Part 111
CONCLUSION
A Comparative Reflection
Methodological Preliminaries
As stated in the Introduction to Part One of this work, I started this
study prompted by the conviction that what Professor Henry Cor-
bin calls 'un dialogue dans la métahistoire' is something urgently
needed in the present world situation. For at no time in the history
of humanity has the need for mutual understanding among the
nations of the world been more keenly felt than in our days. 'Mutual
understanding' may be realizable - or at least conceivable - at a
number of different levels of life. The philosophical level is one of
the most important of them. And it is characteristic of the
philosophical level that, unlike other levels of human interest which
are more or less closely connected with the current situations and
actual conditions of the world, it provides or prepares a suitable
locus in which the 'mutual understanding' here in question could be
actualized in the form of a meta-historical dialogue. And meta-
historical dialogues, conducted methodically, will, I believe, event-
ually be crystallised into a philosophia perennis in the fullest sense
of the term. For the philosophical drive of the human Mind is,
regardless of ages, places and nations, ultimately and fundamentally
one.
I readily admit that the present work is far from even coming
close to this ideal. But at least such was the motive from which I
undertook this study. In the first Part, an attempt was made to lay
bare the fondamental philosophical structure of the world-view of
Ibn 'Arabi, one of the greatest mystic-philosophers. The analytic
work was done quite independently of any comparative considera-
tions. I simply tried to isolate and analyze as rigorously as possible
the major concepts that constitute the basis of Ibn 'Arabï' s
philosophical world-view in such a way that it might forma com-
pletely independent study.
The second Part dealing with Lao-tzii and Chaung-tzii is of a
slightly different nature. Of course it is in itself an equally indepen-
dent study of Taoist philosophy, which could very well be read as
such. But it is slightly different from the first Part in one point,
namely, that in isolating key-concepts and presenting them in a
470 Sufism and Taoism
systematic way, 1 already began preparations for the work of co-
ordination and comparison. By this 1 am not simply referring to the
fact that in the course of this work mention was made from time to
time of this or that part of Ibn' Arabi's thought. 1 am referring to
something more fondamental and of a more methodological nature.
1 have just spoken of the 'preparatory work for co-ordination and
comparison'. Concretely, this refers to the fact that 1 consciously
arranged and presented the whole matter in such a way that the very
analysis of the key-concepts of Taoism might bring to light the
common philosophical ground upon which the meta-historical
dialogue could become possible. Let this not be taken to mean that 1
modified the given material with a view to facilitating comparison,
let alone distorted the given facts, or forced something upon Lao-
tzu and Chuang-tzu for such a purpose. The fact is rather that an
objective analysis of Taoist key-terms naturally led me to the dis-
covery of a central idea which might work as the most basic connect-
ing link between the two systems of thought. The only arbitrary
thing 1 did - if 'arbitrary' it was - consisted in my having given a
philosophical 'name' to the central idea. The name is 'existence'.
And the name once established, 1 could characterize the guiding
spirit of the philosophical world-view of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu as
'existentialist' as opposed to the 'essentialist' tendency of the Con-
focian school.
1think1 have made it abundantly clear in the course of the second
Part that by understanding the philosophy of Lao-tzu and Chuang-
tzu in terms of 'existence', 1 have not arbitrarily forced upon them
anything alien to their thought. The only point is that the Taoist
sages themselves do not propose any definite 'name' for this particu-
lar idea, whereas Ibn 'Arabi has the word wujüd which is, histori-
cally as well as structurally, the exact Arabie expression for the same
idea. Certainly, Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu do use the wordyu mean-
ing'being' or'existence' in contradistinction from wu 'non-beil)g' or
'non-existence'. But, as we have seen,yu in their system plays a very
special rôle which is different from that of 'existence' here in ques-
tion. The yu refers to a particular aspect or stage of the creative
activity of the Absolute, the stage at which the absolutely 'nameless'
Absolute definitely turns into the 'named' and begins to be
diversified into myriads of things.
Far better than yu in this respect is the word tao, the Way, which is
primarily an exact Taoist counterpart of the Islamic IJ,aqq, the Tru th
or Reality. But tao, to. begin with, is a word having an extremely
complex connotative structure. It covers an extensive semantic
field, ranging from the Mystery of Mysteries to the 'being-so-of-
itself' of all existents. Its meaning is, so to speak, tinged with
variegated nuances and charged with many associations. Certainly
Methodological Preliminaries 471
it does cover to a great extent the meaning of'existence'. But if used
as an equivalent of 'existence' it would inevitably add many ele-
ments to the basic meaning of 'existence'. The use of the term
'taoism', for example, instead of 'existentialism' in those contexts
where we want to bring out the radical contrast between the fonda-
mental position of Taoism and 'essentialism' - which by the way, is
an English equivalent chosen for the Confocian conception of
'names' (ming)-would make the whole situation more obscure and
confosing. In order to refer to the particular aspect of the tao in
which it is conceived as the actus purus, it is absolutely necessary
that we should have a far less 'colorfol' word than tao. And 'exist-
ence' is just the word for its purpose.
These considerations would seem to lead us to a very important
methodological problem regarding the possibility of meta-historical
dialogues. The problem concerns the need of a common linguistic
system. This is only natural because the very concept of 'dialogue'
presupposes the existence of a common language between two
interlocutors.
When our intention happens to be to establish a philosophical
dialogue between two thinkers belonging to one and the same
cultural and historical background, Plato and Aristotle, for
instance, or Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, Kant and Hegel,
etc., the problem of the necessity of a common language does not of
course arise. The problem begins to make itself felt when we pickup
within a cultural tradition two thinkers separated one from the
other by a number of factors, like Aristotle and Kant, for example.
Each of them philosophized in a language which is different from
that of the other. There is, in this sense, no common language
between them. But in a broad sense, we can still say that there is a
common philosophical language between the two, because of the
strong tie of a common philosophical tradition that bind them
together inseparably. lt is, in fact, hardly imaginable that any key-
term of primary importance in Greek should not find its equivalent
in German.
The linguistic distance naturally becomes more conspicuous
when we want to establish a dialogue between two thinkers belong-
ing to two different cultural traditions, Avicenna and Thomas
Aquinas, for example. But even here we are still justified in recog-
nizing the existence of a common philosophical language in view of
the fact that in the last analysis they represent but two varieties of
scholastic philosophy, both of which ultimately go back to one and
the same Greek source. The concept of 'existence', for instance -in
the linguistic form of wujüd in Arabie and in that of existentia in
Latin - appears with the same basic connotation in both the Eastern
472 Sufism and Taoism
and Western scholastic traditions. Thus the problem of a common
language does not arise in a very acute form.
The problem does arise with real acuity where there is no histori-
cal connection in any sense whatsoever between the two thinkers.
And this is precisely the case with Ibn 'Arabï and Lao-tzii or
Chuang-tzu. In such a case, if there happens to be a central concept
active in both systems, but having its linguistic counterpart only in
one of the systems, we have to pinpoint the concept in the system in
which it is in astate of non-linguistic ftuidity or amorphousness, and
then stabilize it with a definite 'name'. The 'name' may be borrowed
from the other system, if the term actually in use in it happens to be a
really appropriate one. Or some other word may be chosen for the
purpose. In our particular case, Ibn' Arabï off ers the word wujüd,
which, in its translated form, 'existence' serves exactly our purpose,
because it does express the concept to be expressed in as simple a
manner as possible, that is, without 'coloring' it with special conno-
tations. The word remains connotatively colorless mainly due to the
fact that Ibn 'Arabi uses by preference a variety of other terms, like
tajallï, fay<J,, ral)mah, nafas, etc., in order to describe the same
concept with special connotations.
That we are not doing any injustice to the reality of the world-
view of the Taoist sages by applying the word 'existence' to the
central idea of their thought will be clear if one takes the trouble of
re-examining Chuang-tzii's description of the Cosmic Wind
together with the analytic interpretation of it which has been given
in Chapter VI.
However this may be, with the establishment of 'existence' as the
central concept of both systems, we are now in possession of a
common philosophical ground on which to establish a meta-
historical dialogue between Ibn' Arabï on the one hand and Lao-tzii
and Chuang-tzu on the other. With this in mind, let us review the
main points of the two philosophical systems which we have already
analyzed in detail in the preceding pages.
1 would like to point out at the outset that the philosophical
structure of both systems as a whole is dominated by the concept of
the Unity of Existence. This concept is expressed in Arabie by
wal)dah al-wujüd, literally the 'one-ness of existence'. For expres-
sing the same basic concept, Chuang-tzii, uses words like t'ien ni
'Heavenly Levelling' and t'ien chün 'Heavenly Equalization'.
The very words 'levelling' and equalization' clearly suggest that
the 'unity' in question is nota simple 'unity', but a 'unity' formed by
many different things. The idea, in brief, is this. There are actually
different things, but they are 'equalized' with each other, or 'level-
led down' to the state of 'unity', losing all their ontological distinc-
l' ' ' M ethodological Preliminaries 473 tions in the midst of the original metaphysical Chaos. More briefly stated, the 'unity' in question is a 'unity' of 'multiplicity'. The same is true of the 'wa}:tdah' of Ibn 'Arabï. In both these systems, the whole world of Being is represented as a kind of ontological tension between Unity and Multiplicity. Unity in the world-view of Ibn' Arabï is represented by }:taqq, 'Tru th' or 'Reality' while in that of Taoism it is represented by the tao, 'Way'. And Multiplicity is for Ibn' Arabi the mumkiniit 'possible beings', and for Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu the wan wu, 'ten thousand things'. tajallï }:taqq mumkiniit shêng' tao wan wu And the relation between the two terms of the ontological tension is that of Unity. lt is a Unity because all the things that constitute Multiplicity are, after all, so many different phenomenal forms assumed by the Absolute (the Truth and the Way respectively). The phenomenal process by which the original One diversifies itself into Many is considered by Ibn' Arabi as the tajallï, 'self-manifestation' of the One, and by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu as shëng 'producing'. And Chuang-tzu, in particular, further elaborates this idea into that of the universal Transmutation, wu hua, lit. 'things-transforming'. Such is the broad conceptual framework which is shared by the world-views of Ibn' Arabi and the Taoist sages. The framework is in its entirety constructed on the most basic concept of 'existence'. In what follows we shall examine in terms of this framework and in tenns of this basic concept the major points of emphasis which characterize the two philosophical systems. Note 1. 1:., shêng: 'produces' or 'brings into existence'.
11 The lnner Transformation of Man
The philosophical world-view of the 'Unity of Multiplicity',
whether in the form of the 'Unity of Existence' or in the form of
'Heavenly Equalization', is an unusual - to say the least - world-
view. lt is an extraordinary world-view because it is a product of an
extraordinary vision of Existence as experienced by an extraordi-
nary man. The most characteristic point about this type of philos-
ophy is that philosophizing act starts from an immediate intuitive
grasp of Existence at its metaphysical depth, at the level of its being
the 'absolu te' Absolu te.
Existence - which has always and everywhere been the central
theme for innumerable philosophers - can be approached and
grasped at a number of different levels. The Aristotelian attitude
represents in this respect the exact opposite of the position taken by
the philosophers of Taoism and Sufism. For an Aristotle, Existence
means primarily the existence of individual 'things' on the concrete
lev el of phenomenal 'reality'. And his philosophizing starts from the
ordinary experience of Existence shared by all men on the level of
common sense. For an Ibn' Arabi or Chuang-tzu, however, these
'things' as experienced by an ordinary mind on the physical level are
nothing but a dream, or of a dreamlike nature. From their point of
view, the 'things' grasped on that level - although ultimately they
are but so many phenomenal forms of the Absolute, and are, as
such, no other than Existence - do not reveal the real metaphysical
depth of Existence. And an ontology based on such an experience
touches only shallowly the surface of the 'things'; it is not in a
position to account for the structure of the 'things' in terms of the
very ground of their Existence. A philosopher of this type is a man
standing on the level of the 'worldly mode of being' (nash'ah
dunyawïyah), in the terminology of Ibn Arabi. Such a man lacks the
'spiritual eyesight' ('ayn al-ba$ïrah) - or 'illuminating light' (ming)
as Chuang-tzu calls it - which is absolutely necessary for a deeper
penetration into the mystery of Existence. In order to obtain such
an eyesight, man must experience a spiritual rebirth and be trans-
ferred from the 'worldly mode of being' to the 'otherworldly mode
of being' (nash'ah ukhrawiyah ).
1 . . 1 .· The Inner Transformation of Man 475
Since the former is the way the majority of men naturally are,
men of the 'otherwordly mode of being' must necessarily appear as
'abnormal' men. The world-view of Taoism and Sufism represents
in this sense a vision of Existence peculiar to 'abnormal' men.
It is significant that the process by which this spiritual transforma-
tion occurs in man is described by Ibn' Arabi and Chuang-tzu, in
such a way that it discloses in both cases exactly the same basic
structure. Ibn 'Arabi describes it in terms of 'self-annihilation'
(fana'), and Chuang-tzu in terms of 'sitting in oblivion' (tso wang).
The very words used: 'annihilation' and 'forgeüing', clearly point to
one and the same conception. And the same underlying conception
is the 'purification of the Mind', or as Chuang-tzu calls it, the
spiritual 'fasting'.
As to what actually occurs in the process of 'purification', details
have been given in the first and second Parts of this book. And it
would be pointless to repeat the description here. The 'purification'
in both Taoism and Sufism consists, in brief, the man's purifying
himself of all desires as well as of the activity of Reason. lt consists,
in other words, in a complete nullification of the 'ego' as the empiri-
cal subject of all activities of Reason and desires. The nullification of
the empirical ego results in the actualization of a new Ego, the
Cosmic Ego, which, in the case of Taoism, is considered to be
completely at one with the Absolu te in its creative activity, and, in
the case of Ibn 'Arabi, is said to be unified with the Absolu te to the
utmost limit of possibility.
Perhaps the most interesting point concerning this topic from the
viewpoint of comparison is the problem of the 'stages' of the 'puri-
A comparative consideration is here the more interesting
because both Ibn' Arabi and Chuang-tzu distinguish in the process
three basic stages. The two systems differ from each other in details,
but agree with each other in the main.
Let us begin by recapitulating the thesis put forward by Chuang-
tzu. The first stage, according to him, consists in 'putting the world
outside the Mind', that is to say, forgetting the existence of the
objective world. The world as something 'objective' being by nature
relatively far from the Mind from the very beginning, it is relatively
easy for man to erase it from his consciousness through
contemplation.
The second stage consists in 'putting the things outside the Mind',
that is, erasing from consciousness the familiar things that surround
man in his daily life. At this stage, the external world completely
disappears from his consciousness.
The third stage is said to consist in man's forgetting Life, that is,
his own life or his persona! existence. The 'ego' is thereby corn-
476 Sufism and Taoism
pletely destroyed, and the world, both external and internai, disap-
pears from the consciousness. And as the 'ego' is nullified, the inner
eye of the man is opened and the light of 'illumination' suddenly
breaks through the darkness of spiritual night. This marks the birth
of a new Ego in man. He now finds himself in the Eternal Now,
beyond all limitation of time and space. He is also 'beyond Life and
Death', that is, he is 'one' with all things, and all things are unified
into 'one' in his 'no-consciousness'. In this spiritual state, an unusual
Tranquillity or Calmness reigns over everything. And in this cosmic
Tranquillity, away from the turmoil and agitation of the sensible
world, man enjoys being unified and identified with the very process
of the universal Transmutation of the ten thousand things.
Ibn 'Arabi who, as 1 have just said, also <livides the process into
three stages, provides a markedly Islamic version of spiritual 'puri-
fication'. The first stage is the' annihilation of the attributes'. At this
stage man has all his 'human' attributes nullified, and in their place
he assumes as his own the Divine Attributes.
The second stage consists in that man has his own persona!
'essence' nullified and realizes in himself his being one with the
Divine Essence. This is the completion of the phenomenon of
'self-annihilation' in the proper sense of the word. This stage cor-
responds to the first half of the third stage of Chuang-tzü, in which
the man is said to abandon his old 'ego'.
The third stage, according to Ibn' Arabi, is the stage at which man
regains his 'self' which he has 'annihilated' at the previous stage.
Only he does not regain his 'self' under the same conditions as
before, but rather in the very midst of the Divine Essence. This is
evidently but another way of saying that having abandoned his old
'ego' he has obtained a new Ego. Having lost his life, he has found a
new Life in being unified with the Divine Reality. In the technical
terminology of the Sufism, this is known as 'self-subsistence' (baqà').
This third stage corresponds to the latter half of the third stage
according to Chuang-tzü' s division of the process. Now man witnes-
ses all phenomenal things mingling with each other and merging
into the boundless ocean of Divine Life. His consciousness - or, to
be more exact, supra-consciousness -is in the utmost propinquity to
the Divine Consciousness in an ontological stage previous to its
actual splitting into an infinity of determinations and particular
forms. Naturally he falls into profound Silence, and an extraordi-
nary Tranquillity reigns over his concentrated Mind.
There is another important point to be mentioned in connection
with the problem of the 'purification' of the Mind. It concerns the
centripetal direction of the 'purification'. The process of 'self-
annihilation' or 'self-purification', if it is to succeed, must definitely
l ' ' '
,,
The Inner Transformation of Man 477
be turned and directed toward the innermost core of human exist-
ence. This direction clearly goes against the ordinary movements of
the Mind. The activity of the mind is usually characterized by its
centrifugai tendency. The Mind has a very marked natural tendency
to 'go out' toward the external world, attracted by, and in pursuit of,
external abjects. For the sake of 'purification', this natural tendency
must be curbed and turned to the opposite direction. The 'puri-
fication' is realizable only by man's 'turning into himself. This is
expressed by Ibn 'Arabi through the famous Tradition: 'He who
knows himself knows his Lord.' To this corresponds on the side of
Taoism the dictum of Lao-tzü: 'He who knows others (i.e., external
abjects) is a "clever" man, but he who knows himself is an
"illumined" man.' In reference to the same situation, Lao-tzü also
speaks of' closing up all the openings and doors'. 'Closing up all the
openings and doors' means obstructing all the possible outlets for
the centrifugai activity of the mind. What is aimed at thereby is
man's going down deep into his own mind until he cornes into direct
touch with the existential core of himself.
The reason why this point must be mentioned as being of special
importance is that such a thesis would appear at first sight to
contradict the more fondamental thesis of the Unity of Existence.
For in the world-view of both Ibn 'Arabi and the Taoist sages, not
only ourselves but all things in the world, without a single exception,
are phenomenal forms of the Absolute. And as such, there can be
no basic difference between them. All existents equally manifest,
each in its particular way and particular form, the Absolute. Why,
then, are the external things to be considered detrimental to the
subjective actualization of the Unity of Existence?
The answer is not far to seek. Although external things are so
many forms of the Absolute, and although we know this intellec-
tually, we cannot penetrate into them and experience from the
inside the palpitating Life of the Absolute as it is actively working
within them. Ali we are able to dois look at them from the outside.
Only in the case of our own selves, can each of us go into his 'inside'
and in-tuit the Absolute as something constantly at work within
himself. Only in this way can we subjectively participate in the
Mystery of Existence.
Besides, the centrifugai tendency of the mind is directly con-
nected with the discriminating activity of Reason. And Reason
cannot subsist without taking an 'essentialist' position. For where
there are no conceptual boundaries neatly established Reason is
utterly powerless. In the view of Reason, 'reality' consists of various
'things' and' qualities', each having what is called 'essence' by which
it is distinguished from the rest. These 'things' and 'qualities' are in
truth nothing but so many forms in which the Absolute manifests
478 Sufism and Taoism
itself. But in so far as they are self-subsistent entities, they conceal
the Absolute behind their solid 'essential' veils. They intervene
between our sight and the Absolute, and make our direct view of
Reality impossible. The majority of men are those whose eyesight is
obstructed in this way by the thick curtain of 'things'. They have
their counterpart in Taoism in those people who, unable to
'chaotify' the 'things', cannot interpret reality except in terms of
'this'-or-'that', 'good'-or-'bad', 'right'-or-'wrong', etc.
When the 'purification' of the Mind is completed, and when man has
tumed into a metaphysical Void, forgetting both the inside and the
outside of himself, he is allowed to experience what the Taoist sages
call 'illumination' (ming) and what Ibn 'Arabi calls 'unveiling'
(kashfl or 'immediate tasting' (dhawq). It is characteristic of both
'illumination' and 'unveiling' (or 'tasting') that this ultimate stage
once fully actualized, the 'things' that have been eliminated in the
process of 'purification' from the consciousness all corne back once
again, totally transformed, to his Mind which is now a well-polished
spotless mirror - the Mysterious Mirror, 1 as Lao-tzu calls it. Thus it
cornes about that the highest stage of metaphysical intuition is not
that of those who witness only the Absolute, wholly oblivious of
its phenomenal aspect. The highest 'unveiling', according to
Ibn 'Arabi, is of th ose who witness both the creatures and the
Absolu te as two aspects of one Reality, or rather, who witness the
whole as one Reality diversifying itself constantly and incessantly
according to various aspects and relations, being 'one' in Essence,
and 'all' with regard to the Names.
Likewise, the Perfect Man of Taoism does perceive infinitely
variegated things on the phenomenal level of Existence, and the
spotless surface of his Mysterious Mirror reflects all of them as they
appear and disappear. But this kaleidoscope of ever shifting forms
does not perturb the cosmic Tranquillity of the Mind, because
behind these variegated veils of the phenomenal world, he intuits
the metaphysical 'One'. He himself is one with the constant flux of
Transmutation, and being one therewith, he is one with the 'One'.
The philosophical world-view of an Ibn' Arabi, a Lao-tzu and a
Chuang-tzu is a product of such an 'abnormal' spiritual state. Itis an
ontology, because it is a philosophized vision of Existence. But it is
an extraordinary ontology, because the underlying vision of Exist-
ence is far from being an ordinary one.
Note
1. :tl'., Hsüan fan, X.
r
,
111 The Multistratified Structure of
Reality
In terms of historical origin there is obviously no connection at all
between Sufism and Taoism. Historically speaking, the former goes
back to a particular form of Semi tic monotheism, while the latter -if
the hypothesis which I have put forward at the outset of this study is
correct - is a philosophical elaboration of the Far Eastern type of
shamanism.
It is highly significant that, in spite of this wide historico-cultural
distance that separates the two, they share, on the philosophical
level, the same ground. They agree with each other, to begin with, in
that both base their philosophical thinking on a very peculiar con-
ception of Existence which is fundamentally identical, though dif-
fering from one another in details and on secondary matters.
They further agree with one another in that philosophizing in
both cases has its ultimate origin not in reasoning about Existence
but in experiencing Existence. Furthermore, 'experiencing' Exist-
ence in this particular case consists in experiencing it not on the
ordinary level of sense perception, but on the level (or levels) of
supra-sensible intuition.
Existence or Reality as 'experienced' on supra-sensible levels
reveals itself as of a multistratified structure. The Reality which one
observes in this kind of metaphysical intuition is not of a uni-
stratum structure. And the vision of Reality thus obtained is totally
different from the ordinary view of 'reality' which is shared by the
common people.
It is extremely interesting that both Ibn' Arabi and Chuang-tzu
begin by giving a rude shock to common sense by flatly refusing to
admit any reality to so-called 'reality', saying that the latter is
nothing but a dream. Quoting the famous Tradition: 'All men are
asleep; only when they die, do they wake up', Ibn' Arabi says: 'The
world is an illusion; it has no real existence .... Know that you
yourself are an imagination. And everything that you perceive and
say to yourself, "this is not me", is also an imagination.' In an
exactly similar way Chuang-tzu remarks: 'Suppose you dream that
you are a bird. (In that state) you soar up into the sky. Suppose you
480 Sufism and Taoism
dream that you are a fish; you go down deep into the pool. (While
you are experiencing all this in your dream, what you experience is
your "reality" .) Judging by this, nobody can be sure whether we -
you and I, who are actually engaged in conversation in this way- are
awake of just dreaming.' Thus we see so-called 'reality' being all of
a sudden transformed and reduced to something dreamlike and
unreal.
Far more remarkable, however, is the fact that for both Ibn
'Arabi and Chuang-tzii the dictum: 'All is a dream' has a very
positive metaphysical meaning. It is not in any way an emotive
statement to the effect, for instance, that the world we live in is like a
dream, that everything in this world is tragically ephemeral and
transient. It is, on the contrary, a definite ontological statement
recognizing the existence of a higher ontological level where all
things are deprived of their seemingly solid essential boundaries
and disclose their natural amorphousness. And paradoxically
enough, this 'dreamlike' lev el of Existence is, in the view of both Ibn
'Arabi and Chuang-tzii, far more 'real' than so-called 'reality'.
This dreamlike level of Existence is in the ontological system of
Ibn' Arabi what he calls the 'world of similitudes and Imagination',
while in that of Chuang-tzii it is the Chaos.
Thus the basic proposition that all is a dream does not mean that
so-called 'reality' is a vain and groundless thing. Instead of meaning
simply that the physical world is a sheer illusion, the proposition
indicates that the world which we experience on the sensible level is
nota self-subsistent reality, but is a Symbol - an ayah (pl. ayat), or
'indicator' as Ibn 'Arabi calls it, using the Quranic term - vaguely
and indistinctively painting to 'Something beyond'. The sensible
things, thus interpreted, are phenomenal forms of the Absolute
itself, and as such, they are 'real' in a particular way.
However, this again is a matter of immediate intuitive experi-
ence. The metaphysical fact that behind and beyond so-called 'real-
ity', which is apparently a colorful fa bric of fantasy and imagination,
there lies hidden the 'real' Reality, does not become clear except to
those who have learnt how to 'interpret' rightly- as Ibn' Arabi says
- the infinitely variegated forms and properties as so many manifes-
tations of Reality. This is what is meant by Ibn 'Arabi when he says
that one has to 'die and wake up'. 'The only "reality" (in the true
sense of the term) is the Absolu te revealing itself as it really is in the
sensible forms which are nothing but the loci of its self-
manifestation. This point becomes understandable only when one
wakes up from the present life - which is a sleep of forgetfulness -
after one dies to this world through self-annihilation in God.'
Chuang-tzii, likewise, speaks of the need of experiencing a Great
I_
The Multistratified structure of Reality 481
Awakening. 'Only when one experiences a Great Awakening does
one realize that "reality" is but a Big Dream. But the stupid imagine
that they are actually awake .... How deep-rooted and irremedi-
able their stupidity is!'
In the eye of those who have experienced this spiritual Awaken-
ing, all things, each in its own form and on its own level, manifest the
presence of 'Something beyond'. And that 'Something beyond' is
ultimately the haqq of Ibn 'Arabi and the tao of Lao-tzii and
Chuang-tzii - the Absolute. Both Ibn 'Arabi and the Taoist sages
distinguish in the process of the self-revealing evolvement of the
Absolute several degrees or stages. Ontologically speaking this
would mean that Existence is of a multistratified structure.
The strata, according to Ibn' Arabi, are:
(1) The stage of the Essence (the absolute Mystery, abysmal
Darkness);
(2) The stage of the Divine Attributes and Names (the stage
of Divinity);
(3) The stage of the Divine Actions (the stage of Lordship);
( 4) The stage of Images and Similitudes;
( 5) The sensible world.
And according to Lao-tzii:
(1) Mystery of Mysteries;
(2) Non-Being (Nothing, or Nameless);
(3) One;
( 4) Being (Heaven and Earth);
( 5) The ten thousand things.
The two systems agree with each other in that (I) they regard the
first stage as an absolute Mystery, that is, something _absolutely
unknown-unknowable, transcending all distinctions and all limita-
tions, even the limitation of 'not being limited'; and that (2) they
regard the four remaining stages as so many various forms assumed by
this absolute Mystery in the process of its ontological evolvement,
so that all are, in this sense, 'one'. This latter point, namely, the
problem of U nity, will be further discussed in the following chapter.
IV Essence and Existence
As we have seen above, both Chuang-tzu's 'Heavenly Levelling'
and Ibn' Arabi's 'Unity of Existence' are based on the idea that all
things are ultimately reducible to the original Unity of the Absolu te
in its absoluteness, that is, the 'Essence at the level of Unity
(al}adïyah )'.
It is to be remarked that the Essence in the Unity of its uncondi-
tional simplicity is, in Ibn 'Arabi' s view, nothing other than pure
Existence, there being here not even the slightest discrepancy be-
tween 'essence' (i.e., 'quiddity') and 'existence'. In other words, the
Absolu te is actus purus, the act itself of 'existing'. The Absolute is
not a 'thing' in the sense of a 'substance'.
As Qâshâni says: 'The Reality called the" Essence at the lev el of
Unity" in its true nature is nothing other than Existence pure and
simple in so far as it is Existence. It is conditioned neither by
non-determination nor by determination, for in itself it is too sacred
to be qualified by any property and any name. It bas no quality, no
delimitation; there is not even a shadow of Multiplicity in it. It is not
a substance ... , for a substance must have an 'essence' other than
"existence", a "quiddity" by which it is a substance as differentiated
from all others.'
The conception of the Absolute being conditioned neither by
determination nor by non-determination is more tersely expressed
by Lao-tzu through single words like 'Nothing' and 'Nameless', and
by Chuang-tzu through the expression No-[No Non-Being]. The
last expression, No-[No Non-Being], indicates analytically the
stages in the logical process by which one arrives at the realization of
the Absolute transcending all determinations. First, the idea that
the Absolute is Being, i.e., 'existence' as ordinarily understood, is
negated. The concept of Non-Being is thus posited. Then, this
concept of Non-Being is eliminated, because, being a simple nega-
tion of Being, it is but a relative Non-Being. Thus the concept of.
No-Non-Being is obtained. This concept stands on the negation of
both Being and Non-Being, and as such it still keeps in itself a trace
or reftection of the opposition which exists between the contradic-
Essence and Existence 483 tories. In order to eliminate· even this faint trace of relativity, one bas to negate the No-Non-Being itself. Thus finally the concept of No-[No Non-Being] is established, as 'Nothing' in its absolutely unconditional transcendence. And Chuang-tzu clarifies through the admirable symbol of the Cosmic Wind that this transcendent Nothing is nota purely negative 'nothing' in the usual sense of the word; that, on the contrary, it is a supra-plenitude of Existence as the ultimate ontological ground of everything, as Something that lies at the very source of all existents and makes them exist. 'lt would seem', Chuang-tzu says, 'that there is some real Ruler. It is impossible for us to see Him in a concrete form. He is acting - there can be no doubt aboutit; but we cannot see His form. He does show His activity, but He has no sensible form.' This simply means that the No-[No Non-Being] - or theo- logically, the real Ruler of the world- is actus, creative energy, nota substance. The Cosmic Wind in itself is invisible and impalpable - because it is nota substance - but we know its presence through its ontological activity, through the ten thousand 'hales' and 'hollows' producing each its peculiar sound as the Wind blows upon them. The basic idea underlying the use of the symbol of the Wind is comparable with Ibn 'Arabi's favorite image of the 'ftowing' of Existence (sarayim al-wujüd). 'The secret of Life (i.e., Existence) lies in the act of ftowing peculiar to water.' The 'water' of Existence is eternally flowing through all things. It 'spreads" throughout the universe, permeating and pervading everything. It is significant that both Chuang-tzu and Ibn 'Abrabi represent Existence as something moving: 'blowing', 'ftowing', 'spreading', 'permeating', etc. This is a definite proof that Existence as they have corne to know it through 'immediate tasting' is in reality actus, nothing else. Existence which is actus, th us spreading itself out far and wide, goes on producing the ten thousand things. The latter, as 1 have repeatedly pointed out, are various forms in which Existence (or the Absolu te) manifests itself. And in this sense, all are Existence, nothing but Existence. And there is nothing but Existence. Viewed from this angle, the whole world of Being is one. On the other band, however, it is also an undeniable fact that we actually see with our own eyes an infinity of infinitely variegated 'things' which are different from one another. 'lt is evident', Ibn 'Arabi says, 'that this is different from that . .. And in the Divine world, however wide it is, nothing repeats itself. This is a truly fondamental fact.' From this po:nt: of view, there is nota single thing that is the same as any other thing. Even 'one and the same thing' is in reality not exactly the same in two successive moments.
484 Sufism and Taoism
These individually different things, on a more universal level of
Existence, still retain their mutual differences and distinctions, not
'individually' this time, but in terms of 'essences'. And these
ontological differences and distinctions which the 'things' manifest
on this level are far more solid and unalterable because they are
based on, and fixed by, their 'essences'. The latter provide the
'things' with an 'essential' fixity which ensures them from disinte-
gration. A 'horse' is a 'horse' by its 'essence'; it can never be a '<log'.
A '<log' is 'essentially' a '<log', nothing else. It goes without saying
that this is the very basis on which stands the 'essentialist' type of
ontology.
How could we account for the apparent contradiction between
the above-mentioned absolute Unity of Existence, Unity of all
things, and the undeniable Multiplicity of the ten thousand things
which are not reducible to each other, let alone to a unique and
single thing? Surely, if one puts these two points of view si de by side
with each other, one's mind cannot help being thrown into bewilder-
ing confusion. To see the One in the Many and the Many in the One,
or rather to see the Many as One and the One as Many - this
naturally causes what Ibn 'Arabï calls (metaphysical) 'perplexity'
(IJ,ayrah).
Faced with this problem, Chuang-tzu takes a thoroughgoing
anti-essentialist position. The view of things, each being distin-
guished from the rest by a solid 'boundary' of 'essence', he main tains,
does not give a true picture of these things themselves. The 'essen-
tial' distinctions which common sense and Reason recognize be-
tween things are, according to him, devoid of reality. The 'things'
ordinarily look as if they were distinct from each other in terms of
'essences', simply because ordinary men are not 'awake'. If they
were, they would 'chaotify' the things and see them in their original
'undifferentiation'.
The things being 'chaotified', however, is not the same as their
being sheer nothing. The very concept of 'chaotification' would be
meaningless if there were no plurality at all in the world of Being. It
is, as Ibn 'Arabï main tains, a truly fondamental fact that many
'different' things do exist, no matter how 'unreal' they may be in
themselves and from the viewpoint of the higher metaphysical level
of Existence. The differences and distinctions that are observable in
the world may reveal themselves as 'unreal' when observed with the
'spiritual eyesight' of an ecstatic philosopher, but in so far as things
are factually different and distinct from each other, there must be
some ontological ground for that, too. And the ontological ground
cannot be anything other than 'essences'.
The 'essences' are symbolically designated by Chuang-tzu
through the image of the 'hollows' in the trees, which emit all kinds
Essence and Existence 485
of sounds as the Wind blows upon them. Chuang-tzu does not assert
that the 'hollows' do not exist in any sense whatsoever. They are
surely there. The only point is that they do not produce any sound
by themselves. It is the Wind, not the 'hollows', that really produces
the sounds. '(One and the same Wind) blows on the ten thousand
things in different ways, and makes each "hollow" produce its own
peculiar sound, so that each imagines that its own self produces that
particular sound. But who, in reality, is the one who makes (the
"hollows") produce various sounds?'
All this would seem to be tantamount to saying - although
Chuang-tzu himself does not talk in terms of these concepts - that
the 'essences' are not sheer nothing, that they are potentially exist-
ent. The 'essences' do exist, but only in potentia, not in actu; they
are not actual or real in the fullest sense of the word. What is really
'real' is Existence, nothing else. And the 'essences' look as if they
were 'real' only by dint of the actualizing activity of Existence.
The position of the 'hollows' in the ontology of Chuang-tzu
corresponds to that of the 'permanent archetypes' in the ontology of
Ibn' Arabï. The main difference between the two lies in the fact that
in the former the relation between Essence and Existence is merely
symbolically suggested, whereas Ibn 'Arabï consciously takes up
the problem as an ontological theme and elaborates it far more
theoretically.
Details have been given in Chapter XII of the first Part regarding
the conceptual structure of the 'permanent archetypes'. Suffice it
here to note that the 'permanent archetypes' are the 'essences' of
the things, and that they are described as 'neither existent nor
non-existent' - which would exactly apply to the 'hollows' of
Chuang-tzu. It is remarkable, however, that the 'permanent
archetypes' are also described by Ibn' Arabï as 'realities (IJ,aqa'iq)
eternally subsistent in the world of the Unseen'. That is to say, the
'permanent archetypes', although they are 'non-existent' in terms
of'external existence', do existin actu within the Divine Conscious-
ness. The ontology of Ibn 'Arabï is, in this respect, Platonic; it is
more 'essentialist' than that of Chuang-tzu who does not concede
anything more than sheer potentiality to the 'essences'.
V The Self-Evolvement of Existence
The absolu te and ultimate ground of Existence is in both Sufism and
Taoism the Mystery of Mysteries. The latter is, as Ibn 'Arabï says,
the ankar al-nakirat 'the most indeterminate of all indeterminates';
that is to say, it is Something that transcends all qualifications and
relations that are humanly conceivable. And since it is transcendent
to such a degree, it remains for ever unknown and unknowable.
Existence per se is thus absolutely inconceivable and inapproach-
able. Ibn 'Arabï refers to this aspect of Existence by the word
'ghayb, 'concealment' or 'invisibility'. In the Taoist system, it is
hsüan or Mystery that is the most proper word for referring to this
absolutely transcendent stage of Existence.
The Taoist sages have also a set of negative words like wu,
Non-Being, wu-wu, No-thing or 'Nothing', wu-ming, Nameless,
etc. These terms are properly to be considered as functioning still
within the domain of the original transcendence. Conceptually,
however, there is already observable a distinction between these
negative terms and the 'Mystery', because their very 'negative-ness'
indicates their opposition to something 'positive', i.e., the following
stage of yu or Being, at which the 'boundaries' of the things-to-be
are adumbrated. This is the reason why Chuang-tzii proposes to use
the complex expression, No-[No Non-Being] or No-No-Nothing in
order to refer to the ultimate stage of Existence (i.e., the Mystery of
Mysteries) without leaving the level of negativity. However, this
distinction between the Mystery and these negative terms is ex-
clusively conceptual. Otherwise, 'Non-Being', 'Nothing', and
'Nameless' denote exactly the same thing as the 'Mystery'. They all
denote the Absolute in its absoluteness, or Existence at its ultimate
stage, qua Something unknown-unknowable, transcending all
qualifications, determinations, and relations.
It is important to note that Ibn' Arabi calls this ontological level the
'level of Unity (alJ,adiyah )'.The Absolu te at this stage is 'One' in the
sense that it refuses to accept any qualification whatsoever. Thus,
being one here means nothing other than absolute transcendence.
The self-evolvement of Existence 487
The Taoist sages, too, speak of the Way as' One'. As I have tried
to show earlier, the 'One' in the Taoist system is conceptually to be
placed between the stage of Non-Being and that of Being. It is not
exactly the same as the Way qua Mystery, because it is considered as
something which the ten thousand things 'acquire', i.e., partake of.
The One, in other words, is the principle of immanence. The Way is
'immanent' in everything existent as its existential core, or as its
Virtue, as Lao-tzii calls it. But whether regarded as 'immanent' or
'transcendent', the Way is the Way. What is immanent in everything
is exactly the same thing as that which transcends everything. And
this situation corresponds to the conceptual distinction between
tanzih and tashbih and the factual identity of the two in the system of
Ibn 'Arabi.
Thus the Taoist concept of One, in so far as it refers to the
Absolute itself, is an exact counterpart of Ibn 'Arabï's alJ,ad, the
'absolu te One', but in so far as it is 'One' comprising within itself the
possibility of Multiplicity, it is a counterpart of walJ,id, i.e., the 'One
at the level of the Names and Attributes', or the Unity of the Many.
In short, the Taoist One comprises both the alJ,ad and the walJ,id of
Sufism.
These considerations make us realize that the first and ultimate
stage of Existence itself can naturally be considered from two
diff erent angles: ( 1) as the Absolu te perse, and ( 2) as the Absolu te
as the very origin and starting-point of the process of self-
evolvement. In the first of these two aspects, the Absolute is Mys-
tery and Darkness. In the second aspect, on the contrary, a faint
foreboding of light is already perceivable in the very midst of utter
darkness. As Ibn' Arabï says: 'Everything is contained in the bosom
of the Breath, just as the bright light of day in the very darkness of
dawn'.
It is quite significant in this respect that the word used by the
Taoist sages to denote the Mystery, hsüan, originally means 'black'
with a mixture of redness. Lao-tzii, as we have noticed, likes us to
use in this sense also the word p'u meaning originally 'uncarved
wood'. Existence, at this stage of absolu te simplicity, is like
'uncarved wood'. In so far as it still remains 'uncarved', there is
nothing observable but 'wood'. But in so far as it contains the
possibility of producing all kinds of vessels and utensils, it is more
than sheer 'wood'. Actually it is still 'Nothing', but potentially it is
all things. There is at least a vague and indistinct feeling that
something is about to happen. And that is the 'positive' aspect of the
Mystery, the face of the Absolu te turned toward the world of
creation. Ibn 'Arabi conveys the same idea by the expression:
'hidden Treasure', which he has taken from a Tradition. And it is of
488 Sufism and Taoism
the very nature of the 'hidden Treasure' that it 'loves to be known'.
It is, however, at the stage of the Divine Names and Attributes -
in terms of Ibn' Arabi's world-view-that this 'love of being known',
i.e., the inner ontological drive of Existence, becomes actualized.
At the stage of the absolu te Unity, the Absolu te qua Absolu te is
characterized by a perfect 'independence', and does not require by
itself and for itself any creative activity. If' creation' is at all conceiv-
able at this stage, it is simply in the form of a faint foreboding. In the
System of Taoism the concept of Non-Being or Nothing refers
precisely to this delicate situation. 'Deep and Bottomless', Lao-tzii
says, 'it is like the origin and principle of the ten thousand
things .... There is nothing, and yet there seems to be something. 1
know not whose son it is. It would seem to be antecedent even to the
Heavenly Emperor.' 'The Way in its reality is utterly vague, utterly
indistinct. Utterly indistinct, utterly vague, and yet there is in the
midst of it an Image. Utterly vague, utterly indistinct, and yet there
is in the midst of it Something.'
The 'hidden Treasure loves to be known'. The Treasure lies 'hid-
den', and yet it is, so to speak, pressed from inside by the' desire to
be known'. Speaking less symbolically, the infini te things that are
contained in the Absolute in the state of pure potentia forcefully
seek for an outlet. This naturally causes an ontological tension
within the Absolute. And the internai ontological compression,
growing ever stronger finally relieves itself by bursting forth. It is
highly interesting to notice that both Ibn 'Arabi and Chuang-tzii
resort to the same kind of imagery in trying to describe this situa-
tion. Chuang-tzii talks about 'eructation'. He says: 'The Great
Earth eructates; and the eructation is called Wind. As long as the
eructation does not actually occur, nothing is observable. But once
it does occur, all the hollows of the trees raise ringing shouts.' The
issuing forth of the ten thousand things from the Absolute is here
compared to the Great Earth belching forth the Wind.
No less bold and picturesque is the mythopoeic image of 'brea-
thing out' by which Ibn 'Arabi tries to depict the matter. The
ontological state of extreme tension which precedes the 'bursting
out' and which has been caused by an excessive amount of things
accumulated inside is compared to the state in which a man finds
himself when he holds his breath compressed within himself. The
tension reaches the last limit, and the air compressed in the breast
exp Iodes and gushes forth with a violent outburst. In a similar way,
the creative drive of Existence gushes forth out of the depth of
Absolute. This is the phenomenon which Ibn 'Arabi calls the
'breath of the Merciful'. In the theological language peculiar to Ibn
'Arabi, the same phenomenon can also be described as the Divine
The self-evolvement of Existence 489
Names, at the extreme limitof inner compression, suddenly burst-
ing out from the bosom of the Absolute. 'The Names, previous to
their existence in the outer world (in the form of phenomenal
things) exist hidden in the Essence of the Absolu te (i.e., the Mystery
of Mysteries), all of them seeking an outlet toward the world of
external existence. The situation is comparable to the case in which
a man holds his breath within himself. The breath, held within,
seeks an outlet toward the outside, and this causes in the man a
painful sensation of extreme compression. Only when he breathes
out does this compression cease to make itself felt. Just as the man is
tormented by the compression if he does not breathe out, so the
Absolu te would feel the pain of ( ontological) compression if it did
not bring into existence the world in response to the demand of the
Names.' This may also be compared with the image of a great
Cosmic Bellows by which Lao-tzii symbolically-describes the inex-
haustible creative activity of the Way. 'The space between Heaven
and Earth is comparable to a bellows. It is empty (i.e., the Absolute
qua the Mystery of Mysteries is "Nothing"), but its activity is
inexhaustible. The more it works the more it produces.'
Thus Existence, in compliance with its own necessary and natural
internai demand, goes on inexhaustibly determining itself into an
infinity of concrete things. And the 'breath of the Merciful' or the
ontological Mercy pervades all of them, constituting the very exis-
tential core of each one of them. And the existential core thus
acquired by each phenomenal thing is what The Taoist sages call tê
or Virtue.
It is worth remarking that the ral)mah or Mercy as understood by
Ibn 'Arabi is primarily an ontological fact. It refers to the actus of
Existence, namely, the act of making things exist. lt does not
primarily denote the emotive attitude of compassion and benevol-
ence. But Mercy as bestowal of existence of course carries an
emotive and subjective overtone. And this squares well with the
ethical understanding of God in Islam. The creative activity of
Existence is represented in Taoism in a form which is diametrically
opposed to such a conception. For in Taoism the Way is said to be
'non-humane' (pu jen). 'Heaven and Earth', Lao-tzii says, 'lack
"benevolence" (i.e., lack mercy).' They treat the ten thousand
things as if the latter were straw dogs.' The difference between the
two systems, however, is only superficial. For whether described in
terms of Mercy (in Sufism) or non-Mercy (in Taoism), the basic fact
described remains exactly the same. This because the ontological
Mercy, in the conception of Ibn 'Arabi, is absolu tel y gratuitous.
What is meant by both Mercy and non-Mercy is nothing other than
the all-pervading creative activity of Existence. Ibn' Arabi himself
490 Sufism and Taoism
warns us against understanding the word ralJ,mah with its usual
associations. 'There does not corne into its activity any considera-
tion of attaining an aim, or of a thing's being or not being suitable for
a purpose. Whether suitable or unsuitable the Divine Mercy covers
everything and anything with existence.'
This explanation of Mercy by Ibn 'Arabï is so congenial to the
spirit of Taoism that it will pass verbatim for an explanation by a
Lao-tzu of the Taoist concept of non-Mercy which is as equally
impartial and indiscriminating as Ibn' Arabï's Mercy in bestowing
the gift of 'existence' upon everything and everybody. In the view of
Lao-tzu, the creative activity of the Absolute is extended over the
ten thousand things without a single exception precisely because it
stands on the principle of non-Mercy. If even a trifting amount of
human emotion were involved therein, the Absolute would not be
acting with such an absolu te impartiality. In the view of Ibn' Arabï,
on the contrary, the Absolute bestows 'existence' to all things
without excluding anything precisely because it is the actus of
Mercy. The Divine Mercy being by nature limitlessly wide, it covers
the whole world. As is obvious, the underlying idea is in both cases
one and the same.
The structure itself of this concept of Mercy or non-Mercy is directly
connected with another important idea: that of the Absolute being
'beyond good and evil'. The creative activity of the Absolute, which
consists in the bestowal of 'existence' qua 'existence' upon every-
thing involves no moral judgment. From the point of view of the
Absolu te, it does not matter at all whether a given object be good or
bad. Rather, there is absolutely no such distinction among the
objects. The latter assume these and other evaluational properties
only after having been given 'existence' by the indiscriminating act
of the Absolute; and that from the particular points of view of the
creatures. Otherwise, all existents are on the 'straight way' - as Ibn
'Arabï says - or all existents are 'so-of-themselves' - as the Taoist
sages say. There is no distinction at this stage between good and evil.
This idea is formulated by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu in terms of a
'relativist' view of all values. Ordinary men distinguish between
'good' and 'bad', 'beautiful' and 'ugly', 'noble' and 'ignoble', etc.,
and construct their life social as well as persona!, on these distinc-
tions as if they were objective categories that have been fixed in an
unalterable way by the very nature of the things. In truth, however,
these and other seemingly solid objective categories, far from being
'objective', are but products of 'subjective' and 'relative' points of
view. A 'beautiful' lady from the human point of view, Chuang-tzu
argues, is 'ugly' and 'terrifying' enough, from the point of view of
other animais, to make them run away as fast as their legs or wings
The self-evolvement of Existence 491
can carry them. The distinctions are a sheer matter of relative
viewpoints, a matter of likes and dislikes. As Ibn 'Arabï says: 'The
bad is nothing other than what one dislikes, while the good is
nothing other than what one likes.'
Thus in both Sufism and Taoism the basic proposition holds true
that everything is primarily, that is, qua 'existence', neither good
nor evil. However there is a certain respect - again both in Sufism
and Taoism - in which everything is to be considered fundamentally
'good'. This because everything qua 'existence' is a particular self-
manifestation of the Absolute itself. And looked at from such a
viewpoint, all things in the world are 'one'. As Chuang-tzu says:
'(However different they may look from each other) they are, in
reality no other than so man y things that are "affirmable" piled up
one upon the other.' They are at one with each other in being
fundamentally 'affirmable', i.e., good. The Perfect Man 'is "one",
whether he (seemingly) likes something or dislikes something'. And
Lao-tzii: 'Those who are good 1 treat as good. But those who are not
good also 1 treat as good. For the original nature of man is goodness.
Those who are faithful 1 treat as faithful. But even those who are not
faithful 1 treat as faithful. For the original nature of man is faithful-
ness.' Such an attitude would immediately be approved by Ibn
'Arabï, who says: 'What is bad is bad simply because of (the subjec-
tive impression caused by) the taste; but the same thing will be
found to be essentially good, if considered apart from the (subjec-
tive attitude on the part of man) of liking or disliking.'
These considerations make it clear that for both Ibn' Arabi and the
Taoist sages there is the closest and most intimate relationship
between the Absolute and the things of the phenomenal world.
Although the latter are apparently far removed from the Absolute,
they are after all so many different forms which the Absolute
assumes in making itself manifest at various stages and in various
places. This intimate ontological relationship between the two
terms of the creative process is in Taoism symbolically expressed by
the image of the Mother-Child relationship. The Way at the stage of
the 'Being' or 'Named' is considered by Lao-tzu the 'Mother of the
ten thousand things'. The symbolic implication of this statement is
that all things in the phenomenal world are the very ftesh and blood
of the Absolute. And the Taoist ideal consists in man's 'knowing the
Children by knowing the Mother, and in his knowing the Children
and yet holding fast to the Mother' .
On the side of Ibn 'Arabi, the same ontological relationship
between the Absolute and phenomenal things is compared to the
inseparable relationship between 'shadow' and its source, i.e., the
man or object that projects it upon the earth. 'Do you not see', Ibn
492 Sufism and Taoism
'Arabï asks, 'how in your ordinary sensible experience shadow is so
closely tied up with the person who projects it that it is absolutely
impossible for it to liberate itself from this tie? This is impossible
because it is impossible for anything to be separated from itself.' The
world is the 'shadow' of the Absolute, and, as such, it is connected
with the latter with the closest relationship which is never to be eut
off. Every single part of the world is a particular aspect of the
Absolute, and is the Absolute in a delimited form.
Ibn 'Arabï describes the same rélationship by referring to the
Divine Name: 'Subtle' (latïf). The 'subtleness' in this context means
the quality of an immaterial thing which, because of its immaterial-
ity, permeates and pervades the substances of all other things,
diffusing itself in the latter and freely mixing with them. 'lt is the
effect of God's "subtleness" that He exists in every particular thing,
designated by a particular name, as the very essence of that particu-
lar thing. He is immanent in every particular thing in such a way that
He is, in each case, referred to by the conventional and customary
meaning of the particular name of that thing. Thus we say: "This is
Heaven", "This is the earth", "This is a tree", etc. But the essence
itself that exists in every one of these things is just one.'
We shall do well to recall that in a passage of his commentary
upon the Qashanï also uses the Mother image. 'The ultimate
ground of everything is called the Mother (umm) because the
mother is the (stem) from which all branches go out.'
lt is worth noticing, further, that both Ibn 'Arabi and the Taoist
sages pictute the process of creation as a perpetual and constant
flow. Their world-view in this respect is of a markedly dynamic
nature. Nothing remains static. The world in its entirety is in fervent
movement. 'As water running in a river, which forever goes on
being renewed continuously' (Ibn 'Arabi), the world transforms
itself kaleidoscopically from moment to moment. The Cosmic Bel-
lows of Lao-tzii is an appropriate symbol for this incessant process
of creation. 'The space between Heaven and Earth is comparable to
a bellows. lt is empty, but its activity is inexhaustible. The more it
works, the more it produces.'
The thesis of the universal Transmutation of things which
Chuang-tzii puts forward also refers to this aspect of Reality. All
things in the phenomenal world are constantly changing from one
form to another. Everything is ontologically involved in the cosmic
process of Transmutation. 'Dying and being alive, being subsistent
and perishing, getting into a predicament and being in the ascend-
ant, being poor and being rich, being clever and being incom-
petent, being disgraced and being honored ... all these are but the
constant changes of things, and the results of the incessant working
The selfevolvement of Existence 493
of Fate. All these thing go on replacing one another before our own
eyes, but no one by his Intellect can trace them back to their real
origin.' These changes 'remind us of all kinds of sounds emerging
from the empty holes (of a flute), or mushrooms coming out of
warm dampness. Day and night, these changes never cease to
replace one another before our eyes.'
Ibn 'Arabi pursues this perpetual flux of things down to a single
moment. The result is his theory of 'new creation', that is, the thesis
that the world goes on being created anew at every single moment.
At every moment, countless things and properties are produced,
and at the very next moment they are annihilated to be replaced by
another infinity of things and properties. And this ontological pro-
cess goes on repeating itself indefinitely and endlessly.
It is remarkable that neither in Sufism nor in Taoism is the
ontological Descent - from the Mystery of Mysteries down to the
stage of phenomenal things - made to represent the final comple-
tion of the activity of Existence. The Descent is followed by its
reversai, that is, Ascent. The ten thousand things flourish exuber-
antly at the last stage of the descending course, and then take an
ascending course toward their ultimate source until they disappear
in the original Darkness and find their resting place in the cosmic
pre-phenomenal Stillness. Thus the whole process of creation forms
a huge ontological circle in which there is in reality neither an initial
point nor a final point. The movement from one stage to another,
considered in itself, is surely a temporal phenomenon. But the
whole circle, having neither an initial point nor a final point, is a
trans-temporal or a-temporal phenomenon. lt is, in other words, a
metaphysical process. Everything is an occurrence in an Eternal
Now.
