2021/03/03

미 전문가들 "한국 통일장관, 제재 아닌 김정은 실정 비판해야...북한 '자체 제재'가 민생 파괴" | Voice of America - Korean

미 전문가들 "한국 통일장관, 제재 아닌 김정은 실정 비판해야...북한 '자체 제재'가 민생 파괴" | Voice of America - Korean

이인영 한국 통일장관이 지난달 3일 서울에서 기자회견을 했다.
이인영 한국 통일장관이 지난달 3일 서울에서 기자회견을 했다.

바이든 행정부의 대북정책이 구체화되기도 전에 한국 통일부가 ‘제재 재검토’를 거듭 요구하는 데 대해 워싱턴에서는 비판의 목소리가 높습니다. 북한의 인도주의적 위기는 김정은 정권의 잘못된 정책에서 비롯된 만큼, 통일부 장관은 제재를 탓할 게 아니라 북한 정권에 문제를 제기하라는 촉구가 이어지고 있습니다. 백성원 기자가 보도합니다.

한국 정부 당국자가 열악한 북한 민생을 대북제재와 결부시키며 해제 필요성을 반복적으로 거론하는 데 대해 워싱턴에서는 미국과 엇박자를 내며 김정은 정권의 실정에 눈감고 있다는 비판이 거세지고 있습니다.

특히 이인영 통일부 장관이 전면에 나서 남북 경협을 주장하며 미국의 기조와 다른 대북제재와 규제 완화를 연일 촉구하는 것은 미-한 간 이견을 부각시키고 북한만 이롭게 할 것이라는 우려가 나옵니다.

워싱턴의 한반도 전문가들은 북한의 위협에 공동 대처해야 할 동맹국이 오히려 미국과 대북제재를 ‘악의 근원’으로 선전하는 북한의 주장을 옹호하고 있다면서, 이 장관에게 공개 질문을 던지고 있습니다.

데이비드 맥스웰 민주주의수호재단(FDD) 선임연구원은 VOA에 “이인영 장관에게 구체적으로 어떤 제재를 해제하고 김정은 정권의 어떤 악의적 행동과 불법 행위를 공개적으로 용납하려는 것인지 묻고 싶다”고 말했습니다.

[데이비드 맥스웰 FDD 선임연구원] “I would ask Minister Lee which sanctions he would like to lift and which malign behavior and illegal activities conducted by Kim Jong-un does he publicly want to condone?”

앞서 이인영 장관은 지난달 26일 공개된 영국 파이낸셜타임스(FT)와의 인터뷰에서 “제재의 목적이 아니었는데 결과적으로는 (북한) 주민들의 삶이 어려워졌다면 이런 점들은 어떻게 개선하고 갈 것인가”라며 “분명히 평가하고 짚고 넘어가야 할 시점은 된 것 같다”고 밝혔습니다.

또 대북제재 장기화, 신종 코로나바이러스 감염증, 태풍 피해, 수해 등을 언급하며 “경제적인 어려움이 지속되는 과정에서 북한 주민들을 중심으로 해서 인도주의적인 위기, 그 가능성들이 점증하고 있다는 점은 부인하기 어렵다”고 진단했습니다.

하지만 전문가들은 이 장관이 북한 주민을 어려움에 빠뜨린 원인으로 제재 등 여러 외부 요인만을 열거하면서 김정은 정권의 정책 실패를 언급하지 않는 건 이해할 수 없다는 반응을 보였습니다. 

맥스웰 연구원은 “이인영 장관은 북한인들에 미치는 제재의 영향을 재검토하는 대신, 김정은의 정책이 주민들의 고통에 미치는 영향을 연구하도록 주문해야 한다”며 “한반도의 모든 문제는 김씨 정권의 사악한 본질과 압제 시스템에서 비롯되기 때문”이라는 이유를 들었습니다.

[데이비드 맥스웰 FDD 선임연구원] “Instead of Minister Lee's proposal to the impact of sanctions on the Korea people, he should demand a study of the impact of Kim Jong-un's policy decisions and the suffering of the people. It is the evil nature of the Kim family regime and the system it has designed to ensure survival through oppression that is the cause of all the problems on the Korean peninsula.”

이인영 장관은 이전에도 국제사회 공감대를 전제로 “비상업용 공공 인프라와 같은 분야로 제재 유연성이 확대되는 것도 바람직하다”며 남북 철도·도로 연결사업 추진 의지를 피력했고, “국제사회가 (북한) 개별방문이 갖는 인도주의적 가치도 함께 고려해 제재에 대해 유연하게 접근할 수 있기를 바란다”며 코로나19 확산세가 가라앉는 대로 금강산 개별관광을 추진하겠다고 밝힌 바 있습니다.

하지만 워싱턴에서는 대북제재 이전부터 만성적인 식량난 등을 겪어온 북한의 극심한 인도주의 위기를 제재 탓으로 돌린 채, 문제의 근원인 김정은 정권의 실정에 대해선 언급을 꺼리는 한국 정부의 대북 ‘저자세’가 도를 넘었다는 지적이 많습니다.

에반스 리비어 전 국무부 동아태 수석부차관보는 “어떤 제재도 인도적 지원이 북한 주민들에게 전달되는 것을 차단하지 않는다”며 “북한의 현 경제 위기는 제재 때문이 아니라 형편없는 경제 계획과 관리상의 무능함이 원인”이라고 지적했습니다.

[에반스 리비어 전 국무부 수석부차관보] “I am not aware of any sanctions that are preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching the people of North Korea. Much of the current economic crisis in North Korea today is caused by poor economic planning and managerial incompetence, the self-imposed isolation and lockdown the regime has implemented because of the coronavirus pandemic, crop failures and bad weather, and the collapse of China-North Korea trade caused by Pyongyang's closure of the border.”

또한 “코로나바이러스 감염증으로 인한 자체적 고립과 봉쇄, 흉작과 악천후, 국경 차단에 따라 붕괴된 북-중 무역 등도 북한 주민을 어렵게 만들었다”며 “이 역시 모두 북한 정권이 자초한 것”이라고 강조했습니다.

수미 테리 전략국제문제연구소(CSIS) 선임연구원도 “주민들이 식량난을 겪는 와중에 핵과 미사일 프로그램 등 군비 확충에 수십억 달러를 지출하고 있는 당사자는 바로 북한”이라며 “북한인들의 삶에 끼치는 영향에 관한 한, 김정은의 정책에 직접적 책임이 있다”고 지적했습니다.

[녹취: 수미 테리 CSIS 선임연구원] “I think Kim Jong-un’s policies are what's directly responsible in terms of impacting the lives of ordinary North Korean people. North Korea is the one that spends billions of dollars in armaments, in nuclear and missile programs, while people are experiencing food shortages.

백악관 국가안보회의 한국 담당 보좌관을 지낸 테리 연구원은 “과거에 한국 통일부는 북한이 국방비를 5%만 줄여도 식량난을 모두 해결할 수 있다고 밝혔었다”며 “따라서 북한 스스로의 정책이 북한 주민의 삶에 영향을 주고 있다는 것은 명백하다”고 거듭 강조했습니다.

[녹취: 수미 테리 CSIS 선임연구원] “I think South Korea's Ministry of Unification in the past has even noted that if North Korea just stopped or even just reduced their defense spending by 5%, they will take care of all of the food shortages in North Korea. So clearly, it's North Korea's own policies that's having an impact on the lives of North Korean people.”

실제로 김정은 국무위원장은 2017년 4월 ‘자강력 제일주의를 구현하여 주체적 국방공업의 위력을 다져나가야 한다’는 제목의 담화문에서 “위대한 장군님께서는 ‘사탕알(식량)이 없이는 살 수 있어도 총알(무력)이 없이는 살 수 없다’며 귀중한 자금을 국방공업 발전에 돌리시였습니다”라고 밝혔습니다.

북한 경제를 최악의 상황에 빠뜨리고 고난의 행군 시기에 수많은 아사자를 발생시킨 김정일 국방위원장의 선군정치를 올바른 선택이었다고 평가한 것입니다.

전문가들은 북한의 민생을 도탄에 빠뜨린 건 대북제재가 아니라 바로 김정은의 이런 인식과 정책 실패라며, 김정은이 생각을 바꾸고 국가 운영 방식을 바꾸지 않는 한 어떤 외부 지원이나 제재 해제도 북한의 인도주의 위기를 해소하지 못할 것이라고 지적합니다.

브루스 벡톨 앤젤로주립대 교수는 “통일부든 누구든 조사 결과 북한의 영양실조 실태를 파악했다면, 그런 상황은 5년 전, 15년 전에도 마찬가지였다는 사실을 기억해야 한다”고 말했습니다. “1992년 이래 지속된 북한의 영양실조 문제는 앞으로도 제재와 관계없이 계속될 것이며, 이는 군부와 엘리트들이 주민들을 차단한 채 모든 부를 독차지하기 때문”이라는 설명입니다.

[녹취: 브루스 벡톨 앤젤로주립대 교수] “Let’s say, group from the Ministry of Unification decides to do a study on this and the result of this study is there are malnourished people in North Korea. Okay, there were malnourished people in North Korea five years ago, there were malnourished people in North Korea fifteen years ago, there were malnourished people in North Korea really starting in 1992. That's going to happen regardless of the sanctions because those people are cordoned off from the elite and from the military, which is always going to get the best stuff and the most money.”

이처럼 과거 남북교류와 대북지원이 활발히 이뤄진 시기에도 북한 주민의 삶은 전혀 나아지지 않았고, 제재가 대폭 강화된 것은 훨씬 뒤의 일이라는 게 전문가들의 지적입니다.

벡톨 교수는 “한국 정부로부터 많은 자금을 공여받은 유엔과 비정부기구의 대북지원이 최고조에 달했던 김대중, 노무현 행정부 시절에도 지원은 일반 주민이 아닌 군부와 엘리트, 평양의 고급 아파트 건설, 최신식 무기 시스템 구입에 사용됐다는 사실을 누구나 알고 있다”며 “제재 여부와 관계없이 북한은 늘 그렇게 했고 앞으로도 그럴 것”이라고 말했습니다.

[녹취: 브루스 벡톨 앤젤로주립대 교수] “You and I both know, even at the peak of the aid that they were getting from NGOs and from the UN during the Kim Dae-jung administration, for example, and the Roh Moo-hyun administration that all this stuff they were getting from the South Korean government and NGOs, which were largely subsidized by the South Korean government that most of that was still not going to the average North Koreans. We know this but those were going to the army, they were going to the elite, they're going to build fancy apartment buildings in Pyongyang, and to buy bright and shiny new military systems. They were not going to do the simple basics of maintaining your populations’ well-being. They just were not, they never were and they won't be whether the sanctions are enforced or not.”

로버트 매닝 애틀랜틱카운슬 선임연구원은 “유엔 제재가 북한 경제에 영향을 준 것은 사실”이라면서도 “주민을 고통에 빠뜨린 장본인은 김정은”이라고 지적했습니다. 그러면서 “김정은의 자체 제재(self-sanctions), 국경 봉쇄, 무역 차단, 최근 당대회에서 자인한 끔찍한 경제 부실 운영, 희소한 재원의 핵·미사일 프로그램 전용이 문제의 근원”이라고 비판했습니다.

[로버트 매닝 애틀랜틱카운슬 선임연구원] “UN Sanctions have had an impact on the DPRK economy. But Kim’s self-sanctions, closing borders, cutting off trade flows, horrific economic mismanagement, as he conceded at the recent Party Congress, and allocating scarce resources to his missile and nuclear weapons programs are the main cause. Kim is the main culprit.”

데이비드 맥스웰 민주주의수호재단(FDD) 선임연구원은 “2500만 명의 북한인들이 엄청난 고통을 겪고 있고, 그들은 매우 열악한 상황에 처해있다”며 “김정은과 국제사회 일각에서는 자연재해와 코로나바이러스 감염증, 제재 탓을 하고 싶겠지만, 이는 원인이 아니다”라고 말했습니다. “주민의 건강과 안녕보다 핵 개발과 군사 현대화를 우선시하는 김정은의 의도적인 정책 결정 때문에 북한인들이 고통을 겪고 있다”는 설명입니다.

[데이비드 맥스웰 FDD 선임연구원] “There is tremendous suffering among the 25 million Koreans in the north. They are facing terrible conditions. While Kim Jong-un (and some of the international community) want to blame the natural disasters, COVID 19, and sanctions, these are not the reason for the people suffering. The people are suffering because of Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear development and military modernization over the health and welfare of the Korean people.”

맥스웰 연구원은 “김정은은 자국민에 대해 염려하지 않고 더욱 압제적인 조치를 취하기 위해 코로나바이러스 위협을 이용하고 있다”며 “이는 김정은이 미국보다 북한인들을 더 두려워하기 때문”이라고 진단했습니다.

[데이비드 맥스웰 FDD 선임연구원] “Proper prioritization of resources in North Korea would reduce the suffering. Kim Jong-un has no concern for the people and has in fact used the COVID 19 threat to impose even greater repressive measures on the population because he fears the Korean people in the north more than he fears the U.S.”

미국 정부의 주도로 강화된 대북제재를 계속 문제 삼는 동맹국의 태도에 누구보다도 강하게 반발해온 인사는 미 의회 의원들과 함께 제재법 입안에 직접 참여했던 제재 전문가들입니다.

2016년 시행된 미국의 ‘대북제재와 정책강화법’ 초안 작성에 참여한 조슈아 스탠튼 변호사는 “모든 중요한 정책 문제와 관련해, 심지어 유엔 제재와 자국민의 시민적 자유를 희생해가며 김정은의 이익을 옹호하는 문재인 행정부의 경향을 고려할 때, 미국이 한국을 동맹으로서, 그리고 수만 명의 미군과 미군 가족들의 안전한 주둔국으로서 신뢰할 수 있는지를 바이든 행정부는 현실적으로 재평가해야 할 것”이라고 주장했습니다.

[조슈아 스탠튼 변호사] “The tendency of the Moon administration to advocate for Kim Jong-un's interests on every important policy question, even at the expense of compliance with U.N. sanctions and the civil liberties of its own citizens, should cause the Biden administration to realistically reassess whether the U.S. can rely on South Korea as an ally, and as a secure host for tens of thousands of our service members and their families.”

더 나아가“부유한 한국에 주둔하는 미군과 이들이 제공하는 안보 혜택이 한국의 잘못된 안전감과 진지하지 않고 비효율적인 대북정책 추진을 뒷받침하는 건 아닌지 질문해봐야 한다”며 “나는 여기에 비관적”이라고 말했습니다.

[조슈아 스탠튼 변호사] “We must ask if our presence in a wealthy South Korea, in addition to the security benefits it offers, undergirds a false sense of security and the unserious, ineffective North Korea policy Seoul continues to pursue. I am a pessimist.”

앞서 미국 국무부는 지난달 26일 ‘제재로 북한 주민의 삶이 어려워졌다’는 이인영 한국 통일부 장관의 발언에 동의하느냐는 VOA의 질문에 북한인들을 고통스럽게 만드는 이유는 제재 때문이 아니라 북한 정권의 정책 때문이라는 사실을 분명히 했습니다.

국무부 대변인실 관계자는 “북한은 국제 항공과 운송에 대한 국경 폐쇄를 비롯해 극도로 엄격한 코로나바이러스 감염증 대응 조치를 시행해 왔다”며 “이런 엄중한 조치들은 1718 위원회로부터 제재 면제를 신속히 승인받은 뒤 도움이 가장 절실한 이들에게 지원을 제공하려는 인도주의 기관과 유엔 기구들, 그리고 다른 나라들의 노력을 크게 저해해 왔다”고 지적했습니다.

VOA 뉴스 백성원입니다.

 


If something is in me which can be called religious then it is the unbounded admiration for the structure of the world so far as our science can reveal it.[21]

Albert Einstein - Wikipedia 한글위키 on religion

Albert Einstein - Wikipedia

Einstein spoke of his spiritual outlook in a wide array of original writings and interviews.[167] Einstein stated that he had sympathy for the impersonal pantheistic God of Baruch Spinoza's philosophy.[168] 
He did not believe in a personal god who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings, a view which he described as naïve.[169] He clarified, however, that "I am not an atheist",[170] preferring to call himself an agnostic,[171][172] or a "deeply religious nonbeliever".[169] 
When asked if he believed in an afterlife, Einstein replied, "No. And one life is enough for me."[173]

Einstein was primarily affiliated with non-religious humanist and Ethical Culture groups in both the UK and US. He served on the advisory board of the First Humanist Society of New York,[174] and was an honorary associate of the Rationalist Association, which publishes New Humanist in Britain. For the 75th anniversary of the New York Society for Ethical Culture, he stated that the idea of Ethical Culture embodied his personal conception of what is most valuable and enduring in religious idealism. He observed, "Without 'ethical culture' there is no salvation for humanity."[175]

In a German-language letter to philosopher Eric Gutkind, dated 3 January 1954, Einstein wrote:

The word God is for me nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of honorable, but still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty childish. No interpretation no matter how subtle can (for me) change this. ... For me the Jewish religion like all other religions is an incarnation of the most childish superstitions. And the Jewish people to whom I gladly belong and with whose mentality I have a deep affinity have no different quality for me than all other people. ... I cannot see anything 'chosen' about them.[176]

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종교적 견해
아인슈타인은 불가지론자였다. 특히 확률적으로 존재하기 어려운 인격신, 유대교와 기독교 세계관의 야훼를 부정하였으며, 자유의지의 존재도 과학적으로 확인되지 않았다는 이유로 믿지 않았고, 생명체의 사고는 주로 환경에 의해 결정된다고 보았다. 생전에 아인슈타인은 이런 말을 했다.[33]

나는 자신의 창조물을 심판한다는 신을 상상할 수가 없다. 또한 나는 물리적인 죽음을 경험하고도 살아남는 사람이란 것을 상상할 수도 없으며, 믿고 싶지도 않다. 유약한 영혼들이 두려움이나 터무니없는 자기중심적 사고에 빠진 나머지 그런 사고를 전도한다. 나는 삶의 영원성이 미스터리로 남은 지금 그대로에, 그리고 내가 현 세계의 놀라운 구조를 엿볼 수 있음에 만족하며, 또한 비록 작은 부분이기는 하지만, 자연에 스스로를 체화한 이성의 일부를 이해하는 데 내가 전력투구해온 삶에 만족한다.
 
— 아인슈타인, "Mein Weltbild" (1931)
또한 1954년에 아인슈타인이 철학자 에릭 구트킨트(Eric Gutkind)에게 보내는 편지에는 이런 내용들이 적혀있다.[34]

내게 신이라고 하는 단어는 인간의 약점을 드러내는 표현이나 산물에 불과하다. 성서는 명예롭지만 꽤나 유치하고 원시적인 전설들의 집대성이며 아무리 치밀한 해석을 덧붙이더라도 이 점은 변하지 않는다.
 
— 아인슈타인, 1954년 1월 3일의 편지
아인슈타인의 종교적 관점에서의 창조주에 대한것은 다음과 같은 아인슈타인의 견해가 기록되어 있다.[35]

인간이 도저히 이해가 되지 않는 우주에 나타나 있는 초월적 존재에 대한 감성적인 확신이 내가 이해하는 하나님이다
 
— 아인슈타인, 1953 출간된 영국 런던의 책자
그러나, 위의 아인슈타인이 직접 적인 견해와 달리, 주변에서 본 아인슈타인의 모습에 대해서는 "아인슈타인은 같이 연구를 하는 동료 과학자들과의 입장과는 달리, 비록 성경에서 기록된 창조주는 아니라도, 아인슈타인은 우주를 창조한 창조주에 대한 확고한 믿음을 가졌다." 라고 휴 로스(Hugh Ross, 점진론적 창조론자) 박사는 책에 기록하였다.[36] 아인슈타인의 종교관을 스피노자의 합리주의적인 범신론에 가깝다고 보기도 한다.
===


[책] Buddhist Modernities 불교 근대

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[책] Buddhist Modernities 불교 근대
Re-inventing Tradition in the Globalizing Modern World
Edited by Hanna Havnevik, Ute Hüsken, Mark Teeuwen, Vladimir Tikhonov, Koen Wellens
© 2017 – Routledge
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Description
The transformations Buddhism has been undergoing in the modern age have inspired much research over the last decade. The main focus of attention has been the phenomenon known as Buddhist modernism, which is defined as a conscious attempt to adjust Buddhist teachings and practices in conformity with the modern norms of rationality, science, or gender equality. This book advances research on Buddhist modernism by attempting to clarify the highly diverse ways in which Buddhist faith, thought, and practice have developed in the modern age, both in Buddhist heartlands in Asia and in the West. It presents a collection of case studies that, taken together, demonstrate how Buddhist traditions interact with modern phenomena such as colonialism and militarism, the market economy, global interconnectedness, the institutionalization of gender equality, and recent historical events such as de-industrialization and the socio-cultural crisis in post-Soviet Buddhist areas. This volume shows how the (re)invention of traditions constitutes an important pathway in the development of Buddhist modernities and emphasizes the pluralistic diversity of these forms in different settings.
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Table of Contents

1 Buddhist Modernities: Modernism and its Limits
Mark Teeuwen
Part 1: Early Meetings with Modernity
2 The Scope and Limits of Secular Buddhism: Watanabe Kaikyoku (1868-1912) and the Japanese New Buddhist "Discovery of Society"
James Mark Shields
3 Buddhism and the Capitalist Transformation of Modern Japan: Sada Kaiseki (1818-1882), Uchiyama Gudō (1874-1911), and Itō Shōshin (1876-1963)
Fabio Rambelli
4 Parsing Buddhist Modernity in Republican China: Ten Contrasting Terms
Justin R. Ritzinger
5 Seeking the Colonizer’s Favours for a Buddhist Vision: the Korean Buddhist Nationalist Paek Yongsŏng’s (1864-1940) Imje Sŏn Movement
Hwansoo Kim
Part 2: Revivals and Neo-Traditionalist Inventions
6 Buddhism in Contemporary Kalmykia: "Pure" Monasticism versus Challenges of Post-Soviet Modernity
Valeriya Gazizova
7 Buddhist Modernity and New-Age Spirituality in Contemporary Mongolia
Hanna Havnevik
8 Yumaism: A new Syncretic Religion among the Himalayan Limbus
Linda Gustavsson
Part 3: Contemporary Sangha-State Relations
9 Failed Secularisation, New Nationalism and Governmentality: The Rise of Buddhism in Post-Mao China
Koen Wellens
10 Militarized Masculinity with Buddhist Characteristics: Buddhist Chaplains and their Role in the South Korean Army
Vladimir Tikhonov
11 Re-Enchantment Restricted: Popular Buddhism and Politics in Vietnam Today
Aike P. Rots
12 "Buddhism Has Made Asia Mild…" – The Modernist Construction of Buddhism as Pacifism
Iselin Frydenlund
Part 4: Institutional Modernity
13 Family, Gender and Modernity in Japanese Shin Buddhism
Jessica Starling
14 Theravāda Nuns in the USA: Modernization and Tradition
Ute Hüsken
15 Some Reflections on Thich Nhat Hanh’s Monastic Code for the 21st Century
Jens W. Borgland
16 Modernizing American Zen through Scandal: Is "The Way" Really the Way?
Stuart Lachs
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[남북문제][한국사회의 개혁] 이남곡 선생이 제창하는 건강한 중도파 운동

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Sejin Pak
dstie3dih SMpaoconrtmchso relS2d018  · Adelaide  · 
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[남북문제][한국사회의 개혁] 이남곡 선생이 제창하는 건강한 중도파 운동
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이남곡: (내가 살을 조금 부처서) 1803
1] 통일문제
- 통일에 반대하는 것이 아니라, 지금 단계에서 (그것부터) 거론할 문제가 아니라고 본다.   
- 외교에서 반일-반미-친중- (친북?)은 옳은 선택이 아니다. 
- 남북간에는 우선은 국교정상화 (미국과 일본도 북한과 국교정상화)
-  (통일은 마음속에 두고 언제인가를 위하여 준비해야 한다.)
- 국내에서는 과거에 실패한 좌우 (진보보수)합작을 계속 시도하여 제 3의 노선으로 남남갈등을 줄일 것(?).
2] 사회개혁에서는
(보수이거나, 진보이거나) "진정한 교체는 정권의 인위적 노력이 아니라 ‘맑은 물 붓기’에 의해 이루어진다. 진정으로 이 나라의 주류가 건강하게 변하기를 원한다면 ‘새로운 인간, 새로운 사회, 새로운 문명’이 발전할 수 있도록 그 토양을 만드는 일에 힘을 쏟을 일이다."
Namgok Lee
dstie3dih SMpaoconrtmchso relS2d018  · 
얼마 전에 지인(知人)으로부터 내가 젊어서 한 때 운동을 같이 했던 사람들이 나를 통일에 반대하는 사람이라고 한다는 말을 들었다.
내가 신문 칼럼이나 sns(페북) 등에 공개적으로 제안하는 글들을 보면서일 것이다.
나는 통일에 반대하는 것이 아니라, 지금 단계에서 통일을 거론하는 것은 축복이 아니라 ‘재앙’이라고 보고 있다.
내 생각이 바뀔 수 있는 근거를 제시하면 나는 통일에 반대할 사람이 아니다.
진정으로 통일을 원한다면 소중한 보물을 깊이 간직하는 것처럼 심장 속 깊이 감추라고 말하고 싶다.
나는 거의 대부분의 사람들이 ‘독립’을 가망 없는 것으로 보고 전향하던 시기에 끝까지 독립운동을 한 선열(先烈)들을 존경한다.
그것과는 별개로 ‘해방’이 분단과 동독 상잔으로 이어진 역사에 대해서는 실사구시해야 미래를 설계할 수 있다.
우리 힘으로 이룬 해방이 아니다.
일제의 패망으로 왔다.
그리고 냉전을 맞았다.
분단의 외적 조건이다.
삼일운동 이후 임시정부가 수립되었지만, 좌우 합작에 실패하였다.
분단의 내적 조건이다.
그리고 70년이 지났다.
남북은 각각 다른 길을 걸었고, 민족의 동질성보다 두 국가의 이질성이 훨씬 심화되었다.
그리고 지금 북핵을 둘러 싸고 일촉즉발의 전쟁 위기까지 내몰리고 있다.
이런 엄중한 시기에 문재인 정부가 평창 올림픽을 통해 남북 간 대화와 북미간 대화의 물꼬를 튼 것에 대해 진심으로 높게 평가한다.
그리고 평창 기간 ‘우리민족끼리’나 ‘통일’에 대한 말을 대통령을 비롯해 정부의 책임 있는 당국자 누구도 입에 올리지 않은 것을 높게 평가한다.
이 말들은 현실성이 없을 뿐 아니라 현상을 제대로 보지 못하게 하고 관념을 70년 전에 묶어 놓는 역할을 한다.
 개방에 약할 수 밖에 없는 북쪽이 이 말들을 주로 하는 것은 아이러니지만, 그 만큼 그 진의를 잘 파악해야 한다.
아마 문재인 정부의 의도는 모르겠지만, 지금 여러 추측들이 나오고 있다.
복잡한 국제정세와 열강들의 이해가 정면으로 부딪치는 지정학적 조건 속에서 그만큼 우리 정부의 고뇌가 깊은 면도 있겠지만 나는 그것이 추측일 뿐 문재인 정부의 공식적인 입장이 아니기를 바라는 몇 가지가 있다.
이것은 우리가 지난 70년 만들어온 역사 위에 우리가 서 있다는 자각을 놓치면 엉뚱한 길로 갈 수 있고, 그 길은 재앙이 될 수 있다는 생각 때문이다.
우리는 산업화에 성공했고, 어떻든 세계 10위 권의 경제 대국이 되었다.
우리는 민주화 분야에서도 제도적 민주주의를 상당한 수준으로 달성했다.
해방과 동시에 세웠어야 할 민족적 정의(친일청산)를 제대로 이루지 못한 상태에서 전개되었다.
두 가지만 간략하게 언급하고 싶다.
 하나는 반일(反日) 친중(親中)이나 반미(反美) 친중(親中)은 옳은 선택이 아니라는 것이다.
등거리 외교가 방향이다. 아마 사람마다 친소(親疏)는 다양할 수 있다. 그러나 나라의 정책은 그것보다는 냉철한 이해관계의 파악 위에 서야한다. 
아마 현 정부도 잘 알고 있을 것이라고 본다.
그리고 20-30 세대는 물론이지만 전체 국민을 대상으로 만약 부득이 해서 국적을 선택해야 한다면 어떤 나라를 선택할지 조선민주주의인민공화국을 포함해서 미국, 일본, 중국 등에 한정해서 여론조사를 한다면 어떤 결과가 나올 것인지 생각해 보기 바란다.
관념의 이중성을 잘 봐야 한다.
또 하나는 이른바 ‘주류교체’에 대한 것이다.
민주주의 국가에서 어떤 정권에 의한 인위적인 주류교체 시도는 가능하지 않을 뿐 아니라 극도로 분열되어 있는 우리 현실에서 그런 시도는 오히려 재앙으로 작용할 가능성이 크다.
이것도 추측 기사로 보고 있지만, 우려 된다.
진정한 교체는 정권의 인위적 노력이 아니라 ‘맑은 물 붓기’에 의해 이루어진다.
진정으로 이 나라의 주류가 건강하게 변하기를 원한다면 ‘새로운 인간, 새로운 사회, 새로운 문명’이 발전할 수 있도록 그 토양을 만드는 일에 힘을 쏟을 일이다.
이것도 현 정부는 잘 인식하고 있을 것이다.
노파심에서 몇 자 적어본다.
새벽의 단상이다.

Quakers and Business Group - Decision making 'in the manner of Friends'

Quakers and Business Group - Decision making 'in the manner of Friends'

Quakers and Business Group
Promoting Quaker values in Business and the Workplace
Decision making 'in the manner of Friends'
David Boulton reports on an experiment in exporting Quaker decision-making to other communities. This article was originally published in The Friend (3rd October 2014).

Is our much treasured method of deciding business ‘in the manner of Friends’ exclusive to our Society? Does it only work for Quakers, or is it, in one form or another, exportable to other religious or even secular communities? Might we be sitting on a secret that should be shared with others?

I ask because I’ve recently been involved in an experiment designed to explore this very question. Each year Lancaster University (which has historic Quaker connections) runs a unique course for senior business people and decision-makers from all over the world, many of them on the board of major household-name multinational companies. The three-week programme aims to expand their business horizons by introducing them to ways of thinking that they would be unlikely to come across in the standard Harvard-type business school. So they find themselves studying stuff like William Wordsworth’s The Prelude – and even Quaker faith & practice!

Listening
At the university’s invitation, I contribute an annual lecture on Quakerism to men and women, most of whom have never heard of Quakers. This year I had a group of fourteen from Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, the USA, Japan, Korea and Brazil. I was given a couple of hours to fill them in on Quaker history, testimonies, worship and practice. But what really grabbed their attention was the Quaker method of decision-making, no doubt because it was so very different from what they are used to in the boardroom.

It seemed to me that the best way to get across how Quaker decision-making works was to involve them in the process. So, I asked them to imagine that they had been appointed by an international body – the ‘G14’ – commissioned to make a ruling on corporate taxation. Their remit was to decide whether it would be best, in the interest of both the business community and the general public, for there to be an internationally agreed level of corporate taxation, applied to all countries, or to leave each country to set its own levels.

As the (in this case) self-appointed clerk, I outlined the rules. First, a period of silence while hearts and minds were prepared, then the importance of listening to each opinion or comment without interruption, allowing a period of silence between each contribution. There would be no vote. Instead, the clerk, supported in silence, would draft a minute summarising the sense of the meeting. This would be offered for approval, rejection or further consideration.

Being in unity
The first speaker favoured an internationally binding agreement on corporate tax levels, signalling international cooperation rather than competition. Another was eager to respond and had to be reminded of the silence rule. After maybe twenty seconds or so he suggested that a common level would disadvantage less developed countries, depriving them of the power to attract investment by setting lower tax rates. What might be intended as a fairness rule, he suggested, would be fairer to some than to others. More silence, followed by more contributions as the meeting considered complexities beyond the clerk’s understanding!

It became clear that the meeting was not of one mind on the question, but was in unity with the proposal that the ‘G14’ members consult with those they represented and reconvene to consider how best to take the matter forward. The clerk minuted this, read it to the meeting and was rewarded with a multilingual chorus of ‘Hope so!’

Was this an authentic Quaker Business Meeting? Of course not. It could never be more than a shared experience of the mechanics of consensual decisionmaking. But what followed, in the brief time available as the session had overrun, was a passionate discussion on the value of seeking agreement by consensus rather than by adversarial debate focused on winning majorities. No-one, least of all the clerk, was misled into supposing this had been a real Quaker Business Meeting in ‘right ordering’, but it clearly made a strong impression on those who took part. The organisers told me that it remained a talking point throughout the rest of the programme and participators’ evaluation sheets scored it as the most stimulating session of the course.

Consensual models
So, how might this relate to the question I posed at the beginning? Is Quaker decision-making ‘in the manner of Friends’ exportable? Clearly, I do not expect our process, enriched by more than three centuries of discernment and experience, to be adopted lock, stock and barrel in the boardrooms of Lufthansa and Sony. But is it too much to hope that, even in the most competitive environments, consensual models of making decisions might lead to better outcomes than traditional models built around strategies for defeating and out-voting one’s perceived opponents?

By now, I guess, there will be some readers who are already halfway through drafting a letter to the editor drawing my attention to paragraph 3.02 in Quaker faith & practice, which insists on a distinction between ‘the secular idea of consensus’ and recognising God’s will ‘through the discipline of silent waiting’. I do see the difference, but I do not, personally, believe that it is important. However we may choose to describe it, we know from experience that in the discipline of silence ‘a new way may be discovered which none present had alone perceived and which transcends the differences of the opinions expressed. This is an experience of creative insight, leading to a sense of the Meeting’ (Quaker faith & practice 3.06).

Creative insight
If we really want to share with others our ‘experience of creative insight’ as we grapple with decision-making in the discipline of silence, we should perhaps avoid being too dogmatic about insisting on one understanding (God’s will) to the exclusion of another (seeking consensus). After all, whether the guidance we rely on is divine or human, it’s we fallible humans who decide whether to paint the Meeting house walls pink, or what name to give the refurbished Large Meeting Room at Friends House.

We decide ‘in the manner of Friends’. Maybe what is exportable is the process of deciding ‘in the manner of friends’.

‘In the manner of Friends’ | Quaker Historical Lexicon

‘In the manner of Friends’ | Quaker Historical Lexicon

‘In the manner of Friends’

11th of 2th mo., 2010

Quakers will sometimes describe something as done in (or afterthe manner of Friends.  This means just what it sounds like it means: that the activity in question is performed in a distinctively or traditionally Quaker fashion.  Most often, this phrase is used of worship or marriage, since in both these areas, Friends’ practice is noticeably different from that of other denominations; but it is occasionally applied to many other sorts of activities as well.

This phrase appears to originate in the first half of the 19th century.  The earliest occurrences I have found are in the Journal of the Life, Labours, and Travels of Thomas Shillitoe (1839), for example in vol. 1, p. 68:

A company of very poor persons at West Houghton, about ten miles
from Warrington, were in the practice of meeting together for religious worship after the manner of Friends, towards whom my attention was turned, with an apprehension of duty to sit with them on First-day in their usual meeting.

The earliest application of this phrase to marriage that I know of is in Life of William Allen, (1847), vol. 1, p. 303, where he describes an interview with the king of Norway, in which the subject of legal recognition for Quaker marriages was discussed:

We spoke of the Friends in Norway, and he told us that the affair of marriage had been before the council, and it was concluded that, provided it was performed after the manner of Friends, and registered, it should be lawful, and that he would protect not only the Friends there at present, but those who might join them in future.

The phrase was used early on for other practices as well, such as shaking hands at the end of a meeting, as in this 1842 report quoted by John Wilbur in A Narrative and Exposition of the Late Proceedings of New England Yearly Meeting pp. 90–91:

We hereby certify, that at the Monthly Meeting of Friends, held at Hopkinton, on the 22d of 8th month last, while the report of the committee in the case of John Wilbur, was in the hands of the women’s meeting, we saw Rowland Greene and Thomas Anthony,
then sitting at the head of the meeting, shake hands after the manner of Friends when breaking up a meeting; but just at that moment, before there was time for others to follow, the women returned the report, and the meeting remained some time longer together.

Stanley Newman uses the phrase to describe the procedure by which a minister requests the approval of a meeting before setting off on a religious journey, in Memories of Stanley Pumphrey (1883), p. 100:

The time was now approaching when after the manner of Friends, this important prospect of service should be thrown before the meetings with which he was connected, for the serious consideration of his fellow-members.

Before closing, perhaps I should say something about the phrase communion after the manner of Friends, used nowadays for waiting worship — predominately, I think, by Orthodox Friends.  This has been around since at least the early 1960’s.  The earliest attestation I have found is in Cecil Riney’s (1964) USC dissertation The Emergence and Development of a Ministry of Music in the Society of Friends, where it appears as part of a sample “Order of Service” on p. 167.

Another relatively early appearance in print is on p. 229 of D. Elton Trueblood’s (1967) biography Robert Barclay.  It is clear from this quote that the phrase was already in reasonably widespread use at that time:

One consequence of this interpretation is that some Friends in the twentieth century now speak of their meetings as “Communion after the manner of Friends.”

This is part of a larger passage in which Trueblood expands on Barclay’s explanation of communion as an inward, spiritual partaking of the blood and body of Christ, not an outward, ceremonial practice with bread and wine.  This conception of communion can certainly be traced back to early Friends, but referring to our worship as “communion in the manner of Friends” is, as Trueblood points out, a modern innovation.

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In the Manner of Friends: Learnings from Quaker Practice for Organizational Renewal | Emerald Insight

In the Manner of Friends: Learnings from Quaker Practice for Organizational Renewal | Emerald Insight

er of Friends: Learnings from Quaker Practice for Organizational Renewal
In the Manner of Friends: Learnings from Quaker Practice for Organizational Renewal
Meryl Reis Louis 
Journal of Organizational Change Management

ISSN: 0953-4814

Publication date: 1 February 1994 Reprints & Permissions

Abstract
Tells the story of Quaker meeting, drawing on readings and experiences of the author over the past three years. Describes common practices and key features of the Quaker way, including Meeting for Worship, committees and governance, fellowship, and Meeting for Business. Provides a view of Quaker practice and its effects in a secular setting. Argues that renewal in the sense of restoration and refreshment of vigour and human spirit are warranted in today′s society and work settings, and that the Quaker way can provide useful guidance in such an effort. The change strategy developed works from the “person‐out” rather than from the top down or the bottom up.

Keywords
      

Bioethics as a way of resistance to biopolitics and biopowers

 

 



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Bioethics as a way of resistance to biopolitics and biopowers



Fermin Roland Schramm




Fermin Roland Schramm

PhD, professor at the National School of Public Health (Ensp/Fiocruz) and at the University of Brasília (UnB), researcher at the national Institute of Cancer (Inca), Rio de Janeiro/Brasília, Brazil



Abstract The work attempts to deconstruct the concepts of biopolitics and biopower and seeks to create conditions for a correct action of bioethics, understood both as an analytical tool and normative of the morality of biopolitics and biopower and as practical application in the form of democratic resistance and dissidence with respect to morally questionable purposes, resulting from biopolitical practices and the improper use of such concepts to perform them. Their assumption is that the concepts of biopolitics and biopower are used most of times, in an inconsistent way or as passepartout words, which affects its power of intelligibility for understanding the profound changes in contemporary society, including with respect to perceptions of itself while a 'living system'. Deconstruction is therefore a necessary pre-operation due to the subsumption of ethics to politics, supposedly legitimized by the common reference to "life", indicated by the Greek word bios, which, however, reveals itself inextricably linked to zoé, if not subsumed to this. Finally, this paper discusses the proposals for biopolitical democracy and democratic biopolitics, showing the need for a bioethical control of biopolitics.



Key-words: Bioethics. Biopolitics. Control. Justice. Immunity.







This work attempts to deconstruct the concepts of biopower and biopolitics and aims to detect the contradictions resulting from the misuse of these two concepts, showing some interpretative conflicts involved. Deconstruction is understood here in the sense given by Derrida, that is, a practice of critical reading of the speeches that take refuge in the concepts of biopower and biopolitics and a method - or strategy - to analyze the existing imaginary and symbolic constructions, but highlighting the need to reconstruct what has been forgotten or repressed in them, from what anyone believes that ethics cannot be deconstructed: justice - which can also be understood as a principle, both formal and substantive in any ethics and / or policy. The conception of justice as originates from the formal principle of Aristotle, who considered it the architectural virtue that sustains and should govern the common life.



For Derrida, this procedure for the dismantling of categories, concepts and speeches, thanks to the practice of critical reading, is achieved through a thinking of structured genealogy of its concepts as faithful and internal way as possible, but at the same time external, determining that what this story could conceal or forbid, becoming history through this repression somehow interested.1



The assumption of this approach is that deconstruction is a necessary condition for bioethics to be able to fulfill not only its dual descriptive and normative role in relation to moral facts, i.e., of rational and impartial analysis of the morality of the facts of biopolitics and biopower, proposing rules to regulate the conflicts involved, but also to provide support to the recipients of these facts, thanks to justice, which, for Derrida, would be that which cannot be deconstructed and that encourages and legitimizes the project of deconstruction. Furthermore, it also assumes the existence of the roles of resistance and dissence regarding the attempts to subsume the bioethical problematic and the biopolitical problematic, i.e., of submitting or subsuming ethical questioning to supposed pragmatic needs of a political realism, considered the most concrete, effective and legitimate in its management of bodies, populations and life in general, but which may in fact be a mere cynicism and justification for biopolitical practices that continue to be morally questionable because they are unjust.



Particularly, the operation of deconstruction has a practical effect, because it can be considered a necessary condition in order a pluralistic and secular bioethics can be rebuilt as a tool of resistance to the unfair effects resulting from uses and abuses of biopolitics, having as a paradigmatic reference the authoritarian and bioethical power represented by Nazism. In short, deconstruction is an analytical and interpretative method of moral conflicts placed on biopolitics, but also a practical tool that justifies bioethical practices questioning biopolitics and biopower.



In fact, the concepts of biopolitics and biopower are used often on an inconsistently and unnecessary way, or as passe-partout words (or clichés), including two in the field of bioethics2, reason why it seems to be necessary their deconstruction so a field of criticism of the existing can be rebuilt, as can be that of bioethics, grounded by 'undesconstructability' of justice that makes deconstruction possible 3.



Thinking in terms of genealogy, when it comes to biopolitics and biopower a mandatory reference and the text by Michel Foucault's The Will to Knowledge, 1976, in which, its final chapter presents a first systematic reflection of these two concepts, relating them with the forms of power (and power-knowledge) on the vital processes in the fields of health and hygiene, production and reproduction, but trying to avoid any kind of anthropologism in their approaches 4.



Another author who became a constant reference and Giorgio Agamben, with the work Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, published in 1995, which incorporates the concept of biopolitics, but deconstructs the concepts of bare life and homo sacer and focuses its attention on the power devices over the biological body, having as a paradigmatic reference the concentration camp 5.



A third author also became, recently, a reference. He is Roberto Esposito, who in 2004 launched Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, in which he retakes and reconfigures the project of Foucault and Agamben, aimed at the concept of biopolitics from the deconstruction of the concept of bios and relating biopolitics and tana politics to understand the enigma of biopolitics and try its affirmative reconversion, i.e., in terms of democratic biopolitics or biopolitical democracy, but without distinguishing the two possible reconfigurations 6.



However, none of the three authors made explicit reference to bioethics which, on the contrary, is made by bioethicists dealing with biopolitics, as it is the case of sanitary bioethics, which, however, must face this confrontation with biopolitics, including with the internal criticism that would have detected internal faults and failures that have led to suggest the replacement of the shortcomings inherent to an applied ethics for a more effective and robust biopolitics 7. Therefore, the need to see what, indeed, may indicate the terms biopolitics and biopower, and which they are or may be, the relationship between biopolitics, biopower, and bioethics, or, rather, between the so-called political realism personified by biopolitics and biopower, and the political justice, personified by a correctly interpreting and acting bioethics.


The problematic biopolitics word



The word biopolitics appears in the Houaiss Dictionary of Portuguese Language, which gives the following ambiguous definition: an interdisciplinary science that studies the integration and reconciliation of modern society and its institutions with the infrastructure of basic organic support (nature, climate, soil health, water purity etc.) 8. But the word does not appear in the Novo Aurelio of the 21st Century.



Such ambiguity does not appear to be due to chance, since what characterizes biopolitics would be a clear conceptual vagueness, since that the concept of biopolitics appears crossed by an uncertainty [that] prevents any stable connotation [and that] seems to make him not only the instrument but also an object of a harsh political and philosophical confrontation about the configuration and the fate of our time, raising the question of knowing: how a policy that will be directly addressed to it should be thought? 9



One of the consequences relevant to bioethics and the ambiguity and vagueness of the biopolitics concept allows it to be used to connote phenomena seemingly antithetical, as can be, on the one hand, contemporary policies for care, protection and welfare - as were and still are the public policies of democratic states – and on the other hand, the ways that biotanatopolíticas that conceived the state as a body that must be immunized against pathogenic elements - such as, for example, biocracy of Nazi politics.



On the first connotation, biopolitics applies to government practices defined as forms of biopower that, according to Foucault, aim to ensure and strengthen the population's health through the control and intervention over births, morbidities, skills and environment, and also through the control, management and intervention over the human body (the individual) and over the human species (this being understood more than as polis or society than as biological species).

In this case, the concepts of bios and polis may have two types of relationship: a) a relationship among themselves with no priority of a concept over another - that linguists call paratactic and that may also be the form of an interface, or b) a relationship of subsumption of the first (bios) in relation to the second (polis) - called by linguists hypotactic - which corresponds roughly to the type of relationship existing in the Greek period.



This hypotactic relationship was recovered by Hannah Arendt, when the philosopher tries to restore the difference made by Aristotle (but unlit by modernity) between bios and zoé, understanding this as the biological life which man shares with other living beings and that as the specifically human life (…) full of events which can later be narrated as history and establish a biography 10. But in this second circumstance, rather than a interface between bios and polis we have a subsumption which can be either the bios of the polls – that is that the case referred to by Aristotle and Arendt - as an annexation (Anschluss) of the polis to bios, that is, a policy submitted to biology and its laws, as was certainly the case in Nazi biocracy.



However, a clear distinction between the two conceptions is not always easy to do, and one of such amphibologies or conceptual duplicity can be seen in public health itself, where sanitary policies seem to oscillate between the poles of medicalization of life, encouraged, mainly by the pharmaceutical industry 11, and politics itself (we could say), encouraged by the sanitary movement which led to the Unified Health System (SUS) and established focal points between health sciences, political science, human science and social movements. That is, where aspects of biopolitics and biopower are manifest in the fact that sanitary policies manage, discipline and control the bodies, lives, morbidity and death of populations under their responsibility (or management) but leaving uncovered the question of the ethical and bioethical aspects involved by becoming the inclusion of life in the devices of biopolitics and biopower applied to the perception and management of collective health. And this seems to be one of the priority tasks of sanitary bioethics, which shall begin its work analyzing its possible links with biopolitics and biopower.


The biopolitics-biopower– bioethics set ad its relationship with bios



The conceptual relationships between biopolitics, biopower and bioethics can be detected by analyzing the common reference to the prefix bios, noting that the relationship is not necessarily the same for the three and that this is due probably to the problematic use of the concept 'life' in bioethics and [to] their interfaces [established] with the biopolitical praxis and the biopower devices 12, which are not very clear.



For Agamben, behind this ambiguity there would be a real indistinction between the zoé and bios concepts themselves, which for the Greeks (who created such terms) indicated realities distinct from life as a whole: the simple natural life (zoé) and a particular way of life (bios), i.e., life in general and qualified lifestyle that is typical of men, immersed in the biological body and [in the] political body 13. This distinction will be eliminated from the Modernity, when confusion will be installed between the two concepts that Agamben considers the decisive fact in the origin of the totalitarian biopolitics of the twentieth century. When bios and zoé, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible blur, one can affirm that this entry of zoé in the sphere of polis, the politicization of bare life as such, constitutes the decisive event of modernity, which marks a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories classic thinking14.



Thus, the blurring may become confused when we consider that bioethics, biopolitics and biopower have as a common reference the bios concept, allowing, for example, that to one speaks, on the one hand, on life ethics, politics of life and power of life, but also, on the other hand, in ethics about life, politics, about life and power over life. But this common reference to the bios term does not allow so say that it is the same meaning of life being referred to, even assuming the classic distinction between bios and zoé, since the two prepositions of and about indicate different relationships between politics and life. In particular, the reference to bios made by the biopower / biopolitics - in which the first refers to devices for the effective exercise of power over life represented by biopolitics and the second to the policy aimed to implement and manage biopower - has in fact a nature different from that of bioethics, when this is understood as bioethics of life and not on power against biopower, i.e., as empowerment of citizens.15



Moreover, until the present moment, it has not been established any consensus on relations between biopolitics and biopower or between potency and power. There is, for example, some who consider that the relationship paratactic relationship biopower- biopolitics (which is in substance Foucault's position) can be seen as an biopower / biopolitics opposition. This dichotomy between the two concepts is considered, for example, by Toni Negri and Michael Hardt, who define biopower - represented by power of the crowd - as opposed to biopolitics or as a form of resistance to it 16.



This form of resistance can, for example, be seen as a rejection of the repressive hypothesis according to which modern power censures, interdicts and represses freedom and desire, since the power would be less what prevents than what produces, and life is not simply the victim of its repression. Upgrading its resources and potentialities biopower [would give] to life the necessary weapons to its emancipation, as if life should pass through biopower to access to a full system of subjectivity. So biopower would reveal from the exterior the productive dynamism immanent from vital powers, exploring them and moving them, being, therefore, a transformation of this power over life in a power of life, to find again the conditions for a fully developed life. 17 . However, according to Jacques Rancière, this would eventually reaffirm a life rooting of politics18 - which, as discussed below, may represent one of its most questionable forms, according to its full biocratic version.


The need to deconstruct biopolitics



As shown by Esposito6, the term biopolitics (or bio-politics) has conceptual background since at least the early twentieth century, with the appearance of the geopolitical conception of vital space and biogeographic state19 or that of State understood as an organism, which would have anatomy and physiology of its own to be protected by state medicine 20



In 1911 the term biopolitics emerges, with the following explanation: the term 'biopolitics' means a policy that should consider two aspects of nation: first, the increase in population and competition, and secondly, the individual attributes of human that are available to fill posts of responsibility in the State.21



In 1920 appears the term biopolitics (without hyphen) associated with a vitalistic conception of State, conceived as a body with natural instincts and impulses, but still leaves space for the specificities of bios: this strain characteristic of life itself (...) led me to call such his discipline biopolitics, by analogy with [a] biology; it is better understood when one considers that the Greek word 'bios' means not only the natural, physically life, but still but also in an equally significant measure the cultural life. This designation is also intended to express that dependence on the laws of life that society expressed herein and promotes the state itself [to] the role of arbitrator or at least of a mediator 22.



When spelled bio-politics the word reappears with the installation of Nazi biocracy when bios is subsumed to zoé and bio-politics will be understood as the study of the risks and diseases of the social body, and associated to the question of the immune defense to be assumed by policy 23. The many meanings of biopolitics were preserved throughout the twentieth century. For example, biopolitics perceived as a policy guided by the life sciences as 24 or as a strategy of compatibilization between the human gender and the environment 25, with respect to linkages between politics and life sciences, in particular the subsumption of politics and biology.



But the term is also re-sementicized in a neohumanist key after the defeat of Nazism: [a] biopolitics does not deny [the] blind forces of violence and the will of power, nor the self-destructive forces that exist in man and in human civilization [because] these forces are elemental forces of life. But biopolitics denies that such forces are fatal and that cannot be contradicted and directed by spiritual forces - the forces of justice, charity, clarity, the truth 26.



In this respect it is worth remembering also the "ontopolitica" conception of Edgar Morin, aimed at subtracting the evolution of mankind from economicism and productivism in favor of a multidimensional policy of man, so that all paths of life and all the ways of politics begin to meet and interpenetrate themselves, and announce a ontopolitics, respecting more and more and globally the human being 27.



Finally, we must remember the neo-naturalistic concept, a trend that is still present and that refers to nature as a parameter for determining politics, influenced by Darwinism (Social), ethology and sociobiology: [biopolitics and the] term commonly used to describe the approach of the political scientists who use biological concepts (especially the Darwinian evolutionary theory) and techniques of biological research to study, explain, predict and sometimes also prescribe political behavior 28.



It can be deducted from this rapid genealogy that the extension of the semantic field of biopolitics and from the Foucault conference in Rio de Janeiro, in 197429 and the subsequent publication of his book The Will to Knowledge , in 1976, the term biopolitics spread among scientists concerned in studying and understanding the social and political transformations of our time.



In the 1974 lecture, Foucault had used the term bio-politics associating it to the body and medicine, regarding it as a capitalistic strategy: for the capitalistic society the biopolitics is what is important before anything else: the biological, the somatic, the corporeal. The body is a bio-political reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy 29. Subsequently he moved away from previous conceptions of biopolitics, although it shares its criticisms to modernity: 'Biopolitics'shouçld be understood as the way by which, from the eighteenth century, it was sought to rationalize the problems posed for governmental practice by the phenomena peculiar of a set of living being while population: health, hygiene, birth, longevity, race 30.



In another text he specifies the meaning of biopower: it seems to me that one of the fundamental phenomena of the nineteenth century has been, [and] is that the power has assumed life, in a perspective that we could call welfare. It is, so to speak, a catching of power over man as a living being, of a kind of statization of the biological, or at least a trend toward to what we could call the statization of the biological (...) something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of human body, but that would call a 'biopolitics of the human species 31.



In the critical evaluation by Esposito – recognizing the Foucauldian change in the genealogy of biopolitics as we understand it today – in a few years, the notion of 'biopolitics' (...) opened a completely new phase of contemporary reflection. Since Foucault (…) proposed again and reclassified the concept, the whole quadrant of political philosophy was profoundly modified. It did not left the scene [classical categories] as those of 'right', 'sovereignty' or 'democracy' (...). But his meaning effect is increasingly weak [and] the normalization process increasingly invades ample spaces 32.


Three references: Foucault, Agamben and Esposito



When talking about biopower and biopolitics the first mandatory reference is almost always an affirmation of the final chapter of History of sexuality 1- The will to know – in which Foucault writes: for millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question33. And in this text the author introduces the term biopolitics by writing:: we must speak of 'biopolitics' to designate what makes life and its mechanisms enter in the field of explicit calculations and makes power-knowledge a change agent of human life 34.



Another important reference is Homo sacer: the sovereign power and bare life, by Agamben 5, in which the author develops the concepts of bare life and homo sacer in order to rethink the categories of biopolitics and biopower, the light of the Nazi pragmatic biocracy and its extermination device (Shoah), represented by the concentration camp. In a subsequent text, he considered that in contemporary biopolitics there would not be actually a submission of the bios to zoé, but rather a mysterious disconnection between them: in our culture has always been the human was always thought as an articulation and a conjunction of a body and a soul, of a living being and a logos of a natural element (or animal) and a supernatural, social or divine element. We must instead learn to think man as that which results from the disconnection of these elements and examine [the] practical and political mystery of separation 35.



In the genealogy done by Agamben what would prevail in the current biopolitical debates would point out to an indistinction between the zoé and bios concepts, where the disappearance of such distinction would correspond to the emergence of totalitarian biopolitics of the twentieth century. For him, in this case, the terms bios and zoé, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction, because its current use reveals the entry of zoé in the sphere of the polis, the politicization of bare life as such, [which would make] the decisive event of modernity, which marks a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classic thought 36.



In this sense, the double fundamental category of Western policy not [would be] that friend-enemy, but bare life-political existence, zoé-bios, inclusion-exclusion. A conclusion that derives from the fact that politics exists because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes to it the very bare life itself and, at the same time, remains in a relationship with it in an inclusive exclusion, since modern democracy compared to the classic one [has] a claim and a release of zoé, [and because] it seeks constantly to transform the same bare life in terms of life and [find], so to speak, bios zoé 37.



In short, the implication of bare life in the political sphere constitutes the original nucleus – although disguised - of sovereign power. One could say that the production of a biopolitical body is the original contribution of the sovereign power and that biopolitics is, in this sense, at least as old as the sovereign exception, since putting biological life in the center of its calculations the modern state [redirects] to light the secret link that unites the power to bare life 38.

The third reference is the work Bios: Biopolitics and philosophy, by Esposito. For him, what would characterize the concept of biopolitics would be not only its patent conceptual indefinition - highlighted by Agamben - but also – and more radically - a biologicist view of biopolitics, that would make it morally and politically dangerous, since a policy built directly on the bios has the risk of overlapping violently bios to policy 39. The author also criticizes what he considers an anthropological reductionism of biopolitics since in, the concept of biopolitics is in danger of losing weight to the point of losing its identity, becoming a form of traditional humanism 40, in fact incapable of facing the challenges represented in the inter-relationship between life and politics.



Finally, to Esposito, we should also refuse the naturalistic conception, due to confusion between the descriptive aspect and the prescriptive aspect in which it holds itself and that would actually make the argumentation and justification circular. Indeed, in this conception the resulting notion of biopolitics is this time sufficiently clear, but if the political behavior is inextricably wired in the size of the bios and the bios is what binds man to the sphere of nature, the only possible politics shall be that already registered natural in our natural code. In this case, every argumentation would be based in a rhetorical circuit in which theory does not interpret reality, but reality dictates a theory to confirm it. That is, the enigma of biopolitics seems solved - but in a way that gives as an assumption exactly what ones was looking for.41



Esposito also notes that, apparently, all the confusion seems to arise from the very word bios, because if we put our trust to the Greek lexicon (...) more than to the term bios, understood in the sense of 'qualified life' or 'way of life, 'biopolitics refers to the zoé dimension, i.e., of life in its simplest biological expression, or to the line of conjunction along which bios emerges over the zoé also naturalizing itself. But [because of ] from this change in terminology the idea of biopolitics seems to be in a zone of double indiscernibility 42.



Therefore, it could be said that there is a dual indiscernibility in the concept of biopolitics, resulting from the fact that it is inhabited by a term that does not suit it - and that assumes risks even to distort its more remarkable features. In this semantic context the term zoé would become a problematic definition since it would refer to a conception of life absolutely natural (...) without any formal connotation what would be something unthinkable, even today, when the human body appears more challenged, and even literally crossed by the technique 42.



One can therefore say that in his work of deconstruction Esposito would have detected the unthought (or indeed the repressed) of biopolitics 43. The unthought, indeed, would orient it but would have been forgotten by those who highlight the concepts of homo sacer and the state of exception while constituent characteristics of biopolitics (Agamben) as per those that refer to a kind of vitalism in its biopolitics of the crowd (Negri). This unthought, detected by Esposito, and what the author calls the immunitary paradigm associated with the practices of protection against all kinds of risks, since the bacteriological contagion until the so-called terrorism 44.Such paradigm would be for him, a mechanism subjacent to biopolitics that would allow avoiding difficulties of its conceptual vagueness. Indeed, in the immunitas bios and nomos, life and politics, [are indeed] the two components of a single, inseparable, set that only makes sense from the relation between them. Thus, immunity would not only be the relation that connects life to power, but the power to preserve life, since contrarily to everything that involves the concept of biopolitics - understood as a result of the meeting which at one point occurs between the two component elements – of this point of view there is no power external to life, just as life never occurs outside the relations of power. For this reason, in this case, politics could only be seen as a possibility or the instrument to preserve life and immunization as a negative protection of life 45.


Contradictory effects of conceptual vagueness of biopolitics



The conceptual vagueness of biopolitics seems to allow us to use this concept to indicate phenomena as diverse as the public biopolicies for assistance, protection and welfare of democratic states on the one hand, and ways to biotanatopolítica, as was the case of Nazi biopolitics (or biocracy), on the other hand. The two situations that the term biopolitics seems to make indistinguishable, shall however, be analytically distinguishable and practically distinct.



In the first case, the term biopolitics emerges from an inter-relationship (or interface) between bios and polis and refers to welfare policies aimed at guaranteeing and strengthening the health of the population, thanks to devices or the prevention, control, management and intervention over individual human body and over the population, not necessarily identifying itself with a policy on the human species (although may be related to the immunitary paradigm). In the second case, what emerges is a policy where individuals and human populations are conceptually subsumed to the human species, to be (supposedly) protected from pathogens, i.e., instead a relationship (or interface) between bios and polis we have a subsumption (which in fact is an annexation) of polis to bios. In short, a policy subjected to biology and its laws.



But, as pointed out earlier, the bios and polis concepts have two possible logical relationships: 1) the interrelationship with no priority of a concept over the other (paratactic); 2) a subsumption of a term to the other (hypotactic). In turn, the second form of relationship between bios and polis has two possible variants: the subsumption of the bios to polis (which corresponds to the kind of relationship that existed for Aristotle) and the subsumption of polis to bios and, in turn, from bios to zoé, as probably still occurs in immunitary policies.



Despite these logical distinctions, duplicity of meaning (or amphibology) persists today, and is a source of conceptual confusion and practically of possible authoritarian slippage supposedly legitimized by science of life and by the immunitary-type protective policies. And that's exactly what leads to need to deconstruct biopolitics and, from this deconstruction, trying to apply the bioethics tools to detect morality (which includes immorality) of biopolitics and biopower. From this analysis it may then reconstruct forms of resistance on behalf of what cannot be subject to deconstruction: justice.



The form of resistance, represented by the bioethics should, however, comply with certain conditions. First, it should not be seen as substitute (or representative) of social control (which is indeed a guarantee of democracy), but as a tool of resistance to service of possible democratic control of the control, represented by the power exercised by biopower and biopolitics. Secondly, it should make accounts with the actual political consequences resulting from the moral imperative and social justice, what can be possible from the point of view of an intervention bioethics [understood as] the analysis of macro collective problems and conflict 46, in turn coupled to a bioethics of protection, understood not only as a descriptive and normative tool, but particularly as a protection against threats to 'bare life' and as 'minimum' moral indispensable for the existence of organized social life 47.



However, this position should consider the criticism, internal to the bioethics itself, according to which bioethics would be a discipline at risk, due to his alleged excessive academicism, focused on specific and irrelevant problems when compared with the great themes as social inequity, public sanitary policies, ecological crisis, which would be in fact being assumed or attached by biopolitics, and should, therefore, prevent its appropriation from other sides, away from specific agenda of bioethical thought 48. From Indeed, this risk condition of bioethics can be considered as a stimulus for power a bioethics think-resistant, which would include both an intervention bioethics as a bioethics of protection, but knowing that it only become possible if there is a deconstruction predicted category of biopolitics and biopower, as well as the essential criticism of unjustified annexation of bioethics to biopolitics.


Final considerations



What can we tentatively conclude from such deconstruction of the ambiguous and dense category of biopolitics? From this entry in the political field of notion of biological life? The answer is not simple if we consider that biopolitics is not based on a philosophical assumption [but] of concrete events 49, and should therefore do the accounts with facts which, in turn, should be weighted with undesconstructible justice – according to Aristotle – and the architectural virtue of social life.



The paradigmatic example of this process goes back to the Nazi biocracy which, in addition to resulting in a depoliticization of modern philosophy (as intended by Arendt), came to disarrange and reverse the political categories previously defined, historically founded on the separation zoé / bios and on the lexical priority of bios over zoé. That is, the entry on the scene of the notion of life - the dual bios and zoé dimension – crossed and transformed by the tools and devices of the biotechnoscientific paradigm not only mixed up the previous relationship, but also obscured the complexity of relationships between these categories, when applied to the phenomenon of life in its articulations with politics, technique, science, the interests involved, the production and consumption.



To Esposito, it would be precisely the force of biopolitical perspective that would arise from the ability of reading this tangle and this conflict, this displacement and this implication. Otherwise - he asks - what would happen when life, perceived as zoé and not as bios, that before the validity of the biopolitical paradigm was 'out' of the political sphere, breaks into such dimension, exploding its alleged autonomy and shifting the discourse of the modern political philosophy on an irreducible ground to the traditional terms - democracy, power, ideology? 50



The author warns, however, that one should know that biological life of individuals and population [settled down a long time ago] in the center of all significant political decisions, which forces us to a paradigm shift, since the model of medical healing has become not just the privileged object, but the very form of political life, i.e., a policy that only in life finds the only source of possible legitimacy 51.



Referring to the radical heterogeneity represented by Nazism and its biocracy he believes that from the biopolitical standpoint the twentieth century, and even the entire course of modernity - which he considers that staredt with Machiavelli - is not determined, decided, by the superficial and contradictory antithesis between totalitarianism and democracy, but for that, much deeper, because it belongs to the field of wildlife conservation, among history and nature, between historicization of nature and naturalization of history. Moreover, this dichotomy could not simply be reconducted to a symmetrical bipolarity, since that nature - understood in the biological sense, as Nazism has done - is not a anti-history, a philosophy or ideology opposite of the story but a non philosophy and a non ideology. Not a political philosophy, but a political biology, a policy of life and about life reversed into its opposite and, therefore, a producer of death 52.



All this has an important consequence which should not be forgotten, because when this bodily dimension becomes the real interlocutor - contemporarily subject and object – of the government, what is being discussed is, before all, the principle of equality that becomes inapplicable to something like the body, constitutively unlike any other criteria each time definable and modifiable. In this case, what would be being withdrawn was not only the principle of equality, but a whole series of distinctions or oppositions on which it is based [the] whole conception of modern politics from which it is generated: that means those between public and private, artifice and nature, law and theology. Thus, when the body replaces, or 'fills', the abstract subjectivity of the corporation, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish what concerns the public sphere of what concerns the private one [but also] what belongs to the natural order and what may be subjected to the intervention of technique, with all the issues of ethical character [that] this choice implies 53.



To Esposito, the reason for this lack of distinction and the conflicts it inevitably entails and that human life is exactly that about what the public and the private, natural and artificial, politics and theology are intertwined by a bond that no majority decision will be able to undo, since the revolt of life of in the power devices marks the eclipse of democracy, at least of democracy as we have imagined it so far, which would mean to think in another kind democracy - compatible with the ongoing biopolitical change, henceforth irreversible 53. And the author ends his questioning leaving an open question: But where to look, how to think, which may mean, today, a biopolitics democracy or a democratic biopolitics - capable of influencing over the bodies, but for the sake of the bodies?54 It assumes this is something very difficult to tell on a determined manner, since at the moment it is something we can only glimpse, even though we know that to enable a line of thought in this direction we have to get rid of all old philosophies of history and all conceptual paradigms concepts that lead them 54.



And what would be the role of bioethics in all this? I believe it is possible to consider it as an alternative to biopolitics, contrary to what seems to suggest Esposito, who considers that in the very field of biopolitics the evidence of a democratic biopolitics or a democracy biopolitics would be found, capable of stimulating policies in favor of the bodies and not about them. However, this suggestion may question: first if a democratic biopolitics and a biopolitical democracy were indeed the same thing or if the second would not have in itself the conditions to become inevitably biocracy a supposedly legitimated by a biomedical or sanitary model but in fact morally and politically objectionable; secondly, if the entry of life as object of political concern and the consequent filling up the abstract subjectivity of traditional legal personality may involve abuses against the fundamental rights, morally and politically questionable, too.



Thus, based on the undesconstructible principle of justice, appointed by Derrida, bioethics can, in principle, mediate regulatory issues involved by biopolitics and biopower, that is, the relationships established between bios and zoé, between them and the polis and between them and techne. But what would be the legitimacy of bioethics to do this? I think it is the resistance to the biopolitics reduction the political (in fact a zoopolitcs with the glaring exception of the bios, if we think in Nazi biocracy). I believe that such resistance can be realized from the own tools for this field, respecting the specifics of each knowledge involved to establish dialogue with the various forms of knowledge and power involved. Or, perhaps, resistance occurs only by profanation 55 of the so-called natural 'inevitable' established between biology and politics by the biopolitical paradigm. But the sense of profanation should be understood in this case as a displacement, without abolishing what one intends to displace. A displacement of power devices that would allow return to common use spaces that [power] had confiscated. And that is what deconstruction, along with the bioethics of protection and bioethics intervention, seems to jointly perform in polis

.


Resumo A bioética como forma de resistência à biopolítica e ao biopoder

O trabalho intenta desconstruir os conceitos de biopolítica e biopoder e objetiva criar condições para uma atuação correta da bioética, entendida tanto como ferramenta analítica e normativa da moralidade da biopolítica e do biopoder quanto como aplicação prática sob a forma de resistência e dissidência democrática com relação aos efeitos moralmente questionáveis, resultantes das práticas biopolíticas e dos usos inadequados de tais conceitos para realizá-las. Seu pressuposto é o de que os conceitos de biopolítica e biopoder são utilizados, na maioria das vezes, de forma inconsistente ou como palavras passe-partout, o que afeta seu poder de inteligibilidade para entender as profundas transformações da sociedade contemporânea, inclusive com relação às percepções de si enquanto ‘sistema vivo’. A desconstrução constitui, portanto, uma operação prévia necessária devido à subsunção da ética à política, supostamente legitimada pela referência comum à “vida”, indicada pela palavra grega bíos, a qual, no entanto, se revela inextricavelmente vinculada a zoé, quando não subsumida a esta. Por fim, o trabalho discute as propostas de democracia biopolítica e de biopolítica democrática, mostrando a necessidade de um controle bioético da biopolítica.



Palavras-chave: Bioética. Biopolítica. Controle. Justiça. Imunidade.


Resumen La bioética como forma de resistencia a la biopolítica y al biopoder

El trabajo intenta desconstruir los conceptos de biopolítica y biopoder y objetiva crear condiciones para una actuación correcta de la bioética, entendida tanto como herramienta analítica y normativa de la moralidad de la biopolítica y del biopoder como aplicación práctica bajo la forma de resistencia y disidencia democrática con relación a los efectos moralmente cuestionables, resultantes de las prácticas biopolíticas y de los usos inadecuados de tales conceptos para realizarlas. Su presupuesto es el de que los conceptos de biopolítica y biopoder son utilizados, la mayoría de las veces, de forma inconsistente o como palabras passe-partout, lo que afecta a su poder de inteligibilidad para entender las profundas transformaciones de la sociedad contemporánea, inclusive con relación a las percepciones de sí en tanto ‘sistema vivo’. La desconstrucción constituye, por tanto, una operación previa necesaria debido a la subsunción de la ética a la política, supuestamente legitimada por la referencia común a la “vida”, indicada por la palabra griega bíos, la cual, no obstante, se revela inextricablemente vinculada a zoé, cuando no subsumida a ésta. Por fin, el trabajo discute las propuestas de democracia biopolítica y de biopolítica democrática, mostrando la necesidad de un control bioético de a biopolítica.



Palabras-clave: Bioética. Biopolítica. Control. Justicia. Impunidad.




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Received: 5.29.2010 Approved:11.8.2010 Final approval: 11.10.2010


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