2018/09/02
Why Stoicism Is Having a Cultural Moment
Why Stoicism Is Having a Cultural Moment
Why Stoicism Is Having a Cultural Moment
Stoicism is apparently popular again — at least, that’s how it appears, given the spate of recent popular books, articles and events on the topic. There’s Julie Beck’s essay from The Atlantic on the benefits of thinking about death like a Stoic, Oliver Burkeman’s book on the “negative path” to happiness that includes a chapter entitled “What Would Seneca Do?”, and, perhaps most notably, an article that appeared in the New York Times, which created a sensation and which the author, Massimo Pigliucci, is now developing into a book. There are also Stoic meet-ups occurring in cities all over the world; the New Stoa, an online community of modern Stoics who offer courses and publish a magazine; a blog called Stoicism Today; and “Stoic Week”, a yearly social event/science experiment, in which participants live according to Stoic principles and submit data about their experiences to be analyzed for changes in quality of life.
The level of enthusiasm this philosophical revival has produced for an ancient belief system is surprising but also inspiring. These manifestos and popular expressions don’t just celebrate an academic engagement with Stoicism; they advocate using it as a practical tool in our everyday lives. They are a far cry from the criticisms of Stoicism as a cold, harsh school of thought, where suppression of emotion and a Vulcan-style detachment from the world is paramount. And yet, all this positive press made me wonder: what exactly is Stoicism’s appeal for us moderns? What’s behind the desire to rehabilitate a way of life once championed by hard-bodied soldiers and toga-clad politicians? Why is being a Stoic so cool right now?
The self-help trends of mindfulness and gratitude
Anyone even glancingly aware of the world of self-help cannot have failed to notice that the practice of mindfulness, or “living in the moment while calmly acknowledging and accepting one’s feelings, thoughts, and bodily sensations”, is all the rage these days. Celebrities, tech gurus, and sports stars are publicly swearing by “getting centered”, “being fully present” and “unplugging” through practices such as meditation, yoga, or even visualizing a dot for sixty seconds.
Most practitioners of mindfulness understand its origins to lie in the Eastern spiritual traditions of Buddhism and Hinduism; however, the Western world also had a longstanding tradition of mindfulness. That tradition is Stoicism.
Ancient Stoics were all about living in the moment, a goal achieved by cultivating self-control and self-awareness through meditative practices, though not necessarily of the om-chanting variety. They “thought about thinking” by considering their emotions from a rational perspective, reflecting on the ethics of their decisions, and constantly reminding themselves that while they had no power over what happened in life, they did have power over their responses to it. The slave-turned-philosopher Epictetus summed up this idea in his Stoic handbook, the Enchiridion: “Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views they take of them” (5). His advice? “Don’t expect that events to turn out the way you want, but wish them to happen as they do happen, and you will get on well” (8).
Today’s mantras of mindfulness sound strikingly similar to those of Epictetus, and many activities that Stoics undertook to achieve equanimity are similar too. Take, for example, the premeditatio malorum, a methodical visualization of the worst-case-scenario for any situation. Here’s how Seneca describes it: “We need to reflect upon every possibility and to fortify ourselves against whatever hardships may come about. Run through (meditare) them in your mind: exile, torture, war, shipwreck” (91.7–8). He goes on to explain how, if we do this regularly, we can minimize our fear of life’s misfortunes and prepare to face them. The extreme version of this practice is, of course, imagining our own or a loved one’s death. So Marcus Aurelius exhorts us to “Think of yourself as dead. You have lived your life. Now take what’s left and live it properly” (7.56).
Part of the premeditatio’s charm for us is that it exposes the limitations of purely positive thinking, which was one of the last big self-help trends (remember the book The Secret?), by turning it on its head. For the intelligent and sophisticated among us, it’s not enough to hope and wish for the best. To find success and contentment, we instead must grapple with all possible outcomes, especially the bad ones. (This tendency likely explains the growing popularity, especially in the business world, of a variation on the premeditatio — the project premortem.) The practice of premeditatiooffers us an efficient way to generate not only a deep state of mindfulness, but a keen sense of gratitude as well.
Gratitude is another big trend in self-help, where it’s often envisioned as the result and benefit of mindfulness. People are advised to keep gratitude journals, give compliments, and do volunteer work, all to increase their feelings of appreciation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, cultivating gratitude was also important to the Stoics, and the link between it and mindfulness was not lost on them. (One need only look to the first book of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations — history’s first self-improvement journal? — where he thanks his family, friends and teachers for all they’ve done for him.)
To enhance their sense of gratitude, ancient Stoics also utilized practical techniques, such as voluntary discomfort (cold showers, foregoing sweets, et cetera). Or they would deliberately engage with what they called “externals” or “indifferents”, such as money, fame or even good health (which are desirable but not necessary), only to remind themselves that all they really needed to have a good life was virtue. These exercises in reverse psychology are more extreme than journaling or volunteering, but the same spirit and the same goal — achieving eudaimonia, or happiness with one’s lot in life — informs both the ancient and modern practices of gratitude.
For both Stoic philosophers and modern mindfulness advocates, it’s not enough to endure life’s ups and downs; we should appreciate and enjoy all that it brings. Seneca encapsulates the sentiment well in his essay On the Happy Life: “The happy man is content with his present lot, no matter what it is, and is reconciled to his circumstances; the happy man…allows reason to fix the value of every condition of existence” (7.6). Ancient Stoicism may seem far removed from us in time and space. But Seneca’s words, which echo those of modern-day gurus like Deepak Chopra and Eckhart Tolle, clearly demonstrate that when it comes to helping ourselves, Stoicism’s aims and message may be more resonant than ever.
The rise of the New Atheism movement
Since the early 2000s, a number of outspoken critics of traditional religion have received a great deal of media attention. The rapid rise of these “New Atheists” reflects a broader trend of growing disenchantment with organized religion. Many people are sympathetic to New Atheist critiques of religion as dogmatic, outmoded, politicized, and violent; they’re also compelled by the efforts of New Atheists to use scientific inquiry as a means of debunking religious beliefs. Much ink has been spilled lately, for example, trying to disprove God’s existence through scientific methods and logical arguments (see the work of Richard Dawkins and Victor Stenger).
These efforts have inspired people at all points on the skepticism spectrum to search out systems of belief that lack the ideological baggage of the world’s dominant religions. And in their search for a new life stance, one place they quickly end up is secular humanism, which, according to the International Humanist and Ethical Union, “stands for the building of a more humane society through an ethics based on human and other natural values in a spirit of reason and free inquiry through human capabilities.” Those who dig deeper into the history of humanism soon find themselves standing on Stoicism’s stoop, since much of what humanism champions — rationality, freedom, virtue, naturalism — serves as the foundational principles of ancient Stoic philosophy as well.
To people who are leaving behind organized religion, Stoicism’s emphasis on reason as the law (or logos) that shapes and guides the universe is refreshingly simple. (It may also explain why you’re constantly hearing the phrase “Everything happens for a reason” uttered by everyone from your mom to Barack Obama.) Ancient Stoics believed that, as part and parcel of the universe, we humans have our share of reason within as well (see Marcus Aurelius, Medit. 7.9; Musonius Rufus, Frag. 38). And by using our reason to guide us, we can understand the nature of reality and perceive the truth. Amazingly, this is all that’s required to be a good person and live an ethically correct life. So Seneca says, “Virtue is nothing else than right reason” (Ep. 66.32). Right reason is the path to contentment: “If you accomplish the task before you, following right reason with diligence, energy and patience…if you can hold to this, without fear or expectation, and find fulfillment in what you’re doing now… you will live a happy life” (Marcus Aurelius, Medit. 3.12).
That being reasonable is all that’s required for a good and happy life is a very freeing concept for those who have attempted to live according to the arcane rules and odd prohibitions of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam — and for those who just aren’t sure what to believe. You don’t have to have all the answers; you just have to think rationally and do what’s right. That’s what Epictetus recommends: “Isn’t it enough to know the nature of good and evil, the limits of desire and aversion…and to use these as rules to administer the affairs of life, without troubling ourselves about things above us? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind” (Frag. 7.175).
The Stoics’ acceptance of both our capacity to live rightly and our inability to understand all also underlies their theology, including their conception of God. As a philosophy that evolved over time, there is no fixed dogma or text that defines “Stoic belief” on this topic. (Of course, many Stoic beliefs, including that of a unitary god with multiple aspects, were absorbed into Christian doctrine. This makes them strangely familiar to us and may also, ironically, make them all the more appealing too.) However, for most ancient Stoics, God, or more appropriately, Zeus, certainly did exist. He was a singular entity, equivalent with Reason, which encompasses and directs all of Nature or the Universe for a purpose.
Some Stoics were devout worshippers of this god: see, for example, Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus or Epictetus’ famous declaration, “If I were a nightingale I should sing as a nightingale, if a swan, as a swan: but as I am a rational creature I must sing to God” (Discourses, 1.16). Others were less certain about the nature of the divine. The debate continues to this dayamong modern philosophers, but almost all Stoics seem to agree that in the end what you think you know about God doesn’t really matter — you still can and should pursue the good and live virtuously. As Marcus Aurelius puts it, “Things are either isolated units [atoms], or they form one inseparable whole. If that whole be God, then all is well; but if aimless chance, at least you need not be aimless also” (9.28).
This flexible agnosticism is another attractive feature of Stoicism for modern adherents. You can retain the spiritual elements of the philosophy while remaining outside the confines of proper religion, or you can adapt it to suit even the most die-hard non-believers, all while maintaining its integrity as a belief system. Pigliucci nicely sums up the allure of this “best-of-both-worlds” quality in his NYT essay: “There is something very appealing for me as a non-religious person in the idea of an ecumenical philosophy, one that can share goals and at the least some general attitudes with other major ethical traditions across the world.”
Stoicism offers its modern-day devotees a sort of New Atheism “lite”, seemingly untainted by the clashes that define contemporary religious (or anti-religious) thought. It doesn’t demand adherence to an all-or-nothing view of God, or project a sense of self-righteous certainty about matters that are beyond our control (or understanding), even as it champions goodness and reason. This calm yet confident focus on being our best selves, no matter who or what rules the cosmos, may be what’s drawing so many people toward the Stoic way of life.
The similarities between now and then
Stoicism is a philosophy that, in the words of Kare Anderson, was “built for hard times.” It emerged in the early 3rd century BCE in Athens, after the premature death of Alexander the Great left the eastern Mediterranean in disarray. The political and social upheaval of the times made many people anxious about their place in the world: migration became necessary for survival and the independent power of the polis to define its inhabitants’ identity went largely by the wayside. In its place came rule by inefficient and often corrupt kingdoms. Rapid and arbitrary change became the new normal during this era.
This chaotic period in history shares quite a lot with the current one: think legislative intransigence, the Great Recession, climate change, income inequality, the war on terror, and the widespread displacement of peoples all over the globe. Living in such a volatile world has compelled individuals to seek out a path to inner tranquility, just as they did in the early Hellenistic period. Now as then, Stoicism offers them a promising route. In unpredictable times, it makes sense to rely on ourselves and find strength in our individual autonomy. Deciding to act with reason and virtue is something the turmoil of the outside world cannot change. As Seneca points out, “If you really want to escape the things that harass you, what you need is not to be in a different place but to be a different person” (Ep. 104.8).
And yet, Stoicism doesn’t advocate a retreat into a self-absorbed world of one’s own — quite the opposite. Ancient Stoics believed that a major component of virtue was serving other human beings and recognizing our common humanity. In fact, it was the Stoics who first made popular the concept of cosmopolitanism, and encouraged people to see themselves as “world citizens”, not defined by location, class, or religion: “Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world” (Epictetus, Discourses1.9). By concentrating on the similarities between us, we can succeed not only at living in accordance with nature, but also at creating a new, expansive sense of community that transcends local differences.
Ancient Stoics also used the concept of oikeiosis to understand ethical duties and relationships with others in communal terms. Oikeiosis derives from the Greek word for “home” or “family” and essentially means “having a natural attachment to what is familiar” or “viewing something as belonging to oneself.” Stoicism encourages us to extend our sense of affinity and concern outward, from our selves, to our family, to our fellow citizens, to all people — to zoom out, as it were, and to collapse the distinctions between yourself and others. It also gives perspective on just how insignificant you are in the grand scheme of things. The philosopher Hierocles created a way of visualizing this idea of duty radiating outward in the form of concentric circles, while Marcus Aurelius simplifies the concept: “Whatever happens to you is for the good of the world. That would be enough right there. But if you look closely you’ll generally notice something else too: whatever happens to a single person is for the good of others” (6.45).
Seeing the world in this light — as one big family or commonwealth where whatever happens to the most distant person is also important to our own lives — fosters our empathy toward each other. Perhaps more importantly, it promotes a sense of justice that transcends our own self-interest. This justice ideally pertains to all members of society and aims to set us in harmony with one another. It compels Seneca to reminds his friend Lucilius that slaves are really “our fellow-slaves, if one reflects that Fortune has as much power over us as over them” (Ep. 47.1). For the Stoics, recognizing our equality as humans brings social harmony — a necessity if we want to live rightly and find true fulfillment.
The value for our globalized society of thinking and acting in a manner that emphasizes our similarities and increases our capacity for compassion and justice can hardly be overstated. Solving the problem of climate change, for example, will undoubtedly require us to draw upon and develop these qualities further than ever before. And yet, it seems to many that as a society we are only growing more fractured and detached from one another, focusing on our divergent political views, or our racial and religious differences, or our distinct lifestyle choices (all this notwithstanding our ubiquitous connectedness via the internet).
“Doing as the Stoics did” provides moderns with a means to combat this trend; it also reflects a desire to restore simplicity and fairness to our current code of human ethics. And while a nostalgic fantasy about the unerring “wisdom of the ancients” may underlie this desire, it may be that turning back to this old school of thought is actually a sensible step in our efforts to move forward: “If you can see the road, follow it. Cheerfully, without turning back. If not, hold up and get the best advice you can. If anything gets in the way, keep moving forward, making good use of what you have on hand, and sticking to what seems right” (Marcus Aurelius, Medit. 10.12). If this approach worked for past practitioners of Stoicism, why can’t it work for us?
This post originally appeared on Eidolon.
Modern Stoicism - Wikipedia
Modern Stoicism - Wikipedia
Modern Stoicism
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Modern Stoicism is an intellectual and popular movement in the late 20th and early 21st century which attempts to revive the Stoic philosophy in the modern setting. It is not to be confused with Neostoicism, an analogous phenomenon in the 17th century. The term "Modern Stoicism" covers both the revival of interest in the Stoic philosophy and the philosophical efforts to adjust Ancient Stoicism to the language and conceptual framework of the present. 'The rise of Modern Stoicism' has received attention in the international media since around November 2012 when the first Annual Stoic Week event was organized.[1]
Contents
1Background
1.1Philosophically
1.2Psychology and psychotherapy
1.3As a popular movement
2Key concepts
2.1Problems with the appeal to nature
2.2Following nature as following the facts
2.3Virtue, agency, happiness
2.4Degrees of virtue
2.5Aspirations for universality
2.6Stoicism versus Aristotle
2.7Dichotomy of control
2.8The question of ascesis and renunciation
3Notable books
4See also
5References
6External links
Background[edit]
Philosophically[edit]
Modern Stoicism has developed in the context of the 20th-century surge of interest in virtue ethics in general. "The [...] work by philosophers like Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Martha Nussbaum, among others, have brought back virtue ethics as a viable alternative to the dominant Kantian-deontological and utilitarian-consequentialist approaches."[2]Modern Stoicism draws a lot from the late 20th and early 21st century spike in publications of scholarly works on ancient Stoics. Beyond that, “the Modern Stoicism movement traces its roots to the work of Dr Albert Ellis, who developed Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy,[3] as well as Aaron T. Beck,[4] who is regarded by many as the father to early versions of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. Victor Frankl also found stoicism useful in assisting him during the war, he later developed his theory known as Logotherapy [2]
One major premise of Modern Stoicism can be expressed as, in Lawrence Becker's words, "it is interesting to try to imagine what might have happened if Stoicism had had a continuous twenty-three-hundred-year history; if Stoics had had to confront Bacon and Descartes, Newton and Locke, Hobbes and Bentham, Hume and Kant, Darwin and Marx."[5]Or, as Massimo Pigliucci puts it more concisely, "it is worth considering what it means to 'be a Stoic' in the 21st century."[6]
The first major modern work that spelled out the key premises of Modern Stoicism is, arguably, A New Stoicism[5] by Lawrence Becker, first published in 1997.[2] For other important books, see the notable books section below.
Psychology and psychotherapy[edit]
Stoic philosophy was the original philosophical inspiration for modern cognitive psychotherapy, particularly as mediated by Dr Albert Ellis' Rational-Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), the major precursor of CBT. The original cognitive therapy treatment manual for depression by Aaron T. Beck et al. states, "The philosophical origins of cognitive therapy can be traced back to the Stoic philosophers".[7] A well-known quotation from The Handbook of Epictetus was taught to most clients during the initial session of traditional REBT by Ellis and his followers: "It's not the events that upset us, but our judgments about the events." This subsequently became a common element in the "socialization" phase of many other approaches to CBT. The question of Stoicism's influence on modern psychotherapy, particularly REBT and CBT, was described in detail in The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy(2010) by Donald Robertson.[8] Moreover, several early 20th century psychotherapists were influenced by stoicism, most notably the "rational persuasion" school founded by the Swiss neurologist and psychotherapist Paul DuBois, who drew heavily on Stoicism in his clinical work and encouraged his clients to study passages from Seneca as homework assignments.
As a popular movement[edit]
It is characteristic of the Modern Stoicism movement that it is global and that it relies heavily on the social media and online communities. As E.O. Scott puts it "Modern Stoicism is really a “Web 2.0” phenomenon."[9]One of the key sites is the Modern Stoicism website, which harbors the Stoicism Today blog and hosts the Annual Stoic Week (online) and Stoicon (offline) events.[10] Another important place is the New Stoa, which was founded in May 1996 and is arguably the first lasting stoic community on the internet. Three key podcasts talking about Stoicism applied to modern thought are the Stoic Solutions Podcast hosted by Justin Vacula[11], The Practical Stoic Podcast hosted by Simon Drew [12]and Steve Karafit's The Sunday Stoic [13]
There are also a number of personal blogs exploring stoicism, some of them run by notable stoic scholars (e.g. Massimo Pigliucci, William Irvine or John Sellars) and some by therapists who explore stoic applications (e.g. Donald Robertson). In addition, articles on Stoicism have appeared on popular websites.[14][15] In E.O.Scott's words, "[the] potent combination of social media and a few highly publicized books and articles [...] has recently launched stoicism on an exponential growth curve."[9] There is a variety of stoic meetups and groups based in places like Australia, Denver, Dublin, Edinburgh, Fremont, Helsinki, London, Manchester, Milwaukee, New York, Orlando, San Francisco, Toronto and Warsaw - amongst others. According to E.O.Scott, "arguably the most important and influential gathering place for Modern Stoics [online]"[9] is the "stoicism group" on Facebook of ~27 000 people (as of July 19, 2017). The analogous Reddit group has amassed ~96 400 users (as of June 11, 2018). Beyond the Anglophone there is the “Sztuka życia według stoików” site run by Piotr Stankiewicz, "Stoicyzm Uliczny" run by Marcin Fabjański and Centrum Praktyki Stoickiej run by Tomasz Mazur and others.
Applications of Modern Stoicism are reported across industries. According to "Forbes," Modern Stoic thought "hold[s] fascinating promise for business and government leaders tackling global problems in a turbulent, post-recession slump."[16] However, two Stoic academics, Kai Whiting and Leonidas Konstantakos, have warned against using "life-hack Stoicism" or "Silicon Valley Stoicism", as the primary means of understanding Stoic philosophy[17]. Subsequently, they discussed on a popular Stoic blog, Stoicism's role in advocating for change in society, including when it comes to standing against gender-based discrimination in the workplace [18].
Similarities of Modern Stoicism and Third Wave CBT have been suggested as well, and its potency in treating depression has been studied.[19] There has also been interest in applying the tenets of Ancient Stoicism to the human origin story [20] and the modern challenges of sustainable development, material consumption and consumerism. [21]
Key concepts[edit]
Problems with the appeal to nature[edit]
Presumably, the single most difficult challenge that Modern Stoicism faces is its relationship to the core principle of Ancient Stoicism, that is to the principle of “following nature.” In a word, the Ancient Stoics put forward it was unquestionable that in order to live a good life, one needed to live consistently with nature. According to the Ancient Stoics, nature was by definition good and everything which was conformable to nature was deemed good. Moreover, the Ancient Stoics had a teleological outlook on the world, that is, they held that everything in the universe was purposefully and rationally organized to a good end.
However, this view is much more difficult to uphold in the present day. As Becker puts it, “science presented significant challenges to our [Stoic] metaphysical views.”[5]:3 The notion of the rational organization of the world seems much more doubtful in the 21st century than it, presumably, was two millennia ago. “When we face the universe,” Becker writes, “we confront its indifference to us and our own insignificance to it. It takes no apparent notice of us, has no role other than Extra for us to play, no aim for us to follow.”[5]:11 Even more pressing questions are raised when we face our own human realm, with the long and still expanding record of genocide and atrocity and the manslaughter that followed. These are major challenges for the ancient Stoic view of the world as a rational and essentially good being.
We happen upon an analogous problem if we narrow down our interest to human nature (as contrasted to the nature of the universe as a whole). In other words, the idea of “following our human nature” also raises serious questions. As Becker describes it, “it is ‘natural’ to find these [defining] traits in human character and conduct, but it is equally natural to find a significant number of exceptions. As a result, none of these characteristics fits into the most familiar forms of ethical argument from human nature, e.g. (a) that humans are by nature X, and that Y is contrary to X, hence, that Y is contrary to human nature; or (b) that X is what defines the unique function (the essence) of a human being, thus to flourish as a human being is to excel at X."[5] In this vein, “following human nature” yields no specific guidelines for conduct either. All told, this is one of the central problems for Modern Stoicism: that in the 21st century it is far more difficult to ground our ethical framework in “nature,” be it universal, cosmic nature, or to special human nature.
Following nature as following the facts[edit]
Becker acknowledges this problem and even goes to the point of asserting that “stoic ethics would be much better off without its ‘follow nature’ slogan."[5] Yet, he reflects that the stoics are, “however, too deeply branded with it to renounce it now. The best we can do is reinterpret it.”[5]
The reinterpretation he proposes is this. “Following nature means following the facts. It means getting the facts about the physical and social world we inhabit, and the facts about our situation in it [...] before we deliberate about normative matters. It means facing those facts - accepting them for exactly what they are, no more and no less - before we draw normative conclusions from them. It means doing ethics from the facts constructing normative propositions a posteriori. It means adjusting those normative propositions to fit changes in the facts, and accepting those adjustments for exactly what they are, no more and no less. And it means living within the facts - within the realm of actual rather than hypothetical norm.”[5]
This process of “getting the facts about the [...] world”[5] happens in some measure (but not exclusively) through science. In Becker’s words, “The biological, behavioral, and social sciences contribute to ethics in three important ways: they offer a wealth of material that can be used in the naturalistic arguments [...], they offer explanatory theories (e.g. from evolutionary biology) that help separate relatively fixed traits from transient or malleable ones and they offer powerful, elaborate analyses of learning, rationality, and rational choice."[5] Ethical reasoning of a stoic “cannot begin until all relevant description, representation, and prediction are in hand, [...] – until, let us say, the empirical work is done.”[5] This empirical work may be obtained by the scientific method and thus the principle of “following facts” can be (in some contexts) read as “not contradicting science” (not to be confused with simple “following science,” which would be reductive and misleading).
Virtue, agency, happiness[edit]
Becker organizes his reading of stoic ethics around the concept of agency. “The Development of Virtue [happens through] the Perfection of Agency,”[5] or through the “ideal agency”[5] as he calls it. In other words, this can be described as the belief in the “inherent primacy of virtue in terms of maximization of one’s agency.”[2] This agency is understood in terms of “a balance of control and stability”[5] and is executed all-things-considered, i.e. upon having obtained the most detailed information about the facts as available.
Happiness, in this view, is also explained and achieved through agency. “We hold,” this is Becker again, “that happiness as understood by mature and fit agents is a property of whole lives, not of transient mental states. We hold that it is achievable only through a proper balance of stability and control in the exercise of agency.”[5] And, “this sort of happiness with one’s life also appears to be a psychological consequence of healthy agency [...] The life of a stoic sage is filled with such happiness, as a consequence of virtue."[5]
Degrees of virtue[edit]
In Becker’s version of Stoicism, several dogmas of Ancients Stoics are questioned or challenged. For example, the traditional stoic all-or-nothing understanding of virtue is questioned (to some extent). In the original, Orthodox Stoicism one was either a perfect sage or no sage at all, there was no “middle ground,” or “in between.” The Ancient Stoic virtue admits of no degrees. And yet, Becker lays ground for a softer, more nuanced approach. “You can drown,” he writes, “face down on the calm surface of the sea as surely as at the bottom. [...] We [i.e. the Modern Stoics] follow later colleagues in thinking that these doctrines are untenable.”[5]
Aspirations for universality[edit]
Another dogma of the Ancient Stoics that is sometimes questioned in Modern Stoicism is the idea that the gateways of stoic philosophy are open to everyone and that living a stoic life is definitely the best option for every human being. E.g. in Becker’s New Stoicism suggests that “acting appropriately, as understood here, is a special kind of optimization project – one that it is logically possible to reject. (Which people with compulsive, obsessive, or addictive personalities may in fact reject.) [Modern Stoic] claim is, only healthy agents, at least those well along the road to fitness in their deliberative powers, cannot plausibly reject it.”[5]
Stoicism versus Aristotle[edit]
Another example of possible discrepancies between the Modern Stoic approach and Ancient Stoicism is the question of whether a certain amount of external goods is required for a good life. In the Orthodox Stoic view there are absolutely no entry conditions to living a stoic life. One can become a sage no matter the circumstances: be it poverty, illness, physical adversity and so on. This issue has been traditionally the bone of contention between the stoics (who held the mentioned position) and the followers of Aristotle (who held that a certain amount of external goods is necessary for development of virtue). In this context, Becker’s words are quite non-orthodox coming from the stoic position. He writes that “it is [...] plausible to conclude, however, that there is an identifiable kernel of bodily and psychological health that is a necessary condition of all further development. If this kernel is damaged, so is the capacity to develop agency.”[5]
Dichotomy of control[edit]
A very important concept of Traditional Stoicism is the distinction between things within one’s power and not within our power. While this concept is embraced fully by many Modern Stoics, some reinterpret it. Becker, for instance, points out that the whole idea of the dichotomy is in fact a major oversimplification. As he puts it, “[the] distinction between things that are within our control, or ‘up to us,’ and those who are not [...] [is] misleading.”[5] Instead, he proposes to read it along the lines of “it is wise to calibrate the strength, depth, and dissemination of our attachments to the fragility and transience of the objects involved.”[5]
On the other hand, William Irvine goes even further and undermines the central premise of the dichotomy, i.e. that the distinction between things “in our power” and “not in our power” is sharp and that there is no third option. In other words, Irvine suggests the possibility of turning the “dichotomy of control” into a “trichotomy of control.” Irvine argues “We can restate Epictetus’s dichotomy as follows: There are things over which we have complete control and things over which we have no control at all. As well as suggesting "the dichotomy is a false dichotomy, since it ignores the existence of things over which we have some but not complete control.”[22] Pigliucci describes it as follows: “some things are up to us (chiefly, our judgments and actions), some things are not up to us (major historical events, natural phenomena), but on a number of other things we have partial control. Irvine recasts the third category in terms of internalized goals, which makes more sense of the original dichotomy.”[2]
The question of ascesis and renunciation[edit]
There is also no unity in evaluating the ascetic elements in stoicism and in defining the sage’s attitude towards the ordinary pleasures of life. Becker mentions “the confusion, both among stoics and their critics” and the “false notion that the stoic ideal is a life devoid of the ordinary pleasures of sex, food, drink, music, wealth, fame, friends, and so on”[5](according to Becker this confusion happens because “stoics have occasionally claimed that, for the sage, eudaiomonia somehow replaces ordinary happiness”.[5] In this vein, Stankiewicz argued against the “ascetic misinterpretation,” saying that “stoicism is not asceticism and a stoic is not a monk. In fact, it is the school of The Pale Epicureans that is closer to the ideal of abstemiousness. The stoic proposal is far broader and it extends far beyond the narrow passage of the ascetic way.”[23]Thus, “we [the Modern Stoics] must face the lushness, diversity and – yes! – sensuality of life and we have to live and thrive inside this world, accepting it as it is. Unlike a monk, a stoic doesn’t dodge the myriad of different aspects of the earthly and sensual life.”[23]
On the other hand, Kevin Patrick refutes this argument, ridiculing it as “hedonic stoicism” and saying that the mentioned position “falls into the more common trap and misinterpretation, that since externals are indifferent to us, we should go ahead and indulge in all of those things for which we have a proclivity.”[23] “Modern Stoics,” he concludes, “ought to be stoics.”[23]
Irvine takes a more modest stance and he proposes a program of “voluntary discomfort.” As he describes it: “By undertaking acts of voluntary discomfort – by, for example, choosing to be cold and hungry when we could be warm and well fed – we harden ourselves against misfortunes that might befell us in the future. If all we know is comfort, we might be traumatized when we are forced to experience pain or discomfort, as we someday almost surely will. In other words, voluntary discomfort can be thought of as a kind of vaccine: By exposing ourselves to a small amount of a weakened virus now, we create in ourselves an immunity that will protect us from a debilitating illness in the future.”[22]
Notable books[edit]
The following list, arranged by the time of first publication, includes positions representing modern Stoicism only, while it excludes purely scholarship books on ancient Stoics, biographies, etc.)
James Stockdale, Courage Under Fire, (Stanford University: Hoover Essays, 1993)
Sharon Lebell, The Art of Living. The Classical Manual on Virtue, Happiness and Effectivness, (New York: Harper One, 1995)
Lawrence C. Becker, A New Stoicism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)
John Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003; 2nd edn London: Duckworth, 2009)
Vernezze, Peter. Don't worry, be Stoic: ancient wisdom for troubled times. (Lanham: University Press of America, 2005)
Keith Seddon, Stoic Serenity: A Practical Course on Finding Inner Peace, (Stoicon Foundation, 2006).
Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, (Chicago, University Of Chicago Press, 2007)
M. Andrew Holowchak, The Stoics. A Guide for the Perplexed,(London: Continuum, 2008)
William B. Irvine, A Guide to the Good Life. The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
Cooper, Ray. The stoic homilies: a week-by-week guide to enlightened living. (Burleigh, Qld: Zeus Publications, 2009)
Natalie Haynes, The Ancient Guide to Modern Life, (London: Profile Books, 2010)
Marcin Fabjański, Stoicyzm uliczny. Jak oswajać trudne sytuacje, (Warsaw: Czarna Owca, 2010)
William O. Stephens, Marcus Aurelius. A Guide of the Perplexed, (London: Continuum, 2012)
Jules Evans, "Philosophy for Life: And Other Dangerous Situations", (Rider, 2012)
Donald Robertson, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy: Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy (Karnac, 2010)
Donald Robertson, Stoicism and the Art of Happiness (2013)
Tomasz Mazur, O stawaniu się stoikiem, (Warsaw: PWN, 2014)
Piotr Stankiewicz, Sztuka życia według stoików, (Warsaw: WAB, 2014)
Ryan Holiday and Stephen Hanselman. The daily stoic: 366 meditations on wisdom, perseverance, and the art of living. (2016)
Ryan Holiday. "The Obstacle is the Way: The Timeless Art of Turning Trials into Triumphs" (Penguin Publishing Group, 2014)
Patrick Ussher [ed.], Stoicism Today: Selected Writings vol. I, (Stoicism Today: 2014)
Patrick Ussher [ed.], Stoicism Today: Selected Writings vol. II, (Stoicism Today: 2016)
Massimo Pigliucci, How To Be a Stoic, (New York: Basic Books, 2017)
See also[edit]
Alasdair MacIntyre
Aretaic turn
Arete
Applied ethics
Eudaimonism
Glossary of Stoic terms
Lawrence Becker
Martha Nussbaum
Massimo Pigliucci
Neostoicism
Oikeiosis
Phronesis
Pneuma
Rationality
Virtue
Virtue epistemology
Virtue ethics
Virtue jurisprudence
Sage (philosophy)
Stoic categories
Stoicism
References[edit]
Jump up^ Joe Gelonesi (November 17, 2014). "The rise of Modern Stoicism". ABC - Australian Broadcasting Corporation. ABC - Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 20 July 2017.
^ Jump up to:a b c d e Pigliucci, Massimo (December 14, 2016). "Stoicism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jump up^ "REBT Network".
Jump up^ "Arron T Beck". Wiki.
^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Becker, Lawrence (1997). A New Stoicism. Princetion University Press.
Jump up^ Pigliucci, Massimo. "How To Be A Stoic?".
Jump up^ Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery (1979) Cognitive Therapy of Depression, p. 8.
Jump up^ Robertson, D (2010). The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy: Stoicism as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy. London: Karnac. ISBN 978-1-85575-756-1.
^ Jump up to:a b c Scott, E.O. "A Quick Map of the Online Stoic Community".
Jump up^ AM, Timothy Willis On 12/1/14 at 7:33 (1 December 2014). "Meet the Real Stoics Taking Psychology Back to the 3rd Century BC". Newsweek.
Jump up^ "Stoic Solutions Podcast - Practical Wisdom for Everyday Life". Stoic Solutions Podcast. Retrieved 2018-04-09.
Jump up^ Development, PodBean. "The Practical Stoic Podcast with Simon Drew". Retrieved 2018-04-09.
Jump up^ "Home | Sunday Stoic". Home | Sunday Stoic. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
Jump up^ "7 insights from the ancient philosophy of Marcus Aurelius that will change the way you think about life, death, and time". Business Insider. Retrieved 2018-02-05.
Jump up^ Shammas, Michael (January 23, 2014). "Want Happiness? Become a Practicing Stoic". The Huffington Post. Retrieved February 3, 2018.
Jump up^ Sheffield, Carrie. "Want an Unconquerable Mind? Try Stoic Philosophy".
Jump up^ Whiting, Kai; Konstantakos, Leonidas (2018-04-17). "Life-Hack Stoicism—Is It Worth It?". The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast. Retrieved 2018-04-26.
Jump up^ Whiting, Kai; Konstankos, Leonidas (5 May 2018). "Taking Stoicism Beyond the Self: The Power To Change Society". The Daily Stoic.
Jump up^ Evans, Jules. "Anxious? Depressed? Try Greek philosophy".
Jump up^ Whiting, Kai; Konstantakos, Leonidas; Sadler, Greg; Gill, Christopher (2018-04-21). "Were Neanderthals Rational? A Stoic Approach". Humanities. 7 (2): 39. doi:10.3390/h7020039.
Jump up^ Whiting, Kai; Konstantakos, Leonidas; Carrasco, Angeles; Carmona, Luis Gabriel (2018-02-10). "Sustainable Development, Wellbeing and Material Consumption: A Stoic Perspective". Sustainability. 10 (2): 474. doi:10.3390/su10020474.
^ Jump up to:a b Irvine, William (2009). A Guide to the Good Life. The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy. Oxford University Press.
^ Jump up to:a b c d Ussher [ed.], Patrick (2016). Stoicism Today: Selected Writings vol. II. Stoicism Today.
External links[edit]
William Irvine's website
"Stoicism" entry on the IEP, by Massimo Pigliucci
Lawrence Becker's biography and blurb
Modern Stoicism website
Stoicism Today website
Stoicism group on Facebook
New Stoa website
n terrorism | How to Be a Stoic
What Would a Stoic Do? On terrorism | How to Be a Stoic
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What Would a Stoic Do? On terrorism
Last Friday I was in Pittsburgh, PA, to deliver a talk on science and pseudoscience for the local annual “Sagan Fest,” named after the astronomer and science popularizer Carl Sagan, one of my intellectual role models. It was an engaging, constructive moment of critical reflection, and even fun over drinks and dinners with the students and faculty of Carnegie Mellon University that organized the event.
Then, when I got back to my hotel room, I was greeted by a text message from my companion, which simply said “Did you see what happened in Paris?” I hadn’t, but I knew instantly that whatever it was, it wasn’t good news. I also knew that it had to do with a terrorist attack.
I loaded the front page of the New York Times on my browser, and I was greeted to the images and descriptions of events that we are all familiar with. At current count, the ISIS orchestrated attack has resulted in 129 dead and 352 hospitalized, many in critical condition. I’m sure the death toll will eventually be higher.
I have not read much in the way of commentaries and analyses as of yet. First, because I don’t believe they will tell me much that is going to be new or insightful about the event or their context — these things are becoming part of “normal” life, unfortunately. Second, because I wanted to think things over on my own, and see if my recently adopted Stoic perspective would be at all useful under this sort of circumstances.
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty for a Stoic when faced with horrors such as the Paris attacks (and let’s not forget the ones in Beirut, or Kenya), is the idea that people don’t do evil on purpose, but out of ignorance. Here is how Marcus famously puts it:
“Begin the morning by saying to yourself, I shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. … I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him.” (Meditations, II.1)
Right, go tell the friends and relatives of the victims that they should not hate the perpetrators, or not be angry at what happened.
Of course, Stoicism is not alone in this. Both Christianity and Buddhism have similar sentiments, and so do a number of other religious and philosophical traditions. But maybe they are just all mistaken.
Then again, perhaps it is precisely the occurrence of events like the Paris attacks that can be used to seriously probe our most fundamental assumptions and test our most cherished beliefs. So let’s consider for a moment what it would mean, from a Stoic perspective, to try not to get angry or hateful, and to really entertain the thought that ISIS fighters do what they do out of ignorance. What would that mean in terms of our response to acts of terror and their perpetrators?
Shock, anger and even hate are natural human responses to tragedies like this one. We cannot avoid them, they originate from the depths of human psychology and nature. But shock is paralyzing, and anger and hate are negative, destructive emotions. If we simply yield to them, as Seneca remarked, they will lead us to act under the spell of a temporary insanity. What a Stoic should do, then, is to turn the initial destructive emotion into a constructive one, which will take the deployment of at the least three of the four cardinal virtues.
To begin with, we need to summon courage, specifically the moral courage to stand up and be counted among those who oppose all that ISIS stands for. I don’t mean just adding yet another hashtag to your social media stream, or temporarily changing your Facebook profile photo. I mean something a bit more substantial, like standing with the majority of Muslim in your country who themselves reject ISIS, or opposing politicians who are already using the attacks for cynical purposes, like blocking asylum for refugees of the conflicts in Syria and surrounding areas — apparently oblivious to the fact that those refugees are abandoning their homes and countries precisely because they don’t want to live under ISIS or other oppressive regimes.
Next, we should channel our anger and outrage into a renewed exercise of the virtue of justice, demanding of our elected representatives that they truly do whatever is in their power to help react in the proper way to the threat of Islamist terrorism, to keep in mind that the goal is to bring about a safe and flourishing human community, not to use external threats for political gain, or to push agendas that result in the demonization of minorities and immigrants and in the restriction at home of those very liberties that we are allegedly trying to protect from the assault of ISIS.
Which brings me to the most difficult of all virtues to practice and deploy: wisdom, particularly the practical wisdom of knowing what the best thing to do is under difficult and complex circumstances. This requires critical reflection as well as what I would call principled pragmatism — seeking what works in practice, even if not ideal, while at the same time keeping in mind the fundamental principles we cherish and wish to defend. What the exercise of wisdom certainly does not mean is what we we will surely see plenty of in the next days and weeks: demagoguery, fear mongering, and simplistic slogans that fit on a bumper sticker but do not advance serious discourse. We ought to resist all of this, and that is possible only if we work to overcome our natural anger at what happened and hatred of those who made it happen.
Finally, let me go back to this entirely counterintuitive, superficially even outrageous idea that people — even terrorists — don’t do what they do out of evil, but because of ignorance. Setting aside the philosophical point that to talk of “evil” as a metaphysical category is highly problematic in itself, I think this attitude — with practice, since it certainly doesn’t come spontaneously — will allow us to see more clearly what is going on and what to do about it.
If we simply label something or someone as evil we give ourselves an automatic pass for not thinking about complexities, root causes, and responsibilities. ISIS exists for a number of reasons, some of which have to do with still widespread perniciously regressive cultures of fundamentalism in the Middle East, but others that have to do with both recent and not so recent Western intervention in that area of the world, often for anything but altruistic reasons.
This does nothing to justify the Paris attacks, but it does a lot for us to understand why they happened and, ideally, what to do to prevent future ones. I am reminded of a controversial editorial written for the Italian magazine L’Espresso by Umberto Eco in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on New York’s Twin Towers. The title of the piece was “Understanding Bin Laden.” Eco’s point was precisely the one I’m making here: understanding is an altogether different thing from excusing. There is no condoning either 9/11 or Paris, nor an increasingly large number of similar episodes. But if we do not make a genuine attempt at understanding why so many people think that they are doing the right thing by massacring others in what they see as a necessary defense of their own lands and way of life then we will keep acting unthinkingly, giving in to a simplistic us-vs-them mentality, and simply perpetuate the cycle of violence. As Stoics, Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, and indeed as members of the man cosmopolis, we ought to have the moral courage and the wisdom to do better.
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37 thoughts on “What Would a Stoic Do? On terrorism”
EugenRNovember 17, 2015 at 11:03 am
If my i to add, i wonder according to your statistics, how many European Muslims are redy to condemn the Caliphate as an imperialistic aggressive idea, that if successful will bring end to human civilization. ( viz my comment below.)
https://rodeneugen.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/islam-and-the-monotheism/
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Patrice AymeNovember 17, 2015 at 12:59 pm
Dear Massimo:
Trying to understand ideas without their genealogies is impossible. Trying to understand regional moods, without their genealogies, is also impossible.
The history of morals, and the reality of morals, is dominated by the reality of regional, or religious moods.
Ideas, moods, morals are complicated, because so is history. There is no royal road to either mathematics, nor history. (Nor physics or sociology.)
When eager admirers of Nietzsche sat in front of him in a restaurant in Nice or Turin, they found he was not eager to talk to them. The philosopher’s preoccupations were too far removed for whom he viewed as children to condescend to address them.
Italy, say in Mussolini’s sense, did not exist before Mussolini, indeed. The dictator spent enormous amounts of energy to “Italianize” parts of “Italy” where Italian was not even spoken (I have good friends from there).
Until the bloody, self-entranced Corsican “noble” who became dictator of Europe cancelled it, the Roman empire was, nominally, ruling Europe. For more than a millennium. France was the one and only exception, as the Paris area declared the king of the Franks “emperor in its own kingdom”. Said kingdom was long tiny.
This is why considering that nation-states did not exist in Europe is not a pertinent notion. Although all nominally part of the Roman empire, regions such as Bavaria, Savoy, Piedmont, Catalonia, Burgundy, Aquitania, Venice, Firenze, Genoa, Provence, Artois, Palatinate, Bohemia, Brittany, etc… were all rather independent entities submitted to the theoretical authority of either the (elected) Roman Emperor or the king-emperor of France.
Hundreds of these states shared a common currency, the Thaler (“Tollar”, dollar).
Those states fought very hard with each other. For example Savoy and Dauphine’, both quasi republics, both speaking some sort of “French” had an active war for centuries, with a sort of Chinese wall separating them across the Alps (still standing, but not advertised much)..
So there were nation-states of sorts throughout Europe for centuries, and they created regional moods still in evidence today.
To come back to the subject at hand, the mood created by the 80,000 words Qur’an has been extremely favorable to war. Thus Islam created the world’s largest empire in less than 80 years, by using enormous violence which baffled and surprised both Persians and Romans. The reason? Hundreds of verses in the Qur’an are calls to mayhem, if not outright murder, of most categories of people.
As ISIS was saying, 200 million Shiites are “apostates”. Penalty according to Qur’an and Hadith? Death. Just staying stoic will not help. Prepare to die, or prepare to fight.
Although military men have to know how to be stoic, they do not limit their emotional arsenal to that. No baboon ever could, and to ask less of man is to no little of that creature.
Sorry for all the history, but, as you said, nobody has to read it.
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MassimoPost authorNovember 17, 2015 at 5:16 pm
Patrice,
of course one cannot understand current events if one does not understand their genealogy, though one hardly has to go all the way back to the Pleistocene. But your continued lessons in history are both unnecessary (at the least for me, I’m well aware of all the factoids you mentioned), and indeed misleading, since you keep inferring incorrect notions from them.
For instance, your insistence that just because words like “Italia” or “Europa” have been in use for millennia they actually referred to anything like the same entities that we label with those terms today. Not to mention that Italy was a country with a cultural identity before Mussolini took over, thank you very much.
Liked by 1 person
Daniel MannNovember 18, 2015 at 3:28 pm
Massimo, I am glad to see that you are speaking out against the horrors of ISIS and recognize the need to strenuously combat such evils. However, I feel that you undermine the most important element for a confident and concerted moral response, when you deny evil motivations:
• “People don’t do evil on purpose, but out of ignorance.”
• “If we simply label something or someone as evil we give ourselves an automatic pass for not thinking about complexities, root causes, and responsibilities.”
Here are several problems with your analysis:
1. You haven’t provided any argumentation to rule out evil motives.
2. If ISIS is merely acting out of ignorance, then the prescription should merely be education.
3. Punishment is not the appropriate way to address ignorance.
4. To use punishment/warfare to address ignorance is unjust, unless it is purposeful ignorance.
5. Instead, punishment is appropriate to address evil.
6. It will be hard to motivate a concerted response against ISIS if their problems consist only of ignorance, poor cultural conditioning, or poverty.
7. Such an analysis will ultimately give ISIS a relatively free-pass.
While you state that our analysis of the causes of ISIS “does nothing to justify the Paris attacks,” it seems that this evil-less analysis will defuse the necessary moral outrage:
• So let’s consider for a moment what it would mean, from a Stoic perspective, to try not to get angry or hateful, and to really entertain the thought that ISIS fighters do what they do out of ignorance.
Sadly, this analysis will doom our efforts. However, I do agree that we need to genuinely understand ISIS:
• “But if we do not make a genuine attempt at understanding why so many people think that they are doing the right thing by massacring others… [We] simply perpetuate the cycle of violence.”
However, the West is in denial about the very thing that all of the Islamic terrorists claim to be their motivation – Islam itself. It is an unassailable fact of history that we live out what we believe.
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MassimoPost authorNovember 18, 2015 at 4:38 pm
Daniel,
I think we are using words like “ignorance” and “evil” in somewhat different ways. I don’t mean to say that ISIS doesn’t know what they are doing, I mean that it does it out of a failure to know the chief good for humanity, which — according to Stoics — is the application of reason to peaceful and flourishing societal living.
At any rate, on your specific points:
“You haven’t provided any argumentation to rule out evil motives”
I don’t believe in “evil” as a metaphysical category. If you have any good arguments to establish that ontological claim I’d be happy to entertain it.
“If ISIS is merely acting out of ignorance, then the prescription should merely be education.”
No, some people are beyond education passed a very early stage of their life, so this doesn’t follow.
“Punishment is not the appropriate way to address ignorance”
That’s right, punishment is *never* appropriate in my view. That doesn’t mean one cannot do anything to stop bad things from happening, up to and including the use of violence, when absolutely necessary, which looks like is indeed the case with ISIS.
“To use punishment/warfare to address ignorance is unjust, unless it is purposeful ignorance”
It should be clear from my two answers above why this is not the case, from a Stoic perspective.
“Instead, punishment is appropriate to address evil”
Since evil doesn’t exist, metaphysically, punishment is never appropriate.
“It will be hard to motivate a concerted response against ISIS if their problems consist only of ignorance, poor cultural conditioning, or poverty”
Not at all. The immediate response will very likely have to include violence to stop them and revert their gains. But the long term problems that made ISIS possible to begin with will simply not go away unless we do address ignorance, cultural conditioning and poverty.
“Such an analysis will ultimately give ISIS a relatively free-pass”
It should be clear from my answers above that this is not the case.
“the West is in denial about the very thing that all of the Islamic terrorists claim to be their motivation – Islam itself”
You could say the same thing of Judaism itself, and of Christianity itself. And yet, by and large, those two religions have gotten over their worst phase. There is nothing intrinsically bad about Islam, and indeed there have been periods of history when Islam was far less violent and more tolerant than Christianity. So we just need to figure out how to help the world’s Muslim community get out of their current rut. To accuse them all of being evil is, obviously, a non-starter.
Liked by 3 people
Daniel MannNovember 18, 2015 at 6:51 pm
Massimo, For evidence of objective moral absolutes, you might start by reading that essay:
http://mannsword.blogspot.com/2009/08/moral-absolutes.html
You wrote: “I don’t mean to say that ISIS doesn’t know what they are doing, I mean that it does it out of a failure to know the chief good for humanity, which — according to Stoics — is the application of reason to peaceful and flourishing societal living.”
You appeal to the concept of “peaceful and flourishing societal living.” However, if peace and human flourishing have no objective truth value, you are wasting your time with ISIS. They claim to have a truth that transcends your concern for a peaceful society. Admittedly, they too believe in a peaceful society, but one that will result when the entire world is under Islam. Your pragmatic reasoning about peace will have absolutely NO effect upon those who believe that their truth comes from above.
Instead, we have to demonstrate that their truth does NOT come from above. Without this, you will have no leverage in this culture war.
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MassimoPost authorNovember 19, 2015 at 8:44 am
Daniel,
“For evidence of objective moral absolutes, you might start by reading that essay”
As you know, I don’t believe morality is “out there.” It is a human construct, and as such there are no absolutes to be had, sorry.
“if peace and human flourishing have no objective truth value, you are wasting your time with ISIS”
Forgive me but that’s a non sequitur. Even if they did have objective value there would be people who would reject them. The theory of evolution is, as far as we can tell, true, yet millions of people reject it. Contrariwise, plenty of non-objective conclusions are accepted by many people, for instance that to live a life of comfort is “better” than to live one of misery.
Besides, Stoicism does hold that there are objective truths about the human condition, but these truths are derived from a study of human nature and the nature of the cosmos (Stoic “Physics”), not from any belief in the transcendental.
“Your pragmatic reasoning about peace will have absolutely NO effect upon those who believe that their truth comes from above”
Indeed, which is why ISIS needs to be defeated by force. But that would be futile if we also do not address the underlying causes of ISIS and like movements, which have to do with marginalization, poverty and ignorance.
Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation - Oxford Scholarship
Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation - Oxford Scholarship
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Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation
Richard Sorabji
ABSTRACT
The Stoics (Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus) tell us how to get rid of unwanted emotions by re-evaluating situations (cognitive therapy). In their view, an emotion is a pair of value judgements that harm or benefit if at hand, and that it is appropriate to react. Bodily and mental shocks (e.g., crying) are not part of the emotion. One Stoic, Posidonius, protested that such judgements are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion, not necessary, for example, for emotion produced by melody, or in animals. Seneca replied that what is produced by music and the arts, or in animals, is only preliminary shocks or ‘first movements’. Others (Galen) suggested that bodily factors are important and need separate physical treatment, and recent brain studies (LeDoux) explain why. But the Stoics are right that cognitive therapy can often on its own remove unwanted emotion. Moreover, their two judgements are the right targets for re-evaluation, and it is a muddle to be sad (William James) because I cry. Crying is only a shock. We need not share the Stoic ideal of apatheia — freedom from all emotions — just freedom from unwanted ones. Some Christians (Origen, Evagrius) took up the idea of first movements and converted them from preliminary shocks into preliminary ‘bad thoughts’, which act as temptations. They worked out a whole art of nipping them in the bud to achieve the Stoic ideal of apatheia. But Augustine favoured Aristotle's emotion in moderation, except for example for lust, which he saw as disobedient to will.
Keywords: Aristotle, Chrysippus, Posidonius, Galen, Augustine, first movements, judgement, apatheia, Seneca and Epictetus
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Print publication date: 2002 Print ISBN-13: 9780199256600
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.001.0001
AUTHORS
Affiliations are at time of print publication.
Richard Sorabji, author
Wolfson College, Oxford
-----------------
Contents
Go to page:
Front Matter
Introduction
Part I Emotions As Judgements Versus Irrational Forces
1 Emotion As Cognitive and Its Therapy
2 The Emotions As Value Judgements In Chrysippus
3 Seneca's Defence
4 Seneca's Defence
5 The Arts
Aristotle, Philodemus, and the Stoics
6 Posidonius On the Irrational Forces In Emotion
7 Posidonius
8 Posidonius
9 Aspasius and Other Objections To Chrysippus
10 What Is Missing From the Judgemental Analysis?
Part II Value Of the Emotions, Cognitive Therapy, and the Role Of Philosophy
11 The Role Of Analytic Philosophy In Stoic Cognitive Therapy
12 Stoic Indifference: A Barrier To Therapy?
13 The Case For and Against Eradication Of Emotion
14 The Traditions Of Moderation and Eradication
15 How the Ancient Exercises Work
16 Exercises Concerned With Time and the Self
17 Physiology and the Non‐Cognitive Galen's Alternative Approach to Emotion
18 Sex, Love, and Marriage In Pagan Philosophy and the Use Of Catharsis
19 Catharsis and the Classification Of Therapies
Part III Emotional Conflict and Structure Of the Mind
20 Emotional Conflict and the Divided Self
21 The Concept Of Will
Part IV From Stoic Agitations To Christian Temptations
22 First Movements As Bad Thoughts
23 From First Movements To the Seven Cardinal Sins Evagrius
24 First Movements In Augustine
25 Christians On Moderation Versus Eradication
26 Augustine On Lust and the Will
End Matter
------------------------
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AVAILABLE CHAPTERS
Abbreviations
Introduction
1: Emotion as Cognitive and its Therapy
2: The Emotions as Value Judgements in Chrysippus
3: Seneca's Defence Third Movements as Harmonizing Chrysippus and Zeno
4: Seneca's Defence First Movements as Answering Posidonius
5: The Arts First Movements and Controversies on Drama and Music Aristotle Philodemus and the Stoics
6: Posidonius on the Irrational Forces in Emotion Galen's Report
7: Posidonius Judgements Insufficient for Emotion Exhaustion and Lack of Imagination
8: Posidonius Judgements Not Necessary for Emotion Disowned Judgements Animals Music
26: Augustine on Lust and the Will
9: Aspasius and Other Objections to Chrysippus
10: What is Missing from the Judgemental Analysis? Brain Research and Limitations on Stoic Cognitive Therapy
11: The Role of Analytic Philosophy in Stoic Cognitive Therapy
12: Stoic Indifference: A Barrier to Therapy?
13: The Case for and against Eradication of Emotion
14: The Traditions of Moderation and Eradication
15: How the Ancient Exercises Work
16: Exercises Concerned with Time and the Self
17: Physiology and the Non-Cognitive: Galen's Alternative Approach to Emotion
18: Sex Love and Marriage in Pagan Philosophy and the Use of Catharsis
19: Catharsis and the Classification of Therapies
20: Emotional Conflict and the Divided Self
21: The Concept of Will
22: First Movements as Bad Thoughts: Origen and his Legacy
23: From First Movements to the Seven Cardinal Sins: Evagrius
24: First Movements in Augustine: Adaptation and Misunderstanding
25: Christians on Moderation versus Eradication
Oxford University Press
2003
SUMMARY
In Emotion and Peace of Mind, Sorabji examines how the Stoics developed the idea of emotions as judgements internal to the mind, differing from Platonists, who regarded emotions as rooted in the irrational faculties of the soul. He argues that for ancient philosophers and early Christians alike, philosophical analyses on the human emotions provided useful therapies for emotional disturbance. For the same reason, he expects that the ancient philosophy of emotions will contribute to current strands in psychotherapy and psychology.
The book consists of four parts. The first part is devoted to the formation of the Stoic idea of emotions and peace of mind in ancient philosophy. Chapter 1 sketches how the idea of philosophy as psychotherapy and the view of emotions as cognitive were developed in the period of the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. Chapter 2 presents Chrysippus as identifying emotions with ‘mistaken judgements of reason’. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to Seneca’s defence by ‘harmonizing Chrysippus and Zeno’ and ‘answering Posidonius’. Chapter 5 deals with the Stoic reply to Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis. The next four chapters (6–9) introduce the Stoic Posidonius’s main objection—“judgements are not necessary for emotion”—to Chrysippus’s analysis in Galen’s report, with further objections from Aspasius and others. Chapter 10 analyses the modern brain research of Joseph LeDous, who reduced the role of cognition in emotion.
The second part focuses on the value and therapy of emotions in a non-Christian context. Chapter 11 considers how Stoic cognitive therapy would work. Chapter 12 argues that the theory of indifference was not an essential part of Stoic therapy. Chapter 13 considers Chrysippus’s radical thesis that all emotions should be eradicated by examining the reasons for and against eradication. Chapter 14 looks at the debates on whether the emotions should only be moderated or actually eradicated in the Pre-Socratics, Plato, the Epicureans, the Neoplatonists, Aristotle and the Stoics. Chapters 15 and 16 analyse the ancient exercises regarding the dimension of time (past, present, future) and the diversity of the self. Chapter 17 is devoted to Galen’s non-Chrysippan alternative approach, called ‘the physiology of emotion’, which gave a central role to the body in emotion and recognized the need for non-cognitive therapies. Chapter 18 considers the value put on erotic emotions. Chapter 19 explains what catharsis might relieve us of.
Explaining how different views on the nature of emotional conflict bear on the structure of the mind, the third part (chaps. 20 and 21) details the Stoic controversy on the psychology of emotion and supplies a background to Christian treatments of temptation, will and divided will. In the last part, Sorabji analyses how the Stoic concepts of emotions were transformed in Christian traditions. Chapters 22 and 23 address how the concept of first movements was devised by Christian thinkers such as Philo, Origen, Jerome, Augustine and Evagrius. Chapter 24 discusses the influence of the Stoic analyses on emotions on Augustine. Chapter 25 traces the developments of Christian attitudes to the Stoic idea of apatheia, freedom from emotion in the Alexandrians, the Cappadocian Fathers and the Latin tradition. Chapter 26 analyses Augustine’s argument against lust as ‘disobedience to the will’ in his debates with Julian.
Emotion and Peace of Mind - The Gifford Lectures
Emotion and Peace of Mind - The Gifford Lectures
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Emotion and Peace of Mind
Lecture:
Emotion and Peace of Mind
AVAILABLE CHAPTERS
Abbreviations
Introduction
1: Emotion as Cognitive and its Therapy
2: The Emotions as Value Judgements in Chrysippus
3: Seneca's Defence Third Movements as Harmonizing Chrysippus and Zeno
4: Seneca's Defence First Movements as Answering Posidonius
5: The Arts First Movements and Controversies on Drama and Music Aristotle Philodemus and the Stoics
6: Posidonius on the Irrational Forces in Emotion Galen's Report
7: Posidonius Judgements Insufficient for Emotion Exhaustion and Lack of Imagination
8: Posidonius Judgements Not Necessary for Emotion Disowned Judgements Animals Music
26: Augustine on Lust and the Will
9: Aspasius and Other Objections to Chrysippus
10: What is Missing from the Judgemental Analysis? Brain Research and Limitations on Stoic Cognitive Therapy
11: The Role of Analytic Philosophy in Stoic Cognitive Therapy
12: Stoic Indifference: A Barrier to Therapy?
13: The Case for and against Eradication of Emotion
14: The Traditions of Moderation and Eradication
15: How the Ancient Exercises Work
16: Exercises Concerned with Time and the Self
17: Physiology and the Non-Cognitive: Galen's Alternative Approach to Emotion
18: Sex Love and Marriage in Pagan Philosophy and the Use of Catharsis
19: Catharsis and the Classification of Therapies
20: Emotional Conflict and the Divided Self
21: The Concept of Will
22: First Movements as Bad Thoughts: Origen and his Legacy
23: From First Movements to the Seven Cardinal Sins: Evagrius
24: First Movements in Augustine: Adaptation and Misunderstanding
25: Christians on Moderation versus Eradication
Oxford University Press
2003
SUMMARY
In Emotion and Peace of Mind, Sorabji examines how the Stoics developed the idea of emotions as judgements internal to the mind, differing from Platonists, who regarded emotions as rooted in the irrational faculties of the soul. He argues that for ancient philosophers and early Christians alike, philosophical analyses on the human emotions provided useful therapies for emotional disturbance. For the same reason, he expects that the ancient philosophy of emotions will contribute to current strands in psychotherapy and psychology.
The book consists of four parts. The first part is devoted to the formation of the Stoic idea of emotions and peace of mind in ancient philosophy. Chapter 1 sketches how the idea of philosophy as psychotherapy and the view of emotions as cognitive were developed in the period of the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. Chapter 2 presents Chrysippus as identifying emotions with ‘mistaken judgements of reason’. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to Seneca’s defence by ‘harmonizing Chrysippus and Zeno’ and ‘answering Posidonius’. Chapter 5 deals with the Stoic reply to Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis. The next four chapters (6–9) introduce the Stoic Posidonius’s main objection—“judgements are not necessary for emotion”—to Chrysippus’s analysis in Galen’s report, with further objections from Aspasius and others. Chapter 10 analyses the modern brain research of Joseph LeDous, who reduced the role of cognition in emotion.
The second part focuses on the value and therapy of emotions in a non-Christian context. Chapter 11 considers how Stoic cognitive therapy would work. Chapter 12 argues that the theory of indifference was not an essential part of Stoic therapy. Chapter 13 considers Chrysippus’s radical thesis that all emotions should be eradicated by examining the reasons for and against eradication. Chapter 14 looks at the debates on whether the emotions should only be moderated or actually eradicated in the Pre-Socratics, Plato, the Epicureans, the Neoplatonists, Aristotle and the Stoics. Chapters 15 and 16 analyse the ancient exercises regarding the dimension of time (past, present, future) and the diversity of the self. Chapter 17 is devoted to Galen’s non-Chrysippan alternative approach, called ‘the physiology of emotion’, which gave a central role to the body in emotion and recognized the need for non-cognitive therapies. Chapter 18 considers the value put on erotic emotions. Chapter 19 explains what catharsis might relieve us of.
Explaining how different views on the nature of emotional conflict bear on the structure of the mind, the third part (chaps. 20 and 21) details the Stoic controversy on the psychology of emotion and supplies a background to Christian treatments of temptation, will and divided will. In the last part, Sorabji analyses how the Stoic concepts of emotions were transformed in Christian traditions. Chapters 22 and 23 address how the concept of first movements was devised by Christian thinkers such as Philo, Origen, Jerome, Augustine and Evagrius. Chapter 24 discusses the influence of the Stoic analyses on emotions on Augustine. Chapter 25 traces the developments of Christian attitudes to the Stoic idea of apatheia, freedom from emotion in the Alexandrians, the Cappadocian Fathers and the Latin tradition. Chapter 26 analyses Augustine’s argument against lust as ‘disobedience to the will’ in his debates with Julian.
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