Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch07 VII The Divine Names [99-107]

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Names

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

VII The Divine Names

The philosophical world-view of Ibn 'Arabi is, concisely stated, 

a world-view of Divine self-manifestation (tajallï), for, as we have seen, 

as long as the Absolute remains in its absoluteness 

there can be nothing in existence that may be called the' world', 

and the word 'world-view' itself would lose all meaning in the absence of the world.

The principle of tajallï, on the world's side, 

is the 'preparedness' (or ontological aptitude), and

the same principle of tajallï from the standpoint of the Absolute 

is constituted by the Divine Names.

The present chapter will deal thematically with the problem of tajallï 

in so far as it directly bears upon the Divine Names.

Islamic theology discusses as one of the basic themes the question

whether a Name (ism) is or is not 

the same as the 'object named' (musammà). 

Ibn' Arabi gives his answer to this theological question 

by saying that a Name and its 'object named' are 

• the same in one sense and 
• different from each other in another sense.

The reason why they are one and the same thing is that 

all the Divine Names, in so far as they invariably refer to the Absolute, are nothing but the 'object named' (i.e., the Essence [dhat] of the Absolute) itself. 

Each name is a special aspect, or special form, of the Absolute in its self-manifestation. And in this sense, each Name is identical with the Essence. 

All the Divine Names, in other words, are 'the realities of the relations' (baqa'iq al-nisab ), 1 i.e., the relations which the One Reality bears to the world, and in this respect they are all the Divine Essence itself viewed from the standpoint of

the various special relations which are caused by the phenomenon of Divine self-manifestation.

The relations which the Absolute can possibly bear to the world

are infinite, that is, to use Ibn 'Arabi's peculiar terminology, the

forms of the Divine self-manifestation are infinite in number. Con-

sequently, the Divine Names are infinite. 

However, they can be classified and reduced to a certain number of basic Names. For example, it is generally recognized that the Qoran gives ninety-nine

Names of God.

100]

These Names, whether infinite or finite in number, can also be

considered by themselves independently of the Essence to which

they refer. 

In other words, they can be regarded as so many independent Attributes. 

Considered in this way, each Name has its own 'reality' (l)aqiqah) by which it is distinguished from the rest of the Names. 

And in this respect, a Name is different from the 'object named'.

Ibn' Arabi explains this point by making reference to the famous Sufi of the West, Abü al-Qâsim b. Qasi (d. 1151).2

This is what is meant by Abü al-Qasim b. Qasi when he says in his

book Taking Off The Sandals that every Divine Name carries in itself

ail the Divine Names and ail their properties; this because every

Name indicates both the Essence and the particular meaning of

which it is the Name and which is especially required by the latter.

Thus every single Name, in so far as it points to the Essence, con tains

ail the Names, but in so far as it points to its own proper meaning, is

different from ail the rest, like 'Lord', 'Creator' or 'Giver of the

forms' etc. The Name, in short, is the same as the 'object named' in

regard to the Essence, but it is not the same as the 'object named' in

regard to its own particular meaning.

Thus the most conspicuous feature of the Divine Names is their

double structure, that is, their having each two designations. Each

Name designates, and points to, the unique Essence, while pointing

to a meaning or reality which is not shared by any other Name.

In the first aspect, every Name is one and the same as all other

Names, because they all are indicative of the same Essence. In this

respect, even such Names as appear to contradict each other ( e.g.,

'All-Forgiving' and 'Revenger', 'Outward' and 'Inward', 'First' and

'Last') are identical with each other.

In the second aspect, on the contrary, each Name is something

independent, something having its own peculiar reality. It definitely

distinguishes itself from all others. The' Outward' is not the same as

the 'Inward'. And what a distance between the 'First' and the 'Last' !

It will have been made clear to you (by what precedes) in what sense

each Name is the same as another and in what sense it is different

from another. Each Name, in being the same as others, is the Abso-

lute, and in being 'other' than others, is the' Absolute as it appears as

a particular image' (al-IJ,aqq al-mutakhayyal). Glory be to Him who is

not indicated by anything other than Himself and whose existence is

established by nothing other than Himself and whose existence is

established by nothing other than His own self!3

The' Absolute as it appears in particular images', i.e., the world, is

nothing but the whole sum of the Divine Names as concretely actualized. 

[101]

And since it is the sole indicator of the absolute Absolute, the latter, after ail, is not indicated by anything other than itself. 

The Absolute indicates itself by itself, and its concrete existence is established by itself. Ibn 'Arabi cannot withold his pro- found admiration for the beauty and the grandeur of this structure. 

We discussed in Chapter V the relation between the One and the Many. 

In terms of the main topic of the present chapter, 

the Many are the forms of the Absolute actualized in accordance with the requirements of the Names. 

The Many are the 'Absolute as it appears in particular images', 

i.e., the Absolute 'imagined' under the particular forms of the Names. 

And from this point of view, the One is the Essence (dhat) which is indicated by the Names and to which retum ail the Names. 

At this juncture Ibn 'Arabi uses an interesting expression, 

'the names of the world' (as ma' al-' alam), 

as a counterpart to the Divine Names (al-asma' al-ilahiyah).4 

Whatever really exists in the world of Being is solely 

what is indicated by (the word) 'unity' (ahadïyah), 

whereas whatever exists only in imagination is 

what is indicated by 'multiplicity' (kathrah). 

Therefore he who sticks to the multiplicity stands on the side of the world, 

the Divine Names and the names of the world, 

while he who takes the position of the Unity stands on the side of the Absolute. 

The Absolute here is the Absolute considered in the Essence 

which is completely independent of the whole world, 

not in its aspect of Divinity (i.e., being God) and its phenomenal forms. 

In this passage Ibn 'Arabi states that 

the Absolute in its Essence is completely 'independent', i.e., has absolutely no need of the world. 

It is to be remarked that having no need of the world is the same as having no need of the Divine Names. 

The Names are, as we have observed above, the relations in which the Absolute stands to the creatures. 

They are there because of, and in the interests of, the creatures. 

The Essence in itself is not something which cannot subsist apart from such centrifugai relations. What needs the Names is not the Absolute, but the created world. He says: 5 

If the Essence is completely independent of the whole world, 

this independence must be the same independence by which the Essence transcends the Names to be attributed to it. 

For the Names indicate not only the Essence but particular 'objects named' 6 which are different from the Essence. 

This is evidenced by the very effect of the Names.7 

Thus, the Divine Names, 

in their centrifugai side turning toward multiplicity-diversity, are definitely 'other' than the Absolute, 

But in their centripetal side turning toward the Essence, 

all the Divine Names are ultimately one because they are reducible to the Absolute. 

102]

And in this second aspect, the Absolute at the level of the Names is One as it is at the level of its absoluteness.

The Absolute is in this way. One in two different senses.8

The Unity of God on the level of the Divine Names which require

(the existence of) us (i.e., the phenomenal world) is the Unity of

multiplicity (ahadîyah al-kathrah ). 

And the Unity of God in the sense of being completely 'independent' of us and even of the Names is the Unity of essence (ahadîyah al-'ayn). 

Both aspects are called by the same name: 'One'.

The Unity of multiplicity here spoken of is also called the Unity of 'unification' (ahadïyah al-jam'). 

It plays an exceedingly important role in the world-view of Ibn' Arabï, as we have already seen in what precedes and as we shall see in more detail in what follows. 

In brief, it is a position which recognizes multiplicity existing in potentia in

the Absolute which is essentially One. 9

We have observed above that the Absolute, in so far as it is the

Absolute, does not need the Names, and that it is the creatures that

need them. 

The latter half of this statement, namely, that the world needs the Divine Names, may be formulated in more philosophical terms by saying that the Names have the property of causality ('illïyah or sababïyah). From this point of view, the Divine Names are the 'cause' ('illah or sabab) for the existence of the world. The

world needs the Divine Names in the sense that nothing in the world can exist without them.

There can be no doubt that the world stands in essential need of many

causes. And the greatest of ail the causes which it needs is the

Absolute. But the Absolute can act as the cause needed by the world

only through the Divine Names as its cause.

By 'Divine Names' here is meant every Name that is needed by the

world (as its cause), whether it be part of the world itself or the very

Absolute. In either case it is God, nothing else. 10

This passage makes it clear that, in Ibn' Arabï's view, if the world

essentially needs as its cause the Absolute, it does not need the

Absolute in its absoluteness but in its various aspects, such as

'creativity', 'Lordship', etc. 

In other words, the Absolute on the level of the Names is the 'cause' of the world's existence. Regarding the latter half of the passage, nothing, I think, could make its meaning more lucid than the following explanation by al-Qàshànï. 11

The Divine Names are the very things which are needed by the world

(as its causes). (Two cases are distinguished). 

The first is when the Name needed is something similar to the thing which needs it: e.g., 'son' needs 'father' in his existence, sustenance and maintenance. In

such a case the things needed are nothing but concrete forms taken by

the Names of the Absolute, i.e., their concrete manifestations. 

[103]

The second case occurs when the thing needed is ( directly) the Absolute

itself: e.g., the 'son' is in need of the Absolute, the Former, the

Creator, in having his own form, figure and character. This is differ-

ent from (the first case in which) he needs something similar to

himself (e.g., 'father').

In either case, however, the Name needed is no other than the Name

'Allah'. (This may not be clear) in the first case, (but that it is so will

be known from the following consideration). 

The causality of 'father' does not lie in the permanent archetype of 'father', for the latter is (actually) non-existent. 

The causality of 'father' comes from 'father' in its real existence, his action, and his power. But the existence (of 'father') is essentially nothing but the Absolute as manifested in a locus of self-manifestation; and the action, the form, the ability, the power, the sustenance, and the maintenance - ail these are but what

naturally follows from existence: they are but Attributes of the Absolute and its Actions (in concrete forms). What properly pertains

to 'father' is only being-receptive and being-a-locus-of-Divine-

self-manifestation. As you already know, however, the one who

merely receives has no positive activity; the positive activity belongs

only to the One which manifests itself in (the receiver as) its locus of

self-manifestation. (The causality of the Absolu te) in the second case

is too obvious to need explanation.

The gist of the argument may conveniently be given in the following

way: in the second case in which the world directly needs God, God

is the 'cause' of the world; 

but in the first case, too, in which the things in the world need each other in the form of a cause-caused relation, it is again God who is the ultimate 'cause' of everything.

When, for example, 'son' needs 'father', it is the causality of God

that is working through the medium of 'father'.

We see in this way that everything in this world, every event

which occurs in this world, is an actualization of a Divine Name, that

is to say, a self-manifestation of the Absolute through a definite

relative aspect called Divine Name. The conclusion to be drawn

from this is that there are as many Divine Names as there are things

and events in the world. The Divine Names in this sense are infinite

in number.

이 세상의 모든 것, 이 세상에서 일어나는 모든 사건은 신성한 이름의 실현, 

즉 신성한 이름이라는 명확한 상대적 측면을 통한 절대자의 자기 현시입니다.

The Names of God are limitless because they become known by what

comes out of them and what comes out of them is limitless. 12

However, they are reducible to a limited number of basic Names

(usul, lit. 'roots') which are the 'Mothers' of Names or, we might say,

the 'Presences' (i.e., basic dimensions) of ail the Names.

The truth of the matter is that there is only one Reality (haqîqah) that

receives ail these relations and relative aspects which are called the

Divine Names. And this same Reality requires that each of these

Names that come into appearance limitlessly should have its own

reality which distinguishes it from ail other Names. 

104]

The Name is this reality which distinguishes each individual Name, not that thing (i.e., the Reality) which is common to all. This situation is comparable to

the fact that the Divine gifts are distinguished from each other by

their individual natures, though they are all from one source.

It is evident that this is different from that, and the reason for this

difference lies in the individual distinction of each Name. Thus in the

Divine world, however wide it is, nothing repeats itself. This is a truly

fundamental fact. 13

Here again, as we see, we are brought back to the basic dictum: the

One is the Many and the Many are the One. Only the dictum is here

interpreted topically in terms of the Divine Names. 

The Many, i.e. the Divine Names, determine a point of view from which there is not even one thing that is the same as some other thing, because

'nothing repeats itself' in the world. Even 'one and the same thing'

is not in reality the same in two successive moments. 14 

In general, any two things that are normally considered the same are not in

reality the 'same'; they are merely 'similar to each other' (shab-

ihan). And of course, 'similar to each other' means 'different from

each other' (ghayran). 15 However, from the point of view of the

Essence, not only similar things but things that are widely different

from each other, are one and the same thing.

The sage who knows the truth sees multiplicity in 'one'; likewise, he

knows that the Divine Names, even though their (individual) realities

are different and many, all point to one single Entity. 

This ( difference among the Names) is but a multiplicity of an intelligible nature (i.e., existent only in potentia) in the reality of the One. And this (intelli-

gible multiplicity) turns into sensible multiplicity to be witnessed in

one single Reality, when (the One) manifests itself (in the world).

The situation may be best understood by what happens to Prime

Matter (hayülà) as it enters the inner structure of every 'form'. In

spite of their multiplicity and diversity, all the 'forms' ultimately are

reducible to one single substance which is their 'matter'. And 'he who

knows himself' in this way 'knows his Lord', because (the Lord) has

created him in His own image, nay, He is the very He-ness of the man

and his true reality. 16

All the Divine Names point to one single Reality, and in this sense

they are, as we have just seen, all one. This, however, does not

mean that all the Names stand on an equal level. On the contrary, a

difference of degrees or ranks is observable among them. This

difference of ranks corresponds to the difference of ranks among

the things of the world. And this is natural because, in Ibn' Arabï's

view, the Divine Names owe their very existence to the ontological

requirements of the things. Ibn 'Arabï explains this difference of

ranks among the Names in the following terms: 17

[105]

There is absolutely nothing except it (i.e., the Absolute). 18 However,

there must also be a certain respect in which we are obliged to use

language of discrimination in order to account for the (observable)

existence of 'higher' and 'lower' in the world, so that we might be able

to talk about (for example) this man being 'more' learned than that,

notwithstanding the essential unity (of 'knowledge') itself. 19 This

implies (that there is a similar difference in rank between Attributes;

that, for example,) the Will, in respect to the number of its objects, is

inferior to Knowledge.

Although Will and Knowledge are both Attributes of God and are

one in this aspect, Will is lower than Knowledge. But that same Will

is higher than Power. This because, generally speaking, 'will' begins

to work only after one 'knows' something, and 'will' not only

precedes 'power' but covers a wider field than the latter. Exactly the

same kind of superior-inferior relation obtains among all the Divine

Names. The thing to which they all point, that is, the Essence, stands

on a transcendental height above all comparisons and relations, but

the things other than the Divine Essence are different in ranks,

some being 'higher' and others 'lower'. Concerning the transcen-

dental height of the Essence Ibn 'Arabi says: 20

The Transcendent (al- 'aliy) in itself is that which possesses the ( abso-

lu te) perfection (kamiil) in which are engulfed all existent things as

well as non-existent relations 21 in such a way that there can absolutely

be no property that is not found therein, whether it be something

which is considered 'good' according to convention, Reason, and the

Divine Law, or something to be judged 'bad' by the same standards.

And this is a state of affairs which is observable exclusively in what is

designated by the Name Allah.

This passage is explicated by al-Qàshànï as follows: 22

The Transcendent with a real and essential - not a relative - height,

possesses an absolute perfection which comprises all the perfections

pertaining to all things. The perfections comprised are (exhaustive),

covering as they do both those that are positively existent and those

that are in the nature of non-existence; some of them are 'good' in

every possible aspect, and some of them are 'bad' in a certain respect.

This last point may be understood if one remembers that some of the

perfections are essentially of a relative nature and are 'bad' in rela-

tion to some of the things; e.g., the valor of a lion in relation to his

prey. But the absolute perfection must not lack even one property or

ethical qualification or action. Otherwise, it would be imperfect in

that particular aspect.

Ibn 'Arabi asserts that such an essential height and an absolute

perfection can only belong to the One as determined by the primary

self-determination on the level of the Onesness (wahidiyah) which

gathers together all the Names. 

106]

And this is the Greatest Name (al-ism al-a'zam) which is the very thing designated by the Name Allah or the Name Merciful (al-rahman ). 23 In this state, all the Divine Names which have a positive effect (on the things of the world) are

considered together as a unity; they are not considered in their aspect

of multiplicity.

Such is 'God' as the comprehensive whole unifying all the Names.

As to 'what is not the thing designated by the Name Allah', i.e., all

things that are not God, Ibn' Arabï distinguishes two kinds: 

(1) that which is a locus of theophany (majlà, i.e. the place of tajallï), and 

(2) that which is a form in God, the word 'form' in this context

meaning a particular Name by which the Divine Essence becomes

determined.

'What is not the thing designated by the Name Allah' is 

either a locus of the self-manifestation of it 

or a form subsisting in it. 

In the former case, it is quite natural that there should occur a difference of ranks

between individual loci. 

In the second case, the 'form' in question is the very essential perfection (belonging, as we have seen, to the Transcendent) for the form is nothing other than what is manifested in it (i.e., the Transcendent itself), so that what belongs to that which is designated by the Name Allah must also belong to the form. 24

The meaning of this seemingly obscure passage may be made explicit in the following way. 

---

In case 'other than God' signifies a locus of theophany, the One Absolute is witnessed in the concrete things of the world as so many loci of theophany. 

In this case the Absolute assumes various different aspects in accordance with the

natures of the individual things. And there naturally arise various ranks and degrees according to the more-or-less of the self-manifestation.25 

---

But in case 'other than God' signifies a 'form' in God, various forms are witnessed in the Absolute itself. And in this case, each one of the forms will possess the very same essential perfection which is possessed by the whole, i.e., God. If God possesses perfection, the same perfection must necessarily be possessed by each 'form' because the latter appears in nothing other than God.

The existents thus differ ontologically from each other in rank, but

taken as a whole, they constitute among themselves a well-organized order. And this ontological order corresponds to the order formed by the Divine Names.

Two things are worth remarking concerning this theologico-ontological hierarchy. 신학적-존재론적 위계.

(1) A higher Name implicitly contains all the Names that are lower than itself. 

And, correspondingly, a higher existent, as a locus of the self-manifestation of a higher Name, contains in itself all the lower existents. 

[107]

(2) Every single Name, regardless of its rank in the hierarchy, contains in a certain sense all the other Names. 

And, correspondingly, every single part of the world contains all the other parts of the world. 

Ibn' Arabï says: 26

When you assign a higher rank to a Divine Name, 

you are thereby calling it (implicitly) by all the Names (that stand lower than it) and attributing to it ail the properties (that belong to the Names of lower

ranks). 

The same is true of the things of the world; 

every higher being possesses the capacity of comprehending all that is lower than itself.

However, every particle of the world is (virtually) the whole of the

world, that is, 

every single particle is capable of receiving into itself all the realities of all single particles of the world. 

So the observed fact, for instance, 

that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not in any way 

prevent the same He-ness of the Absolute being the very essence of Zayd and 'Amr; 

nor does it prevent the He-ness being more perfect, more conspicuous in 'Amr than in Zayd.

This situation corresponds to the fact that 

the Divine Names differ from each other in rank 

while being all no other than the Absolute.

Thus, for example, 

God as 'Knower' is more comprehensive, regarding the domain covered, 

than God as 'Willer' or 'Powerful', 

and yet God is God in every case. 

Of the numerous Divine Names, 

the greatest and most comprehensive, and the most powerful one is the 'Merciful' (rahman). 

It is a 'comprehensive' (shamil) Name in that it gathers all the Names together into a unity. 

And the Absolute on this level of unity is called Allah. 

In the following two chapters these two Names will be discussed in detail.

====

Notes

1. FU!i., p. 193/153.

2. FU!f., p. 70/79-80.

3. Fu-î., p. 119/104.

4. FU!i., p. 120/104-105.

5. ibid.

6. i.e., particular Attributes which are, more concretely, various particular aspects

of the world.

7. i.e., the fact that the Names indicate besides the Essence the special aspects of the world as something different from the Essence is clearly shown by the created world itself which is the very effect of the Names.

8. FU!f., p. 1211105.

[108]

9. Ibn' Arabi here distinguishes between two types of a}Jadïyah or 'Unity'. In his

technical terminology, the first kind of Unity, i.e., the Unity of multiplicity at the

ontological stage of Divine Names and Attributes, is specifically called wâl.zidïyah

'Oneness (of Many)' and is thereby strictly distinguished from the absolute, pure

Unity (al)adiyah), the Unity of Divine Essence. It will be well to remember that there is in his system one more basic type of a}Jadïyah. It is the Unity of'actions and effects' (a}Jadiyah al-af iil wa-al-iithiir) and is symbolized by the name of the prophet Hüd.

Al-Qâshâni (p. 123) refers to these three types of Unity as follows: 'There are three degrees in the Unity. The first is the Unity of the Essence. (God is called at this stage a}Jad "One" or "Unique" in a non-numerical sense). The second is the Unity of the Na mes. This is the stage of Divinity, and God is called at this stage wa}Jid "One" in a numerical sense). The third is the Unity of Lordship (rubübïyah) or the Unity of actions and effects'. This last kind of Unity means that whatever we may do in this world, whatever may happen in this world, everything is 'walking along the straight road'. Everything, every event, occurs in strict accordance with the law of Being (which is nothing other than the Absolute). Ali are 'one' in this sense.

10. Fu$., p. 122/105-106.

11. p. 122.

12. 'The Essence as the Unity is, in relation to each single thing comes out of it, a

particular Name. Thus whenever a determination comes into being there is a Name therein. And the relations (of the Essence with the things of the world) are limitless because the receptacles (i.e., the things that receive the self-manifestation of the Absolute) and their natural dispositions are limitless. Thus it cornes about that the Names of God are limitless' - al-Qâshâni, p. 38.

13. Fu$., pp. 38-39/65.

14. This is the concept of the 'ever new creation' (khalq jadïd), which will be

discussed in detail later.

15. FU$., p. 152/124-125.

16. ibid.

17. FU$.,p.193/153.

18. He means to say: since everything is a self-manifestation of the Absolute

through a particular Name, ail that exist in the world are nothing but the Absolute.

19. This example properly concerns only the existence of degrees in one single

attribute called 'knowledge'. But the real intention of Ibn' Arabi is to maintain that

there is also a difference of degrees between 'knowledge' itself and other attributes.

20. FU$., p. 69/79.

21. As we have observed before, the relations (nisab) are in themselves essentially non-existent.

22. p. 69.

23. On Allah = the Merciful see the next two chapters which will be devoted

specifically to this question.

[109]

24. Fu$., p. 69179.

25. If, for example, ail the Divine Names are actualized in a thing, it will be the

Perfect Man, while if the most of the Names are manifested, it will be an ordinary

(non-perfect) man, and if the number of the Names manifested happens to be far Jess than that, it will be an inanimate thing - al-Qâshâni, p. 69.

26. Fu$., pp. 193-194/153.

====

Fus = Fusus al Hikam

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch05 V Metaphysical Perplexity [68-86] 당혹감

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

Sufism Chapter 5 Metaphysical Perplexity

---

Key words:

1. perplexity
2. mystical
3. spiritual
4. God
5. Divine
6. Absolute
7. self-manifestation
8. diversify
9. Multiplicity
10. ego
11. self-annihilation

---

As the preceding chapter will have made clear, in Ibn 'Arabi' s

conception, the only right attitude of man toward God is a harmoni-

ous unity composed of tanzih and tashbih, which is realizable solely

on the basis of the mystical intuition of 'unveiling'.

If man follows the direction of Imagination which is not yet

illumined by the experience of 'unveiling', he is sure to fall into the

wrong type of idolatry in which each individual idol is worshipped as

a really independent and self-sufficient god. Such a god is nothing

but a groundless image produced in the mind of man. And the result

is a crude type of tashbih which can never rise to the lev el of tanzih.

If, on the other hand, man tries to approach God by following the

direction of Reason unaided by Imagination, man will inevitably

rush toward an exclusive tanzih, and lose sight of the Divine life

pulsating in ail the phenomena of the world including himself.

The right attitude which combines in itself tanzih and tashbih is, in

short, to see the One in the Many and the Many in the One, or rather

to see the Many as One and the One as Many. 

The realization of this kind of coincidentia oppositorum is called by Ibn' Arabi 'perplexity' (hayrah). 

As such, this is a metaphysical perplexity because here

man is impeded by the very nature of what he sees in the world from

definitely deciding as to whether Being is One or Many.

Ibn' Arabi explains the conception of 'perplexity' by an original

interpretation of a Qoranic verse. 

The verse in question is:

'And they (i.e., the idols) have caused many people to go astray' (LXXI,24). 

This is interpreted by Ibn 'Arabi to mean that 

the existence of many idols has put men into perplexity 

at the strange sight of 

the absolute One being actually diversified into Many through its own activity. 1.

The idols in this context represent the multiplicity of forms that

are observable in the world. And, as al-Qâshâni remarks, anybody

who looks at them 'with the eye of unification (tawhid)', i.e., with

the preconception of tanzih, is sure to become embarrassed and

perplexed at the sight of the One being diversified according to the

relations it bears to its loci of self-manifestation.

[69]

The Qoranic verse just quoted ends with another sentence: 

'and ( o God) increase Thou not the people of injustice (zàlimin) except

in going astray', 

and the whole verse is put in the mouth of Noah.

This second sentence, too, is interpreted by Ibn' Arabi in quite an

original way. The interpretation is, in fact, more than original, for it

squeezes out of the verse a conception of zàlim which is exactly the

opposite of what is meant by the Qoran. He begins by saying that

the word zàlim or 'a man of injustice' here is equivalent to a phrase

which occurs repeatedly in the Qoran, 

zàlim li-nafsi-hi, meaning 

'he who does injustice or wrong to himself'. 

Now according to the actual usage of the Qoran, 

'he who wrongs himself' designates a stubborn unbeliever who disobeys God' s commands and by sticking obstinately to polytheism, 

drives himself on to perdition. 

But, as interpreted by Ibn' Arabi zàlim li-nafsi-hi refers to 

• a man who 'does wrong to himself' 
• by refusing himself all the pleasures of the present world and 
• devotes himself to seeking 'self-annihilation' (fanà') in God. 2

This interpretation is based on another Qoranic verse, namely XXXV, 32, 

which reads: 

'Some of them are doing injustice to themselves and some of them are moderate, 

while some others vie one with another in doing good works with the permission of God'.

And quite opposite to the usual ranking, Ibn' Arabi 

considers 'those who do injustice to themselves' the highest and best of ail the three classes of men. [?]

They are, he says, 'the best of all people, the specially chosen of God' .3

Al-Qâshâni quotes, in this connection, a Tradition from al-Tirmidhï's SalJ,ilJ, 

which reads: 

'These men are ail in one and the same grade; ail of them will be in the Garden'.

 He says that this Tradition refers to the three classes of men mentioned in the verse just quoted. 

These three classes are, as the Tradition explicitly states, in the same grade in the sense that they ail are destined to go to the Garden, but al-Qâshâni thinks that this does not prevent them from forming a hierarchy, 

• the highest being 'those who do injustice to themselves', 
• the middle the 'moderate', and 
• the lowest 'those who vie with one another in the performance of good works'.

The theoretical explanation he gives of this hierarchy, however,

does not seem to be convincing at ail. lt would seem to be better for

us to take, as Affifi does, 

• 'the man who does injustice to himself' as meaning a mystic who has had the experience of 'unveiling' in self-annihilation, and 
• 'the moderate man' as meaning 'a man who keeps to the middle course'. 
• Then most naturally, 'those who vie one another' would mean those who are still in the earlier stage of the mystical training.

However this may be, what is important for Ibn 'Arabi is the

conception that the 'man who does injustice to himself' occupies the

highest rank precisely by being in metaphysical perplexity. [70]

As is easy to see, this has a weighty bearing on the interpretation of the

latter half of the Qoranic verse, in which Noah implores God to

increase more and more the 'going astray' of the 'people of injustice'.

Noah, according to this understanding, implores God to increase

even more the metaphysical 'perplexity' of the highest class of men,

while the standard, i.e., common-sense, interpretation of the verse

sees Noah calling down Divine curses upon the worst class of men,

the stubbom idol-worshippers.

In exactly the same spirit, Ibn 'Arabï finds a very picturesque

description of this 'perplexity' in a Qoranic verse (II, 20) which 

depicts how God trifles with wicked people who are trying in vain to

beguile and delude Him and those who sincerely believe in Him. 

하나님은 헛되이 하나님을 미혹하고 미혹하는 악인과 진심으로 하나님을 믿는 자들을 업신여김

A dead darkness settles down upon these people. From time to time

roars frightful thunder, and a flash of lightning 'almost snatches

away their sight'. And 'as often as they are illuminated they walk in

the light, but when it darkens again they stand still'.

This verse in Ibn' Arabï's interpretation, yields a new meaning

which is totally different from what we ordinarily understand.

Although he merely quotes the verse without any comment, what

he wants to convey thereby is evident from the very fact that he

adduces it in support of his theory of 'perplexity'. On behalf of his

Master, al-Qashanï makes it explicit in the following way: 4

This verse describes the 'perplexity' of these people. Thus, when the

light of the Unity (alJ,adïyah) is manifested they 'walk', that is, they

move ahead with the very movement of God, while when it darkens

against them as God becomes hidden behind the veil and the Multi-

plicity appears instead (of Unity) obstructing their view, they just

stand still in 'perplexity'.

This 'perplexity' necessarily assumes the form of a circular move-

ment. 'The man in "perplexity" draws a circle', as Ibn' Arabï says.5

This is necessarily so, because the 'walking' of such a man reflects

the very circle of the Divine self-manifestation. 

The Absolute itself

• draws a circle in the sense that it starts from the primordial state of Unity, 'descends' to the plane of concrete beings 
• and diversifies itself in myriads of things and events, and 
• finally 'ascends' back into the original non-differentiation. 

The man in 'perplexity' draws the same circle, 

for he 'walks with God, from God, to God, 

his onward movement being identical with the movement of God Himself' .6

This circular movement, Ibn' Arabi observes, tums round a pivot

(qutb) or center (markaz), which is God. And since the man is

merely going round and round the center, his distance from God

remains exactly the same whether he happens to be in the state of

Unity or in that of Multiplicity. 

Whether, in other words, he is looking at the Absolute 

• in its primordial Unity or 
• as it is diversified in an infinite number of concrete things, 

he stands at the same distance from the Absolute per se.[71]

On the contrary, a man who, his vision being veiled, is unable to

see the truth, is a 'man who walks along a straight road'. 

He imagines God to be far away from him, and looks for God afar off.

He is deceived by his own imagination and strives in vain to reach

his imagined God. 

In the case of such a man, there is a definite distinction between the 'from' (min, i.e., the starting-point) and the 'to' (ilà, i.e., the ultimate goal), and there is naturally an infinite distance between the two points. 

The starting-point is himself imagined to be far away from himself, and the distance between is an imaginary distance which he thinks separates him from God.

Such a man, in spite of his desire to approach Him, goes even farther

from God as he walks along the straight road stretching infinitely ahead.

The thought itself, thus formulated and expressed with the image

of a man walking in a circle and another going ahead along a straight

line, is indeed of remarkable profundity. 

As an interpretation of the above-cited Qoranic verse, however, it certainly does not do justice to the meaning given directly by the actual context. 

The extraordinary freedom in the interpretation of the Qoran comes out even 

more conspicuously when Ibn 'Arabï applies his exegesis to other

verses which he quotes as a conclusive evidence for his thesis. 7 

The first is LXXI, 25, which immediately follows the one relating to the

'people who do injustice to themselves'. 

lt reads: 'Because of their mistakes (kha(i'àt) they (i.e., the people of injustice), were drowned, and then put into fire. And they found nobody to help them in place of God' .

The word khati'àt meaning 'mistakes' or 'sins' comes from the

root KH-T' which means 'to err' 'to commit a mistake'. lt is a commonly used word with a definite meaning. Ibn 'Arabi, however, completely disregards this etymology, and derives it from the root KH-TT meaning 'to draw lines' 'to mark out'. The phrase min khatï.' àti-him 'from their mistakes' is thus made to mean something like: 'because of that which has been marked out for them as their

personal possessions'. 

And this, for Ibn 'Arabï, means nothing other than 'their own individual determinations (ta'ayyunàt)', that is, 'the ego of each person'.

'Because of their egos', i.e., since they had their own egos already

established, they had to be 'drowned' once in the ocean before they

could be raised into the spiritual state of 'self-annihilation' (fanà').

[72]

This ocean in which they were drowned, he says, symbolizes 'knowledge of God', and that is no other than the 'perplexity'. And al-Qashanï: 8

(This 'ocean'-'perplexity') is the Unity pervading all and manifesting

itself in multiple forms. 

It is 'perplexing' because of the Unity appearing in a determined form in every single thing and yet remaining non-determined in the whole. (It is 'perplexing') because of its (simultaneous) non-limitation and limitation.

As regards the sentence in the verse: 'then (they) were put into tire',

Ibn' Arabi remarks simply that this holocaust occurred in the very

water, that is, while they were in the ocean. The meaning is again

explicated by al-Qàshàni: 9

This 'fire' is the tire of love ('ishq) for the light of the splendor of His

Face, which consumes ail the determined forms and individual

essences in thé very midst of the ocean of 'knowledge of God' and

true Life. And this true Life is of such a nature that everything comes

to life with it and yet is destroyed by it at the same time. There can be

no perplexity greater than the 'perplexity' caused by the sight of

'drowning' and 'burning' with Life and Knowledge, that is, simul-

taneous self-annihilation and self-subsistence.

Thus 'they found nobody to help them in place of God', because

when God manifested Himself to these sages in His Essence, they

were all burned down, and there remained for them nothing else

than God who was the sole 'helper' for them, i.e., the sole vivifier of

them. God alone was there to 'help' them, and 'they were destroyed

(i.e., annihilated) in Him for ever'. Their annihilation in God was

the very vivification of them in Him. And this is the meaning of

'self-subsistence' (baqa'), of which fana', 'self-annihilation', is but

the reverse side.

If God, instead of destroying them in the ocean, had rescued them

from drowning and brought them back to the shore of Nature (i.e.,

brought them back to the world of limitations and determinations)

they would not have attained to such a high grade (i.e., they would

have lived in the natural world of 'reality' and would have remained

veiled from God by their very individualities).

Ibn' Arabi adds that all this is true from a certain point of view, 10

'although, to be more strict (there is no 'drowning', no 'burning',

and no 'helping' because) everything belongs (from beginning to

end) to God, and is with God; or rather, everything is God.

In a Qoranic verse following the one which bas just been discussed,

Noah goes on to say to God: 'Verily, if Thou shouldst leave them as

they are, they would surely lead Thy slaves astray and would beget

none but sinful disbelievers'.

The words: 'they would surely lead Thy slaves astray' mean,

according to Ibn' Arabi, 11 'they would put Thy slaves into perplexity

and lead them out of the state of being slaves and bring them to their

inner reality which is now hidden from their eyes, namely, the state

of being the Lord. 

[73]

(If this happens,) then those who think themselves to be slaves will regard themselves as Lords'. The 'perplexity' here spoken of is considered by al-Qàshàni not the true metaphysical perplexity but a 'Satanic perplexity' (l:tayrah shaytanïyah). 

But this is evidently an overstatement. Ibn' Arabi is still speaking of the

same kind of metaphysical 'perplexity' as before. The point he

makes here is that, if one permits those who know the Mystery of

Being to lead and teach the people, the latter will in the end realize

the paradoxical fact that they are not only slaves, as they have

thought themselves to be, but at the same time Lords.

The interpretation which Ibn 'Arabi puts on the ending part of

the verse: 'and would beget none but sinful disbelievers', is even

more shocking to common sense than the preceding one. We must

remember, however, that this interpretation is something quite

natural and obvious to Ibn' Arabi's mind.

The Arabie word which I have translated as 'sinful' is fajir, a

well-established Qoranic term which is derived from the root FJR

meaning 'to commit unlawful, i.e., sinful, acts'. Ibn' Arabi derives it

from another FJR meaning 'to open and give an outlet for water'.

And in this paticular context it is taken in the sense of 'making

manifest' (izhar). Thus the word fajir, instead of meaning 'a man

who commits sinful acts', means 'a man who manifests or unveils

what is veiled'. In a terminology which is more typical of Ibn' Arabi,

a fajir is a man who manifests the Absolu te in the sense that he is a

locus of the Absolute's self-manifestation.

As for the second term translated here as' disbeliever', the Arabie

is kaffar, an emphatic form of kaftr meaning 'one who is ungrateful

to, i.e., disbelieves in, God'. But, as we have observed before, Ibn

'Arabi takes this word in its etymological sense; namely, that of

'covering up'. So kaffar in this context is not an 'ingrate' or 'disbe-

liever', but a man who 'covers up' or bides the Absolute behind the

veil of his own concrete, determined form.

Moreover, it is important to remember, the fajir and kaftr are not

two different persans but one and the same persan. So that the

meaning of this part of the verse amounts to: 'these people would do

nothing but unveil what is veiled and veil what is manifest at the

same time'. As a result, those who see this extraordinary view

naturally fall into 'perplexity'.

But precisely the act of falling into this kind of 'perplexity' is the

very first step to attaining ultimately the real 'knowledge'. And the

'perplexity' here in question has a metaphysical basis. We shall

consider in what follows this point in more theoretical terms,

remaining faithful to Ibn' Arabi's own description.

* * *

[74]

What we must emphasize before everything else is that, in Ibn

'Arabï's world-view, the whole world is the locus of theophany or

the self-manifestation of the Absolute, and that, consequently, all

the things and events of the world are self-determinations of the

Absolute. Therefore, the world of Being cannot be grasped in its

true form except as a synthesis of contraditions. Only by a simul-

taneous affirmation of contradictories can we understand the real

nature of the world. And the 'perplexity' is nothing other than the

impression produced on our minds by the observation of the simul-

taneous existence of contradictories.

Ibn 'Arabï describes in detail some of the basic forms of the

ontological contradiction. And the explanation he gives of the

coincidentia oppositorum is of great value and importance in that it

clarifies several cardinal points of his world-view. Here we shall

consider two most fundamental forms of contradiction.

The first 12 is the contradictory nature of the things of the world as

manifested in the relation between the 'inward' (bii(in) and the

'outward' (ziihir). When one wants to define 'man', for example,

one must combine the 'inward' and the 'outward' of man in his

definition. The commonly accepted definition - 'man is a rational

animal - is the result of the combination, for' animal' represents the

'outward' of man, while 'rational' represents his 'inward', the

former being body and the latter the spirit governing the body. Take

away from a man his spirit, and he will no longer be a 'man'; he will

merely be a figure resembling a man, something like a stone or a

piece of wood. Such a figure does not deserve the name 'man' except

in a metaphorical sense.

Just as man is man only in so far as there is spirit within the body,

so also the 'world' is 'world' only in so far as there is the Reality or

Absolute within the exterior form of the world.

It is utterly impossible that the various forms of the world (i.e., the

things in the empirical world) should subsist apart from the Absolute.

Thus the basic attribute of divinity (ulühïyah) must necessarily per-

tain to the world in the real sense of the word, not metaphorically,

just as it (i.e., the complex of spirit, the 'inward', and body, the

'outward') constitutes the definition of man, so long as we understand

by 'man' a real, living man.

Furthermore, not only is the 'inward' of the world the Reality itself

but its 'outward' also is the Reality, because the 'outward' of the

world is, as we have seen, essentially the forms of theophany. In this

sense, both the 'inward' and 'outward' of the world must be defined

in terms of divinity.[?]

Having established this point, Ibn' Arabï goes on to describe the

strange nature of the praising (thanii') of the 'inward' by the 'outward'.

[75] 

'Just as', he says, 'the outward form of man constantly praises with its own tangue the spirit within, so the various forms of the world praise, by a special disposai of God, the inward spirit of the world'. 

How does the bodily form of man 'praise with its own tangue' the spirit within? This is explained by al-Qashanï in the following way: 13 The bodily form of man praises the spirit, i.e., the soul, by means of its movements and by manifestation of its peculiar properties and per- fections. (The reason why this is 'praise' is as follows.) 

The bodily members of man are in themselves but (lifeless) objects which, were it not for the spirit, would neither move nor perceive anything; besides, the bodily members as such have no virtue at ail such as generosity, liberal giving, magnanimity, the sense of shame, courage, truthfulness, honesty, etc. And since 'to praise' means nothing other than mentioning the good points (of somebody or something), the bodily members (praise the spirit) by expressing (through actions) the virtues of the spirit. Exactly in the same way, the various forms of the world 'praise' the inner spirit of the universe (i.e., the Reality residing within the universe) through their own properties, perfections, indeed, through everything that comes out of them. Thus the world is praising its own 'inward' by its 'outward'. 

We, however, usually do not notice this fact, because we do not have a comprehensive knowledge of all the forms of the world. The language of this universal 'praise' remains incomprehensible to us 'just as a Turk cannot understand the language of a Hindu'. 14 The contradictory nature of this phenomenon lies in the fact that if the 'outward' of the world praises its 'inward', properly speaking both the 'outward' and 'inward' are absolutely nothing other than the Absolute itself. Hence we reach the conclusion that the one who praises and the one who is praised are in this case ultimately the same. 

The phenomenon just described, of the Absolute praising itself in two forms opposed to each other, is me rel y a concrete case illustrat- ing the more profound and more general fact that the Absolute, from the point of view of man, cannot be grasped except in the form of coincidentia oppositorum. Ibn 'Arabï quotes in support of his view a famous saying of Abü Sa'id al-Kharraz, a great mystic of Bagdad of the ninth century: 'God cannot be known except as a synthesis of opposites'. 15 

coincidence of opposites.

[76]

Al-Kharraz, who was himself one of the many faces of the Absolute and one of its many tongues, said that God cannot be known except by attributing opposites to Him simultaneously. 

Thus the Absolute is the First and the Last, 

the Outward and the lnward. 

It is nothing other than what comes out outwardly (in concealing itself inwardly),

whereas in the very moment of coming out outwardly it is what conceals itself inwardly.

There is no one who sees the Absolute except the Absolute itself, and

yet there is no one to whom the Absolute remains hidden. lt is the

Outward (i.e., self-manifesting) to itself, and yet it is the Inward (i.e.,

self-concealing) to itself. The absolute is the one who is called by the

name of Abü Sa'ïd al-Kharraz and by other names of other contingent beings.

The Inward belies the Outward when the latter says 'I', and the

Outward belies the Inward when the latter says 'I'. And this applies

to every other pair of opposites. (In every case) the one who says

something is one, and yet he is the very same one who hears. This is

based on the phrase said by the prophet (Mul)ammad): 'and what

their own souls tell them', indicating clearly that the soul is the

speaker and the hearer of what it says at the sa me time, the knower of

what itself has said. In ail this (phenomenon), the essence itself is one

though it takes on different aspects. Nobody can ignore this, because

everybody is aware of this in himself in so far as he is a form of the

Absolute.

Al-Qàshàni reminds us concerning this fondamental thesis of his

Master that everything, in regard to its ontological source and

ground, is the Absolute, and that all the things of the world are but

different forms assumed by the same essence. The fact that the

phenomenal world is so variegated is simply due to the diversity of

the Divine Names, i.e., the basic or archetypal forms of the Divine

self-manifestation.

Nothing exists except the Absolute. Only it takes on divergent forms

and different aspects according to whether the Names appear out-

wardly or lie hidden inwardly as well as in accordance with the

relative preponderance of the properties of Necessity (wujüb) over

th ose of Possibility (imkân) or conversely: the preponderance of

spirituality, for instance, in some and the preponderance of material-

ity in others. 16

As regards Ibn 'Arabi's words: 'The lnward belies the Outward

when the latter says "I", etc.', al-Qâshâni gives the following

explication:

Each one of the Divine Names affirms its own meaning, but what it

affirms is immediately negated by an opposite Name which affirms its

own. Thus each single part of the world affirms its own I-ness by the

very act of manifesting its property, but the opposite of that part

immediately denies what the former has affirmed and brings to

naught its self-assertion by manifesting in its turn a property which is

the opposite of the one manifested by the first.

[77]

Each of the two, in this way, declares what it has in its own nature,

and the other responds (negatively) to it. But (in essence) the one

which declares and the one which responds are one and the same

thing. As an illustration of this, Ibn' Arabï refers to a (famous) saying

of the prophet (Mul)ammad) describing how God pardons the sins

committed by the people of this community, namely, 'both what their

bodily members have done and what their souls have told them (to

do) even if they do not actually do it.'   This is right because it often

happens that the soul tells a man to do something ( evil) and he

intends to do it, but is detained from it by another motive. In such a

case, the man himself is the hearer of what his own soul tells him, and

he becomes conscious of the conflicting properties at work in himself

when he hesitates to do the act.

The man at such a moment is the speaker and the hearer at the same

time, the commander and the forbidder at the same time. Morover,

he is the knower of ail this. And (he manifests and gathers in himself

ail these contradictory properties), notwithstanding his inner essence

being one and the same, by dint of the diversity of his faculties and

governing principles of his actions such as reason, imagination, repul-

sion, desire etc. Such a man is an image of the Absolute (which is

essentially one) in its divergent aspects and the properties coming

from the Names.

Close to the relation between the 'inward' and 'outward' is the

contradictory relation between the One and the Many. The two

kinds of contradictory relations are, at bottom, one and the same

thing. For the dictum that the Absolute (or the world) is One and

yet Many, Many and yet One, arises precisely from the fact that the

infinitely various and divergent things of the world are but so many

phenomenal forms of one unique Being which is the Absolute. 

The (apparent) difference is due to our taking a slightly different view-

point in each case.

Regarding the second relation which we will now consider, Ibn

'Arabi offers two explanations, one mathematical and the other

ontological. We begin with the 'mathematical' aspect of the

problem.

The structure of the metaphysical fact that the One appears in the

multiplicity of things, and the things that are many are ultimately

reducible to the One or the Absolute, is identical with the structure

of the reciprocal relation between the mathematical 'one', which is

the very source of all numbers, and the numbers.

The numbers are produced in a serial form by the (repetition of)

'one'. Thus the 'one' brings into existence the numbers, white the

numbers <livide the 'one', (the oqly essential difference between

them being that) a 'number' subsists as a number by virtue of some-

thing which is counted. 17

[78]

Ontologically, as we have seen, the diversification of the unique

Essence by concrete delimitations and various degrees is the cause

of things and events being observable related to one another in an

infinitely complicated manner. The basic structure of this

phenomenon, however, is quite simple. lt is, Ibn 'Arabi says, the

same as the proceeding of the infinite series of numbers out of' one'.

In his view, the mathematical 'one' is the ultimate source of all

numbers, and the numbers are nothing but various forms in which

'one' manifests itself.

'One' itself is not a number; it is the source or ground of all

numbers. Every number is a phenomenal form of'one' brought into

being by the repetition of the latter (just as all the things in the world

are products of the one Essence 'repeating itself', mutakarrir, in

various forms of self-determination). 18 The important point is that a

number thus constituted by repetition of 'one', is not a mere con-

glomeration of the units, but an independent reality (}Jaqiqah ). For

example, the number 'two' is explained by al-Qâshânï in the follow-

ing way: 19

When 'one' manifests itself (tajallà )20 in a different form it is called

'two'. But 'two' is nothing other than 'one' and 'one' put together,

while 'one' itself is not a number. It is to be remarked that the

structure of this putting together (of two 'one's) is one, and the

product of this putting together, which is called 'two', is also one

number. So that the essential form here is one, the matter is one, and

the two 'one's put together is also one, i.e., 'one' manifesting itself in

a form of the Many. Thus 'one' produces the number ('two') by

manifesting itself in two different forms. The same is true of 'three',

for example, which is 'one' and 'one' and 'one', and the nature and

structure of its one-ness is exactly the same as in the case of 'two'.

Thus, all the numbers are each a particular form in which 'one'

manifests itself according toits peculiar determination and the rank

it occupies in the numerical series.

It is very important to note that the numbers brought into being in

this way are all intelligibles (haqà'iq ma'qûlah, lit. 'realities grasped

by Reason'), and have no existence in the external world; they exist

only in our mind. They exist in the external world merely in so far as

they are recognizable in the objects that are countable. This must be

what is meant by Ibn 'Arabï when he says (in the above-quote

passage) that a 'number' is actualized only by something which is

counted. And tkis situation corresponds exactly to the ontological

structure of the world of Being.

'Something which is counted' (ma'dûd), in al-Qâshânï's interpre-

tation, refers to the One Reality which manifests itself and

diversifies itself in the Many. But this is clearly a misinterpretation.

The ma'dûd in this context must denote a concrete object which

exists in the external world and which manifests the transcendental

'one' in a concrete form.

 [79]

In terms of the correspondence between the mathematical and the ontological order of being, 'one' corresponds to the One Reality, i.e., the Absolute, and the numbers that are intelligibles correspond to permanent archetypes, and finally

the 'countable things' correspond to the things of the empirical

world. Balï Efendi brings out this system of correspondences with

an admirable lucidity: 21

You must notice that 'one' corresponds symbolically to the one inner

essence ('ayn) which is the reality itself of the Absolute, while the

numbers correspond to the multiplicity of the Names arising from the

self-manifestation of that reality (i.e., of the Absolute) in various

forms in accordance with the requirement of its own aspects and

relations. (The multiplicity of the Names here spoken of) is the

multiplicity of the permanent archetypes in the Knowledge (i.e.,

within the Divine Consciousness). Finally, the 'things counted' cor-

respond to the concrete things of this world, that is, creaturely forms

of theophany, without which neither the properties of the Na mes nor

the states of the permanent archetypes can become manifest (in the

external world in a concrete way).

Only when we understand the word 'things counted' in this sense,

are we in a position to see correctly what is meant by the following

words of Ibn 'Arabï: 22

The 'thing counted' partakes of both non-existence and existence, for

one and the sa me thing can be non-existent on the lev el of the senses

while being existent on the level of the intellect. 23 So there must be

both the 'number' and the 'thing counted'.

But there must be, in addition, also 'one' which causes all this and is

caused by it.24 (And the relation between 'one' and the numbers is to

be conceived as follows.) Every degree in the numerical series (i.e.,

every number) is in itself one reality. (Thus each number is a self-

subsistent unity and) not a mere conglomeration, and yet, on the

other hand, there certainly is a respect in which it must be regarded as

'one's put together. Thus 'two' isone reality (though it is a 'gathering'

of'one' and 'one'), 'three' is alsoone reality (though it is a 'gathering'

of 'one' and 'one' and 'one'), and so on, however far we go up the

numerical series. Since each number is in this way one (i.e., an

independent reality), the essence of each number cannot be the same

as the essences of other numbers. And yet, the fact of 'gathering' (of

'one's) is common to all of them (i.e., as a genus, as it were, which

comprises all the species). Thus we admit the (existence of) various

degrees (i.e., different numbers, each being unique as an indepen-

dent number) in terms of the very essence of each one of them,

recognizing at the same time that they are all one. 25 Thus we inevi-

tably affirm the very thing which we think is to be negated in itself. 26

[80]

He who has understood what 1 have established regarding the nature

of the numbers, namely, that the negation of them is at the sa me time

the affirmation of them, must have thereby understood how the

Absolute in tanzïh is at the same time the creatures in tashbïh,

although there is a distinction between the Creator and the creatures.

The truth of the matter is that we see here the Creator who is the

creatures and the creatures who are the Creator. Moreover, all this

'arises from one unique Essence; nay, there is nothing but one unique

Essence, and it is at the same time many essences.

In the eye of a man who has understood by experience the ontologi-

cal depth of this paradox the world appears in an extraordinary form

which an ordinary mind can never believe to be true. Such an

experience consists in penetrating into the 'real situation' (amr)

beyond the veils of normal perception and thought. In illustration,

Ibn' Arabï gives two concrete examples from the Qoran.27 The first

is the event of Abraham going to sacrifice his own son Isaac, and the

second is the marriage of Adam with Eve.

(Isaac said to his father Abraham): 'My father, do what you have

been commanded to do!' (XXXVII, 102). The child (Isaac) is essen-

tially the same as his father. So the father saw ( when he saw himself in

his vision sacrificing his son) nothing other than himself sacrificing

himself. 'And We ransomed him (i.e., Isaac) with a big sacrifice'

(XXXVII, 107). At that moment, the very thing which (earlier) had

appeared in the form of a human being (i.e., Isaac) appeared in the

form of a ram. And the very thing which was 'father' appeared in the

form of 'son', or more exactly in the capacity of 'son'.

(As for Adam and Eve, it is said in the Qoran): 'And (your Lord)

created from it (i.e., the first soul which is Adam) its mate' (IV, 1).

This shows that Adam married no other than himself. Thus from him

issued both his wife and his child. The reality is one but assumes many

forms.

Of this passage, al-Qâshânï gives an important philosophical expla-

nation.28 It is to be remarked in particular that, regarding the

self-determination of the Absolute, he distinguishes between the

'universal self-determination' (al-ta'ayyun al-kulliy ), i.e., self-

determination on the level of species, and the particular or

'individual self-determination' (al-ta'ayyun al-juz'iy). These two

self-determinations correspond to the ontological plane of the

archetypes and that of the concrete things.

'The reality is one but assumes many forms' means that what is in

reality the one unique Essence multiplies itself into many essences

through the multiplicity of self-determinations.

These self-determinations are of two kinds: one is 'universal' by

which the Reality in the state of Unity becomes 'man', for example,

and the other is 'individual' by which 'man' becomes Abraham. Thus,

in this case, (the one unique Essence) becomes 'man' through the

universal self-determination: and then, through an individual self-

determination, it becomes Abraham, and through another (indi-

vidual self-determination) becomes lshmael. 29

[81]

In the light of this, (Abraham, notas an individual named Abraham,

but on the level of) 'man' before individuation, did not sacrifice

anything other than himself by executing the 'big sacrifice' (i.e., by

sacrificing the ram in place of his son). For (the ram he saerificed) was

in reality (i.e., if we consider it on the level of the Absolute

before any self-determination). (It appeared in the form of the ram

because) the Absolu te determined itself by a different universal

self-determination30 (into 'ram') and then by an individual self-

determination (into the particular ram which Abraham sacrificed.)

Thus the same one Reality which had appeared in the form of a man

appeared in the form of a ram by going through two different self-

determinations, once on the level of species, then on the level of

individuals.

Since 'man' remains preserved both in father and child on the level of

the specific unity, (Ibn 'Arabi) avoids aftirming the difference of

essence in father and child and affirms only the difference of 'capa-

city' (l:iukm) saying 'or more exactly, in the capacity of son'. This he

does because there is no difference at all between the two in essence,

that is, in so far as they are' man'; the difference arises only in regard

to their 'being father' and 'being son' respectively.

The same is true of Adam and Eve. Both of them and their children

are one with respect to their 'being man'.

Thus the Absolu te is one in itself, but it is multiple because of its

various self-determinations, specific and individual. These self-

determinations do not contradict the real Unity. In conclusion we

say: (The Absolute) is One in the form of Many.

It is remarkable that here al-Qâshânï presents the contradictory

relation between the One and the Many in terms of the Aristotelian

conception of genus-species-individual. There is no denying that

the world-view of Ibn' Arabï has in fact a conspicuously philosophi-

cal aspect which admits of this kind of interpretation. However, the

problem of the One and the Many is for Ibn 'Arabï primarily a

matter of experience. No philosophical explanation can do justice

to his thought unless it is backed by a persona! experience of the

Unity of Being (walJdah al-:wujüd). The proposition: 'Adam mar-

ried himself', for example, will never cease to be perplexing and

perturbing to our Reason until it is transformed into a matter of

experience.

Philosophical interpretation is after ail an afterthought applied to

the naked content of mystical intuition. The naked content itself

cannot be conveyed by philosophical language. Nor is there any

linguistic means by which to convey immediately the content of

mystical intuition. If, in spite of this basic fact, one forces oneself to

express and describe it, one has to have recourse to a metaphorical

or analogical language. And in fact, Ibn' Arabï introduces for this

purpose a number of comparisons. Here I give two comparisons

which particularly illumine the relation of the One and the Many.

[82]

---

The first is the organic unity of the body and the diversity of the

bodily members.31

These forms (i.e., the infinite forms of the phenomenal world) are

comparable to the bodily members of Zayd. A man, Zayd, is admit-

tedly one personal reality, but his hand is neither his foot nor his head

nor his eye nor his eyebrow. So he is Many which are One. He is

Many in the forms and One in his person.

In the same way, 'man' is essentially One no doubt, and yet it is also

clear that 'Umar is not the same as Zayd, nor Khâlid, nor Ja'far. In

spite of the essential one-ness of 'man', the individual exemplars of it

are infinitely man y. Thus man is One in essence, while he is Many

both in regard to the forms (i.e., the bodily members of a particular

man) and in regard to the individual exemplars.

---

The second is a comparison of the luxuriant growth of grass after a

rainfall. It is based on the Qoran, XXII, 5, which reads: 'Thou seest

the earth devoid of life. But when We send down upon it water, it

thrills, swells up, and puts forth all magnificent pairs of vegetation'.

He says: 32

Water13 , is the source of life and movement for the earth, as is indicated

by the expression: 'it thrills'. 'It swells up' refers to the fact that the

earth becomes pregnant through the activity of water. And 'it puts

forth all magnificent pairs of vegetation', that is, the earth gives birth

only to things that resemble it, namely, 'natural' things like the

earth.34 And the earth obtains in this way the property of 'double-

ness' by what is born out of it.35

Likewise, the Absolute in its Being obtains the property of multiplic-

ity and a variety of particular names by the world which appears from

it. The world, because of its ontological nature, requires that the

Divine Names be actualized. And as a result, the Divine Names

become duplicated by the world (which has arisen in this way), and

the unity of the Many (i.e., the essential unity of the Divine Names)

cornes to stand opposed to the world.36 Thus (in the comparison of

the earth and vegetation, the earth) is a unique substance which is

one essence like (the Aristotelian) 'matter' (hayülà). And this unique

substance which is one in essence is man y in its forms which appear in

it and which it contains within itself.

The same is true of the Absolute with all the forms of its self-

manifestation that appear from it. So the Absolute plays the role of

the locus in which the forms of the world are manifested, but even

then it main tains intact the intelligible unity. See how wonderful is

this Divine teaching, the secret of which God discloses to some only

of His servants as He likes.

 [83]

The general ontological thesis that the Many of the phenomenal

world are all particular forms of the absolute One in its self-

manifestation 

is of extreme importance in Ibn' Arabï's world-view

not only because of the central and basic position it occupies in his

thought but also because of the far-reaching influence it exercises

on a number of problems in more particular fields. 

As an interesting example of the application of this idea to a special problem, 

I shall here discuss the view entertained by Ibn 'Arabï concerning the

historical religions and beliefs that have arisen among mankind.

The starting-point is furnished by the factual observation that

• various peoples in the world have always worshipped and are wor-shipping various gods. 
• If, however, all the things and events in the world are but so many self-manifestations of the Absolute, 
• the different gods also must necessarily be considered various special forms in which the Absolute manifests itself.

• All gods are ultimately one and the same God, 
• but each nation or each community believes in, and worships, Him in a special form.

Ibn 'Arabï names it 'God as created in various religious beliefs'.

And pushing this argument to its extreme, he holds that each man

has his own god, and worships his own god, and naturally denies the

gods of other people. God whom each man thus worships as his god

is the Lord (rabb) of that particular man.

In truth, everybody worships the same one God through different

forms. 

Whatever a man worships, he is worshipping indirectly God

Himself. 

This is the true meaning of polytheism or idolatry. 

And in  this sense, idol-worship is, as we have seen above, nothing blam-

able.

---

In order to bring home this point, Ibn' Arabï refers to an article of

belief which every Muslim is supposed to acknowledge; namely,

that God on the day of Resurrection will appear in the presence of

the believers in diverse forms. 37

You must know for sure, if you are a real believer, that God will

appear on the day of Resurrection (in various forms successively):

first in a certain form in which He will be recognized, next in a

different form in which He will be denied, then He will transform

Himself into another form in which He will be again recognized.

Throughout this whole process, He will remain He; in whatever form

He appears it is He and no one else. Yet, on the other hand, it is also

certain that this particular form is not the same as that particular

form.

Thus, the situation may be described as the one unique Essence

playing the role of a mirror. A man looks into it, and if he sees there

the particular image of God peculiar to his religion he recognizes it

and accepts it without question. If, however, he happens to see an

image of God peculiar to some other religion than his, he denies it.

This is comparable to the case in which a man sees in a mirror his own

image, then the image of some one else. In either case, the mirror is

one substance while the images reftected upon it are many in the eye

of the man who looks at it. He cannot see in the mirror one unique

image comprising the whole.38

[84]

Thus the truth itself is quite simple: in whatever form God appears

in the mirror, it is always a particular phenomenal form of God, and

in this sense every image (i.e., every object worshipped as a god) is

ultimately no other than God Himself. This simple fact, however, is

beyond the reach of Reason. Reason is utterly powerless in a matter

of this nature, and the reasoning which is the activity of Reason is

unable to grasp the real meaning of this phenomenon.39 The only

one who is able to do sois the real 'knower' ('ârin. Ibn' Arabï calls

such a true 'knower' who, in this particular case, penetrates into the

mystery of the paradoxical relation between the One and the Many,

a 'worshipper of the Instant' ('âbid al-waqt),40 meaning thereby a

man who worships every self-manifestation of God at every

moment as a particular form of the One.

Those who know the truth of the matter show a seemingly negative

attitude toward the various forms which ordinary people worship as

gods. (But this attitude of denial is merely a make-believe. In reality

they do not deny such a form of worship for themselves) for the high

degree of spiritual knowledge makes them behave according to the

dictates of the Instant. In this sense they are 'worshippers of the

Instant.' 41

In the consciousness of such men of high spirituality, each Instant is

a glorious 'time' of theophany. 

신현 (Theophany) 신현이란 신의 현현

The Absolute manifests itself at

every moment with this or that of its Attributes. The Absolute,

viewed from this angle, never ceases to make a new self-

manifestation, and goes on changing its form from moment to

moment.42 

And the true 'knowers', on their part, go on responding with flexibility to this ever changing process of Divine self-manifestation. 

Of course, in so doing they are not worshipping the changing forms themselves that come out outwardly on the surface;

they are worshipping through the ever changing forms the One that

remains etemally unchanging and unchangeable. 

These men know, further, that not only themselves but even the

idol-worshippers are also (unconsciously) worshipping God beyond

the idols. This they know because they discem in the idol-worshippers the majestic power of Divine self-manifestation (sultân al-tajalli) working actively quite independently of the conscious minds of the worshippers.43

If, in spite of this knowledge, the 'knowers' hold outwardly an

attitude of denial toward idolatry, it is because they want to follow

the footsteps of the prophet Muhammad. The prophet forbad

idol-worship because he knew that the understanding of the mass of

people being shallow and superficial, they would surely begin to

worship the 'forms' without going beyond them. He urged them,

instead, to worship One God alone whom the people could know

only in a broad general way but never witness (in any concrete

form). The attitude of the 'knowers' toward idol-worship is pious

imitation of this attitude of Muhammad. 

[85]

Let us go back to the point from which we started. We opened this chapter with a discussion of the problem of 'perplexity' (IJ,ayrah).

We are now in a better position to understand the true nature of the

'perplexity' and to see to what extent the ontological structure of

Being is really 'perplexing'. 

A brief consideration of the problem at this stage will make a suitable conclusion to the present chapter.

An infinity of things which are clearly different from each other

and some of which stand in marked opposition to one another are,

with all the divergencies, one and the same thing. 

The moment man becomes aware of this fact, it cannot but throw his mind into

bewildering confusion. This 'perplexity' is quite a natural state for

those who have opened their eyes to the metaphysical depth of Being.

But on reftection it will be realized that the human mind falls into

this 'perplexity' because it has not yet penetrated deeply below the

level of superficial understanding. 

In the mind of a sage who has experienced the Unity of Being in its real depth there can no longer be any place for any 'perplexity'.

 

Here follows what Ibn' Arabï says on this point.44

The 'perplexity' arises because the mind of man becomes polarized

(i.e., toward two contradictory directions, one toward the One and

the other toward the Many). But he who knows (by the experience of

'unveiling') what I have just explained is no longer in 'perplexity', no

matter how many divergent things he may come to know. For (he

knows that) the divergence is simply due to the nature of the locus,

and that the locus in each case is the eternal archetype itself of the

thing. The Absolute goes on assuming different forms in accordance

with different eternal archetypes, i.e., different loci of self-

manifestation, and the determinate aspects which man perceives of it

go on changing correspondingly. In fact, the Absolute accepts every

one of these aspects that are attributed to it. Nothing, however, is

attributed to it except that in which it manifests itself (i.e., the

particular forms of its self-manifestation). And there is nothing at all

(in the whole world of Being) except this.45

On the basis of this observation al-Qashanï gives a final judgment

concerning the metaphysical 'perplexity'. It is, he says, merely a

phenomenon observable in the earliest stage of spiritual development.46

The 'perplexity' is a state which occurs only in the beginning when

there still lingers the activity of Reason and the veil of thinking still

remains. But when the 'unveiling' is completed and the immediate

intuitive cognition becomes purified, the 'perplexity' is removed with

a sudden increase of knowledge coming from the direct witnessing of

the One manifesting itself in diverse forms of the archetypes in

accordance with the essential requirement of the Name 'All-knowing' ('alïm). 41

[86]

=====

Notes

1. FU$., p. 55/72.

2. Cf. Affifi, Fu$., Corn., p. 40; FU$., p. 56/72-73.

3. Reference to Qoran, XXXVIII, 47.

4. p. 56.

5. FU$., p. 56/73.

6. Qâshânï, p. 56.

7. FU$., p. 57173.

8. p. 57.

9. ibid.

10. i.e., from the point of view of the Names, in whose plane alone there corne into

existence all these diff erences in degrees.

11. FU$., p. 58/7 4.

12. FU$., p. 48/69.

13. p. 48.

14. Qâshânï, ibid.

15. FU$., p. 64/77.

16. p. 64.

17. FU$., p. 64/77.

18. The words in parentheses belong to al-Qâshânï, p. 65.

19. ibid.

20. It is to be remarked that the multiplication of the mathematical 'one' is described

in terms of 'self-manifestation' (tajallî) just in the same way as the Absolute is

described as 'manifesting itself' in the Many.

T Metaphysical Perplexity 87

21. p. 65, footnote.

22. FU$., p. 65/77-78.

23. i.e., one and the same thing qua 'number' is non-existent on the level of the

senses, existing only on the level of intellect, but it is, qua 'a thing counted', existent

on the level of the senses. In other words, it is the 'thing counted' that makes a

'number' exist in a concrete, sensible form. The same applies to the relation between

an archetype and a thing which actualizes it in a sensible form.

24. i.e., besides the 'number' and the 'thing counted', there must necessarily be also

'one' which is the ultimate source of ail numbers and things counted. But 'one' which

th us causes and establishes the numbers is also caused and established by the latter in

concrete forms.

25. That is to say: we admit the one-ness (i.e., uniqueness) of each number, while

recognizing at the same time the one-ness (i.e., sameness) of ail numbers.

26. You affirm of every number that which you negate of it when you consider it in

itself. This may be explained in more concrete terms in the following way. You admit

the inherence of 'one' in every number; 'one' is the common element of al! the

numbers and is, in this respect, a sort of genus. But, on the other hand, you know that

'one' is not inherent in every number in its original form but only in a particularized

form in each case; 'one' may be considered a sort of species as distinguished from

genus. Thus 'one', although it does exist in every number, is no longer the 'one' perse

in its absoluteness. And this precisely corresponds to the ontological situation in

which the Absolute is manifested in everything, but not as the absolute Absolute.

27. FU$., p. 67/78.

28. p. 67.

29. the Absolute

. /\ .. (umversal self-determmat1on)

I \

'ram' 'man'

/\ Î".

( individual ) ( individual ) self-determination self-determination

this ram / that ram Abraham f "' lshmael

30. i.e., by a specific self-determination different from the self-determination by

which the Absolu te became 'man'.

31. Fu$., pp. 231-232/183--184.

32. FU$., p. 253/200.

33. 'Water' for Ibn' Arabi is a symbol of cosmic Life.

34. The idea is that the earth produces only 'earth-like' things, i.e., its own 'dupli-

cates', the symbolic meaning of which is that the things of the world are ultimately of

the same nature as the Absolute which is their ontological ground.

88 Sufism and Taoism

35. i.e., the luxuriant vegetation which grows forth from the earth, being of the same

nature as the latter, 'doubles' so to speak the earth.

36. This is a difficult passage, and there is a remarkable divergence between the

Cairo edition and that of Affifi. The Affifi text reads: fa-thahata hi-hi wa-khâliqi-hi

al)adiyah al-kathrah 'thus the unity of the Many becomes established by the world

and its Creator'. The Cairo edition, which 1 follow here, reads: fa-thunniyat hi-hi

wa-yukhâlifu-hu al)adïyah al-kathrah.

37. .• p. 232/184.

38. i.e., what he actually sees in the mirror is always the particular image of a

particular object which happens to be there in front of the mirror; he can never see a

universal image comprising al! the particular images in unity.

39. p. 233/185.

40. The word waqt 'Time' in this context means, as al-Qashanï remarks, the present

moment, or each successive moment as it is actualized (p. 247).

41. p. 247/196.

42. a view comparable with the atomistic metaphysics of Islamic theology.

43. p. 247/196.

44. ., p. 68178.

45. Ali the divergent aspects (al)kâm) that are recognizable in the world of Being are

so many actualizations of the eternal archetypes. And the eternal archetypes, in their

turn, are nothing but so many self-manifestations of the Absolute. In this sense

everything is ultimately the Absolu te. And there is no place for 'perplexity'.

46. p. 68.

47. The archetypes are, as we shall see later in more detail, the eternal essential

forms of the things of the world as they exist in the Divine Consciousness. They are

born in accordance with the requirement of the Attribute of Omniscience.