The Korean Peninsula within the Framework of US Global Hegemony | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

The Korean Peninsula within the Framework of US Global Hegemony | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus





The Korean Peninsula within the Framework of US Global Hegemony
Tim Beal
November 15, 2016
Volume 14 | Issue 22 | Number 1
Article ID 4980





On 8 July 2016 it was announced in Seoul that the US would, as had long been anticipated, deploy an initial unit of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.1 The announcement was made at a press conference hosted by the South Korean Deputy Minister of Defense Ryu Je-seung and the Chief of Staff of US Forces in Korea (USFK) who has the significant, if unfortunate, name of General Vandal. The decision did not attract much attention in the international media being overshadowed by the Brexit drama in Europe, shootings and electioneering in the US, and Obama’s last NATO summit in Warsaw.




General Thomas Vandal, the Chief of Staff for the US Forces in Korea and South Korea’s Deputy Minister Of Defense Ryu Je-seung announce the decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea, at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul, July 8. (Yonhap News)


The limited coverage however was definitely ‘on message’:
US and South Korea agree THAAD missile defence deployment (BBC)2
South Korea and US agree to deploy THAAD missile defence system (Guardian)3
Pentagon to deploy anti-missile system in South Korea (Washington Post)4
South Korea and US Agree to Deploy Missile Defense System (New York Times)5

It was Reuters which delivered the whole message in the headline:


South Korea, US Agree to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense to Counter North Korea Threat6

So, the message goes, we have two equal allies--South Korea and the US (and that is often the order in which they are given) --who after much deliberation are stationing this segment of Missile Defense precisely to defend South Korea against a belligerent North Korea. It must be admitted that China7 and Russia8 are making a bit of a fuss although it has been patiently explained many times that the sole purpose of THAAD was, as Minister Yoo reiterated at the press conference “to guarantee the security of [South Korea] and its people from the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles” and is “not aimed at a third country"9. Indeed, Jane Perlez suggested in the New York Times, China was peeved because the deployment show that despite its attempts to woo Seoul ‘Ms. Park’s government showed that it was embracing its alliance with Washington more than ever, and that it would rely less on China to keep North Korea and its nuclear arsenal at bay.’10

However, a little burrowing beneath the surface reveals that the reality is very different from the official US and South Korean government line so assiduously reported by the media.

There are, for a start, serious doubts amongst experts that THAAD would in fact be effective against North Korean missiles. Even those in the military-industrial-security complex such as Michael Elleman formerly of the US Department of Defense and now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) who is, by profession, ‘pro-THAAD’ cautions that it would not offer complete protection.


Adding THAAD to missile-defense deployments that already include Patriot systems would likely substantially enhance South Korea’s capacity to minimize the damage caused by a large North Korean missile attack. However, it is important to note that a layered defense will not be able to completely block such an attack. As a result, missiles armed with nuclear weapons could cause significant casualties as well as damage in the South.11

A similar point is made by Garth McLennan, who refers to the technique of haystacking where a large number of missiles are fired, only a few of which have nuclear warheads (because they are in short supply). The nuclear component then becomes a needle in a haystack:


THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads.12

A more trenchant, and independent critic, is Theodore Postol, emeritus professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) who is frequently cited by the liberal Seoul newspaper Hankyoreh.13 Postol argues that North Korea could make its missiles tumble or fragment in flight in order to confuse THAAD and hence penetrate defences.14

There appears to be a consensus amongst experts that despite claims by the South Korean Defense Minister a single THAAD unit would be ineffective against Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMS) because it only has a 120 degrees azimuth, or window, and since SLBMs can be launched from any direction it would be necessary to have at least three to cover the whole 360 degrees.15




THAAD on the Korean peninsula, used for detecting Chinese ICBM (hypothetical)16


Then there is the question of where the THAAD unit would be stationed. The right wing Chosun Ilbo has expressed concern that it would be positioned to protect US bases, rather than Seoul.17

Postol concludes, in a lengthy technical presentation given at Harvard, that “The claim that the US is aiming its missile defense at North Korea is simply nonsense.”18

If THAAD offers little or no protection against North Korea’s missiles, why the deployment? The answer lies in THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar system which can penetrate deep into China, and Russia.19 Postol explains:


The Chinese are concerned about the THAAD radar because it was designed from its beginning to provide cuing information to the US National Missile Defense. The placement of a THAAD radar in South Korea has the unambiguous technical appearance of placing the radar in a location where it can provide track information on Chinese ICBMs before they rise over the curved earth-horizon and can be seen by the main radars of the US National Missile Defense in Alaska...

South Korea will get no military benefit from the THAAD defense system, and China will consider the radar‘s deployment to South Korea as a hostile act by South Korea against China. It therefore has a significant negative impact on South Korean/Chinese relations, with essentially no real benefit to South Korea.20

Russia has warned that it ‘could deploy missile bases to its Far East region that would be within reach of THAAD bases in South Korea’.21

China has gone further in an editorial in the authoritative Communist Party newspaper Global Times, which outlined a number of measures in response to the THAAD deployment:

We recommend China to take the following countermeasures.
China should cut off economic ties with companies involved with the system and ban their products from entering the Chinese market.
It could also implement sanctions on politicians who advocated the deployment, ban their entry into China as well as their family business.
In addition, the Chinese military could come up with a solution that minimizes the threat posed by the system, such as technical disturbances and targeting missiles toward the THAAD system.
Meanwhile, China should also re-evaluate the long-term impact in Northeast Asia of the sanctions on North Korea, concerning the link between the sanctions and the imbalance after the THAAD system is deployed.
China can also consider the possibility of joint actions with Russia with countermeasures. 22

The enormous implications of these measures are obvious. For one thing it seems likely that the deployment, combined with US containment of China in the South China Sea, will reinforce Chinese rethinking of its conciliatory policy over the Korean issue.

In South Korea there have been serious concerns raised about the commercial impact of the response from China, its major economic partner. The Korea Times, in an article entitled ‘Businesses fear backlash from China’ reported:


Company officials and analysts expressed concern that THAAD may stoke anti-Korean sentiment in the neighboring country.

They also said business ties with China could worsen, heightening uncertainties about the Korean economy.

"The THAAD issue is more about politics and diplomacy, but it could hurt Chinese consumer sentiment about Korean products," Hyundai Securities analyst Kwak Byeong-yeol said.

Company officials expressed worries over retaliatory actions such as higher tariffs and stricter rules on some Korean products manufactured in China.23

South Korean companies exporting to, or producing in China, would not be the only casualties. There is also tourism. The Hankyoreh noted that


What the South Korean government and business are most concerned about in connection with the THAAD debate are economic sanctions. China is by far South Korea’s number one export market, accounting for 26% of exports as of 2015 - a figure that rises to 31.8% if Hong Kong (5.8%) is included.

Last year, 45% (6 million) of foreign visitors to South Korea were Chinese, and they are lavish consumers, spending five times more than the average foreign tourist’s expenditures (US$400). Chinese investors hold 17.5 trillion won (US$15.22 billion, 18.1%) in government bonds and other publicly traded securities in South Korea, more than any other country. Furthermore, around 23,000 South Korean companies were doing business in China as of 2013. Sanctions from China would deliver a body blow to the South Korean economy.24

So we have a situation where the South Korea government has, it claims, willingly agreed to the deployment of a weapon system which will afford it little or no protection against North Korea, but will exacerbate North-South tensions which are already at highest level in decades.25 THAAD will inevitably increase the danger of South Korea being a target of Chinese and Russia counterattack in the case of war.26 And in the meanwhile it is producing the likelihood of substantial damage to the South Korean economy as the relationship with China and Russia sours.27

The United States is inflaming the situation on the Korean peninsula, and worldwide. THAAD is clearly one part of a larger pattern. Obama at the NATO summit in Warsaw 8 July confirmed ‘Russia as implacable enemy No. 1, while Defense Secretary Carter’s recent campaign to up the military ante in the western Pacific casts China as a close No. 2.’28 At the same time Abe Shinzo, with another electoral victory under his belt continues his inexorable journey towards revision or ‘reinterpretation’ of the Japanese ‘peace constitution’ and the remilitarisation of Japan. 29 How do we explain the hysteria and the war-mongering? And, in the case of South Korea, the self-harm?




Choi Sun-sil depicted as a Shaman


A framework for analysis with the US at its core

In order to make sense of this and, lay the foundation for activism, as appropriate, we must contextualise and establish a framework for analysis. The starting point for this framework is that we must look in the right direction. Most writing and discussion on Korean peninsula issues focuses almost exclusively on North Korea. We are told of the North Korea problem, the North Korea threat, how North Korea, or the Kim family, is mad, bad, unpredictable, and so forth. The clue is to look at phrases such as the “Vietnam War”, the “Korean War”, “invasion of Afghanistan”, “invasion of Iraq”, and work out what they have in common; or rather what is left out that they have in common. The answer of course is the United States. The US is the common denominator.

No doubt some wise person thousands of years ago pointed out that we will not see the mountain, however high it may be, if we are looking in the wrong direction. And the American mountain is very high indeed. The US is the global colossus. It is the world’s major economy (although now overtaken in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms by China) and one relevant consequence of that has been its fondness for economic warfare. Physical sanctions may devastate a target economy without impinging on the far larger American one. The US had an embargo against China for 25 years without American business protesting; mind you they didn’t realise what they were missing out on. Sanctions on North Korea have been in place for some 70 years, with no apparent protest from American business. The US dominance in the international business and banking architecture makes financial sanctions very appealing; again they cause great damage without much cost to the US. 30American economic might means there is plenty of cash to buy friends and influence people. General David Petraeus claimed that ‘money is my most important ammunition in this [Iraq] war’ and this insight led to a US Army manual entitled Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System.31 Vicky Nuland’s boast, in December 2013, just before the coup in the Ukraine, that they had ‘invested’ $5 billion in the Ukraine is one example; then there are all the stories of CIA operatives sashaying through Afghanistan and Iraq with dollars, not in fistfuls but in suitcases. 32

The US is uniquely blessed by nature, with extensive agricultural and mineral resources meaning it cannot be blockaded into submission, however strong a future enemy might be. It is protected by vast oceans east and west and bordered by small, non-threatening countries north and south and surrounded by a huge network of overseas bases.33 Despite this geographical invulnerability, the US spends on its military nearly as much as the rest of the world put together. If one adds to its military budget that of its ‘allies’ and compares that to the military wherewithal of potential adversaries the disproportion is staggering. At a rough calculation using data from the latest Military Balance assessment from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the military expenditure of US and its ‘allies’ is about $1 trillion a year. 34They outspend China seven times, Russia 15 times and North Korea somewhere between 100 times and, if one accepts the estimate of Pyongyang’s military budget made by the director of the South Korean Defence Intelligence Agency back in 2013, 1000 times.35

The United States also has immense Soft Power which includes diplomatic power and its domination of the global intellectual space which are linked together, the one feeding off the other.

The US has immense diplomatic power. Hence for instance all those dubious UN Security Council resolutions censuring North Korea, and violating the sovereignty of Libya, Yugoslavia, Iraq, or Iran.36 The US is able to bully, cajole or perhaps just instruct permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC to commit egregious violations of the UN Charter, damaging its enemies and protecting its friends, such as Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and of course itself. Again its power is not absolute, but it is extraordinary.

The official US narrative not merely fashions Western media and academia but also much of that in Russia and China. If you look at Russian or Chinese media, in English at least, you will see that unless national interests are directly challenged – in Ukraine and Eastern Europe for the Russians and the South China Sea for the Chinese, the default position is to accept uncritically what the Western news agencies, and hence Western officials, portray. This, needless to say, only works one way. No Western newspaper would ever regurgitate a statement from Tass or Xinhua without inserting it in a political envelope telling the reader not to believe it.

As a result of this domination of the international intellectual space no one seems to blink when the US, with its thousand nuclear tests, fulminates against North Korea’s five, or with its myriad nuclear and conventional missiles, bombers, fighters, aircraft carriers, and submarines claims that it is being threatened by North Korea with its very limited and uncertain ability to project power far beyond its borders. This goes beyond hypocrisy and double standards into the construction of a special sort of unreality.

Of all countries in the world North Korea alone has been censured by the UNSC for launching satellites, and that on the strange ground that they utilised ballistic missile technology. Strange because not merely are all satellites launched by ballistic rockets, but ballistic missiles are not themselves illegal.37 How could they be when the US has so many of them?

There are various bilateral and multilateral agreements by which the US attempts to fortify its hegemony by managing the utilisation of missiles by other countries – there is, for instance, the limitation it has imposed on South Korean missiles (they don’t want Seoul attacking China without permission) but missiles per se are not prohibited Similarly for nuclear tests and weapons. There are various ‘voluntary’ agreements – the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty – but these are different in nature from, for instance, the prohibition on invading other countries which is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.38 In this regard the construction of North Korea as an international pariah is an expression of American power rather than, as is usually claimed, a result of the infringement of international law. In fact, the discriminatory charges against North Korea are themselves a violation of the norms of international law and the equal sovereignty of states.

American power means that nothing much happens in the world without the US being involved although that is frequently hidden. Sometimes it is the dominant actor, sometimes just an endorser, but the US is always there. This does not mean that the US is omnipotent. Indeed it is intriguing the way that clients sometimes have surprising leverage against the US One thinks of Syngman Rhee in South Korea the 1950s, or more recently Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. These are people who were installed by the US, had not much popular support and many domestic enemies, but nevertheless at times could disobey orders quite flagrantly. The client/master relationship is constantly being negotiated and is complex. However, if push comes to shove the master prevails, as Rhee found out in 1960.

Deciphering US global strategy

So, in analysing world affairs the starting point must be the US What does America want? That, needless to say, often bears little connection with what it proclaims as its objective. Analysis must be hard-nosed looking beyond the spin and rhetoric, focussing on actions and seeking real explanations. When we have some idea of America’s position we can start looking at the other players, in descending order of importance. For most countries, most of the time, the United States is their major strategic partner-cum-adversary. They tend to tailor their policy in relation to third countries in the light of their political relationship with the United States. However for many countries, and South Korea is by no means alone, there is the dilemma of reconciling the economic importance of China with the relationship with the US.39 At the same time we must presume that Washington has a global grand strategy (however incoherent and subject to various factions that may be) and that this strategy prioritises and subordinates the part to the whole.




US Vice President Joe Biden clasps hands with President Park Geun-hye at the Blue House before Biden signs the visitor’s book, Dec. 6. (Blue House photo pool)40


The failure to put the US at the core of geopolitical analysis is a fundamental reason why so much writing on the Korean peninsula is usually off the mark. We have innumerable websites and NGOs, books and articles focusing on North Korea, often with little attention paid to the US, other than considering what effect North Korea, and often ‘the North Korean threat’ has on America. Looking in the wrong direction, asking the wrong questions, they get misleading or meaningless answers. Associated with this, and arguably a result of it, is the fact that virtually all the experts, all the pundits we hear from are, to use Perry Anderson’s term ‘state functionaries’. 41He was talking about American experts on China but the same term can be applied to American experts on Korea, and much the same holds for experts from Britain, Russia, and China. Most of these experts either currently work for the US government or have in the past – in the CIA, Defence, or State usually. If they are former employees they now work for think tanks or NGOs which are, to put it politely, state-aligned. Even academics are constrained by the desire for research funding. There are very few neutral, dispassionate, disinterested (in the proper meaning of the term) voices. One simpler indicator is that virtually all of them express horror at the idea of North Korea having nuclear weapons but few have any qualms about the US and its arsenal. They tend to view the prospect of the US attacking North Korea with moral equanimity. There are, of course, honourable exceptions. Donald Gregg, former CIA operative and George H. Bush’s ambassador to South Korea has become a leading advocate of engagement, as well as offering a critical perspective on US policy.42 James Hoare, the British diplomat (and Korean scholar) who opened the British mission in Pyongyang.43 Robert Carlin, with a background in the CIA and State Department, who offers such interesting insights into US negotiations with North Korea.44

The Korean peninsula in US strategy

Why is the US interested in the Korean peninsula? The answer is location. Korea is the most valuable piece of geopolitical real estate in the world. It is the nexus where most of the great powers meet and contend. China and Russia share a land border with Korea, Japan is separated by a small sea, and although the Pacific is a large ocean it is also ‘the American lake’. None of these powers want a unified Korea subservient to any of the others and since the US is by far the most powerful it has the most pro-active policy. The US is also different in that it alone, at the moment, has aspirations for global hegemony. This means keeping Japan subservient, and containing China and Russia with the longer term aim of fragmenting them so that they are no longer competitors. It is easy to see how Korea fits in with these strategic objectives. As a physical location it provides bases adjacent to China and Russia and whilst the number of troops permanently deployed in South Korea is small, one of the functions of the joint exercises with the ROK is to practice the rapid influx of massive reinforcements. Japan fulfils the same role.

As an aside it might be noted that Korea also provides a base for keeping an eye on Japan. Whilst the US has been an enthusiastic supporter of Japanese remilitarisation, thinking in terms of the containment of China, it is possible this may change. A remilitarised Japan (and it should be remembered that Japan has the expertise to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems that might well be superior to China’s), made a ‘normal’ country again, may want to assert its independence from the US. As Palmerston remarked, back in the nineteenth century, countries don’t have perpetual friends and enemies, merely perpetual interests.45

In the meantime Japan remains America’s main asset in East Asia and an important aspect of the US presence in the southern part of the Korean peninsula, dating from 1945, is its function as a bulwark protecting Japan from any military threat from the Asian mainland. In 1945 that meant the Soviet Union but as time passed China has been perceived as the bigger threat. However the military facet is less important than the political one. The US has to be concerned that Japan does not become too friendly with its Asian neighbours, South Korea and Taiwan being obvious, but ultimately perhaps partial, exceptions. This concern was well illustrated by the ‘Dulles Warning’ of 1956 when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, alarmed at peace treaty negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union, threatened that the US would not relinquish Okinawa if Japan went ahead by agreeing to a Soviet proposal for a compromise solution to the territorial dispute (Kurils/Northern Territories) between the two countries. Dulles was also worried that if Japan concluded a peace treaty with the Soviet Union this might lead to a normalisation of relations with China.46 Dulles got his way and relations between Japan and Russia are still bedevilled by territorial disputes, as are Japan’s relations with China.47 Fears that Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002 might lead to a rapprochement with North Korea may have been the trigger that led to the Bush administration’s abrogation of the Agreed Framework.48 Japan is the jewel in America’s East Asian crown, but the Korean peninsula has been regarded as essential to its protection.

The Korean peninsula not merely provides the US with physical bases for its military; it provides access to a huge reservoir of Korean military assets. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies( IISS) report, Military Balance 2016, South Korea has a total troop complement – that is the combination of service personnel and reserves – of about 5.1 million. For comparison this is 2.6 times as much as that of North Korea’s ostensible 2 million, considerably more than America’s 2.2 million and quite a bit more than China’s 3.5 million.49 As an aside it might be noted that South Korean scholars using census data estimate the North Korean armed forces at about 700,000.50 In addition, it is claimed that 400,000 are engaged full time in construction. 51 Which leaves about 300,000 for ordinary soldiering, rather less that the IISS estimate of 1.19 million.

Because of interoperability, these South Korean troops can fight alongside America, under American command, but probably can’t operate on their own in a major war. The Joint military exercises such as Key Resolve, Foal Eagle and Ssang Yong are described as defensive to deter North Korean aggression. Given North Korea’s incredible military inferiority against the US-led forces this is obviously a pretext. The exercises practise more than the invasion of the North. The Chosun Ilbo which, like Donald Trump sometimes blurts out an inconvenient truth, recently made this comment about the exercises:


The underlying aim is to bring South Korea, Australia, Japan and the US closer together to thwart China's military expansion in the Pacific.52

When the United States looks at Korea, it sees China.




The 20th CBRNE Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives) is participating in Exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian in South Korea, Aug. 17 - 28. (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Antwaun J. Parrish, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)53


So it is clear that for the Unites States the Korean peninsula is hugely important. This is partly in its own right – its 75 million people put it on a par with Germany or France. However its main significance to the US is that it is a strategic asset in its confrontation with China, and to a lesser extent, Russia. If the peninsula could be detached from the Asian mainland, towed down to the South Pacific and parked near New Zealand, then the US would be far less interested. We would not have had the division of Korea, the war, or the militarisation of the peninsula and of Japan.54

All this means that the US’s North Korea policy, and hence its South Korea policy, must be seen within the context of its struggle with China, and Russia. In 1945 when the US had the peninsula divided its main concern was the Soviet Union. At that time the US ‘owned’ China, through Chiang Kai-shek. This changed over time and now China is the major component in its East Asia strategy. However Russia should not be overlooked. The US is a global power, and Russia straddles Europe and Asia, and although it is the European face of Russia which concerns the US, it is its Asian side which is most vulnerable.

To recap, the US’s Korea strategy is a component of its global strategy, and China is the major focus of that, with Russia coming in behind. North Korea is important because of the role it has in that strategy; it is not really important in itself. So, if for instance, the US decided that good relations with North Korea would better serve its containment of China than the present hostility – by no means a foolish idea – then its Korea policy would change, whatever the screams in Seoul.

US North Korea policy

What, then, is the US’s North Korea policy? Most people, left or right, find that easy to answer. It sees North Korea’s nuclear programme threatening and its focus is the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The reality is not quite so straightforward. For one thing US hostility long preceded North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. More important and telling is the fact that there has never been a serious, bipartisan, and sustained attempt to negotiate with Pyongyang on the issue. There was, indeed, the Agreed Framework of 1994 but that was sabotaged by the Republicans while out of the White House, and torn up by them, by George W Bush, when they did hold the presidency. Bush did go through the motions of negotiating for some years, but despite North Korean gestures such as blowing up the cooling tower of its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in 2008, these came to naught. Obama, under the rubric of ‘strategic patience’ has refused to negotiate. To some extent this history can be ascribed to infighting within the power elite, and between government agencies; for instance Treasury’s actions against Banca Delta Asia which scuttled the negotiations for some time. American governments are also reluctant to negotiate with adversaries because negotiation implies compromise, thus exposing themselves to charges of being soft and unpatriotic by opponents – Trump, Cruz, Rubio, et al. However, underlying this is a fundamental strategic dilemma.

Some argue that the US could easily negotiate a deal by offering a grand bargain where it guaranteed North Korea’s security with perhaps the concession of allowing Pyongyang to retain its present, probably inoperable and certainly tiny, nuclear deterrent. Sig Hecker’s ‘The Three No’s’ is an example of this – ‘no new weapons, no better weapons, no transfer of nuclear technology.’ 55 With Libya in mind, let alone the abrogation of the Agreed Framework, it is difficult to see how the US could offer credible guarantees, even if it wanted to. But it is scarcely likely that it wants to. North Korea’s major threat to the US is not its nuclear weapons but its proposal for a peace treaty. If North Korea, by developing a nuclear deterrent, by building a formidable, but primarily defensive, military, by refusing to buckle down under sanctions and having the temerity to launch satellites – if North Korea by doing all this is able to force the US into accepting peaceful coexistence then its example might be followed by others. The one thing empires detest above all else is independence; that and its brother, rebellion. It was for this crime that the Roman Empire reserved crucifixion. 56North Korea’s success would also have implications for China and Russia in their struggle with the US

Having said that, the US would probably negotiate if it were genuinely concerned that North Korea’s nuclear weapons presented a serious threat. It seems that despite the posturing, they do not. Firstly it is a deterrent, not an offensive weapon, so if North Korea is not attacked then it does not come into play. Barring accidents, the initiative lies with Washington. Secondly, there is no evidence that North Korea can actually deliver a nuclear weapon, certainly not to substantial US territory. This may change; miniaturization may proceed beyond photo opportunities, and an ICBM may someday be tested. Thirdly, the US, bolstered by its allies, has overwhelming military superiority. For the moment there is no pressing need to negotiate.

This brings us back to China policy. If the US did negotiate a peace treaty, or if it were able to invade and conquer North Korea and extend Seoul’s administration up towards the Yalu (under an American general of course) without provoking a Chinese intervention, what would this do to its China policy? If China did intervene then we would have a second Sino-American war, with all that might entail. But leaving aside that possibility and just considering the implications of a peaceful Korean peninsula we immediately see problems in justifying the US military presence, and missile defences. How would the US keep South Korea cooperating with the containment of China at great cost to itself without a North Korean threat? 57

It seems that the present situation of managed tension serves US policy towards China (and towards Russia) very well. Going to war to remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons would be perilous, negotiating them away by accepting peaceful coexistence might be even more problematic for US global interests should other small countries follow North Korea’s example.

China and Russia – shared predicaments, common strategies

There are considerable differences between China and Russia but the most relevant in this context is the huge economic interpenetration of the Chinese and US economies. The US, and in particular Hillary Clinton appear to contemplate the economic consequences of war with Russia with so little concern that it seems never to be mentioned.58 China is different. It is plausibly argued that for various geo-economic and geopolitical reasons China would suffer much more than the US in the event of war. Much of US trade would be impervious to Chinese action while Chinese trade, especially imports of oil, are vulnerable to US interdiction.59 These are the strategic reasons behind China’s drive to develop rail and road links across Eurasia; the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to provide a more secure gateway for Middle East Oil, and rail links to the European market.60 They also underlay America’s interest in the South China Sea.61

Whilst economic considerations may be a restraint, especially in respect of China, it would be foolish to lay too much hope on economic rationality. Norma Angell famously argued in The Great Illusion that the consequences of ripping up the economic interdependence that by then existed between states made war obsolete. That book was published in 1910, on the eve of the Great War’.62

Despite their differences what China and Russia have in common is more relevant in this context. Both are competitors to the Unites States and so both are targets of US global strategy. In addition, both are resurgent states. Russia is recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Yeltsin years, and China from the 19th century meltdown of the Qing dynasty. Other things being equal, this means that both are getting stronger relative to the US, but both are currently very much weaker, Russia of course more than China.63 But the shift in relative power means that the US has an incentive to go to war earlier rather than later, while for China and Russia the longer they can delay any such clash the better. This in itself does not mean that the US will attack either of them, although there is plenty of conjecture from all quarters on that. However, current weakness combined with the likelihood of greater security in the future, as the balance of military power moves against the US does present both China and Russia with a shared predicament.64 How do they cope with an America in relative decline, but which is still very strong, has a history of aggressiveness and, the current presidential campaign suggests, may be more adventurist in the future.65

This surely is no easy matter. It requires cool and calm judgement in balancing the need to be firm on core issues while giving the United States neither cause nor pretext to attack on more peripheral ones. But what is core and what is peripheral? And where does Korea fit in?

It is often said that the Korean peninsula is the most likely place for conflict between the United States and China (though the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea are also candidates). For Russia it is more likely to be Eastern Europe or Syria, but a war in Korea would involve Russia to some degree. It is also the place where Russia is most vulnerable. Whilst the US keeps a pretty firm grip on South Korea (it does have wartime control of its military for example66) China has little leverage over North Korea and Russia even less. So while the US can ratchet tension up and down as it requires, neither China nor Russia have much control over Korean events; an unenviable strategic position to be in.67

However, whilst recognising the dilemma they face it can be argued that they have erred on the side of timidity, even perhaps appeasement, especially in relation to the UN Security Council. They were both complicit in voting for UNSC resolutions censuring North Korea for actions which were quite legal such as attempting to launch a satellite.68 They have done this on other occasions; Libya comes to mind, but they seem to have learnt a lesson from that and have stood firmer on the issue of Syria. UNSC resolutions against North Korea stretch back to 1950, when unfortunately the Soviet Union absented itself and was not in a position to utilise its veto to defeat the US’s resolution to go to war in Korea, but the modern series of resolutions date from an attempted satellite launch in 2006.69 Once having accepted that a satellite launch by North Korea was sui generis and uniquely a violation of the UN Charter they have been on a slippery slope with no way back.

The word ‘appeasement’ is often used loosely in order to condemn compromises which are the natural consequence of negotiations between adversaries of some degree of equality. Country A makes a demand of country B. If country B complies will that be the end of the matter; indeed will A reciprocate with a gesture of good faith? If so, well and good. However, if country A’s demands are really stepping stones on the way to an objective – perhaps the enfeeblement or destruction of B – then giving way only whets its appetite.

The problem for China is that America’s North Korea policy is really aimed at it itself. As Kim Ji-suk puts it ’Even when the US points at North Korea, we should understand that it is really aiming at China’.70 This means that concession does not solve the problem, but probably exacerbates it. The same, with obvious differences, applies to Russia.

It might be argued that China, and Russia, have followed a strategy in the UNSC of conciliation rather than confrontation. Given that the present composition of the Council automatically favours the United States they would have either been defeated or forced to use the veto which both, though China more than Russia, have been loath to do. Instead they have negotiated a softening of the resolutions and then not implemented them vigorously. 71 This has not been a wise strategy because it means they are constantly on the defensive. North Korea will remain intransigent, because it has no choice, and the US will continue its pressure. Putin’s response to the US-assisted coup in Ukraine and the US-assisted crisis in Syria offers lessons. Nimble footwork and countermeasures, a judicious amount of military intervention, both in quantity and duration, while at the same time restraining criticism of America with plenty of face-saving gestures.72 Even so it is reported that he is coming under pressure to take a firmer stand against the US.73

China, supported by Russia, calls for the resurrection of the Six Party Talks as a solution to the problem. 74 However, the Six Party Talks are probably dead, partly because as explained above the US has little interest in negotiating with North Korea but also because the Obama administration concluded that Bush had made a strategic mistake in agreeing to them in the first place. Allowing China, your main competitor, to chair and host the major security forum in East Asia while you, and your allies Japan and South Korea, sit on the second tier with North Korea and Russia was not a smart move. The US can go in either of two directions. One is to expand the number of countries in the talks to dilute China’s role.75 The other direction is the bilateral one, which has been much discussed over the years.76

China’s contortions, and those of Russia, have been painful to watch. They have condemned North Korea for its violations of the UNSC resolutions forbidding satellite launches and nuclear tests, but they are partly responsible for the resolutions in the first place. They are also partly responsible for the nuclear tests. The United States does provide security and a nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Because it is a master-client relationship it has been able to prevent the South developing nuclear weapons in the past, during Park Chung-Hee’s time, and will surely do so in the future despite Trump’s comments during the election campaign.77 Neither China nor Russia provides real security assurances, or a nuclear umbrella, to North Korea, so they can scarcely be surprised if it attempts to look after itself. To be fair, the United States is far superior in military terms and they perhaps cannot be expected to match America’s muscular approach. This leaves China in particular in a vulnerable, defensive position where the initiative is in America’s hands. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has warned that “As the largest neighbour of the peninsula, China will not sit by and see a fundamental disruption to stability [there], and will not sit by and see unwarranted damages to China’s security interests.” 78.

But what does this mean in practice? Is he saying that if the US does invade North Korea, China will intervene? If so, surely it would be wise for China to be more explicit. It should be recalled that in 1950, with no direct communication with the US, China conveyed a message through Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar that it would intervene if US forces invaded the North and moved towards the Yalu. Washington did not hear, did not listen, or just ignored that warning.79 The first Sino-American War ensued. Will history repeat itself for a lack of a clear understanding of the consequences of invasion?

If, however, the U S decides that now is the time to give resurgent China a bloody nose, explicit warnings will be irrelevant. Starting the conflict in Korea would give the US signal advantages, not available elsewhere. It would automatically bring in the formidable South Korean military, with the world’s largest reservoir of military manpower. It would certainly utilise Japan, whose military budget is 25% higher that South Korea’s and whose air and seapower is reputedly superior to China’s.80

Japan – leveraging the Korean situation for remilitarisation

Japan’s position in all this is relatively straightforward. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party has long sought to remilitarise, to shed itself of the constraints of Article 9 of the ‘Peace Constitution’ imposed by the US after its defeat in 1945, and so become a ‘normal’ nation again. This process has accelerated under Abe Shinzo.81 It has used the Korean situation, and the perceived ‘North Korean threat,’ buttressed by a good dose of Japanese colonial racism as a pretext for remilitarisation.82 This has been supported by the US, not in respect of North Korea, where it is scarcely needed except as a place for bases, but as a bulwark against China.83 Japan’s recent eagerness to join in conflict on the Korean peninsula, however, has caused considerable anguish in Seoul.84 Fighting fellow Koreans under an American general is bad enough, but for South Korea soldiers to fight alongside Japanese troops would be a public relations disaster.

South Korea – the pivot which did not turn

When Lee Myung-bak’s term of office came to an end in 2013 it seem reasonable to suppose that whoever succeeded him there would be a shift in North Korea policy. His policy had been such a disaster that it seemed that the new president would move in some ways to correct things. Lee had increased the danger of war, and his sanctions had damaged the South Korean economy while pushing the North’s into the hands of China. Even on his own terms nothing had been achieved.

Whilst Park was less likely than a progressive to want to improve the relationship with the North she has a distinct advantage in being able to do so, if she wishes. Just as Nixon, with his anti-Communist reputation could go to Beijing and play the ‘China card’ against the Soviet Union without being accused of being ‘soft on Commies’ so too could Park, as the daughter of the late anti-Communist dictator, Park Chung Hee, engage Pyongyang in ways that the more liberal Moon Jae-in (her opponent in the 2012 presidential election) could not.

Back in 2011, before the election President Park published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled ‘A new kind of Korea: building trust between Seoul and Pyongyang’ where she talked about ‘Trustpolitik.’85 That, and the phrase ‘peaceful unification’ was often on her lips; a notable occasion being her speech in Dresden in 2014.86 She described unification as a ‘bonanza’ and described her dream, stolen in fact from Kim Dae-jung, of a Eurasian land bridge through the Koreas and Russia through to Western Europe. 87The words still live on. Yet her actions have always belied her words.

Obviously, if she had been serious about building trust she would have cancelled the May 24 Sanctions, have built economic and social links between South and North, and have at least attempted to curtail the joint military exercises88. She did none of those things. On the contrary, she has now done what Lee couldn’t do, and closed down the Kaesong industrial Park, and the current exercises are larger than ever. It is commonly agreed that she has brought inter-Korean relations to a nadir. The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents of 2010 were spurious but they did provide Lee with an alleged justification for his actions.89 Nothing comparable has happened during Park’s term of office. The things that did happen, and were seized upon by her to escalate tension with the North, related primarily not to South Korea but to the United States. Long range missile development and nuclear tests were a response to US policy and had little to do with South Korea in itself. The exception was the satellite launch programme which was in fact part of North-South competition. 90 But even this was construed, incorrectly, as the development of an ICBM aimed at the United States.91 And an ICBM, by definition, was not relevant to inter-Korean combat.

Park Geun-hye aside South Korea remains what might be called a ‘pivot state’. All the other actors in this drama, from the US through to North Korea, have their lines written for them. The United States is an empire and will do what empires do. It has many options within that characterisation but the general thrust is fairly ineluctable. Mao Zedong once said that we shouldn’t expect imperialism to put down its butcher’s knife and become a Buddha. Conceivably it could, but it won’t. North Korea is a vulnerable target state and will do what it can to defend itself, wisely or unwisely. It has few options and cannot avoid the role it has to play.

South Korea is different. Born as a client state of the US from the ruins of the Japanese empire it now has considerable economic and social strength. It has options. It can make choices. It can, at its most brutal, choose between putting Korea first or serving the US. Roh Moo-hyun, in a rather sad exchange with Kim Jong Il at their 2007 summit described how he was attempting to make gradual moves towards autonomy from the US. 92 He did not succeed but the challenge is still on the agenda.

Park Geun-hye’s administration has not been a happy or successful one. South Korea is beset with economic problems, due in part to encroaching Chinese competition. 93 It is reported that ‘Most Koreans Feel Economy Is in Crisis’.94 There is a general lack of manufacturing competitiveness against Japan and China.95 Key South Korean industries such as shipbuilding96, shipping97, automobiles98, and overseas construction99 are faltering, with some top companies going into receivership. Dreams of Seoul becoming an East Asian financial hub are fading.100 Samsung’s woes with its ‘exploding’ Galaxy Note 7 smartphone have captured headlines around the world but an editorial in the Chosun Ilbo suggested that the problems lie deep and are symptomatic of much of the South Korean economy – 3rd generation chaebols which cannot cope with competition from China, and a political class so entangled with them that it cannot seek solutions.

South Korea has social problems common to many countries – corruption, ageing society, lack of meaningful employment, nepotism, and limited social mobility.101 However the problems are felt to be so pressing and intractable that young people have coined a term for their country: ‘Hell Joseon’ (variously ‘Hell Chosun’ and ‘Hell Korea’).102

All countries tend to utilise foreign threat – real , imagined, or exaggerated- to divert attention from domestic problems but for South Korea this has been so inbuilt by historical circumstance that it is more part of the political fabric than is the case in most other places. Conservative politicians, and Park Geun-hye, is no exception are prone to use the ‘North Wind’ – the perceived threat from North Korea - both for electoral advantage and for diversion.

Under Park Geun-hye South Korea’s foreign relations have followed a distinct pattern, reminiscent of the Cold War and a definite regression since the days of Roh Moo-hyun’s attempt to position the country as a ‘balancer’.103 The relationship with North Korea is the worst it has been in decades. That with Japan is bedevilled by the ghost of Japanese colonialism, exemplified by the ‘comfort women’ issue, territorial disputes and lingering mutual antipathy. Park Geun-hye, under American pressure, has given into Japan over the comfort women issue.104 That, though galling, is mainly symbolic. More important she has antagonised China, and Russia, over the proposed deployment of THAAD missiles in South Korea. This is not a temporary irritant because THAAD is just a stage in the incorporation of South Korea into the US missile defense architecture, so the problem will not fade away, but rather grow.105 This in itself is important, but it is also a symbol of a deeper and continuing dilemma. The United States sees South Korea as a pawn in its struggle against China, and Russia. Pawns, as we know, sometimes survive but are often sacrificed.

The one country with whom relations have blossomed during her tenure in office is the United States, and therein lies the root of Park’s failure. She has shown herself willing to sacrifice the interests of Korea to those of the United States, with THAAD being the most prominent recent example.

Early revelations, with presumably more to come, on the role played by Choi Sun-sil (also transliterated Choi Soon-sil), Park Geun-hye’s ‘Shaman confidante’ in influencing policy towards North Korea are shedding new light on this strange, rather dysfunctional administration.106 Choi Sun-sil inherited her relationship with the Park family, father and daughter, from her father Choi Tae-min, who was labelled in State Department cable, Korea’s Rasputin.107




President Park Geun-hye, center, who served as first lady for her father President Park Chung-hee, left, after her mother was assassinated, speaks to Choi Tae-min, her mentor and the father of Choi Soon-sil, at a hospital owned by Guguk (save-the-nation) missionary group, set up by the senior Choi, in 1976. / Korea Times file


In particular it is alleged that Choi Sun-sil was instrumental in the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Park, and propagated the myth of North Korea’s imminent collapse.108 Obama’s policy of ‘Strategic Patience’ is widely supposed to have been based on the collapse myth – no negotiations with North Korea were necessary because collapse was just around the corner.109 We are left with the intriguing possibility that recent US policy towards North Korea has been based on Shamanistic prediction, unconsciously echoing the Reagans’ predilection for astrology.110

North Korea – limited options of a target state

Most writers put North Korea first; here it is last because there is less to say. There are few options to discuss.

Militarily speaking, as we have seen, North Korea is vulnerable and far inferior to its adversaries who outspend it from a hundred to a thousand times. It has survived sanctions so far – some 70 years and counting – but that is to a large degree due to uncertain and undependable Chinese policy.

There are many things about North Korea policy that are difficult to fathom. It is unclear, for instance, why Kim Jong Un has not worked harder at relations with China and Russia. There may be good, but unknown reasons, why he did not attend the anniversary celebrations in Moscow and Beijing in 2015, leaving the stage to Park Geun-hye.111Why, with his overseas education did he not do anything to reform North Korea’s notoriously dysfunctional foreign communications/propaganda apparatus? Having lived in Switzerland he must have been aware of how superbly the Americans do these sorts of things. Lack of resources is clearly an issue and frankly however sophisticated and adroit the communications became it would not make much difference to the way that North Korea is portrayed in the mainstream Western media.112 The Russians run a pretty sophisticated show but that has not stopped the demonization of Putin and the vilification of Russia. But it would help on the margins. Then there are the ridiculously excessive prison sentences imposed on foreigners, most of whom are seemingly mentally unstable or pawns, for petty crimes.113 There is a long list.

Nevertheless these are relatively minor matters compared with the overriding reality of the problems that North Korea faces, circumstances forged by geography and history, and forged primarily, but not exclusively, by US policy. If South Korea can be seen as a pivot state with some freedom of action to develop autonomy, North Korea can be thought of as a responsive state whose main challenge is how to cope with the United States. It cannot deflect or ignore American hostility, but it must respond to it.

North Korea is constantly portrayed as a threat to the United States.114 In military terms it could conceivably be considered as a threat to South Korea on its own (but not in alliance with the US), although the South is very much stronger. However given the huge disparity in power between the US, buttressed by its allies, its bases, and with its geographic invulnerability the assertion of a North Korea threat is nonsense. It is a belief produced by unrelenting propaganda and indoctrination which even a cursory examination of reality should dispel. It is part of a pattern in which the US is depicted as threatened by countries which are far weaker and have absolutely no ability to project power to attack it – Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Iran come immediately to mind.

North Korea cannot threaten the US, but the US certainly does threaten North Korea and has waged war against it since the late 1940s.

First of all North Korea is constantly under military threat – the frequent joint military exercises with South Korea, increasingly involving Japan,115 are just one example – and is subject to continual economic, propaganda, and psychological warfare.116 Sometimes this is relatively straightforward with physical and financial sanctions. Occasionally it is very petty as illustrated by a couple of stories from Japan, one of a South Korean who was arrested for sending sweets, garments, dishes, spoons and forks to North Korea and another of the Chinese woman arrested for selling knitwear.117 Sometimes the warfare is more invidious. Recently there were media stories from Australia of goods for the sports clothing company Rip Curl being made in Pyongyang by ‘slave labour’.118 Unnerved by the hype, Rip Curl apologised and cancelled the contract. Perhaps the unfortunate textile workers in Pyongyang lost their jobs – which were probably highly prized – just like those of their compatriots in Kaesong.

‘Slave labour’ is also a term used in respect of North Koreans working abroad and whilst the propaganda has been around for some time, 2016 has seen a concerted push by the US. The intention is to dissuade countries from permitting the employment of North Korea citizens by a mix of bilateral pressure and action through the United Nations.119 It is unclear how much remittances from overseas workers contribute to the North Korean economy. The South Korean Ministry of Unification estimates $200-300 million a year.120 Others suggest $500million.121 The Chosun Ilbo goes up to $1billion and an article in Foreign Affairs came up with a high of $2.3 billion. 122 In the other direction Yonhap, perhaps drawing on US estimates quotes ”low $100s of millions” a year.123 Remittances from overseas workers (and migrants) are an important part of the global economy. In 2015 it was estimated that China would receive $66billion in remittances, continuing a trend stretching back centuries.124 Remittances to lower and middle income countries in 2016 were projected to reach $422billion.125 The Philippines has some 10million overseas workers ‘often employed in low-paying service jobs and under harsh working conditions. Stories of maltreatment and abuse are …common’.126 In fact the global migrant worker industry is often revealed as scandalous, with stories about Qatar being just a recent example.127 Ironically in this context, South Korea has a particularly bad reputation in respect of migrant (i.e. non-Korean) workers, both at home and abroad.128

There is no credible evidence that North Korean workers overseas in general fare any worse than others. Plenty of lurid stories from the propaganda mills of course but nothing substantial. It was reported in August 2016 that the State Department had issued a report to Congress on the subject and it might perhaps have been expected that it would contain some solid evidence. However the South Korean state news agency Yonhap admitted that ‘Details of the latest report were not immediately available’.129 That was August; the report had not appeared on the State Department website by the end of October, suggesting that something was amiss. Many of the stories about North Korean overseas workers revolve around allegations that they are left with little disposable income after deductions by North Korean government agencies. 130 There is no rigorous evidence on the level of deductions but it appears that they escape the fate of so many migrant workers who fall into a debt trap in which they find it very difficult to repay their debt to the recruitment agency. One estimate has 21 million people worldwide trapped in this ‘modern-day slavery’. 131 Are North Koreans to be counted amongst them? Andrei Lankov, the Seoul-based Russian academic who is certainly no friend of the North Korean government, is scathing:


But are these people actually “modern day slaves?” Well, they certainly do not see themselves as such, and not because they have been brainwashed by North Korean propaganda, but rather because they are doing what they and their compatriots overwhelmingly see as a prestigious and exceptionally [well] paid job. Indeed, the selection process is highly competitive, and nearly all those who make it have to make use of family connections and/or bribes to get selected.132

Most discussion about North Korea are infused with hypocrisy – for a country which has conducted over a 1000 nuclear tests, many atmospheric with damage to both humans and the environment, to express such indignation over a country that has conducted just five underground tests requires considerable chutzpah. The subject of overseas labour is no exception, providing fruitful ground for displays of insincerity and historical amnesia. The United States was founded to some extent on slave labour and, more relevant, the economic development of South Korea was due in large part to the export of labour. Park Chung-hee sent over 300,000 troops to Vietnam between 1964 and 1973, which provided a great stimulus to the economy, and foreign exchange133. Then the ‘Middle East Boom’ of the 1970s provided a further opportunity. Between 1975 and 1985 nearly one million labourers were sent to the Middle East to work mainly in construction, often for Korean chaebol, providing profit and foreign exchange. In the peak year of 1982 Middle East construction constituted 6.6 percent of South Korea’s GDP.134 By comparison North Korea’s overseas labour is small beer, but it does provide a useful source of foreign exchange, where such opportunities are much constrained by sanctions, as well as income for the workers and their families.

The ostensible rationale given for trying to stop North Koreans working overseas, and for sanctions on exports – from coal to fish – is that the foreign revenue is used for nuclear weapons. We are told that North Korea ‘ is likely to expand the export of fish to continue pursuing development of nuclear weapons.135 So, the argument goes, if foreign exchange is cut off then spending on weapons will go down. This is both untrue and masks the strategy behind sanctions. Since money is fungible and the North Korean government, like others, spends its revenue on a wide variety of activities from defense through to importing grain for domestic consumption, building hospitals and schools, agricultural and industrial development and so on, then constraining revenue streams does not necessarily impact on expenditure of a certain type.136 In fact any government faced with an existential threat will prioritise national defence so if sanctions impose constraints they are more likely to impact on general, civilian expenditure. Moreover, as noted below, since a nuclear deterrent is cheaper than a conventional one, the nuclear weapons programme is unlikely to suffer from sanctions, and may even get a boost.

If sanctions cannot stop North Korea’s development of a nuclear deterrent, what is their purpose and strategy? Here we might go back to the classic studies of US sanctions conducted by Gary Hufbauer and colleagues who describe the objective of sanctions against North Korea, stretching back to 1950 as ‘1) impair military potential 2) destabilize communist government’.137’Destabilisation’ covers a range of objectives from creating a dysfunctional ’failed state’, with impaired military potential to the replacement of a hostile or independent regime with something more compliant. Sanctions are one way of achieving such objectives – propaganda campaigns and funding opposition movements – being alternative or complementary mechanisms. By creating economic distress which is blamed on the government, rather than the sanctioner, they seek to create an environment in which the victims try to escape (as refugees or, or in South Korean parlance, ‘defectors’) or rebel in some way against the government. No doubt there are those in Washington, and Seoul, who hope that sanctions will produce food riots in Pyongyang which would provide a justification for a ‘humanitarian intervention’. However, sanctions tend not to be very effective in achieving these objectives. Famine in the 1990s did not lead to massive protest against the government and realistic observers see no likelihood of that happening today even if increased sanctions were to result in similar food shortages.138 Hufbauer tends to be sceptical about them and as we have seen in the recent case of sanctions against Russia they may have the opposite effect, of actually increasing the popularity of the government.139 Nevertheless they can cause immense suffering and damage. One North Korean source estimates the damage done by ‘economic sanctions and blockade, the products of the US hostile policy toward the DPRK….for six decades up to 2005 to 13,729,964 million US dollars’.140

North Korea has sought to counter American hostility by a dual strategy. It has basically been open to genuine negotiations with the US. ‘Genuine’ primarily revolving around negotiations without preconditions that would deliver to the US its objectives without concessions on its part.141 The conventional wisdom is that the US honestly has tried over the years to negotiate with North Korea but has not got anywhere because Pyongyang is untrustworthy and ‘cheats’.142 The logic of the situation suggests that the reverse is more likely. North Korea is a small, tightly controlled state for whom these negotiations are of huge, existential importance. It has a strong incentive to honour an agreement. The US is very different. It is the global hegemon with many choices to make and is run by a large fractious elite within which foreign policy is contested between cliques, institutions, personalities and of course succeeding administrations. The US finds it very difficult to honour its commitments.143 For North Korea Hillary Clinton’s destruction of the Gadhafi government in Libya in contravention of Condoleezza Rice’s assurances must be the outstanding example.144

The other side of this dual strategy is the development of defensive and deterrent capability, culminating in Kim Jong Un’s Byungjin policy. This strategy of a simultaneous development of a nuclear deterrent with economic development is sensible and perhaps inevitable although it has often been pilloried as evidence of economic mismanagement and irrationality.145 It is really merely a special variant of the guns and butter dilemma that all governments face and can be analysed dispassionately.146

There is clearly no easy way for North Korea to counter what it rightly calls the ‘hostility policy’ of the US except with nuclear weapons. For all their direct and indirect costs, they do make sense. They are cheaper than conventional arms.147 Although the long-term development costs, which crucially must include delivery systems, are considerable, some costs are surprisingly modest. For instance the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) estimated that the fifth nuclear test on 9 September 2016 'Only Cost $5 Million'.148 Moreover, even if it suddenly acquired huge wealth North Korea could never match the conventional military power of the US and its allies. It may be the best option for North Korea in the circumstances, but it does have its drawbacks. ‘Best option’ of course does not mean that something is desirable, merely that of all of the possible options it is the best choice. This obvious point is often avoided or obscured by people who do not recognise the predicament that North Korea is in; a predicament produced by geographical location, by history and by US global strategy. It was the US that divided the Korean peninsula; it is the US that is hostile to North Korea. This is not a situation that North Korea can avoid, but only seek to cope with.

Being cheaper than conventional weapons means that more resources can be devoted to the economy. There are indications that this is happening.149 The March 2016 budget showed a small decrease in the proportion devoted to national defense.150

As a corollary, it should be remembered that one function of the military threat, as exemplified by the invasion exercises, is to force North Korea to divert resources from the productive economy into defence. ‘Going nuclear’ offers a way of avoiding that trap.

The most authoritative assessment of the Byungjin policy comes from the Russian Koreanologist Georgy Toloraya. Writing in 38 North, the Washington website set up by former US official Joel Wit, he noted that he saw evidence in his recent trips to North Korea substantial (though constrained) economic growth and pronounced the Byungjin policy a success:


Despite all the mockery, North Korea’s Byungjin policy seems to have proven more effective than foreign critics expected. This is evidenced by empirical data I have collected during recent visits to North Korea...

What are the sources of this [economic] growth? One explanation might be that less is now spent on the conventional military sector, while nuclear development at this stage is cheaper—it may only cost 2 to 3 percent of GNP, according to some estimates.151

There are however three major disadvantages of the nuclear weapons option.

Firstly the early stage of nuclear weapons requires physical testing. The US no longer needs that, because it already has under its belt those 1000 physical tests in the past that brought it to this position. Unlike, for instance, acquiring an F-35 fighter or an Aegis destroyer nuclear tests are obvious and newsworthy and attract much opprobrium, hypocritical though most of that is. One of the great successes of American propaganda has been to attach to non-proliferation the assumption of peace and disarmament. In fact it has nothing to do with that, it is merely preserving the monopoly of nuclear weapons states. The authoritative US political scientist Kenneth Waltz argued that proliferation is peace-enhancing because it provides protection to small states that that they would not otherwise have.152

Secondly, nuclear weapons for North Korea can only be used as a deterrent. However unlike the prospect of mutually assured destruction (MAD) of the US-Soviet Cold War, North Korea’s deterrent is rather like the ‘Sampson Option’ described by Seymour Hersh in respect of Israel.153 It is similar to a suicide bomber who kills himself, and in the process some, but not all, of the enemy.

In any case deterrence is a matter of convincing the other side that attacking you would result in intolerable damage to them, and that it is not worth the risk. So it is a matter of perception rather than reality. You may be bluffing – and bluff is an inherent aspect of deterrence – and your defences may in reality be weak, but that is irrelevant.

North Korea is often mocked for making extravagant claims about its military capabilities and accused of being crazy for threatening to attack the US. That is a misunderstanding of what it is all about. North Korean threats are always essentially conditional. For instance the warning by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Supreme Command regarding stories that the US was preparing to launch a ‘decapitation’ attack:


...all the powerful strategic and tactical strike means of our revolutionary armed forces will go into pre-emptive and just operation to beat back the enemy forces to the last man if there is a slight sign of their special operation forces and equipment moving to carry out the so-called "beheading operation" and "high-density strike."[Emphasis added] 154

The media often, especially in headings, leaves out the crucial little word ‘if’ thereby creating the false impression that North Korea is being threatening and bellicose, when in reality it is the other way round. The military exercises, the practising of decapitation and amphibious landings, and of the invasion of North Korea are surely threatening and belligerent – one can well imagine the uproar in the West if it were Chinese and North Korean forces practising to invade the South. North Korean statements therefore are not a matter of threat, but of deterrence.

However, the third problem for North Korea is that its deterrent in respect of the US is a nuclear one. If the US were not involved and it were merely a matter of deterring the South then North Korea’s artillery, which it claims can turn Seoul into a sea of flames, would be sufficient. 155 But it is the US that must be deterred and the only feasible way to do that is to convince American leaders that there is a real chance that America itself might be damaged in a counterattack and that means nuclear weapons. In this context bluff is quite reasonable since it is a matter of instilling doubt in the minds of the other side. North Korea almost certainly can’t deliver a nuclear warhead on the US at the moment but it just might.156

The phrase used above -not worth the risk- is relevant here. From the point of view of the US it is a matter of risk-benefit analysis. The amount of risk must be related to the amount of benefit. We might image some megalomaniac strategist sitting in Washington and calculating that it might be worthwhile losing the West Coast if it meant destroying China. With China out of the way the US would have no challengers for generations. The world would be at its feet. It would be a big prize.157 North Korea is quite a different matter. It is a very small prize and as discussed above removing it through war, or indeed peace, would cause problems for the containment of China.

Moreover a nuclear deterrent is a blunt instrument. For a small country like North Korea, faced by vastly more powerful adversaries, a retaliatory attack has to be all out, no holds barred. No calibrated response, no escalation such as a powerful country might apply to a weak one – Vietnam comes to mind. But, as noted above, this is the Samson option, one that could result in the devastation of North Korea.

This brings us to the word ‘pre-emptive.’ This was misconstrued by George W. Bush to mean unprovoked. A simple dictionary definition is an action to prevent attack by disabling the enemy. Since Iraq was in no position to attack the US, the invasion was clearly not pre-emptive. Pre-emption is normally associated with the action of a weaker person or country faced with what is perceived as an imminent attack by a stronger adversary. This is probably what would happen in a conflict between the US and China, apart from the scenario of China intervening, as in 1950, in response to a US invasion of North Korea.158 The US would force China into a situation, say in the South China Sea or Taiwan Straits, in which it felt it was compelled to make a pre-emptive strike.159 Being by far the stronger combatant the US would absorb this strike, and then having gained the moral high ground would launch the attack, now a counter-attack, that it had planned; a variant on Pearl Harbour.160

Leaving aside the moral deception involved in shifting blame there is the danger that the weaker party might misinterpret the actions of the stronger and launch a pre-emptive strike unnecessarily. This is particularly plausible in the case of North Korea which has very limited surveillance and intelligence capabilities compared with the US (North Korea’s satellite programme is an attempt to remedy this deficiency).161 The US makes a feint which North Korea interprets as presaging, say, a decapitation strike and launches a pre-emptive all-out attack. The war, so long desired in certain quarters, comes about.

It might well be argued that for North Korea nuclear deterrence is unwise and might in fact incite the US to attack now, before it is too late. If tomorrow the enemy will be invulnerable, better to attack today. This is the inevitable predicament in developing a deterrent. Certainly to do so is to enter a dangerous period, as Stratfor explains:


As Pyongyang approaches a viable nuclear weapon and delivery system, the pressure is rising for the United States and other countries to pre-empt it. Consequently, the final moments of North Korea's transition from a working program to a demonstrated system are the most dangerous, providing a last chance to stop the country from becoming a nuclear weapons state. For North Korea, then, these final steps must happen quickly.162

This is probably the explanation for the frenetic pace of North Korea nuclear and missile tests in 2016. 163 The US is unlikely to attack during a presidential election year, but 2017 is different. It is probable that the bellicose Hillary Clinton will be in her first year of office, and Park Geun-hye in her final full year.164 It might be that Clinton will be less of a hawk than most observers expect or too occupied with Russia to embark on a potential war with China.165 It might be that Park Geun-hye will be impeached or her political power fatally wounded by the Choi Sun-sil affair.166 However at this stage it would be prudent to assume that 2017 will be a particularly dangerous year for North Korea. Indeed, Josh Rogin, writing in the Washington Post on the eve of the 2016 election in an article entitled ‘The coming clash with China over North Korea’ concluded that:


...the North Korea issue could mean that the first foreign crisis of a potential Clinton presidency will come not in the Middle East or with Russia, but in northeast Asia.167

The report that the US command in Korea (United States Forces Kores, USFK) has begun to practice the evacuation of US civilians is surely a better indicator than any article of speech that the US military is anticipating that conflict is likely under the incoming administration.168

North Korea could say ‘if you invade we will unleash a people’s war – remember the 1950s, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.’ The problem with that is what might be called the ‘Stalingrad factor’. Stalingrad, it has been said, was easier to defend against the Germans when it had been reduced to rubble. But who wants their cities reduced to rubble?

North Korea’s nuclear deterrent also have the potential to force the US into some sort of peace agreement in a way that a conventional defence, which by its nature would pose little danger to the US, ever could. Whether that might come to pass is another matter but since peace with America must remain North Korea’s major foreign policy goal, it will always be on the agenda even if denied. 169

Conclusion

The American empire is a curious one, rather different to the ones with which most of us are familiar – the Roman, the British, or the French. It is an empire which does not proclaim itself; indeed it denies its existence, to the condescending amusement of admirers such as Niall Ferguson. 170It often names its weapon systems after vanquished peoples – Apache and Iroquois –perhaps in a somewhat cannibalistic attempt to acquire their fruitless valour and to deny their subjugation. Denial goes a long way back; what other group of slave owners would have written in their declaration of independence that ‘all men are created equal’? The United States does not erect statues of its presidents in its foreign possessions. Its imperial forces in Europe are described as those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those in South Korea, in the ‘Republic of Korea’ are called the United Nations Command. There is little doubt where the power really lies; an American general is in command of both. Indeed, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti the commander of the US forces in South Korea, and hence of the United Nations Command, and the ROK army, was transferred to Brussels in March 2016 to become NATO commander, in a career move which would have been familiar in the Roman Empire.171 Despite its relative invisibility the American empire is the greatest in history and the salient reality of contemporary geopolitics. Any analysis of a geopolitical situation must start with the US, though not end there.

The US is by no means omniscient or strategically coherent, and it is certainly not omnipotent; the relationship with ‘allies’ and adversaries is under constant negotiation. This means the relationships have to be carefully scrutinised, avoiding simplistic narratives. Nevertheless it is the dominant factor in most circumstances and in general, and in the long term (though not necessarily in the short term) it is the initiator to which other countries respond. The US divided Korea in 1945 as part of its strategy of containing the Soviet Union and protecting its war booty of Japan. The focus has now shifted to China but the basic thrust is the same. The US has a necessary and crucial interest in Korea because of its strategic location and this situation informs its Korea policy. North Korea is far too small to threaten the US, but the US does threaten North Korea and has conducted economic and diplomatic war against it since the late 1940s. The Korean War itself had its own specific causes and effects but it was one episode in a longer historical struggle. This hostility has moulded North Korean politics into a particular defensive and distorted configuration, and has produced, amongst other things, the putative nuclear deterrent. North Korea has long proposed a peaceful coexistence in the form of a peace treaty to the US, and the US has refused out of concerns about the impact on its global strategy of preserving nuclear superiority (‘non-proliferation’) and its containment of China, and Russia.172North Korea’s commitment to a peace treaty is likely to endure because it is the gateway to survival and prosperity. American policy on that may conceivably change as it attempts to cope with shifts in the international landscape. In order to understand what is going on, and attempt to anticipate future developments, it is essential to start with the US and move out from there.

This is a revised and updated version of a paper prepared for webinar Crisis in Korea - Causes/aftermaths of 2016 H-bomb test and Satellite Launch, 19 March (US/Canada) 20 March (Korea/New Zealand) 2016 organised by the Korea Policy Institute, Los Angeles.


Notes
1

Editorial, "THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula opens Pandora's box," Hankyoreh, 9 July 2016.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/751627.html
2

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3

"South Korea and US agree to deploy THAAD missile defence system," Guardian, 8 July 2016.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-thaad-missile-defence-system
4

Missy Ryan, "Pentagon to deploy anti-missile system in South Korea," Washington Post, 7 July 2016.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/07/pentagon-to-deploy-anti-missile-system-in-south-korea/
5

Sang-Hun Choe, "South Korea and U.S. Agree to Deploy Missile Defense System," New York Times, 8 July 2016.http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/world/asia/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-missile-defense-system.html
6

Jack Kim, "South Korea, U.S. Agree to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense to Counter North Korea Threat," Reuters, 7 July 2016.http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2016/07/07/world/asia/07reuters-southkorea-usa-thaad.html
7

Shinhye Kang, "China Blasts U.S., South Korea Missile Defense Deployment," Bloomberg, 8 July 2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-08/china-blasts-u-s-south-korea-missile-defense-deployment
8

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9

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Fostering Trust in Government During a Pandemic: The Case of South Korea | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

Fostering Trust in Government During a Pandemic: The Case of South Korea | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus


Fostering Trust in Government During a Pandemic: The Case of South Korea
Nathan Park
July 11, 2020
Volume 18 | Issue 14 | Number 10
Article ID 5426






Abstract: With mass-scale testing and extensive contact-tracing, South Korea’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been among the strongest in the world. This success has often been credited to the Korean public’s cultural willingness to trust their government and put up with measures that supposedly infringed on their liberties and privacy. While the trust has indeed been important, the reductive attempts to locate the source of the people’s trust in Korea’s Confucian heritage, homogeneous society, or deferential culture are misplaced. Contrary to the orientalist caricature, South Korea’s political culture is marked by low trust in government and deep polarization along ideological lines, making it an obstacle to be overcome rather than a foundation for success. This paper will analyze the measures taken by the Moon Jae-in administration to manage the fractious politics surrounding the outbreak and foster the public trust in the government’s response, and also explore the limits of such measures.



Introduction

South Korea’s successful response to the coronavirus pandemic won plaudits from around the world. At one point, with a massive outbreak in the southeastern city of Daegu in late February, South Korea had the highest number of COVID-19 cases outside of China. Yet, it decisively flattened the curve while many other countries floundered, thanks in no small part to the orderly cooperation of its citizens. Korea saw no heated debate about the wisdom of mask-wearing, nor did it see any protest against the government-mandated quarantine of affected individuals (although there were protests for other reasons, to be sure). Toilet paper rolls in stores never ran out.

International observers ascribed such cooperation to the stereotypical image of compliant and homogenous Asians, deferential to authority and focused on social harmony. This orientalist caricature is contrary to fact: the South Korean public, in truth, is marked by low trust in government and in one another. As it has only been a few years since former president Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, South Korean politics have been rife with unvarnished attempts to politicize the pandemic response.

Yet it is also true that the Korean society did follow the government’s lead in the fight against coronavirus—not because some cultural factor made Koreans predisposed to trust their government, but because the government earned their trust. Acutely aware of the previous administration’s repeated failures in the face of major disasters, the Moon Jae-in administration focused on communicating the message that his government would protect the people and followed through on the message in its actions. This posture, standing in sharp contrast to the previous administration’s, led the Korean public to rally around the government’s recommendations and also reward the Moon administration with an unprecedented landslide electoral victory.

This article first outlines the arguments regarding cultural factors in South Korea’s successful response to the pandemic and discusses why such arguments are fallacious by expanding on the reasons described above. This article then examines three critical junctures in Korea’s journey through the pandemic: (1) the airlift of Korean nationals out of Wuhan and elsewhere; (2) the Daegu outbreak, and; (3) the socioeconomic secondary effects such as face mask distribution, online education and holding a national election. At each juncture, the South Korean government took measures designed not only to combat the disease, but also to give the public the sense that the government was doing everything it could to protect them and address their needs arising from the pandemic response. This article concludes with a look toward further challenges that the South Korean government will face in inspiring public trust, especially in relation to marginalized social groups such as LGBTQ.



The Cultural Argument Fallacy

South Korea’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic has been among the world’s best. While many other countries deserve commendations for their pandemic responses, South Korea’s success is relatively unique in that it managed to quell a huge spike in the number of cases without resorting to a wholesale lockdown or travel ban. Unlike other success cases like those of Taiwan or New Zealand, which initially had a low number of cases that were then kept low, South Korea faced a massive outbreak event in the city of Daegu, where the secretive Shincheonji cult members spread the virus while lying to the contact tracers about the circumstances of transmission. On February 17, South Korea had a total of 30 COVID-19 cases and zero deaths; just a month later, the number of cases skyrocketed to over 8,000, with as many as 909 new cases in a single day at its peak (KCDC 2020). Yet, South Korea resisted the temptation to implement a harsh lockdown that would have severely infringed on the people’s liberty and caused significant damage to the economy. Through the redoubled efforts to trace and isolate the patients, South Korea was able to successfully flatten the curve.




Source: Statista



Voluntary cooperation of the South Korean public was crucial in this effort. Even without a stringent lockdown, Koreans by and large followed the government’s recommendations on mask wearing and social distancing. Except for a handful of exceptions involving cult members and other socially marginalized groups, those who came in contact with a carrier dutifully self-isolated. News reports praised exemplary cases of hygiene, such as a tour guide in Incheon who worked with Chinese tourists (MBC News Desk 2020). The tour guide self-isolated, wore a mask and gloves even inside her own home, and walked to clinics rather than taking public transit to get tested when symptoms appeared. Although the tour guide tested positive, all 23 people with whom she came into contact—including her mother who lived in the same house as she—were unaffected.

To be sure, it may be fair to say the Korean public had a lower bar to clear. Unlike many other governments around the world, the Korean government was not asking the public to essentially put themselves under house arrest for months. Because Korea already had the mask-wearing culture in place, there was little controversy on the recommendation to wear masks in case of a pandemic. In fact, the commotion about the masks in Korea was more about how to buy them in the sudden spike of demand, not about whether or not to wear one. When compared to the toilet paper hoarding and the boisterous protests across the United States and Europe by those refusing to acknowledge the danger of the pandemic, it seems fair to say that the South Korean public heeded their government’s suggestions better than most.

Observing South Korea’s successful response, several Western thinkers and media outlets offered reductive cultural explanations, usually centered on the orientalist trope that Koreans are less individualistic, more community-oriented, and more willing to sacrifice for the greater good. Guy Sorman, for example, cited Korea’s “deep-rooted sense of solidarity,” or “the belief that each individual belongs to a community beyond just oneself, and a national mission to unite as a member of such a community,” to explain Korea’s strong response to COVID-19, adding he felt ambivalent about how such solidarity weakens individuality (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). A similar idea appeared in a New York Times article analyzing South Korea’s success: “Social trust is higher in South Korea than in many other countries, particularly Western democracies beset by polarization and populist backlash” (Fisher et al. 2020). Closely related to this analysis is the claim that Koreans are docile and more willing to follow the government’s lead. Sung-yoon Lee claimed in an interview with the Wall Street Journal: “Most [Korean] people willingly submit themselves to authority and few complain . . . The Confucian emphasis on respect for authority, social stability, and the good of the nation above individualism is an ameliorating factor in a time of national crisis” (Martin et al. 2020). Bruce Klingner suggested Americans would not accept South Korea’s extensive contact tracing, which included monitoring CCTV footage, credit card records and cell phone GPS data (Lucas 2020, Kim, Max 2020).

These observations, however, do not stand up to closer scrutiny. First, contrary to popular imagination, South Korea is a society marked by its citizens’ low trust in government and in one another. In an OECD study from 2016, only 24 percent Koreans responded they had confidence in the national government, trailing significantly behind the OECD average of 42 percent and such “independent-minded” Western countries like Canada (62 percent), Germany (55 percent), the United Kingdom (41 percent), the United States (30 percent), and France (28 percent) (OECD 2017). Similarly, in an OECD study from 2014, South Korea’s score for “average trust in others” was merely 0.32, trailing such “individualistic” Western societies like Norway (0.68), Sweden (0.65), the Netherlands (0.53), Canada (0.44), the United States (0.41) and the United Kingdom (0.37) (OECD 2018).

South Korea also had no shortage of fractious politicians seeking to leverage the coronavirus epidemic for political gain. It was only three years before the outbreak that former president Park Geun-hye was impeached and removed, leaving a bitter, polarized political scene in its wake. When the pandemic began in late January, the all-important National Assembly elections were just a few months away on April 15. Recalling that Park’s inept handling of the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) epidemic of 2015 led to the erosion of her support, South Korea’s conservatives mounted a full-scale attack on Moon Jae-in administration’s response to COVID-19. The main line of conservative attack was the demand to implement a travel ban against China. On February 24 as South Korea was going through the peak of its outbreak, Hwang Gyo-an, then-chairman of the conservative United Future Party, said: “We once again strongly urge a ban on travel from China. That is virtually the only available response” (Jeong et al. 2020). On the same day, JoongAng Ilbo—the right-leaning, second largest newspaper of South Korea—made the extraordinary move of putting its editorial at the top of the front page, titled: “Enact Total Ban of All Foreigners’ Entry from China” (JoongAng Ilbo Feb. 24, 2020, p.1). These moves were a cynical attack that simultaneously red-baited and race-baited, painting Moon Jae-in as “too soft on China” while whipping up xenophobia against ethnic Chinese immigrants in South Korea.

The politics around coronavirus in South Korea became so toxic to the point that, in the middle of the pandemic, the South Korean government had to dissolve the presidential board of medical advisors. The Korean Medical Association, an interest group representing doctors in South Korea, had long been critical of the Moon administration, and opposed the expanded coverage of South Korea’s national health insurance as harming doctors’ interests. Just as COVID-19 was reaching its peak in South Korea in late February, Choi Dae-jip, the president of the KMA (and a founder of a fascist group that claimed to be the heir of the groups that massacred civilians during the Korean War) demanded the Moon administration sack the Minister of Health and Welfare and the presidential advisory panel (Kang 2020). To accommodate the KMA and protect its members from political attacks, the panel decided to voluntarily disband.

Finally, a recent survey conducted jointly by KBS, Korea Research, and SisaIN magazine, focusing specifically on the correlation between political orientation and individual participation in the social effort to combat the outbreak, strongly suggests that deference to authority has little to do with Koreans’ willingness to follow their government’s lead (Cheon 2020). In the survey, the researchers devised a questionnaire with 288 questions, designed to gauge the political orientation of the respondents along the lines of authoritarian tendencies, deference, collectivism, democratic citizenship, and horizontal individualism. Then the respondents were presented with ten everyday actions involving personal hygiene and social distancing measures recommended by the government, such as wearing a mask, washing hands and avoiding public transit, and were asked how often they adopt those measures in their personal lives on the scale of 1 to 4. The study found no significant correlation between the rates of compliance with such measures and political orientation. To the extent there was any correlation, there was a weak positive correlation between sanitation measures and democratic citizenship, and sanitation measures and horizontal individualism. In other words, the individualistic and democratic Koreans were more likely to be more diligent in following the government’s guidance, albeit by a small margin.



Moon Jae-in Administration’s Efforts to Win Popular Trust

In putting together all that has been mentioned, we are presented with a mystery. By and large, the South Korean public faithfully followed the government’s recommendations to respond to the pandemic. The KBS/Korea Research/SisaIN survey suggests that an individual’s political orientation makes no significant difference in the rate of compliance with the government-recommended personal hygiene measures. Indeed, South Korea is a society marked with deep mistrust of the government and fellow citizens. Throughout the coronavirus outbreak, there were constant attempts to politicize the disease response from the conservative opposition—so much so that the attempts nearly derailed the scientific response when the presidential advisory board disbanded under pressure. At least through the peak of the outbreak for South Korea, there was no discernible “rally around the flag” effect for Moon Jae-in: in the Gallup Korea weekly survey, Moon’s approval rating in all of February and the first week of March fluctuated at around 44 percent, remaining constant from the pre-outbreak approval rating (Gallup Korea 2020). How did the government in a society that does not trust it manage to extract such a robust response from the public?

I believe the intuitive answer is that the government earned their trust. By seeing the fall of the Park Geun-hye administration, the Moon Jae-in administration was acutely aware of the importance of gaining public trust, especially in matters where the government is expected to protect the public’s health and safety. Seeing the potential of COVID-19 to undermine the support for the government, the Moon administration strongly focused on measures to earn the public trust, demonstrating its commitment to protect the public. In an interview with France 24, Korea’s Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha provided a helpful view into the Moon administration’s mindset in responding to the pandemic:

You may know that in 2014, we had a terrible ferry boat accident where we lost 304 lives in the midst of a very inept response from the government at the time, and that has been a collective trauma to all Korean people. And then in the following year 2015, we had a MERS outbreak that lasted for about three months. It didn’t affect that many people, but was very highly fatal. And I think the government’s reaction then was also initially very intransparent and dismissive. It came around, responded and contained. So this government has been very determined to be prepared when disaster strikes. We may not be able to prevent disasters from striking, but we can do a lot to prepare so that we can minimize the human suffering and contain the socioeconomic consequences (Perelman 2020).

Kang’s reference to the 2014 Sewol ferry disaster in the same breath as the 2015 MERS epidemic is worth noting. On April 16, 2014, a ferry bound to the southern island of Jeju-do capsized, killing 304 passengers aboard—most of whom were students from a single high school on a field trip. The live telecast of the shocking image of the overturned ship, slowly sinking with hundreds of children in it while the outmatched rescue team could only watch helplessly, traumatized the Korean public like few other disasters have. Meanwhile, then-president Park Geun-hye was missing in action, appearing at the disaster response center seven hours after the news broke and asking questions that clearly indicated she did not understand the severity of the situation. At the time, the Park administration’s incompetent response to the Sewol ferry disaster was seen as a violation of the most fundamental compact between the government and the people: that the government will protect the people (Choe 2014). This was a moment that signaled the beginning of the end for the Park administration, culminating in her impeachment and imprisonment in 2017.




Hankyoreh 21 cover headline: "Is This a Nation?"



I believe that the lessons learned from the Park administration’s failure drove the response by the Moon administration. At each key juncture of the pandemic’s progression, the Moon administration endeavored to instill in the public the sense that the government was doing everything it could possibly do to protect them and was attuned to their needs during the pandemic. In particular, three key moments stand out: (1) the effort to bring Koreans home from the affected areas, including Wuhan, China; (2) the all-out push in the Daegu Shincheonji outbreak, and; (3) second-order relief programs such as mask distribution and online schooling, as well as holding the national election for South Korea’s legislature. The public trust earned through these actions helped not only with the public’s response to the pandemic, but also with the Moon administration’s political fortune.



Critical Moment 1: Bringing Koreans Home

When the COVID-19 outbreak began in the Hubei Province of China, there were approximately 800 South Korean nationals in the province. When China began its lockdown of the Hubei Province, the Koreans in the area were stranded. On January 28, the South Korean government announced it would send four charter planes to evacuate Wuhan and Hubei Province. By February 1, 701 Korean nationals returned to Korea via two charter flights. Their arrival to Incheon Airport, and the motorcade that escorted them to the designated quarantine facility, was telecast live with an air of solemn ceremony. Around the same time, Moon Jae-in held a cabinet meeting on live television, emphasizing fast and transparent communication of information. This episode, in the early stages of the pandemic before large domestic clusters began to appear in Korea, set the tone for how the Moon Jae-in administration would respond to the pandemic.





Korean nationals from Wuhan arrive at Incheon International Airport via charter flight. Source.



The evacuation of Wuhan left a strong impression in the minds of the Korean public. Living in the shadow of a war virtually for their nation’s entire existence, South Koreans have regarded a country’s ability to evacuate their citizens from dangerous areas as an important indicator of the country’s status. Koreans, and especially Seoul residents, have always looked out for the surefire sign that the second Korean War was afoot—that the Americans were leaving the country (Deloitte 2017). The United States’ near-mythical commitment of safely bringing every last American home loomed large in the minds of Koreans, who faulted their own government for failing to live up to that standard. One prominent example occurred in late 2016 under the Park Geun-hye administration, when the news broke that South Korea’s consulate in Mexico did little to help a Korean national who claimed she was wrongfully imprisoned for eight months based on a false charge of sex trafficking (Ryu 2016). The consul, who did not speak Spanish, gave incorrect legal advice to the woman, who eventually served more than three years of prison time before the Mexican judiciary exonerated her.

In Korea’s first major public display of the governmental action in the face of the pandemic, the Moon administration seemed determined to avoid the Park administration’s missteps. Early in the outbreak when South Korea only had three cases of coronavirus, Moon publicly remarked to the presidential aides that the Blue House must be the “control tower” that provides timely and comprehensive directions in managing crisis situations both domestic and abroad (Choe 2020). This remark was clearly made to serve as a contrast to a statement by Kim Jang-su, the chair of the National Security Council under the Park administration who infamously claimed after the Sewol ferry disaster that “the Blue House is not the control tower for disasters” (Kyunghyang Shinmun Apr. 23, 2014). Commenting on the evacuation, Choi Deok-gi, president of Hubei Province’s Korean Society, said: “we felt the presence of our nation as we saw everyone who endeavored for the evacuation” (Cha 2020). Choi’s remark reads like a response to the headline in the aftermath of the Sewol ferry disaster – “Is This a Nation?”, with a tragic picture of the overturned ship (Jeong et al. 2014).

The evacuation of Korean nationals around the world continued apace, with chartered flights bringing Koreans out of Cuba, Kenya, Sudan, India, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, India, and beyond. To retrieve the seven Korean nationals aboard the Diamond Princess cruise ship docked at the port of Yokohama—the ship that became notorious for becoming a floating petri dish for the coronavirus—the Korean government sent the presidential plane. By late May, the Korean government brought home more than 30,000 Korean nationals from 103 countries around the world (Im 2020).



Critical Moment 2: The Daegu Outbreak

On February 10, Moon Jae-in seemed to issue a declaration of victory, commenting: “At least in our country so far, the novel coronavirus is not a serious disease and the fatality rate is not high” (Park, Jeong-yeop 2020). It was a misstep that would come back to haunt Moon, as the massive outbreak in Daegu would make South Korea the greatest epicenter of COVID-19 outside of China by the end of the same month. On February 17, there were only 30 coronavirus patients in South Korea. But the situation took a dramatic turn for the worse with the diagnosis of the 31st patient on February 18.

Patient 31 was a member of a quasi-Christian cult called Shincheonji. Founded in 1984, Shincheonji (whose official name is Shinchonji, Church of Jesus, the Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony) means “new heaven and earth,” a reference to Revelation. Its founder Lee Man-hee claims to be the second coming of Jesus who is to establish the “new spiritual Israel” at the end of the world (Bell 2017). The cult is estimated to have approximately 240,000 followers and claims to have branches in 29 countries in addition to South Korea. Shincheonji’s secretive ways seem almost designed to facilitate transmission of the virus. According to Shin Hyeon-uk, a pastor who formerly belonged to the cult, Shincheonji believes in “deceptive proselytizing,” approaching potential converts without disclosing their denomination (Kim, Myeong-il 2020). Shincheonji has inculcated its members to cover their tracks, providing a pre-arranged set of answers to give when anyone asks if they belong to the cult. Often, even family members are in the dark about whether someone is a Shincheonji follower. What is more, Shincheonji teaches illness is a sin, encouraging its followers to suffer through diseases to attend services in which they sit closely together, breathing in droplets as the devoted repeatedly amen in unison.

Patient 31, following the Shincheonji practice, became a super-spreader. Although Patient Number 31 ran a high fever, she attended two Shincheonji services which held more than a thousand worshippers each, in addition to attending a wedding and a conference for a pyramid scheme (Yu 2020). She visited a clinic after being involved in a minor traffic accident but ignored the repeated recommendations by the doctors to receive testing for COVID-19. In other cases, a self-identified Shincheonji follower who came to a hospital complaining of a high fever ran off during examination, when the doctors informed her that she might be quarantined (Kim, Y. 2020). A daughter who underwent surgery to donate her liver to her mother for transplant belatedly admitted she belonged to Shincheonji when her fever would not drop after the surgery (Park, Jun 2020). (Both cases led to a temporary shutdown of the hospitals involved, reducing the number of hospital beds that were critically needed.) Ironically, one of the Daegu city officials in charge of infectious disease control was revealed to be a Shincheonji cultist only after a diagnosis confirmed he was infected with coronavirus (Lee, E. 2020).

Just two weeks after Patient 31 appeared on February 18, the number of cumulative cases exploded by 200 times to more than 6,000 by March 5, making South Korea the largest outbreak of COVID-19 outside of China at the time. (KCDC 2020). Moon faced a potentially severe political consequence, as conservatives made hay with his premature declaration, as well as the fact that Moon was hosting a Blue House luncheon for Academy Award winner Bong Joon-ho and the crew of Parasite when later that day, South Korea recorded its first coronavirus fatality. There was speculation that the liberal government would lock down the notoriously conservative Daegu and let the city fend for itself (Min 2020).

It was in the response to the Daegu outbreak that South Korea’s vaunted testing capacity came to shine. As soon as the first patient of COVID-19 emerged in South Korea in early January, the South Korean government convened with Korea’s pharmaceutical companies to develop a mass testing scheme that allowed nearly 15,000 tests per day by the end of February (Terhune et al. 2020). (In contrast, the United States—which had its first patient on the same day as South Korea—had conducted fewer than 500 coronavirus tests total.) With extensive contact tracing paired with blanket coverage of testing, the KCDC was able to keep pace with the spread of the virus. Also crucial was a tiered treatment system—the first of its kind in the world—that assigned the patients with severe symptoms to hospitals and those with light symptoms to community treatment centers, so as not to overwhelm the medical system (Lee, Jae-chun 2020).

The South Korean government also followed through with Moon’s pledge to provide transparent and timely information regarding the spread of the virus. Twice a day, the KCDC gave a live briefing on the daily status of the pandemic, including the number of new infections and notable developments, which was also posted immediately on the KCDC’s website. Jeong Eun-gyeong, the head of KCDC who handled most of the briefings early on, attained a near folk-hero status as the viewers at home could see her hair turning visibly greyer with each passing day. Such transparency did much to dispel the suspicion that the Moon administration might try to downplay the extent of the pandemic by restricting testing or under-stating the number of cases.

These efforts were successful, as South Korea flattened the curve and pushed the number of new daily cases from the peak of 909 on February 29 to fewer than a hundred by mid-March—in other words, South Korea entered and exited its worst phase of coronavirus in about a month. Most importantly, South Korea never implemented any measure that was more drastic than its regular method of test, trace and treat. Even as Korea was going through the worst of the outbreak, the Moon administration stressed that Daegu would not face any Wuhan-style lockdown, or a shelter-in-space order that would soon become commonplace throughout the United States and Europe. The people of Daegu faced no restrictions on their activities, albeit with the recommendation to wear a mask and follow social distancing guidelines, and could travel outside the city if they wanted to.



Critical Moment 3: Masks, Online Schools and Election

The Daegu outbreak was a sobering moment for South Korea at a time it was sliding into complacency about the coronavirus. As the Korean public began to take COVID-19 much more seriously, they faced potential second-order and third-order socioeconomic problems. The National Assembly elections, just a month and a half away, still loomed large not only because of their political significance, but also because of the logistics of arranging millions of voters to cast their ballot safely. But one by one, the government handled the issues ranging from supporting agricultural producers and small businesses facing a collapse in consumer demand, providing childcare for couples working from home, controlling the movement of international visitors, and protecting the mental health of the people who had been staying home for an extended period of time. In this section, I discuss three measures of particular significance: face mask distribution, online education, and holding the National Assembly election. Like the early stages of the Daegu response, not every part of the implementation of these measures was completely smooth. Yet the Korean government persisted, and the initial public querulousness shifted towards increasing trust in the government, delivering positive results for the Moon administration.

By never resorting to a lockdown or a shelter in place order, South Korea avoided the run on everyday commodities like toilet paper, but it did face a run on one major commodity of renewed importance in times of a pandemic: face masks. Korea’s demand for masks declined in mid-February when it appeared that the coronavirus was under control, then surged again by early March as the country was going through the peak of the Daegu outbreak (Kim, W. 2020). The inability to import masks from China (which was facing its own shortage) as well as the hoarding by some of Korea’s distributors compounded the shortage. The media lambasted the government and public opinion soured.

The Korean government responded by essentially nationalizing the production and distribution of masks. On March 5, they issued the Mask Supply Stabilization Plan, through which the government would oversee the entire process of production and both wholesale and retail distribution of face masks (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2020). Specifically, the government prohibited the export of masks, and mandated the mask-producers to supply 80 percent of their production to the government at a set price. The publicly procured masks were distributed solely to local pharmacies to control the distribution. At each retail pharmacy, the sale was limited to two per person. Each customer could purchase the masks once a week, on the specific day of the week designated by the year of birth. (For example, those born on a year ending in 1 or 6 could be allowed to purchase the mask on Mondays.) Each customer would have to present identification to prevent multiple purchases.

The rough-and-tumble implementation of this plan should dispel any mistaken notion that Koreans are unselfish and order-oriented communitarians. The producers revolted, with some of them claiming they would stop producing masks rather than sell them at a loss (Lee, Jin 2020). They only resumed production after further negotiation with the government. The pharmacies that sold the masks were overwhelmed with the additional task of checking IDs and ensuring customers lined up and were forced to sell the masks that earned them little profit. Some of the customers got into fisticuffs out of frustration at the prospect of leaving empty-handed after waiting in long lines. However, after several weeks of adjustment, the public came to trust the distribution system to have masks on hand when they were needed. The government also provided a smartphone app to show the real time inventory of masks at various pharmacies. Within a month, the mask supply stabilized, and there were no more long lines at pharmacies.

Schooling was another major issue. The pandemic began during the public schools’ winter break, as the South Korean school year begins in March. As the outbreak continued through early March, the government pushed back the schools’ opening several times. The government opened new cable TV channels for each grade level and offered lessons over television, but the unidirectional lecture was not an adequate substitute. In the minds of the Korean public, infamous for their focus on education, anxiety began to build: would their children’s education be disrupted this year? How would, for example, the rising seniors cope with the new schedule and prepare for the all-important college entrance exam later in the year?

To quell the concerns about a major disruption, the government pushed for online classes by building an interactive platform for every classroom in Korea so that the students can virtually meet with their teacher and classmates. To achieve this, the Ministry of Education converted a pilot program that was designed to host 2,000 simultaneous connections to a national online infrastructure that could host all 3 million public students in South Korea—an endeavor that was described as “converting a sailboat into an aircraft carrier” (Jo 2020). With around-the-clock support from Microsoft and LG CNS, the Ministry of Education completed this process in two weeks, allowing for the “online opening” of schools on April 9. Although some technical problems persisted, the online instruction served as a critical bridge for the full opening of schools, which occurred on a staggered basis from late May to early June.



Voter in Gwangju receives a temperature check prior to entering the polling site. Source.

Next came the National Assembly elections on April 15, in which South Korea elected the members for its unicameral legislature. It was a particularly important election, as throughout Moon Jae-in’s term until that point, his administration could not enact its legislative agenda as their Democratic Party had the plurality but not majority in the legislature, with 123 seats out of 300. With two years remaining in Moon’s single five-year term, the Assembly elections practically served as a midterm election that would either provide a renewed boost for Moon’s political mandate or turn the president into an early lame duck. The logistics of having millions of voters cast their ballot amid the pandemic was a daunting problem. As late as one month before the elections, some politicians called for the elections to be postponed (Lee, M. 2020)

Ultimately, the elections proceeded, making South Korea’s National Assembly elections the first national election to be held in the pandemic era. Nearly all of Korea’s voting is in-person, as absentee voting had been a popular method of election-rigging by South Korea’s military dictatorships prior to democratization. Having disavowed remote voting options such as the mail-in ballot, Korea undertook an elaborate process to ensure the safety of the voting public. After having put on a mask and lined up at the polling site in a socially distanced manner, each voter could enter the site only after a temperature check did not show a fever. After entering, the voters had to clean their hands with a hand sanitizer and put on disposable gloves, provided by the polling site, then proceed to vote after an ID check. Those with a fever or respiratory symptoms were escorted to a separate voting booth, which was cleaned after each use. Those under quarantine after having been diagnosed with the virus or having come in contact with a carrier received temporary relief from their quarantine, during which they could exercise their right to vote at a designated polling site. The result was a highly successful election in terms of participation: the turnout was 66.2 percent, the highest turnout for an Assembly election since 1992—with no case of coronavirus traceable to the polling sites.

The election was also a wild success for the Moon Jae-in administration, as his Democratic Party won 180 seats out of 300 in the National Assembly, an unprecedented scale of victory even under South Korea’s military dictatorship when elections were blatantly rigged. While the coronavirus response was not the only factor in play, the result was an unmistakable vote of confidence for the Moon administration’s handling of the pandemic. Moon’s approval rating, surveyed each week by Gallup Korea, dipped slightly in the last week of February when the Daegu outbreak reached its peak, then began taking off in the second week of March as Daegu was exiting the peak (Gallup Korea 2020). By the first week of April, a week before the election, Moon enjoyed a +20 margin in approval (56% approve, 36% disapprove); by the first week of May, Moon’s approval rating was a staggering +50, with 71% approval and 21% disapproval. Among those who expressed approval of Moon, 53% responded that the leading reason was the COVID-19 response. Even among those who disapproved of Moon, only 8% responded that the administration’s pandemic response was inadequate.



Conclusion: The Limits of Earning Public Trust as a Pandemic Response

For Koreans who were feeling increasingly safe in the belief that the coronavirus episode was behind them, the Itaewon club outbreak in early May was a rude awakening. Contact tracing revealed that on May 7, a virus carrier went club-hopping in the hip Itaewon district, coming into contact with thousands of people in a matter of several hours. By May 26, the KCDC traced 255 cases of COVID-19 originating from the Itaewon club cluster, with the infection traveling as far as seven steps removed from the original patient in Itaewon. In this instance, contact tracing was particularly difficult as many of the club goers were visiting Itaewon’s vibrant gay bar scene, and were less than forthcoming about their whereabouts for fear of being outed in a society where homophobia remains strong.

This essay discussed the Moon Jae-in administration’s success in cultivating public trust in response to the coronavirus pandemic, delivering excellent results both in terms of public health and political gains. However, in order to caution against excessive exuberance, it must be noted that the government’s efforts to win public trust were largely focused on measures that would appeal to society as a whole, such as mask distribution. When confronted with specific demographics that were much less inclined to cooperate, the contact tracing had to take on more coercive forms, such as gathering information from nearby cell towers—an intrusion on privacy conjuring the dystopian scenario feared by some observers.

That two of the largest coronavirus clusters of South Korea were the Shincheonji cultists and the gay club goers is illustrative. These were two marginalized groups of people who, for justifiable and less-than-justifiable reasons, held long-standing mistrust of the government that could not be overcome by a series of short-term measures, however well-intended and well-executed they may have been. These clusters show that even in a country with world-leading testing and tracing capabilities led by a government that earned broad-based trust, relatively small sub-groups can derail efforts to contain the virus. Thus, to the extent that South Korea’s pandemic response succeeded because Koreans trusted the government, it may be that the government so far has been fortunate not to encounter too many groups whose trust could never be won.





References

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밧세바는 강간당한 것인가, 유혹한 것인가

밧세바는 강간당한 것인가, 유혹한 것인가



김순영의 '구약성경 속 여성 돋보기'

밧세바는 강간당한 것인가, 유혹한 것인가

한종호  2016. 12.

구약성경 속 여성 돋보기(16)







밧세바는 강간당한 것인가, 유혹한 것인가



 “모호하게 보이는 것들에서 우리는 뭔가를 깨달을 수 있다”라고 말한 자끄 라깡의 한 마디처럼 모호함은 텍스트 해석의 실마리가 되곤 한다. 모호성은 일상 언어와 과학의 영역에서 환영받지 않지만, 문학의 옷을 입은 텍스트의 모호성은 독자를 미묘한 언어게임의 장으로 불러들인다. 예컨대 다윗의 드라마에서 도덕적으로 가장 큰 문제였던 이른바 밧세바와의 간음 사건에서도 모호성이 포착된다. 단 한 절만으로 기록된 이 사건은 사무엘하 11장 전체 맥락에서 왕의 권력을 남용한 다윗의 일방적인 강간행위는 아니었는가를 질문하게 만든다.



다윗의 간음 이야기는 이스라엘과 암몬과의 전쟁이 진행되는 폭력의 상황 가운데(10장; 12:16-31) 다윗의 궁전에서 벌어진 사건이다. 전쟁 상황, “왕들이 출전할 때”가 되었지만 다윗은 자신의 궁에 머물러 있었다. 온 이스라엘 군대는 랍바를 에워싸고 전쟁 중이었지만(11:1), 다윗은 저녁 시간 침상에서 일어나 옥상을 거닐다가 목욕하는 한 여인을 보게 된다(2절). 왕이 전쟁터에 군사들을 보내놓고 한가로이 저녁 산책하는 모습은 불안하고 불길하다. 군사들과 함께 전쟁터에 있어야 할 왕이 여유로운 시간을 보내는 것은 직무유기다.



옥상을 거닐던 중 다윗 왕의 눈에 들어온 한 여인, 그 여인은 매우 아름다워 보였다(2절). 다윗은 사람을 보내 그 여인이 누군지 알아본다. 심부름을 다녀온 사람이 “그녀는 엘리암의 딸이고, 헷 사람 우리아의 아내 밧세바 아닙니까?”(3절)라는 질문형식의 답변을 한다. 다윗이 이미 잘 아는 사람들이라는 것을 밝힌 셈이다. 우리아는 다윗의 37명의 용사 중 한 사람이고(23:39), 엘리암 역시 다윗의 용장이었다(23:34). 다윗은 밧세바의 신원을 확인하고도 그녀를 호출한다.



 다윗이 전령을 보내어 그 여자를 자기에게로 데려오게 하고 그 여자가 그 부정함을 깨끗하게 하였으므로 더불어 동침하매 그 여자가 자기 집으로 돌아가니라(4절, 개역개정).



 그런데도 다윗은 사람을 보내어서 그 여인을 데려왔다. 밧세바가 다윗에게로 오니, 다윗은 그 여인과 정을 통하였다(그 여인은 마침 부정한 몸을 깨끗하게 씻고 난 다음이었다) 그런 다음에 밧세바는 다시 자기의 집으로 돌아갔다(4절, 새번역).







개역개정과 새번역의 미묘한 차이는 문장의 모호성을 반영한다. 히브리 문장의 동사들을 꼼꼼히 살펴보면, 다윗이 주도하는 형태다. 다윗은 여자에게 전령들을 보냈다. 그가 그녀를 취했고 그녀는 그에게로 들어갔다. 그리고 그는 그녀와 함께 누웠다(4절). 두 명 이상의 전령이 다윗의 명령에 따라 밧세바에게 갔을 때, 그녀는 자신이 왜 왕의 호출을 받았는지 알지 못한 채 명령대로 다윗에게 간 것이다.







이 과정에서 밧세바의 저항이나 불복종의 묘사는 없다. “정을 통했다”라는 번역은 둘의 합의된 성관계처럼 보이게 한다. 그러나 목소리 없는 밧세바의 수동적인 태도와 대조되는 다윗의 적극적인 행동과 왕으로서 강제력 행사의 가능성을 따져봐야 한다. 말한 것과 말하지 않은 것 사이의 간격과 모호성의 긴장이 있다. 밧세바의 수동적인 태도와 정황에 해석자들이 관심을 두었다면 다윗을 강간범으로 고발하지 않았을까?







해석자들은 밧세바의 자리로 이동하여 수동적일 수밖에 없는 처지를 상상해보려 하지 않았다. 왕의 지위가 요구하는 강제력과 명령을 받는 밧세바의 복종 사이에서 고려해야 할 것은 없는가? 몇몇 해석자들처럼 이 여인이 저녁 시간에 목욕하고 있었던 것을 문제 삼아야 하는가? 밧세바가 누군가에게 보이기 위해 목욕하고 있었던 것인가? 한 여자가 목욕하고 있고, 왕이 높은 곳에서 지켜보고 있다. 그녀는 다윗을 볼 수 없다. 그녀는 단지 누군가에 의해 관찰 당했을 뿐이다. 본문은 그녀의 의도와 감정을 단 한 줄도 표현하지 않았다.







그럼에도 불구하고 그녀의 목욕을 유혹하려고 추파를 보내는 행위처럼 해석하는 주석가들이 있다. 이것은 목욕하는 여성을 남성의 성적인 도발을 자극하려고 유혹한 것처럼 죄를 덮어씌우려는 의도다. 이러한 해석은 밧세바를 가부장적인 위계질서의 틀 안에서 여성은 남성을 유혹하는 위험한 존재라는 인식에 기초한 것이다. 동시에 여성을 향한 ‘동료인간’으로서의 연대의식이 결여된 차별적인 태도다.







밧세바가 목욕한 것을(2절) 생리로 인한 부정한 기간이 끝나 정화하는(4절) 제의적인 정결예식이라는 해석은 접어두자. 또 다른 문제가 이 여인의 임신에서(5절) 시작되니까. 11장에서 밧세바가 처음 소개될 때를 제외하면, 그녀는 실명이 아니라 “그 여자” 혹은 “우리아의 아내”로만 불린다. 다윗 왕의 지위와 권력 앞에서 밧세바의 목소리는 없다. “내가 임신했습니다.”라는 한 마디 말뿐이었다. 그녀 역시 다윗처럼 사람을 보내 임신 사실을 알렸을 뿐이다. 이것은 우리아의 아내로서 다윗과 동침한 위험성을 감지한 대처다. 동시에 그녀의 임신은 다윗의 범죄행위를 드러내는 증거다.







밧세바의 임신 소식을 전해들은 다윗은 자신의 충실한 장군 우리아를 전쟁터에서 불러들여 밧세바와 성관계를 갖도록 책략을 짜냈지만 실패하고 만다. 다윗은 밧세바의 뱃속 아기를 우리아의 아기처럼 위장하여 죄를 은폐하려 했지만, 우리아는 다윗의 숨은 의도를 좌절시켰다. 우리아는 왕에게 장군님과 모든 군대가 벌판에서 야영중인데, 어찌 집에 가서 먹고 마시고 아내와 동침할 수 있겠냐며 그럴 수 없다고 했다(11절). 다윗은 당황스러웠을 것이다. 그는 죄를 감추기 위한 시도가 실패하자 우리아가 전쟁터에서 칼에 맞아 죽도록 요압 장군에게 명령을 내리는 방식을 선택했다(15-17절). 그는 은밀하게 비열했다.







밧세바는 자기 남편의 죽음이 다윗 왕의 비밀스러운 계획에 근거한 것을 모르는 상황이다. 우리아의 아내는 남편의 죽음 소식을 듣고 슬피 울며 애도의 시간을 가졌다. 애도의 시간이 끝나자 다윗은 사람을 보내 그녀를 궁으로 불러들인다. 이 여인은 다윗의 아내가 되고, 아들을 낳았다. 저자는 다윗이 저지른 일에 대해 “여호와 보시기에 악했다”라고 평가했다(26-27절).







다윗의 죄악은 두 가지로 압축된다. 다른 사람의 아내를 취하여 간음했고, 자기 손에 직접 피를 묻히지 않았어도 우리아의 죽음을 사주했다. 때문에 11장의 본문은 다윗의 행위를 비난하지만, 밧세바를 비난하지도 죄인 취급하지도 않는다. 간음은 행위 대상자인 남녀 모두에게 책임이 있지만, 밧세바가 아니라 다윗에게만 죄의 책임을 돌린다. 왜일까. 저자는 이 사건을 왕의 권력과 지위를 남용한 성범죄행위로 간주한 것이다. 그러니까 다른 남자의 아내를 바라보는 욕망을 비난해야지 벗음을 상상하게 하는 밧세바의 목욕을 도덕적으로 비난할 이유는 없다.







신앙과 신학적 교훈이 담긴 본문은 말한 것과 말하지 않은 것 사이의 모호성에서 질문하며 사유할 자유를 허락했다. 그러면 다윗과 밧세바 이야기에서 우리가 가져야하는 부담과 책임은 무엇일까. 다윗은 권력을 남용한 왕으로서 품위를 잃었고, 마음의 법정인 양심을 버렸으며, 죄는 또 다른 죄를 낳는다는 교훈의 증거가 되었다. 다윗이 이스라엘의 위대한 왕이었더라도, 성경은 그의 도덕적인 죄를 덮어두지 않았다. 이 맥락에서 우리 시대의 ‘목회자 성윤리’ 의식도 따져볼 일이다. 목사의 영적 지위를 이용한 성범죄가 의혹제기로만 끝나거나 피해 여성의 문제로만 끝나지 않도록 공동체의 책임의식이 절실하다.







김순영/백석대 신학대학원 강사





좋아요14



김태현2016.12.06

글 잘읽어보았습니다. 다윗의 범죄에 대해서는 님과 같은 생각입니다. 하지만 그 당시 신본주의적 왕정체제에서의 다윗의 지위와 현대의 목회자의 지위를 비교한 것은 지나친 논리의 비약아닌가 합니다. 목회자의 성적 타락에 대한 엄중한 평가는 다윗의 사례를 인용할 필요도 없이 이미 십계명이나 레위기서 자체 명시된 내용으로도 충분히 정죄가능한 것이지요. 님은 은연 중에 다윗 당시 관념조차도 할 수 없었던 현대 세속주의의 잣대로 억지로 들이대고 좌편향적 사상과 외곡된 페미니즘을 관철시킬 목적으로 성경을 이용하는 의도가 속속들이 드러납니다.



무엇을 어떻게 주장하든 님의 자유지만 다윗과 밧세바 사건의 기술의도는 절대적 왕권을 남용한 후 당시의 역사적 정황과 다윗의 탄탄한 지지세력 및 사회적 인지도를 통해 이를 덮어버리려고 해도 가능했을 법함에도 불구하고, 다윗은 그것을 온전히 하나님 앞에 나아가 하나님께 사죄하고 그와의 관계를 다시 회복했다는 점입니다. 나중에 그가 그런 죄의 댓가로 밧세바의 아이가 죽거나 한 점은 하나님과의 관계회복에 비하면 결코 중요한 문제는 아닙니다.



그리고 다윗은 인간에게 그런 문제를 폭로하거나 용서를 빌거나 하지도 않았다는 점에서, 첫째, 간음과 살인을 포함한 율법의 침해는 하나님과 인간간의 관계를범한 것이라는 관점으로 보면 그런 관계회복이 가장 급선무이며, 둘째, 그로 인한 피해자와의 후속적인 관계회복은 사실상 부차적인 문제일 수 있다는 것입니다. 피해자와의 관계회복은 피의자가 노력은 할 수 있지만 쉽사리 이루어 질 수 없는 여러 정황과 감정적 요소등 복합덕 요인 들이 있지요. 하지만 이것이 이루어지지 않았다 하여 하나님과의 관계회복이 무효가 되거나, 흔히 얘기하는 피의자의 구원여부자체가 무효화된다고나 타인의 입장에서 피의자의 구원여부 자체까지 의심해야 한다는 것은 결코 아니라고 봅니다.



따라서 님이 쓴 본문의 논리는 다윗과 밧세바 사례에서, 속죄(expitiation)에 따른 신학적 함의를 상당히 외곡시킬 위험이 있는 지나친 논리의 비약으로 보입니다.



권력의 남용으로인해 잃어버린 것들은 그저 님의 상상일 뿐 성경의 신학적 교훈은 상당히 명료합니다. 그걸 님은 페미니스트적인, 그리고 상당히 외곡되고 좌편향적인 민주주의 개념을 결부시키려 하는 심각한 오류를 범하고 있는 것입니다.



개독이싫어요2019.07.10

밑에댓글끔찍하네요..너무맹목적이기까지하네..;;



말이 심하네2020.03.18

위엣분 개독이 싫다면서 성경체널와서 뭐라하네... 위엣글은 뭐 불경이냐? 댓글은 개독이고?



ㅇㅇ2020.06.28

밧세바와 우리야 아히도벨과 자기 미래의 자식들에게 죄를 지은 일은 분명한 죄악인데 하나님께 용서받았다는 사실만을 강조하며 합리화하는 사람들이 많아요. 정말 불쾌한 일이죠, 하나님께서 이 모든 일을 성경으로 남기신데는 이유가 있읅 것입니다.

希修 我 vs. 無我

希修

23 h  · Shared with Public

< 我 vs. 無我  >

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원시 힌두교의 영향이 우선 섞이고, 그 후 각 지역마다 현지 철학 및 토속 신앙들이 스며든 대승불교의 어떤 개념/이론들은 초기경전에 나오는 애초의 부처님 가르침과는 좀 다를 수가 있다. 慈悲와 無我도 그런 예에 속하는데, 박원순 시장 문제와 연결되는 지점 (3번)도 있고 해서 무아에 대해 수다를 떨어 보려고 한다. (공부삼아 가끔 써 보는 것일 뿐 초보 수준의 이해에 불과함을 미리 말씀드립니다. 아래에 단계를 나눈 것은, 타니사로 스님의 가르침과 아비담마에 대한 저의 얕은 이해에 근거하여 편의상 나름대로 도식화해 본 것입니다. 제 자신의 이해가 1~3단계의 순서를 따르기는 했지만, 1~3단계가 서로 다른 '측면'들로서 동시에 고려되는 것이 이상적이기는 하겠습니다.)  

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(1) 1단계: '나'는 있다

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아시다시피 불교는 업에 의한 윤회를 전제한다. 이승의 모든 디테일들이 세세하게 다 예정되어 있는 것은 아니고, 마치 어떤 방송국에서 TV 연속극 제작을 시작할 때는 대충의 플롯만 있고 스토리의 디테일은 시청자 반응을 보면서 전개해 가는 것처럼, 또 삶의 큰 윤곽은 四柱八字에 나오지만 그 구체성은 스스로 완성해 가는 것처럼, 그런 대충의 밑그림만 그려져 있는 정도라고 얘기할 수 있을 듯. 물론 그 '윤곽' 자체가, 삶을 일정 방향으로 흐르게끔 하는 모멘텀을 이미 갖고 있기는 하며, 그걸 바꾸는 게 쉽지도 않지만 불가능하지도 않다. 내 삶을 완성하는 것은 결국 나의 의지와 노력. 나의 현재 생각/말/행동이 얼마나 'skillful'/'wholesome'한가 (貪瞋痴가 적은가)?에 따라, 이것이 새로운 업으로서 전생/과거 업과 상호작용을 계속하면서 나의 삶을 확정해 나간다. 남에게 피해를 주면서까지 자신의 쾌락/이익만 좇는 이기적인 사람은 1단계의 날라리, 바른 과정/방법을 통해 행복을 추구하는 사람은 1단계의 모범생이라 할 수 있을 텐데, 암튼 이 삶의 '책임'( ≠'탓')은 오로지 '나'의 것이다!

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(2) 2단계: '나'라는 사람에 대한 규정이 가능한가? 

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기독교에서 말하는 것과 같은, 영원불변하는 그런 '영혼'을 불교에선 인정하지 않는다. One and the same 영혼이 옷갈아입듯 몸을 바꾸는 것이 힌두교의 윤회 (reincarnation)이고, 한 양초의 불로써 다른 양초에 불을 붙이듯 그렇게 불=업이 다음 양초=생으로 넘어간다고 보는 것이 불교의 윤회 (rebirth). 힌두교의 윤회와 다른 점은, 불교의 윤회에서는 이전 양초의 불과 이후 양초의 불이 같다고도 다르다고도 말하기가 애매하다는 것이다. 전생의 철수가 남긴 업이 물질을 끌어 와 영희라는 이승의 육체를 형성하며, 이 때 철수의 업이 영희에게 상속된다 - 부모님의 재산을 상속받을 때 채무도 함께 상속되듯이. 상속받은 업을 요리할 책임은 영희에게 있고, 그 요리의 결과가, 영희의 미래 and/or 영희의 업을 상속할 내세의 미경에게 영향을 미치는데, 어떤 업이 이승의 영희 자신에게 결과를 가져오고 어떤 업이 내세의 미경에게 갈지 알 수 없기에, 영희로서는 그저 요리에 최선을 다 할 밖에. 이것이 업과 윤회의 과정이며, 해탈로써 정지시키지 않는 한, 이 과정은 영원히 무한히 반복된다. 겉모습으로만 철수-영희-미경 '세 사람'인 것이지 업은 그렇게 명확히 구분되지 않고, 한 생 안에서도 새로운 업에 의해 매 순간 계속 '만들어져 가는' 영희를 딱히 규정할 방법 또한 없다. 이 내용을 표현한 개념이 바로 '無我'. 이런 관점에서 보자면 영희가 생각하는 '나'라는 것은, 1단계에서의 자기중심성 혹은 소위 말하는 ego에 대한 환상 내지 집착인 것. 

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하지만 여기서 머무르면, 종교에 중독된 좀비 혹은 '道士입네' 하는 사이비가 된다. 어떤 사무라이가 적을 죽이면서 "오늘 내가 너의 목을 베는 것은 내 자신의 목을 베는 것과 같다. 모든 것이 하나일 뿐 너도 따로 없고 나도 따로 없는데, 누가 누구를 죽인다는 말인가?"라고 했다는 일화처럼. 온갖 비리와 탐욕에 절어 사는 스님들도 전부 이런 '논리'를 자기합리화로 악용하면서 선악을 초월한 체 한다.  

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사실 부처님은 "'나'라는 것이 있습니까?"라는 질문에 Yes/No 대답을 아예 거부하셨다!!! "니 몸도 니 마음도 100% 통제 못 하면서 니 몸이나 마음에 집착하는 게 무슨 의의가 있느냐?"라며 지나친 애착/집착을 경계하거나, "Self라는 관점에서도 not-self라는 관점에서도, existence의 관점에서도 non-existence의 관점에서도 생각하지 마라"고 하셨을 뿐. 사람들이 여기서 'not-self'라는 부분만 뽑아내어 확대해석하고 과장하고 또 오염되어 오늘에 이르게 된 것. 그러므로 기억할 것은 오로지, 부처님이 말씀하신 이 마지막 문장뿐이다.

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(3) 3단계: 가방의 브랜드 대신 재료, 디자인, 바느질 하나 하나를 보라

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그럼 self나 existence 말고 어떤 관점에서 생각해야 하느냐? '너', '나', 이렇게 패키지로서의 '사람' (1단계에서의 주체)에 촛점을 두지 말고 그 패키지의 구성요소인 낱낱의 생각/말/행동에 어떤 탐진치가 얼마나 들어있는가?에만 집중하라는 것. (물론 낱낱의 생각/말/행동이 쌓여 패키지가 되는 것이니, 결과/포장보다 과정/내용에 집중하라는 의미로 이해할 수도 있을 듯.) 이렇게 살면, 자존심, 체면, 열등감, 자괴감, 우월감 등 때문에 서로 에너지 소모할 필요가 없어진다 - 이론적으로는. 부처님은 무조건 온화하고 자상하기만 하셨을 거라고, no judgment를 가르치셨을 거라고 흔히 추측하지만, 사실은 다르다. "그건 너무나 멍청한 소리다", "이 쓸모 없는 인간아" (누군가가 매우 위험한 가치관을 갖고 있을 때) 같은 말씀들도 종종 하셨고, 타인의 생각/말/행동 속에 어떤 탐진치가 작용하고 있으며 어떤 단기적 그리고 장기적 결과를 낳는지를 늘 주의깊게 관찰, 분석하라고 하셨다. 그런 능력이 먼저 생겨야만 자기 자신의 생각/말/행동도 판단, 교정해 나갈 수 있을 것이기 때문에. 그러니 서로 서로를 비판해 주라고 (물론 방법이 중요), 공동체의 화합!을 위해서는 비판!이 필요하니 (비판을 통한 조율이 불가능하다면 서로간의 '다름'은 억압될 수밖에 없는데, 억압 속에서 무슨 '화합'이 가능하겠나? 동양 특유의 공동체주의는 합리적 비판을 억압하려고만 하는데, 최소한 초기불교는 그러지 않는다) 분쟁시에는 제 3자를 동석시켜 토론하라고 초기경전은 가르친다. (부처님이 비판/논쟁을 안 하실 때는, '겸손' 때문도 아니고 상대를 '존중'하셔서도 아니고, 상대가 너무 수준이하이거나 배울 자세가 안 되어 있을 때였다.) 또, 비판을 잘 못 하거나 잘 못 받아들이는 사람은 '신뢰할 수 없는 사람'이라고까지 초기경전은 말한다. 자존심이나 체면 등의 사적인 감정 때문에 판단이 흐려지는 사람이라면 그를 어떻게 신뢰할 수 있겠는가?라는 메세지라고 나는 이해한다. (그리고, 이렇듯 생각/말/행동 속에서 12연기를 파악하려는 impersonal한 노력이, 칸트의 '보편적 입법원리'와 좀 비슷한 부분이 있는 것도 같고 아닌 것도 같고..) 

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다른 예를 들어 보자. 어떤 명품 가방은 가격이 무려 천만원에 이른다. 재료, 디자인, 바느질 등에 대한 세심한 공이 쌓여 그 브랜드의 유명세가 생겨난 것이지만, 나중에는 그런 퀄리티 자체보다 브랜드가 더 중요해진다. 그런데 그 회사에서 어떤 신상품 하나를 인조 가죽으로 만들면서 진짜 가죽을 사용했다고 광고하다 들통이 난다면, 다른 모든 제품들이 완벽해도 그 브랜드는 더이상 이전의 명성을 유지하지 못 할 것이다. 그러나 소비자들이 브랜드 아닌 실제 재료, 디자인, 바느질에만 근거해서 구매를 결정한다면, 허위광고 이전에 천만원을 받을 수도 없을 테고, 허위 광고 이후에도 다른 상품들은 여전히 제 가치대로 팔릴지도 모른다 - 가격이 실제의 물리적 가치를 투명하게 반영하므로. 사람도 마찬가지인 듯. 

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정치인들 여럿을 우리는 자살로 잃었다. 어떤 정치인에 대한 팬덤이 열광적일수록, 그 정치인이 느끼는 '브랜드 수호' 부담감은 무거워질 것이고, 이미지와 실제 자신 사이의 균열이 생기기 시작할 때 즉시 인정하고 바로잡기보다는, 위에서 언급한 사무라이나 일탈 스님들처럼 자기합리화를 하는 쪽으로 기울어지기가 100배 쉬운 것이 인간의 본성인 듯. 그렇게 문제가 곪다가 어느 날 터지는 것이고. 하지만 그렇게 온세상이 무너지는 듯 느껴질 때 "지금 이 순간 어떤 생각/말/행동을 하는 것이 가장 skillful/wholesome 한지, 오로지 이 하나만을 impersonal 하게 생각해라", "칭찬이나 비난 같은 브랜드 이미지의 문제에 휘둘리지 마라", "'너', '나' 이런 패키지의  차원이 아닌 낱낱의 생각/말/행동 차원에서 생각해라", "후회나 자책으로 괴로와하지 말고, 잘못을 인정하고 반복 않기 위해 노력하기로 결심하는 그 선택을 매 순간 갱신함으로써 자긍심을 쌓아라".. 부처님의 이런 말씀들을 누군가 그들에게 해 주었다면, 그랬다면 어떻게 되었을까. 잘못을 인정하고, 사과와 처벌을 감수하며, 더 나아지고자 노력하는, 그런 용기있고 책임있는 훌륭한 모델을 볼 수 있었을까..  

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어떤 사회적 인사가 그 명성에 못 미치는 행동을 할 때, 人情 때문에, 내가 '아랫사람'이라서, 상대방의 체면을 생각해서, 조직의 '화합'을 위해, 우리 진영에 흠이 갈까봐, 남의 허물 특히 지인의 허물은 무조건 덮어만 주는 것이 '미덕'이라 배웠기에, 이런 온갖 이유들, '브랜드 이미지'로 수렴되는 그 잡다한 구실들 때문에 덮고 덮다가, 살이 썩어 고름이 나고 악취가 나도 반창고만 덕지덕지 붙이며 지내다가, 결국은 조직이 괴사하거나 심지어 생명까지 잃는 경우들을 우리는 무수히 보아 왔다. 적당히 '융통성있게' 넘어가지 않고 매 순간 그 하나의 생각/말/행동에만 집중했다면, 그렇게 매 순간 순간을 고지식하게! 산다면, 단기적으로는 혹 '피할 수 있었던 손해'를 보더라도 장기적으로는 훨씬 오래 '진실만이 줄 수 있는 마음의 평화'를 유지할 수 있으련만.. 그러니 '고인에게 불리한 진실은 가급적 은폐하여 고인의 명예를 최대한 지키는 것이 내가 존경하던 분에 대한 나의 도리다'라고 혹 착각하는 이가 단 한 분이라도 계신다면, 그건 1단계의 자기중심적 '아름다운 의리'일 뿐 사실은 惡業 (남의 악행을 돕는 것도 악업이다)임을 이해하셨으면 좋겠다. 탐진치를 줄이는/없애는 善業이라는 것은, 그저 교과서적인 얘기가 아니라 실제로 가장 큰 '이익'( =행복)을 가져오는 가장 현명한 '투자'임을 부디 기억하시기 바란다.  

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(4) 4단계: 모든 것을 초월하라

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해탈을 하려면, 八正道의 8요소 모두를 순서대로 만랩으로 계발하고 균형을 이룬 후, 모든 생각과 관념과 노력을 놓아야 한다고 한다. 그리고 이 생각/관념에는 '나', '수행', '해탈' 등이 모두 포함된다고 한다. "相/想에 집착하지 마라", "모든 것을 내려 놓아라", "생각 많이 하지 마라" 등의 얘기가 모두 이런 의미인데, 문제는, 이건 해탈 직전이나 가서 걱정할 일이라는 것. 지구상 80억 인구 중 이 걱정을 해야 하는 경지에 있는 사람은 아마 80명? 8명?도 안 될 수도 있다. 그러니, 4단계도 아니면서 심오한 척하느라 4단계의 얘기를 주문처럼 읊조리는 사람이 있다면 그의 integrity와 의도에 주의해야 하고, 2단계의 '무아'에 취해 있는 사람은 3단계의 skillful vs. unskillful 사고를 '수준 낮은 이분법'으로 착각하지 말아야 한다. (종교/영성에 관심있는 이들이 가장 빠지기 쉬운 함정도 바로 2단계의 '무아'니 'oneness'니 하는 것들에 대한 집착인데, 초기불교는 이 oneness마저 특정 단계에서의 명상 경험일 뿐 truth/reality는 아니라고 말한다.)   

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(5) 無我之境

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예술 작품/활동에 푸욱 빠져 잠시나마 '나'를 완전히 망각할 때 '무아지경'이라는 표현을 쓰고, 이걸 바람직한 상태로 오해하기에 그래서 심지어는 섹스를 '수행'으로 삼는 '탄트라'라는 것도 생긴 것이지만, 이런 해석은 초기경전의 관점과는 무관하다. 초기불교는 섹스, 도박, 권력, 쇼핑, 예술, 여행, 우정/사랑, 심지어 학문마저도 모두 '감각적 즐거움을 위한 feeding'이라 간주한다. 물론 도박보다는 예술이 건전하고 인간관계보다는 자연에서 즐거움을 찾는 것이 건강하지만, 가장 이상적인 즐거움은 명상을 통해 자가발전하는 것이라고. 또, 예술이든 뭐든 그런 외부 활동/즐거움에 distract되지 않기 위해 일상생활 중에도 늘상 '자신의 호흡에 대한 관조를 anchor로 삼으'라고 (바로 이것이 'centered'의 의미) 초기불교는 가르친다. 그러니 우리가 일상적으로 말하는 '무아'/'무아지경'은, 실은 부처님의 실제 가르침에서는 아주 많이 벗어나 있는 것이라고 할 수 있다.  

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대부분의 사람들은 1단계에서 평생을 보낸다. 2단계의 '무아'도 저 사무라이나 일탈 스님들처럼 그저 '겉멋'에 그치는 경우가 많다. 그러니 3단계를 실천하는 것은 말보다 훨씬 어렵고 특히 인간세상에적용되기엔 비현실적으로 보이는 측면도 있지만.. '사람'이라는 패키지 혹은 브랜드가 아니라 그 패키지를 구성하는 낱낱의 생각/말/행동에 집중하라는 원칙은, 자괴감/자책으로 괴롭거나 혼란스러울 때 특히 도움이 될 수 있을 것 같다. 유명하신 분들일수록 이 점을 기억하시어, 외부에 보여지는 브랜드 이미지 때문에 연기를 하다가 자기 자신으로부터 소외되고 마는 비극이 생기지 않도록, 사회인 아닌 개인으로서의 본인도 지켜 내시기를 바란다. (행/불행을 결정하는 업이 되는 것은 낱낱의 구체적 생각/말/행동이므로, 또 브랜드 이미지에 신경쓰는 자체도 실은 이미 욕심이므로, '자신을 지키'려면 결국은 3단계를 잘 실천해야..) 

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Comments

崔明淑

3단계는 자기로부터 소외되지 않는 상태이겠네요.. 인간의 행복감을 느끼는 상태이기도 한 것 같습니다. 과문하여 글이 쉽게 이해되지는 않네요.ㅜㅜ 그래서 좋습니다.

 · Reply · 22 h · Edited

希修

네, 남이 나를 어떻게 볼까?에 너무 신경쓰며 살면 오히려 불행해지죠. 남들의 시선에만 연연하다가 정작 자신은 방치/무시하게 되구요. 3단계에서 살면 남들 반응에 훨씬 덜 예민해지고 자신에게도 좀더 진실할 수 있고.. ^^

 · Reply · 21 h

崔明淑

希修 1-4단계가 단계별 성장을 나타내는 것이 클리어하게 이해되지가 않아요. 글을 좀 더 잘 읽어봐야겠지요.

 · Reply · 21 h

希修

앞머리에서 언급했듯이, 단계를 나눈 것은 설명의 편의상 임의적으로 나눈 것이고, 제가 이런 순서로 이해하게 되기도 했습니다. 그러나 1~3단계가 결국은 서로 다른 '측면'으로서 동시에 고려되는 것이 이상적일 것 같기는 합니다.

 · Reply · 21 h · Edited

알라딘: 붉은 황제의 민주주의

알라딘: 붉은 황제의 민주주의





붉은 황제의 민주주의 - 시진핑의 꿈과 중국식 사회주의의 본질 

가토 요시카즈 (지은이),정승욱 (옮긴이)한울(한울아카데미)2018-07-27



496쪽



책소개



<뉴욕 타임스> 중국어판 칼럼니스트 가토 요시가즈가 하버드 대학과 존스홉킨스 대학에서 연구한 중국의 현재와 미래. 중국공산당이 지배하는 14억 인구의 거대 국가 중국은 평화적 정권 교체를 이루어냈다. 역사적으로 일당 독재국가가 피의 숙청 과정 없이 권력 교체가 이루어진 예는 거의 없었다. 소련과 동유럽 제국은 예외 없이 정치파동을 겪었으나 중국은 예외다.



공산당 총서기 시진핑은 권력의 정점에 오르자 개혁을 착착 진행했고, 반부패 투쟁을 통해 민심을 얻는 데 성공했다. 시진핑 시대의 중국은 현대 시대에 유례없는 정치적 안정을 구가하며 중국 특색의 사회주의 체제를 굳혀가고 있다. 누구도 따라올 수 없는 전략으로 자신의 뜻을 관철시키는 시진핑과 공산당은 여러 난제에도 차분히 문제 해결을 모색한다.



서방 세계는 정치 후진국이라고 폄하하지만, 세계에서 두 번째 경제 부국이자 미국과 어깨를 나란히 하는 유일한 상대국 중국. 일당독재라는 한계를 넘어 통치의 정당성을 확보해나가는 중국공산당 리더십의 본질은 무엇인지 알려준다.

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목차

서론 중국 민주화 연구란 중국공산당 연구다제1부 내정

제1장 중국공산당

제2장 공산당의 정통성

제3장 네 개의 축으로 본 공산당 정치

제4장 ‘중국의 꿈’과 ‘백 년 치욕’

제5장 노홍위병과 시진핑의 정치관

제2부 개혁

제6장 덩샤오핑에서 시진핑으로

제7장 톈안먼 사건과 시진핑 시대

제8장 반부패 투쟁

제9장 후진타오 시대의 마이너스적인 유산을 청산하다

제10장 애국심과 내셔널리즘

제3부 외압

제11장 홍콩의 ‘보통선거’ 논란

제12장 타이완과 중국인

제13장 중국인 유학생

제14장 초대국, 미국의 의도

제15장 반일과 중국 민주화결론: 중국 인민은 바뀌는가

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책속에서

P. 73 후쿠야마와 보걸, 이 두 사람의 중국판 저서가 정치적으로 민감한 시기에 중국 대륙에서 출판된 사실로부터 필자가 주장하고 싶은 것이 있다. 최근 당 지도부는 “국제적으로 영향력과 지명도가 있는 서방 학자의 언설을 유입해 공산당 일당지배라는 정치체제하에서 전개되는 모든 정책에 정통성을 부여한다”는 수법을 중시한다. 그 과정에서 직면할 수밖에 없는 정치적 리스크는 과감히 감수한다는 것이다.  접기

P. 85 좋은 지도자와 나쁜 지도자라는 후쿠야마의 틀에서 보시라이 사건을 검증하면, 과도기에 놓인 중국 정치가 직면한 현상(現狀)에 관해 두 가지 교훈을 얻을 수 있다. 첫째, 비민주적인 정치체제 즉 정부의 정통성이 제도적으로 담보되어 있지 않음에도, 극단적으로 나쁜 지도자가 지도부의 합의로 배제된 것은 긍정적인 경향이다. 둘째, 정권 운영 측면에서 중국 정치가 지도력이나 행동력을 찾아보기 힘든 시대에 돌입하고 있는 현실이라는 것이다. 카리스마 부재라는 비기능적인 집단지도 체제하에서 극단적으로 나쁜 지도자는 배제될 수 있지만, 좋은 지도자도 출현하기 어려워지기 때문이다. 즉, 좋은 지도자와 나쁜 지도자를 구별조차 지을 수 없게 되는, 혹은 좋지도 나쁘지도 않은 무던하고 평범한 지도자가 만연하는 시대에 들어갈 가능성도 부정할 수 없다는 점이다.  접기

P. 210 중국판 정치 개혁이 공정한 선거, 사법의 독립, 언론의 자유라는 3요소를 제도적으로 확립해 서구식에 근접한 민주화를 실현할 가능성은 낮다. 그래도 시진핑에 ‘기대’할 수밖에 없는 국내 사정을 감안할 때, 중국공산당의 정치 개혁은 쉽지 않다. 역사책 애독가로 알려진 시진핑은 당대 타국의 사례와 타국이 어떠했는지를 참조하기보다는 중국의 역사를 중시하고 참고하면서 정책을 강구하는 경향이 뚜렷하다고 알려져 있다. 2014년 3월, 당과 정부의 경제 정책에 발언권이 있다고 알려진 야오양(姚洋) 베이징 대학 국가발전연구원 원장은 하버드 대학 캠퍼스에서 필자에게 다음과 같이 말했다. “시진핑은 ‘문경의 치(文景之治)’의 역사를 숙독하고 있으며, 자신을 류슈(劉秀, 광무제)와 비교하고 있다.”  접기

P. 301 중화인민공화국의 지도자들은 애국심과 내셔널리즘은 본래 동의하게 다룰 수 없는, 다른 산물임을 충분히 알면서도 양자를 강제적으로 일치시키는 정치를 해왔다. 유아독존이라는 정치적 원리를 채용하고, 중국공산당이 유일하게 옳은 지붕이며, 중화민족이 옳은 국민이라는 정치를 이행해온 것이다. 중국은 국가의 덩치가 커지면서 국제사회에서 영향력이나 책임이 증대하는 한편, 국내 정치·경제·사회 수준의 개혁은 더디다. 빈부의 격차, 민족문제, 환경오염, 사회보장, 교육, 의료, 호적 등의 불공정성, 언론 탄압, 정부의 부패, 대외 관계 …… 문제가 산더미다. 그러나 진정한 문제는 이 문제들이 체제 붕괴로 이어질 것을 걱정하는 ‘국민’들이 ‘조국’을 포기하고 타국으로 이주하는 현상이다. 필자는 이를 ‘공동화(空洞化) 리스크’라 부른다. 중국이 장기적으로 발전해가는 데 필수적인 전략적 자원(특히 인재 자원)이 해외로 이주하면서 나라 가운데가 휑하게 비어버리는 현상에서 초래되는 리스크다.  접기

P. 345 중국의 팽창적 부상을 ‘민주주의에 대한 도전’으로 인식하고 몸을 내던져 자유민주주의나 법치에 대한 침식을 저지하려는 타이완의 대학생과, 톈안먼 사건이 트라우마가 되어 민주화운동에 거리를 둘 뿐 아니라 구미를 비롯한 자유민주주의 국가로 ‘탈출’하려는 중국의 대학생. 민주화의 관점에서 양측의 대학생들과 의사소통하는 과정에서 타이완 대학생으로부터 느낀 것이 신념이라면, 중국 대학생으로부터 느낀 것은 체념이었다. 타이완 해협을 끼고 양자를 둘러싼 정치 환경은 상당히 다르다. 그리고 오늘날 중국과 타이완 쌍방에서 민주화를 둘러싼 역사의 성쇠를, 당사자로서 움직여온 대학생들의 정치적 환경에 대한 입장은 대조적이다.  접기

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저자 및 역자소개

가토 요시카즈 (加藤 嘉一) (지은이)



1984년에 시즈오카현(靜岡縣) 간나미정(函南町)에서 태어났다. 야마나시가쿠인 대학 부속고등학교를 졸업한 후, 2003년 베이징에 유학해 베이징 대학 국제관계학원에서 석사 과정을 수료했다. 베이징 대학 연구원, 푸단 대학 신문학원 강좌학자, 게이오기주쿠 대학 SFC 연구소 방문 연구원을 지냈다. 2012년 8월 미국으로 건너가 하버드 대학 연구원과 존스홉킨스 대학 고등국제문제연구대학원 객원연구원을 거쳐, 현재 랴오닝 대학 국제관계학원 객원교수, 차하르학회 연구원으로 있다. 미국 ≪뉴욕 타임스≫ 중국어판 칼럼니스트이기도 하다. 저서로는 『たった獨りの外交錄』, 『脫·中國論』, 『われ日本海の橋とならん』 등이 있다. 접기

최근작 : <붉은 황제의 민주주의> … 총 17종 (모두보기)





정승욱 (옮긴이)

저자파일



최고의 작품 투표



신간알림 신청

도쿄 특파원으로 활동하며 일본의 진면목과 그 배경을 연구하면서 ‘일본, 중국 바로 보기’에 천착해왔다. 2007년 연세대 행정대학원에서 석사, 2019년 한국외대 대학원에서 “중국공산당 집단지도체제연구”로 국제관계학 박사학위를 취득하고, 국내 대학에서 강의하고 있다. 《김정일 그 후》, 《일본은 절대 침몰하지 않는다》 등의 저서와 《새로운 중국, 시진핑 거버넌스》, 《붉은 황제의 민주주의》, 《넥스트 실리콘밸리》, 《미중 플랫폼 전쟁 GAFA vs BATH》 등의 번역서가 있다.

최근작 : <일본은 절대로 침몰하지 않는다>,<새로운 중국 시진핑 거버넌스>,<김정일 그 후> … 총 11종 (모두보기)

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출판사 제공 책소개



일당독재라는 한계를 넘어 정당성을 확보해가는

중국공산당 리더십의 본질을 날카롭게 파헤친다붉은 황제의 민주주의



정치파동 없이 이뤄낸 평화로운 정권 교체



중국 공산당이 지배하는 거대 국가가 평화적으로 정권 교체를 이루어냈다. 사회주의 체제의 국가들 가운데 역사적으로나 경험적으로나 이 같은 사례는 거의 찾아볼 수 없다. 소련을 비롯해 과거 공산 체제를 수용했던 나라들은 거의 예외 없이 피의 숙청 과정을 통해 정권 교체를 이루어냈다. 그러나 중국은 예외였다. 중국 지도부에 보시라이(薄熙來) 사건 같은 잡음이 다소 일었지만, 제18차 당대회(제18차 중국공산당 전국대표대회)와 2017년 10월 하순 제19차 당대회를 차분한 분위기 속에 진행했다.

후진타오(胡錦濤) 체제에서 시진핑 체제로의 권력 이양과 더불어 시진핑 체제는 더욱 공고해졌다. 서구식 정치학이 대세인 현대 정치학계에서 중국공산당은 연구 대상이 되었다. 국민들이 먹고사는 문제가 해결되고 사회가 복잡다단해지면 민주주의로 이행한다는, 민주국가 이행론이 먹혀들지 않았기 때문이다. 특히 소련처럼 일당 독재국가인 중국도 붕괴할 것이라고 예측했던 보수적인 서구 정치학계는 무색할 수밖에 없다. 이 때문에 한국 정치학계에서도 서구식 잣대로 중국을 재단해서는 안 된다는 자각이 어느 때보다 거세게 일고 있다.

과거 1976년 신중국의 건국자 마오쩌둥 사망을 전후해 공산당 우두머리들 간의 권력투쟁으로 혼란에 빠질 것이라는 전망이 대세였다. 1989년 6월 초순에도 베이징 톈안먼 광장에서 벌어졌던 대학생, 지식인들의 정치민주화 요구 투쟁과 이를 무력 진압한 계엄군을 보며 많은 전문가들은 중국의 분열 가능성을 예측했다. 1997년 개혁개방의 설계자 덩샤오핑 사망 때도 그랬다. 이런 전망은 대부분 미국을 비롯한 서방 측 전문가들에게서 나왔다. 모두 희망 섞인 전망으로 기울었으며 아직 중국은 멀었다는 경멸조의 비판이 주류였다.

이런 시각은 2000년대 중후반까지도 서구 학계 다수의 목소리였으나 예상은 빗나갔다.

중국공산당의 평화적인 정권 교체는 수수께끼였다.



파벌론만으로는 설명할 수 없는 중국의 정치



중국 정치는 표면적으로 볼 때 정치 엘리트끼리 파벌을 지어 권력 다툼을 벌이며 권좌를 서로 주고받는다는 서구 정치학계의 파벌론 분석이 여전히 주류를 이루고 있다. 특히 서구 학계에서는 제17차 당대회와 제18차 당대회를 놓고 파벌론이 크게 부상했다. 이를테면 제18차 당대회 결과 서열 1위 시진핑(習近平) 총서기를 비롯해 서열 3위 장더장(張德江), 4위 위정성(兪正聲), 6위 왕치산(王岐山), 7위 장가오리(張高麗) 등이 장쩌민파였고, 경쟁자였던 후진타오파는 2위 리커창(李克强)과 5위 류윈산(劉雲山) 정도로 줄었다는 식으로 풀이하곤 했다. 그러나 시진핑 시대로 넘어오면서 장파(江派)와 후파(胡派) 대결이라는 중국 정치에 대한 파벌론적 설명으로는 중국정치를 이해할 수 없는 한계를 보였다. 일당 체제를 유지하면서도 세계 2위의 경제 대국이라는 경제성장과 상대적으로 정치 안정을 이뤄낸 중국 지도부를 파벌론만으로 설명할 수 없다.



장쩌민은 왜 시진핑을 선택했는가?



장쩌민 → 후진타오 → 시진핑 시대로 넘어오면서 현대기에 볼 수 없는 정치적 안정이 굳건히 유지되고 있다. 이는 2012년 18차 대회에서 실력자인 장쩌민이 시진핑이라는 인물에게 권력을 넘겨주기로 결심했기 때문이다. 과연 시진핑은 어떤 인물이기에 장쩌민 전 주석의 지원을 받았을까. 실제로 장쩌민 전 주석이 시진핑을 주목한 시기는 2007년 17차 당대회를 6개월 앞둔 때였다. 시진핑 총서기가 중앙 무대에 데뷔한 것은 1997년 제15차 대회였다. 당시 중앙위원 후보위원에 발탁되어 가까스로 중앙 무대의 한자리를 얻은 것이다. 시진핑은 중앙 정치 무대에 데뷔한 지 딱 10년 만인 2007년 권력의 정점인 중앙정치국 상무위원에 서열 5위로 당당히 입성했다. 관운도 보통 관운이 있는 인물이 아니다.

시진핑의 스타일은 장쩌민과 판이하다. 시진핑과 장쩌민이 공산당 내에서 몇 안 되는 독서광이라는 평이 있기는 하지만, 시진핑은 달변가도 아니고 팔방미인도 아니어서 학식이 깊다는 인상도 주지 않는다. 장쩌민은 왜 시진핑에게 대권을 건네주면서 큰 기대를 걸었는가.

장쩌민에게 시진핑은 믿음을 심어주었다. 중국이라는 거대한 배를 신중히 운항하면서, 구소련에서 미하일 고르바초프(Mikhail Gorbachev)가 시작한 페레스트로이카(개혁)와 같은 위험한 일을 벌여 배를 좌초시키고 모두를 끝장내지는 않을 것이라고 믿은 것이다. 장쩌민의 ‘안목’과 역사적인 평가, 그리고 그 후손의 기득권 등을 모두 고려한 선택이었다. 장쩌민 전 주석이 시진핑을 밀면서 혁명 원로들에게 특별히 명분으로 내세운 것은, ‘혁명의 바통’을 대대로 물려주는 ‘정통성’이었다.

장쩌민은 이 ‘정통성’만 유지된다면 중국공산당 ‘3세대 지도부의 핵심’이라는 자신의 명성도 흔들릴 위험이 없다고 판단했을 것이다. 여기까지 보면 장파와 후파의 대결 내지 파벌론이 그런대로 설득력이 있어 보인다. 그러나 장쩌민은 파벌론적 측면에서 시진핑을 지지하지 않았다. 인민을 통치할 정통성, 즉 혁명의 정당성을 이어가면서, 정치 안정을 이뤄내고 경제성장에 집중할 수 있는 통치 능력을 겸비한 인물이 필요했고, 시진핑은 여기에 맞는 인물이었다. 특히 권력 이양기의 중국 지도자들은 전통과 명분을 중시했고, 전통 관행, 즉 불문율로 작동하는 권력 이양 관행을 만들어냈다. 물론 당 규약이 있고, 인민대표대회를 통과한 헌법도 있다. 그러나 보이지 않는 관행을 제대로 이해해야 중국 정치를 이해할 수 있다.

이 책의 필자는 이런 관행을 중국 정치의 본모습을 투여하는 거울로 본다.



문제를 정확히 직시한 시진핑의 반부패 행보



이 책에서는 현실 정치에서 움직이는 권력 투쟁, 즉 선거민주 국가에서도 얼마든지 볼 수 권력투쟁 측면도 있지만, 중국 정치를 움직이는 명분과 관행적인 측면도 고루 투영하고 있다.

중국 연구자들뿐만 아니라 기업가, 정치인은 누구나 향후 중국의 미래에 관심을 갖는다. 미국, 일본처럼 선진형 사회로 갈 것인가, 아니면 사회 전반이 중진국 수준으로 오른 다음 성장이 정체될 것인가. 또는 분출하는 민중의 정치사회적 욕구를 조정하지 못하고 주저 않아 그저 그런 국가로 대충 살아갈 것인가. 공산당의 통치 기반을 뿌리째 흔들어놓을 수 있는 관료들의 부패, 대충대충 해먹기 등, 이런 사정을 말단에서 단계적으로 올라온 시진핑은 후진타오 주석보다 더 분명히 인식하는 인물이다.

중국의 유명 작가 량징(梁京)은 보시라이처럼 시진핑의 범죄도 단속할 기회가 있었을 텐데 움직이지 않았다고 풀이했다. 시진핑은 단 한 번도 관료층 이익집단의 공격에 시달린 적이 없다는 사실로 미루어 그의 처세술이 어떠한지 짐작할 수 있다. 하지만 시진핑은 권력의 정점에 오르자 세간의 시선과는 반대로 움직였다. 그는 평소에 생각했던 대로 착착 개혁을 진행했고, 반부패 투쟁을 통해 민심을 얻는 데 성공했다. 문제를 덮는 것이나 문제를 해결하는 능력에서 시진핑 총서기를 따라갈 인물이 없다고 한다.



아마추어식 시각을 지양하고, 냉철하게 분석한 중국식 민주화의 본질



이른바 G2라는 개념은 미국에서 만들어졌으며, 중국은 미국과 어깨를 나란히 하는 유일한 상대자로 대접받고 있다. 세계 정치 학계에서는 일당 독재라는 한계를 넘어 통치의 정당성을 확보해나가는 중국 공산당의 리더십 내지 통치력, 특히 집정 능력의 본질을 파악하려는 연구자가 점점 늘고 있다. 아직까지도 미국과 서유럽 학자들 사이에서 중국공산당 특유의 집단지도(영도)제와 공산당 내 민주 시스템을 바라보는 시각은 비판적이며, 공산당 일당 체제가 언제까지 지속될 것이냐에 관심이 쏠려 있는 것이 사실이다. 중국은 여전히 공산당 일당 체제 국가이며, 정치범을 억압하는 ‘인권 탄압국’ 내지, 언론·집회·결사의 자유를 허용하지 않는 정치 후진국으로 분류되곤 한다. 그러나 신중국 건국 이후 60여 년 만에 거둔 세계 두 번째 경제 부국, 상대적인 사회 안정, 체계적인 정권 교체와 국가 제도의 안정적 운용, G2라는 국제 위상 등을 감안할 때 중국의 정치체제를 재평가하고 분석해야 한다. 일본에서 나고 자라 미국 굴지의 존스홉킨스 대학원에서 중국 정치를 공부한 이 책의 저자 역시, 중국 체제에 비판적이지만 결코 감정적이지 않다. 냉정한 시각으로 시진핑을, 중국 지도부의 능력을 평가하면서, 공산당이 집권을 지속하려면 어찌해야 하는지 제시하고 있다.



중국식 민주화의 본질이 무엇인지 추적해가는 것이 이 책의 매력이다. 비록 제19차 당대회가 열리기 2년여 전에 쓰인 책이지만, 19차 당대회에서 중국지도부가 어떤 행동을 취할 것인지, 비교적 합리적으로 예측했다. 저자의 예측대로 19차 당대회는 차분히 끝났고, 시진핑을 위시한 중국 지도부는 그대로 실천에 옮기고 있다. 저자의 예측이 적확하다는 얘기다. 서방 언론과 한국 언론에서 떠드는 시황제 내지 독재 공고화 같은 아마추어식 분석을 지양하고, 하나하나의 사례와 다양한 인터뷰를 바탕으로 냉정히 중국의 미래를 분석하는 것이 이 책의 장점이다. 접기

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알라딘: [전자책] 헤이세이(平成) 일본의 잃어버린 30년 - 이와나미 053

알라딘: [전자책] 헤이세이(平成) 일본의 잃어버린 30년 - 이와나미 053



[eBook] 헤이세이(平成) 일본의 잃어버린 30년 - 이와나미 053  | 이와나미 시리즈 epub

요시미 슌야 (지은이)에이케이커뮤니케이션즈2020-07-10



종이책 페이지수 약 272쪽



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책소개



일본은 이제 풍요함을 향유하거나, 세계의 첨단을 걷는 나라가 아니다.　실패와 일탈을 거듭하는, 불안과 과제로 가득찬 나라다. (본문중)

경제거품 붕괴, 대지진, 옴진리교 사건, 후쿠시마 원전사고의 충격 속에 가전왕국의 쇠락, 정치개혁 좌절, 저출산과 빈곤으로 줄달음질친 일본.

쇼와 시대의 성공은 헤이세이의 실패와 좌절을 잉태하고 있었다. 일본의 저명 사회학자가 한 권의 책 속에 건축한 ‘헤이세이 실패 박물관’



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목차

머리글 ‘헤이세이’라는 실패――‘잃어버린 30년’이란 무엇인가

실패의 박물관 / ‘헤이세이’라는 실패 / 정치의 좌절, 회복없는 소자화(小子化) / ‘쇼와’의 반전 / 네 가지 쇼크 / 세계사 속의 ‘헤이세이’



제1장 몰락하는 기업국가――은행의 실패, 가전의 실패

벼랑 앞에서 우쭐거리던 일본 / 2년 반 지연된 금리인상 / 일본호, 모로 쓰러지다 / 야마이치증권 ‘자진폐업’의 충격 / 야마이치증권 파탄을 잉태한 쇼와사 / 반도체시장에서의 일본의 참패 / ‘가전’의 저주와 신화의 종말 / 도시바의 실패를 검증한다 / 카를로스 곤 신화에 취한 일본 사회



제2장 포스트 전후정치의 환멸――‘개혁’이라는 포퓰리즘

버블 속의 액상화――리쿠르트 사건 / 정치극장의 시스템을 바꾸다――소선거구제 도입 / 일본신당 붐이 남긴 것 / 선거제도 개혁의 전말――개혁파와 수구파 / 노조의 변절 사회당의 곤경 / 자멸로 치닫는 사회당의 혼란 / 자민당을 때려부순다――고이즈미 극장의 작동방식 / 민주당 정권의 탄생과 ‘정치주도’ / 국가전략국 구상의 오류와 전말 / 아베 정권――액상화하는 정 ? 관계와 ‘관저(官邸)주도’



제3장 쇼크 속에서 변모하는 일본――사회의 연속과 불연속

‘실패’와 ‘쇼크’ 사이 / 두 차례 대지진과 후쿠시마 원전사고 / 옴진리교 사건과 미디어의 허구 / 헤이세이 첫해에 상실한 자아 / 확대되는 격차――미래에 절망하는 청년들 / 격차의 제도화, 계급사회로 가는 헤이세이 일본 / 멈출 줄 모르는 초소자고령화 / 소멸하는 지방――일본의 지속불가능성



제4장 허구화하는 아이덴티티――‘아메리카닛폰’의 행방

‘종말’의 예감 / ‘부해(腐海)’와 ‘초능력’ / ‘미국’이라는 타자=자아 / 허구로서의 ‘일본’ / 아무로 나미에와 여성들, 그리고 오키나와 / 절정 속의 주역교체――두명의 여성 스타 / 10년 후의 절정과 붕괴――1989년과 1998년 / 코스프레하는 자아 퍼포먼스 / 1990년대 말의 전환――환경화하는 인터넷 세계 / 자폐하는 넷사회



마침글 세계사 속의 ‘헤이세이 시대’――잃어버린 반세기의 서곡

‘헤이세이’를 시대로서 생각한다 / 다시, 올림픽으로 향하다 / 누구를 위한, 무엇을 위한 올림픽인가 / 후텐마기지 이전과 오키나와의 분노 / 오키나와에서 헤이세이 일본을 바라보다 / 발흥하는 아시아 홀로

뒤처진 일본 / ‘잃어버린 30년’의 인구학적 필연

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후기

역자 후기

연표

주요 인용?참고 문헌

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저자 및 역자소개

요시미 슌야 (지은이)



1957년 도쿄 출생. 도쿄대학과 동 대학원을 졸업한 뒤 도쿄대학 신문연구소 조교수, 사회정보연구소 교수를 거쳐, 현재 도쿄대학 대학원 정보학환 교수로 재직 중이다. 전공은 사회학 · 문화 연구 · 미디어 연구이다.

저서로는 『시각도시의 지정학-시선으로서의 근대』, 『포스트 전후사회』, 『친미와 반미-전후일본의 정치적 무의식』, 『트럼프의 미국에 살다』, 『대예언-'역사의 척도'가 나타내는 미래』, 『전후와 재후의 사이-용융하는 미디어와 사회』 등 다수 있다.

최근작 : <헤이세이(平成) 일본의 잃어버린 30년>,<냉전 체제와 자본의 문화> … 총 5종 (모두보기)

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출판사 제공 책소개



헤이세이 일본의 실패 원인을 파고든 ‘일본 최신사정 설명서’



일본의 헤이세이(1989~2019) 시대는 두 차례의 대지진, 후쿠시마 원전사고라는 대참사 외에도 정치개혁 실험이 좌절하고 샤프, 도시바 등 기업들도 글로벌 시대 변화에 적응하지 못한 채 속속 무너지던 ‘잃어버린 30년’이었다. 1989년 세계 시가총액 상위 50개사 중 32개사를 차지했던 일본 기업은 2018년에는 도요타(35위) 외엔 전멸했다. 사회적으로도 비정규직 증가, 인구감소, 지방 소멸위기 등 다양한 문제들이 발생했고, 옴진리교의 지하철 사린가스 테러 같은 엽기적인 사건들도 충격을 가했다. 동일본대지진과 원전사고는 전후(戰後)에 구축돼 쇼와 시대까지 비교적 순탄하게 작동되던 일본형 시스템의 한계를 총체적으로 드러냈다. 연약한 지반이 수분을 머금어 액체 같은 상태로 변하는 ‘액상화’가 일본 사회의 각 분야에서도 두드러지게 나타났던 것이 헤이세이 말기다.

저자는 헤이세이의 액상화는 갑자기 벌어진 것이 아니라 쇼와 시대에 진행된 지반약화의 결과라고 진단한다. 1970년대 말부터 세계사적 대전환의 소용돌이가 일고 있었지만, 일본은 오일쇼크를 무난히 극복한 데 따른 안도감에 사로잡혀 변화를 직시하지 못했다고 본다. 이런 안도감이 1980년대 경제 버블의 형성과 붕괴를 가져왔고, 1990년대 이후 전개된 글로벌화의 다양한 위험과 도전에 대한 응전에서 실패를 초래했다는 게 저자의 진단이다.

그 결과 헤이세이 일본에서 발생한 여러가지 쇼크(버블경제의 붕괴, 한신?아와지대지진과 옴진리교 사건, 2001년 미국 동시다발테러와 이후 국제정세의 불안정화, 2011년 동일본대지진과 도쿄전력 후쿠시마 제1원전사고)와 동시병행적으로 전개된 글로벌화와 넷사회화, 저출산고령화 등 충격 속에서 일본은 좌절해갔고, 이를 타개하려는 시도들이 실패했다. 쇼와의 빛나는 성공신화가 헤이세이 일본의 태세전환을 어렵게 했을 것임은 물론이다. 한때 세계 최고를 자랑하던 일본 전기?전자산업의 어이없는 몰락은 그 단적인 예다.



동아시아 중심에서 밀려난 일본의 앞날은?



헤이세이는 일본이 동아시아의 중심이라는 위상에 종막을 고한 시대이기도 하다. 150여 년 전 메이지유신을 달성한 일본은, 서양의 기술, 제도, 지식을 전력으로 도입해 불과 30년에 동아시아의 제국주의 국가로 성장했다. 제2차 세계대전 패전 이후에도 일본은 미국과의 일체화를 통해 중심성을 유지하려 애썼다. 그러나 냉전 후의 헤이세이 시대, 동아시아의 중심은 일본에서 중국으로 옮겨갔다고 저자는 분석한다. 일본은 점점 늙어가는 사회가 되고, 성장은 환상으로 끝났지만 정부는 리스크를 각오한 채 어떻게든 경제를 부양하려고 필사적이 될 것이라고 저자는 내다봤다. 그러므로, 제2, 제3의 버블 붕괴가 생겨날 가능성도 있다는 것이다. 경제 침체 타개를 위해 신자유주의적 정책이 한층 더 취해지고, 감세조치와 규제완화로 공공영역은 점점 축소돼 경제가 일시 부양하더라도 격차는 확대되는 만큼, 사회전체의 열화는 멈추지 않을 것으로 예상했다. ‘잃어버린 30년’이 ‘잃어버린 반세기’가 될 수도 있다는 우려도 감추지 않는다. 저자는 위기의 실상을 정면으로 응시하며 모두가 위기를 위기로 확실히 이해하는 것이 위기에서 벗어나는 출발점이 될 수 있다고 지적한다.



한국에 주는 시사점은?



헤이세이 시대의 사회 분야에서 저자가 가장 우려하는 것은 초저출산과 격차확대다. 제도와 시스템 미비가 저출산을 가속화시켰지만 가장 큰 원인은 ‘빈곤화’이다. 버블붕괴 이후 기업들이 비정규직 고용을 대거 늘림으로써 노동자들의 생활기반을 붕괴시켰고, 그들이 인생설계를 하기 어렵게 만든 것이 저출산으로 이어졌다는 것이다.

그런데 이는 한국이 더 심각하게 겪는 문제이기도 하다. 한국의 합계출생률은 2018년 0.98명, 2019년에는 0.92명까지 떨어지며 2년째 ‘0명대 출산율’을 기록했다. 경제협력개발기구(OECD) 36개 회원국 중 출산율이 0명대인 유일한 나라다. 합계출산율 1.4명대 수준을 유지하고 있는 일본은 그나마 나은 편이다. 저출산 현상의 구조적 배경은 일견 흡사하지만, 한국은 교육비?주거비의 과중한 부담이 출산은 물론 결혼 자체를 어렵게 만들고 있는 현실을 추가로 꼽지 않을 수 없다. 이 책은 세계에서 한국과 가장 유사한 체제인 일본의 가장 최신 경향을 담은 현대사를 보여준다는 점에서 의미가 있다. 현재 일본이 겪는 위기를 한국은 피해갈 수 있을까. 헤이세이 일본의 ‘실패 박물관’을 돌아보는 것은 한국의 독자들에게 타산지석이 될 수 있을 것이다.



현대 일본을 만들어간 다양한 인물들



이 책은 아사하라 쇼코 옴진리교 교주, 카를로스 곤 닛산 전 회장, 대중가수인 미소라 히바리, 고무로 데쓰야, 아무로 나미에, 우타다 히카루, 애니메이션 감독인 미야자키 하야오, 안노 히데아키, 오토모 가쓰히로 등 각 방면의 다양한 인물을 등장시켜, 이들이 헤이세이 일본을 어떻게 직조해 나갔는지를 보여준다. 일본의 서브컬처에서 자주 등장하는 ‘종말’ 서사가 헤이세이 시대와 어떻게 조응했는지도 흥미를 더해준다.

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알라딘: [전자책] 사주명리 완전정복 용신분석 2

알라딘: [전자책] 사주명리 완전정복 용신분석 2



[eBook] 사주명리 완전정복 용신분석 2  | 사주명리 완전정복 2 pdf

김낙범 (지은이)문원북2018-08-01
종이책 페이지수 336쪽

책소개

명리 공부의 성패를 좌우하는 것은 정확한 “용신”을 찾는 것이다. 용신이 무엇인가에 따라 그 사람의 사회적인 적성, 직업 변화 등을 추측 할 수가 있다. 2권 심화에서 용신분석은 간결하게 “월령중심, 일간중심, 오행중심”으로 구분해 고전에 근간을 두고 명쾌하게 설명하고 있다.

자평진전의 격국용신, 적천수의 억부와 전왕용신, 궁통보감의 조후용신을 체계적으로 정리하여 용신을 찾을 수 있도록 구성하였다.

 그리고 년 내 출간 계획인 『3권 통변』은 전문상담가의 통변편으로 통변의 이론을 체계적으로 제시하고 통변의 주요과제에 따른 상담기법도 아울러 소개하며 사주명리 전문상담가로서 정확한 상담을 할 수 있도록 구성 할 예정이다.
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목차

제 1 장 용신총론用神總論

1. 용신의 개념

2. 용신의 기세

3. 용신의 종류

1) 격국용신格局用神

2) 억부용신抑扶用神

3) 전왕용신專旺用神

4) 통관용신通關用神

5) 병약용신病藥用神

6) 조후용신調候用神

4. 용신의 활용

1) 격국용신格局用神

2) 억부용신抑扶用神

3) 전왕용신專旺用神

4) 통관용신通關用神

5) 병약용신病藥用神

6) 조후용신調候用神

제 2 장 격국용신론格局用神論

1. 격국용신의 개념

2. 격국용신의 특징

1) 격용신을 정하는 기준

(1) 격용신의 개념

(2) 순용과 역용

(3) 내격과 외격

2) 격국의 성립

(1) 격국의 명칭

(2) 격용신

(3) 격용신의 강약

(4) 상신相神

(5) 성격成格과 패격敗格

(6) 성중유패成中有敗

(7) 패중유성敗中有成

3) 격용신의 변화

(1) 격용신의 변화

(2) 지지에 의한 격용신의 변화

(3) 변화해도 변하지 않는 격용신

(4) 격용신의 겸격으로 인한 순잡

(5) 대운에 의한 격용신의 변화

4) 격국의 고저高低

(1) 일간과 격용신과 상신의 관계

(2) 유정有情

(3) 유력有力

(4) 유정과 유력을 겸한 경우

(5) 무정과 무력을 겸한 경우

(6) 유정과 무정을 겸한 경우

5) 순용 4격의 성패

(1) 정관격正官格

(2) 재격財格

(3) 식신격食神格

(4) 인수격印綬格

6) 역용 4격의 성패

(1) 칠살격七煞格

(2) 상관격傷官格

(3) 양인격陽刃格

(4) 록겁격祿劫格

7) 외격

(1) 외격이란

(2) 도충격

(3) 합록격

(4) 기명종재격

(5) 기명종살격

(6) 정란차격

(7) 형합격

제 3 장 억부용신론抑扶用神論

1. 억부용신의 개념

1) 억부용신의 특징

2) 용희기한신用喜忌閑神

(1) 용신

(2) 희신

(3) 기신

(4) 한신

2. 억부용신의 선정

1) 억부의 방법

2) 기세의 판단

(1) 일간 기준 ? 신강 신약

(2) 오행 기준 - 왕쇠 강약

3) 왕자충쇠쇠자발 쇠신충왕왕신발

4) 중화된 사주

5) 월령의 기운

3. 일간 중심의 억부용신

1) 신강 신약의 억부용신

2) 신강한 경우의 억부용신

3) 신약한 경우의 억부용신

4) 극신강한 경우의 억부용신

5) 극신약한 경우의 억부용신

4. 오행 중심의 억부용신

제 4 장 전왕용신론專旺用神論

1. 전왕용신의 개념

1) 전왕용신이란

2) 전왕용신의 성패

3) 전왕용신의 형태

2. 일행득기격一行得氣格

1) 일행득기격이란

2) 일행득기격의 조건

3) 일행득기격의 행운

4) 일행득기격의 사례

3. 종격從格

1) 종격의 의미

2) 종격의 종류

(1) 종왕격從旺格

(2) 종강격從强格

(3) 종아격從兒格

(4) 종재격從財格

(5) 종살격從煞格

(6) 종세격從勢格

(7) 종기격從氣格

3) 진종眞從 가종假從

4. 화격化格

1) 화격의 개념

2) 화격의 조건

3) 화격의 작용

5. 전상격全象格

6. 양신성상격兩神成象格

제 5 장 조후용신론調候用神論

1. 조후용신의 개념

2. 일간의 월별 조후용신

접기

저자 및 역자소개

김낙범 (지은이)

1954년 서울 출생

군 제대 후 종교에 심취하여 기독교, 불교 공부시작의 개기로 동양사상과 명리고전을

독학으로 깨우치고, 사회생활을 하면서 병마로 고충 받는 환자상담과 서울역 노숙자과

인생상담을 통해 이론과 실전을 가미한 자신만의 명리의 체계를 세움.



2007~2016年 후생병원 심리상담 『질병발생과 사주관계 연구』

동방대학원 자연치유학과 심리상담 전공

2013~2015年 서울역 『다시 서기센터』 심리상담, "사회취약계층과 사주관계 연구"



『출판경력』

o사주명리 완전정복1 기초완성 o사주명리 완전정복2 용... 더보기

최근작 : <사주명리 완전정복 5 : 5차원 물상>,<사주명리 완전정복 4 : 대운.세운 운세활용>,<사주명리 완전정복 3 : 상담실무 통변특강> … 총 8종 (모두보기)
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출판사 제공 책소개

명리공부를 시작하다 중간에 포기 하는 경우 대부분 용신(用神) 때문이다.

술사들 마다 제각기 뽑은 용신이 다른 경우가 종종 발생한다. 즉 그 만큼 어렵다는 반증이다

그러나 『2권 용신분석』은 쉽게 이해 할 수 있도록 설명하고 있다.

첫째 “월령중심, 일간중심, 오행중심”으로 구분, 고전에 근간을 두고 명쾌하게 설명하고 있다.

둘째 이해를 돕는 일러스트와, 예시를 함께 설명하고 있다.

셋째 핵심정리, 암기TIP, Summary 등을 첨부하여 혼자서도 완벽하게 이해할 수 있게 하였다.
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전체 (11)
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용신을 하나 하나 특성을 이해하고, 암기해서 실전에서 적용한다면. 당신도 명리의 고수가 될수 있다

gold7265 2019-01-06 공감 (8) 댓글 (0)
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˝용신 찾아 삼만리˝ 라고 했는데 이렇게 체계적로 정리하니 한번에 알 수있어 좋네요

금주 2019-01-20 공감 (6) 댓글 (0)
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용신이 어려운 공부라고 하던데 공부하기 쉽게 구성되었군요.

이제 용신에 대한 확실한 개념을 잡을 수 있을 것 같습니다.

knb54 2018-07-31 공감 (6) 댓글 (0)

용신과 격국을 구분 못했는데 이제는 알 것 같네요 열공 하겠습니다.

꿈가꿈 2018-08-09 공감 (5) 댓글 (0)

최근 사주명리에 관심이 생겨서 입문서를 몇권 봤는데요, 내용이 정말 맛만 보는 정도여서 아쉬움이 있었습니다.이 책은 초보도 따라올수 있도록 설명이 자세히 돼있으면서도 내용은 기초를 넘어선 부분까지 알차게 담겨있어서 저자의 내공과 집필에의 정성이 느껴집니다.

bryankim 2018-08-06 공감 (5) 댓글 (0)

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마이리뷰

용신 때문에 포기 할 뻔 했는데 다시 공부시작 합니다 새창으로 보기

용신과 격국을 구분 못했는데 격국은 격국용신 이네요 격국용신 안에 8격이 있고 잡격도 있군요 용신 때문에 포기 할 뻔 했는데 다시 공부시작 합니다. 감사 합니다

금주 2019-01-20 공감(5) 댓글(0)
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용신 특성을 암기해서 실전에서 적용한다면. 당신도 명리의 고수가 새창으로 보기

자평 명리학의 근간은 용신이다. 용신을 정확히 뽑을 줄 알아야 고객의 사회적 직위, 직업 등 특성을 파악 할수 있기 때문이다. 특히 가장 많은 격국용신에서 내격 8격, 외격으로 구분하여 명확하게 설명을 하고있으며,  명리를 공부하는 초학자의 경우 용신에서 가장 어려워 하는데, 2권에서 분류한 격국용신, 억부용신, 전왕용신, 통관용신, 조후용신을 하나 하나 특성을 이해하고, 암기해서 실전에서 적용한다면. 당신도 명리의 고수가 될수 있다

gold7265 2019-01-06 공감(5) 댓글(0)

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[마이리뷰] 사주명리 완전정복 실력쌓기 : 용신분석 2 새창으로 보기

용신찾기 힘들었던 지난 수년간...무공선생님의 용신찾기 한권 속에 알기 쉽게 녹아있어 너무 좋습니다

samsam444 2018-08-06 공감(5) 댓글(0)
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입문자들이 체계적으로 학습할 수 있도록 일러스트와 함께 쉽게 설명하고 있다. 새창으로 보기

명리공부를 하다 보면 어려운 이론이 많다. 그 중 극복해야 할 부분이 "용신"이다 물론 용신을 보지 않고 물상 이야기 하다. "신살"로 겁을 주다. 육친으로 가족 관계를 맞추면 고객이 혹 할 때,  대충 상담하면 된다.  그러나 진정한 역술 인으로 거듭나 고객의 궁금증을 풀어주고, 방향을 제시 해주려면 완벽하게 용신을 이해하여야만 된다. 즉 고객의 기질을 완벽히 파악해야만 된다는 것이다. 바로 이것이 "용신"이다.  2권 "용신" 은 입문자들이 체계적으로 학습할 수 있도록 일러스트와 함께 지루하지 않게 쉽게 설명하고 있는 것 같다. 

꿈가꿈 2019-02-09 공감(4) 댓글(0)
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˝용신 찾아 삼 만리˝ 라는 말이 있다 새창으로 보기

"용신 찾아 삼 만리" 라는 말이 있다. 이론은 이해했지만, 확실하게 논리적으로 적립되어 있지 않기 때문이다. 머리 속에 격국, 억부, 전왕, 통관, 병약, 조후 6개 큰 카테고리를 만들고 각  카테고리의 세부를 채워가는 방식으로 즉  전왕용신 속에 일행득기격, 종격( 종왕 외 6개), 화격, 전상, 양상신상격 등으로 암기를 해야 만 한다. 2권을 보면서 시험공부 하듯이 암기를 하였더니 좀 명쾌하게 용신의 큰 그림이 머리에 그려졌다. 공짜는 없다. 이해를 했다면 암기를 해야 한다.  용신 정복 성공 하시길 빕니다.



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서태후 2020-02-09 공감(4) 댓글(0)
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