Showing posts with label Indian philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indian philosophy. Show all posts

2024/02/23

The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna, Jay L. Garfield

The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (Audio Download): Nāgārjuna, Jay L. Garfield - translator, Zehra Jane Naqvi, Tantor Audio: Amazon.com.au: Audible Books & Originals


The Fundamental Wisdom Of The Middle Way  Nagarjuna 
by Jay L Garfield


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The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika Audible Audiobook – Unabridged
Nāgārjuna (Author), Jay L. Garfield - Translator (Author), Zehra Jane Naqvi (Narrator), Tantor Audio (Publisher)
4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars 208 ratings
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The Buddhist saint Nāgārjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the second century CE, is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher. His greatest philosophical work, the Mūlamadhyamikakārikā - read and studied by philosophers in all major Buddhist schools of Tibet, China, Japan, and Korea - is one of the most influential works in the history of Indian philosophy.

Now, in The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Jay L. Garfield provides a clear translation of Nāgārjuna's seminal work, offering those with little or no prior knowledge of Buddhist philosophy a view into the profound logic of the Mūlamadhyamikakārikā. Garfield presents a superb translation of the Tibetan text of Mūlamadhyamikakārikā in its entirety and a commentary reflecting the Tibetan tradition through which Nāgārjuna's philosophical influence has largely been transmitted. Illuminating the systematic character of Nāgārjuna's reasoning, Garfield shows how Nāgārjuna develops his doctrine that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, that is, than nothing exists substantially or independently. He offers a verse-by-verse commentary that explains Nāgārjuna's positions and arguments in the language of Western metaphysics and epistemology and connects Nāgārjuna's concerns to those of Western philosophers.
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©1995 Jay L. Garfield (P)2021 Tantor


Listening Length

12 hours and 4 minutes
Author

Nāgārjuna, see all
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Zehra Jane Naqvi
Audible release date

13 July 2021
Product details

Listening Length 12 hours and 4 minutes
Author Nāgārjuna, Jay L. Garfield - translator
Narrator Zehra Jane Naqvi
Audible.com.au Release Date 13 July 2021
Publisher I hear so much
Program Type Audiobook
Version Unabridged
Language English
SALT B097QBYQXD
Best Sellers Rank 44,285 in Audible Books & Originals (See Top 100 in Audible Books & Originals)
85 in Eastern Philosophy (Audible Books & Originals)
194 in Buddhism (Audible Books & Originals)
595 in Buddhism (Books)
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Customer reviews
4.6 out of 5 stars

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Carlo Dolif
5.0 out of 5 stars ExcellentReviewed in Italy on 17 September 2021
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Excellent
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Djamel
5.0 out of 5 stars Nargarjuna’s teaching well commented. InsightfulReviewed in France on 20 May 2020
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Fabulous book!!
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Lynette
5.0 out of 5 stars Five StarsReviewed in Canada on 7 December 2016
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Good
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Theatermann
5.0 out of 5 stars Great commentary on an epochal workReviewed in Germany on 1 January 2016
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With this book - his masterpiece, which he himself probably won't be able to top - Garfield provides a commentary on Nagarjuna's main philosophical work that is as profound as it is easy to read. Garfield succeeds in breaking down the difficult and often almost incomprehensible original text in an immediately comprehensible way and presenting the lines of argument in such a way that both the outstanding intellectual power of the 1800-year-old text emerges as well as its possible meaning for today Philosophize. In doing so, he neither blurs the differences to our current European thinking nor pushes the text into an “oriental” distance. This book is definitely not part of Western wellness Buddhism and would be out of place on the richly stocked esoteric shelves of our bookstores. In short: It is one of the most important and insightful books for anyone who seriously wants to know something about Buddhist thought, especially Madhyamaka.

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T Wright.
5.0 out of 5 stars The Best.Reviewed in the United States on 22 June 2010
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(redaction & addendum of previous review)
In reading the entire text, i found the arguements quite overwelming, however the beginning buddhist is not without help. In searching for applicatons to the examinations it can be said that madhyamaka is the synthsis of all other schools. This is a great starting place for organization. monastics usually study these topics for 20 years intensively , they relate most to the abidharma. Having said this , i would reccomend Geshe Tashi Tsering's Foundations book series, especially Relative truth , ultimate truth ( Vol 2) as the companion to this text. In learning the divisions of the two truths by the four major schools one may place the examinations of nagarjuna in thier context and avoid misintrepretation which garfield says " the danger is to mistakenly view the subtleties of emptiness as nihlism". ( paraphrase) So this would be a great guide to the study applicaton and classification of the book's chapters .. July 8, 2010

I am not a monk, nor have i been given a systematic , structured schooling in buddhist philosophy. My review is based solely upon comparison with my limited understanding of the subtleties of madhyamaka. Nagarjuna is called a master by many prominent buddhist thinkers, to note Tsong khapa. It is said that Nagarjuna is an "Arya" being. "Arya" meaning sees all subtle levels of Dukkha. ( Rather elementary) However it is said repeadedly that without ethics,concentration and then wisdom the madhaymaka is an enigma. Thats why the dalai lama explains it as such. Presupposing the student has built this foundation - Ethics, Concentration, Wisdom. Then one is ready for Madhyamaka.

Garfield gives the best version to western philosophers. I would caution though taking Garfield's view as the monastic view. Even though he gives a great explanation , thouroughly extensive and simplifies deep points in the madhyamaka, he is not able to approach it from the soterilogical point of view, as compared to that of an Arya being. in the madhyamakaavatara, which is like an introduction to Nagarjuna, chandrakirti says that he isn't even an Arya, of the 6th bhumi. Im sure Garfield would agree, that to have a thourough understanding of this text one would have to explain from that view.

This text would be greatly understanded by the most extensive commentary extant by Rje Tsong Khapa. (Ocean of reasoning) with this commentary one would get the jest of the major commentaries from Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita, and Tsong Khapa. Ocean is a great companion to this text.

With this in mind this version of Nagarjuna's seminal treatise is the best buddhist book available, aside from Lamrim Chenmo.

100% gift to the west, Thank you Garfield,Newland and everyone else for this gift to us all.
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Nicholas R. Hunter
4.0 out of 5 stars Demanding but satisfying
Reviewed in the United States on 16 November 2001
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As Garfield states in the introduction, his analysis of the text is more from an analytical, Western philosophical perspective than from a "Buddhalogical" (his word) one. The result is authoritative, scholarly and a little dry. His presentation reminds me of David Brazier's presentation of the Abhidharma in his book "Zen Therapy: Transcending the Sorrows of the Human Mind." The experience of reading this book is very demanding, but also very satisfying. The benefits to be derived are probably directly proportional with the work one puts in to understanding it.
A more poetically compelling translation of the Mulamadhyamikakarika, along with a very thought-provoking introduction, is to be found in Stephen Batchelor's "Verses from the Center."
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Alex
5.0 out of 5 stars Essential reading
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 30 April 2017
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Essential reading for any Buddhist, or even anyone truly interested in philosophy and the nature of reality. A deep and difficult but ultimately worthy read.
3 people found this helpful
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Reader
5.0 out of 5 stars Rating an ancient classic? Really?
Reviewed in the United States on 27 August 2015
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Amazon requested a review. It seems beyond absurd to "rate" an ancient classic text. This is a classic ancient Buddhist text, accompanied by a scholarly and deeply insightful commentary by Jay Garfield. It has academic value as well as value for serious practitioners in any of the major Buddhist traditions. It's not a bedtime read - you would not read it unless you already had a commitment to understanding the approach of this seminal Buddhist thinker and shaper of the tradition (Nagarjuna). Again, too silly to give it a rating, but I just did.
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Werner
5.0 out of 5 stars Eternally true
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 21 July 2013
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As a study work of just for reference then this book does cover the basic philosophical epithets of Buddhist philosophy.
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Brian
5.0 out of 5 stars Difficult in the beginning but it's worth it
Reviewed in the United States on 1 March 2019
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A very detailed commentary and helpful guide through Nagarjuna's fundamental verses. Very digestible for astute lay philosophers and others interested in gaining deeper knowledge of Buddhist studies. Because it can be challenging, I would not recommend if you don't already have some experience with Buddhist texts.
3 people found this helpful
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Mudrooroo Nyoongah
5.0 out of 5 stars I recommend this book
Reviewed in the United States on 11 September 2017
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Ah Buddhism and the emptiness of everything thing and subject. To seek to uderstand the Buddhist Doctrine of Emptiness, I recommend this book. It is not easy going, but work your way through it and then again if you like following an argument.
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philip hynes
5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 4 June 2015
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Superb
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Amazon Customer
5.0 out of 5 stars interesting
Reviewed in the United States on 15 April 2020
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great exploration and elucidation of the topic
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buddhavanhalen
5.0 out of 5 stars Mind boggling and yet unfathomable great
Reviewed in the United States on 17 April 2017
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Just read and see for yourself. It's hard to understand in just one read I think, but I hope to have a firm "grasp" on it soon.
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TOM CORBETT
3.0 out of 5 stars attachment to emptiness
Reviewed in the United States on 21 January 2007
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i have not studied all of nagarjunas logic carefully in this book, it seems that he is arguing for the underlying emptiness of all things on the basis of his assumption of dependent or mutual arising. perhaps its a bit more complicated than this though. a cup of tea is not a cup of tea in itself. nor does the teabag have any individual or inherent identity, rather the teabag is a collection of collections without any individuality. just as my finger is a collection of cells, so a teabag is a combination of dependent things. infact he believes that everything depends on the presence or absence of something else. tea leaves depend on the presence of tanins, flavins, cells, maturation, drying, there is nothing inherently existent that could be called the individuality of the teabag. this of course defies common sense, but is reasonable. why cannot a collection be at one and the same time an individuality. ie one in many, or many as one. such an argument though would be contrary to nagarjunas thrust, which is to emphasise the existence of emptiness through dependence. ie everything that is dependent has no individual uniqueness (or soul) since all individuals are merely collections.

i am still studying nagarjuna, it seems that a statement such as "walker is not the same as walking, nor is it different from walking" can be argued any way which can. "walker is not the same as walking, if it were how could the two be told apart, nor is walker different from walking, or otherwise there would be walking without walker." it could be argued on the grounds of oneness that walker and walking are one and the same, that structure and function are inseperable. you could just as easily say that walker is the same as walking and that is why there isnt walking without walker. if nagarjuna says that legs are not the same as arms because they can be told apart he is right, because they can be told apart, but wrong because arms and legs are all part of one body and cannot be separated. so paradoxically one can say that walker and walking are not the same, but one can also say that they are the same (the same body/oneness).

it can be argued that walker is walking, walker is not walking, and as nagarjuna says walker is not the same as, nor different from walking. infact whatever you seek to prove, if you are clever enough, you can prove it. this is the nature of reason and logic. a donkey that is lead by the carrot of the person who possesses it.

i find his logic is clear (it is)infact, it is pure genius, but as with all logic one has to realise that at this moment logic is thoroughly illogical. though perhaps when he wrote it was thoroughly logical. logic being logical? logic being illogical? two sides of the same coin. if logical can be illogical why discuss something as important as emptiness using logic? this defies a common understanding of nagarjuna, unless of course he wished to impress buddhist emptiness upon the minds of the common people. or, perhaps he really did believe in the immutable logos (reason) of plato. that insoluble all pervasive notion of truth. personally i see that reason has its uses (many of them groundbreaking and earth shattering), but can often be used to say what you want, especially when it comes to philosophy.

i find the argument for emptiness grounded in dependent arising 'can' be compelling, or not compelling. its just how you approach it. in that a collection does not necessarily indicate an individuality, it could be seen as a collective, for example a sea sponge colony 'may' have no singular conscious individuality as the colony as a whole, but then a human being is a collection with a consciousness . but as i see it, dependent arising could be used as a proof against emptiness just as much as a proof for it. i believe that the buddha would have days where he took time out from such an approach, that is he would respect the agile logical display of nagarjuna, but have said "not on mondays nagarjuna" (but only if you dont mind my friend).

i dont think that the buddha was about dogmatising certain concepts and words such as emptiness, as useful as they may be. even freedom can become an obstacle to relationship and his word "liberation" can be in buddhism taken to mean many different things. it may just be that mental freedom and freedom from suffering are synonymous. emptiness is representative of water and air, but one should not forget the presence of fire, or gold (earth)(male elements)that are representative of fullness/form. to argue away form for emptiness seems unbalanced. just as to argue away emptiness for form would be unbalanced, though it may be an interesting excercise (and not too difficult). infact rising to the challenge if one looks in minute detail/huge magnification at an area of space one will find it a quantum soup, and not nearly as empty as one expected. infact buddha is implacable when he says emptiness is form for this could imply that there is no emptiness, only form. or visa-versa one could argue that all is empty.

i have also read nagarjunas, i think its called the flower garland, which was less a discussion of emptiness and logical proof for such, though his approach in the middle way comes across in this book too. no, i remember now its called the discourse of the precious flower garland.

i realise that my comments on nagarguna's mulamadhyamakakarika may seem disrespectful regarding the buddhist saint, and have no desire to show disrespect, but i do feel that all in all, though brilliant his arguments are not compelling ground for emptiness. this is because i am aware of the bias behind reason. there are other ways to illustrate emptiness. the buddhas "emptiness is form" for example is a much clearer statement of anti-logic, that i find very elegant. also the prescence of the zero in any effective numerical system requires a hypothetical emptiness.

i have no doubt that in the original tongue nagarjuna was a marvellous poet, sadly this does not come across in this translation or in "verses from the centre" a different translation of the same work. perhaps, in his poetic form his genius would have shone out as much as it does from his rational genius.

this is an interesting book to read, a fascinating insight into the mind of an early buddhist saint and an example of how one can use logic to prove anything, even that which intuitively seems almost impossible. but personally i dont feel it tells me anything, other than showing patterns of logic, which are a useful thing to aquire. i must say though that i am 'astonished' by the mans logical dexterity.

i would have found nagarjuna more interesting if he had tried to prove the existence of form and balanced this with a proof for the existence of emptiness. for in truth it is not balanced to prove the existence of emptiness without proving the existence of form. and you cannot prove the existence of emptiness without proving the existence of form, for emptiness is form. it can be argued that all is emptiness, but it can also be argued that all is form. whatever you look for is whatever you find. such is the nature of reality. seek and you will find.

infact... making things fun, and killing the buddhas word, i would say that "form is not emptiness, form is form" is just as true as "emptiness is form". this is the buddas freedom. playing with logic, one does not take reason too seriously on mondays, but... aah, on tuesdays it is profoundly important.

thank you nagarjuna for the encouragement you have given many.

love, flakey xxx.
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Full text of "Nagarjuna The Fundamental Wisdom Of The Middle Way"
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Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika 

"So 

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY RY JAY L. GARFIELD 






The 

Fundamental 
Wisdom 
of the 
Middle 
Way 

Nagarjuna’s 

Mulamadhyamakakdrika 

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY BY 

JAY L. GARFIELD 


New York Oxford 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
1995 



Oxford University Press 

Oxford New York 
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Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi 
Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne 
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and associated companies in 
Berlin Ibadan 

Copyright © 1995 by Jay L. Garfield 

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 

198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press, Inc. 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Nagarjuna, 2nd cent. 

[Madhyamakakarika. English & Sanskrit] 

The fundamental wisdom of the middle way : 

Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika / 

Translation and commentary by 
Jay L. Garfield, 
p. cm. 

ISBN 0-19-509336-4 (pbk.); 

ISBN 0-19-510317-3 (cloth) 

1. Madhyamika (Buddhism) — Early works to 1800. 

I. Garfield, Jay L., 1955—. 

BQ2792.E5G37 1995 294.3'85— dc20 95-1051 



Printed in the United States of America 



I dedicate this work, 
with profound gratitude 
and respect, 

to the Most Ven. Professor Samdhong Rinpoche: 
scholar, educator, statesman, public servant 
and shining exemplar of monastic life. 




Preface 


This is a translation of the Tibetan text of Mulamadhyamakaka- 
rika. It is perhaps an odd idea to translate a Tibetan translation of 
a Sanskrit text and to retranslate a text of which there are four 
extant English versions. My reasons for doing so are these: First, I 
am not satisfied with any of the other English versions. Every 
translation, this one included, of any text embodies an interpreta- 
tion, and my interpretation differs in various respects from those of 
my predecessors in this endeavor. This is to be expected. As Tuck 
(1990) has correctly observed, Nagarjuna, like any philosopher 
from a distant cultural context, is always read against an interpre- 
tive backdrop provided by the philosophical presuppositions of the 
interpreter, and by previous readings of Nagarjuna. So I claim no 
special privileged position vis a vis Streng (1967), Inada (1970), 
Sprung (1979), or Kalupahana (1986)— only a different position, 
one that I hope will prove useful in bringing Mulamadhyama- 
kakarika into contemporary philosophical discourse. I, like any 
translator/interpreter must acknowledge that there is simply no 
fact of the matter about the correct rendering of any important and 
genuinely interesting text. Interpretations, and with them, transla- 
tions, will continue to evolve as our understanding of the text 
evolves and as our interpretive horizon changes. Matters are even 
more complex and indeterminate when the translation crosses cen- 
turies, traditions and languages, and sets of philosophical assump- 
tions that are quite distant from one another, as is the case in the 
present project. So each of the available versions of the text em- 
bodies a reading. Inada reads Nagarjuna from the standpoint of 



Preface 


viii 

the Zen tradition, and his translation reflects that reading; Kalu- 
pahana reads Nagarjuna as a Theravada commentator on the 
Kaccayanagotta-sutra , and his translation reflects that reading, as 
well as his view about the affinities between James’s pragmatism 
and Theravada Buddhism. Sprung adopts Murti’s Kantian interpre- 
tation of Madhyamika, and his translation reflects that interpreta- 
tion. Streng reads the text as primarily concerned with religious 
phenomenology. There is no translation of this text into English, 
and no commentary on it, that specifically reflects an Indo-Tibetan 
Prasangika-Madhyamika interpretation. Inasmuch as this is my 
own preferred way to read Nagarjuna, and the reading dominant 
in Tibetan and highly influential in Japanese and Chinese discus- 
sions of Mulamadhyamakakarikd , I believe that it is important to 
fill this lacuna in the English bibliography. 

Having argued that all translation involves some interpretation 
and, hence, that there is always some distance between an original 
text and a translation, however good and canonical that translation 
may be, it follows that Mulamadhyamakakarikd and dBu-ma rtsa- 
ba shes-rab differ, however close they may be and however canoni- 
cally the latter is treated. Since dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab is the text 
read by and commented on by generations of Tibetan philoso- 
phers, I think that it is important that an English translation of this 
very text be available to the Western philosophical public. This 
text is hence worthy in its own right of translation inasmuch as it is 
the proper subject of the Tibetan philosophical literature I and 
others find so deep and fascinating. 

This is not a critical scholarly edition of the text. It is not philo- 
logical in intent; nor is it a discussion of the commentarial litera- 
ture on Nagarj una’s text. There is indeed a need for such a book, 
but that need will have to be filled by someone else. This is rather 
meant to be a presentation of a philosophical text to philosophers, 
and not an edition of the text for Buddhologists. If philosophers 
and students who read my book thereby gain an entrance into 
Nagarj una’s philosophy and see Mulamadhyamakakarikd , as inter- 
preted herein, as a text worthy of study and discussion, this work 
will have served its purpose. Since my intended audience is not 
Buddhologists, per se, but Western philosophers who are inter- 
ested in Buddhist philosophy, I have tried to balance standard 



Preface 


IX 


renderings of Buddhist terminology with more perspicuous contem- 
porary philosophical language. I am not sure that I have always 
made the right decisions or that I have found the middle path 
between the extremes of Buddhological orthodoxy and Western 
revisionism. But that is the aim. 

I am also striving for that elusive middle path between two other 
extremes in translation: I am trying on the one hand to avoid the 
unreadable literalism of translations that strive to provide a verba- 
tim report of the words used the original, regardless of whether 
that results in a comprehensible English text. But there is on the 
other hand the extreme represented by a translation written in 
lucid English prose purporting to be what the original author 
would have written had he been a twentieth-century philosopher 
writing in English, or one that, in an attempt to convey what the 
text really means on some particular interpretation, is in fact not a 
translation of the original text, but a completely new book, bearing 
only a distant relation to the original. This hopelessly mixes the 
tasks of translation on the one hand and critical commentary on 
the other. Of course, as I have noted above, these tasks are inter- 
twined. But there is the fault of allowing the translation to become 
so mixed with the commentary that one no longer has a grip on, for 
example, what is Nagarjuna and what is Garfield. After all, al- 
though the text is interpreted in being translated, this text should 
still come out in translation as a text which could be interpreted in 
the ways that others have read it. Because the original does indeed 
justify competing interpretations. That is one of the things that 
makes it such an important philosophical work. 


Amherst , Mass. 
November 1994 


J. L. G. 




Acknowledgments 


Thanks are already due to many who have helped at different 
stages of this project: Thanks to Bob Thurman and David Sloss for 
first introducing me to Buddhist philosophy and then for encourag- 
ing me to wade deeper. Thanks to David Kalupahana, Steve Odin, 
Kenneth Inada, and Guy Newland, as well as to David Karnos, 
Joel Aubel, Dick Garner, and William Herbrechtsmeier for many 
hours of valuable and enjoyable discussion of this text at the Na- 
tional Endowment for the Humanities Summer institute on Nagar- 
juna in Hawaii. And thanks to the NEH for the grant support that 
enabled my participation in that institute. I am especially grateful 
to Guy Newland for many subsequent conversations, useful sugges- 
tions, encouragement, and a critical reading of my work. Thanks 
to Janet Gyatso for countless hours of profitable and enjoyable 
philosophical conversation and for many useful and detailed criti- 
cisms and suggestions on this and other related work. Thanks to 
the Ven. Geshe Lobzang Tsetan for starting me in Tibetan, for 
much useful philosophical interchange, for teaching me an im- 
mense amount about Madhyamika, and for his close criticism of 
this text; to Georges Dreyfus (Geshe Sengye Samdup) for much 
useful advice and discussion; and to Joshua and Dianne Cutler and 
the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center of North America for hospi- 
tality. I also thank John Dunne for detailed comments on several 
chapters of an earlier draft of this translation. 

I am grateful to the Indo- American Foundation, the Council for 
the International Exchange of Scholars, and the Smithsonian Insti- 
tution for an Indo- American Fellowship in 1990-91. During that 



xii 


Acknowledgments 


time, as a Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Central Institute 
of Higher Tibetan Studies, I began work on this project. I owe an 
enormous debt of gratitude to The Most Ven. Prof. Samdhong 
Rinpoche and his staff for hosting me and my family at the Central 
Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies and to Rinpoche himself for his 
generous personal help. I thank the Ven. Geshe Ngawang Sherab 
for all of his kind logistical help at Santarakshita Library and for 
friendship and philosophical interchange. Thanks also to the Ven. 
Lobzang Norbu Shastri and the Ven. Acarya Ngawang Samten for 
extensive conversations from which I learned much and for useful 
comments on this work and to Karma for Tibetan lessons. 

I am deeply grateful to the Ven. Prof. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas 
for reading dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab and related texts with me and 
for giving me his invaluable oral commentary on these texts during 
that year and on many subsequent occasions. Nobody has taught me 
more about Madhyamika philosophy, and it is hard to imagine a 
more patient, generous, and incisive scholar and teacher. Without 
his lucid teachings, and without Geshe-la’s enormous patience, I 
could never have approached this text with any degree of success. 
While he would not agree with everything I say, my own reading of 
this text is enormously influenced by his. Special thanks to Sri Yeshi 
Tashi Shastri for his translation and transcription assistance during 
many of these sessions and for an enormous amount of cheerful and 
generous general research assistance, including a great deal of care- 
ful proofreading and detailed comments on this translation. 

During that year and in subsequent years I also benefited greatly 
from my visits to the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics. I am deeply 
grateful to the Ven. Prof. Geshe Lobzang Gyatso for his hospitality 
and for his teaching. In our many conversations and from his writ- 
ings I have learned a great deal, and this project certainly reflects 
his influence. Without his patient advice on interpretative and 
expository details and without his vigorous critique of many of my 
ideas it would have been impossible to produce this commentary. I 
thank the Ven. Sherab Gyatso for his tireless and invaluable trans- 
lation and assistance during that time. The Ven. Sherab Gyasto, 
The Ven. Graham Woodhouse, the Ven. Tenzin Dechen, and the 
Ven. Huen have given much to me in many hours of philosophical 
interchange through translation help and through their hospitality 



Acknowledgments 


xiii 


and friendship. Mr. Phillipe Goldin has also offered many helpful 
suggestions on the translation and commentary. I also thank the 
Ven. Khamtrul Rinpoche, the Ven. Geshe Yeshe Topden (Gen 
Drup-Thop) and Gen Lam-Rim-pa for their teachings and Acarya 
Nyima Tshering for his introduction and translation on those occa- 
sions. Special thanks to Nyima Penthog for improving my Tibetan. 

I thank His Holiness the Dalai Lama for his encouragement and 
for valuable discussion of some difficult interpretative issues. 

I am also very grateful to friends and colleagues at Drepung 
Loseling Monastic College. My visit there was extremely enjoyable 
and also philosophically fruitful. Thanks to the Ven. Geshe Dak-pa 
Toepgyal and the Ven. Thupten Dorjee for arranging everything 
and for talking with me about this and other work. I am very 
grateful to the Ven. Geshe Namgyal Wangchen for detailed com- 
ments and encouragement on this work and for useful discussions 
about Madhyamika, translation, the task of presenting Buddhist 
philosophical texts to the West, and other topics. 

My acknowledgment of help in India would not be complete 
without acknowledging the gracious hospitality and assistance in 
living of Sri N. N. Rai, Sri Arun Kumar Rai, Sri A. R. Singh, and 
their families in Sarnath; the hospitality of Kunzom Topden 
Martam and his family in Sikkim — it was the Martam house in 
which the writing actually got started; and Dr. L. S. Suri of the 
American Institute of Indian Studies in New Delhi, whose adminis- 
trative efficiency kept everything moving smoothly. 

I am deeply grateful to four friends who read a complete draft of 
this work and provided honest, searching, sometimes scathing criti- 
cism. What more could one ask from colleagues and friends? Many 
of their suggestions are incorporated in the book as it now stands, 
and much of whatever is good in it is due to their enormous contribu- 
tions. Sometimes I have disagreed with each of them. And whatever 
errors remain are certainly my own. So thanks especially to the Ven. 
Gareth Sparham, the Ven. Sherab Gyatso, Guy Newland, and Jane 
Braaten for copious corrections and criticism and for extensive pro- 
ductive discussion. Thanks also to Prof. Alan Sponberg for useful 
comments on an earlier draft and to Janet Gyatso, Graham Parkes, 
and Georges Dreyfus for reading and commenting on the penulti- 
mate draft. 



xiv 


Acknowledgments 


Another group of colleagues to whom I owe thanks are those 
who kept faith. This may require some explanation. I discovered 
when I — a Western, analytically trained philosopher of mind — 
began to work on Buddhist philosophy that many in philosophy 
and cognitive science took this as evidence of some kind of insan- 
ity, or at least as an abandonment of philosophy, per se. This is not 
the place to speculate on the origins or nature of the stigma attach- 
ing in some parts of our profession to Asian philosophy. But it is a 
sad fact to be noted and to be rectified. In any case, I therefore 
owe special thanks to those who went out of their way to support 
this work and to let me know that they took it and me seriously. I 
thank especially my friend and colleague Meredith Michaels for 
constant support, advice, and encouragement. And I thank Mur- 
ray Kiteley, John Connolly, Nalini Bhushan, Kathryn Addelson, 
Elizabeth Spellman, Frederique Marglin, Lee Bowie, Tom Warten- 
burg, Vere Chappell, Gareth Matthews, and John Robison, as well 
as Dan Lloyd, Steve Horst, and Joe Rouse. Thanks under this 
head also go to many of my nonphilosopher colleagues in the 
Hampshire College Cultural Studies program. I single out Mary 
Russo, Joan Landes, Susan Douglas, Jeffery Wallen, Norman Hol- 
land, and L. Brown Kennedy. 

I also gratefully acknowledge the support of several Hewlett- 
Mellon faculty development grants from Hampshire College and 
thank the deans of the college for supporting this work so gener- 
ously. I am also grateful for the support of this project and of 
related projects involving academic exchange between the Ameri- 
can and Tibetan academic communities from President Greg 
Prince of Hampshire College. Thanks also to Ms. Ruth Hammen 
and Ms. Leni Bowen for regular logistical support, to Mr. Andrew 
Janiak for his extensive assistance and editorial suggestions in the 
final stages of manuscript preparation, and to Mr. Shua Garfield 
and Mr. Jeremy Mage for additional assistance in manuscript prepa- 
ration and proofreading. Thanks as well to many groups of stu- 
dents in “Convention, Knowledge and Existence: European and 
Indo-Tibetan Perspectives” for putting up with and helping me to 
refine my presentation of this text and for my students in Buddhist 
Philosophy at Mount Holyoke College for working through an 
earlier draft of this text. 



Acknowledgments 


xv 


Portions of the translations of and commentaries on Chapters I, 
II, XIII, and XXIV appeared in Philosophy East and West in Gar- 
field (1990) and (1994). I thank the editors for permission to use 
that material here. The Tibetan edition of the text is from dGe 
’dun grub, dBu ma rtsa shes rtsa y grel bzhugs (Commentary on 
Mulamadhyamakakarika ), Ge Lugs Pa Students’ Welfare Publish- 
ing, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, 1987. 

I am more grateful than I could ever express to my family for 
accompanying me to India for one year, for enduring my absence 
when I have been in India alone, and for enduring my preoccupa- 
tion with this and related philosophical projects. I am especially 
grateful to Blaine Garson, who has shouldered far more than her 
fair share of parenting and other household responsibilities. Every 
stage of this project is dependent upon her help, sacrifice, and 
support. 

I hope that I haven’t forgotten anybody. 




2024/02/18

Samkhya - Wikipedia

Samkhya - Wikipedia

Samkhya

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Samkhya or Sankhya (/ˈsɑːŋkjə/Sanskritसांख्यromanizedsāṃkhya) is dualistic orthodox school of Hindu philosophy.[1][2][3] 

It views reality as composed of two independent principles, Puruṣa ('consciousness' or spirit) and Prakṛti (nature or matter, including the human mind and emotions).[4]

Puruṣa is the witness-consciousness

It is absolute, independent, free, beyond perception, above any experience by mind or senses, and impossible to describe in words.[5][6][7]

Unmanifest Prakriti is matter or nature. It is inactive, unconscious, and is a balance of the three guṇas (qualities or innate tendencies),[8][9] namely sattvarajas, and tamas. 

When Prakṛti comes into contact with Purusha this balance is disturbed, and Prakriti becomes manifest, evolving twenty-three tattvas,[10] namely intellect (buddhimahat), ego (ahamkara), mind (manas); the five sensory capacities known as ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose; the five action capacities known as hasta, pada, bak, anus, and upastha; and the five "subtle elements" or "modes of sensory content" (tanmatras), from which the five "gross elements" or "forms of perceptual objects" (earth, water, fire, air and space) emerge,[8][11] in turn giving rise to the manifestation of sensory experience and cognition.[12][13]

Jiva ('a living being') is the state in which Puruṣa is bonded to Prakriti.[14] Human experience is an interplay of the two, Puruṣa being conscious of the various combinations of cognitive activities.[14] The end of the bondage of Puruṣa to Prakriti is called Moksha (Liberation) or Kaivalya (Isolation).[15]

Samkhya's epistemology accepts three of six pramanas ('proofs') as the only reliable means of gaining knowledge, as does yoga. These are pratyakṣa ('perception'), anumāṇa ('inference') and śabda (āptavacana, meaning, 'word/testimony of reliable sources').[16][17][18] Sometimes described as one of the rationalist schools of Indian philosophy, it relies exclusively on reason.[19][20]

While Samkhya-like speculations can be found in the Rig Veda and some of the older Upanishads, some western scholars have proposed that Samkhya may have non-Vedic origins,[21][note 1] developing in ascetic milieus. Proto-Samkhya ideas developed c. 8th/7th BC and onwards, as evidenced in the middle Upanishads, the Buddhacharita, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Mokshadharma-section of the Mahabharata.[22] It was related to the early ascetic traditions and meditation, spiritual practices, and religious cosmology,[23] and methods of reasoning that result in liberating knowledge (vidyajnanaviveka) that end the cycle of duḥkha (suffering) and rebirth[24] allowing for "a great variety of philosophical formulations".[23] Pre-Karika systematic Samkhya existed around the beginning of the first millennium CE.[25] The defining method of Samkhya was established with the Samkhyakarika (4th c. CE).

Samkhya might have been theistic or nontheistic, but with its classical systematization in the early first millennium CE, the existence of a deity became irrelevant.[26][27][28][29] Samkhya is strongly related to the Yoga school of Hinduism, for which it forms the theoretical foundation, and it has influenced other schools of Indian philosophy.[30]

Etymology[edit]

Sāṃkhya (सांख्य) or sāṅkhya, also transliterated as samkhya and sankhya, respectively, is a Sanskrit word that, depending on the context, means 'to reckon, count, enumerate, calculate, deliberate, reason, reasoning by numeric enumeration, relating to number, rational'.[31] In the context of ancient Indian philosophies, Samkhya refers to the philosophical school in Hinduism based on systematic enumeration and rational examination.[32]

The word samkhya means 'empirical' or 'relating to numbers'.[33] Although the term had been used in the general sense of metaphysical knowledge before,[34] in technical usage it refers to the Samkhya school of thought that evolved into a cohesive philosophical system in early centuries CE.[35] The Samkhya system is called so because 'it "enumerates'" twenty five Tattvas or true principles; and its chief object is to effect the final emancipation of the twenty-fifth Tattva, i.e. the puruṣa or soul'.[33]

Philosophy[edit]

Puruṣa and Prakṛti[edit]

Samkhya makes a distinction between two "irreducible, innate and independent realities",[36] Purusha, the witness-consciousness, and Prakṛti, "matter", the activities of mind and perception.[4][37][38] According to Dan Lusthaus,

In Sāṃkhya puruṣa signifies the observer, the 'witness'. Prakṛti includes all the cognitive, moral, psychological, emotional, sensorial and physical aspects of reality. It is often mistranslated as 'matter' or 'nature' – in non-Sāṃkhyan usage it does mean 'essential nature' – but that distracts from the heavy Sāṃkhyan stress on prakṛti's cognitive, mental, psychological and sensorial activities. Moreover, subtle and gross matter are its most derivative byproducts, not its core. Only prakṛti acts.[4]

Puruṣa is considered as the conscious principle, a passive enjoyer (bhokta) and the Prakṛti is the enjoyed (bhogya). Samkhya believes that the puruṣa cannot be regarded as the source of inanimate world, because an intelligent principle cannot transform itself into the unconscious world. It is a pluralistic spiritualism, atheistic realism and uncompromising dualism.[39]

Puruṣa – witness-consciousness[edit]

Purusha-prakriti

Puruṣa is the witness-consciousness. It is absolute, independent, free, imperceptible, unknowable through other agencies, above any experience by mind or senses and beyond any words or explanations. It remains pure, "nonattributive consciousness". Puruṣa is neither produced nor does it produce.[5] No appellations can qualify Purusha, nor can it be substantialized or objectified.[6] It "cannot be reduced, can't be 'settled'". Any designation of Purusha comes from Prakriti, and is a limitation.[7] Unlike Advaita Vedanta, and like Purva-Mīmāṃsā, Samkhya believes in plurality of the Puruṣas.[5]

Prakṛti - cognitive processes[edit]

Elements in Samkhya philosophy

Prakṛti is the first cause of the world of our experiences.[10] Since it is the first principle (tattva) of the universe, it is called the pradhāna (chief principle), but, as it is the unconscious and unintelligent principle, it is also called the jaḍa (unintelligent). It is composed of three essential characteristics (trigunas). These are:

  • Sattva – poise, fineness, lightness, illumination, and joy;
  • Rajas – dynamism, activity, excitation, and pain;
  • Tamas – inertia, coarseness, heaviness, obstruction, and sloth.[39][40][41]

Unmanifested Prakriti is infinite, inactive, and unconscious, with the three gunas in a state of equilibrium. This equilibrium of the guṇas is disturbed when Prakṛti comes into contact with consciousness or Purusha, giving rise to the manifestation of the world of experience from unmanifested Prakṛti.[12][13] Prakriti becomes manifest as twenty-three tattvas:[10] intellect (buddhi, mahat), ego (ahamkara) mind (manas); the five sensory capacities; the five action capacities; and the five "subtle elements" or "modes of sensory content" (tanmatras: form (rūpa), sound (shabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), touch (sparsha)), from which the five "gross elements" or "forms of perceptual objects" emerge (earth (prithivi), water (jala), fire (Agni), air (Vāyu), ether (Ākāsha)).[42][11] Prakriti is the source of our experience; it is not "the evolution of a series of material entities," but "the emergence of experience itself".[12] It is description of experience and the relations between its elements, not an explanation of the origin of the universe.[12]

All Prakriti has these three guṇas in different proportions. Each guṇa is dominant at specific times of day. The interplay of these guṇa defines the character of someone or something, of nature and determines the progress of life.[43][44] The Samkhya theory of guṇa was widely discussed, developed and refined by various schools of Indian philosophies. Samkhya's philosophical treatises also influenced the development of various theories of Hindu ethics.[30]

Thought processes and mental events are conscious only to the extent they receive illumination from Purusha. In Samkhya, consciousness is compared to light which illuminates the material configurations or 'shapes' assumed by the mind. So intellect, after receiving cognitive structures from the mind and illumination from pure consciousness, creates thought structures that appear to be conscious.[45] Ahamkara, the ego or the phenomenal self, appropriates all mental experiences to itself and thus, personalizes the objective activities of mind and intellect by assuming possession of them.[46] But consciousness is itself independent of the thought structures it illuminates.[45]

Liberation or mokṣa[edit]

The Supreme Good is mokṣa which consists in the permanent impossibility of the incidence of pain... in the realisation of the Self as Self pure and simple.

—Samkhyakarika I.3[47]

Samkhya school considers moksha as a natural quest of every jiva. The Samkhyakarika states,

As the unconscious milk functions for the sake of nourishment of the calf,
so the Prakriti functions for the sake of moksha of the spirit.

— Samkhya karika, Verse 57[48][49]

Samkhya regards ignorance (avidyā) as the root cause of suffering and bondage (Samsara). Samkhya states that the way out of this suffering is through knowledge (viveka). Mokṣa (liberation), states Samkhya school, results from knowing the difference between Prakṛti (avyakta-vyakta) and Puruṣa (jña).[16] More specifically, the Puruṣa that has attained liberation is to be distinguished from a Puruṣa that is still bound on account of the liberated Puruṣa being free from its subtle body (synonymous with buddhi), in which is located the mental dispositions that individuates it and causes it to experience bondage.[50]: 58 

Puruṣa, the eternal pure consciousness, due to ignorance, identifies itself with products of Prakṛti such as intellect (buddhi) and ego (ahamkara). This results in endless transmigration and suffering. However, once the realization arises that Puruṣa is distinct from Prakṛti, is more than empirical ego, and that puruṣa is deepest conscious self within, the Self gains isolation (kaivalya) and freedom (moksha).[51]

Though in conventional terms the bondage is ascribed to the Puruṣa, this is ultimately a mistake. This is because the Samkhya school (Samkhya karika Verse 63) maintains that it is actually Prakriti that binds itself, and thus bondage should in reality be ascribed to Prakriti, not to the Puruṣa:[52]

By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish (Samkhya karika Verse 63) ·

Vacaspati gave a metaphorical example to elaborate the position that the Puruṣa is only mistakenly ascribed bondage: although the king is ascribed victory or defeat, it is actually the soldiers that experience it.[53] It is then not merely that bondage is only mistakenly ascribed to the Puruṣa, but that liberation is like bondage, wrongly ascribed to the Puruṣa and should be ascribed to Prakriti alone.[50]: 60 

Other forms of Samkhya teach that Mokṣa is attained by one's own development of the higher faculties of discrimination achieved by meditation and other yogic practices. Moksha is described by Samkhya scholars as a state of liberation, where sattva guṇa predominates.[15]

Epistemology[edit]

The Samkhya school considers perception, inference and reliable testimony as three reliable means to knowledge.[16][17]

Samkhya considered Pratyakṣa or Dṛṣṭam (direct sense perception), Anumāna (inference), and Śabda or Āptavacana (verbal testimony of the sages or shāstras) to be the only valid means of knowledge or pramana.[16] Unlike some other schools, Samkhya did not consider the following three pramanas to be epistemically proper: Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, deriving from circumstances) or Anupalabdi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof).[17]

  • Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types in Hindu texts: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[54][55] The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:[56] Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and Vyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).[56] Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).[57] Further, some schools considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama, so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment).[58]
  • Anumāna (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason.[59] Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana.[54] In all except one Hindu philosophies,[60] this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples).[61] The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha.[61][62] A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion).[63]
  • Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts.[17][64] Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.[65] He must cooperate with others to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words).[65] The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of Vedas.[17][65] The disagreement between the schools has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.[66]

Causality[edit]

The Samkhya system is based on Sat-kārya-vāda or the theory of causation. According to Satkāryavāda, the effect is pre-existent in the cause. There is only an apparent or illusory change in the makeup of the cause and not a material one, when it becomes effect. Since, effects cannot come from nothing, the original cause or ground of everything is seen as Prakṛti.[67]

More specifically, Samkhya system follows the prakṛti-Parināma VādaParināma denotes that the effect is a real transformation of the cause. The cause under consideration here is Prakṛti or more precisely Moola-Prakṛti ("Primordial Matter"). The Samkhya system is therefore an exponent of an evolutionary theory of matter beginning with primordial matter. In evolution, Prakṛti is transformed and differentiated into multiplicity of objects. Evolution is followed by dissolution. In dissolution the physical existence, all the worldly objects mingle back into Prakṛti, which now remains as the undifferentiated, primordial substance. This is how the cycles of evolution and dissolution follow each other. But this theory is very different from the modern theories of science in the sense that Prakṛti evolves for each Jiva separately, giving individual bodies and minds to each and after liberation these elements of Prakṛti merges into the Moola-Prakṛti. Another uniqueness of Sāmkhya is that not only physical entities but even mind, ego and intelligence are regarded as forms of Unconsciousness, quite distinct from pure consciousness.

Samkhya theorizes that Prakṛti is the source of the perceived world of becoming. It is pure potentiality that evolves itself successively into twenty four tattvas or principles. The evolution itself is possible because Prakṛti is always in a state of tension among its constituent strands or gunas – sattvarajas and tamas. In a state of equilibrium of three gunas, when the three together are one, "unmanifest" Prakṛti which is unknowable. A guṇa is an entity that can change, either increase or decrease, therefore, pure consciousness is called nirguna or without any modification.

The evolution obeys causality relationships, with primal Nature itself being the material cause of all physical creation. The cause and effect theory of Samkhya is called "Satkārya-vāda" ("theory of existent causes"), and holds that nothing can really be created from or destroyed into nothingness – all evolution is simply the transformation of primal Nature from one form to another.

Samkhya cosmology describes how life emerges in the universe; the relationship between Purusha and Prakṛti is crucial to Patanjali's yoga system. The strands of Samkhya thought can be traced back to the Vedic speculation of creation. It is also frequently mentioned in the Mahabharata and Yogavasishta.

Historical development[edit]

Larson (1979) discerns four basic periods in the development of Samkhya:[68]

  1. 8/9th c. BCE - 5th c. BCE: "ancient speculations," including speculative Vedic hymns and the oldest prose Upanishads
  2. 4th.c. BCE-1st c. CE: proto-Samkhya speculations, as found in the middle Upanishads, the Buddhacarita, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Mahabharata
  3. 1st-10th c. CE: classical Samkhya
  4. 15th-17th c.: renaissance of later Samkhya

Larson (1987) discerns three phases of development of the term samkhya, relating to three different meanings:[69]

  1. Vedic period and the Mauryan Empire, c. 1500 BCE until the 4th and 3rd c. BCE:[69] "relating to number, enumeration or calculation."[69] Intellectual inquiry was "frequently cast in the format of elaborate enumerations;[69] references to samkhya do not denote integrated systems of thought.[22]
  2. 8th/7th c. BCE - first centuries CE:[22] as a masculine noun, referring to "someone who calculates, enumerates, or discriminates properly or correctly."[69] Proto-samkhya,[70] related to the early ascetic traditions,reflected in the Moksadharma section of the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita, and the cosmological speculations of the Puranas.[22] The notion of samkhya becomes related to methods of reasoning that result in liberating knowledge (vidyajnanaviveka) that end the cycle of dukkha and rebirth.[71] During this period, samkhya becomes explicitly related to meditation, spiritual practices, and religious cosmology,[23] and is "primarily a methodology for attaining liberation and appears to allow for a great variety of philosophical formulations."[23] According to Larson, "Samkhya means in the Upanishads and the Epic simply the way of salvation by knowledge."[23] As such, it contains "psychological analyses of experience" that "become dominant motifs in Jain and Buddhist meditation contexts."[72] Typical Samkhya terminology and issues develop.[72] While yoga emphasizes asanas breathing, and ascetic practices, samkhya is concerned with intellectual analyses and proper discernment,[72] but samkhya-reasonong is not really differentiated from yoga.[70] According to Van Buitenen, these ideas developed in the interaction between various sramanas and ascetic groups.[73] Numerous ancient teachers are named in the various texts, including Kapila and Pancasikha.[74]
  3. 1st c. BCE - first centuries CE:[70] as a neuter term, referring to the beginning of a technical philosophical system.[75] Pre-karika-Samkhya (ca. 100 BCE – 200 CE).[76] This period ends with Ishvara Krishna's (Iśvarakṛṣṇa, 350 CE) Samkhyakarika.[70] According to Larson, the shift of Samkhya from speculations to the normative conceptualization hints—but does not conclusively prove—that Samkhya may be the oldest of the Indian technical philosophical schools (e.g. NyayaVaisheshika and Buddhist ontology), one that evolved over time and influenced the technical aspects of Buddhism and Jainism.[77][note 2]

Vedic speculations and Upanishadic enumerations[edit]

In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person (puruṣa). He looking around saw nothing but his Self (Atman). He first said, "This is I", therefore he became I by name.

—Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.1[79][80]

The early, speculative phase took place in the first half of the first millennium BCE,[68] when ascetic spirituality and monastic (sramana and yati) traditions came into vogue in India, and ancient scholars combined "enumerated set[s] of principles" with "a methodology of reasoning that results in spiritual knowledge (vidya, jnana, viveka)."[71] These early non-Samkhya speculations and proto-Samkhya ideas are visible in earlier Hindu scriptures such as the Vedas,[note 3] early Upanishads such as the Chandogya Upanishad,[71][note 4] and the Bhagavad Gita.[85][68] However, these early speculations and proto-Samkhya ideas had not distilled and congealed into a distinct, complete philosophy.[86]

Anthony Warder (1994; first ed. 1967) writes that the Samkhya and Mīmāṃsā schools appear to have been established before the Sramana traditions in India (~500 BCE), and he finds that "Samkhya represents a relatively free development of speculation among the Brahmans, independent of the Vedic revelation."[87] Warder writes, '[Samkhya] has indeed been suggested to be non-Brahmanical and even anti-Vedic in origin, but there is no tangible evidence for that except that it is very different than most Vedic speculation – but that is (itself) quite inconclusive. Speculations in the direction of the Samkhya can be found in the early Upanishads."[88]

Rig Vedic speculations[edit]

The earliest mention of dualism is in the Rigveda, a text that was compiled in the second millennium BCE.,[89] in various chapters.

Nasadiya Sukta (Hymn of non-Eternity, origin of universe):

There was neither non-existence nor existence then;
Neither the realm of space, nor the sky which is beyond;
What stirred? Where? In whose protection?

There was neither death nor immortality then;
No distinguishing sign of night nor of day;
That One breathed, windless, by its own impulse;
Other than that there was nothing beyond.

Darkness there was at first, by darkness hidden;
Without distinctive marks, this all was water;
That which, becoming, by the void was covered;
That One by force of heat came into being;

Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it?
Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation?
Gods came afterwards, with the creation of this universe.
Who then knows whence it has arisen?

Whether God's will created it, or whether He was mute;
Perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not;
Only He who is its overseer in highest heaven knows,
Only He knows, or perhaps He does not know.

Rigveda 10.129 (Abridged, Tr: Kramer / Christian)[90]

The hymn, as Mandala 10 in general, is late within the Rigveda Samhita, and expresses thought more typical of later Vedantic philosophy.[91]

At a mythical level, dualism is found in the IndraVritra myth of chapter 1.32 of the Rigveda.[92] Enumeration, the etymological root of the word samkhya, is found in numerous chapters of the Rigveda, such as 1.164, 10.90 and 10.129.[93] According to Larson, it is likely that in the oldest period these enumerations were occasionally also applied in the context of meditation themes and religious cosmology, such as in the hymns of 1.164 (Riddle Hymns) and 10.129 (Nasadiya Hymns).[94] However, these hymns present only the outline of ideas, not specific Samkhya theories and these theories developed in a much later period.[94]

The Riddle hymns of the Rigveda, famous for their numerous enumerations, structural language symmetry within the verses and the chapter, enigmatic word play with anagrams that symbolically portray parallelism in rituals and the cosmos, nature and the inner life of man.[95] This hymn includes enumeration (counting) as well as a series of dual concepts cited by early Upanishads . For example, the hymns 1.164.2 - 1.164-3 mention "seven" multiple times, which in the context of other chapters of Rigveda have been interpreted as referring to both seven priests at a ritual and seven constellations in the sky, the entire hymn is a riddle that paints a ritual as well as the sun, moon, earth, three seasons, the transitory nature of living beings, the passage of time and spirit.[95][96]

Seven to the one-wheeled chariot yoke the Courser; bearing seven names the single Courser draws it.
Three-naved the wheel is, sound and undecaying, whereon are resting all these worlds of being.
The seven [priests] who on the seven-wheeled car are mounted have horses, seven in tale, who draw them onward.
Seven Sisters utter songs of praise together, in whom the names of the seven Cows are treasured.
Who hath beheld him as he [Sun/Agni] sprang to being, seen how the boneless One [spirit] supports the bony [body]?
Where is the blood of earth, the life, the spirit? Who will approach the one who knows, to ask this?

— Rigveda 1.164.2 - 1.164.4, [97]

The chapter 1.164 asks a number of metaphysical questions, such as "what is the One in the form of the Unborn that created the six realms of the world?".[98][99] Dualistic philosophical speculations then follow in chapter 1.164 of the Rigveda, particularly in the well studied "allegory of two birds" hymn (1.164.20 - 1.164.22), a hymn that is referred to in the Mundaka Upanishad and other texts .[95][100][101] The two birds in this hymn have been interpreted to mean various forms of dualism: "the sun and the moon", the "two seekers of different kinds of knowledge", and "the body and the atman".[102][103]

Two Birds with fair wings, knit with bonds of friendship, embrace the same tree.
One of the twain eats the sweet fig; the other not eating keeps watch.
Where those fine Birds hymn ceaselessly their portion of life eternal, and the sacred synods,
There is the Universe's mighty Keeper, who, wise, hath entered into me the simple.
The tree on which the fine Birds eat the sweetness, where they all rest and procreate their offspring,
Upon its top they say the fig is sweetest, he who does not know the Father will not reach it.

— Rigveda 1.164.20 - 1.164.22, [97]

The emphasis of duality between existence (sat) and non-existence (asat) in the Nasadiya Sukta of the Rigveda is similar to the vyakta–avyakta (manifest–unmanifest) polarity in Samkhya. The hymns about Puruṣa may also have had some influence on Samkhya.[104] The Samkhya notion of buddhi or mahat is similar to the notion of hiranyagarbha, which appears in both the Rigveda and the Shvetashvatara Upanishad.[105]

Upanishads[edit]

Higher than the senses, stand the objects of senses. Higher than objects of senses, stands mind. Higher than mind, stands intellect. Higher than intellect, stands the great self. Higher than the great self, stands Avyaktam(unmenifested or indistinctive). Higher than Avyaktam, stands Purusha. Higher than this, there is nothing. He is the final goal and the highest point. In all beings, dwells this Purusha, as Atman (essence), invisible, concealed. He is only seen by the keenest thought, by the sublest of those thinkers who see into the subtle.

—Katha Upanishad 3.10-13[106][107]

The oldest of the major Upanishads (c. 900–600 BCE) contain speculations along the lines of classical Samkhya philosophy.[85] The concept of ahamkara was traced back by Van Buitenen to chapters 1.2 and 1.4 of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and chapter 7.25 of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, where it is a "cosmic entity," and not a psychological notion.[85][105] Satkaryavada, the theory of causation in Samkhya, may in part be traced to the verses in sixth chapter which emphasize the primacy of sat (being) and describe creation from it. The idea that the three gunas or attributes influence creation is found in both Chandogya and Shvetashvatara Upanishads.[108]

Yajnavalkya's exposition on the Self in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, and the dialogue between Uddalaka Aruni and his son Svetaketu in the Chandogya Upanishad represent a more developed notion of the essence of man (Atman) as "pure subjectivity - i.e., the knower who is himself unknowable, the seer who cannot be seen," and as "pure conscious," discovered by means of speculations, or enumerations.[109] Acdording lo Larson, "it seesm quite likely that both the monistic trends in Indian thought and the duslistic samkhya could have developed out of these ancient speculations."[110] According to Larson, the enumeration of tattvas in Samkhya is also found in Taittiriya UpanishadAitareya Upanishad and Yajnavalkya–Maitri dialogue in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.[111]

The Katha Upanishad in verses 3.10–13 and 6.7–11 describes a concept of puruṣa, and other concepts also found in later Samkhya.[112] The Shvetashvatara Upanishad in chapter 6.13 describes samkhya with Yoga philosophy, and Bhagavad Gita in book 2 provides axiological implications of Samkhya, therewith providing textual evidence of samkhyan terminology and concepts.[113] Katha Upanishad conceives the Purusha (cosmic spirit, consciousness) as same as the individual soul (Ātman, Self).[112][114]

Proto-Samkhya[edit]

Ascetic origins[edit]

While some earlier scholars have argued for Upanishadic origins of the Samkhya-tradition,[note 4] and the Upanisads contain dualistic speculations which may have influenced proto-samkhya,[85][115] other scholars have noted the dissimilarities of Shamkhya with the Vedic tradition. As early as 1898, Richard Karl von Garbe, a German professor of philosophy and Indologist, wrote in 1898,

The origin of the Sankhya system appears in the proper light only when we understand that in those regions of India which were little influenced by Brahmanism [political connotation given by the Christian missionary] the first attempt had been made to solve the riddles of the world and of our existence merely by means of reason. For the Sankhya philosophy is, in its essence, not only atheistic but also inimical to the Veda'.[116]

Dandekar, similarly wrote in 1968, 'The origin of the Sankhya is to be traced to the pre-Vedic non-Aryan thought complex'.[117] Heinrich Zimmer states that Samkhya has non-Aryan origins.[21][note 1] According to Ruzsa in 2006, "Sāṅkhya has a very long history. Its roots go deeper than textual traditions allow us to see,"[119] stating that "Sāṅkhya likely grew out of speculations rooted in cosmic dualism and introspective meditational practice."[119] The dualism is rooted in agricultural concepts of the union of the male sky-god and the female earth-goddess, the union of "the spiritual, immaterial, lordly, immobile fertilizer (represented as the Śiva-liṅgam, or phallus) and of the active, fertile, powerful but subservient material principle (Śakti or Power, often as the horrible Dark Lady, Kālī)."[119] In contrast,

The ascetic and meditative yoga practice, in contrast, aimed at overcoming the limitations of the natural body and achieving perfect stillness of the mind. A combination of these views may have resulted in the concept of the Puruṣa, the unchanging immaterial conscious essence, contrasted with Prakṛti, the material principle that produces not only the external world and the body but also the changing and externally determined aspects of the human mind (such as the intellect, ego, internal and external perceptual organs).[119]

According to Ruzsa,

Both the agrarian theology of Śiva-Śakti/Sky-Earth and the tradition of yoga (meditation) do not appear to be rooted in the Vedas. Not surprisingly, classical Sāṅkhya is remarkably independent of orthodox Brahmanic traditions, including the Vedas. Sāṅkhya is silent about the Vedas, about their guardians (the Brahmins) and for that matter about the whole caste system, and about the Vedic gods; and it is slightly unfavorable towards the animal sacrifices that characterized the ancient Vedic religion. But all our early sources for the history of Sāṅkhya belong to the Vedic tradition, and it is thus reasonable to suppose that we do not see in them the full development of the Sāṅkhya system, but rather occasional glimpses of its development as it gained gradual acceptance in the Brahmanic fold.[119]

Burley argues for an ontegenetic or incremental development of Shamkya, instead of being established by one historical founder.[120] Burley states that India's religio-cultural heritage is complicated and likely experienced a non-linear development.[121] Samkhya is not necessarily non-Vedic nor pre-Vedic nor a 'reaction to Brahmanic hegemony', states Burley.[121] It is most plausibly in its origins a lineage that grew and evolved from a combination of ascetic traditions and Vedic guru (teacher) and disciples. Burley suggests the link between Samkhya and Yoga as likely the root of this evolutionary origin during the Vedic era of India.[121] According to Van Buitenen, various ideas on yoga and meditation developed in the interaction between various sramanas and ascetic groups.[73]

Textual references[edit]

The Mokshadharma chapter of Shanti Parva (Book of Peace) in the Mahabharata epic, composed between 400 BCE to 400 CE, explains Samkhya ideas along with other extant philosophies, and then lists numerous scholars in recognition of their philosophical contributions to various Indian traditions, and therein at least three Samkhya scholars can be recognized – Kapila, Asuri and Pancasikha.[122][123] The 12th chapter of the Buddhist text Buddhacarita suggests Samkhya philosophical tools of reliable reasoning were well formed by about 5th century BCE.[122] According to Rusza, "The ancient Buddhist Aśvaghoṣa (in his Buddha-Carita) describes Āḷāra Kālāma, the teacher of the young Buddha (ca. 420 B.C.E.) as following an archaic form of Sāṅkhya."[119]

Samkhya and Yoga are mentioned together for first time in chapter 6.13 of the Shvetashvatra Upanishad,[113] as samkhya-yoga-adhigamya (literally, "to be understood by proper reasoning and spiritual discipline").[124] Bhagavad Gita identifies Samkhya with understanding or knowledge.[125] The three gunas are also mentioned in the Gita, though they are not used in the same sense as in classical Samkhya.[126] The Gita integrates Samkhya thought with the devotion (bhakti) of theistic schools and the impersonal Brahman of Vedanta.[127]

Traditional credited founders[edit]

Sage Kapila is traditionally credited as a founder of the Samkhya school.[128] It is unclear in which century of the 1st millennium BCE Kapila lived.[129] Kapila appears in Rigveda, but context suggests that the word means 'reddish-brown color'. Both Kapila as a 'seer' and the term Samkhya appear in hymns of section 5.2 in Shvetashvatara Upanishad (~300 BCE), suggesting Kapila's and Samkhya philosophy's origins may predate it. Numerous other ancient Indian texts mention Kapila; for example, Baudhayana Grhyasutra in chapter IV.16.1 describes a system of rules for ascetic life credited to Kapila called Kapila Sannyasa Vidha.[129] A 6th century CE Chinese translation and other texts consistently note Kapila as an ascetic and the founder of the school, mention Asuri as the inheritor of the teaching and a much later scholar named Pancasikha[130] as the scholar who systematized it and then helped widely disseminate its ideas. Isvarakrsna is identified in these texts as the one who summarized and simplified Samkhya theories of Pancasikha, many centuries later (roughly 4th or 5th century CE), in the form that was then translated into Chinese by Paramartha in the 6th century CE.[129]

Buddhist and Jainist influences[edit]

Buddhism and Jainism had developed in eastern India by the 5th century BCE. It is probable that these schools of thought and the earliest schools of Samkhya influenced each other.[131] According to Burely, there is no evidence that a systematic samkhya-philosophy existed prior to the founding of Buddhism and Jainism, sometime in the 5th or 4th century BCE.[132] A prominent similarity between Buddhism and Samkhya is the greater emphasis on suffering (dukkha) as the foundation for their respective soteriological theories, than other Indian philosophies.[131] However, suffering appears central to Samkhya in its later literature, which likely suggests a Buddhist influence. Eliade, however, presents the alternate theory that Samkhya and Buddhism developed their soteriological theories over time, benefiting from their mutual influence.[131]

Likewise, the Jain doctrine of plurality of individual souls (jiva) could have influenced the concept of multiple purushas in Samkhya. However Hermann Jacobi, an Indologist, thinks that there is little reason to assume that Samkhya notion of Purushas was solely dependent on the notion of jiva in Jainism. It is more likely, that Samkhya was moulded by many ancient theories of soul in various Vedic and non-Vedic schools.[131]

This declared to you is the Yoga of the wisdom of Samkhya. Hear, now, of the integrated wisdom with which, Partha, you will cast off the bonds of karma.

—Bhagavad Gita 2.39[133]

Larson, Bhattacharya and Potter state it to be likely that early Samkhya doctrines found in oldest Upanishads (~700-800 BCE) provided the contextual foundations and influenced Buddhist and Jaina doctrines, and these became contemporaneous, sibling intellectual movements with Samkhya and other schools of Hindu philosophy.[134] This is evidenced, for example, by the references to Samkhya in ancient and medieval era Jaina literature.[135]

Pre-karika Samkhya[edit]

According to Ruzsa, about 2,000 years ago "Sāṅkhya became the representative philosophy of Hindu thought in Hindu circles",[119] influencing all strands of the Hindu tradition and Hindu texts.[119]

Between 1938 and 1967, two previously unknown manuscript editions of Yuktidipika (ca. 600–700 CE) were discovered and published.[136] Yuktidipika is an ancient review by an unknown author and has emerged as the most important commentary on the Samkhyakarika, itself an ancient key text of the Samkhya school.[137][86] This commentary as well as the reconstruction of pre-karika epistemology and Samkhya emanation text (containing cosmology-ontology) from the earliest Puranas and Mokshadharma suggest that Samkhya as a technical philosophical system existed from about the last century BCE to the early centuries of the Common Era. Yuktidipika suggests that many more ancient scholars contributed to the origins of Samkhya in ancient India than were previously known and that Samkhya was a polemical philosophical system. However, almost nothing is preserved from the centuries when these ancient Samkhya scholars lived.[136]

Classical Samkhya - Samkhyakarika[edit]

The earliest surviving authoritative text on classical Samkhya philosophy is the Samkhya Karika (c. 200 CE[138] or 350–450 CE[127]) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.[127] There were probably other texts in early centuries CE, however none of them are available today.[139] Iśvarakṛṣṇa in his Kārikā describes a succession of the disciples from Kapila, through Āsuri and Pañcaśikha to himself. The text also refers to an earlier work of Samkhya philosophy called Ṣaṣṭitantra (science of sixty topics) which is now lost.[127] The text was imported and translated into Chinese about the middle of the 6th century CE.[140] The records of Al Biruni, the Persian visitor to India in the early 11th century, suggests Samkhyakarika was an established and definitive text in India in his times.[141]

Samkhyakarika includes distilled statements on epistemology, metaphysics and soteriology of the Samkhya school. For example, the fourth to sixth verses of the text states it epistemic premises,[142]

Perception, inference and right affirmation are admitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.

Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and deduces that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation (Apta vacana and Sruti, testimony of reliable source and the Vedas).

Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference or reasoning that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained. A truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from Apta vacana and Sruti.

— Samkhya Karika Verse 4–6, [142]

The most popular commentary on the Samkhyakarika was the Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya attributed to Gauḍapāda, the proponent of Advaita Vedanta school of philosophy. Other important commentaries on the karika were Yuktidīpīka (c. 6th century CE) and Vācaspati’s Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī (c. 10th century CE).[143]

Samkhya revival[edit]

The 13th century text Sarvadarsanasangraha contains 16 chapters, each devoted to a separate school of Indian philosophy. The 13th chapter in this book contains a description of the Samkhya philosophy.[144]

The Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra (c. 14th century CE) renewed interest in Samkhya in the medieval era. It is considered the second most important work of Samkhya after the karika.[145] Commentaries on this text were written by Anirruddha (Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti, c. 15th century CE), Vijñānabhikṣu (Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya, c. 16th century CE), Mahādeva (vṛttisāra, c. 17th century CE) and Nāgeśa (Laghusāṁkhyasūtravṛtti).[146] In his introduction, the commentator Vijnana Bhiksu stated that only a sixteenth part of the original Samkhya Sastra remained, and that the rest had been lost to time. [147] While the commentary itself is no doubt medieval, the age of the underlying sutras is unknown and perhaps much older. According to Surendranath Dasgupta, scholar of Indian philosophy, Charaka Samhita, an ancient Indian medical treatise, also contains thoughts from an early Samkhya school.[148]

Views on God[edit]

Although the Samkhya school considers the Vedas a reliable source of knowledge, samkhya accepts the notion of higher selves or perfected beings but rejects the notion of God, according to Paul Deussen and other scholars,[149][150] although other scholars believe that Samkhya is as much theistic as the Yoga school.[151][29] According to Rajadhyaksha, classical Samkhya argues against the existence of God on metaphysical grounds. Samkhya theorists argue that an unchanging God cannot be the source of an ever-changing world and that God was only a necessary metaphysical assumption demanded by circumstances.[152]

The oldest commentary on the Samkhakarika, the Yuktidīpikā, asserts the existence of God, stating: "We do not completely reject the particular power of the Lord, since he assumes a majestic body and so forth. Our intended meaning is just that there is no being who is different from prakrti and purusa and who is the instigator of these two, as you claim. Therefore, your view is refuted. The conjunction between prakrti and purusa is not instigated by another being.[29]

A medieval commentary of Samkhakarika such as Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra in verse no. 1.92 directly states that existence of "Ishvara (God) is unproved". Hence there is no philosophical place for a creationist God in this system. It is also argued by commentators of this text that the existence of Ishvara cannot be proved and hence cannot be admitted to exist.[153] However, later in the text, the commentator Vijnana Bhiksu clarified that the subject of dispute between the Samkhyas and others was the existence of an eternal Isvara. Samkhya did accept the concept of an emergent Isvara previously absorbed into Prakriti.[154]

A key difference between the Samkhya and Yoga schools, state scholars,[150][155] is that the Yoga school accepts a 'personal, yet essentially inactive, deity' or 'personal god'.[156] However, Radhanath Phukan, in the introduction to his translation of the Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna has argued that commentators who see the unmanifested as non-conscious make the mistake of regarding Samkhya as atheistic, though Samkhya is equally as theistic as Yoga.[151] A majority of modern academic scholars are of view that the concept of Ishvara was incorporated into the nirishvara (atheistic) Samkhya viewpoint only after it became associated with the Yoga, the Pasupata and the Bhagavata schools of philosophy. Others have traced the concept of the emergent Isvara accepted by Samkhya to as far back as the Rig Veda, where it was called Hiranyagarbha (the golden germ, golden egg).[157] [158] This theistic Samkhya philosophy is described in the Mahabharata, the Puranas and the Bhagavad Gita.[159]

Chandradhar Sharma in 1960 affirmed that Samkhya in the beginning was based on the theistic absolute of Upanishads, but later on, under the influence of Jaina and Buddhist thought, it rejected theistic monism and was content with spiritualistic pluralism and atheistic realism. This also explains why some of the later Samkhya commentators, e.g. Vijnanabhiksu in the sixteenth century, tried to revive the earlier theism in Samkhya.[160]: 137 

Arguments against Ishvara's existence[edit]

According to Sinha, the following arguments were given by Samkhya philosophers against the idea of an eternal, self-caused, creator God:[153]

  • If the existence of karma is assumed, the proposition of God as a moral governor of the universe is unnecessary. For, if God enforces the consequences of actions then he can do so without karma. If however, he is assumed to be within the law of karma, then karma itself would be the giver of consequences and there would be no need of a God.
  • Even if karma is denied, God still cannot be the enforcer of consequences. Because the motives of an enforcer God would be either egoistic or altruistic. Now, God's motives cannot be assumed to be altruistic because an altruistic God would not create a world so full of suffering. If his motives are assumed to be egoistic, then God must be thought to have desire, as agency or authority cannot be established in the absence of desire. However, assuming that God has desire would contradict God's eternal freedom which necessitates no compulsion in actions. Moreover, desire, according to Samkhya, is an attribute of prakṛti and cannot be thought to grow in God. The testimony of the Vedas, according to Samkhya, also confirms this notion.
  • Despite arguments to the contrary, if God is still assumed to contain unfulfilled desires, this would cause him to suffer pain and other similar human experiences. Such a worldly God would be no better than Samkhya's notion of higher self.
  • Furthermore, there is no proof of the existence of God. He is not the object of perception, there exists no general proposition that can prove him by inference and the testimony of the Vedas speak of prakṛti as the origin of the world, not God.

Therefore, Samkhya maintained that the various cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments could not prove God.

Influence on other schools[edit]

Vaisheshika and Nyaya[edit]

The Vaisheshika atomism, Nyaya epistemology may all have roots in the early Samkhya school of thought; but these schools likely developed in parallel with an evolving Samkhya tradition, as sibling intellectual movements.[161]

Yoga[edit]

Yoga is closely related to Samkhya in its philosophical foundations.

The Yoga school derives its ontology and epistemology from Samkhya and adds to it the concept of Isvara.[162] However, scholarly opinion on the actual relationship between Yoga and Samkhya is divided. While Jakob Wilhelm Hauer and Georg Feuerstein believe that Yoga was a tradition common to many Indian schools and its association with Samkhya was artificially foisted upon it by commentators such as VyasaJohannes Bronkhorst and Eric Frauwallner think that Yoga never had a philosophical system separate from Samkhya. Bronkhorst further adds that the first mention of Yoga as a separate school of thought is no earlier than Śankara's (c. 788–820 CE)[163] Brahmasūtrabhaśya.[164]

Tantra[edit]

The dualistic metaphysics of various Tantric traditions illustrates the strong influence of Samkhya on Tantra. Shaiva Siddhanta was identical to Samkhya in its philosophical approach, barring the addition of a transcendent theistic reality.[165] Knut A. Jacobsen, Professor of Religious Studies, notes the influence of Samkhya on Srivaishnavism. According to him, this Tantric system borrows the abstract dualism of Samkhya and modifies it into a personified male–female dualism of Vishnu and Sri Lakshmi.[166] Dasgupta speculates that the Tantric image of a wild Kali standing on a slumbering Shiva was inspired from the Samkhyan conception of prakṛti as a dynamic agent and Purusha as a passive witness. However, Samkhya and Tantra differed in their view on liberation. While Tantra sought to unite the male and female ontological realities, Samkhya held a withdrawal of consciousness from matter as the ultimate goal.[167]

According to Bagchi, the Samkhya Karika (in karika 70) identifies Sāmkhya as a Tantra,[168] and its philosophy was one of the main influences both on the rise of the Tantras as a body of literature, as well as Tantra sadhana.[169]

Advaita Vedanta[edit]

The Advaita Vedanta philosopher Adi Shankara called Samkhya as the 'principal opponent' (pradhana-malla) of the Vedanta. He criticized the Samkhya view that the cause of the universe is the unintelligent Prakriti (Pradhan). According to Shankara, the Intelligent Brahman only can be such a cause.[160]: 242–244  He considered Samkhya philosophy as propounded in Samkhyakarika to be inconsistent with the teachings in the Vedas, and considered the dualism in Samkhya to be non-Vedic.[170] In contrast, ancient Samkhya philosophers in India claimed Vedic authority for their views.[171]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. Jump up to:a b Zimmer: "[Jainism] does not derive from Brahman-Aryan sources, but reflects the cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Aryan upper class of northeastern India - being rooted in the same subsoil of archaic metaphysical speculation as Yoga, Sankhya, and Buddhism, the other non-Vedic Indian systems."[118]
  2. ^ With the publication of previously unknown editions of Yuktidipika about mid 20th century, Larson[78] has suggested what he calls as "a tempting hypothesis", but uncertain, that Samkhya tradition may be the oldest of the Indian technical philosophical schools (Nyaya, Vaisheshika).[78]
  3. ^ Early speculations such as Rg Veda 1.164, 10.90 and 10.129; see Larson (2014, p. 5).
  4. Jump up to:a b Older authors have noted the references to samkhya in the Upanishads. Surendranath Dasgupta stated in 1922 that Samkhya can be traced to Upanishads such as Katha UpanishadShvetashvatara Upanishad and Maitrayaniya Upanishad, and that the 'extant Samkhya' is a system that unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanishads with the doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism and the doctrine of relativism of Jainism.[81] Arthur Keith in 1925 said, '[That] Samkhya owes its origin to the Vedic-Upanisadic-epic heritage is quite evident',[82] and 'Samkhya is most naturally derived out of the speculations in the Vedas, Brahmanas and the Upanishads'.[83] Johnston in 1937 analyzed then available Hindu and Buddhist texts for the origins of Samkhya and wrote, '[T]he origin lay in the analysis of the individual undertaken in the Brahmanas and earliest Upanishads, at first with a view to assuring the efficacy of the sacrificial rites and later in order to discover the meaning of salvation in the religious sense and the methods of attaining it. Here – in Kaushitaki Upanishad and Chandogya Upanishad – the germs are to be found (of) two of the main ideas of classical Samkhya'.[84]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Knut A. Jacobsen, Theory and Practice of Yoga, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120832329, pages 100–101.
  2. ^ "Samkhya", American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition (2011), Quote: "Samkhya is a system of Hindu philosophy based on a dualism involving the ultimate principles of soul and matter."
  3. ^ "Samkhya", Webster's College Dictionary (2010), Random House, ISBN 978-0375407413, Quote: "Samkhya is a system of Hindu philosophy stressing the reality and duality of spirit and matter."
  4. Jump up to:a b c Lusthaus 2018.
  5. Jump up to:a b c Sharma 1997, pp. 155–7.
  6. Jump up to:a b Chapple 2008, p. 21.
  7. Jump up to:a b Osto 2018, p. 203.
  8. Jump up to:a b Osto 2018, p. 204–205.
  9. ^ Gerald James Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120805033, pages 154–206.
  10. Jump up to:a b c Osto 2018, p. 204.
  11. Jump up to:a b Haney 2002, p. 42.
  12. Jump up to:a b c d Osto 2018, p. 205.
  13. Jump up to:a b Larson 1998, p. 11.
  14. Jump up to:a b "Samkhya"Encyclopedia Britannica. 5 May 2015 [1998-07-20]. Retrieved 8 June 2023.
  15. Jump up to:a b Gerald James Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120805033, pages 36–47.
  16. Jump up to:a b c d Larson 1998, p. 9.
  17. Jump up to:a b c d e * Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy Volume 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245–248.
    • John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238.
  18. ^ John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238.
  19. ^ Mikel Burley (2012), Classical Samkhya and Yoga – An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415648875, pages 43–46.
  20. ^ David Kalupahana (1995), Ethics in Early Buddhism, University of Hawaii Press, ISBN 978-0824817022, page 8, Quote: The rational argument is identified with the method of Samkhya, a rationalist school, upholding the view that "nothing comes out of nothing" or that "being cannot be non-being."
  21. Jump up to:a b Zimmer 1951, p. 217, 314.
  22. Jump up to:a b c d Larson 2014, p. 4.
  23. Jump up to:a b c d e Larson 2014, p. 5.
  24. ^ Larson 2014, p. 4–5.
  25. ^ Larson 2014, p. 9–11.
  26. ^ Michaels 2004, p. 264.
  27. ^ Sen Gupta 1986, p. 6.
  28. ^ Radhakrishnan & Moore 1957, p. 89.
  29. Jump up to:a b c Andrew J. Nicholson (2013), Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History, Columbia University Press, ISBN 978-0231149877, chapter 4, page 77.
  30. Jump up to:a b Roy Perrett, Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges, Volume 1 (Editor: P Bilimoria et al.), Ashgate, ISBN 978-0754633013, pages 149–158.
  31. ^ saMkhya Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany
  32. ^ Mikel Burley (2012), Classical Samkhya and Yoga - An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415648875, pages 47-48
  33. Jump up to:a b Apte 1957, p. 1664
  34. ^ Bhattacharyya 1975, pp. 419–20
  35. ^ Larson 1998, pp. 4, 38, 288
  36. ^ Sharma 1997, pp. 149–168.
  37. ^ Haney 2002, p. 17.
  38. ^ Isaac & Dangwal 1997, p. 339.
  39. Jump up to:a b Sharma 1997, pp. 149–168
  40. ^ Hiriyanna 1993, pp. 270–272.
  41. ^ Chattopadhyaya 1986, pp. 109–110.
  42. ^ Osto 2018, p. 204-205.
  43. ^ James G. Lochtefeld, Guna, in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism: A-M, Vol. 1, Rosen Publishing, ISBN 9780823931798, page 265
  44. ^ T Bernard (1999), Hindu Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-1373-1, pages 74–76
  45. Jump up to:a b Isaac & Dangwal 1997, p. 342
  46. ^ Leaman 2000, p. 68
  47. ^ Sinha 2012, p. App. VI,1
  48. ^ Gerald James Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120805033, page 273
  49. ^ Original Sanskrit: Samkhya karika Compiled and indexed by Ferenc Ruzsa (2015), Sanskrit Documents Archives;
    Samkhya karika by Iswara Krishna, Henry Colebrooke (Translator), Oxford University Press, page 169
  50. Jump up to:a b "Sāṁkhya thought in the Brahmanical systems of Indian philosophy | WorldCat.org"www.worldcat.org. Retrieved 16 February 2023.
  51. ^ Larson 1998, p. 13
  52. ^ Colebrooke, Henry Thomas (1887). The Sānkhya kārika : or, Memorial verses on the Sānkhya philosophy. Chatterjea. p. 178. OCLC 61647186.
  53. ^ Dasti, Matthew R., Bryant, Edwin F. (2014). Free will, agency, and selfhood in Indian philosophy. Oup USA. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-19-992275-8OCLC 852227561.
  54. Jump up to:a b MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
  55. ^ B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0198239765
  56. Jump up to:a b Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 160-168
  57. ^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 168-169
  58. ^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 170-172
  59. ^ W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press, ISBN 0-7914-0362-9, page 26-27
  60. ^ Carvaka school is the exception
  61. Jump up to:a b James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page 46-47
  62. ^ Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0779-0
  63. ^ Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61
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  65. Jump up to:a b c M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120813304, page 43
  66. ^ P. Billimoria (1988), Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge, Studies of Classical India Volume 10, Springer, ISBN 978-94-010-7810-8, pages 1-30
  67. ^ Larson 1998, p. 10
  68. Jump up to:a b c Larson 1998, p. 75.
  69. Jump up to:a b c d e Larson 2014, p. 3.
  70. Jump up to:a b c d Larson 2014, p. 9.
  71. Jump up to:a b c Larson 2014, p. 4-5.
  72. Jump up to:a b c Larson 2014, p. 6.
  73. Jump up to:a b Larson 2014, p. 6-7.
  74. ^ Larson 2014, p. 7.
  75. ^ Larson 2014, p. 3, 9.
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  77. ^ Larson 2014, p. 3-11.
  78. Jump up to:a b Larson 2014, p. 10-11.
  79. ^ Max Muller, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Oxford University Press, page 85
  80. ^ Radhakrishnan 1953, p. 163
  81. ^ Surendranath Dasgupta (1975). A History of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 212. ISBN 978-81-208-0412-8.
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  84. ^ EH Johnston (1937), Early Samkhya: An Essay on its Historical Development according to the Texts, The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume XV, pages 80-81
  85. Jump up to:a b c d Burley 2006, pp. 15–16.
  86. Jump up to:a b Larson 2014, p. 3-4.
  87. ^ Warder 2009, p. 63.
  88. ^ Warder 2009, pp. 63–65.
  89. ^ Singh 2008, p. 185.
  90. ^
  91. ^ "Although, no doubt, of high antiquity, the hymn appears to be less of a primary than of a secondary origin, being in fact a controversial composition levelled especially against the Sāṃkhya theory." Ravi Prakash Arya and K. L. Joshi. Ṛgveda Saṃhitā: Sanskrit Text, English Translation, Notes & Index of Verses. (Parimal Publications: Delhi, 2001) ISBN 81-7110-138-7 (Set of four volumes). Parimal Sanskrit Series No. 45; 2003 reprint: 81-7020-070-9, Volume 4, p. 519.
  92. ^ Larson 1998, p. 79.
  93. ^ Larson, Bhattacharya & Potter 2014, p. 5-6, 109-110, 180.
  94. Jump up to:a b Larson, Bhattacharya & Potter 2014, p. 5.
  95. Jump up to:a b c Stephanie Jamison and Joel Brereton (2014), The Rigveda, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199370184, pages 349-359
  96. ^ William Mahony (1997), The Artful Universe: An Introduction to the Vedic Religious Imagination, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791435809, pages 245-250
  97. Jump up to:a b
  98. ^ Stephanie Jamison and Joel Brereton (2014), The Rigveda, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199370184, pages 349-355
  99. ^ Rigveda 1.164.6 Ralph Griffith (Translator), Wikisource
  100. ^ Larson, Bhattacharya & Potter 2014, p. 295-296.
  101. ^ Ram Nidumolu (2013), Two Birds in a Tree, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, ISBN 978-1609945770, page 189
  102. ^ Stephanie Jamison and Joel Brereton (2014), The Rigveda, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199370184, page 352
  103. ^ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (2005), Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of The Logos, Springer, ISBN 978-1402037061, pages 186-193 with footnote 7
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  105. Jump up to:a b Larson 1998, p. 82.
  106. ^ Paul Deussen, Sixty Upanishads of the Veda, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120814684, pages 288-289
  107. ^ Michele Marie Desmarais (2008), Changing minds: Mind, Consciousness and Identity in Patanjali's Yoga Sutra, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120833364, page 25
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  112. Jump up to:a b Paul DeussenSixty Upanishads of the Veda, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120814684, pages 273, 288–289, 298–299
  113. Jump up to:a b Burley 2006, pp. 15–18
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  115. ^ Larson 1998, pp. 82–90.
  116. ^ Richard Garbe (1892). Aniruddha's Commentary and the original parts of Vedantin Mahadeva's commentary on the Sankhya Sutras Translated, with an introduction to the age and origin of the Sankhya system. pp. xx–xxi.
  117. ^ R.N. Dandekar (1968). 'God in Indian Philosophy' in Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. p. 444. JSTOR 41694270.
  118. ^ Zimmer 1951, p. 217.
  119. Jump up to:a b c d e f g h Ruzsa 2006.
  120. ^ Mikel Burley (2012), Classical Samkhya and Yoga - An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415648875, pages 37-38
  121. Jump up to:a b c Mikel Burley (2012), Classical Samkhya and Yoga - An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415648875, pages 37-39
  122. Jump up to:a b Larson, Bhattacharya & Potter 2014, p. 3-11.
  123. ^ Mircea Eliade et al. (2009), Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0691142036, pages 392–393
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  125. ^ Fowler 2012, p. 34
  126. ^ Fowler 2012, p. 37
  127. Jump up to:a b c d King 1999, p. 63
  128. ^ Sharma 1997, p. 149
  129. Jump up to:a b c Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 4, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0691604411, pages 107-109
  130. ^ "Samkhya: Part Two: Samkhya Teachers"sreenivasarao's blogs. 3 October 2012. Retrieved 15 May 2019.
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  132. ^ Burley 2006, pp. 16.
  133. ^ Fowler 2012, p. 39
  134. ^ GJ Larson, RS Bhattacharya and K Potter (2014), The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 4, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0691604411, pages 2-8, 114-116
  135. ^ GJ Larson, RS Bhattacharya and K Potter (2014), The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 4, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0691604411, pages 6-7, 74-88, 113-122, 315-318
  136. Jump up to:a b Larson 2014, p. 9-11.
  137. ^ Larson, Bhattacharya & Potter 2014, p. 3-4.
  138. ^ Bagchi 1989.
  139. ^ Larson 1998, p. 4
  140. ^ Larson 1998, pp. 147–149
  141. ^ Larson 1998, pp. 150–151
  142. Jump up to:a b Samkhyakarika of Iswara Krishna Henry Colebrook (Translator), Oxford University Press, pages 18-27;
    Sanskrit Original Samkhya karika with Gaudapada Bhasya, Ashubodh Vidyabushanam, Kozhikode, Kerala
  143. ^ King 1999, p. 64
  144. ^ Cowell and Gough, p. 22.
  145. ^ Eliade, Trask & White 2009, p. 370
  146. ^ Radhakrishnan 1923, pp. 253–56
  147. ^ Sinha, Nandalal (1915). The Samkhya Philosophy (2003 ed.). New Delhi: Mushiram Manoharlal. p. 3. ISBN 81-215-1097-X.
  148. ^ Dasgupta 1922, pp. 213–7
  149. ^ Mike Burley (2012), Classical Samkhya and Yoga - An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415648875, page 39
  150. Jump up to:a b Lloyd Pflueger, Person Purity and Power in Yogasutra, in Theory and Practice of Yoga (Editor: Knut Jacobsen), Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120832329, pages 38-39
  151. Jump up to:a b Radhanath Phukan, Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), pp.36-40
  152. ^ Rajadhyaksha 1959, p. 95
  153. Jump up to:a b Sinha 2012, pp. xiii–iv
  154. ^ Sinha, Nandalal (1915). The Samkhya Philosophy (2003 ed.). New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. p. 332. ISBN 81-215-1097-X.
  155. ^ Mikel Burley (2012), Classical Samkhya and Yoga - An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415648875, page 39, 41
  156. ^ Kovoor T. Behanan (2002), Yoga: Its Scientific Basis, Dover, ISBN 978-0486417929, pages 56-58
  157. ^ Larson, Gerald (1969). Classical Samkhya (2005 ed.). New Delhi: Motilal Banrsidass. p. 82. ISBN 81-208-0503-8.
  158. ^ Aranya, Hariharananda (1963). Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali With Bhasvati. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press. pp. 676–685. ISBN 81-87594-00-4.
  159. ^ Karmarkar 1962, pp. 90–1
  160. Jump up to:a b Chandradhar Sharma (2000). A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 978-81-208-0365-7.
  161. ^ Larson, Bhattacharya & Potter 2014, p. 10-11.
  162. ^ Larson 2008, p. 33
  163. ^ Isayeva 1993, p. 84
  164. ^ Larson 2008, pp. 30–32
  165. ^ Flood 2006, p. 69
  166. ^ Jacobsen 2008, pp. 129–130
  167. ^ Kripal 1998, pp. 148–149
  168. ^ Bagchi 1989, p. 6
  169. ^ Bagchi 1989, p. 10
  170. ^ Gerald Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120805033, pages 67-70
  171. ^ Gerald Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120805033, page 213

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