their huts very







Japan as Coloniser 249



neat. In character, they are brave and fierce

wlien roused to ire ; otherwise, friendly and child-

like. They must have occupied the alluvial

plains of the coast in years gone by, but were

driven upward by the Chinese immigrants, Hakkas

and Haklos,*until they now dwell among almost

inaccessible heights.



What concerns us most nearly in their manner

of life, is their much venerated custom of conse-

crating any auspicious occasion by obtaining a

human head. If there is a wedding in prospect,

the young man cannot marry unless he brings in

a head, and the susceptibility of the human heart

being much the same in savagery as in civilisation,

this is a tremendous spur to head-himting. A

funeral cannot be observed without a head.

Indeed all celebrations of any importance must be

graced with it. Where a bouquet would be used

by you, a grim human head, freshly cut, is the

essential decoration at their banquet. More-

over, a man's courage is tested by the number of

heads he takes, and respect for him grows with his

achievements. Thus the gruesome objects adorn

the so-called skull-shelf, for the same reason that

lions* and stags' heads are the pride of a gentle-

man's hall. One sometimes comes across a hut,

near which is placed a tier of shelves ornamented

with heads in all stages of decay — the trophies of

some brave head-hunter !



The district where they roam is marked off by

outposts, which I shall soon describe. Like the







250 TKe Japanese Nation



"Forbidden Territory" or boma in British East

Africa, no one is allowed to enter the "Savage

Boundary" without permit from the authorities.

The importance of this decree will be obvious if I

state that its area covers more than half of the

island, and when the savages want a htad, they steal

down, hide themselves among the underbrush or

among the branches of trees, and shoot the first

unlucky man who passes by. I was told of one sav-

age who had his rifle so placed on a support that

he could shoot any person who happened to walk

past a certain fixed distance and at a certain

height. There he waited for days for somebody

to come within range ; and he succeeded in getting

a head ! With such people it is practically impos-

sible to do anything. We have made repeated

attempts to subjugate them; but so far we have

not succeeded in doing as much damage to them as

they have done to us.



During Chinese ascendency the Government

built a line of military posts, somewhat like the

irocha, of which one still sees remains in Cuba.

But after we had tried different methods, we came

at last to the use of electrically charged wire fences.

At a safe distance from savage assaults, generally

along the ridge of mountain ranges, posts about

five feet high are planted at intervals of six or seven

feet, and on them are strung four strong wires.

On each side of the fence a space of some thirty

feet or so is cleared of brush, so that any one

approaching may be detected at once. All along







Japan as Coloniser 251



the fence are block-houses, perhaps three, four or

five in a mile, guarded by armed sentinels (usually

Chinese trained as police), who are semi-volun-

teers. The most important feature of the fence

is that the lowest wire has a strong electric current

running through it. Such a wire fence stretches a

distance of some three hundred miles. It costs

thousands of dollars to keep it in order; yet every

year we extend some miles farther into the savage

district, so that their dominion is being more and

more restricted to the tops of the mountains.

When they are practically caged, we make over-

tures to them. We say, *'If you come down and

don't indulge in head-hunting, we will welcome

you as brothers," — because they are brothers.

These Malay tribes resemble the Japanese more

than they do the Chinese, and they themselves

say of the Japanese that we are their kin and

that the Chinese are their enemies. Because the

Chinese wear queues, they think that their heads

are especially made to be hunted. And now every

year, as I say, we are getting better control over

them by constantly advancing the fence, and

owing to the fact that they are in want of salt, cut

off as they are from the sea. Then we say, "We

will give you salt if you will come down and give up

your weapons.'* Thus tribe after tribe has recog-

nised our power through the instrumentality of

salt, and has submitted itself to Japanese rule.

Here I may say, to the credit of these primitive

men, that when once their promise of good be-







252 THe Japanese Nation



haviour is made, it is kept. When they submit

themselves, we build them houses, give them

agricultural tools and implements, give them

land, and let them continue their means of live-

lihood in peace.



Thus I have dwelt in a very sketchy manner

on the four points to which Li Hung-Chang, in

the conference at Shimonoseki, alluded as great

obstacles in the way of governing Formosa. What,

now, is the result? At first we could not manage

the colony with the money that we could raise in

the island ; every year we had to get some subsidy

from the national treasury. It was thought

that such a subsidy would be necessary un-

til 1 910. But by the development of Formosan

industries — the better cultivation of rice, the im-

proved production of Oolong tea, for which you

are the best customer, the control of the camphor

industry (for nearly all the camphor that you use,

if not artificial, is produced in Formosa), the suc-

cessful encouragement of cane culture, which has

increased the output of sugar sixfold in the last ten

years — by developing these industries, we can get

money enough in the island to do all the work

that is needed to be done there. An accurate

cadastral survey made landed property secure,

enhanced its value, and added indirectly to its tax-

paying capacity. The consumption tax placed on

sugar alone brings in more than one-third of the

public revenue. The growth of Formosa's foreign

trade has been such that the customs now return







Japan as Coloniser 253



no mean sum. The administration of the Island

has been so successful that it attained financial

independence two years before the expiration of

the term fixed for it.



There still remains much to be done. Irrigation

work, for instance, is being carried out on a large

scale. Then, there is the improvement of the

harbours. Both in the north, at Kelung, and in

the south, at Takao, commodious and deep har-

bours are now being constructed or improved. We

have built a railroad from one end of the island

to the other, but there is demand for further ex-

tention. Schools and hospitals are to be met with

in every village and town, but more are needed.

In all these things we think that we have succeeded

quite well, especially when we compare our colony

of Formosa with the experiments that other nations

are making.



In giving this very rough sketch, I have only

tried to show the general Hnes of policy pursued in

the development of Formosa. Though the colony

was at first thought to be a luxury, it is now a

necessity to us. And the example that we have

set for ourselves will be followed in our other

colonies.



I may say that the general principle of our colo-

nial policy in Formosa was, first of all, the defence

of the island. Much is said about our increased

navy. Some people in America think that we are

enlarging our navy prompted by a dubious motive ;

but with the acquisition of Formosa, of the island







254 THe Japanese Nation



of Saghalien, and of Korea, our coast -line has been

greatly increased, and still the augmentation of

our fleet is not sufficient for the proper defence

of all our shores.



The second principle is the protection of prop-

erty and life, and the dissemination of legal in-

stitutions — the rudimentary functions of a well

ordered state. People unaccustomed to the pro-

tection of law feel as though it were despotism.

But they will soon find that, after all, good govern-

ment and good laws are the safeguard of social

well-being, and we have to teach in Korea as well

as in Formosa, what government is and what laws

are.



You read now and then in the newspapers of

arrests in Korea, and forthwith Japan is charged

with being a cruel master. Let the world remem-

ber that a change of masters is rarely made without

friction. It takes some time for a people to know

that a jural state means enforcement of justice,

and that this does not imply encroachment upon

personal liberty, which under the old regime

Korean courtiers identified with royal favour.

Without law, no real liberty is conceivable, and

lawlessness must suffer its own consequences.



Then the third point is the protection of health.

I have spoken to you of what we have done in

Formosa. A similar policy will be pursued in

Korea. In an interview with Prince Ito in Seoul,

when I said that the population in Korea had not

increased in the last hundred years and that per-







Japan as Coloniser 255



haps the Korean race was destined to disappear,

he replied: "Well, I am not sure. I wish to see

whether good laws will increase the fecundity of

the Korean people.'*



The fourth consideration is the encouragement

of industries and means of communication. In

Formosa we have seen how much the Government

has done to improve the quality as well as the

quantity of rice, salt, camphor, and sugar. Nearly

all the improvements in these industries have

been initiated or suggested by the Government.

As to means of communication, the prefectures vie

with each other in building new roads or in making

old ones better.



The fifth point in our policy is that of educa-

tion. In Formosa we have just reached the stage

where we are taking up educational problems seri-

ously. We could not do it sooner, because our

idea was first of all to give to our new fellow-sub-

jects something that would satisfy their hunger

and thirst ; their bodies had to be nourished before

their minds. Now that economic conditions are

so much better, schools are being started in all the

villages.



These, then, are some of the broad lines of

colonial policy which we have practised with good

results in Taiwan, and which will be carried out in

Chosen. In writing of the Japanese rule in For-

mosa, Mr. MacKay, the British consul there, con-

cludes his article by expressing two doubts: one

in regard to the commingling of races, Japanese







256 TKe Japanese Nation



and Formosans; the other, in regard to the Jap-

anisation of the Formosans. He seems to doubt

whether either will take place. As far as the

Japanese are concerned, they do not trouble

themselves about these questions, any more than

do the English in their colonies. I think assimi-

lation will be found easier in Korea, for the reason

that the Korean race is very much allied to our

own. In Formosa, assimilation will be out of the

question for long years to come, and we shall not

try to force it. We put no pressure upon the

people to effect assimilation or Japanisation.. Our

idea is to provide a Japanese milieu, so to speak,

and if the Formosans adapt themselves to our

ways of their own accord, well and good. Social

usages must not be laid upon an unwilling people.

An ancient saying has it : " He who flees must not be

pursued, but he who comes must not be repulsed."

If the Formosans or the Koreans approach us in 

customs and manners, we will not repulse them. 

We will receive them with open arms and we

will hold them as our brothers; but if they do

not desire to adopt our way of living, we will not

pursue them. We leave their customs and man-

ners just as they are disposed to have them, as

long as they are law-abiding. Our principle is 

firmness in government and freedom in society.

Firmness in government is something which they

did not have before, and that is what we offer to

them. If they look upon it as they used to look

upon cx)urt intrigue and family vendetta, they







Japan as Coloniser 257



must leam at their own cost what modem nomoc-

racy means. At the same time, Japan must know

that the secret of colonial success is justice sea-

soned with mercy. Should she fail to recognise

this ancient truth, she will but add another illus-

tration of the poet's words cited at the beginning

of this chapter.



n


Japan as a Colonizer : Nitobe, Inazo : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive

Japan as a Colonizer : Nitobe, Inazo : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive



Full text of "Japan as a Colonizer"

---------------------------





JAPAN AS A COLONIZER



By Inazo Nitobe, Ph.D.



President of the First National College, and Professor in



the Imperial University, Tokyo, formerly Director of the



Bureau of Industries in the Government of Formosa

---

Published April 1, 1912

"Japan as a Colonizer" is an article from

  The Journal of Race Development, Volume 2.

With the acquisition of the small island of Formosa in 1895,

Japan joined the ranks of colonial powers. Since then she

has had the island of Saghalien by the treaty of Portsmouth

in 1905 and Korea by annexation last year. Besides these

territories she has also in her possession the small province

of Kwang-tung in the Liao Tung peninsula; and a long,

narrow strip of land along the Manchurian railroad, the

last two being leased from the Chinese.



In recounting what Japan has done as a colonizer I shall

for several reasons devote my time to a review of what Japan

has achieved in Formosa. First, because it was the first colony

and as such served the purpose of colonial education for us.

Second, because it may be called the only colony with which we

have had any experience worth speaking about. The other

colonies and possessions are so new to us that whatever

policy we may have formed for them has not yet borne any

fruit. And thirdly, because the administration of this island

of Formosa forms a precedent for the government of later

acquisitions; and also because you can infer from a descrip-

tion of our policy in Formosa what we shall do with other

possessions and colonies. To these three reasons there is

an appendix to be added — namely, because I can speak of

this colony from a long and personal connection with it,

and to me the last is the strongest and the best reason.



Now Formosa, or more properly, Tai-wan (since Formosa

is not a Chinese nor a Japanese name, being a Portuguese

appellation), was ceded to us at the termination of theChino-



347







348 INAZO NITOBE



Japanese war. When accession from China was proposed

by Japan, we were not at all sure that the suggestion would

be complied with by the authorities. But the Chinese

plenipotentiary, Li Hung Chang, took up the proposition

as though it were wise on the part of his country to be freed

from an incumbrance, and even commiserated Japan for

acquiring it. He pointed out that the island was not amen-

able to good government, that brigandage could never be

exterminated there, that the presence of head hunting tribes

was always a menace to social order, and that the climate was

not salubrious, and also that the opium habit among the

people was widely spread and extreme. The island, some-

what like Sicily, had, in the course of its history, been sub-

ject to the flags of various nations; Holland, Spain and

China ruled it at different times, and at one time Japanese

pirates had practically usurped supreme power over it.

At another time the French flag floated on its shores. Such

an instability in government is enough to demoralize any

people; but among the people themselves there were ele-

ments which put law and order to naught.



The indigenous population consists of head-hunters of

Malay descent, who live in small communities in a very low

grade of culture. The only art with which they are ac-

quainted is agriculture, and that in a very primitive style

— what the Germans name Spatencultur, not agriculture

proper but rather what Mr. Morgan, if I remember rightly,

in his Primitive Society calls a primitive form of horticulture.

They have no ploughs; they have no draft animals; this hor-

ticulture is all that they know. But these people are very

cleanly in their habits. This may be due to their Malay

instinct of frequent bathing; and they keep their cottages

perfectly clean, unlike other savages of a similar grade of

culture. The main part of the population, however, con-

sists of Chinese who have come from the continent and

settled in Formosa. They came chiefly from the opposite

shores, the province of Fukien and from the city and sur-

roundings of Canton. It seems that the Chinese emigrants

could not perpetuate their families in their new home for

any number of generations, succumbing as they did to the







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 349



direct and indirect effects of malaria, and hence the Chinese

population proper was constantly replenished by new arri-

vals from the main land. The aborigines or savages liv-

ing a primitive life, constantly driven into the forest regions

and high altitudes, did not increase in numbers; so when

Japan assumed authority in this island she found few con-

ditions that bespoke a hopeful outlook. The Chinese, repre-

senting two branches of their race totally different in char-

acter and in their dialects — their dialect being unintelligible

one to the other — occupied the coast and the plains and were

chiefly engaged in agricultural pursuits. They had a few

fortified cities and towns among them; Tainan and Taihoku,

with a population of about 40,000 were the most important.



The peaceful Chinese inhabitants were constantly exposed to

depredations of the brigands. In fact, a great many villages,

besides paying taxes to the government, had to make regular

but secret tribute to the brigand for immunity from spolia-

tion. But this is nothing peculiar to Formosa. When I was in

Manchuria I found just the same thing there. Perhaps my

friend, Professor Iyenaga, described to you in his speech

this morning the brigandage in Manchuria. When I was

there a few years ago I found that the mounted bandits

often threatened the caravans which carried merchandise

and silver ingots. The government could do nothing with

them and so the caravans formed a kind of league, a kind

of guild; and then the brigands also formed a kind of guild,

and both the caravan guild and the brigand guild would

send their representatives to meet somewhere; and the cara-

van representative would offer to pay something and say,

"Now, we will pay you so many thousands of dollars a year,

if you promise to spare our caravans," and the brigands

would say, "All right. If you carry such and such a flag

we will not attack your caravans, but we will attack other

caravans that do not pay us." Thus without any action

on the part of the government there is peace procured

between the brigands and the caravans.



It is the same with the beggars; in Mukden I saw a num-

ber of wretched looking creatures begging from house to

house. These paupers form a very strong body; they have







350 INAZO NITOBE



a delegate of their own. A number of them will stand in

front of a store and of course no one will go into such a store

guarded by beggars, and that store loses trade. So a num-

ber of these stores get together, form a guild and send a dele-

gate to the guild of the beggars and say," Please don't stand

in front of our stores." Between them the two delegates

settle the matter for a certain sum of money. So it was with

these Formosans, in their dealings with the bandits. They

paid tribute, so many dollars or so many head of cattle a

year. Still the agriculturists who had their farms away

from the villages, even though they were free from brigand-

age, were exposed to the attacks of head-hunters who would

steal unawares from their haunts among the mountains to

shoot anybody. I must make a digression and state that

these head-hunters are very partial to Chinese heads; they

say that they are easier to cut, being shaved in the back.

Well, these head-hunters had a custom among them accord-

ing to which young men must secure some head as a trophy

without which they could not obtain recognition for bravery

or celebrate any feast among their tribes. Hence the For-

mosan people had never known the meaning of a quiet,

peaceful society or of a stable government. They had

never known the security of property or of life. Successive

administrations had, none of them, been able to assure them

of these elementary duties of government. With a people

brought up under these circumstances, patriotism was a

thing entirely unknown.



In accordance with the stipulation of the treaty of Shi-

monoseki, one of our generals, Count Kabayama, was dis-

patched as governor-general of Formosa. In that capacity

he was about to land at the island with a large army; when

he was met by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the port of

Kelung, and in an interview which took place on board of

the steamer Yokohama Maru, the 17th of April, 1895, it

was arranged that a landing should be effected without

opposition. This marked the first landing of our troops since

the acquisition of the island of Formosa by the Japanese.

There were at that time some Imperial Chinese soldiers still

remaining on the island, but on hearing of its cession to







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 351



Japan they were required to disarm and leave the country.

Many did so, but a few remained to oppose our army; and

then also there were a few patriots who did not feel ready to

accept our terms, not ready to accept an alien rule — and

these either left the island or took up arms against us.



Since there was now no government, some of the so-called

patriots proclaimed a republic, one of the very few republics,

(I say one of the very few because this is not the only case

a — we had a similar instance in Japan), that were started in

Asia. Mr. Tang was elected president and the republic of

Formosa lasted three or four months, leaving behind nothing

but some post-stamps valuable for collectors. At this time

the professional brigands took this opportunity of general

disturbance to ply their trade. I dare say the peaceful

inhabitants of the island suffered more from the hands of

their own countrymen, that is, largely from Chinese troops

and brigands, than they did from us. Evidence of this lies

in the fact that several towns received our army with open

arms as a deliverer from robbery and slaughter.



Though the island was pacified no one knew what was to

happen next. We did not understand the character of the

people. Very few Japanese could speak Formosan and

fewer Formosans could speak Japanese. There was natur-

ally mutual distrust and suspicion. The bandits abounded

everywhere. Under these conditions military rule was the

only form of government that could be adopted until better

assurance could be obtained of the disposition of the people.

For this purpose it was calculated that some ten million yen,

I may say five million dollars, was yearly needed for the paci-

fication and government of Formosa. Out of this necessary

sum only three million yen could be obtained by taxation,

according to the old regime. The balance had to be defrayed

by the central, that is by the Japanese, government. Now

an annual expenditure of six or seven million yen in those

years, to be spent in an island away from home, with no

immediate prospect of return, was by no means an easy

task for the rather limited finance of Japan. You know how

land values are rising everywhere. Even in Africa, England

had to pay very much more than she had expected in getting







352 INAZO NITOBE



land in the south; and I think Italy has by this time found

Tripoli rather more expensive than she had calulated at

first. A colony that looks at a distance like the goose that

lays the golden egg, on nearer approach and especially

when you have to pay the bills, often proves to be a white

elephant. So with us impatient people who had expected

great things and great benefits to come from Formosa,

began to call for more frugality and some of the very best

publicists went even so far as to propose that the island of

Formosa should be sold back to China or even to some other

power. In the course of some thirty months, two years and

a half, no less than three times were governors changed.



The first governor general was Count Kabayama, known

as a hero of the Chino- Japanese war; the second was no less

a man than Prince Katsura, now of some international fame

as the prime minister of Japan for many years; and the third

was General Nogi. Finding that the country could ill afford

such a luxury as a colony, the parliament of Japan cut down

its subsidy of six or seven million yen from the national

treasury by about one-third, thus reducing the subsidy from

six or seven million to only four million. Now who would

accept a position held by a man as Nogi, but now reduced

financially to two-thirds of its former prestige and power?

Only a man of unbounded resources, of keen perception and

quick decision, not a second or a third-rate man, would

accept such a place; and Japan is forever to be congratulated

on finding the right man at the right time for the right place,

Viscount Kodama, who, as a member of the General Staff, had

made a study of the Formosan problem and was ready to accept

the governorship and to see if he could put to rights the bank-

rupt housekeeping of the colony. I am afraid that the name

so well known among us is perhaps very much less known in

this country. Kodama is a name which is cherished by

our people with love and respect. Perhaps you can best

remember his name if I tell you that he was the real brains

of the Russo-Japanese war. It was he who actually directed

the whole Japanese army in the war with Russia.



In accepting the governorship of Formosa he was particu-

larly fortunate in the selection of his lieutenant, his assist-







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 353



ant, the civil governor; he made the discovery, as he called

it, of a man who proved himself his right hand, and who

actually came far above his most sanguine expectations.

I mean Baron Goto, one of the rising statesmen of modern

Japan. Baron Goto in the last cabinet held the position of

Minister of Communications and was President of the

Bailway Board. Until Baron Goto was made civil governor

of Formosa under Kodama he had been known as an expert

on hygiene, having been a medical doctor. The advent of

these two men in Formosa marked a new era in our colonial

administration. Upon entering their new post of duty early

in 1898, the first thing they did was the practical suspension

of military rule; at least it was made subservient to civil

administration. Military rule is apt to become harsh and

to the Chinese especially, who are not accustomed to respect

the army, it is doubly harsh.



Next, Kodama and Goto, to whom English colonial ser-

vice was an inspiring example, surprised the official world

by a summary discharge of over one thousand public ser-

vants of high and low degrees, and collected about them men

known and tried for their knowledge and integrity. They

used to say often and often, "It is the man who rules and

not red tape." In an old and well settled country "red tape"

may be convenient, but in a new colony great latitude of

power and initiative must be left to responsible men. I

emphasize this point because these men, I mean the gover-

nor general and the civil governor, attributed their success

largely to the selection and use of right men.



Brigandage was still rampant when Kodama went to

Formosa, and with military rule in abeyance there was some

likelihood of its growing worse. To offset this, the constabu-

lary department was organized and made efficient by proper

care in choosing men for the police and by educating them in

the language, and in the rudiments of law and industries, for

their arduous tasks. Exceedingly arduous were their call-

ings, since these policemen were required not only to repre-

sent law and order but they were expected to be teachers.

They kept account, for instance, of every man, and they

watched over every man and woman who smoked opium;







354 INAZO NITOBB



they had to be acquainted with children of school age and

know which children went to school and which did not.

Moreover, they were required to teach the parents the rudi-

ments of entomology. I do not know how policemen in

this country are educated; but I think they are better edu-

cated, though perhaps not in entomology and hygiene. But

our Formosan police were expected to teach the people how

to take care of themselves, and especially about pests, about

disinfection, and about lots of other things that would

scarcely be required of any policeman in any other part of

the world. Moreover these policemen were required to live

in a village where there were no Japanese, just a purely

Formosan village, alone or sometimes with their wives. Of

course the policemen were required to know the language

and to speak it. Now under civil administration armies

were not mobilized against brigands, and if there was any

trouble it was the policemen who had to go and settle bri-

gandage. But the brigands were invited to subject them-

selves to law and if they surrendered their arms they were

assured not only of protection but against hunger. Not

a few leaders took the hint and were given special privileges,

so that they were assured of a future living. Those who

resisted to the end were necessarily treated as disturbers and

as criminals. Twelve years ago brigandage was so rampant

that the capital of Formosa, Taihoku, was assaulted by them ;

but in the last ten years we scarcely hear of it. I went to

Taihoku ten years ago and whenever I went a few miles

out of the city half a dozen policemen armed with rifles used

to accompany me for my protection. But in the last five or

six years a young girl can travel from one end of the island

to the other, of course excluding savage or aboriginal dis-

tricts, of which I shall speak later.



Thus what Li-Hung-Chang in the conference of Shimono-

seki said, turned out to be of no consequence. According

to him brigandage was something inherent in the social

constitution of Formosa. He said it was something that

could not be uprooted in the island; yet here is Formosa

to-day with not a trace of brigandage. That is one of the

first things which was accomplished by Japan as a colonizer.







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 355



Then another great evil in the island to which Li-Hung-

Chang alluded was the opium smoking. When the island

was taken, it was a favorite subject for discussion among

our people. Some said opium smoking must be abolished

at once by law. Others said, "No, no, let it alone; it is

something from which the Chinese cannot free themselves;

let them smoke and smoke to death." What took Baron

Goto for the first time to Formosa was the desire to study

the question of opium-smoking from a medical standpoint ;

and the plan he drew up was the gradual suppression of the

smoking habit, and the modus operandi was the control of

the production — this was to be done by the government,

because, if the government monopolizes the production and

manufacture of opium, it can restrict the quantity and also

it can improve the quality so as to make it less harmful. A

long list of all those who were addicted to this habit was

compiled, and only those who were confirmed smokers were

given permission to buy opium. People who never smoked

opium before, or children, were not allowed to buy, much

less to smoke opium, and strict surveillance was to be insti-

tuted by the policeman, who, as I mentioned before, knows

every man in the village. The annual returns made of

the confirmed smokers and of the quantity consumed in the

island show distinct and gradual decrease of opium. At

one time the number of smokers was, in round numbers,

170,000. In ten years the olders ones died off and

younger ones did not come to take their place; so there is

constant diminution. In ten years the number decreased

from 170,000 to 130,000; and now it is about 110,000. So

there is this constant annual decrease and that, we think,

is the only right way to do away with this habit. It may

interest you, perhaps, to know that American commissioners

from the Philippine Islands came to study our system.

When I met them they expressed much satisfaction and I

dare say they are going to have the same system introduced

in the Philippines, for the Chinese in these islands. Thus

the second evil which Li-Hung-Chang said was inherent to

Formosa also disappeared, or rather is fast disappearing.



There are two more obstacles which we consider are in the







356 INAZO NITOBE



way of the further development of the island of Formosa;

these are, first the mosquito and second, the savages. By

mosquitoes I mean especially the anopheles, the malaria-

bearing mosquito. Malaria is the greatest obstacle in the

way of developing the resources of the island. The Japanese

immigrants who have come suffer, I may say one-third of

them, from malaria. If I want labor and if I take with me

100 Japanese laborers to Formosa, I can count on the effi-

ciency of only 60 or 70, because one-third of the laborers

must be expected to be sick with malaria. Hygienic and

sanitary measures are vigorously enforced but this can be

done only in the larger cities. In the city or rather the

capital of Taihoku, they made a very perfect sewage system;

they tore down the old castle walls and used the stones in

making the sewage ditches, and ever since then the number

of people suffering from malaria has decreased greatly.

In fact, it is said that malaria has disappeared from the city.

Careful observations resulted in substantiating the fact that

among the mosquitoes in this city less than 1 per cent be-

longed to the dangerous species of anopheles. The rest of

the mosquitoes are harmless, that is to say, as far as malaria

is concerned. Then also, speaking of sanitation, I am

reminded of what we have done against the pest; the pest,

or the bubonic plague, was a very common disease there, but in

the last four years we hear nothing or it. By constant care

and by strict enforcement of sanitary laws is the pest now

eradicated or near eradication.



But as to the aborigines, or the savages of Formosa we cannot

say we have nearly eradicated them. They belong to the

Malay race and are fierce and brave. As I have said before,

they live in the mountains; they never live on the plains.

And when they want a head they steal down, hide them-

selves among the underbrush or among the branches of trees,

and shoot the first Chinese or Japanese that passes by. In

fact I knew of a savage who had his rifle so placed on a rock

that he could shoot any person who happened to walk past

in just a certain direction and at a certain height; and there

he waited for days and days for somebody to walk right

within his range; and he succeeded in getting a head! With







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 357



such people it is practically impossible to do anything.

In number they must be over 100,000; we cannot count them,

but we are pretty sure there are 115,000. Repeated at-

tempts we have made but we never have succeeded thus

far in doing much damage to them, though they have suc-

ceeded in doing much damage to us.



All that we can do and all that we are doing, in order to

prevent their descending from among the heights, is to

place a wire fence on the ridge of the hills. Barbed wire

was used at first, but now we use a wire fence which is not

barbed but is of ordinary wire with a strong electric current

running through it. That may sound very savage to you,

but it is the only way that we can keep them off from us.

I have been in this place and seen the fences. The wire is

strung on posts about five feet high; there are four wires with

a foot between them, and a strong electric current running

through. At first they tried their best to get over the fence,

but they have learned not to approach it. This wire fence

stretches a distance of some three hundred miles. It costs

several thousand dollars ; yet every year we build this fence

some miles further in. The next year we go another stretch,

so that their dominion will be more and more confined to the

very tops of the mountains. Of course I do not wish to give

you an impression that we are dealing harshly with them,

because we offer them their choice. We say, "If you come

down and don't indulge in head-hunting we will welcome

you as a brother," — because they are brothers. These

savages look more like Japanese than Chinese and they

themselves say of the Japanese that we Japanese are their

kin and that the Chinese are their enemies. Because the Chi-

nese wear their qeues they think that their heads are espec-

ially made to be hunted. And now every year, as I say, we

are getting a better control over them by this constant mov-

ing of the wire fence and by the salt-famine for they have no

salt since they are cut off from the sea-shore; they raise their

rice, they raise millet, they have their own animals, and so

they do not want food, but what they want badly is salt.

So we say, "We will give you salt if you will come down and

give up your arms;" and tribe after tribe has recognized our







358 INAZO NITOBE



power and has submitted itself to Japanese rule. Then

we build them houses, we give them agricultural tools and

implements, give them land, and let them continue their

own peaceful ways of livelihood.



Thus I have dwelt in a very sketchy, very unsatisfactory

way, on the four points to which Li-Hung-Chang in the con-

ference at Shimonoseki alluded as great obstacles in the way

of developing Formosa. What now is the result? At first

we could not manage a colony with the money that we could

raise in the island; every year we had to get some subsidy

from the national treasury. It was expected that such a

subsidy was necessary until 1910. But by the development

of Formosan industries, especially of rice and of tea, (of

Oolong tea, for which you are the best customer, because

Oolong tea is made chiefly for American export), by develop-

ing the camphor industry (because all the camphor that you

use, if not artificial, is produced in Formosa) ; by developing

sugar, the production of which was increased five-fold in the

last ten years (a tremendous increase for any country in

any industry) — by developing these industries, we can get

money enough in the island to do all the work that is needed

to be done there. By this I mean that irrigation work,

for instance, is now being carried out on a large scale. Then

there is the improvement of the harbors; both in the north,

at Kelung, and in the south, at Takao, commodious and deep

harbors are now being constructed or improved. "We have

built a railroad from one end of the island to the other.

Schools and hospitals are now to be met with in every vil-

lage and town. Then the police attend to the health, to the

industries, and to the education of the people. In all these

things we think that we have succeeded quite well, especially

when we compare our colony of Formosa with the experi-

ments that other nations are making. We often speak of

English colonies as being models; we speak of French colo-

nies as examples not to be followed ; and we are looking to

your experiment in the Philippines to find what it will

amount to. Comparing our Formosa with the colonies of

these different powers, we have good reason to congratulate

ourselves.







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 359



I have made a very rough, sketchy address this afternoon.

I have only tried to show what were the general lines of

policy pursued in the development of Formosa. We have

been successful. A colony was at first thought to be a

luxury, but now Formosa is to us a necessity. The example

that we set there in that island will be followed in other

colonies of ours. I may say that the general lines of the

colonial policy of Formosa were first of all, the defense of

the island. So much is said about our increased navy,

some people in this country think that we are increasing

our navy in order to attack San Francisco or Manila; but

with the acquisition of Formosa, of the island of Saghalien,

and of Korea, our coast line has increased immensely and yet

our increased navy is not sufficient for the proper defence

of all the coast lines that we have, for the first great object

in the colonial policy of Formosa, and I may say of Japan, is

the defence of the new territory.



The second is the protection of property and life, and the

dissemination of legal institutions. People unaccustomed

to the protection of law feel as though it were despotism.

But they will soon find out that, after all, good government

and good laws are the safeguard of life and property, and we

have to teach in Korea as well as in Formosa what govern-

ment and what laws are.



Then the third point is the protection of health. I have

spoken to you of what we have done in Formosa; similar

lines of policy will be pursued in Korea. When I saw Prince

Ito in Seoul and when I told him that the population in

Korea had not increased in the last hundred years and that

perhaps the Korean race was destined to disappear, he said,

"Well, I am not sure. I wish to see whether good laws will

increase the fecundity of the Korean people." In Formosa

it was a very well known fact that without new recruits

coming from the mainland of China the population would

diminish. There were more deaths than births. But since

we assumed sovereignty there annual returns show a gradual

increase of births over deaths; hence, as I said, the third

great point in the colonial policy of Japan is the protection of

health.







360 INAZO NITOBE



The fourth is the encouragement of industries. In For-

mosa the government has done much to improve the quality

as well as the quantity of rice, and to improve irrigation.

The improvements in the sugar industry which have been

made were suggested by the government. When the work

was started ten years ago we got sixty tons of cuttings from

Hawaii; and we have about twenty mills, the machinery

being imported from Germany, England and Hawaii. The

experiments in the manufacture of sugar were also made by

the government and when the experiments resulted in im-

provement, this was told to the people; experts were sent

out to the different villages, preaching the advantages of

better culture. So with other branches of industry. The

government is constantly encouraging the people to make

improvements.



And then the fifth policy is that of education. In For-

mosa we have just reached the stage when we are taking

up education seriously. We could not do it before this,

because our idea was first of all to give to those new people

something which will satisfy their hunger and thirst; their

bodies must be nourished before their minds. And now that

the economic condition has improved in the last year or two,

schools are being started in all the villages.



These broad lines of colonial policy which we have prac-

tised with good results in Formosa, will be transferred in

Korea. We do not trouble ourselves about the question of

assimilation. In the last number of the Journal of Race

Development published by this University, I read an article

by Mr. MacKay, British consul in Formosa. He concludes

his article by expressing two doubts, namely: one in regard

to the commingling of races, that is, Chinese and Formosans;

and second, in regard to the Japanization of the Formosans.

He doubts whether either will take place. Well, as far as the

Japanese are concerned, we do not trouble ourselves about

these questions. I think assimilation will be found easier

in Korea because the Korean race is very much allied to

our own. In Formosa, assimilation will be out of the ques-

tion for long years to come and we shall not try toforceit. The

idea is that we put no pressure upon them, with the object of







JAPAN AS A COLONIZER 361



assimilation or Japanization in view. Our idea is to pro-

vide a Japanese milieu, so to speak, and if people come and

if they assimilate themselves, well and good. We have a

proverb in Japan which says, "He who flees is not pursued,

but he who comes is not repulsed." If the Formosans or the

Koreans come to us, we will not repulse them. We will

take them with open arms and we will hold them as our

brothers, but we will not pursue them. We leave their

customs and manners just as they like to have them. Our

principle is firm government and free society. Firmness in

government is something which they did not have before,

and that is what we offer to them.



And therefore I beg of Americans who are interested in the

development of Japan as a colonial power, not to be misled

by reports which now and then appear in different peri-

odicals and newspapers by critics of all nationalities and

of all countries. I have often read articles written by

foreign critics who speak of our administration in Korea

as a failure. A well educated man, an American, wrote

that in Formosa the people are very much opposed to the

Japanese government, are very much dissatisfied with it.

If I were to go among the farmers in the west of this country

and ask, "Are you satisfied with Mr. Taft's administra-

tion?" they would say "Yes, we are." But if I were to

press the question. "Do you think there is something to

improve?" "Of course," the farmers will say, "I do not

think Mr. Taft's administration is perfect." Well, I may

note down in my book that the American people are dissat-

isfied with Mr. Taft and may rise against him at any mo-

ment. Such a rumor you may hear from time to time in

any newspaper about any country; but as our adage has

it — "Proof is stronger than argument;" and I have given

but a few proofs, though, if time allowed, I could give

more.

---