SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts
by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.
=====
Contents
Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction
Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu
I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus
Part III - A Comparative Reftection
I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===
VII The Way
Up to this point we have been following the footprints of Chuang-
tzu as he tries to describe analytically the process by which a vision
of the Absolute is revealed to the Taoist Perfect Man,
opening up in
his mind a new vista of the whole world of Being which is totally
different from, and radically opposed to, that shared by ordinary
men on the level of common sense.
In so doing we have discarded Lao-tzu except in a few places.
Nor have we analyzed in a systematic
manner the philosophical thought expressed in the Tao Tê Ching.
We have adopted this course for several reasons, the most impor-
tant of them being that
---
Chuang-tzu, as 1 have pointed out a number
of times, is vitally interested in describing the epistemological
aspect of the problem of the Tao,
while Lao-tzu is almost exclusively interested in giving the result of the experience of the Absolute, i.e., what comes after, and out of, that experience.
---
We have seen in the preceding chapter how Chuang-tzu submits
to an elaborate theoretical analysis the process of the graduai
development of the human mind toward a Taoist perfection.
He
attempts to give an accurate description of the Taoist variety of
metaphysical or spiritual experience by which man' ascends' toward
the Absolute until he becomes completely unified with it.
Certainly,
Chuang-tzu is equally interested in the 'descending' movement of
the mind, from the state of ekstasis back to the level of daily
consciousness, that is, from the stage of the absolute Unity back to
that of 'essential' Multiplicity.
But even then, his description of the
Descent is epistemological as well as ontological.
That is to say, his
description is made so that to each objective stage of Being there
corresponds a subjective stage of spiritual experience, so that the
ontological system, in the case of Chuang-tzu, is at the same time a
complete epistemological system, and vice versa.
Moreover, it is
typical of Chuang-tzu that these two aspects are so completely fused
together that it is at times difficult for us to decide whether a given
passage is intended to be a description of the subjective side of the
matter or of the objective, ontological structure of things.
The 'sitting in oblivion' is an example in point.
376
Lao-tzu, on the contrary, does not seem to be very much
interested in the experiential stages which precede the ultimate
vision of the Absolute.
He does not take the trouble to explain how
and by what process we can obtain the vision of the Absolute.
He seems to be more interested in the questions:
(1) What is the Absolute, i.e., the Way?; and
(2) How is the 'sacred man' expected to behave in ordinary circumstances of social life on the basis of his vision of the Way?
From the very outset he utters his words in the name of the Absolute, as a representative of those who have already attained to the highest stage of Taoist perfection.
Behind the pages of the Tao Tê Ching we feel the presence of a man who has experienced the most intimate union with the Absolute, who, consequently knows
what the Absolute is.
Quite abruptly Lao-tzu sets out to talk about the Way.
He tries to impart tous his personal knowledge of the Absolute, and his strange
- so it seems to common sense understanding -vision of the world.
If it were not for Chuang-tzu, we would hardly be able to know for sure what kind of experiential background this extraordinary vision of the world has as its unstated 'prehistory'.
This is why we have up till now intentionally refrained from turning systematically toward an analysis of Lao-tzu's thought, and confined ourselves to the task
of clarifying this 'prehistory' in the light of what Chuang-tzu says
about it.
But the particular situation which we have just mentioned con-
cerning Lao-tzu's basic attitude would seem to suggest that the Tao Tê Ching is the best possible thing for us to have recourse to, if we want to obtain a clear understanding of the Taoist conception of the Absolute, its reality and its working.
As we shall realize immediately, the Absolute as conceived by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu is by its very nature beyond all verbal description. Despite that, Lao-tzu does endeavor to describe, at least symbolically, this ineffable Something.
And he succeeds marvellously. In point of fact, the Tao Të Ching is a remarkable work in that it attempts to delineate to the utmost limit of possibility the Absolute which is essentially indescribable.
This is why we shall be greatly dependent in the present chapter upon this book for elucidating the metaphysical structure of the Absolute. .
We must remark, however, that here again, Lao-tzu does not explain how and why it is ineffable, and indescribable.
He simply states that the Way is 'nameless', 'formless', 'imageless', 'invisible',
'inaudible', etc., that it is 'nothing' (wu wu) 1 or Nothing (wu) 2 •
As to the psychological or logical process by which one reaches this
conclusion, he says nothing positive.
377
This process is clarified in an interesting way by Chuang-tzu in a passage which
bears ample witness to his being an excellent dialectician.
Let us begin by reading the passage in question as an illuminating
theoretical introduction to Lao-tzu' s conception of the Absolute.
Chuang-tzu is keenly conscious of the fact that the Way, or the
Absolute in its absoluteness, defies all verbalization and reasoning;
that, if brought down to the level of language, the Way will immediately and inevitably turn into a concept. As a concept, even the Absolute is exactly in the same rank as any other concept. He makes this observation the starting-point of his argument. People, he says, distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong' in all matters and thus take the position of there being a fundamental distinction between 'right' and 'wrong'.
Chuang-tzu, on his part, puts forward the thesis that there is no distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' .3 Ordinary people and Chuang-tzu are in this respect diametrically opposed to each other. And yet, he goes on to say, as a logical proposition, 'there-is-no-distinction-between-right-and-wrong' is no less a logos4 than the opposite proposition: 'there-is-a-distinction-between-right-and-wrong'. In this respect, both belong to one and the same category .5
In reality, the two propositions refer to two completely different
levels of discourse. The difference, as we already know, cornes out
only when one realizes that the positive statement is a statement
typical of the empirical level of discourse, while the negative one is
orginally intended to represent the ontological 'chaotification'
which is experienced by the Perfect Man in the moments of his
ecstatic union with the Absolute. As an expression of this original
experience, the statement is not a logical proposition except in its
outward form. But as long as it does have a logical form, it is a logical
proposition; and as such, it does not properly represent the unique
experience of 'chaotification', being as it is nothing but the con-
tradictory of the proposition: 'there-is-a-distinction-between-
right-and-wrong'. If such is the case, could there be any other
attitude for us to take than maintaining a complete silence? 'Despite
this', he says, 'I would dare to discuss the problem (on the logical or
conceptual lev el).' With these preliminary remarks, he sets out to
develop an extremely interesting argument in the following way.
The argument, in brief, establishes that the Absolute in its original
absoluteness is conceptually the negation-of-negation-of-negation,
that is, the negation of the Absolute's being Nothing which, again, is
the negation of Being. And that is the furthest limit to which our
logical thinking can go in its venturesome attempt at grasping the
Absolute on the level of concepts.378
We have seen in the preceding chapter how Chuang-tzu, in
describing the stages of the spiritual development of 'sitting in
oblivion', mentions as the ultimate limit of ecstatic cognition the
view that 'nothing has ever existed from the very beginning'.
What is the ultimate limit of Knowledge? It is the stage represented
by the view that nothing has ever existed from the very beginning.
This is the furthest limit (of Knowledge), to which nothing more can
be added. 6
'Nothing has ever existed from the very beginning' appearing in this
quotation is the key-phrase for the right understanding of the
passage we are going to read. 7 lt is important to keep in mind,
however, that in this latter passage we are no longer concerned with
the epistemological question of the utmost limit of human cogni-
tion. Our problem here is essentially of a metaphysical nature. For it
concerns the ultimate origin of Being, or of the Universe. The
'beginning' here in question means the beginning point of the world
of Being. Whenever we think logically of the formation of the world
of Being, we have to posit a 'beginning'. Our Reason cannot con-
ceive of the world of Being without imagining a point at which it
'began' to exist.
So we posit Beginning. (But the moment we posit Beginning, our
Reason cannot help going further back and) admit the idea of there
having been no Beginning. (Thus the concept of No-Beginning is
necessarily established. But the moment we posit No-Beginning, our
logical thinking goes further back by negating the very idea which it
has just established, and) admits the idea of there having been no
'there-having-been-no-Beginning'. (The concept of 'No-No-
Beginning' is thus established.)
The concept of Beginning, i.e., the initial point of the whole world of
Being, is but a relative concept. lt can be conceptually pushed
further and further back. But no matter how far we may push it
back, this conceptual process does not reach an end. In order to put
a definite end to this process we have to transcend it atone stroke by
negating the Beginning itself. As a result, the concept of No-
Beginning is obtained.
However, the concept of No-Beginning is, again, a relative one,
being as it is a concept that subsists only by being opposed to that of
Beginning. In order to remove this relativity and attain to the
absolute No-Beginning, we have to transcend the No-Beginning
itself by negating it and establishing No-No-Beginning. The
No-No-Beginning - which must be articulated as No-[No-
Beginning] - is, however, a concept whose real significance is dis
closed only to those who are able to understand it as signifying a
metaphysical state of affairs which is to be grasped by a kind of
metaphysical intuition. 379
And this would seem to indicate that No-No-Beginning, although it is something that has been posited by Reason, lies beyond the grasp of all logical reasoning.
In the same manner, (we begin by taking notice of the fact that) there
is Being. (But the moment we recognize Being, our Reason goes
further back and admits that) there is Non-Being (or Nothing). (But
the moment we posit Non-Being we cannot but go further back and
admit that) there has not been from the very beginning Non-Being.
(The concept of No-[Non-Being] once established in this way, the
Reason goes further back and admits that) there has been no 'there-
having-been-no-Non-Being' (i.e., the negation of the negation of
Non-Being, or No-[No Non-Being]).
This concept of No-[No Non-Being] or No-No-Nothing represents
the ultimate logical stage which is reached by our negating - i.e.,
transcending - the negation itself of the opposition of Being and
Non-Being. This is the logical and conceptual counterpart of the
Way or the metaphysical Nothing which is nota simple 'nothing',
but a transcendent Nothing that lies beyond bath 'being' and 'non-
being' as ordinarily understood.
We have thus seemingly succeeded in conceptualizing the Way as
an absolutely transcendent Nothing. However, does the Absolute
th us conceptualized mirror faithfully the reality of the Absolu te? To
this question, we can say neither Yes nor No. As in the case of the
concept of No-No-Beginning, we must remark that the concept of
No-No-Nothing does justice to the reality of the Absolute only
when we transcend, in understanding it, the sphere of logical think-
ing itself into that of ecstatic or mystic intuition. But when we do so,
the concept of No-No-Nothing will immediately cease to be a
concept. And we shall end up by realizing that all the logical
reasoning that has preceded has in reality been futile and of no use.
If, on the contrary, we refuse to transcend the lev el of reasoning, the
concept of No-No-Nothing will remain for ever an empty concept
devoid of all positive meaning and, therefore, in no position to do
justice to the reality of the Absolu te. Thus, either way, the concep-
tualizing activity of the mind proves powerless in grasping the
Absolute as it really is.
(When Reason begins to be active), ail of a sudden we find ourselves
confronted with 'being' and 'non-being'. (Since, however, these are
relative concepts in the sense that 'being' at this stage turns into
'non-being' at the next stage, and so on and so forth), we can never
know for sure which is really 'being' and which is really 'non-being'.
Now 1 have just established something (that looks) meaningful, (i.e.,
1 have established the Absolute as No-No-Nothing). But 1 do not
know whether 1 have truly established something meaningful or
whether what 1 have established is, after ail, nothing meaningful.
380 S
At this point, Chuang-tzu suddenly changes the direction of his
thinking and tries another approach. This time he turns to the aspect
of Unity which, as we have seen earlier, is one of the most salient
features of the Absolute. But before discussing the problem on the
lev el of logical reasoning, he reminds us by way of caution of what is
to be understood by the statement that the Absolute is 'one'. The
Absolute, he says, is 'one' as a coincidentia oppositorum. We have
already examined in Chapter IV Chuang-tzu's position conceming
this problem. The key-term is 'equalization' of all things in the
Absolute.
The Way or the Absolute, according to Chuang-tzu, is the
metaphysical state of Heavenly Equalization, that is, the absolute
One which 'equalizes' all oppositions and contradictions. At this
stage, the smallest is at the same time the biggest, and a moment is
eternity.
(The state of Heavenly Equalization defies common sense and
reason, for we admit at this stage that) there is in the world nothing
bigger than the tip of a hair of an animal in autumn, while Mount Tai
(which is usually mentioned as an example of a very big thing) is
considered extremely small. No one lives longer than a child who dies
before coming of age, while P'êng Tsu (who is related to have lived
800 years) is considered to have died young. Heaven and Earth
endure for the sa me length of time as 1 do (i.e., the eternal duration of
Heaven and Earth is equivalent to the momentary duration of my
individual existence in this world). And the ten thousand things are
exactly the same as my own self.
Thus, from the viewpoint of Heavenly Equalization, all things
become reduced to a single unity in terms of both time and space.
How does logical reasoning grasp such an absolu te Oneness? That is
the question we are faced with now.
AU things (at this stage) are absolutely 'one'. But if so, how is it
possible for us to say something? (i.e., Since all things are absolutely
'one', there is no longer anything whatsoever opposed to anything
else whatsoever. And since there is no opposition, it is meaningless
even to say: 'one').
(But in order to reason, 1 have to posit something). So 1 have said:
'one'. But how could 1 judge that (it is, or they are) 'one' without
explicitly positing the term (i.e., word or concept: 'one')? However,
(the moment 1 posit the term 'one'), the (original) 'one' (i.e., the
absolu te One which is a coincidentia oppositorum) and the term (or
concept of) 'one' necessarily make 'two'. (This would mean that the
least amount of reasoning makes the original One split itself into Two
and thus produces dualism.)
Then, these 'two' (i.e., the two-term judgment: 'The Way is One')
together with the 'one' (i.e., the absolute One which is prior to any
judgment) make 'three'.
381
And from this point on the process ex tends endlessly, so much so that
even a talented mathematician will not be able to count out the
number, much Jess ordinary people.
If, in this way, moving from Non-Being to Being leads us inevitably to
(at least) 'three', where shall we get if we move from Being to Being
(i.e., if, instead of starting from the absolu te One, we take a relativist
point of view and begin to pursue the individual things which go on
being endlessly diversified)? Better not to make any move (i.e.,
better not to exercise reasoning concerning the Absolute and the
things). Let us content ourselves with abiding by the (great) Yes
(which transcends ail oppositions and contradictions, and leaves
everything as i t is) !
Thus after developing an elaborate reasoning on the nature of the
Absolute, Chuang-tzii, ironically enough, ends by asserting the
futility of reasoning. He advises us to abandon all logical thinking
about the Absolute and to remain immersed ecstatically in the
absolute intuitive Knowledge. For only by doing so can we hope to
be in direct contact with the absolute One.
Thus the highest stage of Knowledge is remaining motionless in what
cannot absolutely be known (by reasoning). Is there anyone who
knows the Word which is no longer a 'word'? Is there anyone who
knows the Way which is not even a 'way'? If there is a man who knows
such a thing, he deserves to be named the 'Treasury of Heaven' (i.e.,
he who is in possession of the key to the limitless treasure house of
Being. Nay, he is the same as the 'treasury' itself). (The Treasury of
Heaven with which such a man is completely identical and unified is
like an unbounded ocean); no matter how much you pour water into
it, it will never become full; and no matter how much you dip up
water therefrom, it will never run dry. And no body knows how and
from where all these (limitless) things corne into being.
It is the Knowledge of such a man that is properly to be called the
'shaded Light'.
Thus by following step by step Chuang-tzu's argument we have
been led to the conclusion that the Way or the Absolute in its
ultimate reality transcends all reasoning and conceptualization.
This conclusion forms the starting-point for the metaphysical think-
ing of Lao-tzii. As 1 remarked at the outset of this chapter, Lao-tzu
does not take the trouble of explaining the logical or epistemologi-
cal process which underlies his metaphysical system. But we are
now in a position to understand the background against which this
metaphysics must be set.
Qui te naturally, the metaphysics of Lao-tzu begins by mentioning
negative attributes of the Way. The Way, to begin with, is
'nameless' .8
382
The Way in its absolute reality (ch'ang) has no name. 9
Interminably continuous like a thread, no name can be given to it. 10
The Way is hidden and nameless. 11
That the Way is 'nameless' implies that the very name 'Way' (tao) is
nothing other than a makeshift. Lao-tzü forcibly calls it 'Way'
because without naming it he cannot even refer to it. This fact is
clearly indicated by the very famous opening sentence of the Tao Tê
Ching.
The 'way' which can be designated by the word 'way' is not the real' 2
Way.
The 'name' which can be designated by the word 'name' is not the
real 12 Name.'3
It is interesting and important to remark that this passage, besides
being a clear statement to the effect that the Absolute is 'nameless',
is designed to be an implicit criticism of Confucian realism. The
'way' which is here said to be not the real Way is the human (or
ethical) 'way' as understood in the Confucian school. And the
'name' which is said to be not the real Name refers to the so-called
'names' of the Confucianists, su ch as' benevolence', 'righ teousness',
'wisdom', etc., which the Confucianists consider cardinal virtues.
Asto the meaning of the word 'way' (tao) as it was originally used
by Confucius himself and his circle, authentic information is fur-
nished by the Lun Yü ('The Analects'). Entering into the fine details
of the problem would lead us too far beyond the scope of the present
study. Here I shall confine myself to giving a few examples just to
clarify the most essential characteristics of the Confucian concept of
tao.
Master Yu (one of the disciples of Confucius) once remarked: Those
who are by nature filial and fraternal (i.e., those who behave with an
inborn goodwill toward their parents and eider brothers) at home are
seldom inclined (in public life) toward comporting themselves
against the will of their superiors. And (of th ose who do not comport
themselves against the will of their superiors) none, indeed, has ever
wanted to stir up confusion (in society).
(The observation of this fact makes us realize that) the 'princely man'
should strive (to establish) the root, for the root once established, the
'way' (tao) will naturally grow up. The right attitude toward parents
and eider brothers may, in this respect, be considered the root of
'benevolence' (or 'human love'). 14
It is contextually clear that the 'way' in this passage means the
proper ethical attitude of man toward his brethren in society. The
argument is typical of Confucianists. 383
It recognizes man's inborn
goodwill toward those closest in blood as the 'root' or 'origin' of
human morals. This inborn goodwill, when expanded into a univer-
sal goodwill toward all fellow-members of society, turns into the
highest principle of ethical conduct, the 'way', as exemplified by the
virtue of 'benevolence'.
Clearly, the conceptual structure of the argument is based on the
terms 'filial piety', 'fraternal respect', and 'benevolence'. The word
'way' is mentioned almost in a casual way. It is not even a key term
in the real sense of the word.
The Master (Confucius) said: 0 Shên, 15 my 'way' is a unity running
through (all forms of my behavior). Master Tsêng respectfully
replied: Yes!
When the Master left the place, the other disciples asked (Master
Tsêng) saying: What did he mean?
Master Tsêng said: Our Master's 'way' consists in 'loyalty' (i.e., being
loyal or faithful to one's own conscience) and, 'kindness' (i.e., being
thoughtful for others, as if their problems were one's own). 16
In this passage, the 'way' means again the leading principle of
ethical conduct. By the statement: 'my way is a unity running
through' Confucius means to say that although his behavior appears
concretely in various forms, there underlies them all a unique
ethical principle. The 'way', in other words, is here the unifying
principle of all forms of moral conduct.
The Master said: In case the 'way' prevails in a state, you may be
daring in both speech and action. But in case the 'way' does not
prevail, you may be daring in action, but you should be reserved in
speech. 17
Confucius often speaks of the 'way' prevailing in astate - or more
literally 'a state's possessing the way' .18 What is meant by the word
in such contexts is too clear to need elucidation.
The Master said: The 'way' of the 'princely man' is (manifested) in
three (forms). But I myself am equal to none of them. He who is
really virtuous does not worry. He who is really wise is never per-
plexed. He who is really bold does not fear.
Master K'ung (one of the disciples of Confucius) said: Master, these
precisely are your own 'way'! 19
The interpretation of the word tao may vary more or less in accor-
dance with contexts, but the fondamental meaning is observable in
all the uses of the word. It means the right or proper 'way' of acting
in social life. The 'way' for Confucius is the highest principle of
ethical conduct.
It would be going too far to assert that this Confucian concept of
the 'way' is exclusively human. For, although it is essentially human
and ethical in its concrete manifestation, the concept would seem to
have in the moral consciousness of Confucius something cosmic as
its metaphysical core. 384
The 'way' in its original metaphysical form is the all-pervading supreme law of Being. The supreme law govern-
ing the working of the universe in general, and governing man as a
part of the whole universe in particular, is called 'way' when it is
comprehended by, or reftected in, the consciousness of man. The
highest principle of ethical conduct is, in this sense, nothing other
than a particular manifestation of the universal law of Being in the
form of the supreme law governing the right forms of human life.
The principle of ethical conduct is, for Confucius, by no means a
man-made rule, or set of rules, regulating from outside the behavior
of man. It is a reftection in the human consciousness of the highest
law of the universe. And as such, it is the 'internalized' cosmic law
regulating human behavior from within.
Thus to know the 'way' does not consist merely in learning the
formai mies of good manners and correct behavior. It consists in
man's coming into contact with the all-pervading metaphysical law
of the Cosmos through becoming conscious of it. The following very
forceful and passionate statement would sound absurd or even
ridiculous if the Confucian 'way' were merely a matter of etiquette
and correct behavior.
The Master said: If a man hears (i.e., understands the profound
meaning of) the 'way' in the morning, he may die contented in the
evening. 20
In this 'cosmic' aspect, the Confucian conception of the 'way' might
be said to have something in common with the Taoist counterpart.
The difference between the two, however, is far more conspicuous
and essential than the point of contact, as we shall see presently.
There is, in any case, a conscious attitude noticeable on the part of
Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu to reject the 'way' as understood by Con-
fucius and his followers. The 'way', Lao-tzu says, which can be
recognized as the 'way' by ordinary people - Confucius and his
followers being their representatives - is not the real Way. The real
Way, or the Absolu te in its absoluteness, is not something which an
ordinary mind can become conscious of. How could one 'know' it?
How could one 'hear' it? It is by nature something unknown,
unknowable and inaudible.
Being essentially unknown and unkowable, the Way is 'name-
less'. Here agin we encounter Lao-tzu consciously taking up a
position against the Confucian attitude toward the 'names'.
Certainly, Lao-tzu too speaks of 'names'. The 'nameless' Way,
he says, goes on assuming various 'names' in its process of
self-determinations.
The Way in its absolute reality has no 'name'. lt is (comparable to)
uncarved wood. 21
Only when it is eut out are there 'names' .22
385
But there is a basic difference between Lao-tzu and Confucius with
regard to 'names' in that Lao-tzü does not regard these 'names' as
absolutely established. As we have learnt from the explanation
given by Chuang-tzu of 'chaotification' as well as from Lao-tzü's
thesis that everything in this world is 'relative', all 'names' - and
ultimately the 'things' designated by the 'names' - are but of a
relative nature. Confucian 'realism' on the contrary, takes the posi-
tion that behind every 'name' there is a corresponding objective and
permanent reality. And to the highest Names there correspond the
highest realities. These Names represent the cardinal virtues:
'benevolence', 'righteousness', 'decorum', 'wisdom', 'truthfulness'.
Against this, Lao-tzu puts forward the view that-these 'names which
may be mentioned as names' are not real 'names'. In his mind, the
Names, or the cardinal virtues, which are so highly valued by the
Confucians are but so many symptoms of degeneration and corrup-
tion, that is, symptoms of men's having alienated themselves from
the Absolute.
Only when the great Way declines, do 'benevolence' and 'righteous-
ness' arise. Only when cleverness and sagacity make their appear-
ance do wiles and intrigues arise. Only when the six basic kinship
relations (i.e., the relationships between father and son, eider and
younger brothers, husband and wife) are out of harmony do filial sons
make their appearance. Only when the state falls into confusion and
disorder, do loyal subjects make their appearance. 23
lt is only after Virtue is lost that 'benevolence' becomes prominent. lt
is only after 'benevolence' is lost that 'righteousness' becomes prom-
inent. And it is only after 'righteousness' is lost that 'decorum'
becomes prominent.
Indeed, 'decorum' emerges in an age in which 'loyalty' and 'faithful-
ness' have become scarce. It marks the beginning of disorder (in
society). 24
Far from being real values as the Confucians assert, all these so-
called Names are but signs of man's alienation from Reality. In the
very establishment of these Names as absolute and permanent
values there is an unmistakable indication that the Absolute bas
been lost sight of. Speaking more generally, no 'name' is absolute.
For, as Lao-tzu says, a 'name which can be designated by the word
"name" 'is not the real Name. The only 'real Name' (ch'ang ming)
which is absolute is the Name assumed by the Absolute. However,
that absolute Name is, paradoxically, 'Nameless', or as we shall see
presently, the 'Mystery of Mysteries', the 'Gate of all Wonders'.
I have just used the phrase: 'the Name assumed by the Absolute'.
And in fact, as Lao-tzu himself explicitly admits, the 'nameless'
Way does assume a more positive 'name' at its very first stage of
386 Sufism and Taoism
self-manifestation or self-determination. That first 'name' assumed
by the Absolute in its creative activity is Existence (yu). 25 Lao-tzii,
making a concession to popular parlance, sometimes calls the latter
Heaven and Earth (t'ien ti). 26 Strictly speaking, the Way at this stage
is not yet actually Heaven and Earth. It is Heaven and Earth only in
potentia. It is that face of the Absolu te by which it turns, so to speak,
toward the world of Being which is to appear therefrom. It refers to
the Absolu te as the principle of eternal and endless creativity.
The Nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. The Named is
the Mother of the ten thousand things. 27
But before we go into the details of the problem of the Named, we
must pursue further the 'nameless' aspect of the Way.
With a view to making a fresh start in the consideration of this
aspect of the Way, we may conveniently begin by recalling the
opening words of the Tao Tê Ching, which has been quoted above28
and which has led us into a sort of long digression on the fondamen-
tal diff erence between Confucianism and Taoism regarding the
understanding of'way' (tao) and 'name' (ming). The passage reads:
The 'way' which can be designated by the word 'way' is not the real
Way. The 'name' which can be designated by the word 'name' is not
the real N ame.
The same conception of the Way is expressed by Chuang-tzii in a
somewhat different way as follows.
If the Way is made clear, it is no longer the Way. 29
He means to say by this that a thing which can be pointed to as the
Way is not the real Way. And again,
Is there anyone who knows the Way which is not a 'way'? 30
This, of course, means that the real Way has no visible form by
which one could designate it by the word 'way'.
To say that the Way or the Absolute in its absoluteness is 'name-
1,ess', that it refuses to be designated by any 'name' whatsoever, is to
say that it transcends all linguistic comprehension. And this is the
same as to say that the Way is beyond the grasp of both thought and
sense perception. The Way is of such a nature that Reason cannot
conceive of it nor the senses perceive it. The Way, in other words, is
an absolute Transcendent.
Even if we try to see it, it cannot be seen. In this respect it is called
'figureless'. 31
Even if we try to hear it, it cannot be heard. In this respect it is called
'inaudibly faint'.
Even if we try to grasp it, it cannot be touched. In this respect it is
called 'extremely minute'.
'9f
The Way 387
In these three aspects, it is totally unfathomable. They merge into
One. 32
(Ordinarily, the upper part of a thing is brightly visible, while the
lower partis dark and obscure. But this is not the case with the Way.)
Upward, it is not bright. Downward, it is not dark.
It continues interminably like a thread, but no name can be given to
it. And (this interminable creative activity) ultimately returns to the
original Nothingness.
Shall we describe it as a shapeless Shape, or imageless Image? Shall
we describe it as something vague and undeterminable? Standing in
front of it, we do not see its head. Following behind it, we do not see
its rear. 33
Thus the 'namelessness' of the Way is the same as its being Non-
Being. For whatever is absolutely imperceptible and inconceivable,
whatever has no 'image' at all, is, for man, the same as 'non-
existent'. It is 'Nothing' (wu). 34
It is important to notice that the Way appears as 'Nothing' only
when looked at fromourpoint of view. It is Nothing for us because it
transcends human cognition. It is, as Islamic philosophers would
say, a matter of i'tibar or (human) 'viewpoint'. Otherwise, the Way
in itself is - far from being 'nothing' - Existence in the fullest sense
of the term. For it is the ultimate origin and source of all Being.
For ordinary human consciousness the Way is Nothing. But it is
not 'nothing' in a purely negative sense. It is nota passive 'nothing'.
It is a positive Nothing in the sense that it is Non-Being pregnant
with Existence.
It goes without saying that this positive aspect of the Way is far
more difficult to explain than its negative side. Properly speaking it
is absolutely impossible to exp Iain it verbally. As we have just seen,
the reality of the Way is indescribable and ineffable. And yet
Lao-tzii does try to describe it, or at least to give some hints as to
how we should 'feel' its presence in the midst of the world of Being.
Qui te naturally, the hints are extremely dim and obscure. They are
of necessity of a symbolic nature.
The Way in its reality is utterly vague, utterly indistinct. 35
Utterly indistinct, utterly vague, yet there is within it an Image.
Utterly vague, utterly indistinct, yet there is within it Something.
Utterly profound, utterly dark, yet there is within it the purest
Essence.
The purest Essence is extremely real.
(Eternally and unchangingly its creativeness is at work, so that) from
of old till now its Name36 has never left it. Through this Name it
governs the principles of ail things.
How do we know that it is so with the principles of ail things? From
what I have just said. 37
388
Thus the Way in its purely negative aspect which is absolutely
beyond human cognition is Nothing and Non-Being. In this aspect
the Way has no 'name' whatsoever. Even the word 'way' (tao) is
properly inapplicable to it. lt is 'nameless'.
This absolutely intangible and impenetrable Mystery steps out of
its own darkness and cornes a stage doser to having a 'name'. lt is, at
this stage of self-manifestation, a faint and shadowy 'Image'. In the
Image we feel vaguely the presence of Something awful and mys-
terious. But we do not yet know what it is. lt is felt as Something but
it has still no 'name'.
In the first part of the present study we saw how, in the metaphys-
ical system of Ibn' Arabi, the Absolu te in its absoluteness is 'name-
less'. We saw how the Absolute in such astate is even beyond the
stage at which it is properly to be designated by the name Allah.
Likewise in Lao-tzii, this Something is made to be antecedent even
to God (lit. the heavenly Emperor).
Unfathomably deep it is like the ancestor of the ten thousand things
Like a deep mass of water it is (and nothing is visible on the surface),
yet Something seems to be there.
1 know not whose son it is. 38
It would seem to be antecedent even to the Emperor (i.e., God. 39
This 'nameless' Something, in its positive aspect, i.e., in its eternal
and everlasting creativeness, may be 'named' provisionally the
'way'. Lao-tzii himself admits that it is a provisional 'name'. But of
all the possible provisional 'names', the 'way' is the representative
one. Actually, Lao-tzii proposes several other 'names' for the Way,
and points out several typical 'attributes', each one of which refers
to this or that particular aspect of the Way .40
There is Something, formless but complete,41 born before Heaven
and Earth.
Silent and void, it stands alone,42 never changing. It goes round
everywhere, never stopping.43 It may be considered the Mother of
the whole world. 44
1 know not its 'name'. Forging a pseudonym, 1 call it the 'Way'.
Being forced to name it (further), 1 call it 'Great'.
Being 'Great' would imply 'Moving-forward' .45 'Moving-forward'
would imply 'Going-far' .46 And 'Going-far' would imply 'Turning-
back' .47
In the passage just quoted Lao-tzii suggests the possibility of the
Absolu te being named in various ways. At the same time, however,
he makes it clear that all these 'Names' or 'attributes' are provi-
sional, relative, and partial. For instance, he proposes to call the
Absolute the 'Great'. He is justified in doing so because the Abso-
The Way 389 lute or the Way is 'great'. But it is, we have to remember, 'great' only in a certain sense, from a particular standpoint. To look upon the Way as something 'great' represents but one particular point of view which we human beings take with regard to the Absolu te. This naturally implies that there is also a certain respect in which the Way should be called 'small'. It can be considered 'great'; it can be considered 'small'. Both 'names' are right, but neither of them can do full justice to its reality. In this respect, the Way is comparable to a water plant adrift, turning this way or that. lt has no fixity. Having no fixity, it accepts any 'name', but no 'name' can represent it perfectly. The great Way is like a thing drifting on the water. It goes every- where, left and right. The ten thousand things owe their existence toit. And yet it does not boast (of its own creative activity). It accomplishes its work, yet makes no daim. It dothes and nourishes the ten thousand things, yet never domineers over them. Being absolutely free of desire, it may be called 'Small'. The ten tho-usand things go back toit, yet it makes no daim to being their Mas ter. In this respect, it may also be called 'Great' .48 This difficulty which we inevitably encounter in attempting to give a proper 'name' to the Absolute is due not only to the fact that it is essentially 'nameless' but also to the fact that the Absolute is nota 'thing' in the sense in which we usually understand the term 'thing'. The descriptive power of human language is tragically limited. The moment we linguistically designate a state of affairs, whether metaphysical or empirical, by a noun, it becomes reified, that is, it turns into a 'substance' in our representation. We have earlier referred to the Absolute as Something; but 'Something' is in our imagination some substance, however mysterious it may be. And exactly the same is true of such 'names' as 'Mother', 'Way', etc., or even 'Nothing'. The Absolute which we designate by these 'names', however, is nota 'substance'. And it should not be understood as a 'substance'. This is the reason - or at least one of the main reasons -why Lao-tzii emphasizes so much that all the 'names' he proposes are nothing but makeshifts. Whatever 'name' he may use in referring to the Absolute, we should try not to 'reify' it in understanding what he says about it. For as a 'thing' in the sense of a 'substance', the Absolute is 'nothing'. How cana thing be a 'substance' when it is absolutely 'formless', 'invisible', 'inaudible', 'intangible', and 'taste- less' ?49 The Absolu te is 'Something' only in the sense of an Act, or the act of Existence itself. Scholastically we may express the concep- tion by saying that the Absolu te is Actus Purus.
390
lt is Actus Purus in
the sense that it is pre-eminently 'actual', and also in the sense that it
exists as the very act of existing and making 'things' exist. The
following words of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu makes this point clear.
Lao-tzu says:
He who goes through the world, holding in hand the great Image,50
wherever he may go will meet with no harm. 51 Safe, tranquil and calm
he will always remain.
Beautiful music and delicious food will make wayfarers stop. The
Way, on the contrary, uttered in words is insipid and ftavorless.
One looks at it, and finds it unworthy to be seen.
One listens to it, and finds it unworthy to be heard.
Yet when one uses it, one finds it inexhaustible. 52
The loudest sound is hardly audible.
The greatest Image has no form.
The Way is hidden and has no name. And yet it is the Way alone that
really excels in bestowing help and bringing things to completion. 53
And Chuang-tzu:
The Way does have a reality and its evidence. 54 But (this does not
imply that it) does something intentionally. Nor does it possess any
(tangible) form. Soit may be transmitted (from heart to heart among
the 'true men'), but cannot be received (as in the case of a thing
having an external form). It may be intuited, but cannot be seen.
It is self-sufficient. It has its own root in itself.
It existed even before Heaven and Earth existed. It has unmistakably
existed from ancient times. 55
It is the thing that confers spirituality upon the Spirits. And it is the
thing that makes the Heavenly Emperor (i.e., God) divine.
It produces Heaven. It produces Earth.
It exists even above the highest point of the sky. And yet it is not
'high' .56 It exists even beneath the six directions. 57 And yet it is not
'deep'.
It was born before Heaven and Earth. And yet it is not 'ancient'. It is
older than the oldest (historical) time. And yet it is not 'old' .58
Thus Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzii agree with each other in asserting
that the Way is actus. lt goes without saying that actus exists. But it
does not existas a 'substance'. lt should not be 'reified'. In order not
to reify it, we have to intuit it. For we cannot possibly imagine,
represent, or conceive the Absolute without turning it into a kind of
'substance'. Metaphysical or ecstatic intuition is the only possible
means by which we can approach it without doing serious harm toits
image. But an intuition of this sortis open only to those who have
experienced to the utmost limit what Chuang-tzu calls 'sitting in
oblivion'.
391