2018/03/28

The Making Of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy Of American Empire: Sam Gindin, Leo Panitch: 9781781681367: Amazon.com: Books



The Making Of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy Of American Empire: 
Sam Gindin, Leo Panitch

The all-encompassing embrace of world capitalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century was generally attributed to the superiority of competitive markets. Globalization had appeared to be the natural outcome of this unstoppable process. But today, with global markets roiling and increasingly reliant on state intervention to stay afloat, it has become clear that markets and states aren’t straightforwardly opposing forces.

In this groundbreaking work, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin demonstrate the intimate relationship between modern capitalism and the American state. The Making of Global Capitalism identifies the centrality of the social conflicts that occur within states rather than between them. These emerging fault lines hold out the possibility of new political movements that might transcend global markets.
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Review


"Lucid and indispensable guides to the history and practice of American Empire."—Naomi Klein, award-winning journalist and author of The Shock Doctrine

"A must read for everyone who is concerned about where the future of capitalism might lie."—David Harvey, CUNY Graduate Center, author of A Brief History of Neoliberalism
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About the Author

Sam Gindin is the former Research Director of the Canadian Autoworkers Union and Packer visiting Chair in Social Justice at York University. Among his many publications, he is the author (with Greg Albo and Leo Panitch) of In and Out of Crisis: The Global Financial Meltdown and Left Alternatives.

Leo Panitch is Canada Research Chair in Comparative Political Economy and Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University.
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Editor of The Socialist Register for twenty-five years, his many books include Working Class Politics in Crisis; A Different Kind of State; The End of Parliamentary Socialism; and American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance.


Product details

Paperback: 464 pages
Publisher: Verso (October 8, 2013)

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4.0 out of 5 starsSober, Jargon-free, Middle of the Road
ByGlobalChangeSupercenter5on January 27, 2013
Format: Hardcover|Verified Purchase
One of the curiousities of the death of our beloved Left has been the ascription, and often self-identification, of "Marxism" to middle-aged scholars who might have read a Kapital or three in their youth, but now are virtually Marx-free in their waking hours.

Panitch and Gindin have written an exhaustive (keep the coffee mug nearby) journalism of our times, scrupulously researched and fair to the majordomos and cap di tutti capi of our corporate state supersystem, which is not the greatest of compliments - do we really need to be so kind to Timmie Geithner, to Larry Summers, to the whole host of scoundrels and mountebanks that have shepherded the global financial fraud? If you want that kind of sober information, which documents the stranglehold the American capitalist governance structure has upon the world, this is a fine place, but it is laughable to suggest that there is any "promise" or "solution" that will come out of these ashes. Aside from a "class relations" or two, this radical writing will not tax the nominal academo-liberal trained to spit derision when within eye-blink of Grundrisse or "use-value."

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5.0 out of 5 stars
Powerful Political Economy
ByHans G. Despainon October 7, 2012
Format: Hardcover
Panitch and Gindin argue that market economies have never existed independent of nation states. The state was necessary for the genesis of capitalism, and the state was, and still is, necessary for its historical development and continuous reproduction. Nonetheless, Panitch and Gindin argue there is significant autonomy, or historical "differentiation," between the economy and the nation state. There are economic structural tendencies manifest from the logic of capital and the functioning of the market-system. At the same time nation states can affect these structural tendencies in remarkable ways.

In this sense, there has never been "separation" between capitalist reproduction/development and the state, but there is "differentiation" which has radically significant effects. There is a symbiotic relationship between the state and capitalistic reproduction/development.

This is a book of economic history. But is also a book of economic theory. The economic history is rich and interesting, aimed at explaining the historical emergence of global financial capitalism. While the history Panitch and Gindin offer is rich and interesting, the theory is still richer and even more intriguing.

Their history is primarily aimed, (1) at explaining the emergence of the "informal American empire" (what makes this empire "informal" is the hegemony is accomplished primarily through economic strategy, policy, and diplomacy; and less through military might and political coercion) and (2) demonstrating the historical shifting relationship (from decade to decade since the World War I) between workers, business, finance, and the state.

Their theoretical concern is threefold; (1) offer a theoretical explanation of the crisis of 2007-8; (2) offer guidance toward the direction the future the "informal American empire" has for guiding the economies of world; and (3) to understand the "informal American empire" as a set of beliefs, doctrine, and ideology of how to organize modern societies (workers, business, finance and the state) and the global order (both political [e.g. UN, NATO, etc.] and economical [World Bank, IMF, WTO) for the (ideological) common good.

Although Panitch and Gindin accept that capitalistic development is uneven and unstable, it is crucial to their thesis that each crisis is unique depending upon the particular relationships and alliances forged between workers, business, finance, and the state. In this sense, the crisis of 2007-8 is necessarily unique and the solutions or economic fiscal policies necessary for recovery necessarily different from previous crises.

The highlights of their economic global history include that there have been four! major historical global crises, the long depression in the 1870, the Great depression of 1930, the Great recession of 1970s, and the Great financial crisis of 2007-09.

According to Pantich and Gindin, the 1970s is an economic watershed moment which separates "two Golden ages" of American capitalism. The first Golden Age is from 1947 - 1973; the Great recession and various political crises ensue (1973 - 1983), there is a reconfiguration of both the organization of society (workers, business, finance, and state; along with the role of the IMF, World Bank, and global trade); then the second Golden Age from 1983 - 2007.

It may be quite strange to many readers to call 1983 - 2007 a Golden Age. But in fact when looking at the economic data of the period it was quite literally a Golden Age, with millions of Americans and Global financiers and business leaders becoming impressively wealthy. Moreover, the levels of production (GDP) and productivity during the second Golden Age generally outperform the levels of production and productivity during the first Golden Age. Nonetheless the distribution of this wealth is radically narrow and concentrated within primarily finance, while political power concentrated toward "free-trade" orientated states, and away from workers and industrial production. Moreover, Pantich and Gindin maintain that workers are generally weaker during the second Golden Age, finance is strengthen and trumps over production processes, which is more or less conventional wisdom of this period of modern history. Less conventional is their thesis that the state, in particular the American domestic fiscal state and global "informal American empire," greatly strengthened post-1973-83 crisis.

It is not clear the direction the post-2007-09 crisis will take the global economy and American capitalism. What is clear is that the symbiotic relationship between workers, business, finance, and the state, and the global order (U.S. Treasury, IMF, World Bank, WTO, UN) is once again shifting. Pantich and Gindin's book offers to the reader a far clearer picture of what is at stake and who are the main institutional actors in the historical drama and capitalistic tragedy we call modern human history.

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4.0 out of 5 stars
Not an easy read
ByKDelphion January 11, 2013
Format: Hardcover|Verified Purchase
The first review presents most points of the book much better than I could. But, if you do not know much about Economics, historically speaking, it is not a "fun" read. But it is a good read.
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4.0 out of 5 stars
A Tale of Tall Dollars
ByJeffrey Rubardon March 31, 2017
Format: Paperback
*The Making of Global Capitalism* is a good, if flawed, introduction to the "American Century" of the world economy and its tumultuous consequences in this one. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin are veteran socialist scholars and activists, so their treatment will understandably appeal to those who want to understand the world *and* those who wish to change it; their Canadian vantage point puts them close to the heart of the global economic machine, but far enough away to have some perspective. The strength of this meticulous history of world trade in the 20th and 21st centuries, and America's growing "hegemony" in the international efforts to foster it, lies in its exploration of a "deep structure" of capitalist expansion that existed before, during, and after Keynesianism; the "Great Society" and other seemingly interventionist efforts to improve life in "First World" countries, and the "developing" world's desperate attempts to chart another course, matter less than you might think.

Probably more than Panitch and Gindin think, though. Their "Deep State trance grooves" for the post-Keynesian world focus on the special importance of the US Treasury Department in the last fifty years of trade agreements and capital flows; certainly the role of the US government in "globalization" was grossly underestimated when the phenomenon first became a topic of consideration, but their over-reliance on the "master narrative" of the "Washington Consensus" up to and including the global implosion in the 2000s over-simplifies the avaricious side of life worldwide - a sort of "Marxist Hegelianism", if you will. If ever there was cause to embrace a pluralism of "frog perspectives", the modern capitalist system bids it; more detailed and less one-sided research is surely needed. (This is a good starting point for it, though.)

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4.0 out of 5 stars
Deeply Serious and Progressive Explanation of Capitalism in a World Economy
ByGerald Parkeron January 19, 2014
Format: Paperback
Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin have collaborated on a book, "The Making of Global Economy: the Political Economy of American Empire" (i.e. of U.S. neo-colonialism) that combines the virtues of deep analysis and clear language (and clear thinking, too). They do not deal in persiflage that sounds impressive but which ill serves a wide readership; Panitch and Gindin avoid unnecessary resort to jargon. It is refreshing to have a Canadian perspective upon the phenomena which they examine, all the more so since the authors are genuinely progressive, even socialist, in their analysis, without being hide-bound or doctrinaire.

That said, while the public for which they intend their book is wide, it still is for one that has the resolve to take on dense argument and uncompromising depth. The work is not a "quick read" by any stretch of the imagination. The rather small print and profusion of back-references, the latter too replete with much that is substantive and important to the case which the book makes to ignore, can tire the reader, making the volume arduous to handle navigating back and forth within it.

The hardback edition is well and fully bound, ruggedly and durably, with reasonably spaced margins to left and right of pages, but the binding is a tighter than ideal, requiring some effort on the reader's part to hold the pages flat enough for viewing the pages while going forward and back nimbly (and continually) between the main text and the notes. The reader will need two bookmarks while using the book; this reader added two slender coloured ribbons for the purpose to the binding spine of his own copy; that, of course, is not an option for this or most books' paperback editions.

For those who can persevere in reading it through, this mighty work bears great rewards for those who assay it. For others, too, those who use it as a resource and a reference, rather than read it in entirety, the book also is eminently worth having in one's personal collection and, fortunately for those users, the book is indexed. There is no separate bibliography in the book, but if one patiently mines the bibliographical citations in the notes, the book provides an excellent key to the best literature, rather than just to to a lot of the neo-conservative and emptily theoretical tripe that so many other books on economics mention too exclusively.
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Faith: A Journey For All Jimmy Carter: Books



Amazon.com: Faith: A Journey For All (9781501184413): Jimmy Carter: Books




Faith: A Journey 
– March 27, 2018
by Jimmy Carter (Author)
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Editorial Reviews

About the Author


Jimmy Carter was the thirty-ninth President of the United States, serving from 1977 to 1981. In 1982, he and his wife founded The Carter Center, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving the lives of people around the world. Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002. He is the author of thirty books, including A Full Life: Reflections at Ninety; A Call to Action: Women, Religion, Violence, and Power; An Hour Before Daylight: Memoirs of a Rural Boyhood; and Our Endangered Values: America’s Moral Crisis.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

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Faith
INTRODUCTION
Living faith always involves love. —Richard Niebuhr

Faith without works is not faith at all, but a simple lack of obedience to God. —Dietrich Bonhoeffer

The only thing that counts is faith expressing itself through love. —Galatians 5:6

The issue of faith arises in almost every area of human existence, so it is important to understand its multiple meanings. For many of us, a question that needs to be answered is “Am I a person of faith?” The answer is almost always affirmative. In this book, my primary goal is to explore the broader meaning of faith, its far-reaching effect on our lives, and its relationship to past, present, and future events in America and around the world. I also emphasize the religious aspects of faith since this is how the word is most often used, and I have included a description of the ways my own faith has guided and sustained me, as well as how it has challenged and driven me to seek a closer and better relationship with people and with God. Faith, in both its religious and broader dimensions, influences our individual and communal lives, our lives in religion, and our lives in government and in secular affairs.

The most important element of faith ever imposed on me, and on another person simultaneously, involved the threat of the total elimination of human life on earth by a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. My ultimate responsibility as President of the United States was to defend my country against a military attack, and I learned soon after my election that we and the Soviets had enough atomic weapons in our arsenals to destroy each other and that the resulting radiation and other collateral damage would kill most of the rest of the world’s population. This was a constant haunting realization that dominated my conscious hours during my term in office—and I shared the responsibility with Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Soviet Union. Our common goal, of course, was to avoid a nuclear war. Brezhnev and I had to have faith in ourselves, and in each other. Every decision I made was affected by this threat, and it still exists, as the same responsibility is passed on from one president to the next.

We face many issues within which religion, politics, and private matters tend to mix, sometimes explosively, creating sharp divisions among us, in our private and public lives and between and within religious denominations. It is increasingly difficult to keep issues of religion and government separate, as even the purely religious issues are routinely addressed by politicians—and vice versa. I have confronted the separation of government and religion from both directions. I think often of the strong reaction of our visiting revival preacher in my mother’s home when I decided to run for the state senate back in 1962. He asked me, “How can you, as a Christian, a deacon, and a Sunday School teacher, become involved in the dirty business of politics?” Without thinking, I gave him a smart-aleck response: “I will have 75,000 people in my senate district. How would you like to have a congregation that big?”

I believe now, more than then, that Christians are called to plunge into the life of the world, and to inject the moral and ethical values of our faith into the processes of governing. At the same time, there must be an absolute prohibition against granting any control by government over our religious freedoms. More recently, since our years in the White House, I have tended to move away from politics and toward religion, but the two are still related. There is no doubt that my having been a national political leader is what attracts most visitors to my Bible classes, and it is clear to me that many of these worshippers are eager to help shape our nation’s political agenda.

In a speech to my fellow Baptists in 1978, I tried to explain the duality of my personal responsibilities as a president and a Christian:

Thomas Jefferson, in the original days of our country, said he was fearful that the church might influence the state to take away human liberty. Roger Williams, who created the first Baptist church in America, was afraid that the church might be corrupted by the state. These concerns led to our Constitution’s First Amendment, which prohibits the establishment of any official state religion and, in the same sentence, prohibits the passing of any laws that might interfere with religious freedom.

Separation is specified in the law, but for a religious person, there is nothing wrong with bringing these two together, because you can’t divorce religious beliefs from public service. At the same time, of course, in public office you cannot impose your own religious beliefs on others.

In my office at the White House I have to deal with many domestic and international problems: peace, freedom, nuclear explosives, the sale of weapons, terrorism, rapidly expanding populations without adequate food. But this is more than a list of political problems. These are also moral problems for you and me, because they violate the very precepts of God in which we believe.

I want our country to be strong enough in all elements, military and otherwise, so we never have to prove we are strong.

Reinhold Niebuhr, in his book Moral Man and Immoral Society, pointed out the difference between a society and a people. The expectations from a person are a much higher standard. A person should have as our goal complete agape (self-sacrificial love). The most we can expect from a society is to institute simple justice.

So, we as people have to do better, particularly if we are blessed with the opportunity to demonstrate our worth. Leaders also must be careful not to be too timid. . . .

A country will have authority and influence because of moral factors, not its military strength; because it can be humble and not blatant and arrogant; because our people and our country want to serve others and not dominate others. And a nation without morality will soon lose its influence around the world.

What are the goals of a person or a denomination or a country? They are all remarkably the same: a desire for peace; a need for humility, for examining one’s faults and turning away from them; a commitment to human rights in the broadest sense of the words, based on a moral society concerned with the alleviation of suffering because of deprivation or hatred or hunger or physical affliction; and a willingness, even an eagerness, to share one’s ideals, one’s faith with others, to translate love in a person to justice.

I was brought up in a family that was stable, cohesive, and remarkably isolated from the outside world, except for the small community of Plains, Georgia. Home was our unchangeable haven, in times of pain or pleasure. There was no doubt that my father made the final decisions, but we all knew that Mama’s influence and opinions were always major factors in the management of our family. There were certain aspects of life, particularly in the running of the household and the raising of my sisters, that were almost exclusively my mother’s purview. Together, our parents were dominant, and we children respected and obeyed them. In fact, I never deliberately disobeyed either of them. It was my mother, then my father, in whom I had absolute faith.

Nowadays, most Americans move around frequently and are exposed to many influences, and our environments and customs are multifaceted. But for me as a child, there were just a few sources of knowledge about myself or any other people. Our contacts with the world beyond our community were limited. We didn’t have running water or electricity in our house, so time on the battery radio was restricted, even on the rare evenings when we stayed up after dark. On special nights, keeping our eyes fixed on the radio, we listened as a family to The Lone Ranger, Little Orphan Annie, Fibber McGee and Molly, and Amos ’n’ Andy. My parents would sometimes let me stay up until 8:00 P.M. to hear Glenn Miller’s band playing the current musical hits for fifteen minutes. That was all the outside world I knew. In addition to my family and our close neighbors, all African-American, I encountered other people just through school and the church in Plains. Our prom parties, which parents would support for entertainment and primarily to let boys and girls get acquainted in preparation for future marriages, were orchestrated by the church.

Sunday mornings were for Sunday School and preaching at Plains Baptist Church, where Daddy was a teacher and a deacon. I remember vividly that after church we always had the best meal of the week, usually fried chicken, mashed potatoes, hot biscuits, and vegetables from our big garden, followed by pies made from sweet potatoes or fruits of the season. Afterward, our activities were severely limited. There were no stores open, movies in the county seat were out of the question, and shooting a gun or playing cards was prohibited. Fishing in the nearby creek or pond was a close call, but eventually it came to be permitted if done discreetly. It would not have been appropriate, however, to walk down a public road with a fishing pole. My mother and father played cards, mostly bridge, but certainly not on Sunday. At the age of twelve, when I was deemed old enough to drive a car by myself, my sisters and I went back to the church on Sunday evenings for meetings of the Baptist Young People’s Union (BYPU). This was very important, because it was the BYPU that sponsored most of the teenage social events. I need not go on, since the picture is fairly clear. It was a simple, family-centered, deeply religious, working existence, with interracial labor and play on the farm with my black neighbors. All the farmwork was done by humans or mules, and we grew corn as the common fuel for both. I imagine that, except for the radio, automobile, and a hand-cranked telephone, our lives were quite similar to those of our great-grandparents.

During those early years, I witnessed the racial discrimination that still survived almost a hundred years after the end of the Civil War. Mandatory segregation of black and white citizens was supported and enforced, at least in the Southeastern United States, by state and federal laws, and was not questioned by anyone of influence that I knew. The only person who paid no attention to these racial customs was my mother, and she treated everyone the same because, I presumed, she was a registered nurse and a member of the medical profession. When I was a child, all my friends and playmates were African-American, and the one who was preeminent at any time was whoever had caught the biggest fish, killed the most rabbits, or could run faster, jump higher, or pick the most cotton in a day. When I rode to our county seat with one of my playmates, we always sat in different railroad cars and at separate levels in the movie theater, attended different schools and churches, and I knew that white students rode in buses and black students walked to and from school. I do not remember knowing that only white adults were permitted to vote and to serve on juries.

My first awareness of how segregation affected me and my friends was when my playmates and I were about twelve years old, when we were leaving the field and approaching the barn through what we called the “pasture gate.” The two black boys stood back to let me pass, and I presumed there was a trip wire there or some other reason for them to want me to go through first. Only much later did I realize that their parents had probably told them it was time for them to defer to me in some way. In a poem I wrote as an adult, I said,

We only saw it vaguely then,

but we were transformed at that place.

A silent line was drawn between

friend and friend, race and race.

The next event that affected me directly was when I was a submarine officer and President Harry Truman ordained as commander in chief that all our military forces and the U.S. Civil Service end racial segregation. There was no trouble in implementing this command, and all of us on the ship saw the advantages gained by both black and white members of the crew. When our family returned home from the navy in 1953, this commitment to racial equality had become a part of our lives.

My father taught me that there should be a strict divide between religion and politics, and he also resented very deeply any intrusion of state or federal laws into our private affairs. I remember that Daddy opposed changing our clocks from “God’s sun time” to “daylight saving time,” and although a staunch Democrat in other elections, he never voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt after 1932, because the New Deal agricultural program provided, to stabilize farm prices, that half-grown pigs (shoats) should be slaughtered and that part of our growing crops of cotton and peanuts had to be plowed up. For many years afterward, Daddy recalled how difficult it was to force a trained mule to walk on top of a planted row to plow it up instead of in the middle to cultivate. I guess that today he would be known as a libertarian.

When I look back on my life, I can see how startling the changes have been. Eric Hoffer (1902–1983), the self-educated longshoreman and philosopher, described the years during my childhood as a time of hope, and the time of my adulthood as a time of desire. I knew the Great Depression years to be a time of hope, when the economic situation in America was so bad that everyone believed it could only improve; when things became plentiful, we tended to want not only what we already had but also what everyone else had.

Both at my presidential inauguration and when receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, I quoted my favorite teacher, Miss Julia Coleman, who summarized her advice on how to accommodate the uncertainties in our future: “We must welcome changing times, but cling to principles that never change.” I would say that “cling to” meant “have faith in.” I have thought often about Miss Julia’s advice over the years, and especially during some of the most trying times of my life, when I had to decide which enduring principles should be applied to a particular event or situation, and sometimes I use it in my church and college classes and in counseling people who are distressed about current crises that we have to face.

Today, of course, family life even in the small Plains community is quite different. Some activities that were once strictly concealed in our “proper” society are probably no more prevalent but are now out in the open. Divorce has become acceptable, even for active church members. Without trying to analyze it too deeply, I see that one of the most significant changes is the relationship between young people and their parents. My siblings and I had an intimate and subservient relationship with our parents until we left home, but now the ties are substantially broken during the early teen years, no matter how much parents want to retain a strong influence over their growing children. The outside world is a much more powerful factor in life, with the availability of rapid transportation, television, social media, and particularly a broader circle of friends (and possibly rivals or adversaries), whose influence often exceeds that of immediate families. But perhaps just as many in today’s world would still like to have certain faith in a core of principles that do not change. Where do we turn now when there is a moral question to be answered? What things in the twenty-first century are the same as they were eighty years ago? We still need a permanent foundation on which our lives can be fashioned. Without a central core of beliefs or standards in which to have faith and by which to live, we may never experience the challenge and excitement of seeking a greater life. We will have ceased to grow, like Jesus, “strong; he was, filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was on him” (Luke 2:40).

We must accommodate life’s challenges, some welcome and others quite painful, but we don’t want the verities of our lives to change. We need to have something unshakable in which to have faith, like a mother’s love—something that can’t be changed or destroyed by war, political events, the loss of a loved one, lack of success in business, a serious illness, or failure to realize our own ambitions. We need some foundation on which we can build a predictable and dependable existence.

This cannot always be found in either our nation’s laws or our social customs. I would like to say as an American who has been president that the cherished values of our country are constant, but they are not. There are always powerful forces that work against the idealistic principles of peace, truthfulness, equality, justice, and even hospitality, freedom, and friendship. There is a lot of secret maneuvering that is never understood or even known by the public, and a great deal of unpublicized change in the interpretation of laws or the passage of new ones. Some laws violate what seem to be accepted principles and create serious divisions within our society. Also, almost every major religious faith—Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Islamic—is divided over controversial secular issues like abortion, gay rights, the role of women in society, or even female clothing. But despite the confusion and controversy in secular affairs and among religious organizations, the basic principles I’ve just mentioned have never changed. These are the foundation for our faith.

People have always tried to improve their own lives, through communal living and the evolution of secular laws and rules considered to be beneficial, at least to a dominant portion of them. So far as I know, a concerted worldwide effort to encapsulate high ideals into a common agreement has been made only once, and included the nations who had been victorious, or at least neutral, in World War II. This common agreement is known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I remember that I followed the United Nations proceedings in San Francisco very closely as a member of the U.S. Navy, either as a midshipman at Annapolis or from a battleship in the Atlantic Ocean. The key nations that founded the U.N. in October 1945 were the “Big Four”—China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and they were joined by forty-seven others. The overriding objective was to prevent further armed conflicts after more than 60 million people had been killed in the war, and to agree on a set of peace incentives that could prevent warfare among future potential disputants. For many complex reasons, the United Nations’s primary goal of preserving peace has not been reached.

Since that time, the military forces of our own country have been involved in conflict with more than twenty other nations, in wars that cost the lives of 10 million people, and the potential for further military engagements remains. As of November 2017, the United States military forces were actively engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Niger, Somalia, Jordan, and Thailand. Andrew Bacevich, a retired colonel who lost a son in Iraq, made an accurate comment: “A collective indifference to war has become an emblem of contemporary America.” One major reason for our citizens’ lack of concern about warfare is that most families are not directly affected by these conflicts, since the burden of combat now falls on just the 1 percent of Americans who serve in the military.

To live in peace is only one of the key human rights, and in December 1948, when the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it described these principles in thirty brief articles. To the best of their ability, those who drafted this declaration extracted the highest moral and ethical ideals of the world’s great religions and expressed them in secular terms that could be understood by lawmakers and private citizens of all nations. The Universal Declaration promised to all people the economic, social, political, cultural, and civic rights that underpin a life free from discrimination, want, and fear. As with the United Nations’s promise of sustained peace, these promises of human rights have not been realized. It seems that there is a steady reduction in the number of things in which we can have faith.

We know that evolution is a global process, usually progressive, that results from the adaptation of living organisms to natural selection and sudden mutations. I believe it has been God’s plan to evolve human beings, and that after thousands of centuries we now find ourselves uniquely endowed with an understanding of who and what we are and have the knowledge and freedom to help shape our own destiny. This freedom to help in affecting our future evolution is a great challenge and opportunity, and it is our inherited duty to contribute to moral and spiritual advancement.

It is sobering to realize that the average human intelligence has probably not changed appreciably during the last ten thousand years. In fact, the total capacity of the brains of Neanderthals has been found to be greater than that of modern humans. We also know that the process of learning has greatly accelerated during recent times with our improved ability to share information rapidly. For the first time, we have become aware that our own existence is threatened by things such as nuclear weapons and global warming. These recognized threats are, perhaps, already an ongoing test of our human intelligence, our freedom, and our ability to shape our own destiny. The human challenge now is to survive by having sustained faith in each other and in the highest common moral principles that we have spasmodically evolved, and through mutual understanding and peaceful cooperation in addressing the discerned challenges to our common existence.

It is urgent that humans take a new look at the rapidly growing need for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Ten Commandments, the Koran, or the teachings of Jesus Christ and to see if these visions of improved human interrelationships might be used to meet the challenges of the present moment and evolve a future of peaceful coexistence, based on faith in each other.
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Product details

Hardcover: 192 pages
Publisher: Simon & Schuster (March 27, 2018)
Language: English

2018/03/25

Issues of Greek - Turkish Relations - Hellenic Republic - Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Issues of Greek - Turkish Relations - Hellenic Republic - Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Issues of Greek - Turkish Relations


In the early 1970s, Turkey initiated a systematic policy of contentions and claims against the sovereignty, the sovereign rights and jurisdictions of Greece.

The goal of this newly formed policy against Greece has been the changing of the territorial status quo provided for in international treaties – the Treaty of Lausanne being pivotal among these – and the legal status of maritime zones and airspace as they derive from international law and the law of the sea.

The initiation of this policy ushered in a new chapter of tension in Greek-Turkish relations that lasts to this day, and was marked by the first claims on the Greek continental shelf, in 1973, and the first disputing of the extent of Greek national airspace, in 1975.

The advent of this new Turkish policy coincided with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish occupation of the northern portion of Cyprus, which continues to this day, decisively impacting relations between the two countries and increasing tensions.

Starting at that time, Turkey began to weave a canvass of ever-increasing disputes and claims that even brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict (crisis of March 1987 and Imia crisis of December 1996).

Starting with the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf (1973) and the crisis that followed – bringing the two countries into intense disagreement, which was taken in hand, on Greece’s initiative, by both the UN Security Council and the International Court in the Hague – Turkey started to implement the policy of constantly increasing contentions and claims, including:

• contesting Greece’s legal right, on threat of war (casus belli), to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, as provided for by the Law of the Sea, and as has been done by virtually all coastal states in the international community, including Turkey (in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean);
• disputing the extent of Greek national airspace, through constant violations by Turkish fighter aircraft;
• contesting Greek regime and sovereignty over islands and violation of that sovereignty;
• disputing the delimitation of territorial sea;
• disputing responsibilities within the Athinai FIR, which were entrusted to Greece by ICAO, and constant refusal on the part of Turkey to comply with air traffic regulations;
• disputing Greece’s jurisdiction within the search and rescue region under Greek responsibility;
• demanding the demilitarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean.

Turkey promotes the aforementioned contentions in practice through methods that contravene the fundamental principles of the UN Charter (threat of war, violations carried out with armed fighter aircraft over inhabited islands, violations of Greek territorial sea, etc.).

What is Greece’s reply to the Turkish stance? Greece is firmly dedicated to the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes based on international law. Greece has declared its acceptance of the general mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague, with the exceptions, which are specifically foreseen in the respective declaration , while, Greece has signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).

By declaration made in 2015, Greece has excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the Convention the delimitation of maritime zones, according to article 298 of the Convention (the declaration can be retrieved from the following web site:https://www.itlos.org/en/jurisdiction/declarations-of-states-parties/declarations-made-by-states-parties-under-article-298/).

Within this framework, Greece is pursuing the resolution of the only outstanding difference between Greece and Turkey, namely the delimitation of the continental shelf, in accordance with regulations of international law and specifically the law of the sea.

Turkey’s European perspective plays a particularly important role in Greek-Turkish relations. Greece is a firm and sincere supporter of Turkey’s EU accession course, because Greece believes that the European Union is a catalyst for regional stability and growth, and that Turkey’s accession, if the EU standards are met, will benefit Turkey itself, Europe and the wider region.

A fundamental precondition for Turkey’s accession to the European Union is, in other words, the timely fulfillment of the accession criteria, including respect for the principle of good neighbourly relations. Within this framework, the peaceful resolution of differences – including, if necessary, recourse to the International Court in The Hague – has emerged as one of the basic criteria, prerequisites and priorities within the framework of Turkey’s accession process, and it has been set down in the fundamental accession texts (Negotiating Framework, Accession Partnership), as well as in the Enlargement Strategy, the annual Progress Reports, Council Conclusions and other official EU texts.

Beyond that, Turkey is obliged within the framework of its accession course to meet basic international and European obligations with regard to respect for minority rights and religious freedoms. Greece emphasizes the importance of Turkey’s respecting the internationally recognized rights of the Greek minority and the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

Despite recent steps in the right direction with regard to the Greek minority in Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Ankara is still mired in an outdated rationale of reciprocity. Specifically, Turkey continues to mistakenly link its obligations on human rights and religious freedoms (such as the reopening of the Halki Seminary) with the Turkish policy regarding Greek Muslims in Thrace.

Beyond its obvious full and manifest respect for the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne and the religious beliefs and cultural background of the Muslim minority and its members, the Greek state deals with the members of the Muslim minority and their issues in the same way that it deals with all Greek citizens: it is attentive to their desires and concerns, consulting with them and planning and implementing a consistent, cohesive policy for best meeting their needs in all areas.

Attempts from any quarter to ghettoize the minority and ignore the unique qualities of every member conflict with international law and result in the violation of human rights. The best and loudest responses to these attempts come from the minority itself, through its active and productive contribution to the political and social life of our country.

Greek-Turkish relations are an important parameter not only in the relations between the two countries, but also in the development and stability of the wider region of Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece stresses the need to respect International Law (in particular the International Law of the Sea) as well as the importance of the principle of good neighbourly relations – an essential European common value.

Greece is making an ongoing effort to convert Greek-Turkish relations from relations of conflict into relations of cooperation. That is why Greece is extending a hand of friendship to Turkey, calling on the latter to cooperate – in the spirit of consensus and constructiveness befitting neighbours – on improving Greek-Turkish relations and ironing out tensions.

Relations between Turkey and Greece / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Relations between Turkey and Greece / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Relations between Turkey and Greece


A new era has begun in the Turkish-Greek relations as of 1999, marked with the establishment of various dialogue mechanisms such as regular political consultations, exploratory contacts on Aegean Issues, High-Level Cooperation Council meetings as well as high-level visits and contacts. While seeking settlement to long-standing problems with Greece by means of bilateral dialogue mechanisms, Turkey aims at enhancing bilateral relations in every possible field and attributes importance to the implementation of tangible projects to the benefit of two countries.

In 2010, the High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) between Turkey and Greece was set up thanks to a Turkish initiative. Co-chaired by the Prime Ministers of both countries and under the coordination of Foreign Ministers, the HLCC is envisaged to convene in Turkey and Greece alternately. The HLCC aims at addressing various issues of Turkish-Greek relations at high level, thus contributing to progress in existing and prospective areas of cooperation, and rendering an “institutional” ground for Turkish-Greek relations. Four HLCC meetings have so far been held. The first meeting in Athens on May 14 and 15, 2010; the second meeting in Istanbul on March 4, 2013; the third meeting in Athens on December 6, 2014, and the last one in Izmir on March 8, 2016. 54 agreements/protocols/MoUs were signed during those meetings. Business Fora are also being held on the side-lines of the HLCC Meetings.

High-level visits have also picked up momentum over the last couple of years. In the second half of 2017 only, Presidential, Prime Ministerial and Foreign Ministerial visits were exchanged.

President Erdoğan paid an official visit to Greece, including Athens and Komotini, on December 7 and 8, 2017. This has been the first official visit at the level of heads of state between Turkey and Greece since 1952. Prime Minister Mr. Yıldırım and Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Çavuşoğlu paid a working visit to Greece (Athens and Komotini), on June 19, 2017 and on November 2 and 3, 2017, respectively. Various Ministerial visits are also taking place. The Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Kotzias paid a working visit to Turkey on October 23 and 24, 2017.

Regular political consultations are being held between the Foreign Ministries. The last political consultations were held in Ankara on January 12, 2018.

Commercial and economic relations with Greece have also gained momentum since 1999. The establishment of the HLCC mechanism in 2010 in particular has paved the way for a substantial increase in commercial relations. The bilateral trade volume thus doubled between 2010 and 2014, reaching 5.6 billion USD by the end of 2014. Although the bilateral trade volume decreased in 2015 and 2016, it gained momentum in 2017 and amounted to 3.5 billion USD.

The stock of direct investments from Greece is around 6.8 billion USD. Greek investors, operate in information technology (IT), agricultural applications, packaging, plastics, pharmacy, cosmetics, fisheries, tourism and construction sectors.

The stock of direct Turkish investments in Greece, including the investments via the other European countries amounts to approximately 500 million USD. Turkish investors mostly focus on investing in marinas, ports and the overall tourism sector in Greece. Furthermore, Ziraat Bank has branches in Athens, Xanthi and Komotini.

Transport is another field where both sides are willing to intensify their cooperation. Currently, Turkish airline operators are conducting 44 flights a week between Turkey and Greece. The implementation of projects regarding the Izmir-Thessaloniki Ro-Pax ferry line, the high-speed train link between Istanbul and Thessaloniki and construction of a second bridge at the İpsala-Kipi border crossing will pave the way for an intensified cooperation in maritime, railroad and road transport between Turkey and Greece.

Tourism is one of the promising fields of cooperation between the two countries. In 2017, around 921 thousand tourists from Turkey visited Greece. In the same year, Turkey attracted almost 595 thousand tourists from Greece. The facilitated visa procedure for visiting seven Greek islands close to Turkish shores has been in effect since 2012. It has also been instrumental in the increase of the number of Turkish tourists visiting Greece.

There are some issues between Turkey and Greece concerning the Aegean Sea. For detailed information, visit “Turkish-Greek Relations/Aegean Problems”.

Greek–Turkish relations - Wikipedia



Greek–Turkish relations - Wikipedia



Greek–Turkish relations
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Greek–Turkish relations



Greece
Turkey


The relations between the Greek and the Turkish states have been marked by alternating periods of mutual hostility and reconciliation ever since Greece won its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832. Since then the two countries have faced each other in four major wars—the Greco-Turkish War (1897), the First Balkan War of 1912 to 1913, the First World War (1914 to 1918) and finally the Greco-Turkish War (1919–22). The latter was followed by the Greco-Turkish population exchange and a period of friendly relations in the 1930s and 1940s. Both countries entered NATO in 1952. Relations deteriorated again in the 1950s due to the Cyprus issue, the 1955 Istanbul pogrom and the expulsion of the Istanbul Greeks in the 1960s, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and subsequent military confrontations over the Aegean dispute. A period of relative normalization began after 1999 with the so-called "earthquake diplomacy", which notably led to a change in the previously firmly negative stance of the Greek government on the issue of the accession of Turkey to the European Union.



Contents [hide]
1Diplomatic missions
2Byzantine against Seljuq and Ottoman
3Ottoman era until 1820
4Ottoman era and the Greek state until 1913
5The First World War and after (1914-1927)
61928-1954: Normalization of the relations
7Istanbul Pogrom, Cyprus crisis, Turkish invasion and the collapse of the Greek military junta (1955-1975)
8Aegean Sea
8.1Incidents
9Evros River incident
10Sismik incident
11Cyprus Missile Crisis
12Capture of Öcalan and the resignation of Greek ministers
13Earthquake diplomacy
14Forest arsons
15Illegal immigration
16Sledgehammer (coup plan)
17Accession of Turkey to the European Union
18DHKP-C
19Hagia Sophia
20Recent events
20.12016-2017
20.1.12016 Turkish coup d'état attempt
21Timeline
22Further reading
23See also
24References
25External links


Diplomatic missions[edit]
Turkey has an embassy in Athens and consulates general in Thessaloniki, Komotiniand Rhodes.
Greece has an embassy in Ankara and consulates general in Istanbul, İzmir and Edirne.
Byzantine against Seljuq and Ottoman[edit]
Main articles: Byzantine–Ottoman Wars and Byzantine–Seljuq wars

In 1048 conflicts between Seljuqs and Byzantines (Greeks were part of the Byzantine Empire and the Empire was pretty much Hellenized) started. Many wars and battleswere fought between the Byzantine and the Seljuq armies. Also, in 1300 conflicts between Ottomans and Byzantines started too.

In 1453, Ottomans conquered Constantinople, the capital city of the Byzantine Empire. In 1460 they conquered the Despotate of the Morea and by 1500 most of the plains and islands were in Ottoman hands, but not all, for example Rhodes conquered in 1522, Cyprus in 1571, Venetians retained Crete until 1669, the Ionian islands were only briefly ruled by the Ottomans, and remained primarily under the rule of the Republic of Venice.
Ottoman era until 1820[edit]

During the Ottoman–Venetian Wars and the Russo-Turkish War (1768–74) Greeks helped the enemies of the Ottomans. Also, there were some Greek uprisings, especially by the Dionysius the Philosopher. In addition Lambros Katsonis fleet began harassing the Ottoman fleet in the Aegean Sea.

In 1770, Ottoman army invaded the Mani.
Ottoman era and the Greek state until 1913[edit]
Main articles: Greek War of Independence, Greco-Turkish War (1897), and Balkan Wars

The first Ottoman ambassador to the Greek Kingdom, the PhanarioteKonstantinos Mousouros, at a ball in the royal palace in Athens

In 1803, 1807 and 1815 Ottoman army invaded the Mani. Also, in 1803 there was a final fight between the Souliotes and the local Ottoman ruler, Ali Pasha, which ended the many years of conflicts between them.

In March 1821, the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empirebegan. The Greeks formally declared their independence in January 1822, and after the Battle of Navarino in 1827, the establishment of a Greek state was recognized in the London Protocol of 1828. The first borders of the Greek state consisted of the Greek mainland south of a line from Arta to Volos plus Euboea and the Cyclades islands in the Aegean Sea. The rest of the Greek-speaking lands, including Crete, Cyprus and the rest of the Aegean islands, Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace, remained under Ottoman rule. More than a million Greeks also lived in what is now Turkey, mainly in the Aegean region of Asia Minor, especially around Smyrna, in the Pontus region on the Black Sea coast, in Cappadocia, in Istanbul, in Imbros and in Tenedos.

Greek politicians of the 19th century were determined to include all these territories within a greatly enlarged Greek state, based on the Byzantine model and with Constantinople (Istanbul) as its capital. This policy was called the Great Idea (Megali Idea). Constantinople had been the capital of the Eastern half of the Roman Empireuntil its fall to the Turks in 1453. The Ottomans naturally opposed these plans. The Empire was considered by the European powers as 'the sick man of Europe', but since these powers were irreconcilably divided over the fate of the Ottoman lands, their intrigues both reduced its territorial hold but also kept delaying its collapse. Such policies aggravated relations between Greece and the Ottoman state.

During the Crimean War (1854 to 1856), Britain and France restrained Greece from attacking the Ottomans, by occupying Piraeus. Again during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 the Greeks were keen to join in with the objective of territorial expansion, but Greece was unable to take any effective part in the war. Nevertheless, after the Congress of Berlin, in 1881 Greece was given most of Thessaly and part of Epirus. Also, in 1854-1896, there were revolts in the Ottoman Empire by the Greek population in Thessaly, Macedonia, Epirus.

In 1858-1896 there were many revolts in Crete. Also, in 1878 there were revolts in the Thessaly, Macedonia and Epirus against Ottoman Empire by the Greek population.

In 1897, a new revolt in Crete led to the first Greco-Turkish War. An unprepared Greek army was unable to dislodge the Ottoman troops from their fortifications along the northern border, and with the resulting Ottoman counter-attack, the war had a humiliating end for Greece, also resulting in some minor losses of territory for her.

The Young Turks, who seized power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, were Turkish nationalists whose objective was to create a strong, centrally governed state. The Christian minorities, including Greeks, saw their position in the Empire deteriorate. Crete was once again the flashpoint of Greek and Turkish aspirations.

The First Balkan War of 1912–1913 was a direct consequence of the mounting tension, as a result of which Greece seized Crete, the islands, the rest of Thessaly and Epirus, and coastal Macedonia from the Ottomans, in alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria.
The First World War and after (1914-1927)[edit]
Main article: Greco-Turkish War (1919–22)

In 1913 an organized persecution of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, including the Greeks, was started. Greece entered the First World War in 1917 with the intention of seizing Constantinople (Istanbul) and Smyrna (İzmir) from the Ottomans, with the encouragement of Britain and France, who also promised the Greeks Cyprus at a certain stage. The ongoing genocide of Pontic Greeks[citation needed]in the Ottoman Empire also played a factor in this decision[citation needed]. Although there was little direct fighting between Greeks and Turks[citation needed], when the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918 the Greeks were quick to claim the lands the Allies had promised them. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres gave Greece eastern Thrace and an area of about 17,000 km² in western Anatolia around Smyrna. This Treaty was signed by the Ottoman government but never went into force, not having been ratified by Parliament.

Greece occupied Smyrna/İzmir on 15 May 1919, while Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Atatürk), who was to become the leader of the Turkish opposition to the Treaty of Sèvres, landed in Samsun on May 19, 1919, an action that is regarded as the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence. He united the protesting voices in Anatolia and set in motion a nationalist movement to repel the armies that had occupied Turkey (including Italy, France and Britain) and establish new borders for a sovereign Turkish nation. Having created a separate government in Ankara, Kemal's government did not recognise the abortive Treaty of Sèvres and fought to have it revoked. The Greek advances into Anatolia were eventually checked and the Greek army was forced into retreat.

The Turkish army entered Smyrna/İzmir on 9 September 1922, effectively ending the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) in the field. The Greek army and administration had already left by sea. The war was put to an end by the Armistice of Mudanya, and the Treaty of Lausanne replaced previous treaties to constitute modern Turkey.

The Treaty of Lausanne also provided for a Population exchange between Greece and Turkey that had begun before the final signature of the treaty in July 1923. About one and a half million Greeks had to leave Turkey for Greece and about half a million Turks had to leave Greece for Turkey (note that the population exchange was on religious grounds, thus the exchange was officially that of Christians for Muslims). The exceptions to the population exchange were Istanbul (Constantinople) and the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), where the Greek minority (including the Ecumenical Patriarch) was allowed to stay, and Western Thrace, whose Muslim minority was also allowed to stay.

Due to the defeat of the Greek army and the events following which terminated 3,000 years of Greek presence in Anatolia, Greece refers it as the Asia Minor Catastrophe/Disaster. The alleged atrocities committed by the Greek army during the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia (1919–1922) left a lasting impression on the Turkish mind. Greek accusations, on the other hand, were focused on the Great Fire of Smyrna, especially in view of the account provided by George Horton, the U.S. Consul General in the city from 1919 to 1922.[1] Horton's account remains as controversial as the fire itself.[2][3]

The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 awarded the islands of Imbros and Tenedos to Turkey, under special provisions for the Greeks living there. Tenedos population was overwhelmingly Greek, and Imbros population was entirely Greek. However after the legislation of "Civil Law" on 26 June 1927, the rights accorded to the Greek population of Imbros and Tenedos were revoked, in violation of the Lausanne Treaty. Thus, the island was demoted from an administrative district to a sub-district which resulted that the island was to be stripped of its local tribunals. Moreover, the members of the local council were obliged to have adequate knowledge of the Turkish language, which meant that the vast majority of the islanders were excluded. Furthermore, according to this law, the Turkish government retained the right to dissolve this council and in certain circumstances, to introduce police force and other officials consisted by non-islanders. This law also violated the educational rights of the local community and imposed an educational system similar to that followed by ordinary Turkish schools.[4]

During the Corfu incident between Italy and Greece, at 1923, elements in Turkey advised Mustafa Kemal to seize the opportunity to invade Western Thrace.[5]
1928-1954: Normalization of the relations[edit]

The first president of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (center) hosting Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos (at left) in Ankara October 27, 1930.

The post-war leaders of Turkey and Greece, Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos respectively, were determined to establish normal relations between the two states. After years of negotiations, a treaty was concluded in 1930, and Venizelos made a successful visit to Istanbul and Ankara. Greece renounced all its claims over Turkish territory. This was followed by the Balkan Pact of 1934, in which Greece and Turkey joined Yugoslavia and Romania in a treaty of mutual assistance and settled outstanding issues (Bulgaria refused to join). Both leaders recognising the need for peace resulted in more friendly relations, with Venizelos even nominating Atatürk for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934.[6]

Kemal Atatürk with Ioannis Metaxas in Ankara, March 1938

In 1941, Turkey was the first country to send humanitarian aid to Greece to relieve the great famine in Athens during the Axis occupation. Turkish president İsmet İnönü signed a decision to help the people whose army he had personally fought during the Turkish War of Independence 19 years earlier. Foodstuff was collected by a nationwide campaign of Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent), and were sent to the port of İstanbul to be shipped to Greece. The aid was shipped on board the vessel SS Kurtuluş with big symbols of the Red Crescent painted on both sides. (See SS Kurtuluş for more information.)

At the same time, Turkey signed a "Treaty of Friendship and cooperation" with Nazi Germany in June 1941.[7] The following year, 1942, Turkey imposed the Varlık Vergisi, a special tax, which taxed the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey, including Greek minority. Also, during the WWII there was the incident of the Twenty Classes, this was the conscription of non-Muslims males who were sent in labour battalions.

The early Cold War brought closer the international policies of the two countries, in 1950 both fought at the Korean War at the side of the UN forces. In 1952, both countries joined NATO. In 1954 Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia formed a new Balkan Pact for mutual defence against the Soviet Union.
Istanbul Pogrom, Cyprus crisis, Turkish invasion and the collapse of the Greek military junta (1955-1975)[edit]
Further information: Istanbul Pogrom, Cyprus dispute, Cypriot intercommunal violence, 1974 Cypriot coup d'état, and Turkish invasion of Cyprus

A serious matter of conflict in Turkish-Greek relations since the 1950s has been Cyprus; at the time, it was a British colony with a Greek-Cypriot population share of 82% of the island's total. Some of the Greek Cypriots wanted unity (enosis) with Greece and, as early as 1931, there were nationalist riots in Nicosia. The Greek government was, due to its financial and diplomatic dependence on Britain, forced to disavow any aims for unification with Cyprus.

In the 1950s, the Cyprus issue flared up again when the Greek Cypriots, under Archbishop Makarios, claimed union with Greece, and the EOKA group launched a paramilitary movement on the island - mainly against the British, but also inflicting collateral damage to other parties and civilians. Eventually, Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos took the Cyprus issue to the United Nations.

Turkish nationalist sentiment, angered by the discrimination against the Turkish Cypriots, became inflamed at the idea that Cyprus would be ceded to Greece. This led to the Greek community of Istanbul becoming the target in the Istanbul Pogrom of 1955. In response, Greece withdrew from all co-operation with Turkey, which caused the Balkan Pact to collapse.

In 1960, a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue was agreed on: Britain granted independence to Cyprus, and a constitution was hammered out. Greek and Turkish troops were stationed on the island to protect their respective communities. Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was the main architect of this plan, which led to an immediate improvement in relations with Turkey, particularly once Adnan Menderes was removed from power in Turkey.

During the period of inter-communal strife in 1963 and 1964, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were displaced and many were massacred on both sides.

On 30 December 1964, Makarios declared his proposal for a constitutional amendment that included 13 articles. Turkey, however, restated that she was against this and threatened war if Cyprus tried to achieve unity with Greece. In August, Turkish aircraft bombed Greek troops that surrounded a Turkish village (Erenkoy) and war seemed imminent. Once again, the Greek minority in Turkey suffered from the crisis, causing many Greeks to flee the country, and there were even threats to expel the Ecumenical Patriarch. Eventually, intervention by the United Nations led to another compromise solution.

In 1964, the Turkish government deported 50,000 Greeks.[8]

The Cyprus dispute weakened the Greek government of George Papandreou and triggered, in April 1967, a military coup in Greece. Under the diplomacy of the military regime, there were periodic crises with Turkey, which suspected that the Greek regime was planning a pro-unification coup in Cyprus.

A 1971 Turkish law nationalized religious high schools, and closed the Halki seminaryon Istanbul's Heybeli Island which had trained Greek Orthodox clergy since 1844.

On July 15, 1974, a band of Greek Cypriot nationalists formed EOKA B, advocating Enosis (Union) with Greece and, backed by the Greek military junta in Athens, staged a coup against the Cypriot President and Archbishop Makarios. An ex-EOKA man, Nikos Sampson was appointed President. On July 20, Turkey—using its guarantor status arising from the trilateral accords of the 1959–1960 Zürich and London Agreement—invaded Cyprus without any resistance from the British forces based on the island, occupied 37% of the northern part and expelled the Greek population. Once again, war between Greece and Turkey seemed imminent, but actual war was averted when Sampson's coup collapsed a few days later and Makarios returned to power. Also, the Greek military junta in Athens, which failed to confront the Turkish invasion, fell from power on 24 July. The damage to Turkish-Greek relations was done, and the occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkish troops would be a sticking point in Greco-Turkish relations for decades to come.
Aegean Sea[edit]

Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal in Davos, February 1986.
Main article: Aegean dispute

Since the 1970s further issues arose between the two countries over sovereignty rights in the Aegean Sea. The Balkan Wars of 1913 had given Greece all the Aegean islands except Imbros and Tenedos, some of them only a few kilometres (barely more than three nautical miles) off the Turkish coast. Since the end of World War II Turkish officials insisted that this led to questions regarding the delimitation of territorial waters, air space and other related zones of control. The conflict was motivated both by considerations of military tactical advantages and by questions of economic exploitation of the Aegean. The latter issue became particularly significant as after 1970 there were expectations of finding oil in the Aegean. This was highlighted during the crisis in 1987, when a Turkish ship was about to enter disputed waters to conduct an oil survey. The Greek Prime Minister of the time, Andreas Papandreou, ordered the ship to be sunk if found within disputed waters claimed by Greece. Consultations about this issue were held in Davos between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers.

Issues unresolved to this day concern the mutual delimitation of several zones of control:
The width of the territorial waters. Both sides currently possess 6 nautical miles (11 km) off their shores in the Aegean Sea. Greece claims a right to unilateral expansion to 12 nautical miles, based on the International Law of the Sea. Turkey, which already has expanded its own territorial waters to 12 miles on its other coasts, denies the applicability of the 12-miles rule in the Aegean and has threatened Greece with war in the case it should try to apply it unilaterally.
The width of the national airspace. Greece currently claims 10 miles, while Turkey only acknowledges 6 miles.
The future delimitation of the continental shelf zone in the international parts of the Aegean, which would give the states exclusive rights to economic exploitation.
The right of Greece to exercise flight control over Turkish military flight activities within the international parts of the Aegean, based on conflicting interpretations of the rules about Flight Information Regions (FIR) set by the ICAO.
Since 1996, the sovereignty over some small uninhabited islets, most notably Imia/Kardak

The conflict over military flight activities has led to a practice of continuous tactical military provocations. Turkish aircraft regularly fly in the zones over which Greece claims control (i.e., the outer four miles of the claimed Greek airspace and the international parts of Athens FIR), while Greek aircraft constantly intercept them. Aircraft from both countries frequently engage in mock dog-fights. These operations often cause casualties and losses for both the Greek and Turkish Air Forces.
Incidents[edit]
On 22 July 1974, during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, a pair of Greek F-5Αsintercepted a pair of Turkish F-102 near Agios Efstratios. The aircraft engaged in a dogfight, during which one of the Turkish pilots fired a Falcon missile against one of the F-5s piloted by Thomas Skampardonis. Skampardonis managed to evade the missile and then the other Greek pilot Ioannis Dinopoulos, who up to that point was undetected by the Turks, fired two AIM-9B missiles. The first AIM-9 missed its target but the second shot down one of the F-102s. The pilot of the remaining F-102 became disoriented and fled westwards. When he realized his mistake, he turned east towards the Turkish coast but run out of fuel. This forced him to ditch his aircraft, suffering fatal injuries.[9]
On 18 June 1992, a Greek Mirage F1CG crashed near the island of Agios Efstratiosin the Northern Aegean, during a low-altitude dogfight with two Turkish F-16s. Greek pilot Nikolaos Sialmas was killed in the crash.[10]
Οn 8 February 1995, a Turkish F-16C crashed on the sea after being intercepted by a Greek Mirage F1CG. The Turkish pilot Mustafa Yildirim bailed out and was rescued by a Greek helicopter. After brief hospitalization in Rhodes, the pilot was handed over to the Turkish side.[11]
On 27 December 1995, a pair of Greek F-16Cs intercept a pair of Turkish F-4E. During the dogfight that followed, one of the Turkish aircraft went into a steep dive and crashed onto the sea, killing its pilot Altug Karaburun. The co-pilot Ogur Kilar managed to bail out safely and was rescued by a Greek ΑΒ-205 helicopter. He was returned to Turkey after receiving first aid treatment in Lesbos.[10]
On 8 October 1996, a pair of Greek Mirage 2000s intercepted a pair of Turkish F-16s (a single-seater C and a two-seater D) over the Aegean island of Chios. The F-16s were escorting 4 Turkish F-4Es on a simulated SEAD mission. After a long dogfight, one of the Turkish F-16s was allegedly shot down with a Magic II missile fired by a Greek Mirage 2000 piloted by Thanos Grivas.[10] The Greek authorities said that the jet went down due to mechanical failure, while the Turkish Defense Ministry said, on 2014, that the jet had been shot down by the Greek pilot.[12][13][14] Some Greek media reported that it was an accident and the Turkish plane had unintentionally been shot down.[15][12] Turkish pilot Nail Erdoğan was killed whereas back seater pilot Osman Cicekli bailed out. He was rescued by a Greek helicopter and handed over to the Turkish side. Greece officially offered to assist Turkey in its efforts to locate and salvage the Turkish fighter jet.[13] On 2016, Turkish prosecutors have demanded two aggravated life sentences for the Greek pilot who allegedly downed the Turkish F-16 jet. The indictment demanded that Greek Mirage 2000 pilot Thanos Grivas be sentenced to two aggravated life sentences on charges of “voluntary manslaughter” and “actions for weakening the independence of the state.” It also demanded another 12 years for “vandalizing the jet.”[16] Greece rejected the demands of the Turkish prosecutors.[17]
On 23 May 2006, a Greek F-16 and a Turkish F-16 collided approximately 35 nautical miles south off the island of Rhodes, near the island of Karpathos during a Turkish reconnaissance flight involving two F-16Cs and a RF-4.[18][19] Greek pilot Kostas Iliakis was killed, whereas the Turkish pilot Halil İbrahim Özdemir bailed out and was rescued by a cargo ship.
On 16 February 2016, Turkey prevented the Greek PM's aircraft carrying Greek PM and Greece’s delegation from landing on the island of Rhodes for refueling during their trip to Iran, arguing that the island is a demilitarized zone. Turkey also refused to accept the flight plan submitted by the Greeks, mentioned that the plane will not be allowed to enter Turkish airspace. Greeks created a new flight plan, the plane flew over Egypt, Cyprus, Jordan and Saudi Arabia so as to reach Iran, according to the new plan.[20][21]
Evros River incident[edit]

In 1986, Turkish soldiers and Greek soldiers suffered casualties at the Evros River incident, due to fire exchange. Turkish and Greek soldiers have exchanged fire in the past, as Greeks have tried to stop Iranian refugees from entering the country illegally from Turkey, but this incident was the first in which there have been casualties. During this period, Greek soldiers along the border with Turkey were on alert after receiving reports that Turkey planned to help thousands of refugees slip into Greece illegally.
Sismik incident[edit]

In 1987, the Sismik incident nearly started a war between Greece and Turkey.
Cyprus Missile Crisis[edit]

During the Cyprus Missile Crisis, between early 1997 and late 1998, tensions continued between Greece and Turkey, due to Greece's support of the Cypriot position.
Capture of Öcalan and the resignation of Greek ministers[edit]

In 1999, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, was captured by the Turkish Intelligence Service agents in Nairobi, Kenya, while leaving the Greek Embassy. Öcalan was carrying both Greek and Cypriot passports.[22] Fearing a hostile Turkish reaction, three Greek ministers resigned: Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, in charge of the attempt to hide Öcalan at the Greek Ambassador's residence in Kenya and to find him asylum; Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos, in charge of the Greek Intelligence Service involved in the operation; and Public Order Minister Philippos Petsalnikos, in charge of the Greek security forces which failed to stop the smuggling of Öcalan into Greece in January 1999.[23]
Earthquake diplomacy[edit]
Main article: Greek–Turkish earthquake diplomacy

Relations between Greece and neighbouring Turkey improved after successive earthquakes hit both countries in the summer of 1999. The so-called "earthquake diplomacy" generated an outpouring of sympathy and generous assistance provided by ordinary Greeks and Turks in both cases. These acts were encouraged from the top and took many foreigners by surprise, preparing the public for a breakthrough in bilateral relations, which had been marred by decades of hostility over anti-Greek pogroms, territorial disputes and the situation in the divided island of Cyprus.

Ten years later, Greece has become one of the key supporters of Turkey's struggle to enter the European Union. Yet, despite the confidence Greece and Cyprus have shown, voting YES for Turkey in order to begin its entry negotiations with the European Union in October 2005, many key issues remain unresolved. Furthermore, Turkey still denies access to Cypriot vessels to its territory, an obligation towards the EU with a 2006 deadline. The Turkish government counters that this restriction regarding Cypriot vessels was taken after the trade embargo decision against the portion of Cyprus illegally occupied by Turkey. The issue remains deadlocked, despite UN and EU attempts to mediate. Other unfulfilled obligations include Christian minority rights, acknowledgement of the Orthodox Church of Constantinople and the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch.

In 2002, Turkey and Greece made an unsuccessful attempt to jointly host the 2008 UEFA European Football Championship. The bid was one of the four candidacies that was recommended to the UEFA Executive Committee, the joint Austria/Switzerland bid winning the right to host the tournament.

A sign of improved relations was visible in the response to a mid-air collision by Greek and Turkish fighter jets in the southern Aegean in May 2006. While the Turkish pilot ejected safely, the Greek pilot lost his life. However, both countries agreed that the event should not affect their bilateral relations[24] and made a strong effort to maintain them by agreeing to a set of confidence-building measures in the aftermath of the accident.
Forest arsons[edit]

In December 2011, the Turkish newspaper Birgun reported on an interview with former Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz saying that Turkey was behind a number of large forest fires in Greece in the 1990s. Yilmaz later denied the statements, saying he had been misquoted by the newspaper and that he had been actually referring to unsubstantiated reports of Greek involvement in Turkish forest fires.[25][26] However, despite Yilmaz's denial, the allegations strained the relations between the two countries. Also, former head of Greek intelligence service said they had intelligence that Turkish agencies were involved in the arsons in the 1990s but had no proof. He said they had received information from their agents in Turkey that Turkish agents or others were involved in the forest fires on Greek islands.[27]

Ιn August 2017, a Turkish citizen was arrested after he was trying to set fire near a Greek highway in Xanthi. He had applied for political asylum in Greece.[28]
Illegal immigration[edit]


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Turkey is a transit point for illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe (as well as being a destination itself; see Immigration to Turkey for details). As a result of bilateral negotiations, a readmission agreement was signed between Turkey and Greece in November 2001 and went into effect in April 2002. For third-country nationals, this protocol gives the parties 14 days to inform each other of the number of persons to be returned after the date of illegal entry. For nationals of the two countries the authorities can make use of simplified procedures. But the strict application of the agreement is reported to have retrograded as of 2003. Incidents concerning illegal immigration are frequent on the border of the two countries. Turkey, which is a transit point for illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe, has been accused of not being able to secure its borders with Greece. Since 1996 40 illegal immigrants have been killed by mines, after entering Greek territory in Evros.[29] In 2001, about 800 illegal immigrants were rescued by the Greek coast guard after a fire broke out on board the Turkish-flagged Brelner, believed to have set sail from the Turkish port of İzmir, probably en route to Italy.[30] According to Greek sources the Turkish authorities are tolerant of smugglers trafficking illegal immigrants into Greece; a notable such incident is the one of a trafficking boat, filmed in September 14, 2009 by the Latvianhelicopter crew of Frontex patrolling near Farmakonisi island, during which "it is clear that the Turkish coastguard, at best, does not prevent the "slavetrade" vessels to sail from its shores. At worst, it accompanies them into Greek territorial waters".[31][32]The human trafficking into Greece through the Aegean Sea has been a documented, widespread phaenomenon while "the failure, reported by Frontex, of Turkish officials to stop suspicious vessels as they leave, ensure that a steady stream of migrants reaches Lesbos and other islands in the Aegean".[33]

On July, 2016, after the failed Turkish coup d'état attempt Greek authorities on a number of Aegean islands have called for emergency measures to curtail a growing flow of refugees from Turkey, the number of migrants and refugees willing to make the journey across the Aegean has increased noticeably after the failed coup. At Athens officials voiced worries because Turkish monitors overseeing the deal in Greecehad been abruptly pulled out after the failed coup without being replaced.[34][35][36]Also, the mayor of Kos, expressed concern in a letter to the Greek Prime Minister sighting the growing influx of refugees and migrants after the failed coup.[37] The Association of Greek Tourism Enterprises (SETE) warned about the prospect of another flare-up in the refugee/migrant crisis due to the Turkish political instability.[38]
Sledgehammer (coup plan)[edit]

During the 2010 trial for an alleged plot to stage a military coup dating back to 2003, conspirators were accused of planning attacks on mosques, trigger a conflict with Greece by shooting down one of Turkey's own warplanes accusing Greeks for this and planting bombs in Istanbul to pave the way for a military takeover.[39][40][41]
Accession of Turkey to the European Union[edit]

After 1996, Greek Foreign Minister, and later Prime Minister, George Papandreoucharted a major change of direction in Greek-Turkish relations. He lifted Greece's objections to Turkey's EU aspirations and energetically supported Turkey's bid for EU candidate status.[42]

A 2005 opinion poll showed that only 25% of the Greek public believed Turkey has a place in the European Union.[43]

In September 2017, Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, mentioned that halting accession talks with Turkey would be a strategic mistake by the European Union, amid a war of words raging between Germany and Turkey.[44] Also, former Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, has urged European Union leaders to keep the doors open to Turkey and to continue dialogue with the Turkish government, in an apparent reference to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s calls for the suspension of accession talks with Turkey.[45]
DHKP-C[edit]

At 2013, Greek authorities arrested four militants on two separate operations near the Greece-Turkey border, while the DHKP-C was about to organize an attack on Turkish soil.[46]

At 2014, Greek authorities arrested a number of militants in several operations, including high-ranking members of the Turkish terrorist group.[47]

On November 28, 2017, Greek police raided apartments in Athens and detained nine Turks (one woman and eight men), members of the DHKP-C, plotting to assassinate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan using rockets, during his visit to Greece.[48]
Hagia Sophia[edit]

From the date of its construction in 537 AD, and until 1453, it served as an Eastern Orthodox cathedral and seat of the Patriarch of Constantinople,[49] except between 1204 and 1261, when it was converted by the Fourth Crusaders to a Roman Catholiccathedral under the Latin Empire. The building was later converted into an Ottoman mosque from 29 May 1453 until 1931. It was then secularized and opened as a museum on 1 February 1935.[50]

On July 1, 2016, Muslim prayers were held again in the Hagia Sophia for the first time in 85 years.[51]

On May 13, 2017, a large group of people organized by the Anatolia Youth Association (AGD), gathered in front of Hagia Sophia and prayed the morning prayer with a call for the reconversion of the museum into a mosque.[52]

On June 21, 2017, Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) organized a special program, which included the recitation of the Quran and prayers in Hagia Sofia, to mark the Laylat al-Qadr, the program was broadcast live by state-run television TRT. On June 22, a Greek statement mentioned that Hagia Sophia is an UNESCO world heritage site and should not be any attempt to convert it into a mosque. On June 23 Turkey condemned the Greek statement.[53]
Recent events[edit]

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis and Greek prime minister George Papandreou in Athens, May 2010

Official relations between Greece and Turkey had improved, mainly due to the Greek government's supportive attitude towards Turkey's efforts to join the EU, although various issues have never been fully resolved and remain constant sources of conflict. An attempt at rapprochement, dubbed the Davos process, was made in 1988. The retirement of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreoucontributed to this improvement. His son, foreign minister George Papandreou, made considerable progress in improving relations. He found a willing partner in Ismail Cem and later in the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Turkey continues to systematically disregard Greek national sovereign territory by violating air and sea borders.[54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61] In March 2015 the Turkish forces had intended to carry out a military exercise in the Aegean disrupting international air traffic, and restricted traffic around two Greek national airports.[62][63][64] Turkey subsequently withdrew the earlier Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) reserving an extensive area of air space over the Aegean from March 2 to December 31, 2015. The Greek government lodged complaints with NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and the International Civil Aviation Authority over this flashpoint and NATO was thought to have played a role de-escalating.[65]
2016-2017[edit]

In 2016, Greece has named Turkey an “honorary country” together with Israel, Russia and the United States. Every year four countries are selected by Greece as “honorary” and their citizens enjoy additional benefits and discounts at Greece.[66]

On August 15, 2016, the Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos accused Turkey that it unjustifiably closed the historic Greek Orthodox Sumela Monastery, which is dedicated to the Virgin Mary, in Turkey’s Black Sea region during the celebrations for the Assumption of Virgin Mary/Dormition of the Mother of God. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded to the Greek President that his remarks distorted the decision to temporarily close the Sumela Monastery do not comply with facts and he demagogy far from the responsibility of a statesman.[67]

On September 29, 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan disputed Treaty of Lausanne. He said “We gave away the islands (in the Aegean) through the Treaty of Lausanne,”, “The islands, which if we care to shout (from the western Asia Minor coast) we’ll be heard on the other side (the islands), we gave away with Lausanne. What will now happen with the continental shelf? What will happen with the airspace and land? We’re still fighting for all of these". This caused displeasure in Athens. A Greek Foreign Ministry source remarked that “everyone should respect the Treaty of Lausanne,” noting that it is “a reality in the civilized world which no one, including Ankara, can ignore.”, added that the Turkish leader’s comments were likely geared for domestic consumption.[68][69]

On October 16, 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, “We cannot draw boundaries to our heart, nor do we allow it,” and that “Turkey cannot disregard its kinsmen in Western Thrace, Cyprus, Crimea and anywhere else.” Greece saw his speaking as an effort, informed by a neo-Ottoman narrative and romantic irredentism, to dispute past agreements that settled the borders between the two countries. Greek Foreign Ministry said, at October 17, that "Thrace is Greek, democratic and European. Any other thought is unthinkable and dangerous,”[70]

On March 27, 2017, the former editor in chief of the English version of Turkish Zaman newspaper, Abdullah Bozkurt, posted a tweet on his account warning of increased clandestine operations of Turkish intelligence agents in Greece.[71]

On August 16, 2017, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu speaking before Turkey’s National Assembly, said that a number of interconnected problems remain in the Aegean between the Turkey and Greece. “Among these problems is the question of sovereignty of certain islets and rocky formations, and the fact that there are no sea borders which are set by an international agreement between Turkey and Greece,” he said.[72]

On August 22, 2017, the Erbakan Foundation (a religious foundation) at Sinop staged a protest, demanding the removal of a statue of the ancient Greek philosopher, who was born at Sinop, Diogenes from the city entrance. The foundation said it was protesting the fact that the Greek ideology being attached to the province.[73]

In December 2017 Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first Turkish president to visit Greece in 65 years.[74] Also, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a speech at the parliament criticized Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over his "failure" to raise the issue of "18 occupied islands" during his visit to Greece. His political party also, declared the Turkish names of 156 islands, islets and reefs in the Aegean Sea and claimed them as Turkish territory. The Greek Defense minister, Panos Kammenos, responded "come and get it". Kılıçdaroğlu then said, that Turkey will come and take all of those islands back, while the CHP’s deputy leader for foreign affairs, Öztürk Yılmaz, said that "Greece should not test our patience".[75][76]
2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt[edit]

After the failed 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, several Turkish military personnel sought political asylum in Greece while Turkey requested their extradition. Also, the Greek armed forces and Coast Guard were on alert and increased the patrols and a contingent of the Greek Police was dispatched to some Greek islands to conduct checks there in order to prevent the arrival of participants in the failed coup to Greece and arrest anyone who might manage to enter the country.[77][78][79]

Also, the two Turkey’s military attache in Athens, fled to Italy. The Greek Foreign Ministry canceled the two attache’ accreditations on August 7, 2016, upon the request of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. At August 11, 2016, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that they left Greece to Italy on August 6 and added that Turkey will officially ask Italian authorities to extradite the two soldiers.[80][81]

On August 25, 2016, seven Turkish citizens were seeking asylum in Greece. A couple, both of whom are university professors, and their two children applied for asylum in Alexandroupoli after they illegally entered the country from the northeastern border. Also, three businessmen have illegally reached the Greek island of Rhodes, and they also applied for asylum.[82][83]

On August 30, 2016, a Turkish judge arrived to the Greek island of Chios on a migrant boat and sought asylum in the country. He told the Greek coast guard and police officers that he is being persecuted in Turkey for his political beliefs by the government of President Tayyip Erdogan. The Turkish judge had been arrested for illegally entering the country and, also, he transferred to Athens for his asylum proceedings.[84][85][86][87]

On September 21, 2016, ten Turkish civilians, two men, two women and six children landed by boat illegally on the Greek island of Rhodes and sought asylum. They told to the Greek authorities they were working in the private sector in Turkey and they were being persecuted by the Turkish government due to their political beliefs.[88][89]

On September 29, 2016, five Turkish nationals, a couple and their child and two other men, arrived in Alexandroupolis by crossing the Evros River by boat illegally and requested political asylum.[90]

On 15 February 2017, five Turkish commandos have illegally entered Greece through the Evros river. However, once they entered the country, the group split. The two of them surrendered to the police and on 20 February 2017, requested political asylum. The Greek government mentioned that the Greek authorities will not allow the country to be dragged into the ongoing feud between the Turkish state and the followers of Gulen.[91][92] But there were no sign of the other three. According to a lawyer there were indications that the other three have been arrested by Greek authorities who were about to expel them to Turkey. Later, according to new evidences and new information these three “arrested” marines were delivered under fast and informal procedures from Greek to Turkish services.[93]

On October 24, 2017, Turkish authorities obtained information that 995 Turks have applied for asylum in Greece after the coup attempt.[94]

More than 1,800 Turkish citizens requested asylum in Greece in 2017.[95]
Timeline[edit]


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YearDateEvent
1923 30 January Turkey and Greece sign the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations agreement
24 July Turkey and Greece sign the Treaty of Lausanne
23 August Turkey ratifies the Treaty of Lausanne
25 August Greece ratifies the Treaty of Lausanne
1926 17 February The Turkish Government revokes article 14 of the Lausanne treaty, removing the "special administrative organisation" rights for the Greek majority islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos).
1930 30 October Greece and Turkey sign "Convention of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, with Annexes and Protocol of Signature".
1933 14 September Greece and Turkey sign Pact of Cordial Friendship.
1934 9 February Greece and Turkey, as well as Romania and Yugoslavia sign the Balkan Pact, a mutual defense treaty.
1938 27 April Greece and Turkey sign the "Additional Treaty to the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration of October 30th, 1930, and to the Pact of Cordial Friendship of September 14th, 1933"
1941 6 October SS Kurtuluş starts carrying first Turkish aid to Greece to alleviate the Great Famine during the Axis occupation of Greece.
1942 11 November Turkey enacts Varlık Vergisi.
1947 10 February Despite Turkish objections, the victorious powers of World War II transfer the Dodecanese islands to Greece, through the Treaty of Peace with Italy.
15 September Greece takes over sovereignty of the Dodecanese islands.
1950 Greece and Turkey both fight at the Korean War at the side of the UN forces.
1952 18 February Greece and Turkey both join NATO.
1955 6–7 September Istanbul pogrom against the Greek population of Istanbul.
1971 The Halki Seminary, the only school where the Greek minority in Turkey used to educate its clergymen, is closed by Turkish authorities.
1974 15 July Greek Junta sponsored coup overthrows Makarios in Cyprus.
20 July – 18 August Turkish invasion of Cyprus
1987 27 March 1987 Aegean crisis brought both countries very close to war.
30 March End of 1987 Aegean crisis.
1994 7 March Greek Government declares May 19 as a day of remembrance of the (1914–1923) Genocide of Pontic Greeks.[96]
1995 26 December Imia (in Greek) / Kardak (in Turkish) crisis brought the two countries to the brink of war.
1996 31 January End of Imia/Kardak crisis.
1997 5 January Cyprus announces purchase of Russian-made surface-to-air missiles, starting Cyprus Missile Crisis.
1998 December The missiles are instead positioned in Greece, ending the Cyprus Missile Crisis.
1999 Relations between Greek officials and Abdullah Öcalan (Kurdish rebel leader) and the role of Greek Embassy in Nairobi International Airport Kenya when he captured in an operation by MİT (National Intelligence Organization) caused crisis in relations between two countries for a period of time.
2001 21 September Greek Government declares September 14 as a "day of remembrance of the Genocide of the Hellenes of Asia Minor by the Turkish state".[96]
2004 Turkey reconfirmed a "casus belli" if Greece expands its territorial waters to 12 nm as the recent international treaty on the Law of the Sea and the international law allow. Turkey expanded its territorial waters to 12 nm only in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece hasn't yet expanded its territorial waters in the Aegean, an act which according to some would exacerbate the Greco-Turkish problems in the Aegean (such as the continental shelf and airspace disputes).
2005 12 April Greece and Turkey have agreed to establish direct communications between the headquarters of the Air Forces of the two countries in an effort to defuse tension over mutual allegations of air space violations over the Aegean.

Further reading[edit]
Aydin, Mustafa and Kostas Ifantis (editors) (2004). Turkish-Greek Relations: Escaping from the Security Dilemma in the Aegean. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-50191-7.
Bahcheli, Tozun (1987). Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-7235-6.
Brewer, David (2003). The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from the Ottoman Oppression and the Birth of the Modern Greek Nation. Overlook Press. ISBN 978-1-84511-504-3.
Keridis, Dimitris et al. (editors) (2001). Greek-Turkish Relations: In the Era of Globalization. Brassey's Inc. ISBN 1-57488-312-7.
Ker-Lindsay, James (2007). Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-504-3.
Kinross, Patrick (2003). Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation. Phoenix Press. ISBN 1-84212-599-0.
Smith, Michael L. (1999). Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-08569-7.
See also[edit]

Greece portal
Turkey portal
International relations portal
History of Greece
History of Turkey
History of Cyprus
Hellenoturkism
Foreign relations of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Northern Cyprus
Accession of Turkey to the European Union
Intermediate Region
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Jump up^ "Tension between Turkey, Greece flares up with row over genocide, Sümela". hurriyetdailynews.
Jump up^ "Erdogan: Turkey gave away Aegean islands in 1923". naftemporiki.
Jump up^ "Erdogan disputes Treaty of Lausanne, prompting response from Athens". ekathimerini.
Jump up^ "Erdogan's talk of 'kinsmen' in Thrace raises concerns in Greece". ekathimerini.
Jump up^ Bozkurt, Abdullah (27 March 2017). "My sources are telling me #Turkey intel has escalated clandestine ops in #Greece, raising the number of operatives. Plotting something?". Retrieved 6 January 2018.
Jump up^ "Turkish FM disputes Lausanne Treaty". ekathimerini.
Jump up^ "Conservative group demands removal of statue of Ancient Greek philosopher in Turkey's Sinop". Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved 6 January 2018.
Jump up^ No Turkish President Had Gone to Greece in 65 Years. So Why Now?
Jump up^ "CHP head slams Greek defense minister, vows to take back 18 islands 'occupied by Greece' in 2019". Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved 6 January 2018.
Jump up^ ""Greece should not test our patience" - Turkish opposition party - Ahval". Retrieved 6 January 2018.
Jump up^ "Εντατικοποιούνται οι περιπολίες στο Αιγαίο". naftemporiki.
Jump up^ "Reports of commandos in Aegean put Athens on alert". ekathimerini.
Jump up^ "Interior Ministry refutes 'hijacked coastguard vessels' reports". hurriyetdailynews.
Jump up^ "Turkish FM: Military attaches in Athens have fled to Italy". naftemporiki.
Jump up^ "Statement about Turkish attaches brings Greek relief". kathimerini.
Jump up^ "Seven Turkish citizens seek asylum in Greece after coup bid". hurriyet.
Jump up^ "Seven Turkish citizens requesting asylum in Greece". ekathimerini.
Jump up^ "Turkish judge escapes to Greece on migrant boat, seeks asylum". hurriyet.
Jump up^ "Media report: Turkish judicial official requests asylum in Greece". naftemporiki.
Jump up^ "Turkish judicial official requests asylum on Greek island". ekathimerini.
Jump up^ "Turkish judge seeks asylum in Greece: news agency". reuters.
Jump up^ "Greek media say Turkish boat group sought asylum".
Jump up^ "Greece Rejects Asylum Requests by Three Turkish Officers".
Jump up^ "More Turks Seek Asylum in Greece After Coup Attempt".
Jump up^ "Another 2 Turkish servicemen request asylum; names reportedly match fugitives sought for raid against Erdogan". Naftemporiki. 23 February 2017.
Jump up^ "Turkish commandos ask for asylum". kathimerini. 23 February 2017.
Jump up^ "New evidences for Turkish military officials being sent back to Erdogan". tovima. 8 August 2017.
Jump up^ "995 Turks seek asylum in Greece". Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved 6 January 2018.
Jump up^ "Seventeen Turkish citizens seek sanctuary in Greece: Greek coastguard". Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved 21 February 2018.
^ Jump up to:a b Bölükbasi, Deniz (2004-05-17). Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes. Routledge-Cavendish. p. 62. ISBN 0-275-96533-3.
External links[edit]
Turkish PM on landmark Greek trip
Greece-Turkey boundary study by Florida State University, College of Law
Greece's Shifting Position on Turkish Accession to the EU Before and After Helsinki (1999)
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the relations with Greece
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the relations with Turkey